

EVALUATION DEPARTMENT



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Realising Potential

Evaluation of Norway's Support to Education in Conflict and Crisis through Civil Society Organisations

LEBANON: Case Study Report

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Evaluation of Norway's Support to Education in Conflict
and Crisis through Civil Society Organisations:

Lebanon: Case Study Report

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Contents

1. Introduction	1
1.1 Role of the Lebanon Case Study	1
1.2 Methodology	1
1.3 Limitations of the Case Study	2
2. Lebanon Context and Conflict Analysis	3
2.1 Background	3
2.2 The effects of the Syria crisis on Lebanon	3
2.3 The effects of the crisis on Lebanon's education system	5
2.4 The international response to the regional crisis	6
2.5 The national response to the crisis	6
2.6 Education sector structures and co-ordination	10
3. Norwegian assistance to the country	11
3.1 Overall assistance to the country 2008-current	11
3.2 Recipient Organisation	11
3.3 Source within NMFA	12
3.4 Support via humanitarian and education funding streams (OECD-DAC codes)	12
3.5 Target groups and implementing modalities	12
4. Findings	13
4.1 Relevance	13
4.2 Effectiveness	19
4.3 Efficiency	28
4.4 Coherence	29
4.5 Connectedness	32
5. Conclusions	36
6. Lessons/implications for the evaluation	37
Annex 1: Key Informants	39
Annex 2: Semi-Structured Interview Guide	41
Annex 3: Documents Reviewed	46
Annex 4: Overview of Norwegian-supported Basic Education (EiCC) initiatives between 2008-2016	50

Acronyms

ALP	Alternative Learning Programme
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
EiCC	Education in Conflict and Crisis
INEE	Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies
INGO	International Non-Government Organisation
ITS	Informal tented settlements
MEHE	Ministry of Education and Higher Education
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway
NOK	Norwegian Kroner
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in Europe Development Assistance Committee
PMU	Programme Management Unit
PTA	Parent Teacher Association
RACE	Reaching All Children with Education
SCN	Save the Children Norway
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Programme

Summary – Lebanon Case Study

The Lebanon case study forms one of six evidence streams of Norad's Evaluation of Norwegian Support to Education in Crisis and Conflict (EiCC) through Civil Society Organisations (CSOs); as such it is not in itself an evaluation. The case study was conducted through two weeks of field study in Lebanon, including visits to projects in the North, Beka'a and South of the country.

Lebanon has received over one million refugees from the crisis in neighbouring Syria, since the start of the Syrian crisis in 2011. The volume of refugees hosted is equivalent now to 20 percent of the population - the largest proportion of the population of all countries affected by the crisis. With the Lebanese government preferring to accommodate refugees within communities rather than in formal refugee camps, Syrian refugees have taken up residence in over 1,700 host communities. The conflict in Syria has affected Lebanon's delicate political balance in many other ways, raising concerns for ongoing stability.

The effects on the education system, which was already experiencing challenges, have been immense. Under Lebanese government requirements, CSOs can currently engage mainly in non-formal education, with some limited engagement for certified NGOs in public schools.

Between 2008 and 2017 Norway will have channelled at least 155 million NOK to basic Education (as a main objective) in Lebanon through eight Norwegian civil society organisations. The level of support has increased from 2 million NOK in 2008 to 34.4 million in 2017. In addition, further support has been channelled through 215.9 million NOK worth of grant support between 2008 and 2016, where basic EiCC comprised a significant rather than a main policy objective. Support was channelled through two Norwegian CSOs, Save the Children Norway (SCN) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), and one local CSO.

Relevance: The relevance of CSO support to EiCC in Lebanon is generally high. Strategies and operations reflect extensive use of context and education assessments, though the use of conflict analysis is more varied. Interventions are well aligned with the extensive local and international needs analyses available, and also in with national sector priorities and plans. Priority groups are clearly identified and align with those of national intentions. Interventions demonstrate high levels of adaptive capacity, responding swiftly to the changing policy, operational and conflict context. There is evidence of lesson-learning in implementation, though this is not always systematic and evaluations are not a formal requirement. All partners are committed to, and reflect use of, Do No Harm approaches and parents and children have been strongly involved in the design and implementation of interventions, and generally feel that their concerns are heard.

Effectiveness: There has been regular monitoring of activities, though CSOs apply diverse systems and varied methodologies in the collection of results. Reporting on marginalised groups and gender did not go beyond 'inclusion' in terms of numbers.

Overall, however, there is evidence that Norwegian support to education through CSOs has increased access to quality education for children in Lebanon, and taken an equitable approach in terms of gender, though disability is a relatively recent concern. CSOs' activities have also resulted in increased access to safe, child-friendly learning environments, although efforts in rehabilitation have been limited due to restricted access to public education. Innovative approaches have supported increased enrolment, including the creation of safe spaces, improved teaching and learning methodologies and provision of psycho-social support for vulnerable children – all features highly valued by parents.

Coherence: Coherence of interventions is variable. Beyond the comparatively strong policy architecture for education in Lebanon, Norwegian-supported initiatives are well linked in to organisation-specific country level strategic frameworks. Recent strategies contain comparatively developed results frameworks, which contain clear outcomes, outputs and targets. Informal coordination is strong, but lesson learning is largely bilateral between agencies and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Externally, coherence in the education sector is currently challenging, given wider structural barriers following the dismantling of the Education Working Group in 2015, and CSOs' absence from the Executive Committee of the national strategic architecture for the education response to the crisis. CSOs demonstrate efforts to engage with coordination mechanisms where opportunities have arisen, but overall, engagement with coordination mechanisms has been 'as far as feasible' given wider challenges in the sector.

Efficiency: There were some examples of evidence to achieve efficiency gains, but these were not systematic. However, efforts made had delivered some valuable savings for partners.

Connectedness: Interventions in NFE have sought integration into national strategies and budgets, but have been sometimes impeded by blockages in the national strategic planning process. New methodologies and initiatives have been brought to the non-formal sector, expanding the practices and experience available to national actors. New child protection concepts have also been introduced, though there are questions about sustainability given the limited operational space available. Transition in Lebanon is mainly dependent on MEHE, who take strong ownership over the sectoral response to the Syrian crisis. Discourse has shifted in documentation over time from a purely 'humanitarian' response to a more development-focused one, with attention to systems strengthening and reform. Norwegian-funded CSOs in Lebanon recognise the likelihood of the need for continued support, and are implementing transition strategies where operational space is available, for example in integrating with national plans, and supplying referral pathways from non-formal education into the formal sector.

Scope for capacity strengthening of public education sector institutions and systems is limited, but Norwegian CSOs have made significant efforts to build the capacities of partner CSOs, teachers and parents at the local level. Capacity gains with teachers and parents are well monitored by results frameworks, and reported upon.

1. Introduction

The purpose of Norad's Evaluation of Norwegian Support to Education in Crisis and Conflict through Civil Society Organisations is *'to provide decision-makers with information about the results of Norwegian aid to education in crisis and conflict through civil society organisations, and information about factors contributing to attainment or non-attainment of results, that can be used to improve future Norwegian civil society support to education in situations of crisis and conflict.'*¹ It aims to achieve this through three specific objectives, each with a strong learning focus:

- to map Norway's financial support for education in crisis and conflict through civil society in the evaluation period;
- to assess and document the results of Norwegian support to education in situations of crisis and conflict through civil society organisations, including any positive or negative unintended effects of the interventions; and
- to make recommendations to the MFA, Norad and civil society organisations regarding the design and implementation of Norwegian support to education in crisis and conflict through civil society.

Further detail regarding the context and contextual approach for the evaluation is provided within the main evaluation report, as well as details of the broader evaluation methodology.

Six evidence streams form the basis for responding to the evaluation questions. These are (i) systems analysis, (ii) content analysis of a sample of projects, (iii) telephone survey of civil society partners, (iv) desk study of interventions in Somalia and South Sudan, (v) field studies of interventions in Jordan and Lebanon, and finally (vi) mapping of Norway's EiCC portfolio. This report relates to evidence stream (v) field study.

1.1 Role of the Lebanon Case Study

This case study explicitly **does not present an evaluation** of Norwegian assistance to Education in Crisis and Conflict, through partner Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in Lebanon. This text is a case study which gathers together evidence from one context to contribute to the broader evaluation commissioned by Norad, above. As such, it collates evidence, and analyses it against the broader indicators of the evaluation, but it does not seek to make evaluative judgements. It also does not provide Recommendations (though the Lessons provided at Section 6 may offer some utility for stakeholders).

1.2 Methodology

Norway-supported EiCC interventions (through civil society) in Lebanon were mapped between 2008 to 2016 from the Norad STATSYS database² and triangulated with information sourced from CSOs themselves. Further details of planned investment for 2017 was sourced via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' grants portal³ and triangulated with information provided by in-country partners.

Documents analysed included grant agreements and strategies, annual reports and evaluation reports, and other relevant documentation relating to project design, implementation and/or results.

Field study took place in Lebanon from May 10-25, 2017. This included interviews with key stakeholders in Beirut; visits to six field sites operated by Save the Children Norway (SCN), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and Right to Play in the North, South and Beirut areas of the country including focus groups with parents, teachers and project personnel. Field site visits included visits to interventions supporting Syrian, Palestinian and host Lebanese beneficiaries. Focus groups were split into male and female groups to allow for consideration of gender dynamics.

Semi-structured questions are provided in Annex 2 and the analytical tool for the field study is provided in Annex 3. Analysis of documents and interview data were conducted using the analytical tool: this provides the basis for the findings presented below.

¹ Terms of Reference.

² See Mapping Annex for more details on methodology used to identify Basic EiCC interventions.

³ <http://udtalskudd.regjeringen.no>, accessed 31st July 2017.

1.3 Limitations of the Case Study

The case study has several limitations, recorded below:

- Basic education is a subtheme within the larger thematic area of education. This presented a challenge for accessing relevant information, since the Norwegian systems do not lend themselves to generating data on subthemes. Whilst projects were reviewed on the basis of information available, disaggregating information from grant schemes on intended expenditure on basic education - particularly where this is not clearly defined at the time of agreement, such as through framework agreements with civil society organisations – was not always feasible, though interlocutors in Lebanon provided guidance where they could.
- Given the ten-year time span of the evaluation, interviewees were not consistently able to provide institutional memory dating to before their presence in post. Information is much less available for the period prior to 2011; is limited from 2011-2014; and is most strongly available since 2014.
- Whilst annual reports and proposals were generally provided, evaluations and reviews (particularly recent reports) were less available. The quality and independence of results data must be considered within this context.
- Field study covered as much ground as feasible within the timescale available in-country, but was necessarily not comprehensive.
- It was not feasible to approach local or national educational authorities given access challenges in Lebanon, described below.

2. Lebanon Context and Conflict Analysis

2.1 Background

Lebanon's political system has been characterized as 'corporate consociation form of government'.⁴ The principle of distribution of resources according to sectarian quotas was enshrined in an unwritten National Pact in 1943, which allocated the three top positions in the state to specific sectarian groups (The president of the Republic is a Maronite Christian, Prime Minister Sunni and Speaker of Parliament Shiite).⁵

The fragile power-sharing agreement culminated in a short conflict in 1958 and a more protracted civil war between 1975-1990, which was effectively ended by the signing Taef Accord (4 November, 1989).⁶ The Taef accord further entrenched the sectarian formula of 1943 by transferring the executive power from the Maronite Christian presidency to the Council of Ministers (COM) whose members are equally divided between Muslim and Christian sects.⁷ The unusual power-sharing agreement, which remains in place today, makes Lebanon susceptible to demographic changes and regional conflicts which threatens to upset the delicate demographic and political balance between the various political and sectarian groups.

Lebanon is also host to around 450,000 Palestinian refugees, who in 1948 fled the territory which later became Israel. They represent an estimated ten percent of the population of Lebanon. Just over half of Palestinian refugees in the country live in twelve recognized Palestine refugee camps, and are supported by the international community, including Norway.⁸ No census of the wider population has been conducted since 1932.

Conflict analyses for the country⁹ points out that several other regional axes of conflict run through Lebanon: the Sunni-Shiite divide; Saudi-Iranian rivalry; the Arab-Israeli conflict; the status of minorities (particularly Christians, Alawites and Druze), and; the rise and empowerment of Sunni Islamists.¹⁰ Several localised, armed conflicts along sectarian or confessional divisions have arisen over the past five years—in two suburbs of Tripoli, in the Nahr el-Bared Palestinian refugee camp, in the north-eastern border town Aarsal—as well as several targeted terrorist incidents. Intercommunal tensions are therefore strongly present in the country.¹¹ Wider factors, including the pressures of urbanisation, the Palestinian refugee influx, regional proxy wars and foreign intervention by Syria, have also contributed to internal tensions.¹²

2.2 The effects of the Syria crisis on Lebanon

Into this complex environment, Lebanon has also received over one million refugees from the crisis in neighbouring Syria, since the start of the Syrian crisis in 2011.¹³ The volume of refugees hosted is equivalent now to 20 percent of the population - the largest proportion of the population of all countries affected by the crisis.¹⁴ With the Lebanese government preferring to accommodate refugees within communities rather than in formal refugee camps, Syrian refugees have taken up residence in over 1,700 host communities.¹⁵

⁴ Kerr, Michael (2012): "Before the Revolution". In Knudsen, Are and Kerr (Eds.), Lebanon After the Cedar Revolution. London, UK, Hurst.

⁵ Krayem, Hassan. (1994). The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement <http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/conflict-resolution.html>

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Bahout, Joseph. Carnegie Institute. (May 16, 2016). The Unraveling of Lebanon's Taif Agreement: Limits of Sect-Based Power Sharing. Retrieved from <http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/05/16/unraveling-of-lebanon-s-taif-agreement-limits-of-sect-based-power-sharing-pub-63571>

⁸ <https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon> accessed 22.08.17.

⁹ Norwegian Church Aid (2015) The Syrian Crisis and its Impact on Lebanon – A Conflict Analysis; International Crisis Group (2012): A Precarious Balancing Act: Lebanon and the Syrian Conflict. Middle East Report No. 132. November 2012; International Crisis Group (2014): Lebanon's Hizbollah Turns Eastward to Syria. Middle East Report No. 153. May 2014.

¹⁰ International Crisis Group (2012) op.cit.

¹¹ International Crisis Group (2014) op.cit.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ UNHCR: Syria Regional Refugee Response Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122> accessed 22.08.17.

¹⁴ UNDP and UNHCR (2017) Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2017-2018 p6.

¹⁵ <http://www.reach-initiative.org/where-we-work/ongoing-field-presence/lebanon> accessed 21.08.17.

Effects on the crisis on Lebanon have been immense, ranging from the economic to the social and political. Key dimensions reflected in the literature¹⁶ are:

- **Housing challenges.** The absence of formal refugee camps has placed a strain on housing, with reduced availability and increased prices. World Vision in 2013 found that the significant swelling of certain communities—particularly in the Bekaa Valley and the North, in which settlement population sizes increased by up to 100 percent in two years - sometimes triggered rent increases of 200 percent in a six month period, and up to 400 percent in some locations of Beirut.¹⁷
- **Strain on services:** The health infrastructure of the country has come under strain with the influx of refugees, experiencing significant increases in communicative diseases particularly during summertime and in schools.¹⁸ Health clinics reported at least a 50 percent increase in caseloads from 2014 onwards.¹⁹
- **Employment tensions:** Downward pressure on wages has been noted in several studies, since Syrian refugee labourers would often work for much lower rates. This has caused concern and resentment from the Lebanese host population. One survey found over 90 percent of Lebanese nationals perceiving Syrian refugees as a threat to their economic livelihood, with particular resentment since Syrian families have often also received humanitarian assistance.²⁰
- **Exclusion and marginalization:** The real or perceived exclusion and marginalisation of Syrian refugees within Lebanese communities, as well as resentment by Lebanese communities due to their own real or perceived exclusion from humanitarian assistance, have also caused ongoing community level tensions, and are widely documented in the literature.²¹

The conflict in Syria has affected Lebanon's delicate political balance in many other ways, raising concerns for ongoing stability:

- Although Lebanon has officially developed a policy of official dissociation from all sides of the conflict in Syria,²² conflict analyses report variations from this on the ground.²³ Analysis has also found networks for groups on all sides of the conflict mobilised in Lebanon.²⁴
- The vast majority of Syrian refugees arriving to Lebanon are Sunnis, raising the perceived risk of disturbance to the delicate confessional balance, since communities tend to be homogenous along sectarian lines.²⁵ A significant increase in power of one sectarian group, or a shift from minority to majority status, would upset this fragile political balance.

¹⁶ Key sources applied: REACH Initiative, Lebanon. <http://www.reach-initiative.org/where-we-work/ongoing-field-presence/lebanon> accessed 21.08.17; Search for Common Ground (SFCG) (2014): Dialogue and Local Response Mechanisms to Conflict between Host Communities and Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Conflict Scan. May 2014. UNDP and Lebanon Support (2015): Between Local Patronage Relationships and Securitization: The Conflict Context in the Bekaa Region. Conflict Analysis Report. Report written by Muzna al-Masr. January 2015.

World Vision (2013): Under Pressure. The Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on Host Communities in Lebanon. Study conducted by Tim Midgley and Johan Eldebo. July 2013; International Rescue Committee (2014): Are We Listening? Acting on Our Commitments to Women and Girls Affected by the Syrian Conflict. [Online] Available from: http://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/resource-file/IRC_WomenInSyria_Report_WEB.pdf

¹⁷ World Vision (2013): Under Pressure. The Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on Host Communities in Lebanon. Study conducted by Tim Midgley and Johan Eldebo. July 2013.

¹⁸ World Health Organisation: Lebanon Health Profile 2015, available at http://applications.emro.who.int/dsaf/EMROPUB_2016_EN_19274.pdf?ua=1 accessed 20.8.17.

¹⁹ Norwegian Church Aid (2015). op.cit.

²⁰ <http://www.reach-initiative.org/where-we-work/ongoing-field-presence/lebanon> accessed 21.08.17.

²¹ See for example Guay, J (2015) Social Cohesion between Syrian Refugees and Communities in Lebanon and Jordan World Vision International 2015.

²² See International Crisis Group (2013) Too Close for Comfort: Syrians in Lebanon.

²³ International Crisis Group (2014) op.cit. Norwegian Church Aid (2015) The Syrian Crisis and its Impact on Lebanon – A Conflict Analysis.

²⁴ International Crisis Group (2013) op.cit.

²⁵ Guay, J (2015) op.cit.

- The influx of refugees has exacerbated divisions among the Christian parties in Lebanon, who previously shared a common reference point in opposition to the Government of Syria's Assad regime. Now, it is considered one of the most divisive issues among these parties.²⁶
- The risk of spill over of the Syrian conflict into Lebanon has raised concerns regarding the potential for Hezbollah's military involvement.²⁷
- There are concerns that the influx of refugees is creating a breeding ground for radicalisation among both young Syrians and Lebanese.²⁸

Norway's education interventions are therefore implemented among a highly complex operating context – and one where some commentators perceive the risk of conflict increasing.²⁹

2.3 The effects of the crisis on Lebanon's education system

The challenges in Lebanon's public education system, present well prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, were thrown into sharp relief by the influx of a significant refugee population. Before the Syrian influx, around 30 percent of the Lebanese population was enrolled in the public education system. However, the public sector accounts for only 19 percent of preschool service provision compared to 81 percent in the private and semi-private sector.³⁰ Enrolment of Lebanese children and youth into public schools declined from 249,000 in 2011, to 238,000 in 2014.³¹

The Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) identifies the challenges along parameters of access and quality, as follows:³²

Access	Limited demand for public education , especially from poorer and more vulnerable families - estimated to comprise almost 28% of Lebanese households and 70% of Syrian refugees ³³ (with parental perceptions that private schooling offers a better quality of education) Limited quality and availability of built spaces in public schools
Quality	Poor quality teaching , with Lebanon's teaching corps 'now a shadow of its former self' ³⁴ Bullying and corporal punishment in Lebanese schools

Key barriers to the education system, according to a context analysis prepared by education sector technical partners and MEHE,³⁵ were as follows:

- The cost of education, both for poor Lebanese and displaced Syrian children
- Security concerns, linked to the risk of violence and exploitation
- Economic drivers, the age group 10- 14 often required to contribute to household income
- Early marriage for girls
- Language of instruction, with Syrian refugees lacking sufficient functional literacy in English or French, the language of delivery for Lebanese public education
- Bullying, corporal punishment and abuse, linked to discrimination and exclusion
- School facilities: with a lack of sanitary facilities that meet minimum requirements

²⁶ Norwegian Church Aid (2015). op.cit.

²⁷ International Crisis Group (2014) op.cit.

²⁸ Norwegian Church Aid (2015) op.cit.

²⁹ <https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/sectarian-conflict-in-lebanon> accessed 22.08.17.

³⁰ Government of Lebanon and United Nations Lebanon (2015) Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2015-2016.

³¹ Ministry of Education and Higher Education (2016) Reaching All Children with Education (RACE) II 2017-2020.

³² Ibid. Wider systemic issues also identified by the Ministry are national data systems; curriculum content (focused on subject-matter content rather than on competencies or skills); the lack of comprehensive national standards for the measurement of learning achievement; insufficient and inefficiently implemented policy frameworks to properly address barriers to strengthened delivery of education services; and a need to revise the Ministry of Education and Higher Education's human resource strategy and structure.

³³ UNDP and UNHCR (2016) 3RP Annual Report.

³⁴ Ministry of Education and Higher Education (2016) op.cit.

³⁵ Government of Lebanon and United Nations Lebanon (2015) op.cit.

- Psychosocial needs among children fleeing from, or witnessing, violence and war
- Quality factors, including a lack of sufficient teaching equipment and materials

These factors contributed to dropout rates among Syrian students in public education as high as 70 percent.³⁶

2.4 The international response to the regional crisis

Since 2014, support to countries affected by the Syria regional crisis has been conducted under the auspices of the UN-coordinated Regional Refugee and Resilience Plans ('3RP'). 3RPs have been developed for two-year periods since December 2014, with annual updates. The current 3RP covers the period 2017-2018.

The 3RP sets the main strategic framework for the overall response, with sector-specific overviews and intentions. Education goals and intentions are mainly housed under the UNICEF-coordinated 'No Lost Generation' (NLG) initiative, launched in 2013. Education is one of three pillars under the initiative, the other being child protection and adolescent and youth engagement.

In February 2016, education partners came together at the London 'Supporting Syria' conference to discuss key strategic shifts required to effectively address the education challenges. Key priorities arising, and reflected in the 3RP 2017-2018 are:

- The continuous strengthening of national education systems.
- The promotion of a conducive national policy framework and accelerated scaling of access to quality education.
- Accreditation and regulation of non-formal education programmes as a necessary mode of delivery because of its flexibility and rapidity in reaching out to children and youth for whom the formal system may be inaccessible.

Key outstanding challenges included:

- Certification of learning both in the formal and non-formal sectors.
- Factoring Syrian teachers into national education plans.
- Putting in place social protection frameworks to overcome financial barriers to schooling and reduce negative coping mechanisms.

The 3RP set regional requirements of \$662 for education, requesting \$358m for Lebanon. At the end of 2016, the sector was 77 percent funded in total, at \$506m, with \$253 raised for Lebanon (70.1%).³⁷

2.5 The national response to the crisis

Lebanon Crisis Response Plan: Within the broad framework of the 3RP, countries have prepared their own national and sectoral response plans. In Lebanon, this comprises the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), developed for the periods 2015-2016 and 2017-2020.

The LCRP education response plan is led by MEHE, with support from UNICEF as lead coordinating agency and supporting actors including ICSOs. LCRPs set the following goals and targets, with associated funding requirements:

³⁶ 3RP Annual Report for 2016, available at <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/3RP-2016-Annual-Report.pdf> (Accessed 22.08.17).

³⁷ Op.cit.

Table 1: Lebanon crisis response plans

Date	Requirements	Outcomes	Priority interventions
LCRP 2015-2017	\$388.2 million	OUTCOME 1: Ensuring equitable access to educational opportunities for boys and girls. OUTCOME 2: Improving the quality of teaching and learning. OUTCOME 3: Strengthening national education systems, policies, and monitoring.	1: Support enrolment to formal education for school-aged boys and girls. 2: Support enrolment to Non-Formal Education for children who are outside the formal system. 3: Outreach to get children to public schools. 4: Support to ensure retention in formal education. 5: Strengthen national education systems, policies, and monitoring. 6: Strengthen community engagement to support a sustainable behavioural change towards education.
LCRP 2017-2020	\$372.6m	OUTCOME 1: Enhanced access to, and demand from, children youth, and their caregivers, for equitable formal or regulated non-formal education. OUTCOME 2: Enhanced quality of education services and learning environment to ensure grade-appropriate learning outcomes for children and youth. OUTCOME 3: Enhanced governance and managerial capacities of RACE II implementing institutions to plan, budget, deliver, monitor and evaluate education services.	1 National Back-to-School (BTS) initiative. 2.Regulated Non Formal Education (NFE) Programmes. 3. Rehabilitation of schools. 4. Capacity strengthening for education personnel including teachers. 5. Design and roll out of a national education management information system. 6. Curriculum revision. 7. Building policy frameworks and implementation capacity to regulate education programmes and services, strengthen school management and professionalise teaching services.

National policy frameworks: Within the LCRP, the MEHE-led Reaching All Children with Education (RACE) plans I and II comprise the main sectoral frameworks for education. RACE I³⁸ (June 2014-2016) was developed by the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) in 2014 in response to the Syria crisis. It built upon the “No Lost Generation” strategy and the Stabilization Framework developed by the World Bank, UN and Government. RACE I covered both immediate humanitarian response interventions as well as longer-term support.

RACE I set ambitious targets, committing government and partners to providing 470,000 school-aged displaced Syrian and poor Lebanese children with access to quality learning opportunities in safe and protective environments by 2016. Of this total, 200,000 Syrian children would be enrolled in formal education. 45,000 studies would be provided with community-based instruction in reading and maths.

The key targets of RACE I were:

- An average of 413,000 children per year with access to quality learning opportunities
- Trained teachers: 20,000
- Rehabilitated schools: 250
- Equipped classrooms: 2500
- Established school libraries: 250

The successor RACE II Strategy (2017-2021) was considered to represent an ambitious improvement of RACE I. It focused on building institutional capacity, policy frameworks, and data systems.³⁹ Key targets of RACE II are:

³⁸Ministry of Education and Higher Education (2014) Reaching All Children with Education (RACE I), 2014-2016.

³⁹ UNICEF and partners (2016) Syria Crisis Education Strategic Paper (2016): London Progress Report. Paper prepared jointly for the international ‘Supporting Syria and the Region’ London Conference, held in February 2016.

- A back to school initiative;
- Appropriately equipped public schools;
- Enhanced teachers' capacities to provide learner-centred pedagogy and to contribute to inclusive, safe, healthy and protective environments; and
- Strengthened capacity of the education system; including data management, revised curriculum, content-regulated non-formal education programmes, learning assessment strategy and policy framework for special needs education.

In 2016, or the first year of RACE II, the MEHE set a minimum target of supporting 169,000 non-Lebanese children and 198,980 Lebanese children with access to formal education (kindergarten to Grade 9, secondary education, and TVET). An additional 51,000 or more non-Lebanese children were targeted through non-formal learning opportunities (community-based ECE, preparatory ECE, BLN, ALP, and short vocational courses), and another 50,000 with retention support. This comes to a total of 460,000 vulnerable children supported with learning opportunities in 2017 through RACE II.

Progress under RACE I and RACE II: Under RACE I, the enrolment of Syrian refugee children in public education has significantly increased, reflected in Table 2 below:⁴⁰

Table 2: Enrolment progress 2012-2016

	Refugee enrolment in public education	% of the total public school population
2012-2013	40,000	13.5%
2013-2014	88,000	30%
2014-2015	106,735	36%
2015-2016	150,947	42%

Additionally, the number of Lebanese out-of-school children was reduced back to pre-crisis levels in the 2015/16 scholastic year, at 249,000. In Lebanon, enrolment by gender is proportional to the corresponding school-age population.⁴¹

The vast percent increase in enrolment in public primary schools is attributed to the major increase in the number of schools that opened second shifts⁴² as well as to the partial waiver of school fees under the RACE I initiative. However, the transition to second shift schooling in particular has been far from straightforward, with challenges including insufficiently prepared or experienced teachers to meet the emergency education needs of students; lack of qualified teachers for managing classrooms, dealing with traumatized children or working well for an extended number of teaching hours or without supervision.⁴³ Second shift teachers also lacked financial or other incentives to enhance the quality of teaching in classrooms.

The role of CSOs in Non-Formal Education in Lebanon: Leading up to 2014, concerns within government regarding the diversity of initiatives being implemented within formal schools, as well as high levels of fragmentation, including by CSOs, led to MEHE restricting access to the public schooling system by CSO from August 2014. RACE I required NFE education standards and regulation to be developed, *'in order to insure [sic] the quality of non-formal education.'*⁴⁴

RACE I defined the intended programmes and beneficiaries of NFE in Lebanon as follows:

⁴⁰ Source: Government of Lebanon and United Nations Lebanon (2015) Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2015-2016.

⁴¹ UNICEF and partners (2017) Preparing for the Future of Children and Youth in Syria and Region through Education: London One Year on Brussels Conference Education Report, April 2017.

⁴² Government of Lebanon and United Nations Lebanon (2015) Crisis Response Plan Education Sector Mid-Year Review, 2015.

⁴³ Ministry of Education and Higher Education (2014) op.cit.

⁴⁴ Ibid.


Table 3: RACE I – Programmes and beneficiaries

Type of education	Age group	Provider	Where	How many	Groups in %	Cost per child
Formal basic (1 st shift)	6-14	MEHE	Public schools	30,000	65% Syrian Refugees 20% host communities 10% PRS 5% Lebanese returnees	200
Formal basic (2 nd shift)	6-14	MEHE	Public schools	170,000		600
Accelerated Learning Programme	10-18	CSOs/MEHE (quality assurance)	Public schools/community centres	90,000		350
NFE (basic literacy and numeracy/e-learning)	10-18	CSOs	Community centres/Informal Tented Settlements (ITS)	45,000		250
Community based ECE	3-6	CSOs	Community centres/ITS	40,000		200
Life skills	15-18	CSOs	Community centres/ITS	35,000		75

In January 2016, under RACE I, the **Lebanese NFE Framework** was endorsed. The NFE framework comprises a detailed set of procedures for meeting RACE's broader framework of goals. It requires MEHE to regulate the quality of all education in Lebanon and shut down sectarian or ideological schools. Any organisation providing education outside of the NFE framework is considered to be operating outside MEHE regulations and could be shut down.

RACE II builds on RACE I by setting a firm framework within which CSOs can engage in educational provision. It set out clear NFE programmes and intended pathways from NFE into the public education system (Figure 1):⁴⁵

Figure 1: Non-formal education



It defines the parameters for CSO support within NFE as working within **Early Childhood Education**, **Accelerated Learning Support** (basic and secondary level), and **Basic Literacy and Numeracy** (basic, for ages 10-17) and youth (for ages 15-18)). It also provides scope for CSO engagement through **remedial support programmes** (to be organised inside public schools and implemented jointly by MEHE and

⁴⁵ Source: Ministry of Education and Higher Education (2016) op.cit.

CSOs) and **Homework Support Programmes** (to be implemented either inside the school building or in community centres/tents and implemented through CSO partners). CSOs have also found scope to work within the national **Back-to-School Initiatives**, campaigns launched since 2014 to start the school year.

Under RACE II, the government additionally retains strong control over the **content and implementation** of NFE by CSOs:

- The government's Centre for Educational Research and Development (CERD) will draft the content of each regulated NFE programme; while the MEHE's Programme Management Unit (PMU) will lead the drafting of for the implementation of each of these programmes.
- For the ALP and the preparatory ECE programmes, CERD and the PMU also manage the implementation process.
- Other regulated NFE programmes, while designed by CERD, will be implemented by registered CSOs vetted by the MEHE.
- The PMU maintains a quality assurance role for the implementation of regulated-NFE; and is tasked with collating enrolment, attendance, and transition statistics on regulated NFE.⁴⁶

State engagement in the provision of non-formal education, which typically operates outside state control, has raised tensions between some CSOs – seen typically as providers of NFE - and MEHE.

Enrolment in non-formal education: As of April 2017, registered school-age Syrian refugees enrolled in non-formal education were as follows (Table 4):⁴⁷

Table 4: Enrolment in Non-Formal Education 2015-16

Year	Enrolled in non-formal education
2015	80,119
2016	54,746

The figure was expected to rise in 2017 under RACE II.

2.6 Education sector structures and coordination

The Education Sector Working Group (ESWG) in Lebanon has experienced a complex history. Until 2014, the ESWG operated in the country as part of the crisis response. MEHE disbanded this in 2014, though UN agencies, donors and civil society organisations continued to meet and exchange information in the framework of an “education partners” group. The suspension of the Working Group in Lebanon was considered to have actively impeded sectoral coordination, with a lack of regular reporting/coordination by all agencies.⁴⁸

MEHE replaced the ESWG with the RACE Executive Committee, which it considers the only official coordinating mechanism in education for the Syria crisis response. CSOs are not part of the formal RACE Steering Committee, whose members are the MEHE, main donors (DFID, EU, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, USAID) and multilateral agencies (UNICEF, UNHCR, UNESCO, World Bank).

Elections for a CSO sub-committee took place in January 2016, whose remit was to represent both large and small, national and international NGOs to coordinate community-level RACE II interventions.⁴⁹ Elections were however subsequently repeated. NRC was one of two ICSOs appointed to the sub-committee, in April 2016. The sub-committee works under the Race Executive Committee via the Programme Management Unit (PMU); while the PMU is in charge of the communication between the Race Executive Committee and the NGO sub-committee.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Syria Crisis Education Strategic Paper (2016): London Progress Report. Paper prepared jointly for the international ‘Supporting Syria and the Region’ London Conference, held in February 2016.

⁴⁸ Interviews, Annual report to MFA by NRC 2017.

⁴⁹ Ministry of Education and Higher Education (2017) Reaching All Children with Education II (RACE II), 2017-2021.

3. Norwegian assistance to the country

3.1 Overall assistance to the country 2008-current

Norwegian support for basic education in Lebanon is framed by the 2008 Humanitarian Policy, 2013 White Paper 25⁵⁰ and Annual Budget Propositions. Within Lebanon, the 3RP, LCRP, RACE I and RACE II provide the main sector framework for Norwegian support.

Table 5 below presents Norway's overall assistance to the country, 2008-2016:

Table 5: Overall support from Norway to Lebanon 2008-2016 (NOK million)

2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total
61.9	61.8	56.0	68.4	88.1	139.0	145.2	285.8	546.0	1452.2

Source: extracted from <https://www.norad.no/en/front/toolspublications/norwegian-aid-statistics/?tab=geo>

Funding from Norway contributed to the education component of the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) 2015, the RACE plan and the '#No Lost Generation' initiative in Lebanon, as well as contributing to the Multi-Donor Trust Fund managed by the World Bank to support the expansion of education in the public sector. Multilaterals, specifically UNICEF and IBRD received 239 million NOK from 2014-2016.

According to mapping conducted for the evaluation,⁵¹ between 2008 and 2016 Norway will have channelled **at least** 155 million NOK to basic Education (as a main objective) in Lebanon through eight Norwegian civil society organisations. The level of support has increased from 2 million NOK in 2008 to 34.4 million in 2017.

Table 6: Norwegian support for basic EiCC (main policy objective) through civil society (NOK million)⁵²

2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Total
2.0	12.0	11.0	10.0	10.02	3.12	15.7	23.1	34.3	34.4	155,640

In addition, further support has been channelled through 215.9 million NOK worth of grant support between 2008 and 2016, where basic EiCC comprised a *significant* rather than a *main* policy objective. The bulk of this (194 million NOK) was NRC framework agreements, where education is included as a significant objective. This support was channelled through two Norwegian CSOs, Save the Children Norway (SCN) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), and one local CSO. An overview of Norwegian-supported initiatives between 2008-2017 is provided in Annex 4.

3.2 Recipient Organisation

Many civil society actors delivering basic education [on behalf of the Norwegian Government] in Lebanon have a longstanding presence in the country. Save the Children in its international form has been present in Lebanon since 1958 (though SCN has only had programmes in the country since 2012) and NRC and Right to Play have had country presence since 2006, implementing education in emergencies programmes since April 2007. Prior to 2012, however, most initiatives were focused on supporting basic education to Palestinian and Iraqi refugees in camps, which Norway has a long history of supporting.

⁵⁰ Government of Norway (2013) Meld. St. 25 (2013–2014) Report to the Storting (White Paper) Education for Development.

⁵¹ See Item 1, Mapping.

⁵² Source: Norwegian aid statistics database.

Table 7: Recipient organisations for Norwegian-supported basic EiCC, as a main policy objective (NOK '000)⁵³

Agreement Partner (NOK 1000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Grand Total
Main objective										
NRC		10,000	9,000	10,500	7,000	268				36,232
Fraternity Association for Social and Educational Work								160		160
Insan Association					398			28		370
MSSCF - Maarouf Saad Social and Cultural foundation							1,400	1,500	2,000	4,900
Najda now						580				580
NISCVT - National Institution of Social Care & Vocational Training								1,500	2,000	3,500
SCN					2,622	2,808	14,316	18,297	25,046	63,089
Right to Play	2,000	2,000	2,000				30	1,680	5,309	13,019
Main objective Total	2,000	12,000	11,000	10,500	10,020	3,120	15,746	23,109	34,355	121,850

Organisations receiving the largest levels of support are SCN and NRC, with Right to Play also receiving a considerable level of support over the period.

Both NRC and SCN have framework agreements with both MFA and Norad. However, not all the work conducted in Lebanon takes place under these, with additional applications or addenda required. For example, NRC's expansion of its work to the Syria education response in 2016 took place through an addendum to its existing Global Partnership Agreement of 7.5m NOK.

Additionally, for agreements where basic education is a *significant* (but not main) objective of programming, 194 million NOK has also been channelled through NRC Global Programme Agreements 2008-2017, and a further NOK 21 million through separate agreements with NRC and with Nabaa, a local NGO.

Combining contributions with a *principal* and a *significant* policy objective for basic education, therefore, nearly 337 million NOK has been contributed to basic education in Lebanon through CSOs in the period 2008-2017.

3.3 Source within the Norwegian Aid Administration

The majority of support between 2008 and 2016 was channelled through the Section for Humanitarian Affairs (87.2 million NOK) and Norad's Section for Civil Society Strengthening (23 million NOK). The Embassy in Beirut, through its own funding streams, also provided 9.5m NOK to local organisations in the country.

3.4 Funding by OECD DAC codes

Between 2008 and 2016, the majority of EiCC support with education as a main objective identified Basic education as its main priority (65.6 million). 26.2 million NOK was categorised as Education generally. The remaining support was classified through OECD DAC codes 720 Emergency Response (17.4 million NOK) and 730 Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation (12.6 million NOK).


3.5 Target groups and implementing modalities

Over the time period since 2008, and in light of the operational space provided by RACE and RACE II since 2014, the three main Norwegian CSOs working in education in Lebanon (NRC, SCN⁵⁴ and Right to Play) have addressed target groups and applied implementing modalities as follows:

⁵³ NRC allocations in 2014-2016 are covered in global partnership agreements.

⁵⁴ SCN, like other national SC bodies, has a relatively complex architecture. From 2012 onwards, all SC Country Offices, which had previously implemented operations, merged into one structure: Save the Children International (SCI). SCI serves effectively as the implementing arm of all SC members. SC members, such as SCN, undertake fundraising, provide technical assistance and ensure donor compliance. Since grant applications and agreements refer to both SCN and SCI, and since fully tracking assistance

Figure 2: Programmes implemented



4. Findings

4.1 Relevance

Summary: The relevance of CSO support to EiCC in Lebanon is generally high. Strategies and operations reflect extensive use of context and education assessments, though the use of conflict analysis is more varied. Interventions are well aligned with the extensive local and international needs analyses available, and also in with national sector priorities and plans. Priority groups are clearly identified and align with those of national intentions. Interventions demonstrate high levels of adaptive capacity, responding swiftly to the changing policy, operational and conflict context. There is evidence of lesson-learning in implementation, though this is not always systematic and evaluations are not a formal requirement. All partners are committed to, and reflect use of, Do No Harm approaches and parents and children have been strongly involved in the design and implementation of interventions, and generally feel that their concerns are heard.

4.1.1 Use of context and conflict analysis

Presence and use of context and conflict analysis: All 14 project designs for Norwegian funded CSOs reviewed, as well as associated Country Strategies, incorporate *context* analyses that describe the operating context at the time, and associated risks of interventions. These commonly describe the effects of the crisis on target populations/areas to date; the unfolding events of the crisis; and how the organisation had navigated the limitations confronted in previous implementation.

Within grant applications, context analysis reviewed was highly variable in scope and depth. In particular, individual project grant applications contained very succinct context analysis, with documentation placing much emphasis on grantees' experience and longstanding country and education sector engagement. By 2017, however, context analyses in relation to the Syrian regional crisis are both extensive and mature. For example, NRC produced in 2016 a Norway- and Sweden funded context analysis of the situation in Lebanon: 'A Future in the Balance'.

Presence of *conflict* analysis specifically is more limited. Grant applications to MFA do not explicitly require a conflict analysis. Nonetheless, of 14 project proposals for Lebanon, seven⁵⁵ do contain at least some

from MFA/Norad delivered through SCN to SCI has not consistently proven feasible in any of the case studies for this evaluation, SCI implementation through Norwegian funding is included in the evaluation.

⁵⁵ From both NRC and SCN.

conflict analysis, though of variable quality and depth. NRC proposal and documentation show especially strong use of conflict analysis. For example, NRC's Country Strategy 2011-2014 and 2015-2017 contain detailed analysis of conflict dynamics stretching back to 2008, as well as stakeholder and power analyses, and assessments of specific future scenarios.

Project proposals show gradual *maturation* of conflict analysis over time. For example, given Norway's long history of support to Palestinian groups in Lebanon, an NRC application to MFA in 2008 for support to Palestinian groups – including for basic education - contains a comparatively detailed conflict analysis which discusses the drivers of conflict in camps. Support to refugees from the Syrian regional crisis, which gained momentum in 2012, show lighter analysis in the first project proposal from March 2012, but more developed analyses in proposals for 2014 and 2015.

Links into programme design are often inexplicit within documentation. However, field staff from NRC, SCN and Right to Play interviewed during fieldwork articulated strong local knowledge of the conflict dynamics affecting programming, and could reflect on how changes in these dynamics had affected programming over the implementation period.

Use of Do No Harm approaches in design: Eleven of 14 project proposals reviewed⁵⁶ explicitly reference a commitment to 'do no harm' approaches in the design and implementation of their education interventions. Again, these are most prominent in NRC applications and designs, with all those analysed explicitly referencing the principles. SCN applications and reports reference how implementation was reviewed by the Country Office to check that partners were implementing activities in line with 'Do No Harm' approaches, often as part of risk analyses.

Projects also reflect application of the approaches throughout design and implementation, for example through participatory needs analyses in design (see below). Some designs also integrate attention to conflict resolution and peacebuilding approaches. For example, a 2010 NRC proposal for work with Palestinian refugees in UNRWA-led camps commits to building peace building/conflict resolution skills. *By focusing on methods that move teaching away from authoritarian models towards more student-centred methodologies there is the potential to have a great effect on reducing the cycles of violence so evident in the refugee camp settings.*

Education analysis: Context analyses of the state of the education sector in the country are extensively applied. All strategic and programmatic documentation reviewed detailed the main concerns and barriers to access and quality. Those identified are reflected in the international literature on the crisis described in Section 2 above.

Norwegian-funded CSOs have also been heavily engaged in the production of joint context analyses of the sector. For example, NRC's 2017 Application for Addendum to the MFA-NRC Global Partnership Agreement II (2016-2018) contains an extensive context analysis of the education sector in Lebanon, and the needs associated with it. Save the Children and UNICEF collaborated on a 2012 Education Rapid Needs Assessment for Displaced Syrian Children in schools, communities, and safe spaces, in which SCN was also engaged. This identified key access barriers as language, physical barriers, discriminatory barriers, as well as legal and security barriers. The subsequent Save the Children (international) Draft Education Sector Strategy for Lebanon⁵⁷ contains a detailed needs assessment and problem statement of the challenges facing Syrian refugees in the country:

Box 1: Save the Children – Education Strategy for Lebanon

Save the Children's draft education strategy for Lebanon 2017-2018 describes the main entry routes into formal basic education for refugees, as well as the Non-Formal Education (NFE) framework and accelerated learning pilot program. It also lists the outstanding barriers to access for refugee children, including documentation demands; language of instruction; lack of basic literacy and numeracy skills; distance to schools; and transportation and other "out-of-pocket" costs associated with education. It emphasizes the need for education system strengthening through policy engagement, but also advocacy to change the system.

Draft Education Sector Strategy for Lebanon, Save the Children International

⁵⁶ From both NRC and SCN.

⁵⁷ Version 2017.01.30.

4.1.2 Engagement of affected populations in planning interventions

Engagement of parents and children in design: Engagement of affected parents and children within project design has been generally substantial, and gaining momentum in the later time period of the crisis. All interventions reviewed made explicit reference to consultation at design stage, and staff interviewed in Beirut in all Norwegian-funded CSOs stated that community consultation was a necessary part of design.

In terms of implementation, project designs for NRC and SCN also reflect efforts to set up Parent Committees for NFE programmes. Right to Play also integrates feedback from Parent Committees in the design and operation of its education support programmes, conducting regular monthly meetings and post-exam evaluation sessions to integrate Parents in the educational process.

Focus groups with project implementation staff and parents confirmed that Parent Committees in field sites were mostly functioning; in some cases parents participated in design, for example to determine issues such as optimal class timing. In others, engagement in design had been limited, but regular consultations took part as part of implementation. Project implementation staff stated that course correction, for example on issues such as complaints about individual teaching staff, had been addressed. Parents largely felt that their concerns were heard: *'We have parent meetings every Thursday. I attended some three meetings. Every few months they make parent meetings. There are regular meetings. Also, if you have issues, you can talk to them. The public school you can't.'* All interviewed CSOs also use WhatsApp groups to connect parents together (for each class) to enable information exchange and to make sure all issues are communicated between teacher and parents.

4.1.3 Interventions designed and implemented to meet the needs and interests of the affected population

Alignment with national and/or local education needs analyses: Prior to 2012, when responses to the Syria crisis came into operation, proposals from NRC mostly focused on the needs of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees. Needs assessments therefore align mainly with those of the international community, and specifically those of UNRWA and UNHCR.

Needs assessments have evolved considerably since 2012, when the international response to the Syria crisis began to gain momentum. Project proposals reviewed for 2012 and 2013 contain little explicit reference to *national* needs analyses in basic education, though they all include detailed needs assessments of their own, largely focused on Syrian refugees in the country.⁵⁸ Consultations with communities were also included as part of design.

Since 2014, and with the advent of RACE I and RACE II, all civil society organisations' needs assessments make a strong statement of alignment with the needs articulated in these strategies. In doing so, they start to reference the needs of vulnerable host communities. For example, a 2016 SCN application to MFA for NOK 12 million of GAP funding⁵⁹ explicitly references RACE I, and states that *'The project will focus on support to Syrian refugees, but SC will make an effort to also facilitate the enrolment and retention of vulnerable Lebanese children, to support cohesion in host communities. The support to Syrian Palestinian and Iraqi refugees will continue.'*

Key dimensions of needs identified all reflect the priorities of RACE and RACE II. They include: *access* to formal basic education through MEHE-prescribed NFE pathways for out of school children, including vulnerable Lebanese children; and *quality* of NFE improvements, through parental engagement, improvements to inclusive education, and improved educational facilities, etc.

By 2016 and 2017, all project proposals are not only *aligned* with the needs presented in the RACE and RACE II and the LCRP, but designs and strategies explicitly state how, as major actors supporting the Lebanese government in the international response to the crisis, CSO actors will *contribute* to the realisation of RACE I and RACE II intentions within the limited operating space provided to them. For example, the 2016 grant application from Save the Children to MFA above discusses how the proposed activities actively respond to the realisation of the intentions of RACE and the NFE strategy, in terms of providing a pathway for beneficiaries into the MEHE-managed formal system. NRC has managed to secure of approval for its Learning Support programme in public schools, though it has to apply for approval twice a year.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ As for example in joint NRC-SCN project proposals for MFA support to NFE for 2014-2015 and 2015-2016.

⁵⁹ A continuation of a previous grant: MEU 15/0045.

⁶⁰ Email communication 22/08/17.

Alignment with national and local sector strategies and plans: In the period 2012-2014, Norwegian-funded CSOs were engaging both in their traditional support activities to Palestinian and Iraqi refugees, in alignment with Government of Lebanon and international commitments to these communities. Increasingly, they were also reaching out to support Syrian refugees entering Lebanon.

The absence of a coherent sectoral strategy and steer around the Syria crisis response from national stakeholders in this period created an ‘alignment vacuum’, where external actors found themselves with few firm strategic or operational directives to align *with*. On the CSO side, grant applications during the time period reflect intentions for direct engagement with the public education system as the area of greatest need - for example by raising the awareness of parents of their children’s right to education, providing support for the registration process, and conducting capacity assessments among Lebanese teachers.⁶¹

On the government side, concerns around the fragmentation of support by donors and CSOs, led to a decision to adopt the more directive approach of RACE I. The operational effect of the decision to restrict CSOs’ role initially to NFE provision were significant, both for CSOs operating in the country, and for Government of Norway as their funder. Project documentation from the period reflects a series of requests for no-cost extensions, given implementation delays, and the need for course correction.⁶² For example, in October 2014, SCN requested the MFA for a no-cost extension to its Community Based Alternatives to Strengthening Formal Education in Lebanon. The justification provided was MEHE’s position that they did not support full-curriculum being delivered in a community setting, and the requirement to align with RACE I. Negotiations between MEHE and SCN had taken several months – resulting in delayed implementation.

Since 2014, with a clearer strategic steer in place, Norwegian-funded CSOs’ have aligned with the openings identified within RACE I and RACE II. Key areas of NFE in which CSOs are engaged in Lebanon are (Table 8):

Table 8: Areas of alignment

Area	CSO
Accelerated learning	NRC, SCN
Basic Literacy and Numeracy including remedial/homework support programmes	NRC, SCN
Teacher support	Right to Play ⁶³

Operational alignment with the direction set by MEHE is clear. NRC’s 2015 report to MEHE, for example, cites their main programme responses in basic education in Lebanon – namely: 1) education in emergency for newcomers and out-of-school children not benefiting from formal education programmes; 2) structured non-formal education for children not yet ready or able to access formal education or ALP; and 3) support to formal education through retention programmes. These approaches align with the areas set out in RACE I. NRC has achieved permission to implement Learning Support Programmes inside public schools, with approval from MEHE.

Nonetheless, CSOs in Lebanon – including those funded by Norway – voiced concerns about the limited operating space available to them, and particularly in their inability to verify the effectiveness of their initiatives within NFE though access to data on retention and drop-out within the public education system.⁶⁴

Priority groups targeted RACE, RACE II and the LCRP prioritise *equitable access* to education, both for out of school Syrian children and vulnerable Lebanese children. RACE I explicitly commits to setting vulnerability criteria for selecting pupils, with the purpose that at least half of all children reached by this intervention will be girls, and prioritizing children from the most vulnerable families such as single-parent

⁶¹ For example, LBFS1205, a NOK 7m request from NRC to the Government of Lebanon for emergency support to Syrian refugees, including access to basic education.

⁶² LBN 14/003 Request for No Cost Extension.

⁶³ In UNRWA schools.

⁶⁴ Interviews with stakeholders in Beirut.

households, households with disabled children, households with unemployed parents and households with more than three children.⁶⁵ RACE II prioritises *inclusive education*, particularly for disabled children.

All Norwegian-supported initiatives reviewed in Lebanon specifically targeted *equitable access* to education, as evidenced by a wide range of documentation reviewed, and through fieldwork findings. MFA and Norad requirements require an explicit statement on *gender*, which is consequently prominently mentioned in all project documentation over the full time-period of the evaluation – including in results frameworks, with relevant targets set and reported upon.

In more recent years, and reflecting the policy opening of RACE II, efforts on *inclusive education* have also gained momentum. For example, in a Concept Note presented to MFA in 2017, SCN noted that they saw this area as a doorway to make the organisation increasingly relevant to MEHE. Accordingly, they proposed to prioritise the most marginalized children, including children with disabilities.⁶⁶

A wide range of strategies for ensuring the *inclusion of priority groups* into education are employed within Norwegian-funded EiCC initiatives in Lebanon. This includes advocacy campaigns, particularly the Back to School campaign of 2016, in which both SCN and NRC participated, and supportive action within communities, for example by training staff and teachers on inclusive education approaches and providing educational aids. Other strategies include psychosocial support within NFE interventions (which were highly valued by parents interviewed during focus groups); the use of referral systems for children with disabilities; working on anti-bullying and anti-violence in NFE provision; and working with local communities to raise awareness on educational opportunities available. Gender-specific strategies include, for example, sensitisation of parents, using gender-segregated busses, and offering gender-segregated classes - especially for youth – to facilitate girls' access to education services.

Use of community resources to implement learning opportunities Focus groups in Lebanon found limited use of community resources to help implement non-formal learning opportunities, perhaps due to the strict oversight and management of the process by MEHE.

4.1.4 Extent to which interventions have evolved over time, adapting to changing situations

Responding to changes in need: The increasing influx of Syrian refugees to Lebanon since 2011 has been the main change in the profile of need in the country. Norwegian assistance to education in Lebanon has scaled up substantially over the period since 2011, and that channelled through CSOs has increased commensurately (see figures in section 2). The main CSOs in the country, NRC and SCN, have adapted accordingly, with grant applications and annual funding agreements reflecting an increase in the numbers of beneficiaries targeted and expansion in project areas. For example:

- A joint project proposal between SCN and NRC in 2014⁶⁷ for non-formal education for Syrian refugees was piloted in Akkar and South Lebanon with MFA funding 2014-2015, at a cost of 10 million NOK and targeted 2,500 children to access non-formal education.
- A successor project was proposed (and granted) for NOK 25 million in 2015-2016, targeting 3480 refugee children in expanded geographical areas of Akkar, Tripoli/T5 and Beirut/Mount Lebanon. Additional sites were to be sought through a needs and gaps analysis.
- For 2016-2017, organisations applied separately to MFA for activity continuation/expansion; SCN for example requested a further 10m NOK to target 2825 refugee children in the same areas as the previous project but additional areas for Homework Support. Target groups were also expanded to include vulnerable Lebanese children.

Adjusting to contextual change: Aside from the contextual changes created by the influx of refugees, CSOs have also been required to navigate major changes in the policy and institutional environment in Lebanon since 2008. The contextual shifts described in Section 2, and particularly the restricted access to the public education system, have required high levels of adaptive capacity from CSOs involved in the education sector response. Such capacity is amply demonstrated in the evidence analysed for this field study,

⁶⁵ Ministry of Education and Higher Education (2014) op.cit.

⁶⁶ Ensuring children with disabilities have access to education is also part of SCN's Quality Learning Environment, addressed by all country programmes.

⁶⁷ LBN 1410003.

with evidence of numerous amendments in programme implementation as conditions changed; for example, changing implementation modalities, project sites, etc., also reflected in annual reports and adjustments to country strategies.

This flexibility has been further permitted and enhanced by the flexibility of Norwegian funding. Examples include:

- *No-cost extensions* – of which three were noted during the period;⁶⁸ all to allow for implementation delays caused by the contextual shifts above;
- *Amendments to grant agreements*: Three also occurred during the period.⁶⁹ For example, in July 2016, SCN requested a revision to its budgeting and agreed implementation plan to its MFA-funded NFE activities, due to the changes arising from the RACE I plan.⁷⁰

Box 2 provides an example of the need for adaptation; and CSOs' and the responsiveness of Norwegian assistance (the no-cost extension was granted as requested):

Box 2: Adaptation

Adaptation in SCN Lebanon

In July 2016, SCN requested a revision to its budgeting and agreed implementation plan to its MFA-funded NFE activities, due to the changes arising from the RACE I plan. *'Since the project was originally conceived, a large number of public schools began hosting 2nd shift or Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP) activities in Lebanon. These are both run through the MEHE. Save the Children wished to avoid undermining or de-incentivising formal education, so needed to avoid running non-formal education activities in the same geographical areas. However, since the opening of additional 2nd shifts and ALP programmes was announced on an ad hoc basis by MEHE, this caused planning and implementation difficulties for SCN, who had to adapt its non-formal activities in the Tripoli area particularly, and provide Remedial Classes/Homework support in addition to the Basic Numeracy and Literacy (BLN) classes originally planned.'*

Use of lesson learning All organisations do draw lessons from their engagement in Lebanon, reflected for example in Annual Reports. However, the level of detail and evidencing of lessons provided is highly variable, and learning often reflects on whether approaches have been successful, rather than producing more generically-applicable lessons.

Often, lessons provide signals to the organisations on where to concentrate future effort for organisational improvement. For example, NRC's 2015 Annual Report to MFA identifies lessons on emphasising structured learning support to reduce drop-outs; the need for preparatory Basic Literacy and Numeracy programmes to ensure smooth transition into formal education; the need to intensify trainings and follow up sessions for NFE teachers; and the need for tailored learning support programmes to promote school retention and achievements.⁷¹

Organisation-specific learning processes vary. For example, at a *thematic level*/NRC Country Directors meet annually to share technical expertise from the field and in relation to the international humanitarian agenda.⁷² NRC hold regular field staff meetings and a regional-level education roaming coordinator also helps consolidate lessons learned. Within MFA, presence of a Regional Education Adviser based in Beirut is hoped to increase the potential for lesson learning across Norwegian-funded organisations.⁷³

Lesson-learning from ongoing implementation through regular consultation with implementing staff, partners and beneficiaries was a significant feature of the interventions reviewed. Interviews and focus groups during fieldwork confirmed that, for all organisations reviewed, interviews with teachers and beneficiaries are regularly conducted, indicating that feedback loops are in place and functioning.

⁶⁸ One NRC and two SCN.

⁶⁹ Two SCN; one NRC.

⁷⁰ MFA Education SoF: 57800558.

⁷¹ NRC, Report to MFA 2015.

⁷² NRC interview.

⁷³ Interviews.

Beyond Annual Review meetings with Norad/MFA, there is no formal requirement for independent evaluations to be conducted of Norwegian-funded EiCC activities. However, both SCN and NRC in Lebanon generate regular evaluations. For SCN, this occurs through its 'Monitoring Evaluation Accountability and Learning' system, which has a separate evaluation team that makes sure that each project is assessed and monitored and lessons learned are taken from the field. NRC's evaluations conducted include a 2012 Mid-term evaluation of NRC's cooperation with UNRWA to support Palestinian refugees, including in basic education; an Assessment of NRC's Emergency Education Response to the Syria crisis in Lebanon, April 2013; a review of the Iraqi Community Centres in 2014; plus a range of internal reviews and 'mini-evaluations'.

However, evaluations tend to be of small-scale initiatives rather than at a more strategic, thematic or country level. No Country Programme level evaluations, for example, were available for any of the CSOs reviewed. Moreover, the quality of evaluations reviewed is variable, with few systematic quality standards in place; and – particularly in the case of NRC – not all independently conducted. A more systematic and rigorous approach would add quality and credibility, and help ensure maximum value for the resources spent.

4.2 Effectiveness

Summary: There has been regular monitoring of activities, though CSOs apply diverse systems and varied methodologies in the collection of results. Reporting on marginalised groups and gender did not go beyond 'inclusion' in terms of numbers.

Overall, however, there is evidence that Norwegian support to education through CSOs has increased access to quality education for children in Lebanon, and taken an equitable approach in terms of gender, though disability is a relatively recent concern. CSOs' activities have also resulted in increased access to safe, child-friendly learning environments, although efforts in rehabilitation have been limited due to restricted access to public education. Innovative approaches have supported increased enrolment, including the creation of safe spaces, improved teaching and learning methodologies and provision of psycho-social support for vulnerable children – all features highly valued by parents.

4.2.1 Extent to which interventions achieved, or are likely to achieve, intended outputs and activities

Monitoring of activities and results: Annual reports from CSOs reviewed indicate regular monitoring of education response activities, as well as end of phase learning, reflected in Annual Reports. NRC, for example is also required to provide interim progress reports (twice yearly) against the Global Partnership Agreement, and conducts annual review meetings. Save the Children conduct quarterly internal reviews as well as joint review meetings with Norad.⁷⁴

All CSOs reviewed as part of this case study conducted field-level activity monitoring at field level, though applying diverse reporting frameworks and diverse indicators. A review of results reports prepared for Norwegian government funders finds progress against target outputs and outcomes reported against the various results frameworks, and justification mostly provided when targets are not met; these are also provided in requests for programme amendment, above.

SCN has a particularly well-developed monitoring system, the 'Monitoring Evaluation Accountability and Learning' (MEAL) system, which ensures that data is collected and reported upon under key indicators. A dedicated MEAL team also work to ensure that data is applied, through concrete feedback loops, to inform programming. The MEAL function includes the evaluation process and system, above.

Highly varied indicators, are applied, however, and methodologies applied to collect data and report progress are also diverse. A Norad-conducted wider report on Norwegian support to education reported similarly.⁷⁵

Gaps in indicators were also noted in monitoring reports, which focused mainly on 'hard' outputs and outcomes, such as enrolment and teacher training. Other 'softer' results were however observed by the case

⁷⁴ Key informant interviews.

⁷⁵ Norad (2017) Rising to the Challenge: Results of Norwegian Assistance to Education 2013-2016.

study team in fieldwork, for example in capacity strengthening of local partners and policy influencing at central level. These omissions mean that such results were not consistently made visible in results reporting.

Data disaggregation: Data was mostly disaggregated in terms of gender across all CSOs throughout the evaluation period, though reporting on gender often did not go further than ‘numbers of girls enrolled’. However, reporting on other vulnerable groups noted above, including disabled children, was not reflected in results reporting from any of the organisations analysed. Save the Children began to report globally on disability in 2015,⁷⁶ but this data was not expected to be available from Lebanon until mid-2017.

Challenges noted by civil society organisations in monitoring and evaluation included:

- **Limited access to education management information systems** This prevents CSOs being able to monitor follow-on enrolment pathways into the formal system from non-formal provision – in effect, limiting their capacity to be able to monitor the effectiveness of activities. Data on follow up on referrals into the formal system occurs through surveys of beneficiaries attending non-formal education sessions, and some follow up telephone surveys of parents. CSOs conducted these assiduously, but given a highly fluid population, data is subject to obvious challenges in terms of availability and accuracy. Drop-out from formal education is similarly recorded through follow up surveys.
- **Weak partner capacity/experience in monitoring and evaluation** (in case of SCN, who implement mostly through partners) – though this was mitigated in part through the comprehensive MEAL system applied.
- Both central and field staff in NRC reported **prior weaknesses in monitoring and reporting**, reflected in results reports reviewed. NRC has invested in creating a more robust M&E unit in order to make sure that lessons learned are conducted regularly.

Evaluation coverage was unsystematic, and those reviewed were of mixed quality. Greater efficiency would be achieved by determining systematic quality standards for evaluations, to improve the value of products created, and maximise the value of resources expended. Fewer smaller evaluations, and more frequent strategic, thematic, or country-level evaluations would be likely to deliver increased value.

Lesson learning mechanisms exist within both NRC and SCN, being most formalised through SCN’s MEAL system and programme team. Lesson learning was also shared informally through the operational coordination above and through coordination fora where and when functioning. Lesson learning processes between the Norwegian Government and implementing organisations are considered by stakeholders to be largely *bilateral* (such as joint review meetings held between Norad and Save the Children). However, the role of an Education Adviser in the Beirut Embassy was considered to be a potentially significant set forward in the future facilitation of joint learning. All CSOs stated that they would appreciate more strategic learning opportunities, particularly given the highly protracted nature of the crisis and the need to ensure that EiCC interventions respond to the humanitarian-development nexus.

INEE Standards: The INEE standards were not found to provide a consistent set of quality standards for EiCC interventions in Lebanon. They are most explicitly built into NRC project designs, though not into project results frameworks or reporting. Within SCN, they are less explicit within documentation, and staff and partners interviewed during fieldwork had variable levels of familiarity with the standards. All those interviewed across CSOs felt that the standards were ‘aspirational’ in the Lebanon context.⁷⁷ Given the virtual absence of reporting against them, they are not applied systematically as an analytical framework here, though assessments are made against them where feasible.

Achievement against targets: Given the diverse indicators applied within interventions, therefore, and different methodologies behind them – plus evolution over time in the Lebanon context - it is not possible for this case study to confidently provide a set of aggregate results, or data that is comparable over time, or across organisations for the evaluation period.

⁷⁶ See for example NRC’s Global Outcome and Output reports for 2015 and 2016.

⁷⁷ For example, observation found standards for space at 1.25 m² per person for elementary and intermediate classes, and 1.5 m² per person for secondary classes not always strictly observed.

Whilst results cannot be confidently aggregated or compared over time or across organisations for the evaluation period, some trends can be ascertained by looking across key results in terms of the logic model for the evaluation (see Evaluation Report, Section 2). The main reporting areas are:

- **Access** - All children (*including gender and marginalised groups*) in conflict-affected and fragile situations have the same opportunities to start and complete school;
- **Quality** - All children and young people learn basic skills and are equipped to tackle adult life.

Within these two broad areas, results are as follows:

4.2.1a Access

Access to education: Review of results reports and available evaluations determined that Norwegian-supported EiCC initiatives through CSOs in Lebanon contributed significantly to the 2013 access target of *one million more children with access to good-quality education in crisis and conflict situations*. The most significant contributions achieved occurred since 2014, when the effects of the Syrian regional crisis gathered pace.

Interventions all eventually *achieved* their intended levels of access, in terms of non-formal education provision and referrals into the formal system. Levels of *drop-out* however were high (as far as CSOs could record, given their lack of access to national EMIS systems), due to external barriers highlighted in Section 2. Projects also experienced delays in implementation, mostly due to delays or slow pace in the functioning of national systems and processes, for example in the 2016 Back to School Campaign.

Overall, the number of children enrolled in non-formal education provision (including Basic Literacy and Numeracy, Accelerated Learning Programme and other forms of support) has undergone a significant acceleration from 2014 onwards. A review of results reports and annual reports to MFA/Norad shows the following data in terms of improving access (enrolments and related indicators).⁷⁸ As noted, interventions in basic education scaled up from 2014 in response to the Syrian regional crisis; data are therefore available from this date. Table 8 shows progress against the main enrolment and associated indicators for the period for the two main involved civil society organisations, NRC and SCN.⁷⁹

Table 9: Selected results between 2014 and 2016

Year	NRC	SCN
2014 <i>Achieved</i>	1210 children provided with school learning support and school readiness Non-formal education (NFE) activities for 116 children conducted in the North, and 921 in the South of the country Four schools rehabilitated 53 teachers benefited from a training programme⁸⁰	2186 enrolments (jointly with NRC)
2015 <i>Achieved</i>	1949 children enrolled in NFE programmes (learning support, ALP, and Child Education Pack)⁸¹ Within support to Palestinian camps: 136 teachers and head teachers supported in reflecting on their practices, exposed to new ways of working, experimenting with new approaches. 13 Parents Teachers Associations (PTA) set up in the schools.	881 children attended remedial classes or the ALP (444 boys, 437 girls) 212 referrals into formal education (121 girls, 91 boys)
2016 <i>Achieved</i>	8,828 Syrian refugee, Palestinian refugee and vulnerable Lebanese children and youth reached with education programming, including through:	3164 students enrolled in NFE classes 1199 children out of 3088 completed the full cycle of NFE

⁷⁸ Data subject to the caveats noted in the main evaluation report (Section 2).

⁷⁹ Sources; Annual reports to Norad/MFA; end-of grant project reports.

⁸⁰ Annual Report to MFA.

⁸¹ Annual Report for 2015 to MFA.

	A school retention and a summer programme for Syrian refugee children to keep children engaged, learning and successful in school School Readiness and Basic Literacy and Numeracy to fill the gap in basic learning skills, in order to ensure a smooth transition and integration to Grade One in formal school; 3,500 children reached with information campaigns under the MEHE's Back to School Campaign, Learning centred training given to Lebanese teachers, and parents were engaged to support their children's learning through forming parent community groups; Programmes aimed at Palestinian refugees also included formation of Student Parliaments and Parent and Teacher Associations and selected teachers were trained under the Better Learning Programme (BLP).⁸²	with 80% attendance 64% of children in the North demonstrated improved learning outcomes; 37% in Beirut (target 75%) Norad global framework agreement⁸³ Palestinian children: more than 1000 children were enrolled in NFE exceeding the total annual target of 900. Out of the total, 316 children were enrolled in ALP and 231 completed the cycle and were successfully transferred to public schools (both UNRWA and the Ministry of Education and Higher Education, MEHE). Over 200 (117 female) parents actively involved in children's education through 6 Parent Community Groups.
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In terms of referrals into the formal system: as noted, access to data to confirm successful referral into the public education system (and thereafter, on retention) is extremely limited. However, results reporting⁸⁴ shows the following:

Table 10: Referrals

	NRC	SCN
2014 <i>Achieved</i>	At least 50% of the children who attended the learning support activities enrolled in formal schooling.	No available data
2015 <i>Achieved</i>	90% of learners (boys/girls) enrolled in the formal school system within 6 months of completing NFE programmes (Target: 80%); 4,602 out-of-school children referred to ALP and offered transportation to attend the placement test.	212 children transitioned successfully to public schools (Palestinian refugees).
2016 <i>Achieved</i>	1,781 children referred to formal education	1047 children referred to formal education⁸⁵ 1397 children enrolled in non-formal education⁸⁶

Once into the formal system, however, the lack of access to national data systems prevents CSOs measuring accurately retention and dropout rates, which wider data sources find to be high (at 30% in 2012),⁸⁷ and subsequently not estimated to have reduced.⁸⁸ (Reducing or preventing dropout is however the first education sector indicator and target in SCI's Lebanon Country Strategy for 2016-2018.)⁸⁹

Humanitarian access and protection Given MEHE's strong management of the education sector in Lebanon, Norwegian-funded CSOs had limited scope to engage in school rehabilitation, with shelter programmes largely focused on homes and houses. However, both NRC's and SCN's strategic plans for

⁸² Global partnership agreement report (Lebanon).

⁸³ GLO 0605 QZA – 014/0477.

⁸⁴ Sources: Grant stream reports to MFA.

⁸⁵ Source: Grant stream reports to MFA.

⁸⁶ MFA Education SoF: 57800558; Request for Amendment.

⁸⁷ UNICEF Lebanon and Save the Children (2012) Education Rapid Needs Assessments for Displaced Syrian Children in schools communities and safe spaces.

⁸⁸ See for example Human Rights Watch (2016) 'Growing up without an education' Barriers to Education for Syrian Refugee Children in Lebanon.

⁸⁹ Result 1: # deprived children receive remedial support to prevent their dropout from formal education.

the country include rehabilitation of schools, and rehabilitation is an indicator in some project logframes.⁹⁰ For example, NRC's 2016 humanitarian plan for Lebanon included scope in the top-up Education component of the MFA grant to 'monitor' school rehabilitation within public schools and/or community-based learning spaces. Following a pilot in 2016, NRC secured funding in 2017 to support MEHE with upgrading/rehabilitating public schools.

Observation from field study found learning environments generally safe and secure, in line with the contextualised INEE standards for Lebanon. Field staff had limited awareness of the contextualised standards at field level and given their level of ambition, they were not systematically required to be implemented. Observation by the case study team found that rehabilitation had taken place as documented in Bekaa and Tripoli, and project staff reported widespread rehabilitation efforts in both the South and Northern areas of the country to ensure that buildings met CSOs' own corporate standards. *'We don't go into a school unless our standards are met'.*

In focus groups, parents stated that they found the environment secure, and compared the schools positively to previous experience in Lebanese public schools, with reduced violence and discrimination.⁹¹ Attention to safety and psychosocial health was perceived as one of the main added values of SCN and NRC facilities. *'The psychosocial intervention is also strong. The children have been transformed. Many of us have come from the war. Their psychological situation is really bad. So, when they came here the teachers have really put an effort to assist them in assimilation. For example, they used to call Syrians names... and that has changed.'* All SCN and NRC staff members are required to conduct child protection training and attend security awareness courses.

Transport to schools was also provided by both SCN and NRC as a way of improving access to/inclusion in education opportunities. For example, to facilitate access to the certified Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP), NRC provided transportation to attend the placement test.

Selected results include (Box 3 below):

Box 3: Results in Rehabilitation

Results in rehabilitation

- In 2010-2011, NRC managed to find a house to rehabilitate to teach Iraqi refugees and detainee refugees in prison, with three rooms available for classes, an office for administration and a backyard used for awareness sessions and ping pong).⁹²
- In 2012-2013, NRC was able to establish a NRC Community Centre in Wadi Khaled and provide non-formal educational and information/counselling activities in the Centre for Syrian refugees.⁹³
- During 2015-2016,⁹⁴ SCN identified 16 centres for NFE in Beirut and the North of the country. The shelter team conducted technical assessments and either shelter owners or direct rehabilitation by the shelter team was conducted.
- To respond to the needs in other areas of Mount Lebanon and absorb part of the underspent generated by the challenges faced in North Lebanon, Save the Children one centre in July 2016 to reach 160 children with Remedial Classes and structured recreational activities by the end of September 2016. To ensure safety of children and appropriateness of school environment, the centre was provided with window protection fences and other small rehabilitation works.⁹⁵

Results in psychosocial support

- Under the Norad Global Partnership Agreement for 2016-2017,⁹⁶ to strengthen children's psychosocial coping mechanisms and resilience, SCN and partners provided psychosocial

⁹⁰ For example, number of classrooms rehabilitated, with a target of four, is an indicator in NRC's SYRIAN EDUCATION RESPONSE Sub-project code: LBFE1401 for 2014.

⁹¹ INEE (Access and Learning Environment Standard 2: Learning environments funded with Norwegian assistance are secure and safe, and promote the protection and the psychosocial well-being of learners, teachers and other education personnel.

⁹² Final report to MFA on project LBFT1002.

⁹³ Project report on LBN 12/007.

⁹⁴ Project report, QZ-13/0239.

⁹⁵ MFA Education SoF: 57800558.

⁹⁶ 2016 Report on Global Partnership GLO-0605 QZA-014/0477.

support through a Child Resilience Programme. Out of 320 participating children, 107 surveyed pre-post participation to the course reported 22% improvement of their relations with peers and the environment. Surveyed children also demonstrated an improvement in their problem-solving skills (by 31%) and reinforced self-esteem (by 28%).

Gender equity and inclusion: The *proportion of girls* accessing education through Norwegian-supported initiatives across time is consistently measured and tracked within monitoring and reporting. Proportions are generally equitable (and not less than 45% girls, 55% boys) across documentation.

However, once public education has been entered, drop-out rates for girls are higher than for boys⁹⁷ – making gender a priority within the retention programmes being implemented by SCN in 2016-2017, for example. The limited access available to CSO partners in terms of drop-out within the public education system hinders efforts to track results.

As yet, only SCN reports on *disability indicators* within its monitoring, and then unsystematically. For example, its 2015 report on the Norad Global Framework agreement reports that, of Palestinian children successfully targeted for NFE:⁹⁸ more than 1000 children were enrolled, of which 35 had disabilities.

The *engagement of host communities* in programming began relatively early: an Assessment of NRC's Emergency Education Response to the Syria crisis in Lebanon, April 2013 found that '*All children had access to the Community Centres, no discrimination observed. In two of the centers Lebanese children were participating in the activities, though representing a minority. In the Learning Support Programme in the schools, Lebanese children were also participating.*' However, the emphasis on host communities gained momentum with the explicit policy direction provided by RACE I and RACE II, and particularly by the London Conference of February 2016.

Strategies for inclusion included:

- Extensive awareness raising, training and advocacy in communities.
- Provision of transportation/payment of transportation fees to ensure access to schools and non-formal education centres. Transportation support and learning material was provided and successfully increased enrolment and attendance to 70 percent in NRC reporting.⁹⁹
- Provision of education kits.
- Constitution and regular meeting of Parent Committees, which fieldwork found highly valued by parents as a forum to voice their concerns.

Box 4: Strategies for ensuring inclusion

In 2015, SCN provided transportation fees were provided to children after caregivers signed a social contract stating that they would use the money for transportation only. Children were eligible for transportation based on attendance. Children also received learning and play/recreational materials and in some cases student kits.¹⁰⁰

NRC also covered transportation fees 2015-2017 for children enrolled in NRC NFE programmes based on i) distance; ii) protection risks; iii) vulnerability. Costs were covered by either directly contracting busses (South Lebanon and Akkar) or through vouchers (Tripoli and Bekaa).

Use of innovative and flexible solutions: Research for this case study found a broad range of innovations introduced to improve access to education. This appears to be one of the comparative advantages of CSOs engaged in the Syria education response in Jordan, linked to their adaptability to context, above:

Examples included:

⁹⁷ Ministry of Education and Higher Education (2014) op.cit.

⁹⁸ GLO 0605 QZA – 014/0477.

⁹⁹ Annual Report 2017.

¹⁰⁰ 2015 Report on QZ 13 – 0289.

- The creation of ‘safe spaces’ and psycho-social support for vulnerable children. These include: the use of child friendly approaches, which were welcomed by parents in focus groups;¹⁰¹
- The implementation of summer recreation programmes, which aimed to keep children motivated and engaged until the start of the school term again;
- NRC’s use of the ‘Listening/Communicating schools project approach’ within support to Palestinian refugee children through UNRWA in 2010-2013, which focused on participation, inclusiveness, a caring learning environment and developing positive role-models;
- Establishing teaching communities of practice;
- Employing Lebanese teachers from the host community to bridge the gap between the Lebanese and the Syrian communities;
- Applying recreational activities, theatre and plays around the importance of formal education as part of the Back to School Campaign.

Parents, as noted, particularly valued the psychosocial aspects of the support, which according to focus groups have done much to create trust between beneficiary groups and project implementers.¹⁰²

4.2.1b Quality

Supporting the development of national systems: The comparatively high-capacity context of Lebanon, combined with CSOs’ restricted access to the public education system, leads to limited scope for policy dialogue and capacity strengthening. Support to build national systems is therefore not as extensive as in other case studies of this evaluation.

Overall, the main results observed, particularly since the advent of the Syrian regional crisis, are as follows:

Improved dissemination and take-up of educational opportunities

- Strong engagement by SCN and NRC in the Government’s annual Back to School campaigns have led to increased enrolment in the formal sector. For example:
- SCN reported in March 2017 that as part of its engagement in the Back to School Campaign, more than 1000 phone calls were conducted to parents of 578 children inviting them to register in public schools;¹⁰³
- NRC reported to MFA in 2017 that 3,500 children were reached with information campaigns under the Back to School Campaign, with 47 percent of these enrolling in public schools.¹⁰⁴

Institutional strengthening and policy development for basic education

- Although previous tensions have arisen over the dismantling of the Education Sector Working Group, stakeholders in Lebanon reported signs of more productive relationships forthcoming in the future. NRC’s appointment to the CSO Sub-committee in 2017 has positioned it to offer scope for advocacy in support of policy reform and institutional capacity strengthening, as well as scope to advocate, for example, for sight of educational enrolment data.

Integration of non-formal and formal education

- MEHE’s requirements for all NFE provision to be unified and endorsed by MEHE has – despite the constraints this has imposed on CSOs – brought closer links between formal and non-formal education provision. Norwegian CSOs have worked assiduously to ensure that referral pathways are in place, and that maximum encouragement and support is provided to children referred, for example through the ALP programme. CSOs have also worked hard to monitor and report on children who are successfully integrated into the public education system, but are constrained by their lack of access to retention data.

¹⁰¹ SCN, NRC and Right to Play.

¹⁰² Focus groups in SCN North and South.

¹⁰³ Concept Note presented to MFA, March 2017.

¹⁰⁴ Annual Report to MFA (Global Partnership) 2017.

Improving parental engagement in education

- The establishment of Parent Committees in non-formal education provision was warmly welcomed by parents and functioning well according to focus groups. According to both parents and teachers, these met monthly, and provided valuable fora for not only airing concerns, but making collective decisions on course-correction in programme implementation.

Enhancing teaching skills: *Teacher recruitment* has proven challenging under the Syrian regional crisis particularly, as has been widely documented.¹⁰⁵ Contributions here are not widely documented, though in 2016,¹⁰⁶ SCN reports that 115 NFE teachers were recruited over one grant lifetime. No NRC project or annual reports on numbers of teachers recruited, but an evaluation of NRC's emergency education response in 2013 commented on NRC's challenges in finding suitably qualified teachers for its work.¹⁰⁷

Improve *teacher skills* within NFE was a significant area of results, however. All three of the main CSOs working in Lebanon found teacher training targets met in terms of outputs. In 2016, for example, SCN trained 108 (88 female and 20 male) teachers on active learning methods in classrooms¹⁰⁸ whilst in 2017, NRC reported that it had trained a total of 143 teachers in inclusive approaches and child-centred methodologies.¹⁰⁹ Right to Play reported that it has trained approximately 300 teachers in 2017 in child-friendly approaches using the medium of play and recreation, as well as in creating a positive learning environment and interactive learning (1/3 in UNRWA, 1/3 in kindergartens and semi-private schools, and 1/3 with sports coaches).

Approaches focused on training in inclusive approaches; on child-friendly methodologies; and, particularly in psycho-social approaches for dealing with traumatised children. SCN used the Quality Learning Environment approach to help improve teaching skills (Box 5):

Box 5: Improving teaching skills in Beirut and the North of Lebanon

In Beirut, SCN conducted a Quality Learning Environment baseline assessment, including workshops with teachers. During the workshops, teachers were requested to develop action plans that address the findings including timeline. Areas addressed included:

- Capacity building on how to build trust with children and on the use of active learning techniques, which aim at ensuring children are learning by doing, thinking and exploring through quality interaction, intervention and relationships and based on children's interests and abilities.
- Under the same grant from Government of Norway, SCN held Child Participation sessions with children on a regular basis in order to ensure that and which aimed to ensure that children express their opinions and concerns and when possible, to take their opinions into consideration in decision making.

In the North of Lebanon, the project supported the professional development of teachers and education personnel through the implementation of a capacity building plan to enable them to promote a more inclusive and child centred education. Techniques taught included child resilience and psycho-social support, active learning including positive discipline. During this training, particular emphasis was put on teaching in multi-grade and multi-level settings, which was identified as one of the challenges identified on the ground.

Teachers interviewed in focus groups described receiving several trainings per year, in areas such as active learning, resilience, child protection and curriculum development. Trainings were described as 'very positive', with future requests including how to deal with children with difficulties. The provision of teacher kits was also considered valuable in enabling teachers to improve learning outcomes.

¹⁰⁵ See for example Ministry of Education and Higher Education (2014) op.cit.

¹⁰⁶ QZ-13-0289.

¹⁰⁷ Almaas, T (2013) Assessment of NRC's Emergency Education Response to the Syria Crisis in Lebanon, April 2013.

¹⁰⁸ QZ-13/0289.

¹⁰⁹ Annual Report to MFA.

4.2.2 Factors explaining achievement and non-achievement of results

Factors supporting and constraining the achievement of results in Lebanon are summarised below:

Supportive factors

Strong relationships at local level were identified as key contributors of NGO's success in EiCC in Lebanon. Whilst relationships at national level could be challenging, at local level, stakeholders reported strong collaboration with local authorities, Community Based Organisations and CSOs. Engagement of parents and the wider community, through extensive consultation, was also strongly associated with success in children's attendance in school, particularly through the formation of Parent Committees. The emphasis of all maintaining good relationships with host communities, and particularly examples such as employing host community teachers, also worked well in terms of supporting community cohesion.

Child-centred approaches: The use of child centred approaches was cited by all concerned as a major success factor in retaining students in non-formal education. Parents in focus groups described the value in the methods applied for traumatised children: *'The teacher is really patient with my child. His psychology has changed, he is focused, and now he is better in school. They are very patient and they are tender and they work well.'* *'We trust the skills of teachers here 100 percent...The teachers are making the kids feel relaxed.'*

Psychosocial support: The implementation of psychosocial support was highly valued by both parents and children, providing a dimension of support that could not be provided by the public system. Similarly to the child-centred approaches, parents and teachers highly praised its contribution to helping traumatised children recover from their experiences, and reducing a key barrier to learning. *'My son used to be very violent and hyperactive. Now I feel that he is becoming normal. They are very good at changing the behaviour of children after being in a war zone.'*

Emphasis on education quality and learning outcomes: Whilst significant challenges remain, improvements to teaching and learning methodologies and an emphasis on quality in the classroom (and measurement of achievement) have helped build trust with parents, who generally expressed confidence in the education being provided for their children, particularly in terms of overcoming language barriers.

Few burdens in grant management: Organisations felt that requirements for grant management under Norad and MFA, such as annual reporting requirements, were not an impediment to efficiency, being generally 'lighter' than for other donors, but referenced more stringent requirements under Norad. Interlocutors also appreciated the fungibility of Norwegian funds, without the burdens of needing to rigorously attribute results generated to individual funding streams – particularly important given the multiple sources of Norwegian funding.

Actors also appreciated the improved efficiency allowed by permitting adaptation to contextual change. For example, during the 2014 period of negotiation around the advent of RACE I, and the changed 'rules of the game' for NGOs engaging in NFE, implementation was delayed across funded initiatives, as project reports indicate. Interlocutors interviewed in Beirut indicated that Norad/MFA representatives were understanding of the reasons for the delays, which enabled re-targeting and re-allocation of funds where appropriate.

Strategic use of resources: The flexibility of Norwegian resources was repeatedly cited as a major factor in enabling resources to be strategically deployed, when other donors are less flexible in their requirements. Actors repeatedly cited the ability of Norwegian resources to 'gap fill'; for example, when less flexible donors required a focus on particular target groups or geographical areas, and to leverage, for example by using Norwegian funds to resource areas in the hope of attracting subsequent funding from other donors.

Constraining factors

Lack of access to the public education system and data: CSOs' lack of access to public education, and particularly to retention/drop-out data, means they lack insight into the higher-level effectiveness of their interventions. Whilst NRC is now represented on the RACE NGO sub-committee, CSOs' scope for policy influencing, and for playing an accountability role within the sector response to the crisis, is restricted.

Limited coordination and coherence in the sector: During the period of suspension of the Education Sector Working Group, stakeholders reported limited coordination and coherence at central level in the sector. This has not always impeded joint working – as for example in NRC/SCN collaboration on NFE –

but it has restricted wider strategic coherence. Relations between CSOs and UNICEF, for example, were reported to have been tense at different periods.

Barriers to entry but also barriers to retention: In addition to the barriers to entry described above, this case study has found very significant barriers to retention in NFE for Syrian refugees particularly. This is not systematically reported on in project documentation, but where information is available, it records drop-out for reasons including resettlement in other countries, moving to other areas in Lebanon, child labour, economic limitations, and early marriage. The inability of Syrian refugees to work, before economic restrictions were lifted by the Government in 2016, also impeded retention for children of 10 upwards, who were perceived as able to contribute to households' economic well-being.

Short-term funding interlocutors also cited annual Humanitarian grants as a significant challenge given the protracted nature of the crisis, and the specific status of education as a sector which crosses the humanitarian-development divide. Actors were highly supportive of MFA Humanitarian Section's progression to longer-term framework agreements. Multi-year humanitarian framework agreements with NRC and SCN were cited as useful models for the education sector particularly, not only providing predictability for CSOs and their implementing partners, but also scope for multi-year planning and ability to work with the school calendar in Lebanon as needed. This was particularly given education's wider role in maintaining the fragile social and political balance in Lebanon.

4.2.3 Evidence of effort to design/implement against the International Humanitarian Principles of neutrality, humanity, impartiality and independence.

Whilst results reports did not explicitly report against this indicator, evidence indicates that International Humanitarian Principles were recognised in design and implementation. They were in the main upheld, though with some challenges around independence, below. Initiatives were variously committed to either conflict sensitive or do no harm approaches, and/or to supporting peace building initiatives. Selected examples include:

Humanity	Increased volumes of support generally to EiCC through civil society in Lebanon. Attention to the most vulnerable – refugee children (Syrian, Palestinian, Iraqi etc.), girls and the disabled. However, support to vulnerable sections of the host population in Lebanon did not come until directed by MEHE, from 2014.
Neutrality	Beneficiaries were targeted on a status basis, and therefore selection criteria were neutral and objective by definition.
Impartiality	Support explicitly targeted to the most vulnerable including refugees, with a particular focus on girls and on marginalised groups. However, support as noted to vulnerable sections of the host population did not begin until later in the response.
Independence	In Lebanon, strict operational independence was challenging, particularly in the latter period of the crisis, when the government (MEHE) sought to take stronger ownership of international actors' engagement. Both NRC and SCN sought to walk the line between maintaining their own operational independence, and preserving the relationship with the government in order to be able to continue operations.

4.3 Efficiency

Summary: There were some examples of evidence to achieve efficiency gains, but these were not systematic. However, efforts made had delivered some valuable savings for partners.

4.3.1 To what extent has the portfolio been implemented with a view to cost efficiency?

Evidence of efforts to achieve efficiency gains and savings in programme implementation: Despite coordination challenges in the sector, which have impeded more strategic efficiency, several examples of opportunities seized for cost efficiency were reflected throughout documentation and in fieldwork, as follows:

- Maximising the knowledge and contributions of local partners and contacts to conduct rehabilitation to schools;¹¹⁰
- Repeated efforts to ensure efficiency in implementation through consultation and local lesson-learning, recorded above;¹¹¹
- Information exchange and knowledge sharing through informal networks, despite challenges in coordination in the sector;¹¹²
- The use of strict risk identification, management and monitoring procedures, which were comprehensive in the documentation surveyed.¹¹³

The implementing model of SCN, which works through SCI and ultimately through implementing partners, raised issues for efficiency. A review of the partnership model of SCN in Lebanon found that partner selection is based upon scoping of ‘known’ organisations and occasionally on thematic assessments.¹¹⁴ Whilst such approaches have provided opportunities for efficiency in Lebanon, in terms of use of local knowledge and conditions, ability to access local resources, and so on, SCN staff interviewed also acknowledged its challenges in the education sector, with increased competition since the start of the Syria crisis for capacitated local partners. Short-term funding streams, below, have impeded the continuity and certainty that local partners require to remain engaged.

Turnover of staff over the assessment period inevitably occurred during the assessment period, but was not cited as a major challenge for many organisations, with key post-holders largely remaining in-post for its intended duration.

4.4 Coherence

Summary: Coherence of interventions is variable. Beyond the comparatively strong policy architecture for education in Lebanon, Norwegian-supported initiatives are well linked in to organisation-specific country level strategic frameworks. Recent strategies contain comparatively developed results frameworks, which contain clear outcomes, outputs and targets. Informal coordination is strong, but lesson learning is largely bilateral between agencies and MFA. Externally, coherence in the education sector is currently challenging, given wider structural barriers following the dismantling of the Education Working Group in 2015, and CSOs’ absence from the RACE Executive Committee. CSOs demonstrate efforts to engage with coordination mechanisms where opportunities have arisen, and NRC was appointed a member of the NGO Sub-Committee for RACE II in June 2016, but overall, engagement with coordination mechanisms has been ‘as far as feasible’ given wider challenges in the sector.

4.4.1 To what extent are Norway’s EiCC activities through civil society partners being implemented as a coherent portfolio, rather than as piecemeal activities?

Links into a country-level strategic framework: Norwegian-supported initiatives are directly linked in to strategic frameworks at country level through the structure created to respond to the effects on education of the Syria crisis in Lebanon. The key frameworks here are RACE I and II, and the LCRP, which by definition seek to improve efficiency through a harmonised approach.

A relatively strong strategic architecture exists to inform the education sector response in Lebanon. RACE I and RACE II have provided the main gearing framework for shaping CSO education responses in Lebanon, as recorded both by documentation and by interviewees in the country. Additional, agency-specific strategic frameworks also exist, which have provided a conceptual and operational umbrella for planning and implementation (Table 11 below). They reflect the gradual expansion of target groups, from Palestinian and Iraqi refugees prior to 2011, followed by Syrian refugees and finally expansion to include vulnerable Lebanese children in the most recent strategic period.

¹¹⁰ SCN, NRC and Right to Play.

¹¹¹ SCN and NRC.

¹¹² NRC.

¹¹³ SCN, NRC and Right to Play.

¹¹⁴ IOD PARC (2017) Save the Children Norway Partnership Review.

Table 11: CSO country strategies in Lebanon

Strategy	Objectives
NRC Country Strategy 2011-2014. 'A New Reality'	The overall objective for NRC Lebanon 2011-2014 is to be a strategic advocate and operational actor for improved conditions for the refugees in Lebanon. Specifies working with two key groups: Palestinians living in the camps and gatherings, and the Iraqi refugees in Beirut area.
NRC Country Strategy 2015-2017	The strategic objective for Lebanon recognises that NRC's programme during the three-year strategic planning period will focus on ensuring that displaced people in Lebanon are able to access and secure their rights. For education: In 2017, NRC Lebanon will increase the range and scale of education programming offered to refugee children both from Syria and from Palestine, with a focus on Non-Formal Education and pathways into formal education.
NRC Education Strategy Narrative (September 2016)	Identifies key target groups as Palestinian refugees and those affected by the Syria regional crisis, including host communities. Planned areas of intervention are 1) provision of NFE in community settings for out-of-school children and youth; and 2) support to formal education through the reintegration of out-of-school children and youth into public schools and the provision of school retention programmes such as remedial classes, homework support, recreational and psycho-social activities, transportation support and school construction/rehabilitation.
Save the children Lebanon Country Strategy 2013-2016	Under Strategic Objective 3: Strategically identified children and youth have access to new opportunities and participate in the fulfilment of their rights IR3.1 Save the Children will support (undefined) children to access inclusive, quality, formal and non-formal education.
Save the Children Country Strategic Plan 2016-2018 (Lebanon)	Education-related goal: All girls and boys in Lebanon learn from a safe, quality education free from violence.
Save the Children Education Sector Strategy 2017-2018 (Lebanon)	Deprived children attend good quality inclusive early childhood care & development and basic education, and demonstrate relevant learning outcomes. Effective national systems exist to ensure that deprived children have equitable access to good quality ECCD & Basic Education and demonstrate relevant learning.

Save the Children Lebanon's Country Strategic Plan 2016-2018 sets a clear strategic direction for the education response, within the overarching frameworks of the LCRP and RACE II (Box 6):

Box 6: Strategic Planning for EiCC: Save the Children in Lebanon

Education advocacy is an integral part of system changing, and in this strategic period collaboration with and influencing the Government/MEHE has priority. It will be carried out in collaboration with many stakeholders, including Education Partners, civil society organisations and donors and tailored around:

Influencing Government of Lebanon to develop and enforce laws and regulations to ensure that vulnerable children have equitable access to good quality inclusive ECCD & Basic Education;

Influencing Government of Lebanon to enforce laws and develop/implement regulations and decrees to ensure an education environment free of physical and humiliating violence.

Gearing to a single overarching set of intended results: As for strategic architecture, above, the main results frameworks to which EiCC activities are geared in Lebanon are those of RACE I and the stronger articulation, framed around outputs and outcomes, in RACE II. CSOs engaging in MEHE-approved education activities in Lebanon are required to demonstrate their alignment with these intended results.

The agency-specific strategic architecture above has generally improved its setting of intended results for the sector, with the most recent sector plans accompanied by detailed logframes which include objectives, outcomes and outputs. Two examples are Save the Children's Country Strategic Plan 2016-2018 and NRC's September 2016 Education Strategy Narrative Analysis, which is supported by a Theory of Change in the education sector narrative, and accompanied by a logframe (see Box 7):

Box 7: Intended results

Save the Children Country Strategic Plan 2016-2018

- SUB THEME 4.2 (In-School-Children) Deprived children attend good quality inclusive basic education and demonstrate effective learning outcomes.
- 4.2.1 Vulnerable children (girls and boys) have acquired the skills and competencies to remain in formal education through provision of inclusive, safe education support opportunities.
- SUB THEME 4.2 (Out of School Children) Deprived children attend good quality inclusive early childhood care & development and transition successfully into basic education.
- 4.2.1 Out of School girls and boys have acquired the skills and competencies to (re-)enrol in formal education through provision of relevant, safe non-formal education opportunities.
- SUB THEME 4.2 (Parents and Communities) Deprived children attend good quality inclusive basic education and demonstrate relevant learning outcomes.
- 4.2.3. Caregivers and communities are engaged in addressing learning, protection and development needs of out-of-school children and those at risk of dropout.

NRC Education Macro Logframe, September 2016

Overall objective:

Refugee, displaced, and conflict affected host community children and youth in Lebanon achieve their full potential and enjoy their right to education.

Outcomes:

- Refugees and affected host community children (5-14) access quality education including access/retention into Formal Education (FE).
- Refugees and affected host community youths and young adults (15-30) improve knowledge and skills set through provision of transferable and vocational skills, and through increased access to formal education.
- Education personnel are using child centred and inclusive approaches inside the classroom.
- Parents are involved in the education of their children.
- Government and education authorities adopt policies that facilitate the integration of refugee children and youth in formal schooling.

Both results frameworks provide targets and relevant and appropriate indicators against which to measure progress.

Finally, whilst organisations indicated their committed to the principles of the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) Minimum Standards, as above, there is no explicit reference to monitoring or reporting results against these within country programme documentation.

4.4.2 How closely are Norway-funded interventions linked to EiCC interventions supported by other relevant humanitarian and development actors?

Links to other interventions in the same country: The interruptions in formal strategic coordination mechanisms in the sector during the assessment period impeded formal cooperation and collaboration among partners. Actors widely agreed that coordination in the sector remains challenging¹¹⁵ and described

¹¹⁵ For example, NRC Education Sector Narrative 2016, and interviews with stakeholders.

relationships with partner CSOs as variable, being highly dependent on willingness to engage in the informal coordination mechanisms set up since the disbanding of the ESWG. No formal areas of operational cooperation were identified in the initiatives analysed apart beyond the joint NRC-SCN initiative on community based education 2012-2014.

Implementation in connection with coordination mechanisms: The wider coordination mechanisms for education within Lebanon, and the interruptions within these, have been described above. Institutional memory and documentation was limited in the period prior to 2012, but coordination under the Education Working Group was described as going through a period of initial strength.

During the period of suspension of the Working Group from 2015, education partners continued to coordinate centrally through the informal Education Partner Working Group. Both SCN and NRC were engaged with this group, though it was described as functioning mainly as an information-sharing forum, rather than a platform for strategic or operational coordination (which reportedly functioned more effectively at governance level).

Project and annual reports to Norad/MFA consistently report on efforts to engage with coordination mechanisms.¹¹⁶ However, with the advent of the RACE Steering Committee, and despite the election of NRC to the NGO sub-committee in June 2016, CSOs have found their role in sector coordination to be limited. CSOs agreed that their scope to engage and contribute to strategic decision-making at the level of RACE Executive Committee is highly constrained.¹¹⁷

Overall, therefore, Norwegian-funded CSOs' implementation in connection with coordination mechanisms is probably best described as having taken place 'as far as feasible' in the recent period. Such coordination mechanisms are not yet mature in the Lebanon context, and whilst CSOs funded by Norway have done their best to collaborate and coordinate within available mechanisms, these have not always facilitated wider coordination among actors.

Horizontal linkages at country level: As above, horizontal linkages between interventions during the period of the assessment have been impeded in Lebanon by the weak functioning of the wider coordination architecture. Interviewees in Beirut and during wider field study stated that informal collaboration was strong, but that more strategic coordination was often lacking.

SCN and NRC did use MFA grants to collaborate during the assessment period on joint implementation in NFE from 2012-2014, and referenced lesson-learning and joint sharing of information during that time. Since then, however, no formal joint delivery has taken place, impeded by the wider structural barriers in the sector.

4.5 Connectedness

Summary: Interventions in NFE have sought integration into national strategies and budgets, but have been sometimes impeded by blockages in the national strategic planning process. New methodologies and initiatives have been brought to the non-formal sector, expanding the practices and experience available to national actors. New child protection concepts have also been introduced, though there are questions about sustainability given the limited operational space available. Transition in Lebanon is mainly dependent on MEHE, who take strong ownership over the sectoral response to the Syrian crisis. Discourse has shifted in documentation over time from a purely 'humanitarian' response to a more development-focused one, with attention to systems strengthening and reform. Norwegian-funded CSOs in Lebanon recognise the likelihood of the need for continued support, and are implementing transition strategies where operational space is available, for example in integrating with national plans, and supplying referral pathways from non-formal education into the formal sector.

Scope for capacity strengthening of public education sector institutions and systems is limited, but Norwegian CSOs have made significant efforts to build the capacities of partner CSOs, teachers and

¹¹⁶ See for example NRC Annual Reports on the Global Partnership for 2014, 2015 and 2016; SCN Final project report, QZA-1310289 and others.

¹¹⁷ NRC (2016) Education Sector Narrative Lebanon; interviews in Beirut.

parents at the local level. Capacity gains with teachers and parents are well monitored by results frameworks, and reported upon.

4.5.1 Interventions designed and implemented in a manner that supports longer term needs in the education sector

Integration into national programming/ strategies/budgets as far as feasible: Prior to the advent of RACE I and RACE II, alignment of EiCC interventions in Lebanon with national strategies was mostly passive, with CSOs providing support mainly to Palestinian and Iraqi refugees in line with international commitments. Interventions were therefore less *integrated into* national strategies and plans, and more *aligned with* them.

Since the advent of RACE I and RACE II, CSOs' registration and ability to operate in Lebanon has been wholly determined by their ability to demonstrate alignment with RACE/RACE II. Moreover, they are unable to deliver provision beyond NFE programmes which are approved and accredited by government, and which are implemented in areas agreed by the government. By definition, therefore, the actions of Norwegian-funded CSOs are integrated into the national strategy and budget to respond to the crisis.

Challenges have arisen however with the openings provided by these frameworks. For example, the publication of the NonFormal Education Strategy in January 2016 provided the framework within which CSOs could start to plan their interventions. However, the curricula of the different NFE components, and the related Standard Operating Procedures, only followed many months later. CSOs sought integration with the national policy framework, therefore, but were impeded by blockages in the strategic planning process on the government side of the equation. Right to Play was the only CSO that had a fully developed interactive curriculum in Arabic, which had been in place since 2006. NRC and SCN had to develop their own curricula.

Prioritisation of continuity and recovery of quality education: Norwegian CSOs in Lebanon have, as above, coordinated with the Lebanese authorities for education as far as feasible. Prioritisation of the continuity of a quality education is most strongly reflected in their efforts to bring quality to the non-formal sector, given their limited access to the public sector, and to ensure a smooth transition forward. Working on accredited courses, approved by MEHE, but at the same time bringing new methodologies and approaches to the provision received by host communities and refugees, has brought new ideas, approaches and arguably quality standards to provision in the country.

The reflection of 'quality' indicators within results frameworks is strong evidence of this. Of 14 results frameworks reviewed in Lebanon, all contain quality indicators in some form, though these are neither consistent across years, intervention or organisations. They are however drawn from CSOs' corporate frameworks and adapted for context. Examples include:

- % of participants who can correctly replicate key (skills/methods) covered in training/outreach (75%)
- % beneficiaries/families/schools officials/teachers who report/are observed using kit materials for educational purposes within 3 months after distribution (75%)¹¹⁸
- % of target teachers (m/f) who demonstrate an increase in child-centred teaching practices (disaggregated by category of support)¹¹⁹

CSOs have also brought child protection approaches to the fore within educational provision – reflected for example in SC's Education strategy for Lebanon 2017-2018:

Box 8: SC education strategy 2016-2018

Education interventions will be closely integrated with child protection activities. Child protection staff are supporting children who are out of school, are at risk of dropping out, or are not attending ECCD activities. Collaborating and integrating programme components will facilitate the sharing of necessary information with parents and communities on how children can access education and creating referral

¹¹⁸ NRC Education Macro Logframe 2016.

¹¹⁹ SCN: Application: Strengthening Access to, and Retention in, Formal Education in Lebanon, 2016.

mechanisms. Capacity building for teachers will incorporate key child protection themes such as identification of at-risk children, case referral, PSS and child resilience, and positive discipline. Children and parents/communities will have access to PSS, child resilience, and positive discipline activities, which will be carried out in collaboration with child protection teams.

To date, however, these initiatives have been limited to SC interventions, rather than linked into national systems operating through public schools. Their sustainability will be increasing questions around sustainability/transition.

4.5.2 Were transition strategies explicitly built in?

Integration of transition strategies, where feasible: Prior to 2014, most references in project documentation were to a ‘humanitarian’ response to the education crisis in Lebanon, in common with the wider international response at the time. Since 2014, however, as it became evident that the crisis was becoming protracted, conceptualisation of the response as ‘bridging the humanitarian-development divide’ began to gain momentum. Within RACE I, for example, EiCC is conceptualised as an intervention which bring together emergency and development responses: *“An effective response needs to bridge between the humanitarian and the development divide, between meeting the most urgent education needs of the vulnerable and the longer term development priorities, which can strengthen and sustain the capacity of the education system to respond to needs in a protracted context. Investing in development means investing in resilience, and it needs to be made from the start.”*¹²⁰

References in Norwegian CSOs’ proposals and reports since this time begin to reference the need to address development needs, with strong emphasis on ensuring the strength and capacity of the Lebanese education system, as well as the quality of education provided. Both NRC’s Education Sector Narrative for 2016, and Save the Children’s Education Strategy 2017-2018 reference the need for a sustainable approach, which strengthens the education systemically as well as provides access and quality.

The main ‘transition’ strategy identified within documentation is therefore working within nationally-determined plans to implement approved courses. Given MEHE’s strong lead over international actors working in the country, however, ‘transition’ is more determined by MEHE than by external actors, and is mediated by the operational space made available. For Palestinian and Iraqi refugees, documentation is clear that needs are ongoing, and that exit in the near future is not a realistic possibility.

Rather than ‘strategies for transition’, per se, therefore, review of the evidence finds mostly statements that reflect the protracted nature of the Syria regional crisis, and the likelihood of the need for continued support to MEHE and to the wider education sector.¹²¹ NRC’s Country Strategy for 2015-2017 (Update for 2017) states for example that *‘The most likely scenario identified and forming the basis of this plan is no significant change in the numbers of refugees from Syria, with increasing need of assistance, whilst the needs of the Palestinian caseload are likely to remain constant during the planning period, although the resources available to meet those needs are likely to continue to reduce....There is no anticipation of exit within the planning period.’*

One very specific transition strategy being employed by CSOs is the referral pathways being provided from formalised NFE into public education provision. By supporting accredited NFE provision, and by setting in place stable and accredited pathways forward, CSOs are enabling beneficiaries of NFE to make their own transition from the non-formal to the formal sector of education.

Implementation of transition strategies in practice: Evidence from field study and documentation review finds that transition strategies in terms of referral pathways have been successfully implemented. For example, end of project reports find good levels of referrals into the formal sector (see Effectiveness, above).

However, given the limited scope for transition given the real and continued needs in the sector, project and Annual reports, as well as planning documents, are also realistic on the likelihood of the need for continued support in the country. Systemic challenges in the national system remain, and CSOs’ limited operational space presents ongoing challenges. CSO documentation and interviews reflect a realistic

¹²⁰ RACE I.

¹²¹ See for example NRC Global Partnership Agreement reports for 2010-2015.

awareness of the capabilities and willingness of government to be able to meet the challenges ahead, which would enable a clear pathway to exit.

4.5.3 Do partners work in partnership with national authorities and local CSOs or other actors in ways that support the development of capacity?

Evidence that partnerships with national authorities/local CSOs and other actors have been implemented with a view to capacity development: Scope to build local capacity in educational provision in Lebanon is limited as above by restrictions on engagement in the public education system. For example, CSOs cannot engage on school governance, professional development for teachers in the public system, the education management information system, strengthening local education authorities, or other kinds of support.

RACE II sets out a number of key areas in which capacity strengthening support is required for the public education sector in the country:

- 1- National data systems
- 2- Curriculum
- 3- Measurement of learning outcomes
- 4- Policy frameworks
- 5- MEHE's human resource strategy and structure.

However, the limited scope for engagement in these areas constrains CSOs' engagement in them currently. CSOs' main response has been through strategizing for advocacy – for example, SC's Education Strategy for Lebanon 2017-2018 identifies two key advocacy objectives, to be conducted jointly with partners:

- 1- Influencing Government of Lebanon to develop and enforce laws and regulations to ensure that vulnerable children have equitable access to good quality inclusive ECCD & Basic Education.
- 2- Influencing Government of Lebanon to enforce laws and develop/implement regulations and decrees to ensure an education environment free of physical and humiliating violence.¹²²

NRC has included an outcome area in its Education Sector Macro Logframe for 2016, namely '*Government and education authorities adopt policies that facilitate the integration of refugee children and youth in formal schooling*', with an associated indicator of '*# instances where NRC recommendations on NFE framework development and/or operationalization of RACE is featured in trainings, workshops, meetings, official statements initiated by NGO sub-committee, MEHE*' and a target of 1.

Despite the constraints, Norwegian actors in the country have integrated capacity strengthening into their activities in several, more localised, ways:

- With local partner CSOs, particularly in the case of SCN, in areas such as project management, monitoring and evaluation, child friendly approaches and inclusive education, to help build their delivery capacity and expand their technical expertise.
- With teachers in the (formalised, accredited) NFE system, which those interviewed in fieldwork agreed had developed skills significantly.¹²³
- With public school administration and teachers, particularly in the case of NRC, through the implementation of their remedial support classes directly inside public schools in coordination with school administration and through training of and teaching by public school teachers.
- With parents, by building their understanding and appreciation of their rights to education, and improving links from parents to schools, for example through parent committees established – which were also highly praised by parents and teachers in focus groups.

Gains at this level have done much to build trust between CSOs and their local partners, as attested by fieldwork interviews.

Capacity development gains monitored and reported upon throughout: The main area in which capacity development gains are tracked is in improvements in teacher capability. Results frameworks report

¹²² SC Education Strategy 2017-2018.

¹²³ Interviews and focus groups.

on the extent to which teachers are observed (or students are able to report on) the extent to which new methodologies (such as child friendly learning) is being practiced following training.

Similarly, the intended results of improved parental engagement in engagement is also reflected consistently in results frameworks, at strategic and project level. Examples come from NRC and SCN's most recent results frameworks for their strategies in the country (Box 9):

Box 9: Tracking capacity gains

NRC¹²⁴

Outcome: *Education personnel are using child centred and inclusive approaches inside the classroom*

Indicators:

- 2.1 % of participants who can correctly replicate key (skills/methods) covered in training/outreach (GL-EB6) (75%)
- 2.2 % beneficiaries' families/schools officials/teachers who report/are observed using kit materials for educational purposes within 3 months after distribution (GL-EB8) (75%)

Outcome: *Parents are involved in the education of their children*

Indicator:

- 2.3 % of parents reporting benefiting from awareness sessions (Suggested indicator) (75%)

SCN¹²⁵

Outcome: *Vulnerable children (girls and boys) have acquired the skills and competencies to remain in formal education through provision of inclusive, safe education support opportunities.*

- Indicator: % of NFE (remedial) teachers (m/f) who demonstrate an increase in active, child-centred teaching practices

Outcome: *Caregivers and communities are engaged in addressing learning, protection and development needs of out-of-school children and those at risk of dropout.*

- Indicator: % of targeted parents and caregivers (f/m) who demonstrate improvement knowledge of positive discipline

5. Conclusions

Between 2008 and 2017 Norwegian support to basic Education (as a main objective) in Lebanon will have dramatically over the ten-year period, increasing from just NOK 2 million in 2008, to over 30 million NOK in 2017. Support has been channelled through eight civil society organisations, though mainly through two larger CSOs, NRC and SCN, though with an additional agreement over five years to Right to Play.

The support has provided for strong continuity in the sector, with support extended over several years. Annual funding streams provided by humanitarian grants have proven a limitation in a sector which, by definition, straddles the humanitarian-development divide, and requires at least a minimum degree of predictability in order to function. This has been partially mitigated by a) the trust between CSOs and their partners in the Norwegian government system, meaning that funding continuity can be discussed if not formally assured and b) the recent addition of multi-year funding streams for humanitarian grants.

Norwegian-supported education interventions in Lebanon through CSOs, as well as target groups, are comprehensively aligned with national needs analyses as well as those of the wider international response. Context and conflict analyses vary in depth and scope, but consultation with communities has been a major strength of the designs reviewed. Education assessments are comprehensive and reflect a highly nuanced understanding of the sector's needs.

¹²⁴ Education Sector Macro Logframe 2016.

¹²⁵ Education Sector Strategy 2017-2018 Logframe.

Norwegian-supported initiatives in education have undergone a period of change and development; from limited support to Palestinian and Iraqi refugees in camps in 2008, through to at-scale operations in 2017, albeit mostly restricted to non-formal provision. Along the way, relationships with national actors have at times been complex; with strong national ownership over the sector, and concern at potential fragmentation, resulting in significantly restricted operating space for CSOs. Interventions are by definition, in 2017, aligned with, and integrated into, national policy frameworks and strategies since operating outside these is unfeasible if a CSO wishes to engage in the sector at all.

Support has made significant contributions to the aims and objectives reflected in Norwegian policy goals; it has increased access to quality non-formal education for out of school children in Lebanon, including for girls, with gender comprehensively mainstreamed into designs and approaches. The focus on disability is relatively new, however, and has been driven largely by a national policy directive. Norwegian support has also resulted in increased access to safe, child-friendly learning environments for out of school children – whether Syrian, Palestinian or Iraqi refugees, or vulnerable Lebanese children in host communities – and provided stable and consistent referral pathways into the public education system.

CSO interventions in Lebanon are marked by their use of innovation, including creating safe spaces, training on child-friendly methodologies and providing psycho-social support for children escaping from the conflict in Syria. However, the scope to innovate is constrained by restricted operating space, with NGO's role currently limited to delivering accredited non-formal education services, in locations and according to modalities pre-defined by MEHE. There has been little scope in the recent period to influence policy development, or to engage in capacity strengthening support to public education institutions.

Coherence has been impeded by weak coordination in the sector more broadly, though there are some instances of operational and informal collaboration. The flexibility of Norwegian funds has been much appreciated in a highly dynamic context, but greater predictability is considered a priority, given education's potential role in maintaining Lebanon's fragile political and social balance. There are some examples of efforts at cost-efficiency.

Opportunities for policy development and capacity strengthening of national actors have been highly limited, but CSOs have managed to build highly valued capacities at local level and strengthen relationships between parents, teachers and communities. Such gains are actively tracked and recorded, in order that results may become visible.

Finally, the scope for transition and sustainability is shaped mostly by national actors, and particularly MEHE. CSOs have made the most of the space available, by aligning with national plans and programmes, and emphasising referrals into the formal sector. Given current needs, however, they are not actively planning for exit. Going forward, a politically-nuanced understanding of the current and future operating space is likely to be crucial to continued engagement, as well as a continued focus on relationship-building.

6. Lessons/implications for the evaluation

Analysis of the policy and institutional context: The policy and institutional context within Lebanon is highly dynamic and requires close and ongoing examination, particularly through a political lens. In particular, dynamics within MEHE as it continues to tightly manage the operational space available to external actors, will be essential.

Recording results: With results data from the earlier period of implementation highly limited, it will be important for learning and accountability reasons that results are monitored and tracked, and that they are stored on Norway's archive system. This is particularly important in enabling the Norwegian government to understand CSO's individual and collective contributions to the intended results it has declared in successive policy commitments. More frequent and higher quality evaluation will also help make results visible and bring attention to the valuable results CSOs are generating on the ground in Lebanon, as well as produce useful learning.

Mapping marginalisation: Some important gains have been made in enabling girls and other vulnerable children to access education in Lebanon. However, there are few consistent definitions or interpretations across CSOs and other actors in Lebanon of who the 'most vulnerable' are, in terms of education provision. Results frameworks and monitoring do not disaggregate beyond gender. Collective agreement on vulnerability parameters, and the intention to map and record results against these, would benefit the

collective understanding, and provide the Norwegian government with a clear picture of who its resources are targeting, where, and why.

Advocate for adapted funding modalities: In the early period of the Syria crisis, humanitarian funding streams responded to a largely humanitarian response. In 2017, however, the modality has shifted to a development one, with the focus on sector reform, formalisation of learning and accredited pathways into the public system. Annual funding streams in this context are not fit for purpose. Norway's aid administration has done its best to be flexible, providing multi-year streams where feasible, but grants remain multiple and comparatively short-term. Continued advocacy for adapted funding models - framed within wider dialogue on the contribution of EiCC to development and resilience – will help the issue stay on the agenda.

Seek coherence Despite weak coordination in the sector generally, Norwegian actors have collaborated informally and at times operationally. But there is more scope for greater coordination and, particularly, lesson-learning. The appointment of a regional Education adviser to the Norwegian Embassy in Beirut provides considerable scope for improved coherence. CSOs can make the most of this valuable resource through requests for joint events, collective dialogue and formalised learning events, in order to improve both the effectiveness and the efficiency of the response.

Annex 1: Key Informants

Name/Role	Agreement Organisation	Date Interviewed
Miled Abou Jouadeh, Education Technical Advisor	Save the Children	11-05-2017
Iwona Safi, Director of Programme Development and Quality	Save the Children	11-05-2017
Samar Abboud, Deputy Country Director - Programmes	Save the Children	11-05-2017
Dana Shdeed, Hussien Zehri and Wassim Chahrour Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning Unit	Save the Children	11-05-2017
Anne Marie Borgvad, Counsellor, Royal Norwegian Embassy in Beirut	MFA	11-05-17
Constantijn Wouters, Education Specialist	NRC	11-05-17
Niamh Murnaghan, Country Director	NRC	12-05-17
Daniel Sissling – Head of Programmes	NRC	12-05-17
Karel Chromy – M&E Manager	NRC	12-05-17
Hayfa Farhat – Evaluation, Analysis and Learning Coordinator	NRC	12-07-17
Fatima Safa – Associate Education Officer, Interagency Education Officer, Coordination	UNHCR	12-05-17
Rola Hodeib – Director – Middle East and Asia Programs	Right to Play	12-05-17
Fadi El Yamani – Global Specialist, Training and Capacity Building, Middle East and Asia	Right to Play	12-05-17
Elias Ayoub, Country Director, Lebanon	Right to Play	12-05-17
Jumma Khan, Education Working Group	UNICEF	12-05-17
Sebastian Blomli, Education advisor	Save the Children Norway	6 April 2017
Liv Heidi Pederson, Roving Education Adviser, Education in Emergencies	Save the Children Norway	6 April 2017
Espen Gran, Associate Area Director, Middle East	Save the Children Norway	6 April 2017
Bergdis Joelsdottir, Senior Advocacy Adviser	Save the Children Norway	6 April 2017

Fieldwork and focus groups

Location	Area	Dates
Mina Learning Centre- NRC Key Informant Interviews x 4 ((PM, coordinator, officers and assistants)	North	15-05-17/16-05-17

• Focus Group Discussion with NRC Teachers (SR, BLN, LS, YEP), • Focus Group Discussion with NRC female parents (SR, BLN, LS).		
Saadnayel Learning Center- NRC • Key informant interviews x 3 (teachers, one per module (SR, BLN, LS) • Focus Group Discussion with NRC staff (PM, Coordinator, officers and assistants) • Focus Group Discussion with male parents (8 to 12)	Beka'a	17-05-17/18-05-17
Kharyib Learning Center- NRC. • Key informant interviews • Focus Group Discussion with youth above 18 years old (8 to 12)	South	19-05-17
Ain Helweh Palestinian Camp-SCI • Key informant interviews x 3 (3 NRC implementing staff, PM, coordinator, officers and/or assistants) • Focus Group Discussion with SCN students (15-18). • Focus Group Discussion with Mixed Parents (8 to 12). • Focus Group Discussion with SCI teachers.	Saida, South	19-05-2017
Burj Shamali Camp- SCI • Key informant interviews x 1 (implementation staff) • Focus Group Discussion with Palestinian Students (15-18), • Focus Group Discussion with Palestinian Parents (8 to 12)	Tyre, South	19-05-2017
North SCI Office • Key informant interviews x 3 (implementation staff, PM, coordinator, officers and/or assistants) • Focus Group Discussions with SCN Parents • Focus Group Discussion with SCN Teachers •	Kouweikhat, North	22-05-2017
Right to Play, North Office • Key informant interviews x 2 (implementation staff, PM, coordinator, officers and/or assistants) • Focus Group Discussion with RTP teachers.	Baddawi, North	24-05-2017

Annex 2: Semi-Structured Interview Guide

Interview Questions to key respondents in Beirut

(senior staff/donors and implementing partners)

1. How has the EiCC portfolio evolved since 2008-now? What are the main changes that you have seen? (plot timeline)
2. Is there an overarching strategy for the EiCC portfolio? What is its nature? (time period, priorities, delivery etc.)
3. Does your organisation have any thematic concentrations generally within its EiCC portfolio? What are these?
4. Does your organisation seek to target particular groups through its EiCC assistance? Which ones/why?
5. Are there any particular geographical concentrations within the portfolio? What/where?
6. How does your organisation consider coherence of the portfolio? (linking with partners' EiCC interventions)
7. Please could you describe how you engage with MFA/Norad on EiCC investment? (Core funding? Annual applications? Ad-hoc applications?) Is the applications process cumbersome/light/other?
8. Could you describe the relationship with MFA/Norad? What are the positive/negative aspects? What would you like to change?
9. How does Norad/MFA monitor/review/evaluate work with your organisation on EiCC? What are its requirements for reporting?
10. Have any evaluations or reviews been done of your organisation EiCC initiatives? (ask for copies)
11. What risk management strategies are you required to have in place? (e.g. for working with local partners) Are you asked to report on these?
12. Do you link with other major Norwegian civil society partners to learn from experiences in implementing EiCC?
13. What has worked well so far, and what has not? What would you do differently going forward?

Focus group/KIIs – Parents

1. FACTUAL INFORMATION

- 14. How many people present? (m/f)
- 15. Where from? (Syria/Lebanon/Jordan/other)
- 16. How many children in the school? What ages?
- 17. How long they have participated in the education?
- 18. What stage of education are they participating in? (grade/year)

2. WELL-BEING

- 19. Is the school or facility used for any other purpose apart from children's education – e.g. training, information sessions, meetings etc? Have you participated in any such events?

3. ENGAGEMENT

- 20. How are you involved in the school? Do you have regular meetings with school teachers, managers?

4. CONTRIBUTION

- 21. Do you/does the community provide any contributions to the school? (money, time, other resources?) How is this used?

5. ADAPTATION

- 22. Has the education in which your child participates changed over time? How? For better or worse?

6. CONSULTATION

- 23. Have you been asked (by project implementers) for your views on the education provided for your children – timing, subjects, curriculum etc?

7. QUALITY

- 24. Under the conditions, do you feel that the school facilities are adequate? What would be the priority for change?
- 25. Do you feel that the education/school is a safe environment for your child? Why (not)?
- 26. Do you feel confident in the skills of the teachers at the school? Why? (not)
- 27. Do you feel that the school is well managed? Why? (not?)
- 28. Are you happy with the curriculum provided? Is there anything you would change?
- 29. Generally, do you feel that the school provides a good quality education for your child? Why? (not?)

8. ACCOUNTABILITY

- 30. If you have complained about any aspect of the education, have your complaint been listened to and acted upon?

9. STRENGTHS

- 31. From your perspective, what are the main strengths of the education provided?

10. WEAKNESSES

- 32. From your perspective, what would you change about the education provided?

Focus group/KIIs – Teachers

1. FACTUAL INFORMATION

- How many teachers present (m/f) / Where from? (Lebanon/Jordan/Syria/other)
- Teaching what level? / Numbers in class/gender balance
- Years of experience as a teacher? / Duration teaching in this school/facility
- Where qualified as a teacher?

2. BACKGROUND

- Please describe the classes you teach, and some of their characteristics. What is the teacher: pupil ratio?

3. WELL-BEING

- Is the school or facility used for any other purpose apart from children's education – e.g. training, information sessions, meetings etc? Have you participated in or led any such events?

4. QUALITY

- Are the community/parents involved in the school? Do they provide contributions to help its operation?
- How often do you have contact with parents at the school? Does the interaction work well, or is it challenging?
- Are you provided with adequate materials and equipment for teaching – and in sufficient time? If you ask for items, can they be provided in a timely way?

5. CURRICULUM

- What is the curriculum applied in the school? Is it sufficiently adapted to the needs of the students (language etc)?
- Do you face any particular challenges in trying to implement the curriculum? Please could you describe these?

6. TRAINING

- What professional development and support have you been offered since adopting your role as a teacher? How frequently have you been offered training? Was the training good quality?
- How often is your teaching reviewed? Do you receive feedback, from whom, and is this useful?

7. MANAGEMENT

- What are your views on school leadership and management? What works well and what could be improved?
- If you have any concerns, do you feel that these are listened to and heard? Have any of your concerns been acted on? (examples)

8. CONDITIONS

- Do you have a formal contract for employment? Is this properly implemented?

9. QUALITY

- Do you feel that the education/school is a safe environment for teaching and learning? Why (not)?
- Under the conditions, do you feel that the school facilities provide an environment which helps you teach, and students learn? If you could change one thing, what would it be?

Focus group/KIIs – Project staff implementing partners

1. FACTUAL INFORMATION

- Project name and locations
- Number of schools/education facilities operated
- Total numbers of students served (gender)
- Age ranges served
- Numbers of teachers employed by the project
- Other education-related serves offered by the project

2. DESIGN

- If you were part of the design process for the project – What context analysis was done to make it relevant for the situation?
- (How) Were beneficiaries involved in design?

3. ACCESS

- How does the project ensure equal access for all groups, including girls and the disabled?
- Are any groups harder to reach than others?

4. DEMAND

- Does the supply of education from the project meet the demand in this location?
- Are there any areas where the supply cannot meet demand?

5. MONITORING AND REVIEW

- How is the project monitored?
- How does monitoring inform changes in implementation?

6. IMPLEMENTATION

- Has the education project been implemented as planned? What has changed along the way, and why?

7. CURRICULUM

- What curriculum has been employed, and how has it been adapted to learning needs? Does it meet these needs?

8. LEARNING NEEDS

- Have learning needs evolved as the project has been implemented? (How) have they changed, and how has the project responded?

9. TEACHING NEEDS

- How has the project responded to the needs of teachers?
- What support/training/performance review do they receive?

10. COHERENCE

- Is the project linked to any others in the country? How?

11. EFFICIENCY

- How has the project sought cost-efficiency? (examples)

12. EFFECTIVENESS

What results has the project achieved? (ask for documentation). How many:

- Schools constructed
- Children enrolled (gender disaggregated)
- Drop-out rates
- Teacher:pupil rates
- Cost per pupil
- Learners achieving educational standards (gender disaggregated)
- Teachers appointed (gender disaggregated)
- Trainings conducted for teachers
- Other results

13. LEARNING

- How is the performance of the project assessed? Have any evaluations been conducted? (ask for copies)

14. LEARNING

- What have been the main challenges that the project has encountered?
- What are the main challenges for the future.

Annex 3: Documents Reviewed

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Annex 4: Overview of Norwegian-supported Basic Education (EiCC) initiatives between 2008-2016

Table 1: Basic EiCC as a Main Policy Objective

Agreement number	Agreement title	Agreement partner	Agreement Period	Investment (1000 NOK)	Responsible unit
LBN-09/008	NRC Training of teachers in UNRWA-schools.	Flyktninghjelpen	2009-2010	3000	Section for Humanitarian Affairs
LBN-09/022	NRC. Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, 2009.	Flyktninghjelpen	2009-2010	7000	Section for Humanitarian Affairs
LBN-10/0034	NRC Training of teachers in UNRWA-schools.	Flyktninghjelpen	2010-2011	3000	Section for Humanitarian Affairs
LBN-10/0035	NRC. Shelter Programme. Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, 2010.	Flyktninghjelpen	2010-2011	5000	Section for Humanitarian Affairs
LBN-10/0036	NRC Essential Educational Support for Iraq Refugee Youth 2010	Flyktninghjelpen	2010-2011	1000	Section for Humanitarian Affairs
LBN-11/0016	NRC Training UNRWA schools, shelter, education Iraqi ref, camp management	Flyktninghjelpen	2011-2012	10500	Section for Humanitarian Affairs
LBN-12/0038	NRC emergency support for Syrian refugees phase 3	Flyktninghjelpen	2012-2013	7000	Section for Humanitarian Affairs
LBN-15/0003	Youth Academy - year 4	Fraternity Association for Social and Educational Work	2015-2016	160	Emb. in Beirut/Lebanon
LBN-12/0033	Education for Underprivileged Communities in Lebanon	Insan Association	2012-2013	398	Emb. in Beirut/Lebanon
LBN-14/0005	Emergency Action Plan for Syrian Refugees residing Saida	MSSCF - Maarouf Saad Social and Cultural foundation	2014-2015	4900	Emb. in Beirut/Lebanon
LBN-13/0006	Tomorrow is ours	Najda now	2013-2014	580	Emb. in Beirut/Lebanon
LBN-15/0006	health and education services for residents for camps and surroundings	NISCVT - National Institution of Social Care & Vocational Training	2015-2016	3500	Emb. in Beirut/Lebanon
LBN-14/0003	Save the Children Education project in Lebanon	Redd Barna Norge	2014-2014	10000	Section for Humanitarian Affairs
MEU-15/0045-1	Non-formal education Lebanon	Redd Barna Norge	2015-2016	25000	Section for Humanitarian Affairs
QZA-09/143-67	Education - Lebanon	Redd Barna Norge	2012-2012	2622	Section for Civil Society Strengthening

QZA-09/143-73	Education in conflict areas - Lebanon	Redd Barna Norge	2013-2014	7124	Section for Civil Society Strengthening
QZA-14/0477-12	Education - Lebanon	Redd Barna Norge	2015-2018	6342	Section for Civil Society Strengthening
QZA-16/0219-10	LBN Education Syrian Refugees	Redd Barna Norge	2016-2018	12000	Section for Humanitarian Affairs
08-1083095	LBN/Child development for Palestinian refugees	Right to Play	2008-2008	2000	N/A
LBN-09/023	Right to Play, Lebanon, 2009.	Right to Play	2009-2010	2000	Section for Humanitarian Affairs
LBN-10/0031	Right to Play, Lebanon, 2009.	Right to Play	2010-2010	2000	Section for Humanitarian Affairs
QZA-12/0831-20	Sport and play for children's education in conflict affected settings	Right to Play	2014-2015	1708	Section for Civil Society Strengthening
QZA-15/0469-7	Transforming Attitudes, Approaches, and Learning Outcomes (TAALOM)	Right to Play	2016-2019	5309.463	Section for Civil Society Strengthening