

Mark B. Taylor and Kathleen M. Jennings

In Search of Strategy

An Agenda for Applied Research
on Transitions from Conflict



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1 Peace Implementation: The present state of the art

A cursory history of the past decade and a half would describe an apparent increasing concern with peace and conflict, at the same time as the number of conflicts appeared to be on the decline. A closer look would reveal a more fragmented reality. While the total number of conflicts steadily declined during the 1990s, a number of wars that were once ended seemed prone to re-starting. In addition, conflicts were lasting longer on average and proving more difficult to resolve. Increasing concern appeared to be reflected over the same period by an explosive rise in the number and size of peace operations and a rise in global aid flows in total numbers. Yet, wealthy countries became less willing to provide their own soldiers as peacekeepers and coalition-led operations had come to outnumber operations led by the United Nations. Similarly, aid fell as a proportion of GDP in most donor countries, and over time the preponderance of aid flows shifted from development assistance to relief aid provided mostly to populations in times of conflict.¹

These broad trends, not entirely descriptive of each country or every moment, were played out over a series of international crises and events, and through a flurry of agenda-setting policy research. The story of peace implementation is one strand within this larger history of the policy and practice of international responses to conflict of the first fifteen years since the end of the Cold War. Its narrative is interwoven with three main areas of policy: international peace and security, in particular responses to war and armed conflict; the evolution of the policies and practices of overseas development assistance; and the rapid development of humanitarianism—both relief and human rights protection—as a field of action.

While it is not our intention to trace this history here, it is relevant for what follows to note two important facts of life relevant for any research in this field.

The first is that the institutional responses and policy developments in the security, development, and humanitarian arenas have come to have an increasingly significant impact upon each other. At the same time, however, if there is a convergence of policy and practice, it is a hotly contested issue, one that continues to transect the top items on the agenda in each field. The changing trends in policy have often originated, and have always reverberated, with policymakers in member state capitals, but they have been particularly important in the

debates and approaches at the agencies of the United Nations, the locus—if not quite the leader—of inter-governmental activity in all three fields.

In each case and across all policy arenas, the UN and its Member States have adapted to the second and more important reality of post-Cold War responses to armed conflict: the central position of the United States in the international system. To paraphrase senior UN diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi, the international community on any particular issue can be defined as consisting of all those states with a particular interest in the issue...plus the United States. Even in those geographic or topical arenas which are not of core national interest to the U.S., the policies and positions assumed by its government are the reference point for all others, governmental and non-governmental actors alike. U.S. assertiveness has waxed and waned over times and across issues, and it will continue to do so in the future. This global unipolarity, and the interrelationships of policy and practice in the security, development, and humanitarian fields, have been constant realities in international policymaking for over a decade, and remain so today.

For policymaking and applied research, one of the complicating results of this has been a confusion of terminology. There has been a seemingly endless elaboration of new concepts and definitions. Definitions are contested, vary, and terminology passes in and out of fashion. Terminology has proliferated as policy and research in each arena has passed through phases, usually in direct relation to events and state or institutional interests. Researchers have been partly to blame for this, but we have suffered the consequences. While terms such as human security, peacebuilding, peace-keeping, and peace implementation (and their various qualifiers, for example post-conflict, integrated, strategic, multidimensional, etc.) are less confusing than a decade ago, there is a sufficient lack of consensus that anyone who writes in this field must be clear about their subject.

Definitions and Scope

Peace implementation is the set of policy processes involved in the management of a transition from conflict. For the purposes of our analysis, peace implementation is understood as a process of implementing policies decided by international and national actors, including policies relating to political, economic, and military assistance, in relation to a specific conflict resolution moment. In practice, this “moment” may be represented by a written document, a handshake, or a military victory/defeat, or some variant of these. We will refer to this moment as a peace agreement.

Peace agreements don't end wars, they transform them. In particular, they change the political relations between the parties to the conflict, usually resulting in a parallel transformation of the international relations of the conflict. But the extent of such transformations varies and is often very tentative. What can be said in general is that, with an agreement to stop fighting, the parties begin a transition. The character and nature of that transition—away from armed conflict, towards renewed conflict, stalemate—remains an open question.

The argument that peace agreements don't always end conflicts may seem intuitive. Yet, the obvious fact that conflict dynamics persist after a cease-fire or peace agreement sometimes comes as a challenge to practitioners or to those involved in policy research in this area. Part of the reason for this is that the institutional responses to conflict are based functional distinctions between states of war and peace. Put simplistically, Ministries of Defence fight wars, Ministries of Foreign Affairs negotiate peace agreements, and still other agencies handle development or humanitarian assistance. This functional division of labour means that peace agreements change the international political economy of a conflict. For international policy and practice, the change in the conflict relations wrought by a peace agreement triggers a transformation in the national and international responses to the conflict, from security sector approaches, through humanitarian assistance, to development and reconstruction aid. Different agencies and budget lines become involved, different politicians take the lead, and the world's media reports on the conflict in a different way. This radical shift in the nature of international intervention or response also affects the analytical categories that policymakers and researchers bring to the problem of making peace.

Despite all of this apparent change, however, peace implementation is not always 'post-conflict'. In fact, 'post-conflict' is of little use as a category to describe or analyse a conflict after a peace agreement. The term helps us understand that a peace agreement has occurred, and even implies that the relevant political or institutional roles have altered. But the 'post-conflict' moniker also it carries with it the unfortunate implication that the structure of the conflict has altered, that the levels of violence have actually lessened or that peace is somehow in the offing. This is very often not the case. In fact, the phenomena recorded and activities undertaken before, during, after, and even in the absence of conflict are very similar. For example, armed violence may shift from war to crime. Indeed, research into small arms violence in transitions from conflict often turns up findings similar to developing countries with high crime rates. Severe repression does not necessarily coincide more often with post-conflict transitions than with developing economies. In addition, the patterns of informal economies or criminalised politics in non-conflict countries are not dissimilar to those

of regionalised civil wars. In short, the category 'post-conflict' is often more descriptive of the international political economy surrounding and intervening in a conflict than it is of the conflict itself.

Peace implementation literature can be seen as a sub-set of the peacebuilding literature and, more broadly, as part of the international relations literature related to security. The Utstein study² defines peacebuilding as an attempt "to encourage the development of the structural conditions, attitudes and modes of political behaviour that may permit peaceful, stable and ultimately prosperous social and economic development. Peacebuilding activities are designed to contribute to ending or avoiding armed conflict and may be carried out during armed conflict, in its wake, or as an attempt to prevent an anticipated armed conflict from starting."³ In practice, the principle difference between peacebuilding and peace implementation is that peacebuilding activities can operate throughout the conflict (i.e. before, during, and after) while peace implementation refers to policy implementation after a specific peace agreement. For research, the principle difference is one of perspective: peace implementation analysis structures its questions around a process of policy implementation and approaches specific activities via this larger political economy of transition. Peacebuilding research begins from the opposite end of the telescope, focusing on specific activities and, when it is done well, locating that analysis in context.⁴

Both perspectives have their uses. It is the usefulness of peace implementation as a category for research and policy that it refers to the totality of the relationships and activities involved in implementing the decisions adopted as part of a peace agreement. It makes no judgement about whether the conflict is over, but assumes that a peace agreement launches a transition with an uncertain future. If the conflict was long-lived and widespread, this transition can affect whole societies and sub-regions. If the strategic interests of major powers, particularly the United States, are involved, this transition can dictate much of the international political agenda as well. The value of peace implementation as a description of policy and practice is that it captures the intersection of international assistance and peacemaking efforts, and their interaction with the specific structure and dynamics of the conflict. As we will argue below, it is this aspect of the peace implementation framework that lends itself to the development and evaluation of strategy.

To get us there, we attempt to tie a number of these threads together in a narrative that outlines the present state of the art of peace implementation with a view to setting out a framework for research in this area. We begin by reviewing the policy literature in order to describe the consensus and, where there is no consensus, the debate concerning what comprises peace implementation. With this in mind, we have surveyed literature specifically concerned with the nature of international re-

sponses to implementing peace agreements, particularly the grey and applied literature that forms a crucial bridge between research and policy. Broader categories of peace and conflict research—such as causes of conflict, approaches to conflict resolution, human rights, or human security—have been included here where they form relevant background to the applied research agenda described below.

Rethinking U.S. Capabilities: Can a superpower build nations?

In the wake of the September 11 attacks and the advent of the “war on terror,” U.S. policy researchers and institutions have increasingly focused on issues of peace implementation, variously expressed as “nationbuilding” or post-conflict reconstruction. Below we survey the relevant literature currently influencing policy circles in Washington, New York, and elsewhere; identify the major themes, findings, and gaps in that literature; and provide insight into the tenor and substance of the ongoing policy debate on how to do peace implementation—and do it right.

At the outset, it is important to note a shift in the U.S. policy debate on peace implementation that has occurred over the past four years. As evidenced by the rhetoric employed by George W. Bush in the 2000 presidential election, “nationbuilding” and its associated concepts has been a loaded and, for many conservatives, derogatory term, evoking Clintonian excess and an overly “soft” or entangling approach to foreign policy. “Superpowers don’t do windows,” the saying went.

Yet throughout the 1990s the United States was, in fact, “doing windows,” in Bosnia, Kosovo, and, to a lesser extent, Somalia and Haiti. A substantial disconnect therefore existed between what the United States—particularly the U.S. military—was doing on the ground around the world, and what politicians and policy-makers were saying and doing in Washington and elsewhere. Despite repeated U.S. interventions in post-conflict situations, each mission was treated as a one-off event, with little political impetus to build dedicated peace implementation capacities and institutionalise the processes, interagency and intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms, and lessons-learned from previous actions. Ideological opposition in Congress and key constituencies helps account for the bureaucratic inertia: for those who disdained U.S. involvement in peace implementation, it was preferable to keep U.S. capacity in this area inchoate.

The U.S.-led war on terror changed these calculations. The 9/11 attacks, and the current U.S. administration's subsequent decision to take a pre-emptive, aggressive approach to global terrorism and "rogue states," has triggered the recognition—even among those formerly opposed to U.S. involvement in peace implementation—that it is in the United States' strategic interest to help stabilise and rebuild post-conflict states. The disastrous experience of post-war Iraq—still mired in insurgency and conflict two years after President Bush declared major combat operations over—has reinforced this conviction. It is no longer enough to speak hopefully and wistfully of a new Marshall Plan. Instead, consensus is solidifying on the need for systematic thinking about the priorities, policy processes, institutional capabilities, and forms of cooperation with international organisations and other governments that coalesce in the complex issue of peace implementation.

For the U.S. policy community, the main questions now are: What needs to be done? By whom? And how? Much of the recent policy-centric literature addresses one or more of these questions, sometimes in the context of the U.S.-led wars in Iraq or Afghanistan.

One of the longest and most ambitious studies making the rounds in Washington is James Dobbins et al's *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (2003). Dobbins examines U.S. and international military, political, and economic activities in post-conflict situations since World War II—including Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan—in order to extract best practices in nationbuilding.⁵ In order to evaluate and compare the success or failure of the disparate operations, Dobbins examines "inputs" into each mission military presence, police presence, total external assistance in constant 2001 dollars, per capita external assistance in constant 2001 dollars, and external assistance as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). He measures these against progress towards democratisation and economic sustainability, as expressed by post-conflict combat deaths, timing and sequencing of elections, changes in the numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons over time, and changes in per capita GDP over time.⁶ His findings are, if not revelatory, solid and useful, and particularly interesting when applied to events in Iraq (the book's concluding chapter).

Dobbins's main finding is that the most important determinant influencing the ease or difficulty of nation-building is the level of effort expended, in terms of time, manpower, and money. Simply put, the operations that receive the most resources and longest time commitments (five years at the minimum) by intervening powers have the most felicitous results. With this in mind, the study finds that:

- nationbuilding objectives should be scaled to available forces, resources, and staying power;
- multilateral nationbuilding can produce more thorough transformations and greater regional reconciliation than unilateral efforts;
- an inverse correlation seemingly exists between the size of the stabilisation force and the level of risk;
- neighbours matter, such that regional powers should be engaged in support of the nationbuilding process;
- unity of command and broad participation can be compatible if participants share a common vision and can shape international institutions accordingly.

In terms of governance and economic recovery, Dobbins observes that:

- defeated countries often require rapid sizable transfers to cover basic government expenditures and humanitarian assistance;
- broad justice sector reform is important, particularly to bolster policing capacity and begin the process of accountability;
- the timing and sequencing of elections is key—holding elections too early can be as bad as holding them too late, and it is preferable to hold local elections before national elections;
- unity of command is as important on the civilian side of the operation as on the military side.

On the basis of the experiences in Germany and Japan, Dobbins also argues that economic growth and a recovery in per capita incomes help to legitimate and consolidate democracy, but are not necessary prerequisites for it. On the security front, Dobbins makes two key points: that military forces need to be complemented by civil capacities for law enforcement, economic reconstruction, and political development; and that there can be no economic and political development unless there is security.

The interrelation of security, economic recovery, and governance is also emphasised in “Play to Win,” the report of the Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA). Whereas Dobbins’s study dealt in broad strokes, the CSIS-AUSA report, like the “Task Framework” that preceded it, delves into specific actions and policy recommendations to improve U.S. capacity to work constructively in peace implementation environments. Moreover, unlike Dobbins’s work—which focused on past events and

primarily on the United States—the CSIS-AUSA study lays out a framework for future actions, with the explicit assumption that “the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction are an international problem and responsibility, and that the design of U.S. capacity should take into account the international context and a broad range of international actors.”⁷

That said, the focus of the report is on recommendations aimed at improving the capacity of the U.S. government (USG), particularly in areas where the United States has a comparative advantage that can be usefully exploited. The report divides its recommendations into eight areas, encompassing four substantive “pillars” of post-conflict reconstruction activities—security, justice and reconciliation, economic and social well-being, and governance and participation—and four key capacity “enablers”: strategy and planning, implementation infrastructure, training and education, and funding. Significantly, although emphasizing the importance of a secure environment to effective post-conflict reconstruction, the Commission states that the U.S. military should *not* be the sole, or even principal, actor in post-conflict reconstruction.⁸

At the same time, the Commission recognises key gaps when it comes to implementation on the civilian side, including a lack of civilian leadership in the field to ensure operational coherence, an inability to quickly mobilise and deploy civilian human resources inside and outside the USG, and inadequate mechanisms for civil-military cooperation in the field.⁹ The report therefore recommends the creation of multiple new Director of Reconstruction posts, housed in the State Department, to lead and implement the multidisciplinary USG programs that will be launched in-country after a ceasefire or peace agreement is reached; the creation of a robust civilian rapid response capacity; the institutionalisation of a joint interagency group, under civilian control but with military participation, that can act as the central node for information sharing and operational coordination on the ground; and the establishment of a U.S. training centre for post-conflict reconstruction operations, to provide training both to U.S. personnel and to indigenous actors in-country. On the security front, the report also suggests the creation of a dedicated U.S. military capacity for post-conflict security tasks, and a greater emphasis on disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) through the formation of a DDR unit at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Other recommendations focus on policing and judicial reform, policies to link post-conflict needs with medium and long-term development (including livelihood creation), civil administration, and funding mechanisms specifically for post-conflict operations.

Following in the footsteps of the CSIS-AUSA report is a task force convened by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) under the co-chairmanship of Brent Scowcroft and Sandy Berger, which also focuses on specific recommendations to

improve the organisation of the USG to do post-conflict reconstruction and enhance its coordination with relevant international and multilateral actors.¹⁰ The Council has already produced a series of widely-discussed reports called “Iraq: The Day After,” which appeared in March 2003, June 2003, and March 2004, and dealt with peace implementation specifically as applied to Iraq. Indeed, a garden industry of predictions and recommendations for post-war Iraq sprung up in Washington and New York in the months preceding and immediately following the U.S.-led war.¹¹ Many of these anticipated severe challenges and potential unrest in the aftermath of any conflict,¹² especially considering the limited number of troops committed, the lack of an international mandate (in the form of a UN resolution), and the USG’s decision to house all post-conflict reconstruction activities in the Department of Defense (DOD) rather than the State Department, a more logical alternative.

The issue of human rights, including U.S. commitments under international law and the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), seems to be largely overlooked in the recent U.S. policy literature.¹³ In some cases, human rights is not mentioned at all, either in terms of norms and guidelines or as substantive policy goals for intervening actors to pursue; in others, it is mentioned tangentially or subsumed by other categories (such as governance or the rule of law and transitional justice). This may reflect the fact that the reports almost uniformly situate current and future U.S. involvement in post-conflict reconstruction as a function of the U.S.’s “strategic interests,” rather than assigning a normative or humanitarian motive to such activities. All the same, the omission is glaring and odd, particularly since the post-war experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan (notably the Abu Ghraib prison scandal) illustrate that the United States cannot afford to be complacent on this issue.

Another interesting aspect of much of the recent U.S. policy literature is the way in which the United Nations and the broader international community are discussed. Where the multilateralism is specifically addressed, it tends to be in an instrumentalist fashion—for example, in terms of the various discrete ways in which inter-governmental cooperation may help (or hinder) the United States in a given task or mission. Insofar as this tendency is evident in Iraq-specific material, it mainly reflects realism about the situation at hand. In general, however, this instrumentalist approach is indicative of how the Washington policy community perceives the purpose and worth of the international community. Rhetoric aside, reforming and strengthening the international system is, to many D.C. policymakers, of value only to the extent that it helps the United States pursue its strategic interests more efficiently; it is not an end in and of itself.

Taken together, the recent U.S. policy literature on American and multilateral attempts at peace implementation illustrate where the debate on this issue

has been, where it is going, and what outstanding questions remain. In the U.S. policy community, particularly those in Washington, the primary focus is to establish a consensus on the major tasks that must be done over the immediate, medium, and long-term for successful peace implementation, and to examine and formulate recommendations for enhancing USG capacity to carry out those tasks. The perspective through which peace implementation is understood is that of national security and U.S. strategic interests, with normative reasons acknowledged but regarded for practical purposes as less compelling. Serious attention is being devoted to devising new, or adapting existing, military and policing capacity in order to deal with the pressing problem of public security. Also high on the agenda is improving civil-military coordination and expanding civilian capacity and deployment—perhaps through the creation of a U.S. “civilian reserve corps” modelled on the military reserve system.¹⁴ Although there is some emphasis on developing more effective ways for the United States to “plug in” to the UN system and the international community in these efforts, for the most part international actors are not accorded the same systematic and detailed attention as U.S. institutions. In practice, U.S. policy makers appear to be become concerned to find ways that the UN and other agencies can “plug in” to U.S. strategies when particular situations appear to demand it, for example in Iraq in 2003.

Developing a European Approach: The human security strategy

Obvious contrasts exist in the tenor and substance of the debates on peace implementation taking place in the United States and Europe. In light of the divergent capacities, interests, ideological underpinnings, and perceptions of threat that currently characterise the U.S.-European relationship, this is unsurprising. Indeed, to a significant degree, the U.S.-European differences in this debate conform to the stereotypes that have hardened over the past four years.

The U.S. approach is primarily concerned with developing and managing U.S. capabilities and focuses to a great extent on traditional security issues, with military capacity-building and reform of particular interest. European states are in agreement with the USG over the activities and capacities required for sustainable peace implementation, but are inclined to adopt a more expansive, development-friendly approach to security. This is exemplified by the increasing prevalence of the concept of human security and security system reform (SSR) in European discussions of strategy. It is also reflected in the European approach to creating capacity in the

framework of multilateral institutions and a concentration on issues of process, best practices, and improving donor performance. It can be argued that U.S. policymakers are concerned with building the capacities within the confines of the U.S. military and civilian agencies, while European policymakers are concerned with building through international and regional institutions, such as the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO.

Given the great diversity of views within Europe and the European Union and, indeed, within the U.S. political system itself, comparisons of U.S. or European policies risk oversimplification. However, from a security capacity standpoint, Europe is more monolithic in its approaches than it might at first appear. This can be attributed in part to the fact that no European state—even the United Kingdom—has comparable military and force projection capacity to the United States. This effectively means that, with a few exceptions—U.K. intervention in Sierra Leone or French deployments in Cote D’Ivoire—the use of military force by European states will normally occur within the framework of an international operation. Indeed, the EU fielded its first joint mission to the eastern DRC in June 2003, and did so under the auspices of the United Nations. Typically a European state will not “own” a major offensive military and reconstruction operation the way that the United States “owned” the war in Iraq, implying that countries can specialize in areas where they may have a particular interest or comparative advantage. Thus the debate over capacity in the United States is fundamentally different than in European countries, as having overall control over an operation necessitates an extremely broad range of capabilities, knowledge, and resources.

European capacity to “own” peace implementation missions outside of the NATO umbrella is little tested. The European Union has taken few autonomous missions, of which the majority—in Macedonia, Georgia, and the police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina—have been civilian. However, with the ongoing development of a common security policy and the adoption by the European Council, in December 2003, of a European Security Strategy (ESS), the European Union is developing a more ambitious approach to peace operations and peace implementation. This approach is encapsulated in the recent formulation of “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe” (hereafter the “Barcelona report”) by the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, commissioned by Javier Solana.¹⁵

The Barcelona report is a preliminary think piece on how the ESS—which advocates preventive engagement rather than pre-emption, and effective multilateralism rather than ad hoc “coalitions of the willing”—could be implemented, and is an important signifier of how thinking is developing in and around Brussels. The Barcelona report is innovative and ambitious in asserting that human

security, which is defined as “freedom for individuals from basic insecurities caused by gross human rights violations,”¹⁶ is the threshold on which decisions to intervene (whether preventively or in the context of peace implementation) should be made. This is counter to traditional drivers of intervention: the protection or defence of national security interests. Even interventions justified as “humanitarian”—particularly “preventive” interventions, such as the NATO action against Serbia in 1999—have typically been implemented militarily, with the goal to defeat or neutralise a defined enemy and with an implied trade-off between civilian casualties and “the greater good”—a trade-off deemed questionable, if not outright unacceptable, by the human security approach of the Barcelona report.

The Barcelona report outlines seven principles upon which the EU’s human security approach would be based, of which three are particularly striking.¹⁷ The most notable principle is the primacy of human rights. This is important in two key ways: it signals a shift away from traditional state-based approaches to security—in which support for authoritarian regimes could be justified by *realpolitik* arguments, regardless of the human rights situation in those regimes; and, as suggested above, it entails a change from the traditional military approach that prioritises force protection and coercive tactics to a more law and order-style approach that emphasises the protection of the rights to life, housing, and freedom, even in the midst of conflict. “Human security implies that everyone is treated as a citizen . . . [and that] protection of civilians, not defeating an enemy, is an end in itself.”¹⁸

The second noteworthy principle is the bottom-up approach. The report describes this approach as a “continuous process of communication, consultation, dialogue and partnership”¹⁹ with the people who live in the affected area; it is “a method of on-the-job learning.”²⁰ The significance of this approach is that it essentially takes a stance that has become entrenched in the development community—the importance of local consultation and ownership—and applies it to the military component of peace operations, where local cooperation, insofar as it occurs, is typically more improvised and problematic.²¹ The same idea—applying a civilian approach to the military side of peace operations—is evident in the third significant principle, which derives directly from the first: the use of appropriate force. The report argues: “In human security operations, the lives of those deployed cannot be privileged. The aim should be to protect people and minimise all casualties . . . minimum force is key. Minimum force suggests for instance that it would be an over-reaction to kill someone who threatens violence when an arrest can be made.”²² The implications of the disjuncture, acknowledged in the Barcelona report, between civilian and military attitudes and operating procedures will be revisited below.

Less novel, but in line with evolving thinking on conflict prevention and peace implementation, the report also recommends that human security operations have a regional focus. Here “regional” is understood as the space acted *upon* rather than the states one acts *with*; that is, the emphasis is not only on acting with the cooperation or participation of a regional power, but on dealing with a problematic neighbourhood in a holistic, as opposed to piecemeal, fashion. This also refers to the need to link up similar programs—such as organised crime task forces—that currently operate independently in neighbouring states.

Operationally, the study group recommends the creation of a 15,000-strong, integrated civil-military “Human Security Response Force,” of whom 5,000 would have rapid reaction capability (able to deploy within days). Approximately one-third of this force would be civilian, encompassing police, human rights monitors, development and humanitarian workers, and administrators. In accordance with the priority given to human rights and the use of minimum force, the Barcelona report emphasises that the military component must restructure and reequip itself to be more like law enforcement than a traditional military force, and must integrate the civilian capabilities mentioned above. It also stresses the importance of civilian political control of the overall mission—both in Brussels and in the field—and of civil-military integration at the planning (strategic) as well as operational levels,²³ such that civilians “co-determine the nature and culture of the operation.”²⁴

The Barcelona report’s ambition—to transpose human security from research to the policy realm—is praiseworthy, and brings to the fore a number of issues, many of which it acknowledges but is unable to fully address. One is the capacity gap. In this respect, the EU’s problem is a mirror image of the U.S. government’s: whereas the latter has vast, if overstretched, capacity but gropes for a better way to utilise and reform it, the former puts forth a strong and ambitious vision, but currently has less capacity for its enactment.²⁵ For example, the authors claim that the Human Security Response Force could be drawn from dedicated military and civilian capacities made available under the Headline Goal for a European rapid reaction force and civilian Headline Goals. However, some critics claim that the EU Headline Goal is already grossly insufficient for current global peacekeeping and humanitarian needs, a problem that would be exacerbated by allotting 15,000 troops to a dedicated human security capacity²⁶—which, as the study’s authors note, would not function as either a classic peacekeeping or classic military intervention force.²⁷ It is unclear whether the human security force is intended to supplement or supplant peacekeeping and peace implementation. It may also be asked whether the nascent EU security capacity now deployed in the Balkans is capable of making the leap to such an ambitious, even paradigm-shifting, programme.

Another, more deep-seated issue, concerns the disjuncture between civilian and military culture and operating procedures alluded to above. The Barcelona report calls for both civilian and military parties to make changes in how they deal with situations of severe insecurity and how they deal with each other, but the transformations outlined for the military component—including a shift away from force protection and the use of traditional military tactics and rules of engagement—are much more dramatic and fundamental.²⁸ This is not merely an issue of improving cooperation and integration with civilian capacities or tweaking the chain of command; it more closely resembles the “civilianisation” of the military—the application of methods and approaches from the development and law enforcement communities to the armed forces. Whether or not this change is prudent or welcome can be debated at length; on a functional level, it may be questioned whether it is viable in the short- or medium-terms, even with the increased training and joint exercises recommended by the report.

Of course, this is not to say that militaries should not be subject to strategic and tactical reform; indeed, reams of grey literature, some of it summarised above, have been devoted to just such a subject. The notion of public security as distinct from military security, and the question of how to shift emphasis and operations from war-fighting to policing and peace implementation, occupied U.S. and European forces during the peacekeeping missions in the 1990s and have been put in sharp relief by U.S. and coalition experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the Barcelona report goes further than most in trying to blur, or even break down, the traditional separation between military and civilian missions and tactics. Rather than *supplement* military capacity with law enforcement-type capabilities, the Barcelona report advocates its *substitution*.²⁹ This may be a worthy goal, but it will undoubtedly be difficult to implement. Changing how bureaucracies function is one thing; transforming institutional habits, attitudes, prejudices, alliances, and operating procedures is another.

Striking a Balance: OECD-DAC, Utstein

A somewhat less ambitious endeavour than the Barcelona report is a recent report on security sector reform by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).³⁰ Although the OECD report does not specifically address SSR in the context of peace implementation, it clearly applies to post-conflict scenarios. Security system reform aims to help partner countries “create a secure environment that is

conducive to development, poverty reduction, and democracy”³¹; unlike traditional security assistance that revolves around the military, police, and intelligence systems, SSR is perceived as a means to improve human security in a holistic way that facilitates and enhances development. Like the Barcelona report, and in contrast to much of the U.S. literature reviewed above, the OECD report is not concerned with the specific tasks or activities that donors and partner countries must accomplish in the course of SSR or peace implementation; for example, it gives no guidance on controversial issues like whether to disband or retain combatant armies or how to conduct police reform in a multiethnic post-conflict environment. Instead, the report identifies the principles, processes, and strategic considerations that should underlie and shape donor approaches to SSR. It thus recommends that donors take a “whole-of-government” approach towards assistance provision, in order to better integrate security into development work; encourage local ownership and input into SSR; provide assistance within multisectoral strategic frameworks; and emphasise accountability, transparency, and the development of greater civilian oversight of security processes.³²

With respect to peace implementation, the OECD report is notable for reasserting the importance of the evolving human security agenda. That agenda makes individuals, rather than the state or regime, the referent and encompasses a broader range of threats than the traditional state-centric conception of security. However, it is legitimate to question the efficacy of a reform agenda that encompasses so many actors and institutions in a single society: according to the report, the security system includes core security actors such as the military, police, and intelligence system, as well as most government branches and agencies (including the executive, legislature, and judiciary; the ministries of defense, foreign affairs, finance, and justice; national security advisory apparatus; customs agencies; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; and the penal system) and civil society organisations. Such a massive and diverse undertaking could sink under the weight of its own ambition without greater explication of the priority issues and tasks for donors and affected countries.

The Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding³³ similarly tackles the issue of improving donor performance and implementation in peacebuilding,³⁴ building on analyses of past peacebuilding operations conducted by the four original Utstein governments (U4). The study diagnoses a major strategic deficit in peacebuilding operations: a majority of peacebuilding projects are not linked to a broader strategy for the country in which they are implemented, resulting in conceptual flaws in planning and implementation; problems with the timing of financial flows; a lack of coordination in donor governments and in-country;

unintended effects resulting from the influx of resources; and an inability to effectively evaluate and assess project success.³⁵ To remedy this deficit, the study recommends changes at the policy, evaluation, and research levels.

At the policy level, governments should formulate two strategic frameworks—one laying out a general peacebuilding strategy that enumerates the guiding principles, policy, and criteria for peacebuilding interventions; the other to assist in developing discrete intervention strategies for specific countries and regions as the need arises.³⁶ All peacebuilding projects should be conceived, designed, and implemented in accordance with these general and specific frameworks. To improve evaluation, governments should shift the impact assessment of peacebuilding activities from the project level to the strategic level. Although the report recommends the continuation of project evaluations—which identify project outputs, check that project implementation was in line with best practices, and provide oversight for project expenses—it argues that assessing the impact of individual projects on the overall peace environment is futile, and that it is more useful to instead evaluate the entire intervention on a strategic level. At the research level, the study poses theoretical, applied, and methodological issues relevant to peacebuilding—such as absorptive capacity, means of measuring impact, the relationship between development cooperation and peacebuilding, and the merits and demerits of local ownership—that require scholarly investigation. Finally, on a general note, the study emphasises the importance of greater policy coherence and improved multisectoral and multilateral cooperation, and the need for peacebuilding interventions to be flexible, responsive to context, and sustained over the long-term (at least 10 years).

The objective of the Utstein study is to improve policy formation and implementation in the Utstein governments, not to go into the specific tasks required for effective peace implementation or post-conflict reconstruction. Indeed, the author notes that the use of “reconstruction” to denote post-conflict activity is itself problematic, as “the idea of ‘reconstruction’ is to put things back together again the way they were, which might mean reconstructing the conditions that led to war.”³⁷ However, the report does identify broad activity areas and policy goals that together constitute a “peacebuilding palette,” to be combined according to the specific needs of each intervention.³⁸ Four thematic areas of activity are described: security, reconciliation and justice, socio-economic foundations, and political frameworks. Within these areas is a familiar litany—democratisation, rehabilitation of physical and economic infrastructure, enactment of DDR and SSR,³⁹ establishment of transitional justice, and repatriation and return of refugees and IDPs, to name a few. Where the report gets onto less travelled ground is its cautious approach to local ownership. Although conceding that local ownership has become *sine qua non* in development cooperation,

the study argues that it can “unintentionally come to mean ownership by conflict parties, or by the most powerful sectors of society,”⁴⁰ and concludes that donors must be guided by local realities rather than blind devotion to principle when determining ownership.

U.N. Reform: Integrated missions

In the wake of a succession of disasters in the 1990s—including the unchecked genocide in Rwanda and the massacre in Srebrenica, to name just two—the United Nations launched a comprehensive re-evaluation of its approach to peacekeeping and peace operations. A major finding coming out of this effort was the need for greater integration and coherence among the multiple actors involved in international interventions in complex emergencies, such that “the political effort to bring peace, the human rights attempt to prevent impunity, and the humanitarian effort to save lives, should be managed in harmony.”⁴¹ Greater integration—a policy tool—leading to coherence—a policy goal—is sought on several levels: among the different UN agencies and other governmental and nongovernmental actors operating in the field; between the field and UN headquarters; between separate UN missions in the same region, particularly on shared thematic or security issues; and between the UN system and regional organisations, such as ECOWAS and the European Union.⁴² Proponents argue that improving integration and coherence will avoid duplication or gaps in the international effort, ultimately enhancing the efficacy of the international effort, to the benefit of the prospects for peace in the affected country or region.⁴³

Integrated missions clearly necessitate operational changes in how missions are structured, lines of command and control drawn, mandates written, communication mechanisms crafted, and responsibilities shared. Determining how best to implement integration is an ongoing challenge. The Brahimi Report is the most influential attempt within the UN system to devise reforms to the structure and mechanisms of UN peace operations. It reiterates the goal of integration and coherence among all elements of the UN system in peace operations, and calls specifically for strengthened structural linkages and the creation of Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs) to handle pre-mission planning. An IMTF was first used in planning for Afghanistan (UNAMA), but has not yet become institutionalised.⁴⁴

Yet integration is not merely a matter of organisational or bureaucratic reshuffling; it implies a deeper, more profound transformation in the roles and methods of international actors that, some argue, compromises or dilutes their

principles and effectiveness. Concern over the push towards integration is greatest among the humanitarian community, and stems from both principled and pragmatic objections.⁴⁵

Humanitarian action is guided by the principles of neutrality, impartiality, independence, and proportionality in response to need.⁴⁶ Critics of integration from a humanitarian perspective argue that integrating humanitarian action into the prevailing politico-security structure necessarily compromises these principles—and may ultimately endanger lives, should humanitarian access be deprioritised in light of pressing political or security challenges facing the operation. The objection rests on the assumption that humanitarianism is, and must remain, separate from the calculations and compromises that are necessary for politics, diplomacy, and peacemaking; indeed, Minear argues that “rather than focusing on fitting humanitarian action more snugly into the given political framework, [we] should explore how to ensure the indispensable independence of humanitarian actors from that framework.”⁴⁷

Objections to political and security encroachments on humanitarian space are not only made on principled grounds: there are also concerns that integration will negatively impact humanitarian action’s effectiveness and increase the risk to humanitarian workers and aid recipients. For example, many feel, probably correctly, that in an integrated mission, humanitarian action will be subject to political or security imperatives rather than the reverse. One structural way to combat this concern would be to require the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) to report to the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the UN Development Programme, in addition to the Department of Political Affairs and/or Department of Peacekeeping Operations.⁴⁸ Currently mission configuration and lines of reporting are structured to prioritise political experience and skills in the SRSG, doing little to alleviate other actors’ fears that political and diplomatic concerns trump all other interests and needs.

Humanitarian workers can also be more vulnerable to violence and harassment in areas where there is an actual or strongly perceived link between humanitarian workers and the political and military forces occupying or working in the country, as events in Afghanistan and Iraq have borne out.⁴⁹ This dynamic can force humanitarian organisations to withdraw their staff, to the detriment of the needy population. It is also intertwined with another troubling development for many humanitarians: the dilution or politicisation of humanitarianism. This applies to the use of humanitarianism as a political tool “to legitimise international military intervention to publics in Western countries, as well as in the affected countries themselves.”⁵⁰ It also refers to less extreme but more common instances in which humanitarian assistance is “securitised”—used by governments as a tool

of “soft” security to address the root causes seen as generating terrorism—or used in a developmental or peacebuilding capacity that, though potentially valuable, is not life-saving.⁵¹ Macrae writes:

Increasingly, humanitarian aid was seen as a resource that could be used to address and influence the root causes of conflict. This approach was based on the idea of a “relief-development continuum,” which proposed that “good” relief would provide the basis for development and that well-planned development aid would reduce populations’ vulnerability to future disasters. In the mid-1990s, this idea was taken even further to imply that by making relief more developmental, aid could serve a role in conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution by addressing the root, political causes of wars. This formulation suggests that the coherence agenda involves not just the redefinition of the balance between the respective humanitarian and developmental institutions but the redefinition of the meaning of a humanitarian mandate.⁵²

The potential problems with this dilution or instrumentalisation of humanitarianism are threefold: reducing the coverage of humanitarian action amongst vulnerable populations; compromising the effectiveness of the assistance, as humanitarian workers may not be sufficiently trained and equipped to do development or other projects; and creating or reinforcing cynicism about humanitarianism, its methods, and motives, by allying it in the public mind with political expediency or military intervention.⁵³ Not all humanitarian actors oppose integration in theory, although they may have reservations on the way it is currently framed and pursued. Charny, for example, argues that an integrated approach does not obviate independent humanitarian action, but can co-exist with and even strengthen it, so long as the integrated mission retains several principles: complementarity of actors; operational independence and a degree of separation between the different spheres; prioritisation of the protection needs of civilians; and an emphasis on local involvement and localised planning; and strong humanitarian leadership within and throughout the UN system.⁵⁴ His overall point is that integration is not going away, and that humanitarians must therefore adapt and work to strengthen humanitarianism’s position within the context of an integrated framework, rather than stay at arm’s length and risk increasing irrelevance.

Integrated missions are relatively new, but a few tentative conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the UN missions in Sierra Leone (completed) and Liberia (ongoing). One is that personalities matter: strong leadership can overcome structural deficiencies or, conversely, weak or overbearing management can undermine even the best-designed mission. In the UN Assistance Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)—which was not integrated from the start and, indeed, was a disaster until its overhaul and an influx of troops and resources from the UK

in 2000—the multiple-hatting of DSRSG Alan Doss eventually gave him authority over many strands of the mission, but it is widely agreed that his personal leadership skills, knowledge, and judgment were determinative to the mission’s operational integration and overall success: “The best relations between humanitarian, political and other actors came after the introduction of an integrated mission structure and the appointment of a DSRSG...This improvement is...largely attributable to the character, skills and humanitarian background of the individual DSRSG [Doss], who recognised the legitimate autonomy of different actors and sought to achieve only that level of coherence which was needed to reach effective solutions and which was feasible given the varied mandates.”⁵⁵ Here it is interesting that Doss’s success hinged to some extent on his pragmatic rather than dogmatic approach to integration, in which integration was not an end in itself, but only one means to the end of mission effectiveness. In Liberia, conversely, there is anecdotal evidence that the implementation of a structurally integrated mission has been affected by an overbearing leadership style on the part of the political leadership of the U.N. in the field.

The observation that leadership can be determinative to the success or failure of a peace operation implies that, beyond matters of principle such as humanitarian neutrality and independence, at least part of the tension in the discussion of integrated missions lies in the organizational pathologies of “turf” between humanitarian and political actors in the field. It also seems to imply that the structure of the mission is secondary. This latter conclusion would be inaccurate. Leadership can only build on the structure it’s given: even the best leadership will be hindered by sloppy mission design, while strong mission design ensures some chance for mission success, given effective leadership. Although policymakers in the UN system are still groping for the best way to construct an integrated mission, experience thus far indicates that clear lines of command, communication, and reporting are key.

Properly structured missions should facilitate accountability. To this end, the U.N. in Afghanistan adopted is a “light footprint” in which international organisational presence was as limited as possible and national ownership established as a clear objective of the mission. The international presence was consciously geared towards ensuring a measure of transparency and accountability for the emerging Afghani regime. Perhaps as a result, the U.N. senior management has been credited with excellent leadership of the mission.

Accountability is also crucial within international organizational context of the mission. The importance of vertical accountability—between the field and headquarters, ideally including not just DPA and DPKO but UNHCHR, UNDP, and the USG for Humanitarian Affairs—and horizontal accountability—between the different elements of the mission to the DSRSGs and SRSG—cannot be over-

stated. This requires a concise, and easily understood mission statement. This should be formulated by the SRSG and be distinct from the mandate, with the objective of providing strategic objectives for the disparate components of the mission. Thus, although military, political, humanitarian, and development actors may have different views and methods, their work will be driven by the same concrete and unifying goals. This seems obvious but is strangely lacking in international missions, where the tendency is for each sector to focus on its “turf,” with only tangential regard for how their actions on that turf might impact the overall work of the operation.⁵⁶

The Peace Implementation Consensus?

In a rigorous and policy-relevant volume that analyses the strategies of peace implementation employed by international actors⁵⁷ in operations during the 1980s and ‘90s, Stephen Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens⁵⁸ identify and evaluate various tasks involved in those peace implementation efforts and their relationship to overall implementation success. To provide some clarity to the undifferentiated strategies that characterised peace implementation in the past, the book prioritises several tasks for practitioners:

- demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration;
- the provision of civilian security through police and judicial reform;
- local capacity-building for human rights and reconciliation;
- the demilitarisation of politics and holding of elections in a reasonably fair and free process;
- the rapid revival of the economy to create a “peace dividend”;
- and the creation of the “economic foundations necessary to sustain peace.”⁵⁹

There is substantive convergence between Stedman et al’s priority tasks and those described earlier. Indeed, the good news for advocates of a more cohesive agenda around peace implementation is that there is, to a large extent, consensus over specific tasks for implementers in peace implementation. More recently, these have been grouped by Dan Smith into what he has termed the peacebuilding “palette”, consisting of the thematic areas of security, reconciliation and justice, socio-economic foundations, and political frameworks.⁶⁰

There are also, however, critical departures from this consensus. For example, the issue of infrastructure rehabilitation—encompassing everything from

getting the lights back on, to providing clean water, restoring production and management of natural resources, rebuilding roads and public buildings, and supplying basic public services—is neglected in some of the literature. Infrastructure reconstruction, which is analytically distinct from economic aid and reconstruction, is increasingly recognised as crucial to consolidating public support for the post-conflict governing authority and shoring up public security. But many questions remain concerning who is best placed to quickly and efficiently do such work, whether new capabilities are needed, the extent and legitimacy of the use of private contractors, and the best way to use or build local capacity and ownership in undertaking infrastructure projects.

Another critical point of divergence is in the area of post-conflict security, or “public security”—described by some commentators as the “swing from fighting to policing.”⁶¹ American actors tend to think in terms of adapting existing (or carving out new) U.S. or allied military capability to establish public security, perhaps with the assistance of a civilian “rapid reserve” corps of deployable law enforcement officers. Policy recommendations are guided by a sense that the military will be the principal actor because they are either on the ground already (as was the case in Iraq or Afghanistan), or because they are the only actors with the capacity and resources to respond quickly and in sufficient numbers. Even though much of the grey literature protests that the U.S. military isn’t the right institution to “do” public security, in actual fact it seems to be quarrelling primarily with the U.S. military *as it is currently constituted*, not suggesting that the military absent itself entirely from the business of public or human security.

Prominent European literature, particularly the Barcelona report, takes a different approach that does not seem guided by the same “combat first, human security after” mentality. Rather, the Barcelona report reverses the equation: while taking little note of actual combat exigencies, it proclaims “human security first”—an approach to the security component of peace implementation that is more akin to law enforcement than to traditional military norms of force protection and rules of engagement. Thus, while the U.S. approach seems to be developing in the direction of “military plus”—that is, specialised military components plus a new civilian capacity—the human security approach espoused by the Barcelona report may be tagged as “military minus”, with the resources and capacity of the military, but employing the standards, tactics, and methods of law enforcement.

Call and Stanley, writing in Stedman et al. before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, correctly describe the security threats faced by civilians in post-war environments, stemming from a security vacuum that can be exploited by organised crime, vigilantes, former combatants, and score-settling by ethnic or other adversaries.⁶² They propose wide-ranging police and judicial system reforms, but they also recognise the

importance of functioning interim security and judicial mechanisms to provide order in the immediate aftermath of conflict: “The absence of effective interim security capability at the international level has become a more serious and recognised problem for complex peace operations.”⁶³

After examining four interim public security options—a quick-start local civilian force, pre-existing (or reconstituted) local forces, international military forces, and international civilian police personnel—they conclude that a combination of improved public safety training for military peacekeeping forces, increased use of existing military police capabilities, wider use of gendarme-type support units, and improvements in the quality, availability, consistency, and management of UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL) would be most efficacious in improving transitional security.⁶⁴ However, they stop short of proposing new dedicated capabilities within the U.S. military and State Department or international organisations such as NATO.

These differences arise in part from domestic and international politics, and competition over normative approaches. Because much of the U.S. literature is targeted for the U.S. government and therefore premised on the assumption of some degree of U.S. military involvement, the recommendations tend to instrumentalise other actors and institutions, considering them only to the extent that they “plug in” or provide value-added to existing or needed U.S. military and civilian capacities. Conversely, the European literature tends to take a broader and more holistic view—consistent with the approach demanded by human security—that manifests as a pragmatic interest in multilateral capabilities, processes, and procedures. Similarly, the Barcelona report, which prioritises human security as the threshold for intervention decisions, is built upon the primacy of human rights, whereas much of the U.S. literature, which tends to be practical and interest-based rather than based on international norms, deals with human rights issues as a series of tasks to be tackled as a sub-section of justice and rehabilitation or governance.

Given the dissimilar resources and interests of the U.S. and European security capacities—and the different needs and actions that they may be called to serve—these divergent approaches may in fact represent the best course for both parties. However, a division of labour to work across the U.S., EU, and UN, would require a coherence based on agreed strategies and complimentary organisational capacities, something that is not yet in reach. While there is general consensus concerning what to do in peace implementation, there remain significant differences over how to do it and who is best suited to do it. In other words, there are significant differences of strategy. Most of the researchers sighted above would probably all agree with Shepard Forman’s concise summary of the problem:

At the present time, there is no authoritative governing mechanism for setting the broad strategic objectives, developing and maintaining institutional preparedness, or providing oversight for either conflict prevention or post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. While peacekeeping operations are characterised by common objectives and unity of command, peacebuilding to date has been largely an amalgam of projects devoid of a mutually agreed strategy and coherent plan of action. Multiple agencies, both inter-governmental and bilateral, are subject to diverse decision-making bodies, and they plan and implement programs based on their discrete and sometimes contradictory political objectives and operational doctrines...The assets and capacities of all of these actors are critical to the successful outcome of multidimensional peacebuilding; yet, there is no systematic way to optimise their roles as part of a holistic, coherent strategy to meet both short- and long-term peacebuilding objectives.⁶⁵

2 Peace Implementation: A research agenda

Making peace requires an understanding of what has caused the conflict. There are a number of methodologies and a great deal of literature that address causes of conflict, from both conflict-specific and comparative perspectives, using quantitative as well as qualitative methods.⁶⁶ What is missing, and what we have tried to suggest, is an approach that builds on this literature to develop research that answers questions of direct relevance for the practitioner in the design of strategies, programmes, and policies

It is the nature of public administration, both national and international, that the pillars of peace implementation each consist of their own norms, strategies, decision-making procedures, and institutions. Within each, there are organisational “stove pipes” of functional implementation capacity. All of these interact with international political and economic imperatives to decide the shape of peace implementation interventions. The feasibility of peace implementation depends upon the ability of states, acting collectively through policy coordination and international organisation, to bring about the convergence of material resources, organisational capacity, and political will, and to sustain that convergence over time during an implementation process.

There are, however, significant limits to this analysis. First, peace implementation strategies are highly political, contested, and plural, and not so easily coordinated. When practitioners succeed in gaining a measure of coherence, it is more often than not the result of remarkably hard work, particular talents (e.g. political savvy, diplomatic activism), good in-country knowledge and relationships, and a measure of luck. In the field, as well as in capitals, international organisational incoherence must be assumed as a fact of life.

Second, leadership and mission coherence are both necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for success. The feasibility of peace implementation is equally or more dependent upon the particular level of “difficulty”⁶⁷ or adaptation to the particularities “context.”⁶⁸ While intuitive, this knowledge rarely survives the institutional and inter-governmental politics of peace implementation. In this, peace implementation tends to suffer from the same problem faced in the

development arena—namely, donor-driven agendas that manifest themselves in the implementation of programmes, often regardless of context. Furthermore, the norms and interests driving a peace implementation process tend to suffer from the “technicist fallacy,”⁶⁹ that there is a technical or organisational fix to the complicated affairs of human society, and that what works in one place will work in another. International policy makers and researchers continue to approach peace implementation with a kind of instrumental or utilitarian logic that is in tension with the social, economic and political realities they must confront in specific peace implementation contexts.

This tension between the reality of particular wars, and the dynamics of international responses to conflict, is perpetuated by research frameworks that adhere to functional divisions of international organisation. As we have already noted, there are real tensions in the security, humanitarian, and development fields, and these translate directly into policy research. We do not believe it is useful to call for a unification of these as fields of research. Instead, we will suggest a broad research agenda that attempts analytical coherence by embedding international policy implementation in the realities of particular conflicts.

We propose a research agenda based on a revised approach to policy implementation. Peace agreements in effect pose a set of policy questions that structure policy thinking about implementation in a linear direction, from decision, through implementation, to effect. In keeping with this logic, studies of the political economy of policy implementation suggest that successful implementation of a policy decision is a product of a number of identifiable factors:⁷⁰

- Clear objectives based on adequate causal theory
- Regulation that promotes the compliance of implementation agents and targets
- Committed and skilful officials
- The support of interest groups
- Stability in domestic and international socio-economic and political conditions
- The degree of vulnerability of the target

This is a useful framework for research. Particular research projects can be focused in a practitioner-friendly manner, i.e. within the functional structures that separate bureaucracies and budget lines, both domestic and international. At the same time, through questions about interest groups, social and economic conditions, and targets, research in this area begins from the assumption that

policy implementation processes are embedded in politics and, not least, in the social realities of the people whom the policies are designed to help. Similarly, at the other extreme, context and data “thick” case studies which are concerned with the lived social realities of conflict cannot ignore the effects of the policies, practices (and ‘pathologies’) of the peace implementation machinery.

In short, two broad categories of research emerge: those concerned with peace implementation as international policy interventions, and those research themes concerned with context, or the social, political, and economic processes at work in particular conflicts. Taken together, these categories of research suggest an agenda which views peace implementation as one part of a social transformation, a process that seeks to launch political, economic, and social progress towards peace.

With this in mind, we have drawn on the above framework for policy studies as a source of questions that need answering and topics that need further exploration. We have not stuck religiously to these categories. Instead, we have specified a series of research themes and grouped them into two broad categories—*Intervention* and *Governance and Governability*. These two categories group questions suggested by the policy implementation approach and which arise from the state of policy and practice to date. The questions they imply will be recognisable in what follows. We have not sought here to define methodological or disciplinary approaches. In our view, most of the research themes can be approached by any number of disciplines and methods.

Governance and Governability

In most wars, the institutions of state relevant for economic, social, and political governance are often not effective in large parts of the affected country. When societies are engaged in armed conflict, they can become ungovernable. State agency often fades under the combined pressures of violence and the informalisation—or even criminalisation—of domestic economies and politics. Conflict undermines the ability of the state to govern, and as the state recedes in relevance, society and different groups within it find alternative forms of security, livelihoods, and governance.

With an agreement to stop fighting, the parties begin a transition. The nature of that transition—whether they actually stop fighting, move away from armed conflict, towards renewed conflict, stalemate—remains an open question. Nonetheless, a peace implementation process seeks to move society away from armed conflict towards some form of non-violent governance.

Conflict Analysis

Understanding how to respond to conflict, and what policies to adopt in a transition, requires an analysis of the society in transition. There are a number of useful conflict analysis frameworks available in the peace and conflict research field. For the purposes of policy, the broad question to be asked is: *What does the society in conflict look like?*

Research should explore a variety of transitions as the manifestations of social practice—particularly the struggles for survival and domination between state and society actors that are played out over specific issues of democratic transition and/or political liberalisation. Research into the structure of conflicts is the area of research with the most developed analytical frameworks. However, these are relatively recent, contested, and deserve further attention, particularly with regards to various types of social transitions. Finally, research should examine the interrelationship between the conflict structure, social processes and international agency.⁷² Important first steps in analysis have been made in this area, but the analysis needs to be deepened through further case study work that answers such questions as:

- What is the nature of the transition?
- What are the mobilizing factors (Inequality? Insecurity?)
- What is the structure of the conflict?
- What are the historical class, identity, or ethnic cleavages?
- What economic incentive structures, or power imbalances are there?
- What is the role of international assistance in the conflict or its transformation?

The State

As we noted earlier, peacebuilding or peace implementation is often called “nationbuilding” or post-conflict reconstruction, particularly in the United States. Both terms place heavy emphasis on the role of building state capacities as key to a peace implementation “exit strategy.” This is in part because of the related policy discourse concerning “weak” or “failed” states; the response is an increasing focus on state building as the centrepiece of the peace implementation transition.

This approach, while intuitive in many ways, may privilege an analysis that distorts the problem analysis. To speak of “weak” states, can imply a state’s weaknesses are somehow linked to the likelihood of break-up or secession, which may or may

not be part of the problem. More importantly, it focuses our analysis on the state and its institutions—rules as well as organisations—when, in many cases, it may be that the power relations that matter are private, informal, and regionalised. When we speak of “weak” states, we are probably referring to states in which power resides mainly outside the state’s institutions. In other words, in “weak” states, politics is probably happening elsewhere.

Similarly, our intuitive understanding of a “failed” state implies that a state has somehow “collapsed”. The normative definition of a failed state—one that has lost control of its territory, cannot guarantee the safety of its citizens or deliver public goods, nor maintain their monopoly on the use of coercive force—could be applied in whole or in part to a number of places we would not normally consider “failed” states. By taking a normative position as to the nature of the state, we assume much about the development of states that in reality possess very different histories.

Research is needed into state failure based on a description of a state’s ability or willingness to function in a manner relevant for the welfare of its citizens. By asking questions about the state, we should try to understand where and how state agency is the problem in particular societies—in which case peace implementation policies may be useful—and where it is not, in which case peace implementation policies should probably leave well enough alone. By asking the questions about the people, social groups, and communities that the state is “failing,” we open up an analytical perspective that can speak to the dynamics at work in a particular conflict.⁷³ This sets up a research agenda that is interested in the questions: *how is the state failing, and for whom?*

- Is the state the problem?
- Are state resources the focus of conflict?
- Is the state legitimate?
- How is the state receding (or not)?
- Who is marginalised? How?
- Who participates in politics?
- What is the status of women in society? The role of women in politics?
- What is the role of interest groups in society?
- What are the social sources of political change?
- How is political power exercised? For whom? Where is it located?

State, Society, and Conflict

This set of questions seeks to identify the social processes involved in transitions that have a bearing on conflict and conflict transformation. Research is needed into how societies work to build peace as well as how they reproduce the structures of conflict and patterns of violence. Much more needs to be done in conflict analysis to bring in sociological and anthropological perspectives, and to integrate these with international and regional political economy questions related to debt, structural adjustment, trade integration, and informal networks.

“Spoilers”—those armed factions who may violently oppose a peace agreement—and elite networks do not emerge from thin air. They build on existing structures, both material and ideational (identity-based). Understanding cultural practices and traditional structures is therefore a prerequisite for understanding how illicit or informal networks come into being and how they work, and should also inform policy responses to the challenges these actors pose to the transition away from a structure that benefits them. Equally, elite networks are links to global arms and financial and commodity markets, and this international dimension of local conflicts requires further research.

In the context of transitions from conflict, where the formal economy is both weak and not well understood (for lack of accurate data), planning on the basis of macro economic indicators will inevitably lead to certain policy failures. Much more needs to be done to both generate the data, and design, monitor and test policy options on the basis of this work. In addition, the war economies policy literature should be married with this approach: the fact that there is economic activity in a war zone does not mean that the informal economies that people need to survive are somehow illicit. Rather, these economies provide livelihoods in situations of extreme vulnerability. Further study and differentiation of illicit versus informal economies is required to avoid control measures hurting those who they intend to help. How do we separate criminal economies and informal economies?

More research is needed on informal economies in conflict. In parts of Central and West Africa, the Andean region of South America, the Balkans, and Central and South East Asia, the economic interests of combatants and their political-military allies have sustained some of the most brutal wars in recent memory. In each case, factional military power has been deployed to take advantage of natural resources and other forms of wealth. Elite networks have been crucial. Even in places where peace processes have since appeared to take hold—for example, in Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Sierra Leone, or Liberia—peacemakers must confront the fact that the conflict trade that helped prolong the wars continues uninterrupted by the apparent peace. Transitions to democracy will have to confront these realities. Development will be impossible as long as they are not addressed.

There is remarkably little in the peace implementation literature, for example, concerning violence as a social phenomenon. Although relevant work is being pursued in a variety of disciplines, it does not appear that it is being sufficiently drawn into peace implementation research. In particular, research is needed into the manner in which armed conflict reproduces itself. In addition, there is limited but important work that has been done on domestic peace movements or constituencies of peace.⁷⁴ Married with an analysis of individual or household responses to conflict or insecurity, (adaptations and survival strategies, etc.) research into domestic constituencies promises real policy relevance in terms of planning assistance that supports the domestic capacities for peaceful transition. Initial interesting fieldwork has been done, not least by development researchers, but far more could be done.

- Who are the parties?
- How are they networked locally, regionally and globally?
- Who controls the means of violence?
- What are the social modes of controlling violence?
- What does the war economy look like?
- How do the war, coping and criminal economies share the same economic space?
- What are the coping strategies of households?
- In what context have they developed such strategies (livelihood system)?
- What is the social and historical character of violence?
- Why is it that insurgents and rebels (even politically conscious ones) reproduce the structures of violence and oppression of the powers they overthrow?
- Is there a specific structure-agency dynamic that is comparable across various cases?
- Are there more specific histories of violence that are more prone to replicate themselves?
- Who make up the constituencies for peaceful transition?
- What are the local conflict resolution mechanisms?
- Are there civil society monitoring or advocacy activities?

- What is justice? How is it understood and what do people expect of post-war justice? How does it fit with – or compete with – international justice?

Some of the research tasks suggested by these questions are admittedly very difficult to research, particularly in a methodologically rigorous way. Because the conflict has destroyed institutions and forced many people to flee, the data that might have existed concerning social conditions is often no longer applicable to the society that exists at the time of the peace agreement. Seeking to obtain it can also present problems: conducting social or political research in a conflict zone poses security concerns and researchers have tended to avoid such research because it inevitably involves working in the vicinity of—or sometimes with—armed factions that can pose a threat.

Intervention

This category of research seeks to understand the nature of the peace agreement and related international decisions to intervene in support of it. Below we outline a series of questions and issues related to the international responses to peace agreements, the politics involved, and the strategies stated or implied.

Competing Norms

Research into the ways peace implementation affects, and is shaped by, evolving and competing norms in the humanitarian, development, and security fields will be important in understanding the logic of policy formulation at all levels of peace implementation. This field of research is a necessary complement to the various research themes described below concerning strategic intent, decision-making, and institutions in peace implementation. The broad question asked here is, *In which direction is the normative basis of the international system evolving concerning responses to conflict?*

The stated rationale behind a particular intervention is usually based on normative imperatives, such as saving lives or national self-defence. In a number of cases, humanitarian norms have been in conflict with norms of state sovereignty. The literature in this regard has matured towards concrete proposals concerning the ethics of humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty.⁷⁵ Less explored is the clash between the humanitarian, development, and security norms in specific peace implementation cases and the way these have, in turn, informed both national policies and the evolution of international norms. Also under-

explored is the questions of the normative “fit,” or lack thereof, between the various policies adopted with and across different pillars as part of peace implementation.

- How does peace implementation affect or manage the sovereignty of conflict-affected states?
- Does peace implementation imply a hierarchy of norms?
- How does peace implementation manage competing norms?
- What has been the impact of the peace implementation on global norms relating to humanitarianism? Development? International peace and security? Will the creation of a U.N. Peacebuilding Commission, as recommended in the High Level Panel report, have any affect on normative development?
- Is peace implementation a humanitarian, development, or security imperative?
- Is there a clash of international and domestic normative frameworks?
- What normative legacies has peace implementation faced or left behind in specific cases?

As described above, studying the development, progress, setbacks, and possible synergies of European, U.S., and UN policies will be important in understanding the direction of normative development in all three areas.

Strategic Intent

The expression ‘strategic intent’ assumes that while ‘peace’ may be the stated objective of an agreement, the actual content of this peace is almost certainly contested or unclear. This is likely also to be true of various policies, decisions, or authorisations relating to the peace agreement.

The paucity of a coherent strategy in most cases is well established.⁷⁶ Implementation strategies may not be explicit at all or, if they are, they can be very quickly forgotten as events unfold. In a number of cases, a peace implementation strategy described in a peace agreement has been contradicted over time (or almost immediately) by the policies or behaviour of one or more parties to the conflict, or by third parties. All of this is complicated by the fact that international assistance to peace implementation is provided in response to any number of strategies: expressed in the agreement, by the parties, or embodied in donor country policies. What has remained largely unexplored is how these potentially competing strategies interact.

The broad question to be asked here is, *What is the plan (to make peace)?* Research should focus on various strategies implicit in the agreement or in the policies of the various interlocutors, including the statements and actions of participants/practitioners. It should also address the implications of the agreement's strategic intent for the formulation of international assistance and the management of its delivery. Some obvious questions include:

- What is the nature of the resolution of the conflict embodied in the agreement?
- Does the agreement have a strategy?
- What are the priorities?
- What are the strategies/objectives of the parties? The international actors?
- What are the strategies/objectives of the aid provided?
- What are the potential conflicts in strategy?

The analysis of strategic intent seeks to provide a starting point from which to explore the relationship between the variety of strategies pursued and the progress towards objectives in various peace implementation cases. It will also provide input to other research themes in this agenda, with particular regard to normative development and the institutions of peace implementation. The outcomes from such research will be important as methodologies for policy formulation in future cases, and will help set baselines for carrying out strategic evaluations.⁷⁷

Decisions and Decision-making

As we noted above, a major determinant of the success or failure of peace implementation is the interest and involvement—or lack thereof—of regional and/or major powers, particularly where the environment is difficult: “While the United Nations can succeed in peace implementation in the easiest conflict environments, regional or major power interest is crucial to succeed in the most difficult environments.”⁷⁸ This is in part due to the challenge of generating the necessary resources—human, financial, physical—in the absence of regional or major power interest.

The broad question to be asked here is, *Whose politics are driving the implementation process?* Exploring decisions and decision-making goes beyond the question of strategic intent to understand how peace implementation is managed over time, with particular reference to the nature and sustainability of the

political will and capital invested by the main interlocutors—domestic and international—in peace implementation.

- Who is bound or mobilised by the agreement or as a result of its negotiation?
- What are the origins of interventions in support of implementation (e.g. UN Security Council authorisations, executive orders)?
- Who is pushing what strategy? Why?
- What regional actors are involved? How?
- What are the political level policy coordination structures (e.g. peace talks, contact group negotiations, 'Friends' groups, donor coordination meetings)?
- What institutions—national and international—have been mobilised to provide assistance?

The analysis of decisions and decision-making seeks to identify the nature and level of political will over time and to explore how this affects organisational capacity, material resources, and the politics of implementation on the ground. As noted above, it appears that operations which receive the most resources and longest time commitments—minimum five years—have the best results, regardless of the initial difficulty of the implementation environment. An understanding of decisions and decision-making is fundamental to research into the institutional aspect of peace implementation, and will provide valuable insights into the other themes in this agenda. For example, the literature review found consensus on the point that resource availability and limitations, and the level of difficulty of a case, will influence the choice of implementation strategy over time.

The Institutions of Implementation

As in the introduction to this section, the most pressing issue concerning the institutions of peace implementation is coherence, in particular operational coherence. Research into all the themes identified in this paper should contribute to an understanding of how the security, humanitarian, and developmental institutions interact, where the challenges to coherence lie, and what might be done about them. In addition, there are a series of specific issues concerning multilateral reform that are directly related to the problem of coherence.

There are two cautionary notes that need sounding. The first concerns finance and personnel. There has been comprehensive research into issues surrounding

donor mobilisation in support of peace implementation, and a number of policy initiatives aimed at addressing institutional gaps in resource mobilisation.⁷⁹ What has been less studied, and is less understood, is the chronic lack of resources for the peacebuilding tasks involved in peace implementation, particularly those programmed by the United Nations. Unlike the member state assessed contributions that fund standard military and administrative peacekeeping tasks, peacebuilding activities—including, for example, critical parts of DDR, justice reform, or IDP return—are almost wholly financed by voluntary contributions. There is, in effect, an institutional bias against the peace implementation components that are not implemented by security-centric peacekeeping operations. While some have recommended that all expenses of multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations, including those incurred by peacebuilding activities, be met from assessed contributions rather than through ad hoc voluntary contributions, there has been little exploration of what this might mean in practice. Nor has there been much examination of alternatives that have been developed by practitioners, such as trust funds, or increased discretionary funding for the Secretary-General.⁸⁰ Similarly, while some improvements in personnel procedures have been achieved, the UN needs to develop a personnel management system consistent with the complexities of peace implementation, “including improved capacity for rapid recruitment and deployment, pre-mission training, and retention of highly-qualified staff between operations.”⁸¹

The second note of caution concerns coordination. Coordination has been a mantra of post-war multilateral diplomacy. Practitioners dislike the word, and researchers avoid it as analytically too vague. Despite constant repetition, the demand for improved coordination has not produced practical policy options for the designers of international institutions. Research should explore coordination as a field of politics directly relevant for policy implementation. In fact, “The extent to which the cases were in the political interest of the United States and other powerful states determined both the complexity of the coordination mechanisms employed and the degree to which the United Nations (or other lead actors) was entrusted with a clear and accountable role. As a general rule, the political interest of powerful states and the autonomy of action of the UN or bilateral peace-maker functioned in inverse proportion to one another.”⁸²

The broad question to be asked here is, *What’s the research agenda that supports multilateral reform?* There is a well-developed literature concerning reform of the military, including civil-military relations, and the humanitarian sector literature relevant for peace implementation is also mature. There remain significant gaps in the knowledge base relevant for reform of multilateral capacities in peace implementation.⁸³

Planning

- What are the ethical obligations of peace implementation planning? Can planning move beyond traditional dichotomies between instrumentalism and participation towards a practical application of cognitive justice?⁸⁴
- How can multilateral organisations increase local participation in needs assessments, priority setting and scheduling?
- Are joint (UNDP – World Bank) needs assessments working? How can they better integrate local perspectives or enhance participation and empowerment?
- What does local ownership mean in practice? When is it appropriate—or more usefully, when it is *not*? Can we formulate of guidelines for making ownership decisions?⁸⁵
- What region dynamics affect peace implementation planning?
- How can local participation be integrated into a comprehensive plans of action?
- What data is available in multilateral institutions as well as in affected countries for planning peace implementation?
- What indicators are most relevant for planning what parts of peace implementation (which macroeconomic? Which social indicators?)?

Financial Mechanisms

- What other donor countries are financing peacebuilding (Japan? Brazil? Canada? Other?) Is there an opportunity for intergovernmental policy coordination that could feed into the frameworks identified above?
- What has been the impact on financing of the Human Security Network?
- How can lending and grant programs of the international finance institutions be designed to avoid contributing to the inequalities and other social dynamics that drive conflict?
- How can lending and grant programs of the international finance institutions more effectively support efforts to consolidate peace?
- How can direct programme funding to public sector institutions in host countries support, and not undermine, self-sustaining local revenue streams and responsible fiscal policies?

- What are the implications for the World Bank's "conflict trap" analysis for specific cases in the past? Can this analysis be applied elsewhere?
- How has "peace conditionality" operated in practice? Should it be used and if so how?
- Should Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) be adapted to support peace agreements or vice versa?
- Have Multi-donor Trust Funds delivered the operational flexibility hoped for? If not, why not?
- How have agencies responded to the demands of financing public sector institutions?
- What would be the organisational (budgetary and personnel) implications of redefining the boundaries between assessed budgets for peacekeeping and voluntary contributions to finance civilian activities that are folded into peace operations?

Reform

- Has the UN's "light footprint" design to integrated missions been effective? In what ways?
- What have been the impacts on the UN's capacity to field missions in the wake of the bombing of its headquarters in Baghdad?
- How can the Agencies be made more accountable?
- What is the appropriate relationship between the Secretariat and the Agencies?
- What are the implications of the Peacebuilding Commission recommended by the UN's High Level Panel?
- Is results-based budgeting and management⁸⁶ an option for U.N. reform?
- How can the U.N. Agencies become meritocracies?
- What forms or mechanisms of coordination appear to work? Why?
- What informational obligations and pathways are necessary for coordination to function effectively?

- Coordination is political. It takes place in the absence of effective state or central authority. What impact do coordination structures have on the reconstitution of state sovereignty through peace implementation?

Monitoring and Evaluation

- How have specific programmes of various implementing agencies performed? Which agencies have comparative advantage in different places or in different periods of peace implementation? Who delivers best, and when?
- Who is best placed to deliver infrastructure reconstruction? What are the best ways to use or build local capacity and ownership in undertaking infrastructure projects?
- What would constitute effective monitoring of peace implementation? Who should do it?
- Can we develop a comparative method for measuring and evaluating project impact?
- What about the use of private contractors, both in the reconstruction but also security or intelligence tasks?

3 Peace Implementation as an Approach to Strategy

Things are not moving. We have to do something fast. If we don't, we will have one hundred Harvard professors down here next year poking into where we went wrong.

World Bank official in conversation with UN representative, Gaza, July 1994

There is a popular parable which states that if one hundred monkeys were locked up with one hundred typewriters for one hundred years, they would produce a work of Shakespeare.⁸⁷ The peace implementation consensus described above resembles this parable: at times it seems as though we have sought to design and implement peace agreements in complex societies about which we may know relatively little armed with little more than assumptions and norms, and mired in competing interests and strategies.

It is certainly the case that peace implementation over the past fifteen years has gone forward on the basis of poor in-country information. There has been remarkably little attempt to generate the basic data necessary for planning the peace implementation process. Urgency and lack of domestic capacity are both key explanations for this, but so too is a lack of interest on the part of donor countries, which often prefer their own policies regardless of evidence. Only in the past five years have organisations like the UN and the World Bank begun to digest the lessons of experience. But a maxim elaborated in 1999 remains true today: "there is an inverse relationship between the importance of a foreign policy decision and the amount of information used in making it."⁸⁸

Assumptions and norms about peace-making also seem to distort the peace implementation agenda. Each new peace agreement seems to require a "Marshall Plan" and must deliver a "peace dividend." These generic statements do not necessarily reflect actual policies, let alone realities on the ground, but they are underpinned by powerful ideas about the political and economic foundations of peace. There are usually important truths in our presuppositions about peace.⁸⁹ Indeed, the problem is not that these ideas never work. They often do. But there are arguably more important contingencies in real-existing conflict as well.

An important lesson of the literature summarised here is that our assumptions work in peace implementation only when the implementers dedicate tremendous levels of resources to the task, usually out of a clear national interest in doing so. Peace implementation, it seems, requires deep pockets and big guns and the will to use both. Unfortunately, the literature also makes clear that these resources, and the necessary level of political will, are not usually—or even often—available. The danger in an overabundance of assumptions and a short-fall in resources is that policymakers are forced to recycle policies from conflict to conflict based largely on our preconceptions about what constitutes a peaceful society, rather than on a strategies about implementing peace in a particular context, or given predictable levels of political will, organisational capacities, or material resources.

An additional problem is that, even when and where these necessities would appear to be within reach—Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq—they may not be sufficient. There can be substantial disagreement about priorities and who should do what. Above, we described the difference in strategy between the U.S. and EU approaches as based in large part on the national institutional interests or dynamics at work, such as the influence on U.S. approaches of the institutional position and leadership of the Pentagon, or the politics of building an Common Foreign and Security Policy in the EU. In addition, local realities can complicate matters. In Afghanistan, for example, international efforts on DDR—an activity which is firmly embedded at the centre of the peace implementation consensus described above—have to date stumbled over a U.S. policy of alliances with certain warlords, who are loathe to D, D or R and seem to think they can rely on U.S. permission not to do so. Thus, differences about priorities and tasking may also originate from differences in policies adopted in a specific context. To put it another way, high politics can get in the way of an affective strategy as much as armed “spoilers.”

Stedman, Rothschild, and Cousens⁹⁰ show that, all too often, peace implementation suffered from undifferentiated strategies—the bunching together of many tasks under general strategies without specifying which are most important for war termination and therefore deserving of more resources⁹¹—and from a lack of theory concerning which implementation cases will, and *should*, receive adequate international attention and resources. Dan Smith⁹² confirmed this in his description of the “strategic deficit” in the Utstein countries and went on to suggest the elaboration of strategic frameworks, both for donor policies and intervention strategies in specific countries. In this, there is much that makes sense, particularly the priority placed on knowing and working with the specifics of the conflict. Similarly, the High Level Panel’s proposal for a Peacebuilding

Commission suggests that Member States may just get serious about the institutional lacunae that must be addressed if a strategic approach is to work.⁹³

We don't pretend to have solutions to these problems, but we also don't think they can be ignored. We assume that strategic planning is possible, and that, in undertaking to fashion a strategy, it is necessary to integrate the domestic and international challenges identified above. In our view, a first step is to refuse to accept that what worked once somewhere will work again anywhere. A second is to recognise that intervention is political, both at home and abroad. To understand it, requires a serious attempt to locate the international implementation machinery in a local context. It is this approach which gives the peace implementation framework its analytic power.

The challenge for policy research is to generate knowledge and analysis that communicate complex realities in a manner that speaks to the utilitarian demands of policymakers and their institutions. We suggest that a peace implementation framework provides one way to identify objectives and strategy. The research agenda we've outlined above should provide some of the knowledge base necessary to answer the kinds of questions that would make up a strategic approach. The structure of the agenda and a number of its questions are, in our view, directly relevant for what Smith has called a Strategic Impact Assessment (SIA). Whether as strategic framework, or as impact assessment, the peace implementation approach seeks to answer the question: *How can projects and programmes fit with peace making strategy?*

Peace implementation is a practitioner's view of making peace. It asks the question, "What is the right policy mix to obtain the objective?" This is a question of strategy. Strategy is the art of deploying resources toward an adopted objective. It's the "how" part. It assumes that, often, the difficulty of peace implementation may not be that the implementers don't know enough, or that the planners disagree over approaches, or that there isn't enough money or soldiers, or that the various parties are at odds over vested interests. It may simply be that warring factions may not be inclined to make peace, may be well entrenched, have popular and international support, and access to revenues to finance the fighting—as in Iraq, DRC, the Balkans, or, for many years, Angola or Sudan, to take just a few examples. It is in those increasingly common circumstances that strategies are put to the test.

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Notes

¹ Jones 2004; Macrae 2001; Smillie and Minear 2004; Smith 2001.

² Smith 2004.

³ Smith 2004: 20.

⁴ Smith finds many peacebuilding projects have “no stated connection to a country strategy” (2004: 57). In contrast with this practice, the peacebuilding literature has good supply of country studies and comparative analyses.

⁵ In explaining the use of the term “nation-building,” Dobbins writes (*italics his*): “The German and Japanese operations were referred to as *occupations*. The operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia were generally termed *peacekeeping* or *peace enforcement* missions. The current U.S. administration has preferred to use the terms *stabilisation* and *reconstruction* to refer to its post-conflict operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In all these cases, the intent was to use military force to underpin a process of democratization. *Occupation, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, stabilisation, and reconstruction* do not fully capture the scope of such operations. Neither does the term *nation-building*, but we believe it comes closest to suggesting the full range of activities and objectives involved (2003: 1).”

⁶ Dobbins et al. 2003: xv-xvi .

⁷ CSIS-AUSA 2003: 3.

⁸ The Commission report quotes former CENTCOM commander General Anthony Zinni as remarking that the U.S. military often becomes the “stuckee,” the ones that get stuck with all the clean up because there is no other real alternative—a complaint shared by both proponents and opponents of nationbuilding (CSIS-AUSA 2003: 7).

⁹ CSIS-AUSA, 2003: 9-

¹⁰ Report forthcoming.

¹¹ In addition to the three CFR “Iraq: The Day After” reports (available at the CFR website, www.cfr.org), see for example Crane & Terrell (2003); Independent Working Group of the Council on Foreign Relations and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University (2003); Iraq Reconstruction Assessment Mission (2003); the State Department’s Future of Iraq Working Group; and a series of reports from the International Crisis Group, available at www.crisisweb.org.

¹² For a fascinating account of the findings and recommendations of various pre-war projects dealing with post-war Iraq—and the large-scale dismissal of those efforts—see Fallows (2004).

¹³ A partial exception to this is the State Department's Future of Iraq project, which examined the potential for mass refugee flows in some detail.

¹⁴ From the report of the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force on U.S. Post-Conflict Reconstruction Capabilities (forthcoming).

¹⁵ Much of the intellectual input to the report was led by Professor Mary Kaldor, London School of Economics.

¹⁶ Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities 2003: 6.

¹⁷ The "seven principles for operations in situations of severe insecurity" are: the primacy of human rights; clear political authority; multilateralism; a bottom-up approach; regional focus; the use of legal instruments; and the appropriate use of force. These principles apply to both ends and means. Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities, "A Human Security Doctrine for Europe" (Ibid.: 6).

¹⁸ Ibid.: 15.

¹⁹ Ibid.: 17.

²⁰ Ibid.: 17.

²¹ As noted below, the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding is more wary than most of the efficacy of local ownership in peacebuilding and development cooperation. It should be noted that the United States has endorsed the idea of local ownership in the security/military component of its own operations in Iraq, albeit for somewhat self-interested reasons: the coalition's determination to train and handover to Iraqi security and military forces is to a large extent driven by the view that the eventual takeover by these forces is the key to withdrawing coalition troops in substantial numbers. Of course, it should also be noted that the immediate and medium-term period after the invasion was characterised by the coalition's unwillingness to cede any substantive political, economic, legal, or security control to locals, with the exception of a select, hand-picked few.

²² Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities 2003: 20.

²³ Ibid.: 21-22.

²⁴ Ibid.: 21.

²⁵ Here it should be re-emphasised that the Barcelona report is a think piece and not, at present, an actionable document.

²⁶ O'Hanlon and Singer argue that the global need for peacekeepers is as high as 200,000 troops deployed at any one moment—roughly double the numbers now in the field—and that a pool of 600,000 personnel is required to meet this need. Of the 600,000 deployable military personnel, they estimate that the United States can provide 100,000. Based on Europe's size and strength, O'Hanlon and Singer assert that the European Union must more than double its Headline Goal for rapid force deployment from 60,000 to 150,000 in order to pull its share. European Union nations must also invest in strategic lift and logistics capacity, which is comparatively weak. See O'Hanlon & Singer

(2004). Earle notes that the EU will not have sufficient air transport capacity to meet the Headline deployment goals until at least 2008 (2004: 4).

²⁷ Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities 2003: 11

²⁸ On the civilian side, the Barcelona report notes, "the military are often associated with a mission of violence, which is considered to conflict with and indeed may hamper the purposes of civilian officers, in particular aid-providers (p. 21)." This suspicion seems to have worsened after the experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq, where the distinction between soldiers and relief workers seems to have blurred among the local populace—a problem that puts humanitarian workers at significantly more risk. See Penketh (2004).

²⁹ As such, the Barcelona report marks an important step in policy development for those, such as Professor Kaldor, who have argued for a "cosmopolitan approach" to peace operations based a model closer to policing rather than military intervention. See, e.g. Kaldor (2001).

³⁰ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2004.

³¹ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2004: 12.

³² *Ibid.*: 7-19

³³ The Utstein Group was formed in 1999 by the ministers of international development from Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The group later expanded to include Sweden and Canada. The Joint Utstein Peacebuilding Study is based on a survey of 336 peacebuilding projects implemented by the four original Utstein governments between 1997 and 2002 (taking some operations in Afghanistan into account) (Smith 2004).

³⁴ As noted in the Introduction (above), the Utstein study defines peacebuilding as an attempt "to encourage the development of the structural conditions, attitudes and modes of political behaviour that may permit peaceful, stable and ultimately prosperous social and economic development. Peacebuilding activities are designed to contribute to ending or avoiding armed conflict and may be carried out during armed conflict, in its wake, or as an attempt to prevent an anticipated armed conflict from starting (Smith 2004: 20)." Peacebuilding is conceptualised as a long-term process. The primary difference between the study's definition of peacebuilding and our definition of peace implementation is that peacebuilding encompasses assistance activities that occur before and during conflicts (as well as after), whereas peace implementation describes international responses and activities that occur once a settlement or ceasefire is agreed. Peace implementation therefore describes the transformation of the institutional landscape, both on-the-ground and in donor countries, once a formal shift occurs from active to inactive (or temporarily stalled) conflict.

³⁵ Smith 2004: 10-11.

³⁶ *Ibid.*: 11-12.

³⁷ *Ibid.*: 19, *italics his.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*: 27-28.

³⁹ Security is notably less stressed in the Utstein study than in U.S. literature, reflecting the fact that, of the four countries, only the United Kingdom had more peacebuilding projects in the security area than in the socio-economic, political, or reconciliation areas. Security in the context of this study encompasses activities such as humanitarian mine action and DDR, and must be distinguished from military operations and the establishment of post-conflict public security, which fall outside of the study's remit.

⁴⁰ Smith 2004: 16.

⁴¹ Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) 2003: 4.

⁴² Despite the continuing emphasis on integration and coherence in the UN system, there currently does not seem to be agreed-upon definitions of either term. The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue defines coherence as "the attempt to bring together, cohere, or join up political action in peace operations with other actions including humanitarian and human rights. As pursued by the UN system and key donor governments, it is the attempt to bring together all elements of a multi-dimensional peace operation to serve the UN's central objective to make, maintain, or build peace and security in that country (CHD 2003: 24)." Integration "refers to a structural arrangement for delivering the policy goal of coherence. An integrated mission is one where the management structure is such as to ensure that varied actions are coordinated through a clear chain of command to serve a single or coherent policy objective of peace and security (*Ibid.*)."

⁴³ One of the first studies to identify coherence as a policy goal was *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience* (1996), a comprehensive evaluation commissioned by Danida in light of the failings of the international community in Rwanda. The report identified "a lack of coherence in policy and strategy formulation within the political, diplomatic and military domain, principally within the Security Council, as to how best to 'manage' the crisis; inadequate consideration of the humanitarian consequences resulting from such a lack of coherence; and the erroneous belief that humanitarian action can somehow substitute for inaction in the political, diplomatic and military domain," and argued that the "very substantial differences in the positions and approach of key members of the international community and...the persistence of such differences has substantially contributed to the lack of resolution of the situation in the Great Lakes region." Quotes taken from Study 3, "Humanitarian Aid and Effects," Chapter 6, "Assessment of Performance, Resourcing, Preparedness Measures and Coordination," Section 3, "Coordination." See http://www.um.dk/Publikationer/Danida/English/Evaluations/1997_rwanda/b3/book3.asp.

⁴⁴ Durch, Earle, Holt & Shanahan 2003: 104. Although the implementation of UNAMA was hindered by security difficulties, including the fact that conflict was still ongoing, it is considered by many to be a successful exercise in planning (CHD 2003: 15).

⁴⁵ The authors are indebted to a brown-bag discussion on integrated missions at NUPI (1 October 2004) for some of the insights in this section.

⁴⁶ Charny 2004.

⁴⁷ Minear 2004.

⁴⁸ CHD 2003: 20.

⁴⁹ As noted in the discussion on the Barcelona Report, there has been a particular problem with the blurring of the lines between military/security forces and humanitarian workers in Afghanistan, as military civil affairs teams conduct quick-impact and medical projects that go beyond the traditional scope of military action. In Iraq, the insurgent groups that target civilians seemingly do not confuse civilian and military actors but rather conflate them, eradicating the substantive differences between the two groups by claiming that they all operate in support of the same goal.

⁵⁰ Macrae 2004: 31.

⁵¹ Macrae 2004: 30; CHD 2003: 13.

⁵² Macrae 2004: 32

⁵³ Macrae 2001; Duffield 2004; Smillie and Minear 2004.

⁵⁴ Charny 2004.

⁵⁵ CHD 2003: 12; participants in the 1/10/2004 Nupi discussion also deemed Doss's role to be decisive in the overall success of UNAMSIL.

⁵⁶ The continued freedom of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) illustrates this point. Immediately after the country was stabilised, SFOR commanders had the wherewithal and willingness to capture Karadzic, Mladic, and other war criminals, but were overruled by civilian authorities. By the time the civilian authorities were willing to go after Karadzic et al, the tactical difficulties of such an operation had increased substantially. Had there been a clear consensus from the start of the mission that peace in BiH required bringing war criminals to justice, it is likely that Karadzic and Mladic would have been captured in 1996. The fact that no mission statement was formulated and the mission's intent left unclear essentially prohibited aggressive action on this front. (From a conversation with Maj. Gen. William L. Nash, USA (Ret.), commander of Task Force Eagle, Bosnia, 1996.)

⁵⁷ Including the United Nations, regional organisations such as NATO and ECOMOG, and individual states including India (in Sri Lanka) and Syria (in Lebanon) (Stedman et al 2002: 23).

⁵⁸ Stedman et al. 2002.

⁵⁹ Ibid.: 27.

⁶⁰ Utstein lists four thematic areas of activity: security (including DDR, SSR, mine action, small arms), reconciliation and justice (dialogue, truth commissions, etc), socio-economic foundations (reconstruction, infrastructure, return of refugees and IDPs, food security), and political frameworks (democratisation, good governance, institution building, human rights, etc).

⁶¹ Bronson & Nash 2003. The key point is that military security, which is typically defined in terms of combat and territory, is distinct from public security, which speaks to the overall level of "lived" security and therefore encompasses threats to civilian security from non-combatant elements, such as criminals or vigilantes. This differentiation, and its significance, can be seen clearly in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

⁶² Stedman et al. 2002: 303.

⁶³ Ibid.: 312.

⁶⁴ Ibid.: 312-316.

⁶⁵ Shepard Forman, Center for International Cooperation, New York University; “Building Civilian Capacity for Conflict Management and Sustainable Peace”, A discussion paper prepared for the Government of Denmark’s Meeting on Strengthening the UN’s Capacity on Civilian Crisis Management”, Copenhagen, June 8-9, 2004.

⁶⁶ See also: Berghof Research Centre For Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin, *The Berghof Handbook on Conflict Transformation* at <http://www.berghof-handbook.net/complete.htm>.

⁶⁷ Stedman et al. 2002.

⁶⁸ Smith 2004.

⁶⁹ Macrae 2001.

⁷⁰ Spear 1995; Hooper and Taylor 1999; Stedman et al. 2002; Lia 2003.

⁷¹ The literature is by no means homogeneous, and there are a number of important debates to which further research could contribute. For a summary, see CMI & PRIO 2003; Ross 2004; Berdal 2004; and Smith 2001.

⁷² Duffield 2001; Collier et al 2003; Macrae 2001; Smillie and Minear 2004.

⁷³ Bøås 2001.

⁷⁴ The War-Torn Societies project and Small Arms Survey have both pioneered the use participatory research and conflict resolution in situations of conflict. Also, in Sudan women’s groups were active advocates of a peace agenda during the negotiations between SPLM and the Government of Sudan. Prior to the peace accords, they began planning “Shadow Commissions” to monitor and advocate during the peace implementation process.

⁷⁵ ICISS 2001.

⁷⁶ Smith 2004; Stedman et al. 2002.

⁷⁷ Smith 2004.

⁷⁸ Stedman et al. 2002: 24.

⁷⁹ Forman and Patrick 2000.

⁸⁰ Salomons and Dijkzeul 2001: 16.

⁸¹ Forman 2004.

⁸² Whitfield 2004.

⁸³ This list of questions draws on Shepard Forman's (2004) discussion paper on multilateral reform in this area.

⁸⁴ Van der Velden 2004.

⁸⁵ A standard operating procedure in the development, local ownership is increasingly applied to all sectors of peace implementation including, as seen in Iraq, the security and military components. This merits more critical examination.

⁸⁶ "Results based management blends consumer satisfaction, growth and learning objectives, financial objectives, and personnel measures into an integrated, strategic management tool. Results based management, however, goes beyond budgeting. To be effective for the UN, it would require the Organisation to combine the current budgeting process and its workload indicators with goals based on intra-organisational co-operation measures, and join the outcomes of peacekeeping and development work together in a strategic manner. It would allow for achievement oriented monitoring and evaluation. This, in turn, would help to strengthen both co-ordination and administration. It could also prevent micro-management by providing other progress measures that put the budgets in their broader peacekeeping and development context. This would help to provide Member States with meaningful indicators of success upon which they could focus (Salomons and Dijkzeul 2001: 15-16)."

⁸⁷ The popular version, a parable about probability, is usually attributed to T.H. Huxley and runs something like this, "If you put a hundred monkeys in the British Library with hundred typewriters for a hundred years - one of them would produce a Shakespeare play."

⁸⁸ Barnett Rubin, in comments to the meeting "Knowledge for What", IPA/Fafo/CIC, New York September 1999.

⁸⁹ Such as Westphalian notions of state sovereignty and Hegelian conclusions about the origins of war; or Smithian and Ricardian assumptions about trade integration as conflict mitigation and Kantian notions of republics as the guarantors of peace.

⁹⁰ Stedman et al. 2002.

⁹¹ To a certain extent, some of the U.S. policy literature reviewed above does attempt to prioritise tasks within an overall framework of U.S. post-conflict activities. However, as Stedman et al. note, until recently there has been little sustained, institutional, or cross-cutting thinking on this pressing issue.

⁹² Smith 2004.

⁹³ Any optimism about strategy must be tempered by the knowledge that we have been here before: the U.N. tried – first in Afghanistan in the last 1990s - and failed to get strategic frameworks off the ground. The reason was not that they were a bad idea, but that the U.N.'s ability to make them stick, was largely at the mercy of the politics of the conflict and the member states.

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In Search of Strategy

The challenge facing applied peacebuilding research is to understand and communicate the complex realities of conflict in a manner that speaks to the utilitarian demands of policymakers. *In Search of Strategy* reviews the literature on post-conflict reconstruction, describes the existing policy consensus, and suggests a peace implementation framework as a way to structure research on transitions from conflict. The authors argue for an approach to peace implementation that integrates the international implementation machinery to an analysis of social transformations.

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