Knud Knudsen

Lithuania in a Period of Transition

The NORBALT Living Conditions Project

Fafo

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FAFO'S PREFACE

The present report is an offshoot of the NORBALT Living Conditions Project. In many respects, NORBALT is a continuation of the pioneering effort made in 1990-91, when Fafo and its Moscow-based affiliate Soteco carried out a living conditions survey in Lithuania. The favourable reception enjoyed by this project, which was the first in its kind in one of the transitional economies, spurred further contacts with representatives of other countries in the region. Soon, the idea of a repeated survey, comprising not only Lithuania but the entire Eastern Baltic Rim, was launched as a joint initiative by Terje Rød Larsen, then Fafo Director, and Baltic diplomats in Brussels. It was decided that the project should cover the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as the Kaliningrad enclave and St. Petersburg in Russia. Survey goals were formulated in close cooperation between Fafo and authorities and professional bodies in the Baltic countries. The project marked a new departure in several ways. With the exception of Lithuania, Scandinavian-style living conditions surveys had not been conducted in the region before, and secondly, the scope of NORBALT was almost breathtakingly broad, as it comprised five parallel surveys in five separate areas, and no less than 16.000 households.

Success, it is fair to say, was not a matter of course. It gives me great pleasure to record that the first main stage of the NORBALT project has now been successfully finished with the simultaneous publication of four country reports, for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia (St. Petersburg and the Kaliningrad enclave) respectively. Numerous individuals and institutions have contributed to this happy result. Our Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Russian partners are too many to be counted here; for due acknowledgement, please consult the editor's preface in each report. On the Norwegian side, we owe a particular debt of gratitude to Deputy Foreign Minister Helga Hernes and her successor Siri Bjerke. Both have been firm supporters of the project. At Fafo, I want to pay tribute to the two project managers, Erik Hansen (Russia) and Aadne Aasland (the Baltic countries), who have worked with impressive energy, commitment and professional skill. Professor Knud Knudsen and Jens B. Grøgaard join ranks with Hansen and Aasland as conscientious editors. Research Director Kåre Hagen has provided valuable advice. I wish to thank Special Adviser Jan Dietz for helping to organise the project. We are also grateful to Julia Ferkis for her contributions.

All five areas are in the middle of a transition for which there are no precedents or ready prescriptions. Notwithstanding the uncertainties, there are grounds for believing that the living conditions of ordinary citizens can be improved. Up-to-date, reliable socio-economic knowledge is an essential requirement, maybe even the key to progress. Our ambition has been that the project should play a useful role in current work to modernise local scientific capabilities. Above all, we hope the four reports can be put to good practical use by policy planners and decision-makers. The

NORBALT material is exceedingly rich, and should be made the most of in future research. In the next phase, therefore, we hope it can be utilised in Baltic-Nordic comparative studies of living conditions.

The project has been funded through generous grants from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Ministry of Defence.

Dag H. Odnes
Director General

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

In 1990 the first survey of living conditions in Lithuania was carried out by a group of Fafo social scientists, headed by then Research Director Gudmund Hernes and Director Terje Rød Larsen. The data collection as well as the following analyses were made possible through the creative work and very capable supervision of Dr. Vytautas Žiukas together with his associates on the Lithuanian side. It should be borne in mind that the groundwork was done while Lithuania was still a republic in the former Soviet Union. As part of the research group and coauthor of the 1991 report I had the privilege of working in an exceptionally dynamic environment.

Four years later a second survey was made, this time as part of a larger study of living conditions in the Baltic states. The methodological approach was based on the same principles as in the first round, enabling comparison of the 1990 and 1994 results. This means that questions of political and scientific importance in a period of transition from a socialist system to a market oriented one can be addressed with relevant data at hand. The standardisation of methodological solutions also gives a basis for later comparisons between Lithuania and the other Baltic nations.

The 1994 survey provided a basis for analysing developments in a nation during a period of fundamental social change. I appreciated the invitation again to work together with inspiring and generous Norwegian and Lithuanian colleagues. Among the Fafo researchers, I feel especially indebted to Erik Hansen and Aadne Aasland for sharing their knowledge and giving sound professional advice. They have a unique combination of professional scientific background and fluency in Russian as well as other relevant languages. I also received important suggestions from David Drury, Julia Ferkis and Jon Pedersen. As in 1990/91 the study depended on crucial assistance and support from Dr. (and Deputy Minister) Vytautas Žiukas and his Lithuanian co-researchers Vita Safjan, Zita Šniukštiene, Vida Česnuityte and Dalia Dobrovolskiene. It has been a pleasure to work with them and renew friendships. During the process of analysing and interpreting the data Algis Dobrovolskas generously shared his many insights with us. Anne Ryen in Kristiansand and Else Kielland in Tromsø also provided comments in conversations and written notes. Susan Høivik gave numerous relevant suggestions for improving style and language of the report, Jon Lahlum and Agneta Kolstad in an efficient and competent manner helped in transforming the many bits and pieces into a final, coherent entity.

I thank my wife Gro, my son Kyrre and my daughter Dyveke for making every day a new and meaningful challenge. And finally, this work would not have been possible without support and flexibitlity from my main employer and academic institution, Stavanger College, where I have enjoyed working over the past ten years.

Stavanger, October 1995
Knud Knudsen

CHAPTER 1

ANALYSING LIVING CONDITIONS IN A TRANSITION PERIOD

Lithuania belongs to the Baltic-Scandinavian region, which consists of the Baltic nations and the Scandinavian countries. This area is part of the large East European plain stretching from Russia to Northern Germany. The country is situated on the eastern shores of the Baltic Sea, with nearly 100 kilometres of coast line and an area of 65 thousand square kilometres. Lithuania has 3.7 million inhabitants. About 80 percent of the population is Lithuanian, with most of the remainder split equally between ethnic Russians and ethnic Poles.

Archaeological evidence of the first inhabitants – nomadic hunters – dates back to the late Palaeolithic period, i.e. around 10,000 BC. In European history the Grand Duchy of Lithuania played a central role from the early 12th to the mid-15th century, reaching its peak of influence and prosperity under Vytautas the Great. However, except for a short period between the two world wars, Lithuania has been under foreign rule for most of its history. In 1938 the country celebrated its twentieth year as an independent nation, despite internal conflicts and external difficulties (von Rauch, 1974). Although the Baltic states won their independence as an outcome of the First World War, they lost it again in the Second. In 1940 Lithuania was forcibly annexed by the USSR and declared a Soviet Socialist Republic, through an agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union, based on the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Arrests and deportations followed. In June 1941 a large-scale operation was carried out in the Baltic states, resulting in tens of thousands of Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians being deported. These deportations were directed against the political and social elites. Shortly afterwards, in July 1942, the Soviet Union was attacked by Nazi-Germany and the Baltic countries came under German occupation. During the war years, the Lithuanian population suffered terrors and killing on a massive scale. Most of the two hundred thousand Jews lost their lives. The first postwar years were marked by further terror and deportations, particularly in connection with the collectivization of agriculture. During the Stalin period the Lithuanian nation lost a substantial proportion of its population.

The socialist transformation of Lithuania meant the abolition of private ownership of the means of production, the collectivization of the agrarian sector and large-scale industrialization. Along with this went the implementation of Soviet rule in practically all social, political and economic matters. As a republic the country was made an integral part of the larger Soviet structure, to a considerable extent governed from Moscow (Misiunas and Taagepera, 1983). Nevertheless, Lithuania

enjoyed steady economic growth during the decades following the Second World War, as did other East European satellites . New factories were built and the country's industrial base broadened. Soviet Lithuania had access to raw materials, machinery and equipment at low prices. This process transformed the country into a relatively modern industrialized state. The agrarian sector was also modernized, resulting in production levels in the mid-1960s surpassing those of prewar times. The school system was greatly expanded and improved, bringing better education to previously deprived social groups, and raising the overall level of education. Together whith the other Baltic countries, Lithuania was generally considered among the most developed economies of the former Soviet Union. The majority of industrial enterprises were engaged in the production of machinery and machine parts, processed foods, and light industrial products, including textiles, leather, furniture and household appliances. Along with refined petroleum products from the Mazeikiai refinery and electricity generated at an now-ageing nuclear power plant in Ignalina, these industries contributed to Lithuania's export earnings. Imports included crude oil, gas, metals, chemicals, machinery and equipment.

The extensive integration of the Lithuania into the larger system of republics made the country increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union, with scant possibilities for basic economic or political change. The growing freedom struggle in the 1980s had as its main goal an independent nation. In March 1990, Lithuania became the first republic to try to seek secession from the Soviet Union. Moscow responded with an economic blockade which cut off fuel supplies for two and a half months. The blockade ended after Lithuania's Parliament voted to suspend its declaration of independence pending talks in Moscow. Such talks and later attempts to squash the independence movement did little to weaken the drive for freedom, however. The failed coup in Moscow in August 1991 finally opened the door for the Baltic countries to secede, and soon thereafter Lithuania's sovereignty was widely recognized. Following independence, a government made up of representatives of the Sajudis movement took office. Efforts to liberalize the economy were intensified, in cooperation with international bodies such as the World Bank and the IMF. General elections late in 1992 gave victory to the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDLP), and later elections for the office of President early 1993 resulted in victory for its leader, Mr. Algirdas Brazauskas. At the time of writing (Spring 1995) Mr. Adolfas Slezevicius (LDLP) is the country's Prime Minister.

In October 1990 a survey of living conditions in Lithuania was carried out, based on a national sample of adult inhabitants (Hernes and Knudsen, 1991). This was done at the time when Lithuanians were hoping for freedom, but the final outcome of the struggle was uncertain and the USSR still a hard reality. Today we know this period marked the end of the old empire. Thus, the unique 1990 study reflected living conditions and ways of thinking in the final stage of the years of dependence, after half a century of Soviet rule. It was carried out within a setting marked by the former system in all aspects of life. Lithuania as a Soviet republic was characterized by a command economy and an undemocratic political system. National planning

was strictly controlled and monitored from Moscow, based on large bureaucratic structures locally and centrally. All scientific and cultural activities had to be directed eastward. Lithuanians were practically shut off from contact with the West. Political activities were dominated by the central Party apparatus, and often interfered with by the secret police (KGB), despite efforts to develop a national profile and more independent practices. Communist Party membership was necessary for advancement beyond certain levels in economic, political and cultural life. The presence of Soviet military forces was also a constant reminder of the power of Moscow. Russian language was imperative, and a compulsory part of all education. Cultural and social contact with nations outside the East Bloc was nearly impossible, at least for the common people. On the other hand, despite the lack of national independence and individual freedom, most inhabitants still enjoyed basic economic security. It was the responsibility of the state to ensure decent living conditions for everyone. Though the outcome often was meagre, there was little real poverty: beggars were rarely seen. Every day life may have been grey and predictable, but there was order, and little crime.

After Lithuania regained its independence, the national focus has been on transforming the old centrally steered system towards a marked-oriented economy. This transition process is still underways, and developments may take unexpected turns in the future. In 1994 a survey similar to the 1990 study was carried out, also based on a national, representative sample (cfr. Appendix A). The two surveys together permit comparison of living conditions under the former system with those in the current transition period. Such a shift from *l'ancien regime* to a new one involves many difficult steps not always easily accessible to scientific inquiry. The analyses will be based mainly on systematic evaluation of statistical data, but personal and concrete observations are also relevant for understanding the transition process.

Contrasting Images

Walking around in the centre of Vilnius on a sunny day in the autumn of 1994, a visitor can sense that this is a nation under change for the better. The rhythm of the city beats faster and there is optimism in the air. Streets are crowded with busy people. Parks and gardens, now without the former obligatory statues of Communist heroes, provide shade from the sun and places for relaxation and quiet conversation. The style of clothing is westernized, with T-shirts and Levi's everywhere. The young women of Vilnius, often dressed in latest European fashion, look just as smart as their sisters in Milan, London or Paris, although their male companions may seem less fashionable. On many corners there are new shops for clothing, groceries and other daily needs, occasionally supplemented with an outdoor outlet on the pavement. There is a wide variety of goods, and trade – mostly in imported goods – is brisk. New restaurants have been opened. Lithuanians and foreigners sit around at tables, chatting and laughing. One may choose from the international menu or pick

a Lithuanian or Russian speciality, and there is also a good selection of Danish and German beverages, as well as the local brew. In the lobby of the hotel where former dignitaries from other Soviet republics used to stay, buses arrive daily with tourists from Germany, Italy, France or Sweden. No-one pays particular attention to a Westerner anymore, or pesters the visitor for currency or clothing.

Also the nearby parking lots indicate a very visible difference in the picture. The familiar fleet of Ladas and Volgas and other Soviet-style cars has been supplemented by a large number of Volvos, Opels, Fiats, BMWs, Mercedeses and the like. New styles of culture and entertainment are also in evidence. Taking an evening stroll to the central outdoor arena, the visitor might encounter an international beer festival, the first of its kind in the country. Sampling brews from different corners of the world, the audience listens to traditional jazz played by a professional band. And if in the wee hours one should want ice cream, liquor, cheese or fruit, there is 24-hour-open store nearby. A long line of customers at the counter, even past midnight, suggests that business is good. At the hotel night club Lithuanians and foreigners are dancing to the same rhythms and tunes as in London or Stockholm.

On the surface, then, the immediate impression of the capital and the major cities is one of positive change and progress. This picture gets more nuanced, however, if one gets into deeper discussions with local people, visits the outskirts and smaller towns, or travels in the countryside. For instance, on paper an industrial plant may be nearly fully manned, but little is actually produced, since there has been a slump in demand from traditional customers. Developing new products and processes is difficult and takes time. In the rural areas, land that used to belong to local collective farms now often lies fallow. Many of those who divided the vast holdings up in order to start private farming have simply gone broke, because of low incomes and rising prices of fuel and other necessities. In other instances, farmers who for years had been hoping some day to own their own land, now feel left behind. They have land, but cannot afford to buy modern machinery or fuel. The prices paid for their products are just too low to make investments profitable. In villages and towns the social security apparatus is under increasing pressure. Social workers report that more and more people, especially those with only a minimum wage or who have a large family to support, are now seeking help.

In discussions, any wish to return to the harsh and rigid system of the Soviet era is rarely expressed. Nevertheless, many of those who fought for freedom and independence, and who watched with optimism the downfall of the old empire, now feel deprived and betrayed. Ordinary people repeatedly scoff at the new urban elites and bitterly ask, "What has happened to the solidarity and common identity that used to exist among Lithuanians?"

There is a long way from the young, seemingly rich and smart people of downtown Vilnius, Kaunas or Kleipeda, to the disillusioned old farmer in the grim countryside, or the worker at a factory fighting for survival. The dramatic changes brought about by Lithuania's declaration of independence and the downfall of the USSR first gave new hopes and opportunities, but later also brought disappoint-

ments and social miseries unknown in earlier times. The winners of the transition process so far appear strong and confident, the losers feel deprived and bewildered. Although Lithuanians warmly welcomed the political changes of the early 1990s, many are finding it difficult to accept and adjust to the dramatic turns in economic realities as well as overall norms and value systems. Unquestionably, the old system was bureaucratic and slow, and had long shown signs of stagnation, but ordinary citizens did not have to fear for their basic economic foundation, for themselves or their family. The new situation, with responsibility shifting over to the individual citizen, seems scary and threatening. Especially middle aged and elderly workers are unprepared for life in a society based on radically new principles. They welcome the political freedom that everybody wanted, but are at the same time sceptical to a new system characterized by competition and self-interest. It is true that ordinary Lithuanians resented the old hierarchical ordering, with party-membership and system loyalty as necessary keys to advancement in society, frequently irrespective of personal qualifications and ambitions. However, they also dislike the style of the new economic elites, who often only confirm traditional stereotypes of a ruthless and irresponsible capitalist class. Such reactions are sharpened by the observation that, to a surprising degree the new elite, seems to be made up of the old one: Former party cadres often reappear as directors, businessmen and leaders of joint-venture companies.

Theory and Practice of Transition

According to the doctrines of planned change, a successful transition normally presupposes so strong a medicine that the patient is likely to feel a bit shaky for a while. Economic theory in this area suggests a certain sequencing of reforms, as part of a national economy's transformation from a centrally planned to a market system. A central point here is the assumption that the main components of macroeconomic reform are interconnected. Consequently, reforms should be initiated more or less simultaneously from the start, with special emphasis on macroeconomic stabilization, followed by price and trade reforms. If there is to be privatization, it should come as early as possible, to signal strong government commitment to sustained reform. The implementation of comprehensive enterprise reform will determine the relevant timing of reforms in other areas, such as social security, and liberalisation of other product markets. Only in later stages, after a viable banking system has been established, is full liberalization of financial markets normallyrecommended. This also goes for full liberalization of wage bargaining, which depends on adequate control of such processes through successful enterprise reform.

From these theories it should be evident that a successful shift from a Sovietstyle system to a market economy is not an easy task, whether in Lithuania or any other nation of the former East Bloc. Difficulties are likely to turn up at all stages. A crucial task is to carry out the necessary but difficult institutional changes in the economic

and political sphere, while at the same time keeping morale up spirit and holding on to the belief that after a harsh period, things will indeed improve. If the population is to continue their support for reforms, people will have to feel reasonably sure that the transition period will not last for ever. In this process, rules and basic assumptions that had long been taken for granted will have to be discarded. After the first encounters with a market economy, people often discover that their original expectations were naive, and that the new system may have unwanted consequences. For instance, supporting the principles of a market economy also means accepting that firms that fail to compete successfully will have to go bankrupt, and employees be laid off. Even if one believes in the projections from international experts, indicating that there will be large gains in the future once the economy has been slimmed down, it is hard to keep optimism alive as long as economic problems continue to worsen, with no clear signs of improvements in sight. Economic organizations are interwoven with the established cultural norms and mentalities. People who all their life have been trained to look to the government and the state as responsible for their welfare, now find it hard to have this burden suddenly placed on their own shoulders. Changing the economic system is more complicated than simply reorganizing production units and opening up markets. A successful transition process must be accompanied by changes in the general culture, as well as the establishment of new social institutions and legal structures. It is a central thesis in classical theory as well as a common experience from modern economies, that if well-functioning markets are to survive as such, they need to be defended by the state through necessary institutional arrangements. Without such a framework, the basic mechanisms of economic actors competing against each other will tend to be undermined, and thus the market institution may lose its effectiveness.

Institutions under Pressure

Lithuania is still a nation striving for a successful transformation of its basic *economic* system, from the former command economy to a marked-oriented society, as well as to become an independent partner in international trade. A fundamental problem is to create new motivational systems that can allow individuals to pursue their own interests, while at the same time ensuring the collective interests of the society and nation as a whole. Although there are many signs of optimism and positive change – accompanied by anecdotal success stories – cold statistics so far tell a different tale. The national product has been more than halved over the last five-year period, with a parallel drop in domestic demand. Formerly a major exporter of agricultural produce and selected industrial products to Russia and other Soviet republics, Lithuania today has lost much of its traditional markets with the break-up of the old empire. Economic problems and the shifting situation put heavy pressure on central social institutions, such as the legal system, the education sec-

tor, the political system, and the social assistance and security sector. Lithuanians express doubts about what lies in the future for them. The pressure of change is felt in most areas of society:

* Reforming *the legal system* necessarily involves specifying rules for property rights and the principles of privatization, but it entails more than that. Economic reforms need to be supplemented with broad-scale legislation on civil rights in a democratic society. New laws often tend to take on an ad hoc character. Legislators have limited experience to draw on, in terms of how new laws will actually work. It is one thing to invent a different legal framework: another task is to get people in general to understand and accept it, and to avoid negative side effects. New laws are frequently amended, but further changes and refinements can end up making things more complicated and difficult to understand for the average citizen.

* Transforming the *political system* from a mainly single-party to a smoothly functioning multi-party structure and a stable democracy is another goal. The new situation with competing parties where citizens freely can choose, at first appears strange to some. As the transition process unfolds, major shifts in the political picture are likely to follow. Voters have few loyalties and fluctuate from one political extreme to the other.

* The *educational system* is under pressure from various quarters. Knowledge and competence that used to enjoy high esteem – for instance Russian language and engineering specialities based on Soviet technology – are now in little demand. Instead there is a need for experts in new fields like marketing and market research, while traditional ones – for instance law, English language and the like – will have to undergo major overhauls and adjustments. The shift in orientation involves many areas and on different levels – from the aims, administration and control of the educational sector on the one hand, to content, teaching methods and youth culture on the other.

* The *family institution* that historically played a crucial role in the upbringing of new generations must now adjust to a different climate. These adaptations involve the values transmitted from the older to the younger, as well as the need for the family to take on new responsibilities that had been left to the state. In a market-oriented society that emphasizes personal responsibility, the individuals are likely to become more dependent on the immediate family. As the state frees itself from past obligations for the welfare of its citizens, the family will become a more important source of social and economic support.

* Former *ideologies and belief systems* are gradually being exchanged for new values and norms. During the final stages of the independence struggle the old symbols of communism were eagerly torn down. The statues of Communist heroes that used to be highly visible, are no longer there. Although the old symbols were hated by many, parts of the more passive and invisible traces from the Soviet period still remain. In most citizens' way of thinking, talking and behaving there exist paradigms and modes which were established over a long time: they cannot be erased over night. The new situation may lead to conflicts not only between organized interest groups, but also within families and each individual.

* Traditional *organizations and institutions* that represented important forces and subcultures in the struggle for independence, such as the Lithuanian Roman Catholic Church, find themselves in a new role. Now they have to find a place for themselves within a democratic society. A central question will be how to exert power without too much becoming a political actor outside the normal political system. The printing press and other mass media are facing much of the same problem. At last Lithuania has won its freedom; however, newspaper editors and owners lack experience with independent journalism, and are uncertain how to tackle the new situation. This point is also relevant in the continuing fight for the right to write and rewrite Lithuanian history. For a long time to come, questions like "What did really happen?" during the Soviet period, "Why did it happen?" and "Who were responsible?" will be discussed among historians, representatives of the press, political figures as well as among ordinary citizens.

Outlook

This report attempts to draw a picture of Lithuanian living conditions in a significant period of the nation's history. Questions about what the future holds in store for the nation are many, while clear answers are few. At the time of writing there are some indications, however, that the economic downturn seem to have bottomed out, accompanied by optimistic predictions of a 1995 rise in Gross Domestic Product. Whether such expectations will be fulfilled, implying that the transition process is drawing closer to its end, remains to be seen.

The underlying thesis in the following is that transforming the basic economic system involves a much wider scope of activities and institutions than strictly economic ones. Structural shifts may involve high social costs, making themselves felt through society. Typically, a mood of general pessimism is likely to affect the reproduction potential of the population. In increasingly difficult times birth rates tend to drop; and especially if death rates go up at the same time, natural population growth can decrease. Once such trends are established, they have serious long-term consequences and are difficult to reverse. Uncertainties about the future put additional strains and stresses on the individual. Together with an austere reorganizing of the health care sector, a worsening health situation will probably ensue. These negative tendencies are further accentuated by hazardous and polluted work places. In a weak economy, necessary improvement programmes tend to be shelved. Families and individuals experience the immediate economic price of transition in a direct way as real income drops. When the household has less purchasing power, consumption patterns change, with basic food products making up the largest proportion. Furthermore harsh economic realities accompanied by erosion of traditional social norms represent new challenges for the law enforcement apparatus. Higher crime levels, less individual securiry and more social isolation are expected. When earlier high expectations cannot be fulfilled, general trust in the political

system, and also in one's own abilities, is undermined. In light of continued disappointments about the present situation, former times are seen in a rosier glow than just a few years ago. Despite major changes in many areas, basic processes of inequality are likely to persist, and thus systematic differences in living conditions among population segments will continue.

In the following we will take a closer look at the situation for the population as of late 1994, interpreting survey results within the context described above. To keep focus on change and transition, we will compare 1994 findings with those from 1990, when possible. Both surveys have proven to be good representative samples in statistical terms. Together with available official Lithuanian statistics, these two data sources should provide a relevant framework for analysing changes in a nation in the process of transition. A parallel report has also been written in the Lithuanian language, placing less weight on comparison with the 1990 survey and focusing more on certain areas, such as activities on the household level.

Modern political theory emphasizes that political decisions require answers to three different questions (Erikson 1993): a) What are the actual conditions? b) What goals do we have? and c) What means should be used? The answer to the third question calls for the best available expert knowledge: Given the goals, what is the best way to achieve them? The second question is mainly a normative one and can be answered only through political processes and discussions. The first question is of a different nature. It cannot be answered in discussions alone. Whether living conditions are improving or becoming worse in specific areas involves questions on which people often have different views and opinions. However, reliable answers to such questions cannot be found on the basis of individual experiences or discussions in the mass media. They can be found only if people, under different, relevant and representative conditions are observed or surveyed with the help of modern scientific methods. It is such an approach that is the main method for this report.

Level of living studies are typically used: a) To analyse variations in living conditions among population groups at a given point in time, b) To provide a starting point or "base line" for studies and actions over time, and c) To compare social life and institutions in one country with those of others. The 1994 Lithuanian Living Conditions study, as part of the larger NORBALT study involving all the three Baltic states and parts of Russia, can be used for all three purposes. The present report will, however, concentrate on a combination of the first and the second type of use: we seek to describe and interpret current living conditions in Lithuania, at the same time keeping an eye on the earlier situation of late 1990, in order to achieve a better understanding of the process of change.

The survey approach for studying living conditions has proven a valuable analytical tool in providing politicians and planners with varied and precise information as a basis for decision making. Despite its many advantages this method does have shortcomings. Three points should be emphasized (see Hernes and Knudsen, 1991). First, it is a general approach best suited for giving a bird's eye view of the

overall situation and variations among main groups at given points in time. Analyses of developments in small local regions, special groups or individuals are often better served by anthropological and historical methods. Secondly, the approach is based on quantitative measurements. In many cases, this is critical for providing accurate knowledge of general tendencies and differences. However, many qualitative aspects may be lost behind numbers and computations. Thirdly, measurements are structured and standardized. Questions are asked in the same order in an identical manner to all respondents, to provide a common basis for systematic comparison. In order to contrast individuals or groups one needs a common yardstick. Still, certain variables may not fit all equally well: the meaning of a given question may differ from one person to another.

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CHAPTER 2

POPULATION

Information about the size, composition and future projections of the population gives important input for planners and policy makers. Data on sex and age distribution, fertility patterns, population growth, family relations and housing arrangements, as well as migration trends constitute a vital background for the description and analysis of living conditions. Such information can form the basis for political action. Factors that influence quality of life will vary in importance from segment to segment. For instance: Certain considerations of significance for one group, such as the availability of medical care for old people, may be less important for others, such as for young people. Another example could be the availability of kindergartens and playgrounds: important for many parents, but less consequential for the childless. Or while the physical working environment is essential for groups working full time, it is of less significance for part-time employed or those outside the regular labour force, such as children, students and old people. Population data, thus, are central when planning for the future at the regional or national level. The age distribution indicates how many persons might participate in the work force at one given point in time, and may affect the demand for educational resources and capacity at various levels of the educational system. It also affects the type of health care and social security services that will be required, and could bring about changes in the share of the national product to be allocated to the care of old people. The distribution of family types has consequences for the kind of housing needed; the spread of the population over different regions necessarily puts restrictions for local planners, and so forth.

Lithuania faces difficult economic and social problems in the transition from a socialist economy – earlier tied up to the former Soviet system – to a more independent and market-oriented one. Although many of these problems are of an immediate nature and require quick solutions, some underlying questions will find an answer only in the long run. Resolving such long-term problems often depends on an understanding of demographic processes. As experience from for instance Norway and Sweden has demonstrated, a typical change following modernization is a shift in the age structure, from a younger population to an older one. If this pattern ensues in Lithuania it will have significant implications for economic and social life well into the next century.

Long-term Processes

Current estimates indicate that women in the Baltic countries outlive men by about ten years on the average. This puts these countries near the top of the world list in terms of the male-female differential in life expectancy at birth. Because of the higher mortality rates for men at almost every age, there are roughly twice as many women as men in the older age groups. Taken together, the Baltic nations were among the oldest of the former Soviet republics, with more than 11 % of the nearly eight million people aged sixty-five or older. It is an important observation in the science of demography that present fertility levels will affect the composition of the population for generations to come. Taking trends in fertility and death rates in the Baltics over the last thirty-forty years into consideration, demographers have made projections of the future population. In general, if the pattern of lower fertility in recent years stays the same, and there are no major changes in immigration levels, the Baltic nations can be expected to age slowly. According to such projections these countries are likely to become more like the Scandinavian nations, where the number of old people compared to those in working-age, has been steadily increasing. Thus by the year 2020 the three Baltic nations are projected to have over sixteen percent of their population aged sixty-five and over. According to Velkoff (1993) the age group fifty-five and over will have a steady growth the next 25 years, continuing a trend that started around 1970. However, the age bracket around seventy and older has a particular pattern for men, with a dramatic decrease in numbers for some categories. The main cause of this is a so-called echo effect of World War II and the Stalin period. The men that entered this age group in the 1980s were young in wartime. This special characteristic will be examined further below. Despite such variations, the basic long-term trend seems clear for the elderly support ratio. This ratio is defined as the number of people aged sixty-five and over per one hundred persons in the productive ages, i.e. between twenty and sixty-five. As life expectancy increases and fertility decreases over time, this ratio increases. In Lithuania the median population age is expected to be approaching forty by the year 2020, as compared to around thirty-three in 1990. All in all this could yield a change in the elderly support ratio, from less than twenty in 1990 to around thirty in 2020.

Basic Figures and Patterns

By 1994 the Lithuanian population numbered a little over 3.7 million people. The nation's dramatic history in this century is reflected in the population size for various periods. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1. (All figures in this chapter are based on official Lithuanian population statistics). The figure reports total number of people living in the country from the time before Annexation and the war up to 1994.

The chart shows a sharp fall in population size from 1939, when Lithuania still was an independent nation, to 1950 – after the war, but still in the Stalin period. During the war the Lithuanian population suffered terrors and killings on a massive scale, and the first postwar years were also marked by further deportations. Estimates vary concerning total deaths and disappearances resulting from the war years and the deportations under Stalin. Whatever the correct estimates it is a fact that the population during this period was reduced by at least half a million people, from a little over three million to close to two and a half million a decade later. The next three points in time (1959,1970, 1979) display a long period of steady growth. Although these times were known for hardships and difficulties, they were also marked by economic growth, stability and increasing integration of the Baltic republics into the larger Soviet Union. There was also a substantial influx of other nationalities from USSR moving to Lithuania. The country enjoyed steady economic growth during these decades, as did other East European satellites. Especially during the 1960s many still had hopes for the potential of socialism. However, during the 1980s signs of stagnation became increasingly evident. Despite renewed efforts from Moscow to increase investments and keep up links to Vilnius, Lithuania's Declaration of Independence was announced in 1990, preceding the later disintegration of the Soviet system. The consequences of such developments are also reflected in Figure 2.1 for the last period. Up to 1992 the population still was increasing, but since then it has been declining systematically.

The history of Lithuania over the last sixty years is mirrored not only in the size of the population over time, but also in the composition of the population today. Consider the pattern in Figure 2.2, where the present population is described in terms of its distribution (number of people in thousands) by age and sex.

Several characteristics should be noted. First, for people over fifty-five, there are far more women in each age category than men. It is a well-know fact that women

Figure 2.1 Size of the Lithuanian population: 1939 - 1992



in general live longer than men, so a typical population distribution in most countries will show more elderly women than men. However, the very pronounced difference, especially from ages sixty-five to eighty, is more marked than what is found for instance in the Scandinavian countries. Partly it must be seen as resulting from gender differences in health-related life styles and habits, further commented on in the chapter on Health. The observed pattern should also be understood in light of tragic and dramatic events after Annexation, during war time and the Stalin period, when Lithuania lost a substantial proportion of her population. Many more men than women died, a fact which affects population distribution even today.

Secondly, the number of people in age categories between five and thirty-five shows no special trend. This is somewhat different from Scandinavian countries, where the number of newborns has been going down during the last generation, reflecting a decline in fertility rates. Figure 2.2 shows that if there was such a tendency in Lithuania, it has apparently been less systematic over time. However, the number of people in the youngest age category (0-4) is lower, a consequence of decreasing fertility rates in recent years.

Thirdly, at first glance the distribution in Figure 2.2 does not seem to show the typical decrease in persons aged fifty to sixty-five found in Scandinavian countries, reflecting a reluctance on the part of young couples to start large families during the late 1930s and the Second World War. Such a relative decrease is not found for the Lithuanian population. However, this should not be interpreted as indicating the average Lithuanian couple was more optimistic or had relatively many children during this period. One must recall that whereas Lithuania lost a sizable proportion of her population due to war and deportations, while Norway for instance lost less

Figure 2.2 The Lithuanian population 1994. Distribution by age and sex



than one-half percent during war time. That is why the relative decrease in number of people after age fifty-five in Figure 2.2 is steeper than in Scandinavian countries. A considerable number of those aged sixty and over are "lacking" on the right-hand side of the distribution. This is partly why age groups immediately below do not to the same degree appear relatively small.

Recent Changes: Births and Deaths

A more detailed picture of recent developments is given in Figure 2.3, where the total number of residents in the country is shown for the last ten years.

During the period from 1985 to the turn of the decade, the number of people shows a systematic increase from one year to the next. Every year the growth was on the average close to thirty-thousand individuals, resulting in a total increase in this period of about two hundred thousand residents. This was a period still marked by fairly high fertility rates and low death rates, as well as continued immigration from other Soviet republics. Then the pattern is broken. The strong and marked increase is followed by a smaller, but still systematic decrease. In this way, some underlying trends of the population, on which earlier long-term projections were based have been broken, at least for some time. To gain further insight into the forces behind this change, one normally would look for new developments in the number of births and deaths, as well as migration patterns.

One key to understanding may be gained from Figure 2.4, where birth and death rates (number per 1000 population, each year) are shown for the period 1985-1993.

The upper line in the figure represents the birth rate, while the lower one stands for the death rate. Both lines have distinct profiles. The birth rate drops from its former level from 1985 to 1989, and then remains fairly stable for the next two years.

Figure 2.3 Recent trend in population size. Detailed picture last 10 years



Then a marked decrease is observed in the following years. The death rate shows an opposite trend in the same period. Despite signs of a drop from 1985 to 1989, there is a systematic increase over the next four years, emphasized by an accelerating tendency at the end of the period. This pattern must also be interpreted in light of a general decrease in life expectancy in Lithuania, together with an increase in the proportion of old people. Taken together, these trends present an interesting picture: A marked surplus of number of births over deaths at the beginning of the period gradually changes to a situation where in the end the two rates are at about the same level. However, since the birth rate so far has remained higher than the death rate, even for the last part of the period, this pattern in itself cannot explain the decrease in the total population mentioned earlier in this chapter. On the oth-

Figure 2.4 Natural increase. Recent Trends. Lithuanian population 1985-1993



Figure 2.5 Age specific birth rates



er hand preliminary estimates for 1994 indicate that these two trends are continuing so that death rates now seem to be higher than birth rates.

Figure 2.5, showing age specific fertility rates for the three most important age groups of women, may give further insight. From the early to the mid-1980s there was even a slight increase in fertility for all three groups. In later years this trend levels off, and at least from the turn of the decade it is in opposite direction. The general optimism that characterized the time around independence did not yield any increase in young couples planning more children than earlier.

Thus, the pattern in Figure 2.5 could be understood as a consequence of younger Lithuanian women becoming more "modern". The data are still open to mixed interpretations. Although the large and systematic drop for the youngest group of women parallels trends in other industrial nations, it may carry additional signals. Seen together with a similar sharp drop in marriage rates after 1990, it could also be viewed as an indicating more pessimistic mood in the population.

Recent Trends: Immigration and Outmigration

For further insights we look for changes in migration patterns. Possible changes in this area must necessarily be understood on the backdrop of the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, and the restructuring of the relations between Lithuania and its neighbouring states. After Lithuania became an independent nation, new citizenship laws were adopted, laws regarded by most observers as fairly liberal. Still, it seems likely that the large-scale political and military restructuring in the former USSR would lead a change in once-established migration patterns. Thus, one key to a further understanding is through the distribution of different ethnic nationalities in the country. For historical reasons, the population consists also of nationalities other than ethnic Lithuanians. Of these Russians and Poles traditionally have represented the main groups. In Figure 2.6 the most recent numbers (estimates) are given.

Figure 2.6 Nationalities in Lithuania 1994



Four out of five citizens are of Lithuanian origin. Nearly one in twelve is Russian, and about one in fourteen is Polish. Lithuania differs from the other Baltic states in this respect, especially in the lower proportion of Russians. Other nationalities make up less than four percent, of which Belarussians (1.5 percent) and Ukrainians (1.0 percent) are the largest.

It is a reasonable hypothesis that the radical changes on the economic, political and military level in the former USSR would result in unstable migration patterns. In Figure 2.7 levels of net migration are shown.

In 1989 there was a positive net migration to Lithuania. This indicates that more people from neighbouring republics still were moving into the country than were moving out. That year was the last one to date, in a long period of positive net migration. In 1990 the pattern changed. Gradually the number of individuals moving out compared to the number moving in increased. This trend peaked in 1992, but even in 1993 there was a continued net negative migration. In each year from 1990 and onwards the largest net negative migration was to Russia. It is for her relations with that nation Lithuania's independence has had the greatest consequences. Further examination of migration data (not reported in detail here) shows that the change in net migration is more a result from decreasing immigration than from increased outmigration. In 1993 the number of individuals who immigrated from the CIS states was only around 2,700 as compared to 16,800 in 1989, while outmigration to these states for the same year was close to 15,100, as compared to 15,400 in 1989.

Figure 2.7 Net migration 1989 -1993



Concluding Remarks

As already noted, the level of negative net migration was lower in 1993. This might indicate that the picture drawn in Figure 2.7 is a temporary one. After the restructuring process in the larger region is over, it is not unlikely that migration patterns will stabilize at lower levels. However, for the short period from 1992 to 1994 where a decrease in total population size has been observed, it is to be explained more by new migration patterns than by changes in birth and death rates. In the long run, however, it is the basic demographic processes behind the number of births and deaths that in all likelihood will determine the population size and composition of Lithuania in the future. Clearly, recent trends of both these indicators point in a pessimistic direction. The earlier natural population growth has dwindled and is now negative. If these levels are allowed to continue for some time, they may have grave consequences in the future.

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CHAPTER 3

HEALTH

Health is one of the most important aspects of living conditions of a population, and therefore often treated as the first of several components in level of living studies. The World Health Organization (WHO) Health defines health as "a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity". Such a definition thus takes "the good life" as a starting point and defines health broadly to include most aspects of a person's welfare.

Living conditions and health are interrelated in at least two profound ways. First, directly, as good health has an obvious value in itself. If one's health falters it is difficult to live a full life, feel joy and happiness or interact with one's surroundings. Illnesses and suffering restrict our basic potential as human beings and decrease our well-being. Secondly, indirectly, as good health is necessary for the individual to achieve other things in life, from participating in daily activities ôo obtainingimportant goods and benefits. Health in this respect is a central asset for theindividual to get something out of life. For these reasons variations in health are crucial for understanding differences in living conditions. Moreover, a person's health will itself be affected by the conditions under which he or she lives. Partly this will be a result of factors that the individual has some control over, such as drinking, smoking and the kind of food one eats, together with various forms of physical exercise. Other factors, however, may be beyond the control of the individual. Throughout one's life cycle, housing conditions, recreational possibilities, air pollution and so forth will influence basic health and well-being. The same is also true for conditions at the workplace, where the physical surroundings as well as the psycho-social environment may affect those who work there.

The Lithuanian health-care system used to be among the best in the former USSR, and the life expectancy of Lithuanians among the highest. Today the system is faced with major problems that to a large degree are the results of the former, highly centralized health-care structures. (See for instance World Bank, 1993: chapter 18). These were characterized by an emphasis on quantity, which heavily affected the allocation of resources. The present organization of services still reflects the traditional budget priorities, with emphasis on the number of hospitals, beds and staff, and less on the quality and efficiency of the health care provided. In today's transition process it is difficult to maintain and equip the health-care system properly, and at the same time solve old problems linked to overspecialization and poor coordination. The disintegration of the Soviet Union led to the collapse of the centralized network for supplying inputs to this sector, which resulted in shortages of medicines and equipment. New guidelines have now been adopted and various

reforms implemented, emphasizing decentralization, quality of care, improved training and education as well as prevention and protection. However, such changes take time and are in themselves costly. Despite the many drawbacks of the former centralized system, it did provide the population with basic security and some services. The difficult economic situation of the past few years has probably made people, especially those in need of care, sceptical to radical overhauls and changes. At the same time, doubts have been growing in the West over the effectiveness and limits of the organization of health care in advanced industrial societies. Typically, in the US debate on health care reform in 1994, reference was frequently made to the technologically advanced US system as one of the most expensive and least effective in the world.

On the one hand, independence gave Lithuania a chance to free itself from the former highly centralized and rigid structures and build up its own, independent health-care system, based more on principles of decentralization and quality. On the other hand, the disintegration of the Soviet Union virtually overnight destroyed established supply lines and organizational structures that are costly and difficult to replace quickly. At the same time, there are conflicting views on the best way to build up a new national health care and social security system. It is not obvious what the ideal model for the future organization should be, or what should be the right balance between private interests and government responsibilities. Taken together, such factors make the process of change in this sector slow and painful.

This chapter will take up six aspects of health in Lithuania. We start with a brief description of the scientific and practical context for studying health as a living component by representative surveys and other data sources. Secondly, a rough overview is presented of some available findings of traditional health indicators, emphasizing patterns and trends in such measures as causes of death, life expectancy, and age-specific death rates, as well as infant mortality. Thirdly, we provide some basic information on the organization and structural arrangements of the health system of today's Lithuania. Fourthly, we use available survey data to analyse reported illnesses and consequences of health problems. When possible we compare 1994 results with those of the living conditions survey of 1990, in order to reveal possible changes. This investigation also includes analyses of various psychological difficulties as reported by respondents. Fifthly, we go into health-related habits and activities, analysing such aspects as alcohol drinking and smoking, as well as physical exercise. Next, some simple indicators of actual use of health services are discussed. Finally, we summarize findings and discuss implications.

Context

In the first generation after World War II, Lithuania together with many other countries experienced a gradual and steady improvement of the population's health. However, during the last twenty years as a Soviet Republic the picture deteriorated,

with the main indicators pointing in a negative direction (see Krumins and Zvidrins 1992). From that time the crude mortality rate in the Baltics rose, and life expectancy for middle-aged people (forty years) went down. Despite some periodic improvements in life expectancy at birth and infant mortality, the general impression is one of stagnation in the overall health situation. Typical risk factors for disease, for instance alcohol abuse and smoking, as well as consumption of highly saturated fats, show main trends in a negative direction.

Because health plays such an important part in the lives of individuals and groups there has been a long-standing interest in registering and measuring changes in this area. Ideally, researchers and policy planners would want main indicators to reflect qualitative developments of a society. One starting point for analysing health empirically could be the broad WHO definition given above. In this case, good health is not something that is present or not for the individual, but rather implies a certain state of mind and body. It becomes a question of more or less, of varying degrees along a continuous scale, going from good to bad. A somewhat different approach is to take "being ill" as the starting point. Illness may be understood as a problem that may or may not exist for an individual. Here the baseline stems from the idea that there is an acceptable or normal situation for people. Using this as a standard, actual differences may be measured. Deviations can be evaluated by experts, and results can be expressed as particular diagnoses, such as for the incidence of tuberculosis. In brief then, health is a complex phenomenon that may be viewed from various angles.

Data of the type obtained in surveys are usually better suited for information about illnesses or defects of various kinds, than for describing health status in a broader sense or the physical fitness of a population. This fact makes it difficult to draw a clear and coherent picture from survey data alone, or to describe variations and changes in health conditions in a detailed manner. In comparative analyses, mortality rates and causes of death are often common indicators, as they are easy to obtain and constitute a reasonable standard for comparison. However, such population statistics can portray only limited aspects of the total picture. One supplementary approach is to obtain information on the extent and prevalence of various illnesses, whether these are being treated or not. When such information is gathered by survey questions, the method can give an opportunity for respondents to tell about their illnesses or afflictions. On the other hand, this strategy also has its pitfalls. Some illnesses may be forgotten, particularly the less important ones, or those that the individual has grown accustomed to. Others may not be mentioned because people find it difficult to talk about them, especially to a stranger, as will normally be the case for an interviewer.

In the Level of Living survey of Lithuania in 1990 a great many health questions were asked, and the data thus generated were used in an attempt to draw a detailed picture of the health situation of the population. Although new and valuable information was provided, this proved to be a time-consuming and costly procedure, which probably also was affected by measurement problems of the kind mentioned

above. A simplified strategy was therefore chosen in the 1994 survey. Only basic questions about main health problems were asked. However, of these some were still the same as those applied in 1994, yielding a (limited) baseline for comparison. To provide a relevant context for the interpretation of these survey results, we will describe general trends of health levels and services through data from official Lithuanian statistics.

Patterns and Trends

Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of causes of death for 1993. The figure shows deaths per 100,000 of the population. The relative pattern of the main categories is similar to that found in many industrial nations, such as the Scandinavian countries. Important causes of death are cardiovascular diseases or diseases linked to the circulatory system. More than three times as many die from these causes, as compared to malignant neoplasms of various sorts. The rates for deaths due to accidents, poisoning and injuries are lower, but still high by international standards. Other causes, such as respiratory, digestive and infectious diseases, play a smaller part. Further inspection of official statistics (not reported in detail here) also shows some important gender-differences. In general men have a higher death risk than women. Men die relatively more often from malignant neoplasms, partly stemming from the much higher occurrence (five times as high) of lung cancer. This pattern must be understood on the background of certain life-styles and habits, commented upon later in this chapter. The higher incidence of respiratory diseases among men can be linked to the fact that typical "men's jobs" in Lithuania still are on workplaces with high levels of pollution and exposure to various hazards. The impression of Lithuania as a traditional patriarchal society is reinforced by detailed statistics on accidents, poisoning, suicides, etc., showing levels four to five times higher for men.

Figure 3.1 Causes of death 1993. Deaths per 100,000 population



Figure 3.2 shows average life expectancy for the period 1976-1992. The difference between men (lower line) and women (upper line), is striking. On the average women are expected to live approximately ten years longer than men, a difference also found in the other Baltic nations, although Lithuanians can expect to live one year longer.

The main focus in the figure is on the development over the last fifteen-sixteen years. Although variations over the period do not appear dramatic, we can see a parallel pattern for both sexes, albeit more pronounced for men than for women. From the mid-1980s there were signs of a gradual improvement in life expectancy, towards the end of the decade. Then life expectancy for both genders went down again. While levelling off for women, the downward trend systematically worsened for men, emphasizing the relatively higher health risks for them in the recent period. The general time pattern for both genders is probably not accidental, but can be interpreted against the backdrop of earlier health policies. In the period from the mid-1980s towards the end of the decade measures were taken in Lithuania as well as in other Soviet republics to restrict the consumption of alcohol. At least in Lithuania these measures resulted in the highest ever recorded life expectancies, nearly 77 for women and 68 for men. At the time these were among the highest values recorded in the USSR.

Figure 3.3 (next page) shows a more detailed picture of developments over the past decade, with mortality rates, i.e. deaths per 100,000, for different age groups. As expected the general pattern is the same as in most industrial countries, with an increasing rate for older people, particularly after 55. Mortality rates are also generally high in the very first period after birth, then decline, to rise again with old age.

Figure 3.2 Average life expectancy at birth by gender



Figure 3:3 gives a basis for comparing recent figures (1993) with those from 1990. The difference between the two points in time may not seem dramatic, but there is a systematic tendency: for practically all age groups, rates are higher in 1993 than in 1990. One should be careful not to draw any premature conclusions, however. The difference could reflect periodic fluctuations, or simply improved statistical recording procedures. On the other hand, taken together with the picture drawn in the previous figure (3.2) and additional findings below, the empirical pattern could at least be interpreted as a warning signal. Judging from available official statistics there are indications that the pressures and hardships of the transition process so far have had an adverse effect on the health of the Lithuanian people.

Figure 3.3 Mortality by age, 1990 and 1993



Figure 3.4 Infant mortality



Supplementary information is given in Figure 3.4, where infant mortality rates (deaths under one year of age per 1000 births) are shown from 1970 to 1993. Over the two decades from 1970 to 1990 there was a systematic decease. From 1990 to 1991 a sharp increase can be seen, followed by still somewhat higher levels the next two years.

Again, one should be careful not to over-dramatize this pattern. There have been improvements in the way these statistics are recorded, and part of the initial large increase could be explained by this. However, there is an increasing trend also in the following years, and the general level has remained relatively high by international standards. Therefore, the pattern observed should be of concern to national health authorities. Such a conclusion is underlined by the trends reported in figure 3.5, showing morbidity rates (newly registered patients per 1000) from 1989 to 1993.

These are rather rough statistics; however, they indicate a growing number of patients since 1990. Although increasing rates could be seen as indicative of a more effective treatment system, the markedly higher levels for children after 1990 can hardly be interpreted in such an optimistic way. Detailed inspection of official statistics shows that the main explanation for the higher rates for children lies in an increase in diseases of the respiratory system. Thus, the reported pattern points to a need for better health environments, especially for the younger generation.

Structural Characteristics

It is beyond the scope of this report to give any detailed analysis of the organization and the structural arrangements of the health system of Lithuania. However, available statistics may at least give some impressions of the context of the findings from the survey data. In Table 3.1 (see next page) shows some of these, as taken from

Figure 3.5 Newly registered patients per 1,000



Lithuania's Statistical Yearbook 1993. The table shows indicators of health care and services for the period 1989 to 1993.

The number of physicians has stayed at about the same level (close to 17,000) over the period, while the number of dentists has gone down slightly. Both indicators peaked in 1990, which could reflect optimistic planning and start-ups at the time of independence. However, there has been a systematic and marked decrease in so-called paramedical personnel over the past two-three years. We interpret this pattern as a result of rationalization efforts linked to the transition process. Thus, the support apparatus around the core medical staffs has diminished. According to international experts (World Bank, 1993) there had been an oversupply of hospitals and beds, and the health sector as such was regarded as relatively inefficient. Although the number of hospitals shows no clear-cut pattern, that of hospital beds does. During the period, the number of available beds fell from nearly 47,000 to less than 44,000. There has also been a systematic decrease in hospital beds for children. The pattern of new admisssions to hospitals first had a deceasing trend, but recently this has begun to rise. Seen together with decreasing number of beds above this may indicate more efficient procedures. Again, it also interesting to note the sharp drop from 1989 to 1990. Stressful but promising times may make people less inclined to register as sick or in need of medical assistance. There is also a similar drop in the number of emergency aids, however, this trend continues and only rises somewhat in the last year. Seemingly there is a dramatic drop in the number of beds available in sanatoria and rest homes. Such services were considered a distinct characteristic of the former system. However, inspection of more detailed statistics reveals that the observed change probably stems mostly from the restructuring of the sector.

Table 3.1 Some indicators of health care and services, in thousands

(In thousands)	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Physicians	16.9	17.1	16.6	16.6	16.6
Dentists	2.2	2.3	2.1	2.1	2.0
Paramedical personell	46.5	47.3	47.3	40.6	39.9
Hospitals	192	197	202	199	198
Hospital beds	46.6	46.2	45.9	44.5	43.6
Beds for children	6.8	6.6	5.7	5.5	5.3
Hospital admissions	750	691	704	705	735
Emergency aid, total	963	908	890	851	874
Sanatoria and rest homes number of beds	71.4	68.1	45.6	44.4	34.2

Reported Illnesses and Consequences of Health Problems

In the level of living conditions survey in 1994 Lithuanians were asked several questions about their health. Most people it emerged, feel they have good health. When asked "How would you characterize your health in general?" close to three in four of those who answered say that their health is very good, good or fair. As demonstrated in Figure 3.6 the most typical answer, "Fair", is given by nearly half of the respondents. Only one in five reports bad or very bad health.

Judged on the basis of answers to such self-reported questions Lithuanians would appear to be healthy. This finding must also be interpreted on the background of the emphasis traditionally placed on physical strength and vitality in Lithuania. The impression is also confirmed in figure 3.7. Respondents were asked various questions about their functional abilities, i.e. their ability to carry out the regular activities of everyday life.

In interpreting Figure 3.7 (see next page), it should also be borne in mind that Lithuania still has a relatively young population. Three in four do not find it difficult to go up and down stairs or take a brisk five-minute walk. Six in seven can carry five kilos for a short distance without problems. Close to 60% can read a newspaper without glasses, while 95% who use glasses find it easy to read. Most people hear well, i.e. they can follow a normal conversation, and of those with hearing aids over 85% can do so. Comparing items with very similar questions in 1990 and 1994, however, we may note some indications that Lithuanians today see themselves as less healthy than earlier. The differences are not large and should not be overrated; however, the tendency so far is systematic. One explanation could be that the population surveyed in 1994, although young compared to many other nations, is on the average older than that in 1990. On the other hand, it is not unlikely that the observed change mirrors a feeling of a deteriorating health situation.

Sickness and suffering, especially if of a long term-character, can affect the individual's welfare seriously. The quality of life of a population will thus be linked

Figure 3.6 How would you characterize your health in general?



to the extent of prolonged illnesses. In 1994 31.8 percent of the respondents said they had one or more illnesses or afflictions, as compared to 29.3 percent in percent in 1990. These figures may indicate a slight change for the worse; however, considering the possibility of variation due to random errors, hasty judgments should be avoided. A reasonable conclusion from this finding is that level of experienced illnesses and afflictions has remained fairly stable, although it is interesting to note that the direction of change for this variable at least is similar to the case for other indicators commented on above.

Afflictions and illnesses are likely to be unevenly distributed in the population. Naturally we expect young people to have better health on the average than the elderly. It is also a common observation that women more often report illnesses than men, a finding often linked to differences in upbringing and typical social roles. Reported illnesses or afflictions of prolonged nature are shown in figure 3.8.

The figure reveals an informative picture. We see that prolonged illnesses increase systematically with age. Young and middle-age women more often report chronic afflictions than men, a difference also found in surveys from other countries. This pattern changes somewhat in old age and for some of the youngest groups. That the oldest group of men report illness more often could be a lagged result from heavier burdens and stress during working age. An alternative explanation is linked to age-conditional sex-biological factors. Some further differences between the 1990 and 1994 figures appear in comparative analyses not reported here. However, since the wording of these questions differs and there are few respondents in the older categories, we have chosen not to embark on any elaborate speculations here.

One question concerns how many people experience prolonged illness or affliction and the variation in such sufferings. Another is what consequences diseases have for them, limiting or reducing their ability to work or carry out otherwise normal activities? In the survey we asked those who had already reported at least one chronic

Figure 3.7 Ability to carry out various activities



affliction if this reduced their ability to work, – whether this was paid employment, housework, studies or whatever. The percentages of those with prolonged illnesses who said they found it «very difficult» or «somewhat difficult» are shown in Figure 3.9.

The sphere most affected by long-term illness is the respondent's ability to work,as more than 70% say this activity has been limited. Otherwise, even chronic afflictions do not appear to have grave consequences for most of those affected. From the figure we see that these diseases only rarely prevent people from seeing others, or from studying. Activities that require mobility (moving around in the home, going out alone, joining social clubs or organizations, and participating in leisure activities) are more difficult. On the average the1994 levels are more than 5% higher than those found in 1990, perhaps a further indication of a general

Figure 3.8 Proportion reporting chronic affliction, by age and gender



Figure 3.9 Difficulties from chronic disease



feeling of a more serious health situation than earlier. When difficulties are analysed by sex and age, a certain pattern appears. Not unexpectedly, old people in general experience more problems than the young. Men and women are affected somewhat differently, however, most likely because of their traditional gender roles: i.e. men have more difficulties in work, women in their home environment.

Bodily illnesses and afflictions influence the individual's quality of life. So do also psychological stress and pressures. In periods of mounting national difficulties and uncertainties, individual reactions may go in different directions. In the struggle against an outside enemy, psychological feelings may be strengthened and mental problems reduced. However, under other conditions reactions could be the opposite. The 1994 survey can only give an impression of various symptoms at one point in time. Respondents were asked if they had been bothered or distressed by symptoms or problems during the last week, with such alternatives as feeling scared for no reason, being nervous, feeling tense, having headaches, feeling depressed, worrying too much or feeling worthless. Answers were scored from Not at all (1) to Extremely (4). Figure 3.10 gives the average score for the various categories, for increasing age (lowest=15-19, highest.=80-84).

We do not necessarily expect such problems to increase for older people in the same way as somatic illnesses often do. Figure 3.10 demonstrates some variation across different types of problems. First, feelings of worthlessness and having headaches are more widespread than becoming suddenly scared or depressed. Secondly, except for one type of symptom (Feeling tense) all other problems seem to increase with age. Thus, perhaps surprisingly, there is a general tendency for older people to experience more such symptoms than younger. One possible expanation might be that the older generation faces more severe problems in the ongoing transformation process. Typically, a feeling of worthlessness is more pronounced among elderly, a finding we interpret in light of uncertainties about pensions and other welfare

Figure 3.10 Psychological difficulties and pressures by age



services which used to be taken for granted under the old political system. Additional analyses also show that such symptoms are more widespread among women than men.

Health-related habits and activities

Life-styles and living habits influence individual life expectancy as well as general health condition over the life cycle. As noted above, specific measures were taken in earlier periods to limit alcohol consumption in the Soviet Union. Although these efforts had measurable effects, policies were later relaxed, as they collided too much with traditional customs and norms. In recent decades also smoking has increasingly come to be seen as a factor negatively influencing health. In the 1994 study we found it relevant to get an idea of Lithuanians' habits in these areas. Even though such information is more susceptible to systematic error than many other types of data, we still believe that answers to survey questions can give a picture of the general patterns of drinking habits. Of the respondents who answered questions about alcohol consumption, 62% reported they had an alcoholic drink during the past week, and 20% more did so if asked about the past month. In Figure 3.11 the percentage who reported having taken an alcoholic drink during the past month is shown for men and women, by age groups.

We see that the habit of drinking alcohol is more widespread among the younger and middle-aged than the elderly, and more so among men than women. There is also a telling difference in the age-related pattern between women and men. For women, the proportion who drink drops systematically from the age of forty and onwards. For men, this decrease is much weaker, resulting in a far greater gender difference in drinking habits for old people. The general pattern of the young

Figure 3.11 Drinking habits: Had alcoholic drink during last month



drinking more than the elderly represents a serious challenge for policy-makers. The same holds with regard to the tendency towards more similar patterns for young men and women: This is a trend towards gender-equality likely to have negative effect on the national health level in the long run. Again it should be emphasized that the indicator applied in the figure is rather crude, and therefore one should not indulge in elaborate speculations.

One in four Lithuanians is a regular smoker (smoke every day), while two in three say they never smoke. The pattern of regular smokers by gender and age is shown in Figure 3.12. While on the average nearly half the men say they are regular smokers, this holds for less than one tenth of the women. This is a dramatic difference, even if we allow for possible distortions linked to social desirability. The

Figure 3.12 Regular smoking (smoke every day)



Figure 3.13 Regular physical exercise



figure also reveals a slight age pattern: Younger and middle-aged people smoke more than older ones. If this means that the new generation more often takes up smoking than the former, it is a sign of worsening health-related habits of the Lithuanian population.

Smoking is a habit normally taken up by the young people during their formative years, as they learn from parents and peer groups. Later some may find it costly or fear the negative long-run effects on their health from this practice and many try to stop smoking. Among the present nonsmokers about a fourth report they had smoked in the past. There does not seem to be any particular age or gender pattern among quitters.

While alcohol and smoking are known to have negative effects on health, physical exercise such as jogging and cycling is generally assumed to have positive effects. Only 13% of the respondents report such activities to any considerable degree, i.e. long enough to work up a sweat. Physical exercise of this kind, is still a novel thing in Lithuania. Typically, it is taken up mostly by the younger generation, and more often by men, as demonstrated in Figure 3.13.

Further analysis reveals that these are activities mainly for the well educated and those living in cities.

Use of Health Care Services

Some arguments in medical sociology suggest that the actual use people make of health-care services depends not only on their health status in objective terms, but also on their personal resources and social roles. For instance, men are often considered more in need of health care than women, because of their physically demanding jobs and sometimes careless life-style. However, the man is also expected – though traditional norms – to be the strong one, the one who does not complain as easily, or admit to having personal weaknesses. Thus, other things being equal, we anticipate that men will go to the doctor or seek help in other ways less often than women. Parallel arguments can be made for age differences. Although it is an objective fact that older people are more likely to fall ill or fear being afflicted than the younger generation, it is not obvious that they will seek help accordingly. The elderly of today often grew up in times when services were less available and social norms about what should be "normal" or "acceptable" health problems were different. Therefore,they may feel it less natural to seek help, unless they have a serious or life-threatening illness. From such arguments it follows that while we expect variations in how people use the health-care system, these variations may not always follow patterns of actual diseases or health problems.

Earlier in this chapter we noted that Lithuania during the Sovjet years had a large although somewhat ineffective health-care system. In this centrally steered sector there was practically no room for private health-care services. After independence, the legal obstacles to setting up private practice have been removed. However, there

are reportedly still only a few hundred private doctors, and the process of making the sector more market-oriented is slow. Against this background we may expect most uses of health care services as of late 1994 to be within the public sector, and still mostly free of charge.

In the 1994 survey respondents were asked the following question: "Can you please specify whether you have been in contact with institutions for health care during the last 2 weeks, for either prevention or treatment of disease. We would like to know which kind of health service you have used, how many times, and why you have used the services". Nine different answer categories were supplied:

- Consultation with doctor by telephone
- Visit by to/by general practitioner, local polyclinic, etc.
- Visit to/by company doctor
- Visit to/by a specialist
- Visit to a hospital/specialised clinic
- Visit by a nurse
- Visit to a traditional healer or practitioner of folk medicine
- Other kind of service

Approximately one in seven (15%) had been in contact with a health care institution during the two weeks prior to the survey. There are no directly comparable data available for Norway, but held up against results on average visits per year, the Lithuanian figures appear lower (SSB, 1993: Chapter 3). This seems reasonable, especially when we take into account that Norway has experienced a large increase in availability as well as actual use in recent years.

Most reported types of contact (more than two-thirds) were visits to/by a general practitioner or a specialist. Thus, contact with health-care institutions normally

Figure 3.14 Contact with health-care institution past two weeks, by gender and age



means a visit to/by the doctor. In most cases the reason for seeing the doctor was treatment for a new illness, or follow-up of an earlier one. Furthermore, among those who said they had experienced an acute illness or injury during the last two weeks, nearly half had been in contact with a health-care institution. Respondents were asked to indicate whether the service was public or private, and to specify if and how payment was made. The answers clearly show that health services in Lithuania are only rarely provided through private channels or paid for directly by the patient. On the average only one in twenty reported visiting a private doctor/ institution, while one in ten said she or he paid for the service, in part or in whole. Although the number of observations is small, there are indications that specialised services are more often private and paid for by the patient. However, such variations do not change the overwhelming impression of today's Lithuanian health care system as one with minimal private service and little direct payment by the "customers".

Figure 3.14 shows reported contact with health-care institutions during the two weeks prior to the survey, for men and women in different age groups.

Because of small numbers in each age category, the displayed pattern is not always stable. However, it is clear that women more often visit the doctor than men do. There is also a weak age pattern, although this appears more curvilinear than linear.In part this reflects that younger women much more often go to the doctor than men do - in all likelihood because of pregnancies, childbearing and the like. In addition to factors linked to social roles, we also expect availability of services to influence the tendency to visit a health-care institution. Further analyses (multiple regression) also suggest that this is the case. In such analyses region (urban/rural) shows a separate, additional effect, reflecting that services are more available in urban areas.

Concluding Discussion

In this century the Lithuanian people have lived through many hardships and difficulties, especially following World War II and the Stalin period. The gradual positive health trend of the 1960s and 1970slater stagnated. Reorganization of the sector and major uncertainties and sufferings after 1990 would seem to have had a negative influence on health conditions and the overall well-being of the population. Such a conclusion is accentuated by the recent trend in suicides. Classical sociological works have long considered the suicide rate as a prime indicator of the general health of society. Figure 3.15 (next page) reports rates from 1989 to 1993 in Lithuania. Except for a slight decrease in 1990 - a period of common struggle against an outside adversary - the pattern is clear. There has been a systematic and marked increase in suicide rates in recent years, emphasizing a deterioration of the general health picture in Lithuania.

The restructuring of the economy and major social institutions is likely to result in increased inequalities with respect to the availability of services in Lithuania, and this could especially affect the situation of the very young. Although such tendencies are not very pronounced or could be of a short-term nature, the picture now emerging from official statistics and from the living condition surveys should serve as a warning signal to policy makers. The old health system was regarded ineffective and needed modernization: however, the transformation process could come at a high price.

The large difference in life expectancy between men and women can be explained in part by circumstances of the 1940s and 1950s, as well as sex-biological factors. However, in view of the contrasting profiles of drinking and smoking patterns of men and women, it is reasonable to interpret the much lower life expectancy for men in light of their particular life styles. Finally, when analysing trends over time, one should bear in mind that the population in Lithuanian, as in the other Baltic nations, has been growing slightly older over the recent period.

Figure 3.15 Suicides: Trend in recent years



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CHAPTER 4

EDUCATION

A central goal for any national education system is to teach new generations to become useful citizens by acquiring knowledge, skills, and a common value-base. The school evaluates and ranks students through grading systems, thereby functioning as a gate-keeper for the channels leading to various positions in society. In this way the school affects social stratification and the effectiveness of the economy. A smoothly functioning system should motivate students to choose relevant studies and work hard in order to get a good position later on, in this way supplying society with a well educated and up-to-date labour force.

Periods characterized by upheavals or major changes on the national level may experience a poor match between critical needs of society and the actual competence of new recruits. For a nation going from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented one, it is reasonable to expect some mismatch, at least for a period. In this chapter we will look closer at the consequences of transition for educational outcomes in material as well as psychological terms.

CONTEXT

The largest university in Lithuania, the University of Vilnius, is among the oldest in Eastern Europe, and was founded as early as 1575. The strong historical emphasis on education and academic work in Lithuania is one explanation for the vigorous system of contemporary general and university education in modern times. Lithuanians were among the best educated peoples within the former Soviet Union, known for their relatively advanced educational structure. Traditionally, quality is said to have been high in terms of academic achievements, particularly in areas as science, mathematics and the arts, and research has been noted for its high standard in both basic and applied sciences.

The major challenges for Lithuania's system of education and research after independence are to adapt to a democratic society and reorient the content towards a market economy. Such a reorientation will require increasing capacity in critical areas, and bringing obsolete content up to date, while maintaining high quality standards and improving the use of available resources. Despite its high standing within the USSR, the Lithuanian system today is less suited to meet the current and future needs of the nation. The extensive scientific research complex, which earlier was geared to the needs of the larger Soviet Union, now must relate to new national developments and priorities. In general there is a need for improved capacity for

training and retraining in the type of knowledge and skills at premium in a modern, flexible economy. For instance, conventional technical and vocational training is today regarded as too rigid, lacking sufficient scope and the adaptable orientation so necessary in a modern technologically oriented economy. Furthermore, as a result of privatization, existing capacity for retraining adults in enterprises probably needs to be converted for other purposes. University teaching and science research are characterized by similar problems connected to the national reorientation. According to expert evaluations, the Lithuanian academic sector suffers from difficulties linked to rigidity (See World Bank, 1993, chapter 17), overspecialization and lack of coverage of important subjects. Typically, central fields of study in a market economy as a result of privatization – some social sciences, management, business, law and certain areas of technology – are improperly developed to meet current challenges. Similarly, parts of teaching and research at university level have become outdated.

Structural Characteristis and Changes

Tables 4.1 and 4.2, taken from official statistics, give a rough idea of some structural characteristics of the Lithuanian educational system, as well as indicating the direction of change in recent years. As for many countries within the former socialist

Table 4.1 Pre-school establishments and similar institutions

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Number of pre-shool establishments	1808	1681	1422	1113	927
Number of children in pre-school establishments, thousands	180.2	163.2	128.8	102.7	78.6
As percent of population in given age group	54.3	47.6	37.2	29.6	20.5
Pupils in school, children clubs, thousands		33.0		31.5	25.7
Pupils in summer camps, thousands		49.0		12.8	13.2

Table 4.2 Enrolment in educational institutions

	1989/90	1990/91	1991/92	1992/93	1993/94
Total enrolment, thousands	711	686	661	641	633
Per 10,000 population, Secondary school	1428	1400	1375	1367	1367
Per 10,000 population, Vocational schools	156	128	122	112	120
Per 10,000 population, Special Secondary schools	139	124	98	83	64
Per 10,000 population, Higher schools	187	179	161	147	142

bloc, education policy stressed the public or state responsibility for the socialization and upbringing of the very young. Pre-school institutions of various kind were a marked feature of the former Soviet republic. Today responsibility is likely to be increasingly shifted away from the state, and left to private initiatives and market solutions. Whether such measures, which clearly can be argued for – for economic and other reasons – will mean any improvements in the quality of life for children and their parents, can be questioned. Table 4.1 shows some figures pertaining to education-related activities at age levels before regular schooling. We can see a systematic decease in number of pre-school establishments over the past four-five years, and that the number of children attending such institutions in 1993 was less than half of what it was in 1989. This decreasing trend is also reflected in the percentage of children in given age groups under such arrangements. Additional statistics concerning supplementary spare time activities and institutions with educational purposes, for instance within school children clubs, summer camps and the like, also show a decrease. Hence, even when we take into account lower number of children in these age groups, it seems clear that national-level efforts at making the education system more effective and inexpensive have meant major changes in the environment also for the very youngest. Data from the household survey show that child-care for a large part has been taken over by families or other private arrangements. For those who can afford such provisions, this may imply improvements over the old system; however, for others it implies a setback.

Table 4.2 shows information on the regular school system. Partly because of smaller cohorts, the total numbers of pupils and students have been on the decrease, as can be seen from the two first rows of the Table. It is, however, also clear that some types of education have been relatively harder hit than others: the relative decrease is much greater for specialised secondary schools (row four) than for higher schools of different sorts (row five). The sharp decline of students in specialised secondary reflects the fact that former types of certification are no longer in demand. Although Tables 4.1 and 4.2 tell us little about qualitative changes and the general reorientation taking place within the Lithuanian educational system, these enrolment figures emphasize the profound changes that follow from the ongoing societal transformation.

Educational Resources: Distribution and Meaning in Changing Times

There is little reason to expect major changes in the general level of human capital in Lithuania, in the few years that have elapsed since independence. Such processes are slow and must be judged over a longer time-span. However, in comparing data from 1990 and 1994 surveys, two points should be kept in mind. First, the 1990 survey to some degree underestimated the proportion of those with little education. Secondly, decreasing enrolment rates in some types of intermediate and higher

education could have had at least some limited consequences for the educational distribution of the population. Figure 4.1 shows the relative distribution of the adult population in terms of educational levels, as estimated in the surveys from 1990 and 1994.

Estimated percentages of people having a certain level show a similar pattern for both years. There is a slight tendency for a greater proportion of respondents with low education in 1994, and a parallel lower percentage of well educated. It is, however, unlikely that this reflects any real change and is probably due to a slight bias in the 1990 survey, as mentioned above, as well as regular sampling error. At any rate, the differences are nevertheless fairly small. So far the profiles shown in Figure 4.1 give reason for confidence in our data, a conclusion consistent with other observations throughout this report.

Although the average educational level has remained fairly stable over the past four-five years, the meaning and importance of educational background for the average citizen may well have changed. In the former Soviet republic there was probably less of a systematic relationship between an individual's formal competence of the individual and expected outcomes in terms of job type, prestige, etc., than in many industrialized economies in the West. Today, as Lithuania moves towards a market economy, the relationship between educational resources and outcome in the labour market may become more pronounced. On the other hand, once-relevant knowledge and certificates may often be regarded as obsolete in the new situation. If this is a dominating trend, the relationship could be expected to become even less systematic now than earlier. Figure 4.2 displays findings pertaining to this question, showing results from 1990 and 1994. Both surveys asked about the positional level of the respondent's current main job. Answer categories for 1994 ranged from "Ordinary employee" (1) to "Higher management" (4).

Figure 4.1 Educational level. 1990 and 1994 surveys



After some adjustment to enable comparison (and excluding self-employed), average rank was estimated for increasing education for both years. As far as data go the figure, perhaps surprisingly, suggests a more systematic relationship between educational background and achieved position at the workplace. In this respect Lithuania seems to have become somewhat more similar to what is found in typical West European economies. However, it should be noted that these observations pertain to employees at various levels, and do not include the self-employed.

In most societies educational background not only affects what people achieve in material terms, but also the way they view the surrounding society and their own possibilities within it. The 1990 survey showed that such empirical patterns also could be documented for so-called socialist societies. Typically, well-educated Lithuanians showed much stronger confidence in their ability to master their own lives and to influence politics, than did the less-educated. On the background of the fundamental changes after the turn of the decade, we could hypothesise that uncertain times and major shifts in basic social institutions would affect the established relationship between educational resources and psychological factors. Competing hypotheses can be argued for. One is that the ambiguities of the transformation process should mainly affect people with low education as they are more likely to fear layoffs from work and increased competition in the labour market. Probably they also have less knowledge and insight into the processes of social change going on, and have a less clear picture of what the future has in store for than. An alternative hypothesis would be that the profound character of the transition process has dramatic consequences for all segments of the population, thus leading to reduced self-confidence for all groups, independent of educational background. Figure 4.3 shows the relationship between educational background and perceived control over own life, for 1990 and 1994. The dependent variable measures the respondent's view of control over own life, through reactions to statements about a) understanding the

Figure 4.2 Education and level of postion at work. 1990 and 1994 compared



complexities of politics, b) influencing political discussions, and c) the relevance of family background for success. The figure shows the proportion in each group with very low perceived control over own life.

From Figure 4.3 we may note an interesting finding (further commented on in the chapter on personal politics, later in this report): There is a general decrease in Lithuanians' perceived ability to influence their lives through the political system. The average level of distrust in own abilities is higher in 1994 than in 1990. Secondly, for both years there is a tendency for the poorly educated to feel they have little control over their own lives, Thirdly, and most important in this connection, the profile of perceived control over educational levels differs for the two surveys. The increase in distrust from 1990 to 1994 is generally more pronounced for the

Figure 4.3 Education and perceived control over own life, 1990 and 1994 compared



Figure 4.4 Education and views on inequality 1990 and 1994 compared



less educated. People with high education express about the same level of self-confidence in 1994 as in 1990. There is a different tendency for the top brackets, however, since respondents here seem to have increased distrust in their own abilities in 1994. A reasonable interpretation is that traditional academic disciplines in certain fields have now lost their prestige and importance, and those who had followed such studies now feel left out and relatively deprived in the present transformation.

The meaning and importance of educational background for individuals in different contexts are further illustrated in Figure 4.4, which shows views on economic inequalities in Lithuanian society. Answers were given on a scale from 1 ("Ought to be much less") to 5 ("Ought to be much greater"), and the figure shows average scores on this variable with increasing education, for the 1990 and 1994 surveys.

Clearly there has been a shift in general attitudes towards income inequalities, also commented later in this report. The main focus here is on the difference in the relationship between educational background and attitudinal response for 1990 and 1994. In 1990 the well-educated said they wanted a society with greater economic inequality. Such an attitude probably reflected the limited difference in material outcomes between highly and poorly educated groups, noted above. However, by 1994 we see quite a different pattern. Now, most population segments, independent of educational background, feel income differences should be smaller. This shift in profile implies a fundamental change for the well-educated. After tasting the first fruits of a move towards a market economy, their original attitude appears to have soured. We see this result as a finding with important implications. If those who had most eagerly supported increased inequality, today have lost faith in the remedies of market economics, then the process of transition – information, implementation and adjustment – probably needs to be reviewed over again.

Further insight into consequences of and reactions to the transition process among various groups can be gained from Figure 4.5 (see next page), which shows estimated unemployment proportions for different levels of schooling in 1994. The unemployment variable, further analysed in the chapter on work, here captures jobless individuals, who also had been actively seeking paid work. The pattern to emerge differs from that usually found in Western market economies, where individuals with little schooling normally have the greatest risk of becoming unemployed.

In Lithuania, however, there is no clear-cut or consistent pattern. The relatively low risk of those with only primary education must be seen in connection with the heavy demand for manual labour at the time of the survey. Furthermore, some specialized backgrounds (Secondary specialise, Higher) also have lower risk, while those with unfinished higher education are a relatively high-risk group. In the last group we find many older workers.

The two next figures give some additional indications of how people with different schooling have adapted to today's labour market. Figure 4.6 shows the relative

distribution of various educational groups for each type of industry. As compared with data from 1990 (not reported in detail here) the figure presents a very similar and fairly stable picture. We find a relatively high proportion of individuals with little schooling in the primary industries; "secondary specialise" levels dominate in traditional industries, while the well-educated most often are found in public administration, in health care as well as in the new sector of finance and insurance.

Figure 4.7 shows educational profiles by type of ownership. Although there are fairly parallel profiles over differing ownership types, we may note some interesting differences as well. It seems as if new types of enterprises (especially joint ventures)

Figure 4.5 Education and unemployment. Estimates, working ages



Figure 4.6 Educational profile by industry



on the average have absorbed people with higher educational background than have the traditional sectors.

Persistent Patterns

Notwithstanding significant changes in the importance and meaning of educational background in a society undergoing fundamental change, there are likely to exist some basic and stable inequalities concerning the distribution of a nation's human capital, not affected in the short run. Such patterns relate to typical social roles, linked to age, gender and place of residence. Figure 4.8 (next page) presents findings from the 1994 survey, showing average level of education (Primary=1, Higher, etc.= 6) by age, for men and women.

Some traditional "facts" are underscored by the picture that emerges here. First, Lithuanian women tend to have a stronger educational background than men. Secondly, there is a typical age pattern: for those fifty years or older, educational levels decrease systematically with age. For the most part, this pattern must be interpreted as a consequence of the expansion of the education system undertaken during the 1960s and 1970s, which came to late to affect the older population.

The observed profiles of established inequalities are underlined further by Figure 4.9, which shows average level of education for different regions (Rural/Urban) for men and women. We may note marked differences between cities and towns on the one hand, and villages and countryside on the other. Well-educated Lithuanians live in Vilnius, Kaunas and the few other large towns, whereas the poorly educated live in the countryside.

Figure 4.7 Educational profile by ownership. Relative distribution, within each ownership type



Concluding Remarks

Lithuanian society is currently undergoing a difficult process of transition. In such a period the very meaning of a central individual resource – education – may change with new relevance and importance for outcomes from work as well as social psychological reactions. The findings of this chapter, comparing 1990 and 1994 surveys, have indicated a situation where the social relevance of traditional education is under pressure. The relationship between formal competence and job position (as employee) is, on the one hand, becoming more systematic, and more like that in other modern industrialized societies. On the other hand, those with a high level of schooling – a crucial group for a successful transition process – appear disappointed by what they so far have seen of results in terms of greater economic inequalities and increased unemployment.

Figure 4.8 Age and educational level for men and women



Figure 4.9 Region (Rural/Urban) and educational level



CHAPTER 5

EMPLOYMENT AND CONDITIONS AT WORK

Work is often regarded as the most important social activity, especially in Western Society. In many respects we create and define ourselves as social beings by performing various jobs in an occupation or trade. Participation in working life is usually seen as the basis for further learning, self-realization, creative thinking, social contacts and friendship. Thus, work takes on a fundamental significance beyond merely earning a living. However, there are also other sides to work. It involves hardships, strains and sacrifices. In classical social sciences, work has also been identified as a source of alienation. When labour is traded on the market like any other commodity, when the work process is splintered into many bits and pieces, when the worker has no control over decisions that affect wellbeing, then work alienates people from their own powers, from the product they make, and even from themselves as human beings. Research has shown that psychological stress, health hazards and limited influence on the decision-making process lead to a difficulties and strains for workers.

Most of us spend a large proportion of our adult lives at work. The take home pay from work determines what we can afford in terms of privately consumed goods, type of housing, lifestyle, etc. Not everybody, though, has paid employment as their main activity. They may attend school or university, do housework or have responsibility of caring for others, outside the normal domain of what is categorized as "work". In most societies there has been an established division of labour between women's and men's jobs and careers. Traditionally women have had responsibility for housework child-care, while it has been up to men to ensure the economic foundation for the family. Countries with centrally planned economies were forerunners in getting women to work outside the home. Compared to their sisters in the West, women in the socialist bloc were apparently treated more on a par with men. On the other hand, as social scientists have pointed out, this placed a heavy burden on them, since they were still expected to carry out the same activities in the home as well. It is an important question how the ongoing transformation of East European societies will influence the gender distribution in the labour market and at home.

In modern welfare states, participation in paid work has been seen as a basic legal right for citizens. It is also costly – both for the individual and the society as a whole – when people are out of work. Being jobless hurts socially as well as econo-mically. Those who are laid off often also become cut off from their normal social networks. After the second world war many in Western European counties, especially in Scandinavia, believed that the task of creating work for all those who wanted it

had been solved through modern macro economic planning. Such assumptions were supported by a long period of sustained growth with practically no employment. Then, however, over the past ten-fifteen years traditional welfare states experienced a different reality. It became evident that even small and mixed economies, based largely on market principles, could not avoid the uncertainties and difficulties of unemployment. In Northern Europe unemployment rates rose to levels previously unknown in modern times, first in Denmark, then in Norway and Finland, and finally in Sweden.

In socialist countries with state-owned companies and a centrally plannedeconomy, unemployment in the usual sense of the word was simply not allowed to exist – at least not officially. Under the Soviet system, planning for labour at theenterprise level was mostly regulated by a set of production coefficients. In addition to the problems of a less flexible production organization, this acted to restrict labour mobility, since bureaucratic hurdles and housing problems often led enterprises to apply for more workers than was actually necessary. The year after independence, the Lithuanian government started to implement several reforms to cope with open unemployment, including a small network of labour exchanges and various labour-market policy measures. Despite a sharp drop in output over the period, the number of unemployed has remained surprisingly low by most standards. In 1991 and most of 1992 unemployment was running at less than one percent (for the whole of 1992: 1.3 percent), at the same time as the number of job vacancies outstripped the number of people out of work. Since mid-1992 the low rate has partly been a consequence of the governments' temporary decree that prevents state enterprises from laying off workers, together with a step-by-step regulation for gradually allowing them (as well as private ones) to do so at a later date. After 1992 unemployment began to go up, but less than expected by international experts. It remained low by international standards: in 1993 it stood at 4.5%, according to official statistics, while preliminary estimates for 1994 are in the 5-6% range.

Over the years socialist practice and ideology also affected the general culture of work, planning and administration. Those counties that today want to move towards a market oriented economy face radical challenges at two levels: a) to build up new organizational and economic structures that can handle the many new problems of a market economy, and b) to introduce new modes of thinking and modern motivational systems so as to change the general culture and in-grained attitudes of the population.

The demographic and employment patterns of Lithuania are similar to those of other East European countries. A large share – higher than that in Western Europe – of the population has traditionally been economically active. Also the proportion employed in agriculture and manufacturing is high, whereas tertiary sector employment has been correspondingly low. This holds especially for banking and insurance, where employment has been negligible by Western standards. The ongoing transformation of the Lithuanian economy will in all likelihood result in major changes in this pattern as well.

This chapter deals with some of the basic characteristic of employment and work in Lithuania in the current period of transition. We will see who participates in paid employment, analysing sex differentiation and comparing the pattern of late 1994 with that of 1990, in light of the radical nation-level changes between the two points in time. (For additional findings on the household level, see Chapter 8). We will also look into certain sides of the physical work environment, analysing variations in strains and stresses of the working population, and linking such variations to individual qualifications and social roles. The work environment has come increasingly in focus as more becomes known about some consequences of industrial policies in former socialist countries. In Lithuania environmental protection and health problems are – despite undeniably grave difficulties – considered to be relatively moderate in scale, number, and severity of impact, when compared to those encountered in the Upper Silesia region of Poland, the northern Bohemia region of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, or the St. Petersburg region of Russia. Most of today's environmental problems in Lithuania are concentrated in urban areas, and at the industrial and energy facilities, dispersed throughout the country as the result of the decentralized development policy during the Soviet period. Although they may be less severe in Lithuania then in some other countries, they still affect people, at work or in and around the areas where they live.

Structural Change and Labour Force Developments

Despite policies to soften the shocks from the restructuring of the Lithuanian economy, the move toward a market-oriented economy – with the break-up of the division of labour between republics within the Soviet system – has affected the national labour market. Although official unemployment figures had been on the increase, they were still low (about 5%) at the time of the our study. On the other hand, we should not ignore the so-called unemployment potential (if all not really needed were laid off) which was reported to be some three times greater than this figure. The following section will take a closer look at the situation in the Lithuanian labour market as of autumn 1994, on the basis of the latest survey data.

Figure 5.1 (see next page) shows the relative distribution of the adult population (sixteen years of age and older) by labour-force status. The definitions of employed here are based on a detailed (expanded) version of ILO standards.

We see that over a third of the adult population is not in the regular labour force. Forty percent are full –time employed, while 7% have part-time employment (less than thirty-five hours a week). Approximately one in ten has work, but was temporary absent at the time of the survey. Seven percent of the respondents were classified as "unemployed", in the sense of being out of work and also actively had been seeking a job. Relative to the regular work force, the group of unemployed makes up a little over ten percent, with women having a slightly lower rate than men. This figure in all likelihood gives a more realistic picture of the actual labour

market situation than what so far can be gathered from official statistics. Even if a ten percent is less than the most pessimistic estimates of current unemployment potential, it still indicates a change for the worse, whether compared to the time before independence or to the situation only a year earlier or so. Figure 5.1 thus indicates that an increasingly deteriorating development is probably under way. This interpretation is also in line with an additional observation. When asked "Do you believe that your present job is in danger due to closures, redundancies or for other reasons during the next two years?", over half (55%) of the respondents reports such fears.

Figure 5.2 shows main labour force-status for various age categories. Here a less detailed ILO standard is used, with part-time employed and those temporary ab-

Figure 5.1 Distribution of the Lithuanian population by labour force status



Figure 5.2 Labor force status (ILO Basic) by age. Relative distribution for each age group



sent counted as part of the labour force. The percentages of employed, unemployed and adults not in the labour force, are given for each age group.

A typical pattern appears. Up to the age of fifty, labour-force participation gradually increases, reaching levels of employed people of over 80%. After official pension ages it goes down. By international standards the participation in the regular labour force (as employed) is still high. It is further interesting to note that if the proportions of unemployed and employed are summed together, the total profile is very much the same as that found in 1990. This observation increases our confidence in the survey data. Unemployed are found in nearly all age groups. However, the estimated proportion (of unemployed) is larger among younger people, indicating that it is mostly the newcomers to the labour market also run the highest risk of not getting a job – or losing one – in Lithuania.

Some typical characteristics are illuminated in Figure 5.3, which shows employment percentages for men and women, by age. Here we may note a systematic gender difference: employment levels are throughout higher for men than for women.

The two different profiles are consistent with what should be expected, and thus further support the confidence we otherwise may have in these data. During younger years, women have lower labour-market participation levels, as they are taking care of small children and other family members. Gradually women's level approaches that of men. This continues only up to what used to be the official retirement age for women (approx. 55). Later, there is a gap, as a natural consequence of a five-year difference in retirement age for men. It should be added that unemployment also has a somewhat different profile over increasing age, for the two sexes. Women tend less often to be employed in younger years (under 25), in the period before they have become married and started a family. After that there is no clear-cut gender pattern for unemployment. It should also be noted that Lithuanians are

Figure 5.3 Proportion employed by age and gender



industrious people: A fairly large proportion continue to work also in old age, long after official retirement age.

The major changes in the economy after the turn of the decade have resulted in various new labour-market structures. One area – for obvious reasons – concerns the way firms, factories and work-places of different sorts are owned. In the long run, the traditionally dominant position of state-owned companies is expected to be radically reduced. Figure 5.4 indicates the ownership pattern in 1994, and thus is also indirectly a snapshot of how far changes have come at the time of the survey.

The figure shows the distribution of those in the active work force, by different types of ownership. State-owned enterprises still dominate, as nearly half (44%) of the work force are found at work-places owned by the state. Over one in four (27%) works in various shareholding companies and one in fourteen works in agricultural companies. The private sector as such is still small, with 12% of the employed work force in privately-owned companies. Five percent are self-employed, and three percent work in joint ventures. However, while the sector still is limited in number of employed, these new types of ownership signal a fundamental change and a trend likely to develop further in the years to come.

Figure 5.5 shows exhibits typical length of work weeks for Lithuanians in the active labour force. It is no surprise that many people (37%) work the regular full-time forty-hour week, while fewer (20%) work less than that, often in various part-time arrangements. Somewhat more surprising is the large proportion (22%) working up to fifty hours a week. Some Lithuanians (14%) have indeed long weeks at work, putting in more than sixty-hours. From Figure 5.6 it appears that work hours are fairly evenly spread out over different age groups.

Except for a slight tendency for the younger age groups to work more, and the very oldest employed to work markedly less, there is no clear age pattern. An interesting gender difference exists. Women work very long hours when they are below

Figure 5.4 Type of ownership of work place (main job)



twenty-five, i.e. usually before they have small children. After that – and up to pension age – men work systematically longer hours than women. This implies that women as mothers, daughters and wives often have part-time jobs and make other adaptations, in order to combine traditional role expectations with the obligation of a job in the regular work force. For such reasons it is not evident that, while women may work less outside the home, they should want longer hours. In the survey, respondents were asked if they would prefer longer or shorter work hours than at present, or if they wanted the same. Figure 5.7 (see next page) reveals a clear but not particularly large gender difference.

The proportion of those satisfied with their present work hours is high, and about at the same level for men and women. Two out of three in the active work force say their present hours are suitable. However, to some degree women would

Figure 5.5 Hours usually worked per week



Figure 5.6 Average hours worked per week by age and gender



prefer a shorter work week, while there is a slight tendency for men to prefer a longer one.

The two genders are also differently distributed over ownership types, as shown in Figure 5.8. More than half of the women in the work-force work in state-owned enterprises, while fewer men (36%) do so. Men are also more often found in agricultural and shareholding companies.

As already noted, the size of the private sector as such is still limited. From Figure 5.8 it is nevertheless evident that the two sexes are somewhat unequally represented in these new types of enterprises. Men more often work in joint-ventures and in privately owned companies, and they are more frequently self-employed.

In Soviet times various kinds of informal economic activities were generally not recorded. Such activities include small-scale buying and selling of foodstuffs, buy-

Figure 5.7 Under/overemployment by gender. Respondent wants longer, shorter or same



Figure 5.8 Type of ownership of work place, by gender



ing consumer goods abroad and selling them at home, selling vegetables, fruit or flowers, etc, as well as home-made foods at the local market, and so forth. The importance of the informal sector for the total economic output has often been stressed. Figure 5.9 indicates roughly some characteristics of informal economic activities in Lithuania today. However, one should keep in mind that such information is likely to be underreported.

Figure 5.9 shows the percentages of those involved in such activities for men and women by age. In general this is a type of work more for the younger than for the older generations. Still we find a surprisingly stable proportion (7 – 8%) of old people here. There is a marked gender difference however: men – and young men in particular – are more frequently engaged in such activities.

Work Environment

The work environment is a major factor in most people's overall welfare. An inferior environment is a drawback in itself, as well as having detrimental effect on the individual's health and social life. The work environment is customarily divided into two main areas – physical and organizational. The first includes hazards, stresses and strains, like noise, pollution, climatic conditions and ergonomics. The second comprises factors such as freedom at work, participation in the decision-making process, psychological stress, and the like. The main focus in the following is on the physical environment, but we also take a brief look at simple indicators of an organizational and psychological nature.

Compared to standards in for instance the Scandinavian countries, the work environments in the former East Bloc were known to be rather problematic. This point was also underscored by the 1990 survey in Lithuania, which revealed systematically fewer difficulties and strains experienced by the Norwegian working

Figure 5.9 Informal economic activity by age and gender



population. After the disintegration of the Soviet Empire, levels of hazards and pollution at work places in former republics have been in focus, especially with regard to possible negative health effects for the work-force. However, in most of these countries, only limited efforts have been made to improve the work environment, mainly because of a deteriorating economic situation. It is costly to make sound and safe structures out of work-places that for many years were neglected and run under a system with old-fashioned standards and control procedures. In difficult times such improvements tend to slide downwards on the national priority list.

Against this background we would expect to find the difficulties, strains, hazards, etc. linked to the work environment, to be on the same high levels in 1994 as those observed in 1990. If noticeable, any positive changes as experienced by working people are likely more to be connected to lower production levels than other factors. For instance, the slump in agricultural production probably leads to less outdoor work under varying weather conditions and people more often staying indoors and being idle. Figure 5.10 compares levels of reported strains and difficulties at work for 1990 and 1994.

The pattern is very similar for the two years, suggesting that no major changes have taken place in work environment in the period. Basically , the percentages reporting too high or too low temperatures, dust, smoke, fumes, air pollution and vibrations at work are the same for both surveys. There seems to be an improvement in a few areas, however. Fewer report drafts or dampness than earlier. Whether this suggests a real change though, or is just a reflection of lower activity levels in some sectors, is still an open question. The impression that little has been changed is further illuminated in Figure 5.11, which presents reported exposure to various hazards – poorly lit conditions, inadequate ventilation, work high above ground, dangerous machines, acids, inflammables and the like. On the average we find the

Figure 5.10 Exposure to certain difficulties at work 1990 and 1994 compared



same (high) level in 1994 as in 1990. This conclusion could, however, be nuanced a little further.

There is a tendency for the basic indoor conditions (light and ventilation) to show improvement, but there are more hazards from mechanical tools and processes. The figure indicates some improvements of the physical indoor climate, whereas there are for instance more problems from increasingly outdated machinery and old-fashioned processes.

As demonstrated many times throughout this report Lithuania is characterized by a traditional gender division in social and economic life. Hence, we may also expect gender to affect levels of exposure to difficulties, strains and hazards at work. Figure 5.12 (next page) shows reported levels of difficulties and strains (drafts, high temperatures, ... strong vibrations) for men and women.

The patterns indeed emphasizes that men's work differs from women's in Lithuania. For all types of difficulties/strains examined, men more often report problems. In some areas the difference is especially great, such as for welding smoke, vibrations and dust. The different gender profiles suggest that Lithuanian women leave the very tough physical jobs to men. An alternative interpretation of the same data is that traditional norms in a patriarchal society exclude them from the men's world.

Gender differences in work are further illuminated in Figure 5.13 (next page), which shows percentages reporting various physical strains (heavy lifting, bent or stretched positions, monotonous work, physical exhaustion after work, and becoming dirty from doing the job).

Men more often have jobs requiring heavy lifting, working in difficult positions and becoming dirty. However, both sexes seem to find their work equally tiresome: In both cases 55% regard their work as monotonous while as many as 70 normally feel exhausted at the end of the day .

Gender is an "ascribed" characteristic constituting various social roles, including work role. Education is another – an achieved one – affecting what kind of jobs are

Figure 5.11 Exposure to various hazards. 1990 and 1994 compared



available, and thus indirectly the kind of work environment the individual will meet on a typical work day. It follows that we expect job outcomes of this kind to be unequally distributed not only by gender, but also according to educational background. Some empirical results are reported in Figure 5.14. In order to develop a more compact picture of the relationship between social roles and strains from work, all twenty different items (difficulties, hazards and physical tensions) commented on in the preceding figures were combined into one single index. This measure is based simply on adding the number of work problems (minimum zero, maximum twenty) reported by respondents. Basically, then, we have a variable indicating the level of difficulties for each individual. Figure 5.14 shows average scores for men and women, by level of schooling.

Figure 5.12 Exposure to various diffiucties at work by gender



Figure 5.13 Physical strains and stress at work by gender



Two typical tendencies appear. First, we again observe a systematic gender difference. The impression of men and women operating in very difficult work environment is underlined by the difference in average index score between men and women, on all educational levels. Secondly, we find a marked and similar profile for both genders over different levels of schooling: those with little education have a much more physically burdensome work environment. In this way gender and schooling in a fundamental manner define crucial characteristics of working people's daily environment.

As already suggested, work environment is important also beyond the immediate consequences for daily wellbeing. In the long run, work hazards and strains are likely to affect the health of the individual and his or her quality of life in a wider sense. In the chapter on health, we discussed, the significant gender difference in life

Figure 5.14 Average score on difficulties/hazards index by education and gender



Figure 5.15 Average score on scale for self- reported health by work strains and age



expectancy for Lithuania, with regard to men's and women's distinct lifestyles. It seems reasonable to link men's lower life expectancy also to their relatively harsh work situation, as described by the data presented in this chapter. The available survey data are, however, less suited for analysing the assumed relationship between burdens of work and health on the individual level. To do so properly, much more detailed over-time data are needed. Nevertheless, we can at least attempt to geta glimpse of such links though variables from the survey. A preliminary and rough picture is given in Figure 5.15, which shows subjective health for different works strains by age. Subjective health is measured on a scale from 1 (Very good) to 5 (Very bad), and the figure reports average score on this variable. For this analysis the detailed difficulties/hazards index (see preceding figure) was split into low (scores 0 –3) and high (scores 4-20).

As health is normally affected by how old the person is, age has to be taken into account in such analyses. The figure clearly demonstrates that the elderly more often feel that they have bad health than do young people. Nevertheless, there is an additional effect from work strains, also supported by detailed regression analyses. Those with a difficult work environment and hard job tend more often to report bad health than others. The effect appears especially pronounced the periods before retirement age. It is not unreasonable to understand this increased difference as resulting from accumulated consequences of a strenuous work situations over earlier periods in life. Still, since these are cross-sectional (and not over-time) data, we should be careful not to exaggerate the implications of these findings.

Concluding Remarks

Sutvey data for 1994 emphasize other reports of a grave change in the Lithuanian labour market. At the time of the survey (September) official statistics indicated rising but still low (close to 5%) unemployment levels, while experts privately talked about a unemployment potential three times this level. The living condition data indicate a situation somewhere in-between. About one in ten of those in the available work-force is unemployed. This development must be regarded as serious, and a signal that further deterioration is not unlikely.

While unemployment levels have changed, hazards and strains at the work-place are basically the same as before. Although these levels are considered serious by international standards, it is expensive to improve conditions – especially in difficult economic times. Major improvements are not likely in the short run. Work strains are systematically determined by social roles, as defined for instance by gender and educational background. Marked gender differences in work hazards are likely to affect health, and could partly explain – together with very different lifestyles – the relatively low life expectancy for men.

CHAPTER 6

ECONOMIC RESOURCES

In modern societies, the economic resources of individuals and households constitute a crucial level-of-living component. To a great extent the distribution of relative living conditions can be linked to the distribution of economic means. In a typical money economy, the amount available for spending on goods and services is determined largely by the amount of money at the disposal of the family or the individual. Economic resources not only affect long-term investments in the home and its surroundings, but also have a bearing on the many daily wants and needs such as food and clothing. Thus, the economy of the family or the individual influences their welfare in a direct manner. However, it also affects living conditions indirectly. The way we choose to spend our money can be seen as an expression of life-style and personal preferences. Such preferences may limit other possibilities and prevent the participation in alternative activities. Therefore, economic resources influence people's leisure activities, their social contact with friends and family and outdoor activities.

Economic resources as a concept has various meanings. Most often it is associated with income, and with wealth. The first reflects mainly how much money is earned in a certain period, while the other tells how much one owns at a given point in time. In analysing incomes, different income ideas could be applied. Income can be seen as a reward for productive services, or as a token of welfare. In the first case, it is reasonable to emphasise the value of productive activities, in a market or through similar evaluations. In the second, it is purchasing power that is in focus, with the emphasis on what you get for your money. There are clear linkages between the two approaches, however. Actual performance of productive services is often motivated by the welfare which the individual wants to achieve.

MACRO-CHANGES AND ADJUSTMENTS ON THE MICRO-LEVEL

Rational planning for the individual and the household is dependent on some degree of stability in the national economy. Saving money in the bank for expected needs in old age, taking up a loan for investing in a new home, buying a car, – these are examples of decisions that presuppose assumptions about predictability. Dramatic changes in price levels, in wages, in bank interest rates, etc., accompanied by periods of uncertainty, render it more difficult to make sensible economic decisions. Such ambiguities are even harder to grasp and adjust to, if in addition a new and unfamiliar economic system is introduced. Major system changes tend to make

peaople sceptical and dissatisfied. Not only does planning for the future become difficult, but also earlier choices and investments are made obsolete or valueless. For Lithuania it seems fair to say that many citizens, although happy for the nation's new political freedom, are finding it difficult to accept the personal sacrifices and hardships they feel result from the recent economic reforms. Although the national economy showed clear signs of stagnation during the 1980s, Lithuanians still enjoyed a relatively high living standard then.

In economic transition periods, official data often tend to overestimate actual decline in outputs. This is a consequence of traditional statistics being geared towards the old economic system, so that the usual data are not able to trace new developments. Also, considering the widespread shortages under the Soviet system, there seems to develop a tendency to exaggerate the decline in living standards. However, even when such mechanisms are considered, there is little doubt that the changes during the first 3-4 years after independence did put many people under economic strain. Under the Soviet system, Lithuania's role had been primarily that of a supplier of manufactured goods, particularly in light machinery and electronics. The country was heavily dependent on imports, because of few natural resources. In many areas Lithuania had a dominant position in the former Soviet Union. In this way there existed dependencies both ways. Despite the emphasis on industry, Lithuania traditionally has had a natural comparative advantage in agriculture. At the beginning of the 1990s industry accounted for more than 40% of net material output, while agriculture accounted for around one third, with the state sector playing a dominant role in both.

After Lithuania's first steps towards creating an open market economy, there has been a marked contraction in output. Partly this has to do with the breakdown of the old Sovjet trade system, partly it stems from deficiencies of the socialist system now brought into the open. As elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, the economic situation worsened progressively in the late 1980s and during the first years of the 1990s. Besides the general deterioration in Lithuania's industrial sector following the collapse of traditional trade links, there was also a sharp decline in agricultural production in 1990, when the supply of feed grains was disrupted during the Soviet trade embargo. In 1992 the contraction in the economy continued at an accelerated pace, intensified by a further deterioration in terms of trade, as Russian suppliers of oil and gas raised prices to world market levels, delivering only limited supplies. In total it is estimated (Lithuania's Statistics Yearbook) that during this period industrial production was more than halved, while agricultural production decreased by around 30%, resulting in a general fall in production levels of around 35%. During the early years of the decade the decline in economic activity was matched by large cuts in demand, with the main burdens falling on private consumption and investment. Despite the general negative economic development, employment has remained remarkably stable. Instead of laying off workers, firms have tried to rely on the use of unpaid leave and shorter working hours, also in line with traditional rules from the former system. Various government regulations also

limited the scope for a major wave of dismissals. However, if continued over some time, this implies a decline in real wages, and a potential for increased unemployment, as developments also showed during 1993-94.

During 1991 and 1992 price and wage development for a large part reflected the progressive removal of price controls, combined with large imbalances connected to earlier accumulated monetary overhang, as well as the government's efforts to compensate citizens for increases in the cost of living. From 1991 accelerated inflation followed, peaking in 1992 with an average rate of more than 1000%. In an effort to stabilise the economy it was decided to quit the rouble zone. The litas, which had been the currency of free, pre-war Lithuania, was reintroduced in June 1993 and pegged to the US dollar. In the year after, inflation fell to around 50%, at least for the time resulting in a more manageable and predictable national economy. Estimates for 1994 indicate further improvements, with an inflation rate of around 25%.

Before the introduction of the litas, wages were raised on several occasions throughout 1991 and 1992, with average wage levels moving roughly in parallel with the minimum wage rate. From the beginning of 1992 real wages started to decline, and already by mid-year they had fallen by more than one third as compared with the level six months earlier. The rest of the year real wages continued downward at a similar pace, partly as a result of the government legally binding incomes policy. The decline in Lithuania was sharper than in both Estonia and Latvia. A detailed overview of indices of real earnings in the public sector, as taken from official Lithuanian statistics, is given in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1 Indices of real earnings in public sector

	1991	1992	1993
January	0.823	0,855	0.386
February	0.760	0.715	0.574
March	0.649	0.758	0.400
April	0.760	0.863	0.353
May	0.790	0.958	0.337
June	0.833	0.968	0.355
July	0.887	0.807	0.367
August	0.898	0.747	0.372
September	0.940	0.691	0.377
October	1.224	0.602	0.383
November	1.238	0.470	0.403
December	1.245	0.384	0.432

The table portrays a picture of short-term variations, together with a general decline in real income over the total period. In general the downward spiral seems dramatic, suggesting a real income level by the end of 1993 only 40% of that of three years earlier. (It should be noted, however, that early estimates for 1994 indicate a stabilisation of real income levels, also giving optimistic predictions for real income and gross national product for 1995.)

For the average citizen who had planned life under the assumption that Lithuania's economy and the value of money would be stable, such changes have led to many difficulties. This holds especially for groups with little real capital, whose future was tied up to "paper money", as was the situation for pensioners. After major overhauls in the economy, deprived groups will want to get back what they feel was lost in the process. Claims of this type may put too high strains on the public economy, and run against the government's long-range planning. Such conflicts were behind the referendum in August 1994, when Lithuanians voted over alternative compensation plans.

Variations in Economic Conditions

The 1994 survey asked the following question: "If you reflect back on your household's economy during the last 12 months, did it ever occur that you ...

- had to rely on outside help in order to pay regular expenses ...
- was unable to afford to heat your home ... in winter ...
- could not have meat or fish for dinner more that 1 or 2 times per week
- had to refrain for purchasing necessary clothes or footwear ...
- involuntary had to refrain from taking part in social or cultural activities

These variables could be seen as indicators of the economic hardships experienced by household members, as judged by the respondent. It should be emphasised that these are indirect and subjective measures, so answers are likely to be affected by the position or role of the respondent within the household. Nevertheless such indicators, separately or taken together, can give relevant information on difficulties in the period in question. Answer categories for all five items were "Never", "1-2 times", "3-12 times" and "12 or more times".

The relative distributions of answers for the total sample are informative. One of three Lithuanians say they have had to rely on outside help to pay normal expenses during the past year. About the same proportion report being unable to heat their homes during the winter season, the majority of these indicating this was the normal situation. Half the respondents report they could not afford to have meat or fish for dinner more often than every other week or so. For most of that group this was in fact the normal siuation. Three of four Lithuanians say they have had to refrain from purchasing necessary clothes or foot-wear, whether for adults or

for children in the household. Finally, two thirds say they have had to refrain from taking part in social or cultural activities, like going to a restaurant, cinema, theatre and the like. All in all, answers so far describe a difficult situation for the average Lithuanian and his or her household (See also Chapter VIII). There are no perfectly comparable data available for these indicators from the 1990 survey. However, roughly similar questions in selected areas clearly provide empirical support for a turn for the worse. In 1990 a relatively larger proportion answered that they never had to rely on outside help (73% vs. 67%), never were unable to afford to heat the home (92% vs. 66%), or never could not have meat or fish for dinner (77% vs. 50%). As reported at the two points in time, the economic situation in 1994 was clearly experienced as worse than in 1990.

For further analysis of variations in economic hardships, we constructed a simple index. If the respondent had to rely on outside help three or more times a year, and – for twelve or more times the last year – could not heat the home, not have meat/fish for dinner, not purchase necessary clothes, and in addition had to refrain from social/cultural activities, *then* this index was given a score of one. Otherwise, the score was zero. Roughly, this index attempts to locate relatively deprived persons and their families. On this background, Figures 6.1-6.3 display "Deprived" according to relevant background factors.

According to such a pragmatic operationalisation, 15.3 % of the respondents are classified as deprived, and thus hard hit by economic difficulties. From Figure 6.1 displaying percentages according to age and gender, two points should be noted. First, there is no clear cut or linear age pattern. If anything, the figure suggests that there are more economic difficulties among the middle aged, or those who will be retiring within a few years, than among the old and already retired segment of the population. Secondly, there are marked gender differences. On the average men feel less economically pressured than women. This is probably a reflection of both the

Figure 6.1 Economic hardships: Who are most deprived? By age and gender in percent



fact that women are paid less (and more often work part time), and that they often feel a heavier responsibility for the well-being of their family and household.

Figure 6.2 shows the distribution by place of living (Urban/Rural) as well as gender. On the average we do not see any large difference between urban and rural areas. This is also an important finding. It implies that in difficult economic times on the national level – with industry and enterprises under pressure – the traditional advantage often enjoyed by those living in urban areas decreases. Gender differences are not very large on the average, but it is clear that women have a weaker position.

However, there appears a so-called interaction effect between the two explanatory variables (gender and region): there are scant gender differences in rural areas, but notable ones in urban areas. In cities, men are less likely than women to experience hardships in this sense. Hence, in times of economic instability and

Figure 6.2 Economic deprivation, by region (Urban/Rural) and gender



Figure 6.3 Education and economic deprivation



difficulties, the position of women relative to that of men seems stronger in the countryside than in the city. This pattern is linked to the fact that Lithuanian women often are widows and live in one-person households, where life in the countryside also can provide natural advantages.

Figure 6.3 shows the distribution by education men and women. Again we may note a slight but systematic gender difference: for all educational backgrounds men seem to be better off than women. Although an education-related pattern appears, the difference between those with the highest and the lowest level is not especially marked. This finding adds to the explanation of the frustrations of well-educated groups, discussed in other chapters (See chapters IV and XII). Still, the highest proportion of economically deprived is found within those with middle-range educational background.

Concluding Comments

Women more often than men experience economic difficulties in Lithuania today, relatively often they are widows, or must take care of their older husbands. However, when evaluated together with information from official statistics presented above (Table 6.1) the survey data indicate that economic hardships are not limited to special population segments. People living in urban areas are about as deprived as those in villages, and highly educated as well as poorly educated. Thus, the economic hardships of transition do not follow traditional social dividing lines. This conclusion is supported by some additional findings (not reported in detail here). An indicator of economic wealth of the household was constructed. This additive index was simply the sum of valuable appliance and equipment (washing machine, vacuum cleaner, TV, VCR, motorcycle, stereo sound system, motor boat, etc), ranging in principle from zero to nine. The index showed practically no correlation with the risk of being economically deprived. Hence, the experience of economic setback and personal sacrifices has been felt in most social strata. However, it should be emphasised that this is a conclusion on a general level. No doubt, there are some individuals who have profited from the ongoing changes and done extremely well finacially in the transition period. However, the new, small, financial elite in the largest cities – according to some estimates earning ten times as much as the lower income groups (see *The Baltic Observer,* 26 January, 1995) – tend not to be visible in regular survey data.

CHAPTER 7

HOUSING

In modern societies the home and its surroundings constitute the basic framework for daily life, and people spend much of their time inside or close to their flat or house. As a result the quality of this narrow environment will affect welfare to a significant degree, influencing how people can arrange and organize their social life, leisure activities, local meetings, seeing friends, and being together with children and other family members.

During the Soviet years in Lithuania, from annexation until independence, housing policies were directed from Moscow and based on Sovjet laws. In line with basic socialist principles all land and all houses over a minimum size were nationalised. From that time the housing sector was dominated (close to 60%) by the public provision of rental housing (See World Bank, 1993: Chapter 16). This pattern was even more dominating in Lithuania and the other Baltic states than elsewhere in the Eastern Block. For those who had the means there were still some possibilities, at least in the countryside, to set up their own dwellings. However, housing was a question handled by the state and the government at all levels. The system of public rental housing consisted for a large part of the typical high-rise prefabricated buildings, with their small, standardized flats. Typically for a command-driven economy, the focus was on quantity. Lithuania had an ambitious building programme, over the years resulting in a gradual increase in the total dwelling space of the nation and the average square metres available per person. By 1990 the average amount of dwelling space per person was around 17m^2 in urban areas and 24m^2 in the countryside, placing Lithuania slightly behind such countries as Estonia and Poland. As more people moved into the urban areas this system provided a fairly inexpensive solution to the housing problem for many. It is a general impression that most towndwellers were relatively satisfied with their housingstandard, compared to that of villages and rural areas, especially in earlier times. For a large part financing was provided for by the state. Rent per square metre was often fixed, regardless of quality and location, and was kept at a low level. Such policies implied increasing government subsidies for rental housing maintenance, and led to a very rigid housing marked with limited household mobility.

Over this long period legal and institutional arrangements were established, structures that are difficult to change quickly under the new conditions from the early 1990s. After independence the government began carrying out market reforms. Although slow in the beginning, they eventually resulted in a fundamental transformation of the sector. The process is now nearly complete, with about 95% percent of housing made private. As the private sector becomes responsible for the

bulk of housing production, this will rely more on contributions from household savings and less on subsidies through government budgets. Such mobilising of savings also presupposes a well-functioning banking system.

Today the main problem concerning the quality of the housing stock is an inadequate level of thermal insulation. To maintain reasonable indoor temperatures in winter-time, high energy consumption is required. Under the old system, Lithuania benefited from subsidized oil and other energy products, giving low consumer prices for heating oil and few incentives to economise on energy consumption. Developments after 1990 led to major increases in the price of oil imports. Oil for heating purposes is available to a limited degree, and many dwellings and offices are cold in wintertime, despite continued government subsidies. This fact has fundamental impact also on social life in cold periods, as it made itself especially felt during the winter of 1992-92. Assuming that Lithuania in the future will have to pay world market prices for imported oil, it is seen as a priority to improve thermal- insulation of buildings and their heating systems. One would also hypothesise that higher prices for heating will change the way inhabitants perceive housing quality: Today they are likely to experience their homes as less comfortable then in earlier times, because of less heating. A different, but associated problem for inhabitants is the inadequate level of maintenance and renovation in formerly state-owned dwellings.

Reform efforts at the national and local levels have included various measures. One aim has been to reduce public-sector involvement in housing by privatising state-owned rental housing stock. Another is to shift responsibility for management and planning of housing from the state to the municipalities, and to provide new housing through the private sector. It is also seen important to establish more appropriate building standards and energy-saving technologies. The reform programme has included the return of nationalised housing to the previous owners or their legal successors. Not unexpectedly, reform efforts have led to increases in rents as well as the price for buying a house. Privatisation therefore has made it necessary to cushion the consequences for those most negatively affected. In this way it is evident that main economic reforms have put additional pressure on the social security sector.

In the Soviet period, the building industry of Lithuania was dependent on importing of certain raw materials, equipment and metal products. At the same time Lithuania exported various products to the rest of the USSR, so the national sector was interwoven with a larger and more complex system. With the old ties and technological dependencies broken off after independence, the existing equipment, technologies and machiney are ripe for modernisation. Such attempts are linked to further expansion of joint-venture arrangements with foreign companies.

The following analyses concentrate on trends in housing construction, patterns of ownership and types of housing, and variations in housing standards. Today's situation will be compared to that at the beginning of this decade, and changes

discussed in light of reform attempts. Possible connections between housing standards and other level-of-living components will be evaluated.

Current Setting

Figures 7.1 and 7.2 illustrate a typical characteristic of the Lithuanian urban dwelling structure: Approximately 60% of the adult population live in larger blocks blocks or flats, most of these are five storeys or higher. This is the typical pattern in urban parts of the country. According to this first chart (Figure 7.1) less than 40% live in detached housing.

Figure 7.1 Type of dwelling. Relative distribution of adult population



Figure 7.2 Type of dwelling by region. Percent living in flats in urban/rural areas



Blocks of flats are are found less often in the most rural areas, as illustrated by Figure 7.2. In sparsely populated areas only one in six lives this way. For all other categories, however, blocks of flats were clearly the dominating model for planners, in Lithuania as in the other former Sovjet republics

After independence, new laws were introduced in Lithuania allowing citizens to become private owners of their homes. Consequently, there has been a fundamental shift in the formal ownership as shown in Figure 7.3. The figure displays ownership types for rural and urban areas, with answer categories including State or Municipal ownership on the one hand, and various alternatives of private ownership on the other.

In cities only one in twenty dwellings is still owned by the state or the municipality, and in the countryside this figure is even lower. This pattern reflects a major shift as compared with earlier times, and one likely to have important long range consequences for the organisation and financing of this sector.

The next two figures show the relative distribution of respondents by various dwelling space (Figure 7.4) as well as housing costs (Figure 7.5).

We can see that most people live in homes where the dwelling space ranges from 25m^2 to 75m^2. 7% belong to households with less available space, while 5% come from households with over 100m^2 of dwelling space. The total amount paid for rent (plus utilities) varies. Often (more than 55%) respondents come from household having expenses in the range of twenty to 60 litas a month. However, answers for this variable had a high proportion of missing data, and findings should therefore be interpreted with caution.

Over the last fifty years or so an increasing number of Lithuanians went to live in cities or towns, and often living in households in smaller flats, as described above. Most of existing structures were built in the 1960s and 1970s. While young people went to urban areas for education and jobs, the older generation tended to stay

Figure 7.3 Type of ownership of dwelling unit by region (Urban/Rural)



behind in the village or countryside. As in many other countries after World War II, Lithuania thus developed a pattern of age-related choices of dwelling place, where the cramped city life was mostly for the young and middle aged, and rural life for the elderly. Such processes over time tend to lead to very different living conditions for certain population segments. Often various aspects of quality of life will be distributed according to certain "heaping" mechanisms. (See also the final chapter of this report.) These may run in parallel directions, as when the availability of electricity, modern appliances and a developed transportation system is associated with modern urban life-styles. Or they could go in opposite directions, as when the noise, pollution etc. usually found in the city are regarded as the "price" to be paid for a modern life. Given such assumptions, we expect indoor and outdoor standards of the dwelling place to be related to the age of the individual, as well as whether he or she lives in a city or a village. Some empirical facts are reported in the next

Figure 7.4 Total dwelling space occupied by respondent's household, sq. m., including kitchen, bathroom, hall or small rooms



Figure 7.5 Total expences (litas per month) for dwelling unit



figures. In Figure 7.6 Average dwelling space is shown according to age and living areas of respondents. Two distinct tendencies appear. First, there is more room per person in households in rural areas, whereas people are more often packed together in cities. Secondly, older and middle-aged people generally belong to households with more average space than the younger generation, a result linked to the typical life-cycle of most families and households. Thus, the resulting pic-ture of living space per person is partly a reflection of geographical mobility patterns during the past fifty years, as well as the typical cycle of most families and households.

Figure 7.7 give some further insight into living conditions as linked to the individual's age and place of residence. The survey asked about indicators of indoor

Figure 7.6 Dwelling space per household member by increasing age(from left to right) and region (Rural/Urban), in square meters



Figure 7.7 Quality of dwelling, by age and region (Urban/Rural). Average score on quality index (High score = High qualiity), by increasing age(from left to right)



quality of the dwelling place: WC/bathroom, public sewage system, kitchen, central heating, household gas, electric stove, balcony, and telephone. The figure reports average scores on a simple additive index, ranging from zero (access to no items) to eight ("Yes" for all eight alternatives). A certain picture appears.

First, we can clearly see that modern features are the normal standard in the city and urban areas, but less so in the countryside. Secondly, old people tend to live in less modern households than the younger generation. These conclusions could be further qualified, though, since the age difference is mainly a characteristic of rural areas. In the largest cities, dwelling places have about the same standard, independent of respondents' age.

Figure 7.8 Quality of outdoor surroundings



Figure 7.9 Quality of outdoor surroundings by age and region. Average score on outdoor index (High= many problems), by increasing age(from left to right)



Figures 7.8 and 7.9 concern the outdoor standards of dwelling place. Respondents were asked about seven items (noise from neighbours, streets, railway, airplanes and industry, and exhaust and smoke from cars and industry). From Figure 7.8. nearly one-third of the respondents say they are exposed to car exhaust or street noise, indicating high levels of outdoor problems for people in the city. One in five furthermore mentions noise from neighbouring flats, etc., while one in eight reports smoke from industry. Figure 7.9 shows average score on a simple additive index, ranging from no problem (zero) to seven (all seven types). Note that a high score here means exposure to many outdoor problems, and thus indicates a low standard.

A first impression is that on the average outdoor standards seem fairly high, as few difficulties are reported. Still, there are some differences. First it is important to note that this graph does not indicate clear-cut age patterns. This is only to be expected, since these are qualities connected to larger areas as such, and not to the individual household. Nevertheless, there is an urban-rural difference. Such outdoor problems typically associated with modern life are very rare in sparsely populated areas. Taken together the last four-five figures thus illustrate the advantagesas well as the disadvantages of life in the city.

Changes?

Building patterns, indoor and outdoor standards of dwelling place etc. are structures that do not change quickly and are – as such – not immediately affected by a country's political system. For these reasons we would not expect rapid changes in the reported quality of dwelling places. Some points should be noted, however. First, some structures may change more quickly than others, especially those affected

Figure 7.10 Dwelling quality: 1990 and 1994 compared for selected indicators



by new technologies, such as telecommunications. Secondly, although the material structures are unaltered, other conditions may affect the actual use or perceived quality of them. Of special importance here is the fact that the price of electricity has gone up over the period, thus limiting the actual possibility for people to heat and cook in their home. Such realities may have changed the way people judge the quality of their dwelling place. Whether such expectations are credible can to some degree be determined from the following figures (Figures 7.10, 7.11, 7.12). Figure 7.10 concerns indoor standards in 1990 and 1994, for selected items, i.e. for items with comparable question/answer categories. The percentages who report having WC and bathroom/shower are practically unaltered, while there is a tendency for fewer to say they have access to central heating. This last difference could be interpreted in light of changing prices and supply levels of electricity. We can see an

Figure 7.11 Hot water supply: 1990 and 1994 compared



Figure 7.12 1990 1994 compared, %. Rooms damp or cold?



increase in access to telephone, which should be viewed as a result of actual improvements in the telecommunications sector since independence.

Figure 7.11 further illustrates the argument that the price or availability of fundamental services, such as electricity, may affect the perceived quality of the dwelling place. This figure shows answers to a question about access to hot water. There are indications of improvements, in the sense that more respondents in 1994 report having hot water supply. However, there is also an increase in the proportion who say they have access, but the supply is occasionally cut off. Thus, on the one hand there has been an improvement in material standard, however, because of increased energy prices, slightly more respondents say they cannot make proper use of such improvements. The impression from the two preceding figures is underscored in Figure 7.12, showing percentages of those who report of rooms being cold/damp, or cold/difficult to heat. Clearly, there are increased levels of dissatisfaction. Lithuanians today perceive their dwelling places more often to be damp and cold, than in earlier times.

Concluding Comments

Buildings, houses, and blocks of flats are part of larger material structures that normally change only very slowly, and their quality will not in the short run be affected by political or economic changes on the national level. However, the meaning such structures take on for those living in them, and the use they make of their dwelling, may change. Data from the 1994 survey illustrate that the general character of dwelling places in Lithuania is the same as before, while an important shift in ownership type has been taking place. In all likelihood this shift will lead to a more flexible housing market, as well as to greater differences in types of homes. Such changes will probably lead to increased inequalities in the average amount of space per person and the housing costs. After World War II, Soviet-style architecture and building technologies put their clear stamp on building structures, particularly in the cities. This is a pattern that will characterise living areas for a long time to come, although the old political system is gone.

Although material building structures are unaltered, the way their quality is perceived may change. Comparisons of 1990 and 1994 data suggest that more expensive and less stable energy supplies have led people to experience their homes as less comfortable than before. This finding therefore underlines the argument that in order to improve the living conditions of daily surroundings, more emphasis should in the future be put on better insulation and general improvements in building quality.

Literature:

World Bank (1993), *Lithuania. The transition to a market economy.* A World Bank country Study. Washington:World Bank

CHAPTER 8

HOUSEHOLDS

Studies of living conditions in industrialised economies typically have taken the individual proper as the basic unit of analysis. This is natural, given the function the individual has as the central entity or actor in modern society. However, actions, choices, responses and feelings are played out within certain social contexts and institutions, such as the family, friends, neighbourhood or work group. Man is a social creature, and a person develops a "personality" only as a result of interaction with others. Such arguments are behind the emphasis which this report put on the meaning and importance of social roles – as expressed through variables as gender, age and education – in understanding variations in living conditions. These background variables are indicators of the context and socially defined characteristics of the person, and help to explain actions, attitudes and other outcomes. A supplementary analytical strategy is to measure context and institutional framework in a more direct way, in order to get a better understanding of the exchanges and relationships resulting from members in interplay within social groups. The household is often seen as such a fundamental social and economic entity. The idea is that by examining the household as a unit in itsself, it is possible to better understand outcomes and reactions for those belonging to it.

It is beyond the scope of this report to carry out any extensive analysis of living conditions on the household level. A more detailed investigation is undertaken in the parallel Lithuanian report. However, the 1994 survey was planned in a way that made it possible to record data also on the household level. Together with information from official national statistics this provides a background for describing certain characteristics of Lithuanian households. The aim of this chapter is to give a simple descriptive picture. Here it should be borne in mind that the importance of household as an economic decision unit and a source for social integration probably will increase in the years to come. The transition process implies that the government will free itself from former responsibilities of the state, and that a larger share will then fall on the household.

LITHUANIAN HOUSEHOLDS: BASIC PATTERNS

The 1994 survey asked the (randomly selected) respondents questions about members of their household. For these questions a common definition was used as a starting point: "Could you please count all persons with whom you live together

permanently in this dwelling, and with whom you usually have at least one joint meal per day, or who use the food supplies of the household if meals are not shared"

Figure 8.1 shows the resulting distribution of households, after proper weighing of sample units.

Ninety percent of Lithuanian households consist of units of four persons or less. One-person, two-person, three person and four person households make up about the same proportion of all households, ranging between 20% and 25%. Households consisting of as many as six members or more are rarely found. Additional information in the survey also gave a basis for further classification according to household type. The following categories were decided upon, of which c), d) and e) include units with dependent children:

a) 1-person household

b) Couple living alone, with no children

c) Household with both parents and dependent children over sever years

d) Household with both parents and at least one dependent child less than seven years

e) Household with single head and dependent children (under 16 years of age)

f) Three-generation household (household with three generations represented)

g) Two-generation household, with no dependent children

h) Other

From Figure 8.2 we see that as expected, 23% are 1-person households, as these are the same as those counted as households of smallest size in the preceding figure. This is the most frequent type.

Otherwise, main types are those including a childless couple, or parents together with children. Eighteen percent of households have dependent children aged seven

Figure 8.1 Size of Lithuanian households, persons



or more, while a little less also have smaller children. These first four types make up more than 70% of all households. Of special importance in the national economic and social context are households with children, since they carry the main responsibility for bringing up a new generation of Lithuanians. Only 6% are counted as households with a single breadwinner. Nevertheless, this is also a type of particular interest for policy planning, as it is especially vulnerable to economic difficulties and strains, and often dependent on outside help. (See also final chapter of this report). 8% of Lithuanian households include three generations, while 12% include two generations. This pattern must be understood in light of the rigid housing policies and limited supply of dwelling units over the years, in many cases giving large families no other option than to stick together under the same roof. It also confirms that Lithuania is a nation where family ties and contact across generations traditionally have had a strong position, and still are important.

The household can be seen as an economic decision unit where certain members often have some source of income while others have not. Thus, there are members of the household who depend on others for their economic security and standard of living. This fact constitutes a fundamental basis for the social interaction and activities among members. For further analyses we constructed a dependency-ratio variable. The variable measures the proportion of household members outside regular working ages. Fairly wide categories (below sixty-five and above sixteen) were chosen, partly since people often work also after regular retirement age. This procedure resulted in the distribution shown in Figure 8.3. (see next page).

Approximately one third (35%) of households have a dependency ratio of 0.0, i.e. these are without any member in the typical dependent age categories. Half of the households are characterised by dependency levels between 0.01 and 0.51. Thus, every other unit has up to half of its members dependent on others for their daily necessities. Twenty percent show higher dependency levels. These will often be units of old people or persons living alone.

Figure 8.2 Household types



A further understanding of the economic situation for Lithuanian households can be gathered from official statistics on households. Figure 8.4 reports average monthly income on the household level in 1993, as registered in litas that year.

Several points should be noted. First, the majority of households are evenly spread over the most regular income brackets, i.e. from less than 40 to 100 litas. Secondly, there are some households – over one third in total – that seem to be doing especially well, with incomes of more than 100 litas a month. Clearly, these households belong to the economic elite in Lithuanian society. Thirdly, the relative pattern is different in urban and rural areas. While the majority of rural households are in the lowest income category, the pattern is the reverse for urban households. In interpreting these data it should be recalled that we are looking at cash income for households. This is an indicator of actual or real income that normally has high

Figure 8.3 Levels of dependency ratio in households



Figure 8.4 Households' monthly money income 1993 Litas



validity in urban areas, In rural areas, however, where payments and transfers in kind are more often used, it could be less relevant. This could help to explain why a large proportion of rural respondents are found in the lowest income levels. It should be added that official statistics also give data for average monthly income per household member. Basically these corroborate conclusions based on the observed pattern for 1993.

Table 8.1 gives a rough idea of main income types and expenditures for households in 1993. Wages and salaries, income from business, etc. are the most typical sources of income, while pensions and cash allowance sare of less importance.

Again we can note differences between rural and urban areas. As much as one third of income from households in rural areas stems from household farming, whereas in urban areas this source amounts to practically nothing. It is also telling that households in rural areas have a larger proportion of income from pensions. As noted elsewhere in this report, the elderly more often live in non-urban regions. This is one reason why pensions play a more important part for the incomes of rural households.

Turning to expenditure (lower part, Table 8.1) we also see a certain pattern. The dominating item is for food products, – on the average about half of Lithuanian households' expenditure. About one fifth of total household expenditure is on various non-food products, while 10% is on services. Also here there is an urban/rural devide. The proportion spent on foodstuffs is lower in rural areas, in all likelihood because these are more readily available and less expensive there. On the other hand, in rural areas more than sixteen percent of expenditure is for so-called agricultural production costs, i.e. in connection with household farming. Thus,both

Table 8.1 Household income and expenditure pattern 1993

Income/Expenditure	Urban	Rural
Wages and salaries, income from business etc.	77.4	37.5
Income from household farming	0.5	32.8
Pensions	9.6	15.5
Cash allowances	3.5	5.7
Scholarships	0.4	0.2
Other	8.6	8.3
Total income	100.0	100.0
Food products	54.0	43.1
Non-food products	17.4	21.5
Services	12.4	8.4
Alcoholic drinks	1.3	2.5
Agricultural production costs	0.7	16.2
Taxes. fees. duties	12.8	5.7
Other expenditure	1.4	2.6
Total money expenditure	100.0	100.0

income and expenditure patterns appear quite dissimilar in urban and rural areas, because of the central role household farming plays in villages and rural localities.

Concluding comments: Increasing difficulties also on household level

The worsening trend in the Lithuanian economy since 1990 has been commented on several places in this report, especially in Chapter VI, with reference to individual-level data. This change is naturally felt also on the household level. One consequence of inflation combined with large price rises on certain goods, is that the expenditure profile will change. When real income goes down, a larger proportion of the household budget tends to be spent on only the most fundamental necessities. Whether the transition process in fact has led also to such changes can be seen from Figure 8.5, which shows consumption pattern expenditure for selected items 1989-1993.

For each year the relative distribution of expenditure on a) Food products, b) Non-food commodities, c) Services, and c) Alcoholic drinks is displayed. This implies that the total consumption expenditure is set to one hundred percent for each year.

The figure shows a drastic change during the period. In earlier years (1989–1991) less than half the total expenditure went to non-food commodities of various sorts, while food ranked second. From 1992 onwards – including periods of high inflation and unstable economic environments – this picture is different. Now expenditure on food products alone makes up close to 60% of the household's consumption expenditure. Hard times have forced the average Lithuanian household to spend most of its money on the bare essentials.

Figure 8.5 Household expenditure 1989-1993



CHAPTER 9

CRIME AND INDIVIDUAL SECURITY

Central to the individual's quality of life in any country is a reasonable level of personal security and protection. To feel secure, walk around without fear of threats or violence of any kind, and to feel safe in one's home and local environment is viewed as a significant asset in modern society. And yet, this element of everyday life, essential as it is, is a less manifest phenomenon than other aspects of welfare, like income, health or housing. Social scientists have pointed to a paradox in Western societies in this area. While major welfare programmes often were developed and improvements made in important living components such as education and health, these societies at the same time witnessed an increase in crime rates.

The major changes that swept over East Europe at the turn of the decade produced optimistic promises as well as ambiguities and fears. People had become accustomed to national laws and rules which – although often rigid and disliked – regulated everyday life. The breakdown of the old order put the legal system and law enforcement sector under new and different pressures.

Abrupt and dramatic shifts often leave the individual in a kind of limbo. What was formerly considered valuable and the right thing to do, today may have lost its worth, while life-styles and ways of thinking formerly frowned upon, are now accepted and even welcomed. Thus, a period of transition is likely to involve growing anomie among people. In Lithuania, such tendencies were initially amplified by the uncertainties and slow pace of the legistlative process after independence. The republic's law enforcement apparatus had been part of the larger Soviet system. The break-up of the former structures meant at least temporary difficulties in adapting until a new one could be put into place. Furthermore, although the empire had disintegrated, the larger system was still regarded as a fairly open arena of action, – also by less honest economic entrepreneurs. There have been constant rumours about attempts from organized crime based in Russia or elsewhere, wanting to establish strongholds within the Baltics.

Increased anomie, a sluggish legislative process, changes in the structure of the law enforcement apparatus, and new pressures from the outside could all give leeway for less law-abiding forces. Harder economic times and increased inequalities are likely to help such processes accelerate. A reasonable hypothesis thus is that the process of transition, at least during the initial phases, will lead to increased crime. This expectation has so far been supported by anecdotal evidence from business people and visitors to former Sovjet regions, who report an increased risk of robberies and a growing international mafia. On the other hand, it is not obvious that this should be a credible hypothesis in the Lithuanian case. Lithuania is a small

country, with a traditionally homogeneous population, where social ties are strong and local affairs transparent. Moreover, life-styles are steeped in religious traditions and family values. In general the Lithuanians are regarded as an enlightened people, and a honest and hard working population.

In this chapter we will attempt to draw a picture of the crime situation in Lithuania. First we apply available official statistics to evaluate trends from the time before independence and onwards. Secondly, in those instances where similar questions were asked in the 1990 and the 1994 surveys, these data will be used for comparative analyses of how people react to ongoing developments. Finally, we analyse variations in exposure to crime and violence over various population segments, in order to identify risk-groups.

General Trends

Table 9.1 shows data taken from Lithuania's Statistical Yearbook 1993. The number of offences is reported for selected types, for the period 1990-1993. From the first row, which gives total number of offences for each year, a clear trend emerges. For each year there is a marked increase, resulting in a doubling of registered offences from 1989 to 1993. The largest increase (more than ten thousand) came in 1992, in the immediate aftermath of independence, a period still characterized by unclear rules and uncertain possibilities.

The next row, showing figures for murder or attempted murder, suggests that Lithuania in some respects has become a more brutal society. These figures more than tripled in the period. Misappropriation of public property (next row) increased sharply around independence, but later levelled off, and is now even on the decrease. However, the pattern for thefts and burglaries displays a steady increase, more than doubling during the period. Registered offences in terms of disorderly conduct also show some change for the worse, while traffic offences, after some variations, have been going down. This last trend should probably be interpreted more as a sign of shifting priorities of police efforts, than as an indicator of a more orderly traffic situation.

Table 9.1 Registered offences by selected type

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Total	31238	37056	44984	56615	60378
Murder, attempted murder	155	224	260	303	480
Misappropriation of public property	4672	6836	10314	16886	15148
Theft, burglary	13990	18056	21937	26384	28824
Disorderly conduct	1070	1133	1190	1424	1444
Traffic offences	1777	1536	1824	1057	745

Even when we allow for possible inaccuracies in earlier registrations – there have been efforts to improve reporting routines in recent years –, the statistics in Table 9.1 paint a negative picture: The level of criminal activities in Lithuania has clearly been on the increase since the turn of the decade.

Figure 9.1 shows crime rates during the same period, for the largest cities (towns) and villages/rural areas (regions) separately, on the basis of official national statistics.

Naturally, the general trend in this figure is the same as for the preceding table. As in most industrial societies, there is a systematic difference between urban and rural areas, with crime rates systematically higher in cities than in villages. Two characteristics should be noted, however. First, the relative increase for rural areas seems larger than in cities, resulting in levels becoming more similar by the end of the period. Secondly, the growth pattern for both lines shows a break for the very last part of the period: it could be that the negative trend is about to even out. Developments over the next two-three years will tell if such a prediction holds.

Shift in Exposure?

Although official statistics tell a straightforward and rather grim story, these registrations do not necessarily give a relevant picture of how such activities are experienced and viewed by the ordinary citizen. If crimes are committed mainly within limited groups and circles, they may not directly affect the average Lithuanian to any significant degree. Comparisons of survey results from 1994 with those of 1990 can give some idea of how developments are felt. Figure 9.2 (next page) shows self-reported answers to questions about exposure to crime and violence for both years. Respondents were asked if they during the last year had experienced a) violence that led to physical injuries, b) violence that did not lead to injuries, c) threats that were so serious that she/he felt frightened.

Figure 9.1 Crime rates in towns and regions 1989 - 1993



The levels for 1990 could not be regarded as especially severe, and were at that time about the same as reported –for similar questions – for instance in Norway. It is also debatable whether the 1994 levels should be seen as a dramatically high, and one must further allow for some statistical error. However, the direction of change is systematic. Data show an increase in the proportion of those saying they have experienced violence during the past year, for all three questions. Thus, as far as data and method go, the increase in registered criminal offences would also seem to translate into daily experience for the average citizen. The impression of a negative development as viewed by individuals is further accentuated in figure 9.3 which compares results for questions about whether the respondent fears (becoming exposed to) assaults or threats. This question was specified for three alternatives: 1)

Figure 9.2 Exposure to violence, 1994 and 1990 compared. Experienced violence last 12 months



Figure 9.3 Being afraid of assaults or threats, 1994 and 1990 compared



"In the streets", 2) "In public places", 3) "At home". Answer categories were "Yes, very much", "Yes, somewhat" and "No, not at all".

The figure reports percentages answering "Yes, very much" or "Yes, somewhat". Again, the estimated differences can hardly be described as dramatic; but also here, the change from 1990 to 1994 is clear and systematic. For the last item – fearing assault or threats at home – the percentage of those with such fears has increased substantially, indicating a marked turn for the worse.

The survey results from 1990 and 1994 indicate changes somewhat less grave than the impression left by public crime records. Nevertheless, when official statistics and survey findings are examined as a whole, they suggest a society with more crime and violence, where the individual tends to feel less secure from criminal activities than only a few years earlier.

Who are Most Exposed?

Exposure to the various risks of modern society is likely to be unevenly distributed. As was the case for the distribution of personal resources, goods and services, one would expect also exposure to crimes, violence and the like to be linked to basic social roles. Figure 9.4 illuminates this point, although the differences must be interpreted with caution, because they are based on small numbers. The figure shows answers to questions about experiences of a) theft of personal belongings from house or car, and b) street robbery/mugging.

On the average about 13% of those asked say that they have experienced such thefts, while 4% to 5% have experienced robbery or mugging during the past year. The difference between men and women can be seen as a reflection of traditional gender roles. Men more often report having personal belongings stolen from

Figure 9.4 Thefts and robbery Experienced last 12 months?



house or car, while women have a higher risk of being robbed or mugged in the street. Gender differences of perceived threats from criminal activities are further highlighted in Figures 9.5 and 9.6. The first one shows percentages of who report that they fear assaults or threats, for men and women separately (1994 survey).

In the streets as well as in public places and at home, women – as the physically weaker sex – more frequently feel threatened. Although this may not reflect the actual risk, fears for personal security make women's lives distinct from men's in this area. The systematic character of how such risks are perceived is further illuminated by Figure 9.6, where we see that for practically all ages women have more such fears.

Figure 9.7 displays fears for various age groups (20-24, ... 80-84, from left to right) as experienced in the streets, in public places and at home.

Figure 9.5 Fear of assault or threaths, by gender



Figure 9.6 Fear of assault or threats in public places by gender and region



Except for a slight tendency for the middle-aged to be more afraid, and elderly somewhat less, no pronounced age patterns can be discerned concerning streets and public places. This pattern could reflect how frequently people of different ages typically move outdoors at various times of the day, in connection with work and leisure activities. Answers concerning fears of assaults or threats in the home show a distinct age pattern, with the elderly more often afraid than younger people. Elderly persons and pensioners normally spend much of their time in or close by the home. At the same time their physical strength has often been reduced, and they move less quickly than when they were young. Consequently, they relatively often feel afraid at home.

Figure 9.7 Fear of assault or threaths, by age Agegroups: 20-24,.....80-84



Figure 9.8 Fear of assault or threaths in public places by gender and region



Criminal activities are regularly associated with city life, so one would expect fears of assaults or threats to be a part of daily life primarily for those in urban areas. As already indicated by Figure 9.1 (based on official statistics) such expectations now have only limited empirical support. Rural crime rates have been approaching those for urban areas since 1990. Figure 9.8 (previous page) shows levels of reported fears in public places, along with the urban/rural dimension, for men and women separately.

To some degree anxieties of this type are higher in densely populated areas. People in larger towns and cities (above 50,000) more frequently report fears, although there may be a less distinct pattern for women. For both sexes, however, the highest level is not seen in Lithuania's (two) largest cities, but in the (four or five) middle-sized ones. A possible explanation behind this could be found in an assumed difference in age structures between Vilnius and Kaunas on the one hand, and middle-sized and smaller towns and cities on the other. Nevertheless, further multivariate analyses (regression) clearly show that the urban/rural dimension has a distinct explanatory power, also when age as well as gender are controlled for. A not unlikely interpretation is that the regular "street police" force is better equipped, better organized and more readily available in large urban areas. However, it is beyond the scope of this report to go into further speculations here.

Concluding Remarks

The political, social and economic changes after independence and the ensuring process of transition have resulted in a Lithuania characterized by higher levels of criminal activities than earlier. Even when we allow for uncertainties from varying registration routines, and bearing in mind that the general over time trend now seems to level off, there can be little doubt that criminal operations of various kinds are more widespread in mid-1990s than at the beginning of the decade. Such changes have negative consequences for people's quality of life, both in terms of actual experiences, as well as fears and anxieties. As crime and violence usually tend to be limited to certain areas and milieus, the changes emerging from survey results appear less dramatic than the picture indicated by official statistics on registered offences. However, the trend is clear and systematic. Lithuanians now more often have personal experience of violence and crime, and to a higher degree feel afraid, than only four or five years ago.

Actual experience as well as fears of crime are unevenly distributed among population segments. Such risks are more felt by women, and for selected arenas more so by older than by younger people. They are also more widespread in certain urban than in rural areas. The distribution of this level-of-living component largely follows the pattern of others, where social roles linked to gender, age and place of residence affect the outcome for the individual.

CHAPTER 10

GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY AND MIGRATION POTENTIAL

Demographic projections normally assume fairly stable emigration and immigration levels. A crucial question for the Lithuanian nation and neighbouring countries is whether a continued period of uncertainties and hardships will lead to major changes in migration patterns. Will difficult times result in dramatically increased emigration pressures? Such changes may seriously affect the basis for future economic growth and social improvements, since it is the young and well-educated who tend to leave. During the Cold War it was widely believed that most citizens of the Communist world would pack up and leave, if they were ever given the opportunity. Immediately after the disintegration of the USSR, many also feared an enormous outflow from former Eastern Bloc nations to the West. To some degree this happened, but not on the scale that many had expected. Whatever the validity of such claims in the past, actual developments up to now show they were clearly off the mark, even when the difficult economic and unstable political situation of recent times is taken into account. Developments must also be seen as a consequence of many countries, especially in Western Europe, tightening up their immigration rules. All in all, however, the fears of a massive pressure from the former Socialist Bloc were exaggerated. Robert J. Brym (1992) in a large-scale survey evaluated the emigration potential of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Russia after the turn of the last decade. Fully two-thirds of the respondents said they would like to go to the West for a few months, and a little more than one third that they would like to stay for one or two years. On the other hand, only seven percent expressed a desire to emigrate permanently. This main tendency appeared even more pronounced for Lithuanians, where only two and a half percent expressed any desire to leave for good, thus indicating a low emigration potential. Although such findings can give a rough idea of individuals' attachment to their country and their willingness to try their luck in completely different environments, they must be interpreted with caution. One must not exaggerate their substantive importance. They tell us little about how many or what kinds of people will actually emigrate from Lithuania or other countries of the former Soviet Bloc to Western Europe in the future: they merely indicate the desire of these citizens to leave – as they see the prospects at the time of interview. Whether such desires will become reality, depends on many different conditions and circumstances. In Brym's analysis there are indications that men are more willing to emigrate than women, younger people more than older, and the well-educated more often than the poorly-educated. This study

also confirmed that those who have pessimistic expectations about future political and economic developments in their mother country were more likely to want to emigrate than the optimists. Bearing in mind the limitations of such studies already mentioned, it seems still reasonable to assume that asking people about possible emigration plans or desires can at least give a rough picture about the mood of the population, in the ongoing transition process. Survey data can give some tentative ideas about the emigration potential of the population, given the present social, economic and political situation.

Empirical Patterns

Historically, Lithuania was primarily an agrarian nation, with its rural population scattered in villages and towns. Over the past two generations, after World War II, some –especially of the younger generation – moved to the larger towns and cities for education and jobs. However, also during the Soviet period Lithuania was a major exporter of farm products, and the agrarian sector continued to play an important role for the national economy, as well as providing a basis for living conditions and social life in the countryside. On the background of such factors, together with former rigid rules and regulations on individual relocation, one would expect Lithuanians over the last two generations to have experienced relatively little geographic mobility within their country. We anticipate a pattern where people generally stay on in the same region for long periods of time, often their whole life (See Figure 10.1).

We see that Lithuanians appear strongly tied to their local surroundings. The number of years the individual has lived in his or her present community (town or village) increases systematically with age, resulting in a picture where the typical

Figure 10.1 Time lived in community, by age



Lithuanian has remained within the same area most of her or his life. Almost thirty percent have lived there since birth. Thus even today Lithuanians' identity is tied to the community where they grew up or have lived most of the time, and they seldom move out permanently from this area.

Although Lithuanians – within certain rules – could move to and from other USSR republics during the Soviet era, the population at large was practically sealed off from direct contact with the West. Developments after 1990 changed this reality, making it possible for Lithuanian citizens to establish contacts also with Western European and other nations. Whereas the conditions for making contact and visits have changed dramatically, it is still not easy to emigrate for those who should want to do so, since many countries have tightened their immigration rules. On the other hand, even with more relaxed regulations in the West than today, it seems unlikely that a large flood of emigrants would leave permanently, given "normal" conditions at home. Lithuania is made up of people generally proud of their country's great history, with strong bonds and loyalties within groups and communities, and with a feeling of national solidarity further developed during the recent struggle for freedom, so one would expect that most Lithuanians would not want to leave their motherland, unless the situation should worsen dramatically.

As of September 1994, our survey confirms earlier impressions of stability of residence, and some reluctance to leave the local environment. Respondents were asked: "Do you plan to leave this community (city, village) for another place of residence?". In total only around seven percent said they had any such plans. Of these, however, nearly three-fourths are thinking of living elsewhere within Lithuania. Among those planning actually to leave Lithuania for a foreign country, the largest group consists of people with Russia as their target. This can be understood in light of the proportion of ethnic Russians in the country, and also the ongoing restructuring in the region (See Chapter II on Population). The percentage of Lithuanians currently planning to go to any Western country appears very low indeed (less than one percent). However, given the small number in question one should be wary of over-generalising. Whatever the exact figure, we may certainly conclude that, given present conditions, the emigration potential so far is indeed low. Our results support impressions from other studies of a population with low geographical mobility, as well as a small emigration potential. These results suggest that unless living conditions fall below unbearable standards, Lithuanians are prepared to stay on in their local community and continue their work.

Figure 10.2 (see next page) displays the main reasons why people may wish to leave their present locality, among those who have such plans.

The largest group consists of those who simply feel they cannot afford to live there. Other important reasons are bad housing conditions, that the respondent wants to live with his or her family, and that no job is to found in the region or a better one may be found elsewhere. Keeping in mind the transition process underway in the country at the time of the survey, it is interesting to note that not many mentioned that they could not find work, and very few planned to move because

their present job had been terminated. The picture shown by Figure 10.2 points up the characteristics of this stage of the transition process, as of autumn 1994. Life is not easy for Lithuanians, and for some it is so difficult that they wish to seek their luck in other surroundings. However, it is not the loss of one's job that is behind such plans: unemployment was still low at the time of the interview (See Chapter V on Employment and conditions at work). Rather, the reason is to be found in harsh living conditions and difficult times in general, with a continuing decline in real income.

In assessing migration plans and emigration potential for a population, we should considerwhat kind of links individuals at present have with others living in different areas. If a person herself has lived in another country, or has social ties to friends or relatives there, we may hypothesize a higher tendency to have emigration plans. For such individuals, going outside their own region does not necessarily imply leaving for a totally different or strange environment. We may note a parallel historical experience in earlier emigration from the Scandinavian countries to North America in support of this hypothesis. These emigrants were often encouraged by friends or relatives who had already left. Arriving in their new country, recent immigrants normally preferred to live in the same area as their contacts. One in seven Lithuanians (fifteen percent) reports having family ties abroad. Figure 10.3 shows in greater detail how many have relatives or family members permanently residing in another country, for certain alternatives.

This fairly clear-cut picture must be understood in the light of Lithuania's history in this century. Before World War II and Annexation, it was not unusual for Lithuanians to travel abroad,also to Western Europe and the USA. Some also managed to flee during the war. Thus, there are "colonies" of former Lithuanians in many places around the globe. However, from the early 1940s and onwards, travel to and contact with the West became practically impossible. Over the years, as the

Figure 10.2 Reasons for wishing to move out of present locality



then-Soviet republic gradually became an integrated part of the larger system, social ties and relations too became increasingly directed towards Russia and other republics. Consequently, when Lithuanians are asked about relatives abroad today, contacts in Russia or other states of the so-called CIS are most frequently mentioned. It is also striking how few Lithuanians report of family in the other Baltic nations, or for that matter in the former East Bloc countries.

Not surprisingly, ethnic Russians, Belarussians and Ukrainians make up the larger part of those with relatives in the CIS area (see Figure 10.4), while ethnic Lithuanians make up nearly one third.

The pattern displayed in Figure 10.4 indicates that ethnic Lithuanians proportionately have much fewer relatives in the CIS area, although this still is the region where they most often report of family ties abroad. In the years to come, as former contacts between Lithuanians at home and abroad are resumed on a wider scale, the pattern shown in the last two figures (Figures 10.3 and 10.4) in all likelihood will

Figure 10.3 Relatives abroad



Figure 10.4 Ethnic background of respondents with relatives in CIS-area



be changed. Future surveys will probably show a larger percentage with family ties in Western Europe and other parts of the world. At the present stage, such bonds across national borderlines are still influenced by the former political structures that steered flows of people within the Soviet Union over the last two generations. It is therefore only logical that further multivariate analyses (logistic regression, not reported in detail here) suggest that a strong predictor of having plans to emigrate, still is ethnic and family ties in the CIS area. However, given so few respondents in the sample with such plans, these analyses must be interpreted with caution.

LITERATURE:

Brym, Robert J. (1992), «The emigration potential of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Russia: Recent survey results.» *International Sociology* 7 ,4:387-395

CHAPTER 11

SOCIAL CONTACT

Man is a social creature. This is a fundamental sociological axiom. Humans depend on being with other people. It is essential to belong to social groups, have friends and be attached to others. It is said that we «are» our social relations – emphasizing the point that the world around us is constantly created and interpreted through social processes. In such a perspective it is reasonable to speak of the «social construction of reality». The social environment plays a fundamental role in people's lives. From this it follows that social contact is a welfare component in its own right.

When studying social relations we see clearly that these phenomena have a quantitative and a qualitative side. The quantitative is more directly observable: in such matters as how frequently family members meet, how many persons the individual sees regularly, etc. The deeper meaning of a relationship is more difficult to reveal. Qualitative aspects, although central for our understanding, are less immediately available. Hence, in most cases we shall have to rely on indirect interpretations of what can be observed from the outside.

Unlike other welfare components, social contact is difficult to influence or direct by political means. Government and local authorities can do much to improve the structural conditions that may enhance contact among certain areas and population segments. Still, in most cases it is impossible to exert direct influence on the way people feel about each other, to what degree individuals experience companionship, togetherness and common identity, as one can with the distribution of material resources. The link between state organized welfare and informal social contacts has been a recurrent theme in discussions about the modern welfare state. It has been questioned, at least in Scandinavia, whether the buildup of a large government apparatus for helping people has eliminated the need for the informal institutions and traditions that existed previously, and whether it has unintentionally also undermined local and informal social networks.

SOCIAL RELATIONS IN CHANGING TIME

It is often asserted that modern society suffers from a general lack of friendship and togetherness. In periods of economic growth and increased prosperity, social ties tend to weaken. Some feel that things were better in the old days, when people lived in a simpler, mainly rural, society. Different areas of the world have also shown that historic struggles for national or regional independence have enhanced solidarity within the population. The fight against an outside adversary is likely to strengthen

the feeling of unity, rendering less important the differences between internal factions. After the struggle is over and the outside threat is no longer there, however, a difficult question is how to convert the newly-won freedom into a stable process of political and economic development: How to transform earlier national unity into the new and different struggle for economic growth and democratic institutions?

Images from Lithuanian society presented in the international media during the critical times before and after independence showed a determined people with a strong national identity, based on a long and proud history. This is also a country where such basic social institutions as family and (the Roman Catholic) church have traditionally played a fundamental role in the lives of individuals and groups. Furthermore, it is a nation where the process of urbanization is fairly new and less pronounced than in many other industrialized counties. Much of the population still lives in rural areas, or at least has its roots in the countryside and villages.

The changes following independence are likely to put traditional social institutions under pressure. Lithuania's move towards a market-oriented economy, although necessary and recommended by international experts, may encourage increased individualism and lead to less collective responsibility. Continued economic crises and difficulties can make people doubt their government's ability to act, and make them feel forced to find their own private solutions. Anomie, with unclear and unstable social norms, is often the consequence when former widely-stressed values are abruptly discarded. Many established «truths» are suddenly turned upside down, and traditional norms seem insecure.

Now the old central power in Moscow, formerly taken for granted and representing the outside adversary, is not there in the same way as before. Lithuania is no longer part of the Soviet Union, and the responsibility for her future lies with the citizens themselves. In this process of renewed nation-building, various ideologies and political models compete against each other. In a democratic society this naturally leads to debates and conflicts. The question then becomes what consequences the transformation process will have in the long run for solidarity among groups and within social networks. Several hypotheses could be argued for. One is that periods of hardships and difficulties will energize national identity and social institutions. Another is that the process of transformation will lead to a more individualistic society, with weakened social ties among persons and groups. Perhaps both hypotheses are credible, in the sense that there could be a strengthening of the very close social networks, such as the family, while those linked to local area and work (traditionally strong in Lithuania) become weakened. Such hypotheses about deeper social changes cannot be studied adequately in a level of living survey, but need a broader and long-term approach. However, the preceding discussion can provide a framework for interpreting the available survey data on social contacts and relationship.

Family Ties: Stability and Change.

Our discussion of empirical findings starts with the family, still considered the most fundamental social institution today. The structural framework for ties within families is influenced largely by demographic processes, such as for instance marriage and fertility patterns, norms for how long young people stay with their parents, or life expectancy for men and women. To give an example: The average chance of having parents alive will depend on how early they married, when their children were born, and how long they live. Thus, on the macro-level the distribution of family ties and relations will be affected by demographic changes in the population. This point provides the background for a comparison of 1994 and 1990 data. Both surveys asked a simple question: «Are you parents alive?». During a period of only four to five years (the time between these surveys) there is little reason to expect any major difference in this area. Demographic processes are slow, and the basic hypothesis should be one of stability. However, if there is a change, it should point in a certain direction. From other observations it is clear that the Lithuanian population is slowly getting older. This in turn implies that on the average fewer people will have a father or mother still living. From such knowledge we may expect the two surveys mainly to show the same proportion of respondents with parents alive for the two years, but if there is a change, it should be in a direction of a higher percentage without parents alive in 1994. Since underlying demographic processes are fairly predictable, the resulting pattern can also be seen as an indirect test of the data quality of the surveys. If differences were large, or if they went in the opposite direction, then we should doubt the general validity of the data. If, on the other hand, the pattern is similar, and any difference in expected direction, this should increase our confidence in the survey data.

Figure 11.1 Parents alive? 1990 and 1994 compared



The data (Figure 11.1) give information about the demographic context of family ties in Lithuania. On the average 40% of the adult population have no parents alive, while one third state that both parents are still living. Typically, there is a much higher (five times as high) proportion of those with only mother alive, compared to those with only father. The fundamental position of older women, as grandmother and older mother in the family, in this way is a consequence of men being older when they marry and also having a much lower life expectancy (see Chapter II on Population).

The patterns from the two surveys are similar, but we may note a slight difference. For 1994 there is an increase in the proportion with no living parents, with parallel consequences for the distribution of remaining answer categories. The difference between the two years is not big (although it would be statistically significant if a traditional test had been carried out). Nevertheless, it goes in the expected direction. We interpret the resultent pattern as having substantive as well as methodological interpretations. The substantive is that the observed difference suggests certain consequences following from the long-term processes of an ageing population. As Lithuanians grow older, fewer will have living parents, and the traditional setting for family life will be altered. The methodological interpretation is that the impression of stability, with only minor changes in expected direction, increases our confidence in the survey data. This conclusion provides us with a background for evaluating the next Figure (Figure 11.2), concerning contact with parents (for those with at least one parent alive). Answer categories also included those who live with their parents. Such a comparison can give insight into possible changes in ties and relations within the family institution during the transition period. It seems likely that hard times will result in different reactions. On one hand, economic reasons could lead young people to move in with their parents; on the other – because of personal failures or social problems – they may break off contact

Figure 11.2 Contact with parents 1990 and 1994 compared



with the parents. If such processes are at work, we would expect a more polarized frequency distribution in 1994 as compared to 1990.

Although figure 11.2 paints a picture characterized by stability, there is a noticeable difference in the shape of the distribution of contact frequencies for the two years. In 1990, the proportion was about the same (one fourth) for the three answer categories: Living with parents; See them every week; See them every month. In 1994 more people report living with parents, while fewer see them now and then (every week or month); and a larger proportion say they see their parents very seldom (a few times a year, or not every year). Thus, the contact pattern of 1994 has a more polarized profile: Relatively more live with parents, and relatively more see them only very seldom. (A traditional test for difference in variance would have been significant at any level.) Although the substantive interpretation of the observed change should not be exaggerated, the pattern in Figure 11.2 does suggest some important consequences on family life and generation-relations within the family. Deteriorating economic and social conditions tend either to force different generations to live together, or to break off contact. To some degree there is a similar message in other data, not reported in detail here. For instance there is an increase in parents above the age of 30 who report that children aged 16 or over are still living at home.

Ties within the Local Arena: Neighbours

The 1994 survey had questions about respondents' contact with neighbours. They were asked: "Approximately how often do you socialize with those of your neighbours whom you see most often? Figure 11.4 (next page) shows the resulting distribution.

From the figure we get the impression of good neighbour relations in Lithuanian society, also in hard times. Only 7% say they have no neighbours, while one

Figure 11.3 Socializing with neighbours. How often?



in four reports little contact (not every, or a few times a year). By contrast, 40% have daily contact, and another 30% say they socialize with neighbours every week or every month. Lithuanians thus seem to trust their neighbours and enjoy their companionship. In a society characterized by a homogeneous population and strong historical traditions with national and local loyalties, this is scarcely surprising. Following the same logic we would also expect Lithuanians in their daily lives both to help others in need, or to ask for help when they themselves need it. Some questions in the 1994 survey concerned respondents' tendency to receive help of various kinds, and also by whom they were normally helped. Besides expecting fairly high levels of exchanges, we could argue for relevant differences between genders. Basically, we would expect traditional gender roles – which affect daily routines and activities for the individual – also to influence the types of activities for which the person receives help. The next Figure (Figure 11.5) displays answers to a question about whether the respondent had received any help in various tasks during the past 12 months, from somewhere outside the regular household.

Figure 11.5 shows answers for men and women separately. We see that Lithuanians receive help from people outside their own household for various tasks. Often this will concern simple matters like small services, borrowing tools etc., car transport, helping with the garden or work on fields. It is the availability of such help, although mainly for minor tasks, that is probably experienced as an important dimension of quality of life. Findings furthermore underline the relevance of traditional gender-roles. Men more often get help from others for tools/small services, car transport and gardening/working in the fields, while women typically receive help with housework, shopping or doing errands, and personal services sickness. Figure 11.6 provides further information about exchanges within social networks. This Figure shows from whom respondents got assistance.

Figure 11.4 Have received help from others for various tasks?



Considering that the preceding question specifically concerned help received from persons outside the regular household, it is interesting to see how many still get help from other family members. The most often reported outside contributors are neighbours and friends. About half of these respondents report help from neighbours or friends, while colleagues are mentioned relatively seldom. Again, there are differences linked to gender roles: women more often turn to the family for help, men to neighbours or friends.

The impression that most Lithuanians live within well-developed social networks in family and neighbourhood is strengthened by Figure 11.7. Respondents were asked if they know someone outside the regular household who would be able to help with a loan of 500 litas/200,000 roubles, if needed.

Figure 11.5 Who helps with various activites?



Figure 11.6 Someone to turn to for economic help?



This chart displays "Yes"-percentages for different age groups, in urban and rural areas. On the average, three out of four Lithuanians say they know someone who could lend them money. The younger generation feels it easier to get economic help than the older people do, although further analysis indicates that in most cases young people would get it from parents. There is also a certain tendency for old people to have better developed support networks in the countryside: affirmative answers were given more often in rural areas.

Summary

So far the empirical analyses suggest small but significant changes in social contact patterns in Lithuania. In part such changes result from slow, underlying demographic processes, in part they must be seen as stemming from strains linked to the ongoing process of transition. In a gradually ageing population, fewer people are likely to have living parents, while economic and social difficulties tend to affect the younger generation's choice about when to leave home, as well as how often they stay in contact with parents once they have left. Despite such signs of a changing context for social contact, the main impression remains one of a population with well-developed social networks within the family and the neighbourhood.

CHAPTER 12

PERSONAL REACTIONS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

In previous chapters of this report, living conditions have been discussed in mainly objective terms . A somewhat different but related and relevant dimension concerns the way people themselves evaluate and react to what happens to them. Truly, the present period is a crucial time in the development of Lithuania as an independent nation. The outcome on the national level will depend on how individuals judge the central events and political decision that affect heir daily lives. Without a reasonable level of confidence among the population in their own abilities and those of public authorities, it becomes difficult to effectuate the necessary reforms. Eventually, effective government depend on continued support from the population.

In this chapter we will look into how Lithuanians respond on a more personal level. First, we ask about people's confidence in their political system, and how they evaluate major developments in their country. Although the old system was increasingly disliked, there still existed a fair amount of trust in national figures and public authorities, and Lithuanians at large supported the degree of economic equality that existed among various groups. Future developments could go in various directions. The fact that Lithuania has won her independence and the people now enjoy much greater political freedom may have led to an increase in support for the political system and stronger backing for needed reforms in the transition process. On the other hand, the average citizen will have experienced unexpected events and decisions, which in turn might result in considerable scepticism towards the system, and disappointments over the direction of developments. Secondly, and related to citizens' belief in the political system and authorities, is the question about the people's belief in themselves. Is the process unfolding on the national level something that the average Lithuanian feels he or she can really influence, through personal efforts or decisions? Again, hypotheses could take different directions. It is not unlikely that the general emphasis on a shift of responsibility from the state to the individual level will lead to stronger personal commitments and increased control over own situation in daily life. On the other hand, we could also argue that dramatic changes and major uncertainties on the national and regional level will affect the individual in a negative way. In unpredictable times and uncertain surroundings people may lose faith not only in the system as such, but also in their own abilities. Thirdly, we might hypothesize that current events not only affect judgements about the present situation, but will also influence the way individuals look back on their earlier life. For some, the new political freedom could be so crucial

that when it is actually experienced, earlier periods may be appear as even more harsh than originally. Alternatively, the grave economic developments in recent years, with increased difficulties for many, may have put life under the old system in a different, more utopian perspective.

This chapter will look into these questions, on the basis of available indicators. We will start by describing Lithuanian attitudes as of 1994. In the final part of the chapter we will compare reactions in 1994 to those in 1990 for selected survey variables.

Belief in the System and in Own Abilities

A central component of the process of transition, from a command economy to a market-oriented one is privatization in various forms. Figure 12.1 gives an overview of support for privatization. Respondents were asked who, in their opinion, should be the owner of: 1) Industrial enterprises with less than 100 employees (I.E. less than 100), 2) Industrial enterprises with more than 100 employees (I.E. more than 100), 3) Retail trade shops (Retail tr. shop), and 4) Agricultural land (Agric. land). Main answer categories were: a)"The state", b) "The workers jointly", c) and "Private individuals/private shareholders".

The general impression is one of fairly high support of the privatization drive in Lithuania. For smaller companies (I.E. less than 100), retail trade (Retail tr. shop) and farm land (Agric. land) around half of the surveyed want privatization. However, the respondents are against the privatization of large-scale industry (I.E. more than 100): less than 20% prefer private owners in this case. Nevertheless, this does not change the main picture of fairly positive attitudes regarding this dimension of

Figure 12.1 Attitudes to private ownership. "Private individuals/shareholders should be owners"



the transition process. Figure 12.1 also indicates a systematic gender difference. Men are more positive to privatization than women, a tendency that could be seen as reflection of women being more sceptical to the ongoing changes in general. Supplementary information is found in Figure 12.2 where attitudes are displayed for two selected alternatives: large enterprises with more than 100 employees, and retail trade shops, for various age categories.

Attitudes vary by age according to approximately the same pattern for both alternatives. The younger generation is somewhat more supportive of privatization than the older, appearently fearing less what the new economic system has in store for them. This tendency holds, however, only up to a certain age. Then again, the very oldest groups tend to be more positive. One possible explanation for this pattern is that these are people who were born before annexation, and still have recollections of a Lithuania when privately owned businesses were normal.

Although our respondents appear to support many privatization efforts, it is not obvious that they are favourably inclined to other aspects of the economic and political processes unfolding in their nation. A usual consequence of the transition in other former East Bloc countries, at least during the initial stages, has been increased inequalities among population groups. This is the necessary price to pay, as economic theory suggests, for a more economically effective society. Still, the existence of large gaps between poor and well-off Lithuanians could collide with traditional norms and practices, especially as this is a small nation with a homogeneous population. Figure 12.3 (see next page) indicates how the population evaluates present inequalities. The survey asked respondents for their opinion on differences among income groups in Lithuania. Answer categories were ranked on a five-point scale, from «The differences between the groups ought to be much less» to «The differences between the groups ought to be much larger». Figure 12.3 shows

Figure 12.2 Support for private ownership, by age. Large enterprises and retail



the percentage who say that income differences should be much less or slightly less, by age and gender.

The immediate impression is that respondents consider present inequalities to be too large. On the average about 75% say that the difference should be less. Despite support for privatization demonstrated earlier, the population at large seems to dislike one typical consequence of the ongoing process. The pattern of attitudes varies over age groups in a certain way: The percentage disliking income differences increases gradually by age up to the mid-50s, then decreases more and more sharply for older people. Thus, perhaps surprisingly, it is older Lithuanians who dislike present inequalities the least. For most groups of working age there is also a systematic gender difference. Women, who tend to receive lower pay than men, more often feel that such inequalities should be less than they now are. This pattern can be interpreted in light of women's traditional place in Lithuanian society. As in most countries within the former Socialist Bloc women often had a weaker economic position. Patterns which are part of a more general system of culture and norms are difficult to change over night, and are likely to continue irrespective of political shifts on the national level. The next figure (Figure 12.4, see next page) shows views on the possible discrimination of women in a wider sense. Respondents were asked to give their reaction to the following statement: "Women are discriminated against compared to men". Answer categories ranked from "Never" to "Very often". The figure reports percentages who answered "More often" or "Very often" for men and women, for various age groups.

We see that on the average one in five of our respondents believes women are discriminated against. This feeling is much more widespread among females, the victims of such perceived injustices. This pattern is especially strong for those of working age, while less systematic for the oldest (the very highest age groups were omitted here, because of low cell numbers).

Figure 12.3 Attitudes on income differences. "Ought to be much or slightly less"



The next two figures (see next page) give further insight into the relationship between general social position in society and perceptions of the political system's credibility, as well as of one's own ability to influence the course of events. Figure 12.5 shows the results for one variable – from a battery of items measuring respondents' attitudes towards public authorities – while Figure 12.6 gives results for a variable measuring perceived control over one's own life. The general level of these variables in relation to the situation in 1990 will be commented on in more detail later. Both indicators selected here have a central place within their respective item batteries.

Figure 12.4 Attitudes on gender discrimination, by gender and age. "Women are discriminated against often"



Figure 12.5 Attitudes towards public authorities, by gender and region. "Inefficient in execution of their duties"



Respondents were asked about their reaction to the following statement: «The public authorities are inefficient in the execution of their duties». Answer categories ranged from «Never» to «Very often» on a five-point scale. Figure 12.5 displays average scores for men (upper line) and women (lower line) in various regions. The main impression of a rather firm distrust in public authorities is made only slightly more nuanced by some variations. On the average people in cities more often feel the authorities are inefficient, and men more so than women. This is a pattern of a so-called interaction effect: Gender differences are more pronounced in rural than in urban areas . Figure 12.6 shows whether the respondent agreed or disagreed that "As a private person I can vote, but in reality I have little influence on political decisions". The figure shows percentages who agree, by gender and education. On the average three out of four respondents feel they have scant influence in political matters. People with little education have this kind of low self-confidence more often than the well-educated. This is the main trend, but there is a change for the most highly educated bracket. Here the pattern should probably be interpreted on the background of the general situation for academics today. Many of them experience that their earlier highly-valued background is now of little use, and is difficult to convert into a good job (See chapter on Education.) There is also a gender difference: women more often say they have little influence than men. These feelings reflect the situation of a traditionally patriarchal society.

Figure 12.6 Distrust in own ability to control life "Little influence on political decisions"



Changes in Attitudes and Perceptions

Several of the attitudinal questions analysed above were also asked in the same manner in the 1990 Lithuanian Living conditions survey. This provides a useful instrument for investigating possible changes in the mood of the population in a period of increasing hardships and uncertainties. During the final stages of the struggle with Moscow, the people of Lithuania impressed the international community by their determination and confidence. To what degree have they managed to uphold the positive will and enthusiasm of those days? After many years, the national struggle was crowned with success. However, on the individual level the earlier excitement could be overshadowed by the harsh realities of daily life.

A rough idea of how Lithuanians view their national political structures and practices in 1994 as compared to those of 1990 is given in Figure 12.7, which displays reactions to statements about public authorities. The items presented were a) «Public authorities suppress important information which the public should be informed about», b) «....are inefficient » (same as already introduced above), and c) « Public authorities/officials accept bribes». In addition comes the item on gender-discrimination,which should here be regarded mainly as a control variable to check for any shifts in answers that could derive from methodological or design difficulties. Most observers would agree that the degree of gender-discrimination is a social phenomenon that cannot be eradicted in a short time, so no major change should be expected. If the level on answers in this area is about the same for both years, this could indicate that the measurement instrument chosen for these items provides a valid yardstick for comparison. The figure reports average scores on five-point scales ranging from «Never» to «Very often».

It is important to note that reactions are about the same for the item concerning gender-discrimination, on the left side of the chart. This increases our confidence

Figure 12.7 Change in attitudes towards public authorities 1994 compared to 1990



in the measurement instrument. For the three next variables – on attitudes towards public authorities proper – a large and systematic change is seen. Lithuanians in 1994 clearly have less trust in politicians and authorities than they did in 1990. Feelings that authorities suppress information, are inefficient and accept bribes are far more widespread. Thus, there is little doubt that the transition process so far has left the average Lithuanian more alienated towards the political system.

A related question concerns how individuals look upon themselves in the present situation. Is the distrust of the system accompanied by a similar loss of confidence in own abilities, or does it lead to increased incentive to take on responsibilities for one's own life? Figure 12.8, shows to what degree loss of confidence in the system, at least on a general level, is accompanied by changes in perceived control over one's own life. Respondents were asked about reactions to five statements: 1) «There is no point in planning the future because nothing ever is a success», 2) «Politics are so complex that it is difficult for people like me to understand what it is about», 3) «.....I have little influence... » (already presented above), 4) «It is first and foremost family background that determines your success in life», 5)«"Luck and chance determine our lives».

Main answer categories were «Agree» and «Disagree». The figure pictures a marked and systematic change for the worse: for all five variables, respondents now more often agree with such statements. Taken together, the Figures 12.7 and 12.8 suggest that difficult and unpredictable times have made people more alienated not only towards the system, but also towards themselves.

From the comparative results we may so far infer that the average citizen feels that something important has been lost in the process, and that the costs of moving towards a market-oriented society are high. Traditionally Lithuania was a fairly homogeneous society, with a high degree of equality among the various popu-

Figure 12.8 Distrust in own ability to control life? 1994 compared to 1990



lation segments, even for a socialist republic in the Soviet Union. The transition process has meant the acceptance of larger economic differences among groups. In 1990, on the threshold of a new system, a majority welcomed increased economic differences. In all likelihood they saw this a necessary instrument to develop more effective production of goods and services. Figure 12.9 provides further indication that this initial enthusiasm has grown sour in recent times.

The figure reports respondents' opinions on how large they think income differences should be. In 1994 the previous majority for increased differences has dwindled to about one fifth, while now more than half of the respondents would prefer less economic inequality. A reasonable interpretation would be that most people were simply not prepared for the kind of social and economic imbalances they have experienced in the aftermath of independence.

Concluding Remarks: The Past, the Present and the Future

Sweeping changes, whether for the better or the worse, may affect not only the people's perceptions of the present situation, but also their evaluations of previous experiences. When judged against the problems of today, earlier periods in life may be viewed in a different light. To what degree such an hypothesis is credible can be roughly tested by the results displayed in Figure 12.10 (see next page). At the end of the interview respondents were asked to reflect back on their lives, with all the ups and downs, and to indicate how good or bad various periods had been, from early childhood (0-5 years) to present age. Figure 12.10 has a somewhat complex but interesting message. It displays answers first for those who in the 1990 survey

Figure 12.9 Change in opinion on income differences. Attitudes in 1994 compared to 1990



were between 55 and 65 years of age. Their pattern is shown by a line. The bars give the pattern of those who in the 1994 survey were between 59 and 69 years of age. Thus in both cases we are looking at a sample of the same population group, only on the average four years older since the first survey. Respondents were asked to characterize specific periods of their lives. For the age groups in question these periods have been roughly translated into historical time, as indicated in the figure.

We see the same dominant pattern for both groups. Older Lithuanians view the time before annexation (the time of their childhood) as pleasant, while annexation, the war years and the Stalin period were bad. During the 1960s and the 1970s things improved gradually and systematically. However, from the 1980s life seemed increasingly difficult. Since 1990 there has clearly been a turn for the worse. (This observation pertains in reality only to the 1994 sample, for the age group in question). The group aged 59 to 69 in 1994 clearly feel that they are in a much worse situation now than only four or five years ago. Accordingly, they now have a different background for evaluating earlier periods than they had then, when they were four years younger and had little knowledge about what was to happen. Experiences after 1990 seem to have affected how people now look back on their lives. Earlier periods are judged in a more positive light for the 1994 sample (now aged 59 to 69) than for the 1990 sample (then aged 55 to 65). Similar trends can also be observed when other age groups are compared for 1990 and 1994 in a similar manner. Present events also colour former experiences. Interpreted together with results presented in this chapter, these findings point to a difficult task for policy makers in Lithuania. It can prove be hard to persuade the population to accept tough times in order to build a platform for a better society, if disappointments with the present system continue to spread while previous events and structures are perceived in an increasingly positive light.

Figure 12.10 Life in retrospect, as seen in 1990 and 1994. Respondents aged 55-65 in 1990, versus respondents aged 59-69 in 1994



CHAPTER 13

CUMULATIVE PROCESSES OF INEQUALITY

Data presented in the preceding chapters have shown in detail how Lithuanians have experienced a setback in their living conditions in recent years . The transition process has had high social costs. Population size is going down, and this is no longer a result only of negative net migration, as in earlier stages. Exceptionally low birth rates and increasing death rates are now accelerating this trend. Health indicators are pointing in a negative direction, while a slowly ageing population suggests growing future difficulties for the health-care sector. The educational system is struggling to adapt to new demands, at the same time as earlier established types of schooling have lost their relevance and value. Work places – often characterized as hazardous and polluted – should have been improved, but limited economic resources have halted the much-needed programmes. The drive towards a market-oriented society has proven a painful process: On the family and individual level most people have witnessed a sharp decline in real economic terms, which has also meant a drastic change in consumption patterns. Even material structures – such as housing – are felt less comfortable than before, because proper heating has become more expensive. Safety and security for ordinary people have worsened. Crime rates are rising, and more and more citizens are exposed to threats in their neighbourhoods and homes. Against such a background it comes as no surprise that confidence in the political system, as expressed though the people's trust in public authorities and figures, has dwindled. Scepticism and disbelief are directed not only towards the system, but also inwards – towards oneself. Compared to data from 1990 there is a marked decrease in self-confidence and trust in own abilities. There has also been a swing in attitudes towards economic inequalities: Lithuanians tend to scoff at the nouveaux rich, and most people think economic differences now are too large. Furthermore, as people find themselves fighting the harsh realities of everyday life, former times are viewed in a positive light. After a brief and bitter taste of market mechanisms, privatization and capitalism in a period of economic recession, the difficult decades after World War II appear brighter and better than before. Despite setbacks and hardships there are, however, few indications that people actually want to leave their motherland and try their luck somewhere else. Lithuanians identify with their country, are proud of her long and dramatic history, and they seem prepared to undergo necessary hardships until the tide of history can again take a turn for the better. For people who grew up under Soviet rule, it is nevertheless difficult to let go of the old ways of thinking and adopt new ones. Much has been written and said about moving from a former command economy

towards a market-oriented society – with more responsibility placed on the individual. However, to many people such concepts still lack real meaning. Thus a central political task is not only to carry through specific economic reforms, but also to explain carefully to the citizenry why these are necessary, and what hardships will be involved. It is a real challenge for the political system to develop among the population at large a better understanding of fundamental problems and how they may be solved. Such an understanding will be crucial for building enthusiasm, fostering loyalty and maintaining solidarity. To secure continued support for reforms care should also be taken to prevent the already sizable gap between the new economic elites and ordinary citizens from becoming even wider.

Lithuanian society of today is characterized by systematic inequalities in living conditions, despite the rapid economic and social changes of recent years. In this final chapter we will try to put different empirical pieces together, in order to draw a more coherent picture of the mechanisms of social inequality.

Analysing Causes and Consequences of Inequalities of Living Conditions

In theory, the distributional outcomes of social and economic processes can be structured according to at least three principles:

1. There is *no relation* between different distributions of living conditions – possible combinations of various benefits and burdens appear random and do not form specific patterns or profiles.
2. Distributions are *compensatory* – those with burdens in one area are given benefits in another, such as when those with especially hard work receive higher wages.
3. Distributions are *cumulative* – benefits tend to accumulate for certain groups of individuals, while the burdens heap up for other groups.

Findings in the preceding chapters suggest that inequality processes in Lithuanian society are largely of a cumulative nature. On the other hand, the analyses in each chapter were limited to mainly one level of living component at a time. An analytical challenge for the final analysis is – within the limitations set by the survey data – to view various outcomes of living conditions together, and see whether the many bits and pieces can be summarized into more general patterns. If socio-economic processes mainly are of a cumulative nature, we would expect the outcomes to form a smaller number of basic dimensions of inequality. However, this does not mean that such patterns will necessarily take on a uni-dimensional character. Especially in times of dramatic economic and social change one would expect the picture to be differentiated. Those most negatively affected by the changes on the national level after 1990 are probably be be found in several different population segments. Data tell that for instance farmers and people in the countryside

experienced many economic difficulties; however, this also goes for some academic groups and certain occupations in urban areas. Thus, the previously established standing of social groups will not necessarily predict how they have fared in the transition period.

For the following discussion a specific analytic strategy was adopted. First, we attempt to compound a large number of outcome indicators – measured in the 1994 survey – into a smaller number of basic inequality dimensions. The method chosen for this part is Factor Analysis (see for instance Kim and Mueller, 1978). Here we need to identify possible cumulative dimensions and give to these sociologically relevant interpretations, against the backdrop of available empirical knowledge and theory. Secondly, we want to explain the inequality patterns of living conditions. Thus, in addition to identifying fundamental cumulative mechanisms we want to link such inequalities to social position, as defined by typical background variables. In this way we will be able to pinpoint which population segments have the best and which have the worst living conditions. The technique applied for this second part is Multiple Regression Analysis (see for instance Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1990).

Distilling Outcome Dimensions

As a starting point various living condition indicators – already separately analysed in earlier chapters – were brought within a common analytical framework. To keep computations and interpretations reasonably simple, groups of indicators in the first round were summarized into additive indexes. These included both observations on the individual as well as the household level, and objective registrations as well as respondents' subjective evaluations. Analyses were carried out with the individual as the unit of analysis. In most cases variables/indexes were identical or similar to those indices already separately commented on in earlier chapters. For the factor analysis (of the whole sample) the following variables were used:

Personal Efficacy: «Personal efficacy» An additive index summarizing the respondent's belief in own ability to control his/her life (High value=Low self-belief)

Isolat: «Little social contact» An additive index summarising the frequency of respondent's contact with family, friends and colleagues (High value=No/little contact)

Bad Health: «Bad health» An additive index combining respondent's evaluation of own health, including dental problems and the occurrence of chronic illness (High value=Bad health)

Psychological Problems: «Psychological difficulties» An additive index summarising degree of personal/psychological difficulties, from suddenly feeling afraid for no reason, to having feelings worthlessness (High value=Many problems)

Hardship: «Experience of hardships» An additive index summarising respondent's evaluations of economic difficulties in the household during the last twelve months, from having to rely on outside help in order to pay regular expenses, to involuntarily having to refrain from taking part in social or cultural activities. This index is a measure of degree of economic deprivation (High value= much deprivation/many hardships)

Low Standard: «Low indoor standard» An additive index summarizing the reported quality of household's dwelling through the number of certain items, from WC to telephone (High value=low quality)

Unemployed: «Unemployed» is a simple variable measuring whether the respon-dent is unemployed or not (Unemployed=1, Other=0). It should be noted that this variable does not have the same relevance for pensioners and old people. Therefore, the use of this variable in analyses of the total sample could be questioned. However, to check for possible problematic patterns, analyses were rerun for respondents of working age only, however, this did not affect major findings.

Crime: «Experienced crime or violence» An additive index summarizing experience of violence, threats or crime during the past year, from violence which led to visible bruises, to street robbery/mugging (High value= many experiences)

Dependency Ratio: «Dependency ratio of respondent's household». A variable based on the ratio of how many in the household are economically dependent on others, as compared to how many work/support the family (High value = high dep. ratio)

Little Space: «Little space per household member» This is an indicator of how much room is available for each household member in the respondent's household (High value=little space)

No Equipment: «Few equipment items in household» An index summarising the number of various types of appliances and equipment owned by the household, from washing machine to car. This should be treated as a measure of the wealth or the economic standing of the respondent's household (High value= No or few items)

It should be noted that all variables are scaled in the same direction, *i.e. high value implies difficulties or problems.* This is done for ease of interpretation later on.

Detailed results of parts of the factor analysis are given in Appendix B. The pattern of so-called eigenvalues suggested that three different factors could be traced, as indicated by the step when the drop in value from one factor to the next levels off. Therefore, the final round of factor analyses was carried out under the assumption of three factors. Table 13.1 reports factor loadings for these, after rotation according to the Varimax principle. Various oblique rotations (factors allowed to correlate) were also experimented with. Results showed, however, that the factor structure could be seen as consisting basically of the same three different dimensions.

After rotation the three emerging factors "load" on or correlate with different groups of variables. It is through this clustering that one can make meaningful

interpretations of potential dimensions. The first factor loads high mainly on the variables Bad Health, Hardship, and Psychological Problems, thus suggesting these outcomes are clustered or cumulated. This factor could be interpreted as an individual Quality of Life dimension, where a high score implies grave problems. On this high end of the dimension we find people with bad health, who have experienced many economic hardships and often feel psychological stress and strains. These are individuals who can indeed be said to have a poor life quality. On the other end are those with good health, few economic worries and also no psychological stress. These individuals live pleasant lives, free of serious personal problems. It is interesting to note that this dimension, although based on observations from one point in time (1994), still has a dynamic aspect, as Hardships refer to the consequences of economic difficulties of respondent's household experienced over the past year.

The second factor loads high on Low Standard, Dependency Ratio and No Equipment. This captures what could be seen as The Socio-economic Status of respondent's Household. At the one end of this scale (high score) we find those with low general standard of dwelling, with relatively many household members dependent on others, and no or few items of modern equipment in the home. In material terms they live in low-status households. At the other end are those living under affluent conditions in homes of high standard. We should note that the three variables defining this factor all are characteristics of respondent's household. Thus, this dimension, beyond describing inequalities in material environments among individuals, also says something relevant about differences among Lithuanian households. This point will be further elaborated in the regression analysis below.

Table 13.1 Factor results: Dimensions and Loadings. Rotated Factor Matrix:

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Personal Efficacy	.231	.217	-.102
Isolation	-.042	.126	.569
Bad Health	.656	.286	-.275
Hardship	.667	.049	.283
Pshycological Problems	.782	.044	-.098
Low Indoor Standard	-.145	.792	.008
Unemployed	.060	.029	.673
Crime	.257	-.197	.190
Dependency Ratio	.110	.503	-.010
Little Space	-.058	-.181	.536
No Equipment	.238	.740	.059

The third factor loads high on Isolation, Unemployed and Little Space. This pattern suggests a dimension that could be labelled Vulnerability, or risk of social misery. At the one end of this (high score) we find people with very limited social contact, who tend to be unemployed and live in cramped home environments. They exist on the fringes of society, with a high risk of being excluded from regular social and economic activities. At the other end are those with a wealth of social ties, little chance of unemployment and ample living space.

All in all, the factor analysis not only points towards systematic, cumulative processes. It also suggests that inequalities of living conditions are centred largely around three different dimensions: Quality of Life of the individual, Socio-economic Status of the household, and degree of Vulnerability or social risks. These dimensions represent different and independent aspects. Intuitively we would say that they point towards answers to the following questions: "How are you?", "What is the social standing of your family?", and "How hard are you hit by difficult times?"

Explaining Inequalities

The next step is to locate population segments that succeed or lose in the struggle for a better life along those outcome dimensions distilled from the factor analysis. To do so multiple regression analysis will be applied. We now wish to explain differences in living conditions by a set of relevant independent variables, such as:

Age:	(Dummy variables: higher than 60 years and lower than 25 years, with 25 to 60 as reference category): Less than 25 yearsBetween 25 and 60 yearsOver 60 years
Education:	(Level of education, from Primary or less=1, to Higher or more=6)
Gender:	(Male=1, Female=2)
Region:	(Degree of Urbanism, dichotomized: 0=Rural, 1=Urban)
Ethnic nationality :	(Lithuanian=1, Other=0)
Household type:	(Dummy variables based on categorization of households): 1-person householdCouple living alone, with no children (Used as reference category)Household with children under 7 years of ageHousehold with children up to 18 years of ageSingle head of household, with dependent children-Three-generation householdTwo-generation householdOther types

Table 13.2 shows results from three multiple regressions. For each of these the independent variables are identical, whereas the dependent one differs. Using the results of the factor analysis above, the three dimensions (Quality of life, Socio-

economic status of household, and Vulnerability) were «reconstructed» by the help of original variables and factor-score coefficients.

Part A of Table 13.2 reports main regression results with Quality of life as dependent variable. In short, the pattern of unstandardized and standardized (when relevant) regression coefficients indicates that old people, women, the poorly educated, and those living in less rural areas have poor life quality. Various additional regression analyses – with only one independent variable at a time – further showed that the strongest single predictor of Quality of life is respondent's age. Old people (also normally pensioners) more than others have to carry heavy personal burdens in their daily lives. It is also interesting to observe that ethnic nationality has practically no separate influence. Household type adds only limited explanatory power (only one percent when included last in the regression equation), underlining the interpretation of the dependent variable in terms of individual life quality. The explained variance for this regression model is about 18%. Since these are data at the individual level, this must be seen as a fairly powerful model.

In part B Socio-economic status of respondent's household is the dependent variable. This dimension probably reflects general inequalities among households in Lithuania, linked to the traditional stratification processes of society. The pattern of regression coefficients now is different from part A. First, the results show that older people, individuals with weak educational background, or those in villages, live in families of low socioeconomic status. Secondly, Household type now reveals substantial explanatory power of its own (adding 5% if included last), indicating that individuals living under low standards often are alone, or in homes

Tabel 13.2 Multiple Regression A. Index of individual (low) QUALITY OF LIFE as dependentvariable. (High value=Low quality of life)

Variable	Unst. reg.coeff.	Stand. reg.coeff.
Age		
Age Lower Than 25	-.073	-.023
Age Greater Than 60	.501	.216
Education	-.159	-.260
Gender	.039	.019
Region	-.676	-.315
Ethnic Nationality	.001	.000
Household Type		
Other	.442	.059
One Person Household	.551	.177
Household with Children	-.116	-.046
Household with Small Children	.094	.034
Single Head of Houshold with Dependant Children	.350	.062
Three Generation Household	-.153	-.053
Two Generation Household	-.218	-.082

with a single head and dependent children. The materially rich and well-off are middle-aged or young, often highly educated or found in the cities. In addition they tend to be found in households of more than one generation. Here the single most important predictor of diffetences still is education, as reflected by the bivariate correlation coefficient in analyses not reported here. This suggests that strong educational background as a crucial key for getting ahead in society, although this may be less relevant in the present period. Moreover, when relevant explanatory variables are controlled for, gender as such exerts little influence. This is a reasonable finding, since this (dependent) dimension reflects indicators characterizing the respondent's household. Ethnic nationality too shows no effect. Furthermore, this emerges as a model with strong explanatory power. Over 40% of the variance in Socio-economic status of respondent's household is explained by the independent variables. The result indicates that the dividing lines between the haves and the have-nots are sharply drawn. If the Lithuanian nation aims to develop into a modern welfare state, it will be necessary to soften such systematic and marked differences between high-status and low-status groups.

Finally, we turn to part C, where Vulnerability, or risk of social exclusion, is the dependent variable. Regression results suggest that younger people, those in cities, or those from households with young children – especially if with a single head of household. are vulnerable. They thus run a high risk of being excluded from regular social and economic life. In fact household type now is the strongest single predictor of Vulnerability, increasing explained variance by as much as 7%, if the dummy variables are included last in the regression equation It is also telling that

B. Index of Socio-economic Status of respondent's Household as dependent variable. (High value= Low status)

Variable	Unst. reg.coeff.	Stand. reg.coeff.
Age		
Age Lower Than 25	-.073	-.023
Age Greater Than 60	.501	.216
Education	-.159	-.260
Gender	.039	.019
Region	-.676	-.315
Ethnic Nationality	.001	.000
Household Type		
Other	.442	.059
One Person Household	.551	.177
Household with Children	-.116	-.046
Household with Small Children	.094	.034
Single Head of Houshold with Dependant Children	.350	.062
Three Generation Household	-.153	-.053
Two Generation Household	-.218	-.082

educational background – so important for traditional stratification outcomes, as demonstrated above – shows only limited influence in this case. The well-educated are nearly as vulnerable as the poorly-educated. Again, ethnic nationality is shown to have no effect.

Conclusions: Systematic Inequalities of Living Conditions

On the average these independent variables, which can be seen as expressions of respondents' general social position, explain a substantial part of the variations in three central dimensions of living conditions. Age, both as indicator of life-cycle stage and of generation, systematically affects life chances. Roughly the empirical results warn: "Don't get old in Lithuania". Older people have a low life quality in general and tend to live in poor homes.

Gender also implies widely different living conditions. Lithuanian women carry heavy burdens. The mechanisms work mainly in two ways. First, indirectly – through age – since women on the average live longer than men. Thus, women experience difficult conditions partly because of their high age. Secondly, directly – over and above associated age effects, and as a result of their typical social role. This often means double work-loads as well as considerable responsibility for others in the family. In sum: Men generally enjoy a higher quality of life.

Within the limits of the former order, Lithuania had developed a meritocratic system, where formal education played an important role for placement on the social stratification ladder. Educational background and formal competence were central

C. Index of Vulnerability as dependent variable (High value= High vulnerability)

Variable	Unst. reg.coeff.	Stand. reg.coeff.
Age		
Age Lower Than 25	.395	.127
Age Greater Than 60	-.244	-.105
Education	-.036	-.058
Gender	-.092	-.045
Region	.290	.135
Ethnic Nationality	.020	.007
Household Type		
Other	.505	.068
One Person Household	-.186	-.060
Household with Children	.389	.154
Household with Small Children	.750	.274
Single Head of Houshold with Dependant Children	.808	.143
Three Generation Household	.515	.177
Two Generation Household	.256	.097

factors in the distribution of burdens and benefits of society. Also today educational background continues to affect living conditions systematically. The poorly-educated have a lower quality of life, and they belong to poor homes. In most areas well-educated have better chances of success. However, when it comes to coping with the new miseries of difficult times, they are nearly as vulnerable as the others.

Living conditions are influenced not only by who people are, but also by where they live. There are systematic and clear differences between urban and rural areas, although the effects may go in different directions. For the individual's general quality of life it is not necessarily a disadvantage to be outside the city. Nevertheless, for the family's location within the traditional socio-economic hierarchy, living in the countryside is clearly a drawback: the rich and well off are found in cities.

The living conditions of individuals will normally be shaped within certain institutional frameworks, such as the family or the household. Various mechanisms, at times seemingly random forces, determine what kind of household the individual belongs to, at a given stage in the life cycle. Whatever the reason, specific household arrangements are likely to have consequences for the individual's life chances. Our analyses above suggest that such contexts indeed play an important part. When other relevant variables are controlled for, household type is found to have a marked influence of its own. Notably, households at the bottom of the social hierarchy will often consist of only one person, or have one single head. The risk of social misery is also affected by household type, but according to a somewhat different pattern. Especially at risk here are individuals from households with young children, or with only one household head (often divorced or widowed), as well as three-generation household. Thus, although computed household effects probably also reflect reciprocal processes, the empirical evidence emphasizes the relevance of the social and institutional context for understanding inequalities in living conditions.

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Wonnacott, T. H. and R. J. Wonnacott (1990), *Introductory Statistics*New York: Wiley and Sons

Appendix A1 Organisation of the Fieldwork

Aadne Aasland

Responsibilities and Fieldwork Organisation

Overall responsibility for the fieldwork in Lithuania was held by **Vytautas Ziukas** and Vita Safyan of the Ministry of Social Security of Lithuania (MSS) while practical administration of the field operations was coordinated by **Zita Šniukštiene** from the Department of Statistics of Lithuania (DS). The MSS had the responsibility for recruiting supervisors, interviewers and data-entry operators. Organisational arrangements were developed by the MSS and the DS, in close cooperation with Fafo. Fafo had the overall responsibility for ensuring that the organisation of the fieldwork complied with quality requirements for the survey. Furthermore, Fafo provided training materials for the supervisors and interviewers and took part in organising training courses held by the MSS and the DS. The SPSS template for data-entry was created by **Vida Cesnuityte** of the Institute of Labour and Social Research who, in the capacity of data-entry supervisor, was also responsible for training the data-entry operators. Day-to-day control procedures were carried out by the DS, but Fafo also took part in monitoring and controlling the implementation of the survey at various stages of the fieldwork.

The fieldwork organisation in Lithuania was subdivided into five regional units: **Vilnius, Kaunas, Klaipeda, Šiauliai and Panevezys**, all coordinated by a super-visor. The supervisors reported to and provided the operating linkage to the Field Work Coordinator, Ms. Šniukštiene, who was seconded by an assistant, **Dalia Dobrovolskiene**. Ms. Šniukštiene and her assistant also worked in the capacity of supervisors in Vilnius. Supervisors outside Vilnius were recruited from district offices of the MSS. A total of 65 interviewers took part in the survey, about two thirds of them recruited from the MSS. These were persons who normally worked with distribution of social aid. Most of the remaining third were employees of the DS, working as collectors of statistical information.

Data-entry was carried out in two offices located in Vilnius and Kaunas, by six operators (four in Vilnius and two in Kaunas).

Training

Before the start of the survey, supervisors, interviewers and data-entry operators attended separate training courses. The course for the supervisors was designed to familiarise the supervisors with the questionnaire, fieldwork procedures, interviewing techniques, administrative duties and other information which they needed to fulfil their tasks. All training materials were provided in Lithuanian.

Through a mixture of lectures and practical exercises the course emphasised interviewing practice, confidence building to gain cooperation from respondents, techniques for reviewing completed questionnaires, and administrative procedures.

This was done through lectures, discussions and role-playing. The course was supplemented by a number of hand-outs and by the NORBALT fieldwork manual (common to all the sites of the NORBALT project, but adapted to local conditions) containing comprehensive information for both supervisors and interviewers.

Training courses for interviewers (5 courses in total) were held in the local Field Work Centres. The supervisors were in charge of this training, and they used training materials which had been produced by Fafo and translated into Lithuanian. At least one representative from the Central Field Work Office in Vilnius was present during all courses.

The structure of the interviewer course was very similar to that of the supervisor course. Topics covered were also similar, but with less emphasis on administrative duties. A considerable amount of time was devoted to going through the questionnaire and defining precisely how each question should be interpreted. There were also many exercises and role-play activities.

Training of data-entry operators took place in two groups; operators in Vilnius and Kaunas were trained separately. All operators had experience from similar work, but they had never used the SPSS data-entry programme. Thus, the data-entry supervisor, **Vida Cesnuityte**, prepared training materials based on Fafo's data-entry course outline to familiarise the operators with the programme and the questionnaire.

Execution of the Field Work and Response Rates

An administrative system for controlling the work and the flow of questionnaires was established. Supervisors and interviewers generally met at least twice per week. As a result there was a steady flow of questionnaires coming from the field for quality control. Most of the supervisors then checked on the quality of the completed questionnaires together with the interviewer. After reviewing the questioinnaires, the supervisors took the questionnaires to the data-entry offices, where the data were entered into computers. Any problems in the questionnaires encountered by the data-entry operators were forwarded to the supervisors, who would then decide on further action to be taken.

The survey organisors sent out to all randomly selected individuals a letter of introduction which gave a brief presentation of the survey. This is likely to have contributed to a high response rate. All interviewers were provided with an identification card to show to the respondents before entering the household. Furthermore, both national and local newspapers and TV presented information about the Lithuanian survey. Thus, for the most part respondents already knew about the survey when the interviewer arrived at the door, so there was less reason to be suspicious.

Total response rate was 89.5%, which should be considered a very satisfactory result. The following figure gives the distribution of the various reasons for non-response, or dtop-outs, as a percentage of the entire sample. The largest share of

non-response was due to reasons other than refusals: only 2.8% of all households refused to take part in the survey. In Vilnius and Kaunas there was the problem that some former residential flats, particularly in the city centre, had since been taken over by businesses for office or shop use.

Every interviewer made up to three visits to each address if necessary. Still, a substantial share of the non-response was caused by the interviewer not being able to find anyone at home (4.4% of the sample). One reason may have been that the survey was carried out in August and September, a time when many people are still living in their summer houses. .

Figure A1.1: Reasons for drop-out (percentage of all sampled cases)



Control Measures

High-quality data were ensured by various control measures:

Supervisors participated in interviews (on average one per interviewer) to check on the interviewing techniques of the interviewers.

Supervisors contacted a sample of respondents by phone or in person to check on interviews, especially if there had been inconsistencies in the questionnaire. The supervisors made sure that the correct person had been interviewed, and that the number of individuals listed in the household roster corresponded with the actual number living there. Then several control questions were asked to ascertain that the interview had actually taken place and that the interviewers had coded the answers correctly. Such re-interviewing was documented in the supervisors' forms which had been designed for this purpose. About 5% of the completed questionnaires were checked in this way.

A person from the DS was engaged to conduct control interviews in the households of randomly selected respondents to check that the interview had actually taken place, that the correct person had been interviewed, and that the answers had

been coded correctly. On average 10 respondents from each of the districts were contacted in this way. The control interviewer also asked questions about the conduct of the interviewers and the respondents' general impression of the survey.

Both interviewers and supervisors checked the quality of completed questionnaires before they were forwarded to data-entry. During the first two weeks they usually did this together, so that the supervisor could give immediate feedback and interviewers could more easily become aware of their own mistakes.

All the supervisors met in Vilnius one week after the start-up of the fieldwork to discuss problems they had encountered during the first week and to find uniform solutions to these problems.

Fafo was present at 6 randomly selected interviews in various parts of Lithuania. At these site visits Fafo used the opportunity to check on administrative routines and questionnaire tracking procedures in the local offices, and also looked at the various forms used in the survey.

Fafo's general impression of the fieldwork was very positive. Interviewers had a very professional attitude, and were good at gaining the confidence of the respondents. Control procedures worked efficiently, and there were frequent contacts between supervisors and the central office in Vilnius. Thus, the information flow was fast and efficient.

Incentives and Data Quality

There were many incentives for the persons involved in the survey, and not only of a monetary kind. Fafo's impression was that supervisors, interviewers and data-entry operators found it very interesting to take part in this survey, which was somewhat different from their normal work. Another reason why many wanted to do a good job was the prospect of taking part in similar work in the future.

Monetary incentives also played a part in ensuring good work. People engaged in the survey on a full-time basis received a salary which was adjusted to local conditions but was considered a reasonable rate of pay. Salaries were sufficiently high to attract qualified supervisors and interviewers. Supervisors were paid a set rate, which was based on their expected work load. Interviewers were paid for each questionnaire completed according to a piece-rate system. They were paid more for a questionnaire in the countryside than in the cities, because of the distances involved. In addition, the interviewers received a small extra payment for a second or third attempt of contacting the respondent. Data-entry personnel were also paid according to a piece-rate system. The interviewers and data-entry operators had been told that they would only be paid for high-quality performance, and that part of their pay would be deducted if they did not fulfil Fafo's quality requirements. However, the quality of the work was generally very high, and it was not necessary to fire anyone or reduce pay during the fieldwork period. In fact, supervisors were paid a small bonus for high-quality performance after the completion of their work.

The quality of the data-entry was also very good. This has facillitated the analysis of the data and has contributed to high overall reliability.

Conclusions

We may conclude that the living conditions survey in Lithuania was carried out in a highly satisfactory way. As a result Fafo received a data-set which fulfilled all our quality requirements:

The response rate was very satisfactory, and well above the average for Scandinavian living conditions surveys.

There were few errors in the completed questionnaires, and control procedures worked well, so that potential errors were detected and dealt with at an early stage.

The data files were of high quality, due to conscientious work by the data-entry operators and advanced cleaning procedures.

No incidents of fraud, incompetence or lack of motivation were discovered during the survey period.

Appendix A2 The Sample Design

Jon Pedersen

The sample of the NORBALT living conditions survey in Lithuania was designed in cooperation between the Lithuanian Department of Statistics and Fafo. Several constraints had to be taken into account.

The most important constraint was that even though the survey was designed as a household survey, the only available list of the population was a list of individuals aged 18 and above. Of those in its target group, the Lithuanian Department of Statistics considers the register quite complete, having an under-coverage of less than 3%. This is because being registered is linked to the possibility of having identification papers. There is no indication that the register is particularly incomplete for specific groups, neither in terms of age, gender or ethnicity.

A second constraint was that little information was available on the population distribution in smaller areas, such as parts of towns or municipalities.

Third, population estimates from different sources were not entirely consistent, and some were not easily available.

Fourth, transport costs were fairly high, and funds available for fieldwork quite limited.

In view of these constraints, it was decided to stratify the overall sample by size of the towns or communities, and vary the sample strategy within each stratum. Two strategies were used.

In the strata covering the large towns (over 50,000 inhabitants), the sample was carried out as a simple random sample from the register. All towns in this category were selected, and allocation of households in each town was proportionate to estimated population size (as supplied by the Lithuanian Department of Statistics).

For the strata from rural areas and towns with less than 50,000 inhabitants the sample was a two-stage cluster sample, with selection of clusters proportionate to size and fixed take of households from each cluster within each stratum. The clusters (or Primary Sampling Units - PSUs) were then either towns, or municipalities (*apylinkes*) in rural areas.

Sample allocation and general structure of the sample are shown in Figure A2.1..

Figure A2.1 The sample



Because people could have moved between the time they registered at an address and the survey, it was decided to regard the sample as a sample of addresses, rather than as a sample of individuals. Had this not been done, then all migrants within the country would have fallen out of the sample, because it would have been impossible to follow them to their new addresses. Nevertheless, the method did introduce the slight bias that persons living in newly constructed houses could not be selected in the sample.

The sample design defined three types of respondents in the survey. First, the randomly selected indvidual. Second, the household, and third the individual within the household. The probabilities for selection were not the same for the three types of respondents, because of the strategy of selection in the final stage of the sample. Also, because the allocation of households was in terms of estimated population size in each town or rural area, while the selection was in terms of people aged 18 and above, households achieved slightly different selection probabilities because the proportion of people aged 18 and more varied slightly from place to place. The sample was therefore not self-weighting.

Since the sample was selected as a sample of addresses, it is clear that each household was selected with a probability dependent on the number of people registered as resident at each address. This was unproblematic in cases where the person who was the "bearer" of the address was still living there, but where the household had moved and a new household had taken its place it was assumed that the new household had the same size in terms of people above 18 as the old one, and therefore the same selection probability. That assumption was of course artifical, but necessary to permit selection probabilities to be calculated.

Equation 1 provides the selection probability for the first stage of the selection (in towns with less than 50,000 inhanbitants and in the rural areas). The notation is as given in Table A2.1 below.

Table A2.1 Notation

Symbol	Meaning
p	Probability of selection
$N_{s,c}$	Size of cluster s,c (PSU) in persons
N_s	Size of stratum s in persons
m	Number of clusters (PSUs) selected in a stratum
n^{18+}	Sample number of persons aged 18 and more in stratum s
N^{18+}_s	Population number of persons aged 18 and more in stratum s
$N^{18+}_{s,c,h}$	Number of persons aged 18 and more in household s,c,h

$$p_1 = \frac{N_{s,c}}{N_s} \cdot m \quad \textbf{Equation 1}$$

Equation 2 gives the selection probality for a randomly selected individual within a PSU or within a stratum where there are no clusters.

$$p_r = \frac{n_s^{18+}}{N_s^{18+}} \quad \textbf{Equation 2}$$

The selection probality for a household is then given by p_r multiplied by the number of persons aged 18 and above in the household as given in Equation 3. This is also the selection probaility for an individual within the household (but *not* for the randomly selected individual).

$$p_r = \frac{n_s^{18+}}{N_s^{18+}} \cdot N_{s,h}^{18+} \quad \textbf{Equation 3}$$

In the case of the two-stage sample the total selection probability is the product of the probabilities at each stage, thus as given in Equation 4 for the RSI and in equation 5 for the household.

$$p_r = \frac{n_s^{18+}}{N_s^{18+}} \frac{N_c}{N_s} \cdot m \quad \textbf{Equation 4}$$

$$p_{s,c,h} = \frac{n_{s,c}^{18+}}{N_{s,c}^{18+}} \cdot N_{s,c,h}^{18+} \frac{N_c}{N_s} \cdot m \quad \textbf{Equation 5}$$

Weights are then calculated as the inverse of the selection probabilities. This yields so-called *expansion* weights, because they expand the sample to the population total. In the analysis the *relative* (or *estimation*) weights were used. Those are the expansion weights divided by the mean of the expansion weights, which gives a set of weights where the weighted number of cases is the same as the unweighted number of cases. Weights were corrected for unit non-response (refusals) by multiplying the weight with the inverse of the response rate, calculated for each PSU (or stratum for the strata without two stage sampling). Final weights range from 0.87 to 1.19 for the RSI and 0.26 to 2.36 for the households (and individuals). As can be seen from these figures, as well as from Equation 3, the main variability in

weights concerns the household and the household members, and stems from the fact that households were sampled with the randomly selected individual (or address) as an intermediate stage.

The take within each PSU is fairly high for this type of survey, with for instance 35 households being selected in each of the rural clusters. While the design was selected for logistical reasons, it is not ideal from the perspective of sampling error, because insofar as the PSUs are homogeneous internally (i.e. the same kind of people living within a municipality) variance will tend to increase. This is especially true for some variables, such as those relating to infrastructure, health or environ-mental conditions, where homogeneity within a PSU is often quite pronounced. Even so, in this case the PSUs themselves are quite large, a fact which tends to increase intra-PSU heterogeneity and thereby reduce sampling error. A factor which decreases the variance is the fact that for the large towns, the sample is a stratified, one-stage sample.

The sample design for the survey was of the so-called 'complex' type – not a simple random sample. It shares this characteristic with most surveys with national coverage. A consequence is that common statistical tests for significance or confidence intervals which assume simple random sampling are not appropriate. That is why tests of significance or confidence intervals have not been presented in the text. To give an impression of what the variance of the estimators is like, Table 2 and Table 3 have been produced, using the 'linearization' or 'ultimate cluster' method of variance estimation by means of the program CENVAR (US Bureau of the Census 1993). Table A2.2 provides estimates for selected household variables, while Table A2.3 provides estimates for variables pertaining to the randomly selected individual.

Because of the large strata with no clusters, CENVAR will probably tend to overestimate the true variance as single-cluster strata have to be merged in order to create artificial clusters. This will in effect partly make the variance benefit of stratification appear as a cost of clustering. Nevertheless, the results indicate at least how variance differs between variables, as well as the general level of the variance.

In the two sets of tables that have been prepared in order to illustrate the effect of the sampling design on the variance, the following terms appear:

Estimate is simply the proportion (the percentage divided by 100) having the characteristic in question, or sometimes the mean of the variable.

Standard error is the standard deviation of the estimate, corrected for the effects of the sampling design.

C.V. or *coefficient of variation* is the standard error divided by the estimate. It gives an indication of the relative precision of the estimate. This is given as a percentage, so that a C.V. of 100% means that the standard error is the same as the estimate.

The *95% confidence intervals* (upper and lower bound) refer the upper and lower limits within which one may expect with 95% confidence that the actual value within the total population for the characteristic is located.

Design effect is the variance actually obtained with the sample, divided by what it would have been in the case of simple random sampling. A value of 1 indicates that the variance is equal to the variance of a simple random sample; a value below 1 indicates that the sample is more effecient than a simple random sample would have been; and a value of more than 1, that it is less efficient than a simple random sample. A simple way of thinking about the design effect is to regard it as the factor we would have to divide the number of cases in a sample by in order to obtain the sample size that corresponds to a simple random sample for the variable. Note that each characteristic in the sample has different design effects, because these effects depend on how the characteristic is distributed in relation to the sampling plan.

Observations are simply the number of cases used to produce the estimates.

Since the variance estimation software requires complete data vectors, i.e. no missing values, any missing values have been imputed by a simple hot-deck method before variances were calculated. The estimates may therefore differ slightly from those produced elsewhere in the text.

Tables A2.1 and A2.2 present results which are well within what we would expect from theory for this kind of sample. The variables relating to infrastructure have fairly large design effects, because characteristics such as type of housing (and especially the detached type) tend to be geographically clustered. There is also probably an effect from the variability in the weights, but the software does not allow us to decompose the variance into factors stemming from different sources. The variables pertaining to the randomly selected individual have much lower design effects, indicating that these individual characteristics are less intensely clustered geographically. In all, the sample appears to perform quite well, especially when we consider that the sample design was biased more towards keeping costs down (with comparatively few sampled locations) than towards ensuring less variance.

Table A2.2 Variances and design effects for selected household variables

Variable and values	Estimate	Standard Error	C.V.	95% confidence interval Lower	Upper	Design effect	Observations
Type of Dwelling							
Detached	0.365	0.043	11.80	0.281	0.450	19.32	928
Housing block 1-4 floors	0.162	0.018	11.13	0.127	0.198	5.80	378
Housing block 5+ floors	0.426	0.030	7.12	0.366	0.485	9.06	1,025
Room in com. app.	0.006	0.002	39.88	0.001	0.010	2.18	10
Hostel	0.037	0.008	21.27	0.022	0.053	4.24	67
Other	0.001	0.001	100.51	-0.001	0.002	2.05	1
Hotel etc	0.003	0.002	61.96	-0.001	0.006	2.49	3
Washing machine							
Have washing machine	0.744	0.010	1.33	0.724	0.763	1.24	1,907
No washing machine	0.256	0.010	3.86	0.237	0.276	1.24	505
TV in dwelling							
Have TV	0.939	0.006	0.68	0.926	0.952	1.72	2,306
No TV	0.061	0.006	10.49	0.048	0.074	1.72	106
Have stereo in dwelling							
Have stereo	0.198	0.029	14.61	0.141	0.254	12.67	526
No stereo	0.802	0.029	3.60	0.746	0.859	12.67	1,886
Rooms are humid or damp							
Rooms humid	0.284	0.017	6.05	0.250	0.317	3.50	693
Not humid	0.716	0.017	2.40	0.683	0.750	3.50	1,719
Mean number of rooms	2.4	0.040	1.69	2.3	2.5	3.64	2,412
Mean number of household members	2.75	0.034	1.24	2.7	2.8	1.38	2,412

Table A2.3 Variances and design effects for variables pertaining to the Randomly Selected Individual

Variable and values	Estimate	Standard Error	C.V.	95% confidence interval Lower	Upper	Design effect	Observations
Perception of own health as:							
Very good	0.050	0.005	10.20	0.040	0.061	1.33	122
Good	0.257	0.007	2.85	0.243	0.272	0.68	621
Fair	0.490	0.010	2.14	0.470	0.511	1.06	1,179
Bad	0.163	0.007	4.37	0.149	0.177	0.90	396
Very bad	0.039	0.006	16.27	0.026	0.051	2.57	94
Have contacted health services							
No contact	0.846	0.007	0.82	0.833	0.860	0.90	2,043
Contact	0.154	0.007	4.55	0.140	0.167	0.90	369
Have health insurance							
No insurance	0.872	0.012	1.39	0.848	0.896	3.19	2,100
Public	0.111	0.010	9.01	0.092	0.131	2.45	271
Does not know	0.004	0.002	45.99	0.000	0.009	2.30	11
Private health	0.009	0.003	34.55	0.003	0.014	2.50	20
Company provides	0.004	0.001	31.86	0.002	0.007	1.00	10
Smoking							
Never	0.681	0.009	1.30	0.663	0.698	0.87	1,639
Occasionally	0.071	0.006	8.30	0.060	0.083	1.28	173
Every day	0.248	0.008	3.27	0.232	0.264	0.85	600
Plan to leave the community							
Plans to leave	0.066	0.006	9.62	0.053	0.078	1.57	160
No plan to leave	0.934	0.006	0.67	0.922	0.947	1.57	2,252
Perception of income diflerences							
Should be much smaller	0.551	0.021	3.72	0.510	0.591	4.10	1,330
Should be smaller	0.230	0.018	8.00	0.194	0.266	4.61	549
Are adequate	0.085	0.008	9.05	0.070	0.100	1.83	203
Should be greater	0.021	0.005	22.55	0.012	0.030	2.59	50
Should much greater	0.012	0.004	28.57	0.005	0.019	2.46	30
Do not know	0.102	0.015	15.13	0.072	0.132	6.28	250

Appendix B
Factor Analysis and Multiple Regression: Detailed results

Correlation Matrix:

	Personal Efficacy	Isolation	Bad Health	Hardship	Pshycologic Problems	Low Indoor Standard	Unemployed	Crime	Dependency Ratio	Little Space	No Equipment
Personal Efficacy	1.00000										
Isolation	.00561	1.00000									
Bad Health	.12630	-.00101	1.00000								
Hardship	.09624	.00116	.21860	1.00000							
Pshycological Problems	.11092	-.03223	.43798	.27627	1.00000						
Low Indoor Standard	.06127	-.00789	.11306	-.05821	.03040	1.00000					
Unemployed	-.04077	.13912	-.08462	.13030	.00413	.01828	1.00000				
Crime	-.04398	.01303	-.00634	.05339	.10905	-.00730	.03577	1.00000			
Dependency Ratio	.07588	.07807	.20037	.08442	.07911	.16985	-.04746	-.04235	1.00000		
Little Space	-.02782	.09908	-.17514	.05652	-.05384	-.06405	.06028	.03346	-.04141	1.00000	
No Equipment	.12579	-.00065	.24545	.25043	.16756	.43049	.02561	-.01825	.17635	-.09206	1.00000

Extraction 1 for analysis 1, Principal Components Analysis

Initial statistics:

Factor	Eigenvalue	Pct of Var	Cum Pct
1	2.07203	18.8	18.8
2	1.32085	12.0	30.8
3	1.24874	11.4	42.2
4	1.04568	9.5	51.7
5	.97639	8.9	60.6
6	.94765	8.6	69.2
7	.89708	8.2	77.3
8	.79495	7.2	84.6
9	.72185	6.6	91.1
10	.51191	4.7	95.8
11	.46286	4.2	100.0

Factor results: Dimensions and loadings Rotated Factor Matrix:

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Personal Efficacy	.231	.217	-.102
Isolation	-.042	.126	.569
Bad Health	.656	.286	-.275
Hardship	.667	.049	.283
Pshycological Problems	.782	.044	-.098
Low Indoor Standard	-.145	.792	.008
Unemployed	.060	.029	.673
Crime	.257	-.197	.190
Dependency Ratio	.110	.503	-.010
Little Space	-.058	-.181	.536
No Equipment	.238	.740	.059

MULTIPLE REGRESSION

A. Index of individual (low) quality of life as dependent variable. (High value = low quality of life

Variable	Unst. reg.coeff.	Stand. reg.coeff.
Age		
Age Lower Than 25	-.404	-.131
Age Greater Than 60	.242	.104
Education	-.118	-.193
Gender	.383	.190
Region	.378	.176
Ethnic Nationality	-.068	-.026
Household Type		
Other	-.131	-.017
One Person Household	.047	.015
Household with Children	-.140	-.055
Household with Small Children	-.200	-.073
Single Head of Houshold with Dependant Children	.159	.028
Three Generation Household	.058	.020
Two Generation Household	-.009	-.003

Explained variable =.183 N=2397

B. Index of socioeconomic status of respondent's household as dependent variable. (High value = low status)

Variable	Unst. reg.coeff.	Stand. reg.coeff.
Age		
Age Lower Than 25	-.073	-.023
Age Greater Than 60	.501	.216
Education	-.159	-.260
Gender	.039	.019
Region	-.676	-.315
Ethnic Nationality	.001	.000
Household Type		
Other	.442	.059
One Person Household	.551	.177
Household with Children	-.116	-.046
Household with Small Children	.094	.034
Single Head of Houshold with Dependant Children	.350	.062
Three Generation Household	-.153	-.053
Two Generation Household	-.218	-.082

Explained variable =443 N=2397

C. Index of socioeconomic vulnerability as dependent variable. (High value = low status)

Variable	Unst. reg.coeff.	Stand. reg.coeff.
Age		
Age Lower Than 25	.395	.127
Age Greater Than 60	-.244	-.105
Education	-.036	-.058
Gender	-.092	-.045
Region	.290	.135
Ethnic Nationality	.020	.007
Household Type		
Other	.505	.068
One Person Household	-.186	-.060
Household with Children	.389	.154
Household with Small Children	.750	.274
Single Head of Houshold with Dependant Children	.808	.143
Three Generation Household	.515	.177
Two Generation Household	.256	.097

Explained variable =.170 N=2397

Lithuania in a Period of Transition

How far and how fast has the reform process in Lithuania developed? It is often assumed that life has picked up since the arrival of independence – but what has actually been achieved? The present report gives an overview of living conditions in Lithuania, discussing changes in employment, housing, political attitudes and other dimensions. A complex picture emerges: Although there have been substantial achievements, living conditions have not improved significantly. In some areas, like economic conditions, health, safety and security for ordinary people, as well as political trust, Lithuania has even experienced a deterioration. The report bears out that developments should be followed closely, by Lithuanian politicians and the international community alike.

«Lithuania in a Period of Transition» has been written by Knud Knudsen, who in 1991 authored «Lithuania Living Conditions», together with Gudmund Hernes. That report was the first in its kind from a country in the former Eastern Bloc. It forms the basis for the present analysis.

«Lithuania in a Period of Transition» is published in the context of the NORBALT Living Condition Project, which comprises national reports from five different regions, i.e. the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and the two Russian areas of St.Petersburg and the Kaliningrad enclave. Also planned are comparative analyses and various in-depth studies.

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