

Integration and Development: Need for Dialogue

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Foreword

This PRIO Paper provides a review, analysis and discussion of experiences from Norwegian and international diaspora development engagement initiatives, with the aim of offering ideas for future paths to consider in policy development at the intersection of development and integration policy.

The paper presents work which was commissioned and funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Education and Integration, January–July 2020.

We build on research conducted within PRIO's Migration Research Group since 2006, which has focused inter alia on remittances, diasporas and their development and peace engagements, as well as migrants' transnational ties with people and places in countries of origin and third countries, and how these connect with integration processes in countries of settlement.

We draw on research conducted in the following past projects at PRIO, as well as a review of academic and policy literature focusing on the decade between 2010–2020, enabling a fresh assessment of where this field stands today.

- [Diaspora Return: Implications for Somalia](#)
- [Diaspora, Development and Norwegian Development Policy](#)
- [Diasporas for Peace \(DIASPEACE\)](#)
- [Engaging Diasporas](#)
- [Migrant Remittances and Development Cooperation](#)
- [Migration and Development Policy Challenges in Cape Verde](#)
- [Possibilities and Realities of Return Migration \(PREMIG\)](#)
- [Remittance Services in Norway](#)
- [Remittances for Peace? Experiences from Somalia](#)
- [Remittances from Immigrants in Norway \(RIN\)](#)
- [Somalis in European Cities: Oslo](#)
- [The Role of the Somali Diaspora in Relief, Development and Peacebuilding](#)
- [Understanding the Root Causes and Drivers of Migration.](#)

1. Introduction: Diaspora, development and integration

Migrants' contributions to support families and affect change in places of origin have received increasing interest from policy and academic circles in recent decades, although these practices are of course not new. Attention has in particular been focused on remittances – the money migrants send back to family members and relatives in places of origin and elsewhere. Remittances account for two-to-three times the volume of overseas development aid globally and are far more resilient to shocks and crises than other types of financial flows. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) therefore include specific targets for the level of permissible transaction costs for remittances in any given remittance corridor – e.g. sending money from Norway to Somalia – and on average globally.

The focus on migrants' contributions to development in countries of origin, including but not restricted to remittance-sending, has only to a very limited extent been explicitly discussed in conjunction with integration processes and the circumstances which migrants find themselves in whilst living in countries of settlement. This is arguably a curious omission, as *integration* plays a crucial role in positioning migrants to engage, or not, while also conditioning the forms such engagement in development efforts in places of origin might take.

When questions about migrants' circumstances abroad have been raised, this has often been framed in terms of migrant worker protection in key labour migration destinations, such as the Gulf States. Discussions in the Global Forum on Migration and Development reflect these very legitimate concerns and interests among many states whose citizens migrate to work abroad. Meanwhile, equally important questions about how the foundations for successful contributions to development in countries of origin may hinge on predictable and equitable processes of integration and gaining rights in all countries of settlement have remained under-explored.

Three reasons why this may be the case can be offered. First, while the field of migration research has grown dramatically in recent decades, and despite the so-called 'transnational turn' since the 1990s, much research about international migration remains heavily tilted towards questions of integration in countries of settlement and in particular in countries of settlement in Europe and North America. This 'integration bias' means that much research – not least that funded by public agencies or governments directly – focuses on mapping, understanding, and ultimately identifying solutions to problems within the broadly defined integration-landscape, and not on migrants' engagements in countries of origin.

Second, research that investigates development in countries around the world is primarily concerned with development performance, changes, and obstacles in given local or national contexts, wherein migration invariably plays only a partial role, if any, in overall outcomes. At the same time, the development sector holds a sedentary and nation-focused bias which largely fails to acknowledge the transnational contributions of diaspora and has particular understandings of development aid as a hierarchical geographical relationship that make the role of diaspora invisible (Sinatti & Horst 2015).

Third, where links between migrants' transnational engagements in countries of origin and integration processes in countries of settlement are made, attention has been on specific practices, e.g. how levels of integration in particular domains affect remittance-sending. Here, the

interest has not stretched to the question of what impact these remittances have in tangible terms in the places they are sent to.

The aim of this PRIO Paper is to provide analysis that sheds light on how migrants' integration processes and their development engagements are connected. In studying these connections, it is more straightforward to identify the ways in which migrants' integration processes interact with their transnational engagement in development in places of origin, and less clear-cut how to pin down the effects when it comes to the *outcomes* of such development engagements, especially in the long term. In this PRIO Paper, we actively try to relate to both aspects – transnational engagements which affect development processes in places of origin, and the long-term development outcomes of these diaspora engagements. However, it remains evident that, whether qualitatively or quantitatively, measuring participation in development-related transnational activities is both simpler and more robust than evidencing migrant unique contributions to long-term development outcomes.

As we return to, a key challenge put to diaspora-development engagement efforts by the professional development industry is to provide evidence of the value-added and effectiveness of diaspora-development contributions in producing tangible development outcomes in the long term in areas of engagement (Brinkerhoff 2011; Erdal 2015). From a development perspective, this is not an unreasonable question. However, from a *migration perspective*, considering both ends of the migration cycle, in places of origin and settlement, it is neither the only relevant question, nor is it posed in a way that is adequate for understanding the real long-term impacts of migrants engagements, which may be different from those of professional development aid interventions, and often intersect with other effects of migration itself.

The paper draws on PRIO researchers' longstanding work on diaspora development engagements, diaspora contributions to development, humanitarian efforts and peace processes, migrants' transnational ties, remittances, and the interactions of migrant transnationalism and integration.

We start the paper by offering some explanations of key terms, and how they are understood in the paper, before identifying and discussing key mechanisms connecting diasporas to development in countries of origin: *Remittance-sending*; *Entrepreneurship and investment*; *Return migration*; *Circulation and temporary mobility*; *Transfer of norms, values, and competence*; *Voting and activism*; *Civil society-led initiatives*; and *Participation in official development cooperation*. We then review what existing research teaches us about the links between diaspora, development, and integration. This is followed by a discussion drawing on examples and cases of diaspora development engagements from across Europe and beyond. Finally, we present a case for dialogue between and beyond development and integration policy and reflect on some possible pathways ahead. Appendices 1 and 2 respectively outline the review of existing literature and summarize search and analysis of media texts in the Norwegian context – specifically in *Bistandsaktuelt* and *Utrop* – covering the themes of migrants' engagements in countries of origin and links with integration.

2. Linking integration and development: Key concepts

Country of origin refers to the country that migrants have left. The term ‘country of origin’ is valuable because it can be used as a reference point also for migrants’ descendants, that is, for a diaspora population spanning several generations. It is therefore preferable to terms such as ‘sending country’. The term ‘homeland’ is sometimes used in discussions of diaspora, but this is best avoided in policy documents because it easily implies a normative stance of what is a person’s true ‘home’ and even suggests that migrants do not fully belong in the country of settlement.

Country of settlement indicates the country in which the migrant has established her- or himself permanently following migration. The term ‘country of settlement’ is preferred over ‘country of destination’ because our focus is on integration processes and long-term dynamics, not on the migration journey wherein a ‘destination’ focus would be more relevant. The term ‘host country’ similarly would suggest that this is a context where the migrant is a ‘guest’, rather than fully belonging in the country of settlement, and as such does not align with our approach. The importance of the country of settlement does not preclude maintaining strong ties with a migrants’ country of origin.

Development is understood here in broad terms as improvement of socio-economic conditions collectively in an area. Following e.g. Amartya Sen’s ‘Development as freedom’ and the Human Development approach, we understand development as holistic and longitudinal. As Raghuram points to: ‘While there is broad agreement on the need for development, the forms of development being sought are not adequately interrogated. Rather, models of development have been implicitly adopted and the spatial and temporal registers of certain versions of development unquestioningly applied’ (2009: 106–107). In short, it very often remains implicit ‘which migration, what development’ is being referred to (ibid.).

Diaspora refers to the totality of people who share a national origin but live elsewhere. For instance, the Eritrean diaspora refers to all Eritrean emigrants and their descendants who live in other countries. A diaspora can include several generations of people who identify with and maintain connections to their country of origin and their compatriots. The term diaspora itself has a history of particular use and interpretation. It was first used about the Jewish diaspora, and hence was also linked to the idea of coerced dispersion from a homeland. When referring to diaspora, we include both migrants and their descendants, sometimes referred to as ‘second generation’. In this PRIO paper we do not refer to the children of migrants as ‘second generation migrants’ because they are as much ‘first generation’ nationals¹ in their countries of settlement.

Integration, while a hotly debated term in some circles, is broadly acknowledged to refer to the types of two-way mutual adjustment processes that migrants and the societies in which they live and participate undergo. Integration as a phenomenon is empirically observable, though it may take different specific forms.

Migrants is understood here in an inclusive way², which encompasses refugees and other migrants. This is done, cognizant of the legal definition of refugees and the need for international

¹ Andersson (2010).

² Please see also: <https://meaningofmigrants.org/>

protection for refugee populations. Importantly, conflict and the lack of viable alternatives to migration, may be central to the migration-decisions of both those who eventually gain refugee status in another country, and to those who may not, and instead may gain regular status as a migrant in another country, through work or family-reunification, or who may not access a regular status at all. (See also Diaspora above).

Migration refers to both emigration and to immigration. On the one hand, migration is about the migration journey itself, the decision to migrate, and how the journey actually comes about, from places of origin, via places of transit, to places of settlement. Migration is thus considered as something which connects the people and places left, with new people and places. On the other hand, migration is also necessarily about the drivers and outcomes of migration, on a more long-term basis, in places of origin, settlement and beyond.

Policy describes a set of ideas or principles that identify certain goals and a course of action to achieve them. The effects of a given policy include both intended and unintended consequences, an example being the restrictions imposed on labour migrants in Europe after the 1973 'Oil Shock' and subsequent economic downturn, restrictions which were meant to encourage a voluntary return of these migrants. Many migrants instead decided to remain in their country of settlement, applying for family reunification to bring their relatives into the country.

Reintegration refers to the process facing a migrant upon return to their country of origin, when trying to adjust socially, psychologically and economically to being reinserted into the society they originally left behind. Studies have shown that this process is often easier when legal access to the country they returned from is not precluded.

Return is the action, voluntary or otherwise, of moving back to a country of origin a migrant initially migrated from. When properly supported and facilitated, it would also mean a reintegration into the country originally left behind, while acknowledging that for many, transnational ties and practices are just as important and valuable even after a return move.

Stakeholders refer to people or other entities that have a vested interest in a given course of action, either through direct involvement or through being potentially affected by the action's implementation or outcome. As an example, a push to reform asylum policies in a given country would have the asylum seekers themselves, the authorities involved, political leadership and any NGOs and research institutes consulted as stakeholders, though this list is not necessarily exclusive.

Transnationalism describes the processes by which migrants and people in migrants' countries of origin forge and sustain multi-stranded relations across borders. Transnationalism is not a form of nationalism, and not even an -ism in the sense of a philosophy or ideology. It is therefore often useful to refer to transnational ties or transnational practices.

Transnational practices indicate the specific cross-border activities that connect migrants and their countries of origin. Such transnational practices include remittance-sending and return visits (e.g. for holiday or family transition rites such as weddings, funerals, etc.).

Box 1. Debates over Migration and Development

How and when migration and development mutually affect each other is a question that has received both scrutiny in research and attention from policy circles. There is disagreement about the causal effects in both directions of this relationship.

First, how does development shape migration flows? It would seem logical that when poor societies become wealthier, fewer people leave. In line with this thinking, Europe has devoted large resources to addressing the 'root causes' of migration, especially in Africa, in the wake of the 2015 migration and refugee crisis. Development aid has also been redirected towards countries that generate irregular migration towards Europe. However, academic research finds that in low and middle-income countries, emigration tends to *increase* with development (Carling & Talleraas 2016). A question that remains open to debate is whether some forms of development aid still have a migration-reducing effect – and, if so, how that should influence development cooperation. It is also uncertain how different aspects of development – such as material wellbeing, the quality of public services, or the level of corruption – might have different effects on migration.

The second disputed effect is in the opposite direction: how does migration shape development in the countries of origin? Again, the multi-faceted nature of 'development' matters. Migration can simultaneously have positive and negative consequences, as well as outcomes that will be judged differently by different groups, institutions, and individuals. Such effects cannot easily be summed up to an overall impact. However, policy makers want to know whether migration 'on the whole' contributes to development or not. In light of this dilemma, prevailing assessments have resembled the movements of a pendulum, from negative to positive and back again (Carling 1996; de Haas 2010; Gamlen 2014). These swings have partly reflected political shifts. While the 2000s were marked by optimistic views of migration as a development driver, the past decade has seen renewed pessimism alongside growing anti-immigration sentiments in countries of settlement.

3. Mechanisms that connect diasporas to development

There are many ways in which the activities of diaspora populations can affect development processes in countries of origin. We focus on a broad, holistic and longitudinal understanding of development processes, defined above as those that contribute to the improvement of socio-economic conditions collectively in an area. Meanwhile, most of the specific mechanisms that we discuss will also be relevant when considering diaspora contributions in terms of ‘diaspora philanthropy’ (see e.g. Brinkerhoff 2008) or ‘diaspora humanitarianism’ (see e.g. Horst et al. 2015).

Our discussion of mechanisms – and activities therein – does not distinguish online or virtual engagement as distinct from non-virtual forms; rather, we include both modes as and where relevant. In some cases, e.g. where physical travel is referred to, virtual options are less relevant, while for e.g. remittance-sending or civil-society led initiatives, virtual modes of engagement are integral to the ways in which such diaspora activities are conducted today.

To structure the analysis, we differentiate between eight types of activities:

- Remittance-sending
- Entrepreneurship and investment
- Return migration
- Circulation and temporary mobility
- Transfer of norms, values, and competence
- Voting and activism
- Civil society-led initiatives
- Participation in official development cooperation.

Each of these *can* contribute significantly to development in countries of origin, though it varies whether and how they do, and there are pitfalls to be aware of. Policy measures can affect – positively or negatively – whether diaspora populations engage in these activities as well as what the consequences are for development. We address each activity in turn below.

Often, integration in countries of settlement will facilitate engagement in these activities. For instance, some require material resources that, in turn, presuppose a good position in the labour market.

Diaspora members’ contribution to development in countries of origin can also have consequences for their integration in countries of settlement. At the overall level, making a difference in this way can positively affect the image of diaspora populations.

Apart from the more general impact of contributing to development, the specific activities that diaspora populations engage in could affect their integration, positively or negatively. We address these effects and consider how they are likely to unfold.

Figure 1 displays the connections and key questions we address in the following sections.




Figure 1. Mechanisms linking integration in countries of settlement with development in countries of origin

3.1. Remittance-sending

Remittances are, simply put, money that migrants send to the countries of origin. Sometimes, the prospect of sending money motivated migration in the first place. For instance, this is the case with overseas contract workers' migration in much of Asia. In other cases, migrants found that after settling in a higher-income country, they were motivated or expected to share their income with family members in countries of origin (Carling 2020).

How can remittances contribute to development?

'Remittances' must be understood as an umbrella term for transfers that, from a development perspective, play diverse roles. First, remittances provide supplementary income for many households and thereby contribute to covering daily expenses. Second, remittances provide the means to make human capital investments – whether into education or health – which would otherwise not be possible. Third, remittances can provide a savings and insurance mechanism, allowing for financial planning as well as moderate risk-taking, which may be necessary in running a business. Fourth, remittances have a spill-over effect in local communities, where migrants' relatives can increase their spending, and thus lead to higher incomes for local business owners. Fifth, remittances may also be sent collectively for specific purposes within the extended family or community – ranging from funding education for an orphan, to assisting a widow, to building wells or repairing roofs. Sixth, remittances also have a macro-economic role to play at the national level, ensuring robustness of state finances by boosting foreign exchange reserves, and enhancing liquidity in national banking sectors, thus holding the potential to boost opportunities for loans for business.

Seventh, and lastly, for each of these six mentioned ways in which remittances may contribute to development above, there is a positive, but also a more negative perspective. More often than not, the development effects of remittances require nuance in order to be fully captured. Remittances may contribute to the livelihoods of some, whilst exacerbating local inequalities simultaneously,

and at the cost of those who are the most vulnerable. While remittances may create local opportunities for some, they can in effect lift the threshold for others, closing such opportunities for them. When there are spill-over gains, these may be unequally accessible, and may cause imbalance in local market ecologies. Where remittances may permit women to pursue higher education, they may also contribute to increased employment of young girls as house maids – providing them an income, yet often also effectively infringing their freedom. In turn, women with higher education financed via remittances may pursue professional careers contributing needed human resources in their societies and economies, or changing social status gained with remittances may result in access to marrying up, and perhaps being expected to never use the skills gained in the labour market. These are naturally very context-, culture- and class-dependent aspects of the ways in which remittances may affect development at alternative scales and for different people.

What influences the development effects of remittances?

Given that the effects of remittances on development are potentially multiple, and context-dependent, the factors which in similar ways impact remittances' development impacts across contexts are structural. Unsurprisingly, if political and economic structures are 'development friendly' – in the sense of basic norms of good governance being adhered to, with tabs on corruption, transparency standards upheld and a basic trust in democratic institutions and their accountability – the development effects of remittances are also likely to be higher than in contexts where this is not the case.

A remittance-specific issue is that of transfer costs, which have a strong bearing on the development effects of remittances, in that it makes a huge difference whether transfer costs (per 200 USD sent) are 3.45%, such as in the UAE to India remittance corridor; 5%, such as in the Hong Kong to China remittance corridor; or in the range of 8–17% for remittances sent from Canada to e.g. Rwanda (many other Sub-Saharan African countries are also in the high transfer cost group). As a reflection of the salience of reducing remittance transfer costs – in order to free further funds for potential development use – both the UN's Sustainable Development Goals and the Global Compact on Migration identify remittance transfer cost targets of 3% as a global average, with no corridor's costs to be higher than 5%.

As a reflection of the need for an infrastructure for basic development in order to boost the impact of remittances for development, the salience of access banking and basic financial literacy is crucial. Mobile banking solutions are today providing options for remittance-transfers, related accounts, and savings options, which are contributing to access to financial services to many who were previously unbanked.

What affects diaspora members' inclination to send remittances?

Remittance-sending is determined jointly by diaspora members' capacity and desire to send money to the country of origin. In other words, how much money do families have available to spend, and how do they value remittance-sending compared to alternative uses? (Carling and Hoelscher 2013). The balance between capacity and desire has to be struck in all cases, yet comparing remittance-sending among Pakistani and Somali migrants in Norway, we found that the absolute need for remittances in crisis, e.g. to send money to a relative fleeing outright war, leads to desire at times trumping capacity (Carling et al. 2012). In other words, capacity to remit is, much like desire, a flexible category which is shaped by the specific circumstances at hand, even if both have finite limits.

At a foundational level, the main reason why migrants send remittances is connected with whom they send remittances to: their loved ones in places of origin, and elsewhere. Remittances constitute both the money transfers that migration has enabled which would not have happened otherwise, and money that would have changed hands also without migration, e.g. as the support from children for elderly parents. Thus, a key aspect in considering what affects diaspora members' inclination toward sending remittances pertains to whether or not they have family members to send remittances to, whether their parents have passed away, or whether siblings and other relatives have migrated or have managed to (or been supported to) establish themselves financially, thus not depending on remittances (for livelihood needs). A logical consequence is what is described as 'the remittance decay hypothesis', which proposes that remittances reduce over time, as there are fewer close relatives whom migrants desire to (and/or feel obliged to) support financially. While a decline in remittances in families is often observable, it is important to note that the children of migrants might continue family transnational financial practices via e.g. more organized diaspora-development engagements, direct donations to organizations in countries of origin, or through entrepreneurship, albeit at a lesser scale than their parents' remittance-sending practices.

What are possible effects of remittances on integration?

Remittance-sending has implications for integration in the country of settlement in three ways. First, the image of remittance-sending in society at large affects attitudes to migrant populations. This image is shaped by highly divergent media coverage. On the negative side, remittances have been associated with tax evasion, money laundering, terrorist financing and abuse of public welfare. On the positive side, media coverage has portrayed remittances in terms of solidarity, humanitarianism, and contributions to development (Horst et al. 2014). Regardless of the actual origins and uses of remittances, the ways in which they are discussed in the public sphere has consequences for integration. This is both because societal attitudes towards migrant populations may impact everyday practices and interactions, and because the sense of belonging and recognition of the individuals concerned may be affected by these public images.

Second, issues related to transfer services matter for integration. Fifteen years ago, the remittance market in Norway and several other European countries was tightly regulated, with high prices and poor or non-existent services to several countries. The necessity of using illegal services in order to transfer money was clearly negative from an integration perspective. Conversely, it is positive that there is now a much greater range of services and that Norwegian authorities support initiatives for transparent and reasonable pricing.

Third, remittance-sending can have consequences for integration via its effects on household spending. Families with low income and substantial remittance obligations are less able to spend money on children's spare-time activities, for instance. While such effects in low-income families are a cause for concern, policy measures that aim to reduce remittances are inappropriate. First, it is not given that pressing humanitarian needs among family members abroad should be set aside in order to increase spending on comparatively well-off family members in the country of settlement. Households must have the freedom to make such difficult choices as they see fit (see also Carling et al. 2012). Second, it would be unreasonable to target remittances without corresponding measures to curb certain expenses among low-income families without a diaspora background.

3.2. Entrepreneurship and investment

How can entrepreneurship and investment contribute to development?

Entrepreneurship by diaspora members in countries of origin can contribute to creating employment opportunities, as well as providing services which may not have been available previously. In some instances, entrepreneurship links with the transfer of knowledge and ideas (please see below), such as in examples of diaspora members living in Norway investing in an indoor playground centre in Somaliland, or in a business model for garbage collection and environmentally responsible recycling in Pakistan.³ A much-cited example of diaspora entrepreneurship combining professional competence and expertise with local know-how is that of Indian IT experts working in the Silicon Valley and their contributions to the growth of the Indian IT sector (Newland and Takenaka 2010). Given linguistic and cultural insight, diaspora entrepreneurship may have better chances of sustainability in the longer term than other foreign investment. When diaspora members invest in collaboration with local entrepreneurs, this anchors development within the community. Economic innovation and start-up culture, however, cannot substitute sound governance and robust financial infrastructure, as well as tackling trade relationships that are not equitable between countries in the Global North and Global South.

What influences the development effects of entrepreneurship and investment?

The development effects of diaspora entrepreneurship and investment are influenced primarily by the structural conditions in the contexts where diaspora members set up their businesses or invest. Questions of good governance matter crucially, especially in terms of trust in the trajectory of development an area is assumed to follow, which impacts the likelihood of commitment to sustain investment over time.

Furthermore, how development effects are measured is important. For many diaspora members, entrepreneurship and investments in areas of origin serve a dual purpose: these are both financial investments *and* development engagements. Thus, it matters whether it is the market value of a company that is deemed the sole benchmark of its success, or whether it is e.g. also the makeup of the ownership, where partnership between diaspora members and local owners may be vital for sustainability, or whether the number of local employees in an area in need of jobs is also valued in such measurement of success.

What affects diaspora members' inclination to engage in entrepreneurship and investment?

Diaspora members, like other potential entrepreneurs, respond to the ease of doing business and the prospect for doing it profitably. Access to business loans with reasonable terms and costs is an important starting point, currently in short supply. Diaspora members further benefit from mentorship groups for budding entrepreneurs and a move to locally led and engaged projects. As mentioned above, new ways of valuing entrepreneurship in a development context might also influence this, as well as the reassurance from authorities in both country of settlement and origin that business involvement in a country of origin is as easy and problem free as possible.

One important aspect of diaspora investment and business is that it is often motivated by broader factors than profit alone. For instance, diaspora members often invest in their community of origin even if it is not the most profitable location or risks are high in (post-)conflict contexts

³ Utviklingsfondet 2015

(Horst 2015). Like remittances, diaspora investments can therefore complement other international financial flows and counterbalance regional inequalities.

What are possible effects of entrepreneurship and investment on integration?

It is possible to imagine that business communities in both countries of origin and settlement might become more intertwined and mutually supporting, opening up for new opportunities of investment and development in both places. Equally, if the uneven access to export markets, often in the Global North, is maintained through high tolls, complex custom procedures and other protectionist measures, entrepreneurship in a development context might fail despite these new opportunities. As with remittances, challenges of close ties to countries of origin being viewed with scepticism pose a threat to meaningful integration processes.

3.3. Return migration

Return migration is migration back to the country of origin. In migration research, this term is used as a general description of such migration, regardless of the balance between force and choice. In other words, it is broader than the term 'return' as it is more narrowly used in policy contexts.

How can return migration contribute to development?

Return migration can represent a valuable injection of human and financial capital in countries of origin. It can sometimes reduce geographic inequalities when migrants with resources return to villages or regions of origin that otherwise see little external investment. Sometimes, return migration is a precondition for development effects that are discussed separately in this PRIO Paper, such as those of investment, entrepreneurship, or the transfer of skills and competence.

What influences the development effects of return migration?

Return migration is most conducive to development when it is wanted by the returnees and spread out over time, and when the returnees bring material and other resources that can support their reintegration. Many countries of origin have experienced return migration in starkly different forms, with negative effects on development. Prominent examples include mass expulsions of labour migrants, sudden large-scale returns in response to security crises, and deportations of migrants with criminal convictions and weak ties to their country of origin. The latter has been particularly detrimental in Central America, where a surge in organized crime has been driven in part by deportations of gang members from the US. By contrast, the voluntary return of Mexicans from the US has reduced murder rates in the communities where they settle, apparently because of their positive effects on local development.

What affects diaspora members' inclination to return?

Decisions about return can resemble decisions to migrate in the first place, in the sense that they are typically based on many different considerations and involve a fair amount of uncertainty. Much depends on the conditions in the country of settlement and country of origin (in terms of livelihoods, security, wellbeing and more) as well as on the specific circumstances of the

prospective returnee (e.g. family ties and sources of income). Given the uncertainty of return, a key factor is *whether it is reversible*. Paradoxically, secure legal status in the country of settlement is therefore often a precondition for return.

What are possible effects of return migration on integration?

If diaspora members return to their country of origin, the question of integration loses its relevance. However, the prospect of return could make a difference to the lives of diaspora members and their integration in countries of settlement. People who do not foresee remaining in the country of settlement might, for instance, be less inclined to invest in learning the language.

3.4. Circulation and temporary mobility

Apart from return migration, diaspora members can engage in many other forms of mobility to their country of origin. Three somewhat overlapping forms are prominent:

- 1. Holidays and family visits.** Many diaspora families, especially with school-age children, return to the country of origin during holidays. Such trips can be costly and might not be feasible every year. They are important for maintaining connections with the country of origin, also across generations.
- 2. Other circulation and return mobility.** In some cases, diaspora members do not clearly reside in one country, but travel back and forth, for instance according to work schedules or seasons. Others have a firm home base in the diaspora but return several times per year, often linked to livelihood opportunities (e.g. see diaspora entrepreneurship above). Such flexibility to travel typically increases after retirement but requires substantial resources.
- 3. Extended stays in the country of origin.** Diaspora members who see the country of settlement as their long-term home may nevertheless have reasons to spend an extended period of time – months or years – in the country of origin. Such stays could, for instance, be motivated by caring for elderly parents or strengthening children's language skills and identification with the country of origin. Another example of extended stays might be what is referred to as 'diaspora volunteering', where e.g. youth with ancestral ties to a country spend an extended period of time engaging in voluntary work in the country, akin to other forms of international volunteering (see e.g. Laurie and Baillie Smith 2018; Thomas et al. 2020).

How can circulation and temporary mobility contribute to development?

The ways in which circulation and temporary mobility contribute to development largely overlap with those discussed under return migration, as well as on entrepreneurship and investment and transfer of knowledge and skills. For both entrepreneurship and investments, and for transfer of knowledge and skills, physical presence, which circulation and short-term mobility facilitate, can be instrumental in realizing a development contribution.

Considering holidays and family visits in countries of origin, there may be development contributions as part of what is referred to as '*visiting relatives and friends tourism*', which feeds into the growth of tourism sectors broadly. More specifically, this might be seen in relation to hospitality services, to transport services, and to sightseeing and entertainment businesses. In cases where diaspora members circulate between their country of settlement and country of origin over the longer term, their everyday expenditure in periods of residing in the country of origin will feed into the local economy there, adding to incomes for local businesses. In many instances, this will be coupled with entrepreneurship activity, as discussed above. Finally, for other types of non-permanent extended stays, again the financial aspect of everyday spending, and/or combined with entrepreneurial activity, are likely to be the key ways in which diaspora members contribute to development.

What influences the development effects of circulation and temporary mobility?

On the one hand, the factors that influence the scope and salience of development effects of circulation and temporary mobility are comparable to those discussed previously, centred on basic structural conditions and good governance as vehicles of enhancing diaspora members' development effects by virtue of their circulation and temporary mobility. On the other hand, they are also tempered by the regulation of diaspora members' mobility into, within, and while spending time in countries of origin.

What affects diaspora members' circulation and temporary mobility?

When diaspora members wish to spend time in their country of origin or travel frequently back and forth, the feasibility of doing so is often a matter of financial costs and time-specific commitments to work or school. Whether or not diaspora members have a permanent residency or citizenship in the country of settlement may matter, and similarly the ease with which visas or residency permits for temporary stays are obtained in the country of origin will affect the degree to which such circulation is possible from a legal and bureaucratic perspective. Because short-term mobility – aside from tourism – is rarely the key concern of states' policies in the migration field, considerations that pertain to this type of circulation and temporary mobility are often not taken into account, sometimes posing a challenge to such forms of short-term mobility as an unintended consequence of general migration policies.

What are possible effects of circulation and temporary mobility on integration?

Circulation and temporary mobility in the form of holidays and family visits are likely to have little direct impact on integration, but may indirectly contribute to greater wellbeing, by providing closeness to family members with whom interaction is possible only to a limited extent virtually in everyday life in the country of settlement. There might of course also be inadvertent negative effects on integration in countries of settlement, e.g. if there are negative experiences during such holidays, or if the financial burden of such holidays leads to prioritization which affects life quality in the country of settlement. However, similar concerns to those discussed in the section on remittances can be raised, in terms of whether assessments of individual people's or families' financial prioritization ought to be made by bystanders, and with what right or authority to pass judgment.

In the case of circulation involving '*transnational living*', where people live in both country of origin and country of settlement – for instance, in parts of each year – it may be argued that

integration processes in both contexts rely on existing social networks and financial means to sustain such a way of life. By virtue of spending a period of time here and there, alternating, there will likely be a process of detachment in either context, in the periods of absence; yet, it also seems plausible that, given the right circumstances, living ‘here’ and ‘there’ can capitalize upon successful integration in the country of settlement as the point of departure.

For extended stays of a non-permanent nature in countries of origin, again integration effects should be measured against the point of departure, and on what future plans entail (e.g. onward movement to a third country, or a possible future permanent return, or indeed a permanent move back to the country of settlement). Extended stays in countries of origin have received bad press in the Norwegian (as well as UK) contexts, in connection with specific instances where parents have sent their children back to countries of origin. In some instances, this has been connected with threats, including of forced marriage or violence, and where teenagers approaching adulthood have protested, but not been heard, such extended stays have been harmful for the individuals involved. In other instances, it has been found that long-term stays in parents’ country of origin for children has had negative implications for the education in the long term, also upon return to countries of settlement. There are, however, also instances where families move to the country of origin – either as a planned permanent return, or as a planned temporary move – and where children’s education and wellbeing are well taken care of. In these cases, their futures are not put at risk, but rather their linguistic skills in their parents’ mother tongue and cultural familiarity with that context is enhanced. Meanwhile, these latter examples are rarely heard about in the mainstream media, and migrants who plan to spend – or indeed have spent – time in countries of origin together with their children may choose to remain silent about such stays, given the stigma in general attached to long-term stays in countries of origin in the context of discussions on integration in countries of settlement.

3.5. Transfer of norms, values, and competence

Diasporas can influence their countries of origin in ways that are subtle but consequential. The notion of ‘social remittances’ describes migration-led diffusion of norms and values to countries of origin (Levitt 1998; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2010). It overlaps with the transfers of skills and competence (also often referred to as ‘knowledge transfer’, see e.g. Siar 2014) that are often seen as central to the potential development benefits of migration (see also entrepreneurship). The diffusion of norms, values and competence from the diaspora could occur through return migration, circulation and temporary mobility, or transnational communication and exchanges by virtual means.

Recognizing these phenomena is important, yet there are three important caveats which should be noted when considering transfers of norms, values and competence. First, norms, values, and competence are not simply ‘transferred’ but are to varying degrees adopted, resisted, or transformed in countries of origin in complex ways (see e.g. Borchgrevink and Erdal 2016). Second, it is not given that the influence from diasporas in terms of such ‘social remittances’ is unequivocally positive from a development perspective.

Third, clearly diasporas are not coherent, and as such norms and values, much as competence, are likely to vary among diaspora populations. For instance, it may be likely that the children of migrants born in countries of settlement, ‘the second generation’, may on average share more of the norms predominant in the country of settlement, e.g. when it comes to questions of gender equality and female participation in the labour market, than perhaps might be the case on average among the parent generation where many may have migrated as adults. However, it is equally likely that within such an average, among migrant women there will be individuals who are closer

to the predominant norms in a country of settlement on a given issue, and similarly also daughters of migrants who are more distant from the predominant norms in a country of settlement on a given issue. It is therefore important to not lose sight of the differences within diaspora populations, including but not limited to, gender, education levels, socio-economic position, age, length of stay, and 'generation', and for many diaspora populations also ethnic, religious and linguistic lines of division.

How can transfers of norms, values, and competence contribute to development?

Influence from the diaspora can strengthen local forces in achieving development-friendly social change, for instance in areas of gender equality, democracy, or attitudes towards corruption. Skills and competence from the diaspora can also contribute to the creation of livelihoods. A case in point is the role of return migrants in the tourism industry: experience from living in high-income countries can be valuable for creating services that appeal to international tourists. Also in the field of governance, it is striking that especially in fragile or post-conflict settings, many political leaders are returnees who draw upon experience from living in the diaspora. In Somalia, for example, both the former speaker of parliament and the prime minister of the Federal Government until 2020 returned from Norway (Tellander and Horst 2019).

What influences the development effects of norms, values, and competence?

The development effects of socio-cultural influences from the diaspora depend partly on the nature of the norms that are diffused, and partly on how they interact with other influences or social processes in countries of origin. When diaspora populations live in high-income countries, their socio-cultural impact on countries of origin can amount to speeding up modernization processes in ways that are not indisputably positive or negative. For instance, socially progressive attitudes that align with the SDGs could be diffused alongside increasing individualism and consumerism.

In some cases, the influence from diasporas can be a setback for development, or at least a cause for concern. This is particularly the case when diasporas contribute to radicalization and religious extremism, either because they are based in societies where such norms are prevalent, or because diaspora groups become radicalized sub-cultures.

What affects diaspora members' transfers of norms, values, and competence?

The potential for diaspora populations to contribute to development via norms, values, and competence is closely connected to their lives abroad and their integration in countries of settlement. Experiences of marginalization and discrimination create no such potential. On the other hand, participation in civil society and local democracy, for instance, can strengthen diaspora members' opportunities for having a positive impact on development in countries of origin. In terms of skills and competence, it matters how diaspora populations are able to pursue professional careers in their countries of settlement.

What are possible effects of transfers of norms, values, and competence on integration?

Transfers of norms, values and competence are elusive compared to other mechanisms and may be largely invisible. However, one can imagine a virtuous circle in which diaspora members have

positive experiences in their society of residence, which inspires contributions in their countries of origin, and in turn motivates active engagements in their society of residence (e.g. Horst 2018).

3.6. Voting and activism

How can voting and activism contribute to development?

Here, we refer to migrants' potential voting and activism in the country of origin as a mechanism for contributing to development transnationally from the diaspora. Voting rights are an important signifier of an individual's access to formal politics, which – depending on how restrictive or admissive a given country's institutional context is – hinders or improves diaspora members' potential for political participation in their country of origin. Where there is widespread access to voting for diaspora members, their influence can be shown at the ballot box, through voting for politicians and political parties that put onus on diaspora concerns (e.g. concerning dual citizenship, or other rights for emigrants, or who adopt development-friendly policies that diaspora members wish to embrace). Migrant political activism can also contribute to directing attention to the issue of development, among policy makers in the country of origin, but also internationally, including in the country of settlement. Also where voting rights for diaspora members are restricted, migrant activism can contribute to development through more informal politics, namely participation in cultural, religious, ethnic and social movements. While the contributions to development are perhaps more indirect than e.g. for remittance-sending, it is evident that as more countries enfranchise their diasporas, often indeed to boost remittance-sending, diasporas increasingly also hold some political power to affect change in countries of origin, proportionate to their size of the electorate. Diaspora activism – through mobilization of various forms beyond participation in electoral politics – also holds potential to contribute to development in manifold ways, more often than not in conjunction with local mobilization in countries of origin (see e.g. Kleist 2008).

What influences the development effects of voting and activism?

Beyond participation in elections through voting, the potential success of diaspora members' development engagement via formal politics depends on, among other things, how willing the political class is to engage with and harness the energy, networks and knowledge that exists within diasporas, in order to help achieve successful development in countries of origin. An increasing number of countries develop diaspora policies, and increasingly also organize diaspora consultations, conventions and networks, as steps in the direction of harnessing diasporas for national development (Gamlen 2019). Such policies – and openness from political structures – to utilize diaspora members' political engagement for development purposes is likely to influence these effects.

What affects diaspora members' inclination to engage in voting and activism?

A diaspora member's sense of belonging and desire to actively participate in the country of origin is an important factor affecting diaspora voting and activism. Diaspora members frequently juggle multiple feelings of belonging and a sense of duty towards several communities in both countries of settlement and origin, belongings which coexist and shape voting participation and activism in ways that need not be exclusive or come at the expense of one another (Bertelli 2019, Horst 2018). Meanwhile, activism, both informal and formal, is dependent not only on the dynamism and drive of diaspora member participants themselves, but on how political authorities in both

country of settlement and of origin view, value, permit and encourage this political activism. In contexts where political engagement in countries of origin constitute involvement in violent conflicts, or with political groupings which – rightly or wrongly – are deemed terrorist organizations, there might be direct and formal hindrances which influence diaspora members' inclination to engage. The same is true in contexts where diaspora consist of refugees who have fled authoritarian regimes.

What are possible effects of voting and activism on integration?

Voting and activism in the country of origin among diaspora members has not in existing research been found to correspond with a lesser degree of voting and activism in countries of settlement, where migrants have voting rights in both contexts (which is not always the case). Participation in elections in countries of origin through voting are a strong signifier of membership within the political community of that country, yet as the extent to which dual citizenship spreads around the world increases, it is becoming clear that migrants may exert similar enthusiasm around participation in both countries of citizenship. Meanwhile, a large majority of migrants, even those who do hold voting rights in countries of origin, and who could technically register and be able to vote at an embassy or online, do not vote. Many migrants also do not vote in elections in countries of settlement, even when they do have the right to vote. Thus, any assumptions about effects of voting and activism on integration in country of settlement should be tempered by the fact that most migrants do not vote in country of origin elections. Rather, it is likely the case that among those that do, one finds resourceful migrants, who may well also be local politicians in their communities in the country of settlement simultaneously.

3.7. Civil society-led initiatives

Civil society plays a key role in collective or organized development cooperation. Here, we understand civil society to include all types of non-governmental initiatives and organizations, whether voluntary or professional, small or large, including groups which define themselves along political, interest-based, or faith-based lines. With respect to diaspora contributions to development, there are four important dimensions of variation:

1. Civil-society organizations engaged in development cooperation can have *diverse links with diaspora populations*. Some are diaspora organizations at the outset, defined by a common origin. Others are primarily development organizations and to various degrees include diaspora members among members or in key positions. Yet other organizations fall in between these extremes, such as faith-based organizations that are dominated by people with migrant backgrounds, but from diverse places of origin.
2. Civil society-led initiatives differ with respect to *where diaspora populations engage in development cooperation*. What first comes to mind are, for instance, Norwegian Pakistanis promoting development initiatives in Pakistan. Such initiatives can obviously benefit from country-specific expertise and connections. But, especially as Norwegian society diversifies, it is important to recognize that individuals with diaspora backgrounds can also play other roles. We for example see Muslim contributions from Norway, irrespective of country of origin, to humanitarian crises in a particular country. In some cases, civil-society led initiatives of relevance to development in migrants' countries of origin are also

anchored within religious networks or institutions, such as in mosques or churches (see e.g. Borchgrevink and Erdal 2017).

3. Civil society-led initiatives differ with respect to *government support in the country of residence*. In some cases, civil society organizations are key implementors of official development cooperation, managing primarily government funds. At the other extreme are initiatives based entirely on private donations. In between are initiatives with a more even mix of public and private resources. In addition to financial resources as such, government support comes in the form of competence building or programming that specifically facilitates civil society-led initiatives with a diaspora component.

4. Diaspora-based civil society-led initiatives differ with respect to *government support in the country of origin*. Many countries of origin have government institutions and policies that facilitate and support development initiatives from diaspora organizations. A prominent example is Mexico's *tres-por-uno* programme, in which three levels of government in Mexico provide matching funds, so that 1 peso invested by a diaspora organization provides a total of 4 pesos for the development initiative.

How can civil society-led initiatives contribute to development?

Development initiatives that are led by civil society and have a diaspora dimension can promote development in the same ways as grassroots-level development cooperation more generally. The diaspora dimension could potentially increase effectiveness by mobilizing country-specific networks and expertise. When initiatives are implemented together with local partners in the country of origin, the ties between local and diaspora-based civil-society organizations can also have positive impacts that outlast individual initiatives.

Apart from the role of country-specific networks and competence, diaspora-based organizations could make particular contributions in two ways. First, they may be in a position to mobilize other private funds in the country of residence than mainstream civil-society organizations. Second, they could strengthen the diaspora's ties with the country of origin beyond the first generation. People who are born in the diaspora might not have close family members in the country of origin to whom they send remittances. However, they could be motivated to contribute to collective development initiatives. Civil-society organizations can therefore play a role in the intergenerational sustainability of diaspora contributions to development in countries of origin.

What influences the development effects of civil society-led initiatives?

Civil society is very diverse and not all organizations will have the right combination of commitment, resources and experience to engage successfully in development initiatives. Successful development requires sustained efforts over time and generations to have lasting effects, so the institutional memory of organizations involved in it, as well as the individual members' engagement over the long haul beyond an immediate circle of local partners and instead to the local or regional community as a whole, helps solidify and lengthen the positive effects of these initiatives.

What affects diaspora members' inclination to engage in civil society-led initiatives?

The same would apply here as to any individual's desire to engage in such initiatives, regardless of whether or not they are diaspora members: do they identify with the goals of the initiative itself, is there enough accountability and transparency to convincingly argue for its efficacy, and are there societal factors that make engaging in these initiatives either prohibitively costly or relatively easy, such as regulations on taxation, value put on volunteer work, remittance costs and so forth?

What are possible effects of civil society-led initiatives on integration?

If the civil society-led initiative is primarily coming from an established development sector point of departure, involvement of diaspora members can both enhance the visibility of these individuals and communities in the society at large, and encourage a recognition that their goals do not exist outside of the country of settlement society, but are an intrinsic part of it. Equally, from an integration-perspective, initiatives coming from diaspora organizations can aid with integration if and when this engagement is valued and acknowledged as a facet of civic engagement in general, just as volunteerism and activism are valued among the majority population, and not as something "foreign" or "other", with goals that only affect populations afar in distant countries of origin.

3.8. Participation in official development cooperation

Persons with a diaspora background participate directly in official development cooperation through employment in agencies that formulate or implement development policy, or through being invited into formal consultation processes. They could work at government agencies for development cooperation, the MFA or a host of international development organizations, and bring with them not only their professional competence in development and/or foreign policy but also often an additional competence in the form of language skills, cultural competence, networks and the like. It is increasingly recognized that the composition of governmental and nongovernmental agencies working on development does not reflect the contemporary composition of European societies. While career choice, discrimination and lack of the necessary professional networks may all be of influence, the nature of the development industry may contribute to this reality as well, and as such is currently being challenged both from outside and within the development sector.

How can participation in official development cooperation contribute to development?

Recruitment of diaspora individuals brings value added to those organizations hiring them. A healthy diversity within an organization is understood to be good for productivity, and also in line with the international nature of development work. Another advantage is the ease of contact with communities in countries of origin, due to familiarity with language and cultural norms and practices. This can improve trust relations with both local staff and beneficiaries.

What influences the development effects of participation in official development cooperation?

For development effects to take place, recruitment of individuals with diaspora background first of all may require a change in culture. Those who originate from countries to which development aid is provided, even when hired, can find themselves in a challenging position where they are not

fully trusted as development professionals. One common bias is the assumption that because of ‘proximity’ to the societies in which aid is provided, staff with a diaspora background may lack objectivity. This presupposes these individuals are not first and foremost professionals but their professional engagements are influenced by personal networks and ties. The assumption that these individuals cannot be neutral professionals is highly problematic, and has roots in historical understandings of development and underdevelopment (Escobar 1995, Horst et al. 2010, Sinatti and Horst 2015).

What affects diaspora members’ inclination to participate in official development cooperation?

The greater the number of persons with a diaspora background who have relevant education, experience and competencies, the greater the possibilities for participation in official development cooperation. However, such participation also depends on government agencies’ efforts to prevent discrimination and foster a diverse workforce. The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad)’s *Principles for Support to Civil Society in the South*, May 2009, included a principle promoting diaspora participation in development work.

What are possible effects of participation in official development cooperation on integration?

If recruitment and board membership in the development sector properly reflects the talents in society, irrespective of people’s backgrounds, this means the development sector attracts the best people, with important ramifications for integration. In any sector, if individuals with migrant backgrounds start representing this sector – through getting jobs on appropriate levels to their qualifications and expertise – they function as important role models for others, who can start imagining themselves in these positions. Of course, for the individuals involved, not only do they gain access to economic opportunities but, equally important, they are able to contribute to society in a way that is meaningful to them and draws on the strengths of their multiple, transnational, skills and ties.

4. What does research on diaspora, development and integration tell us?

While research has engaged with the broad question of relationships between migration and development to a substantial extent, the number of studies that specifically scrutinize the links between migrants' integration processes, transnational engagements, and their development impacts amounts to a modest body of work.

Meanwhile, in the literature that does address the triangular relationship that we discuss as diaspora, development and integration, we find that the three aspects are each investigated and approached in contrasting ways. Who is engaging – the diaspora or migrant populations – is usually defined based on country of origin, and few studies considering this triangle actively engage e.g. gender differences, minority status in country of origin, or other population complexity factors. Meanwhile, for both integration and development, the conceptualization of these terms often remains implicit, with studies taking a sub-set of issues related to integration or development to empirically investigate and analyse, while rarely returning to a bird's eye perspective on the broad spectrum of issues that these concepts may denote.

Integration is a concept that is inherently complex, not least due to the fact that in academic work, much as in policy, it often remains unspecified whether integration is referred to as 'integration policies' or as 'measured integration' in terms of migrants' outcomes as compared with non-migrant residents e.g. in the labour market, or as the experience of the integration process at an individual or societal level, which both migrants and non-migrants are exposed to in different ways (Erdal 2013).

Among the studies reviewed, some focus on civic and political participation as a way of measuring integration (Chaudhary 2018, Gabrielli et al. 2017, Liberatore 2018), while others look at the legal aspects of integration, or the importance of dual citizenship (Ambrosetti et al. 2013, Vickstrom 2019, Østergaard-Nielsen 2011), as well as language acquisition (Geurts & Lubbers 2019). Here, as might be expected, it is found that migrants' legal status matters, as lacking legal and regular status appears to impede transnational engagements, including those geared toward development in countries of origin.

Studies of migrant remittance-sending were already common in the 1980s (e.g. Lucas & Stark 1985). However, by the mid-2000s, what Kapur refers to as 'remittances as the new development mantra' (2005) had established itself. Thus, most work on remittances is focused in different ways on impacts of remittances in countries of origin, rather than in countries of settlement. Here, the links between remittances and development are scrutinized within economics, seeking to identify macro-level positive effects of remittances (Donou-Adonsou et al. 2020). While the vast majority of studies on remittances thus do not engage with integration in countries of settlement, neither explicitly nor implicitly, a small body of work has engaged with the relationship between integration and remittance-sending (e.g. Bilgili 2015, Marchetta & Bertoli, 2010, Plaza & Ratha 2011). Some studies focus specifically on the matter of collective remittances sent for development purposes (e.g. Lacroix 2013), while others consider the impacts of migrant integration for remittance-sending channels (Siegel & Luecke 2013).

Recent contributions stress diaspora entrepreneurship as an aspect of development (Portes & Martinez 2020, Ren & Liu 2015, Rezaei & Goli 2020). Simultaneously, there is also growing

evidence of the humanitarian field itself wanting to map out and better understand how to engage with diasporas for more traditional development purposes, and relatedly what this can mean for integration in the countries of settlement (Danstrøm et al. 2015, Kadhum 2019, Sinatti & Horst 2015, Sørensen 2018).

From this review, six findings emerge:

1. **Integration matters.** There is clear evidence that integration matters both for individual and family remittance-sending, and for migrants' development engagements, though specific dynamics may be different (Carling & Hoelscher 2013; Holst & Schrooten 2006). In the literature, there is notably a visible engagement beyond the macro level of national belonging to the country of settlement, looking at what diaspora development engagement means for integration on more local levels (Fauser 2014, van Ewijk & Nijenhuis 2016).
2. **Integration processes and transnational engagements are not a zero-sum-game.** Importantly, research challenges assumptions that diaspora engagement in development work in countries of origin runs the risk of "dividing loyalties" – based on an impression of either/or and a view of this engagement being a zero-sum game (Erdal and Oeppen 2013). Instead, the evidence shows that transnational engagement in a country of origin does not come at the cost of attachment to one's country of settlement (Baudassé et al. 2018, Hammond 2013, Lacroix 2011, Marini 2014, Mügge 2016, Tan et al. 2018). These are much more complex relationships, where weak integration may well go hand in hand with weak transnational engagement, and strong levels of integration may well correspond with strong levels of transnational engagement (Carling & Pettersen 2014; Carling & Pettersen 2015; Erdal 2020; Horst 2018).
3. **Migration and migrants' contributions are relevant to development processes.** Despite nearly three decades since the 'transnational turn' in migration studies, migrants' realities in countries of settlement remain only coarsely included in analyses of the development engagements of diasporas in countries of origin.
4. **There is potential for greater conceptual clarity on both 'development' and 'integration'.** For instance, there is broad-ranging diversity in what is described under the heading of remittances as development engagements. Remittances are much more than cash transfers from migrants to relatives in the country of origin, including fiscal support to country-of-origin organizations and associations (Shah 2019) and collective transfers from groups in country of settlement and across transnational networks, and the distinction between 'remittance-sending' and 'diaspora-development engagements' is often elusive.
5. **Integration-development links are exchanges set within interpersonal relationships.** The importance of social remittances in transnational exchanges has been acknowledged, but to a limited extent, in studies on diaspora, development and integration. Meanwhile, inclusion of social, cultural, and political aspects within analyses of remittances remains key (Carling 2014; Erdal 2012; King & Collyer 2016), though recognizing that these are always exchanges, and not a one-way-street. First and foremost, integration-development links are set within the context of family-anchored transnational social fields.

- 6. Secondary factors, which make a difference.** For migrants' integration processes in countries of settlement, their development contributions in country of origin will never be the primary driver of success. Similarly, migrants' development contributions will never be more than one element among many driving successful development in countries of origin.

Research on diaspora, development and integration has evolved over time, moving from remittances and their importance and size vis-à-vis more traditional development, toward other concerns, such as what development engagement can mean for integration on regional and city-levels, as well as how a public-private partnership model could be applicable to the diaspora development engagement. In recent years, a gradual shift towards more comprehensively including country of origin perspectives on diaspora development is evident.

A review of studies that engage the triad of diaspora, development, and integration clearly reveals that further research is needed in at least four areas:

- First, further research that takes the roles of integration for diaspora development engagement more fully into account is needed. For example, we would benefit from knowing more about how a deep involvement locally in country of settlement societies among diasporas might shape and direct development engagement in countries of origin, or indeed third countries. We also need research on how development engagement could influence integration processes directly and indirectly, at individual and group-levels. We know little systematically and comparatively about how different integration trajectories for individuals and groups impact their levels and types of development engagements in countries of origin. Not least, we know little about the combined impacts of economic factors (e.g. income, employment, home ownership) and factors reflecting belonging and recognition (e.g. self-identification with society of settlement, experiences of discrimination) on migrants' dispositions to engage in development projects in countries of origin.
- Second, the way societies of settlement view and value diaspora engagement in development compared with traditional development aid and humanitarian work needs more investigation and perhaps a reckoning with how what we already know could better be put into practice. This is related on the one hand to how the development sector engages with diaspora populations, over time and in different circumstances, and on the other hand to the ways in which the development sector relates to grassroots and citizen-led initiatives across contexts, e.g. reflecting impacts of a drive toward professionalization and uniformity.
- Third, systematic knowledge combining i) country of origin development trajectories as these intersect with remittance-receiving and diaspora development engagements at collective levels; ii) country of settlement integration trajectories for migrant populations and their engagements in countries of origin simultaneously; and iii) such data across different countries of origin and settlement over time is not readily available. Yet, such knowledge would be essential for ascertaining both long-term patterns and crucial factors that appear to drive different types of trajectories.
- Fourth, considering growing demands to decolonize the development sector as a whole, including both state-led initiatives and NGO-driven development projects, more work

should be done on the historical and structural factors determining understandings of development at present. As Rutazibwa (2018) argues, the development aid sector takes underdevelopment for granted and ahistorically places its cause in the South and its solution in the North. These assumptions are now being challenged. Here, migrants' development engagements tally with the humanitarian and development sectors' own processes of grappling with their own roles and identities as actors in contexts and institutional settings increasingly demanding decolonization and consciousness of the historical weight of white privilege.

5. Lessons learnt: European diaspora-development initiatives

Existing research provides interesting examples of more or less successful diaspora-development initiatives that have taken place over the last 10 to 15 years, from which lessons learnt can be drawn. While many such initiatives do not explicitly address links with integration and integration policy, these links do exist and could be made more explicit. Across Europe, a number of key activities have characterized efforts to strengthen the position of diaspora to engage in development aid and to improve the development outcomes of their initiatives.

5.1. Activities to support diaspora-development initiatives

A first set of activities can be summarized as ‘**research, mapping and piloting**’, which in a few cases then led to ‘**long-term investments in diaspora-inclusive programming**’. A number of key actors in the fields of migration and development – including IOM, the European Union, GIZ and the Danish Refugee Council – have conducted research, mapped existing initiatives and developed a range of handbooks (IOM 2006, 2012; JMDI 2011). Several of these actors have also set up pilot projects to test out specific ways of working with diaspora.

In 2007, for example, GIZ, commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), established a migration and development project to develop and test innovative migration and development policies, with a particular pilot programme on diaspora engagement. The programme funded projects of relevance to the development agenda of the time, and its requirement for 50 percent matched funding could largely be provided through voluntary work, thus also recognizing the value of the labour going into these projects. Most of the funded projects focused on capacity building for particular groups in country of origin, on topics as diverse as agriculture, vocational skills training and renewable energy.

The programme was evaluated and considered successful, and GIZ’s work in this area has continued for more than a decade. Currently, GIZ has a programme on migration and diaspora that runs until 2022, supported by BMZ, which has the goal for key actors in partner countries to more effectively make use of diaspora engagement to achieve development goals. This programme builds on years of experience and results, including the (temporary) return of over 15,000 experts, project support for 150 diaspora organizations, the establishment of 100 diaspora-initiated businesses, and consultations and trainings on migration policy, employment and reintegration. One main lesson learned from this German initiative is that long-term commitment is needed in order to build good relationships of collaboration, create trust between partners, and establish shifts in perspectives that allow different stakeholders to value each other’s unique contributions. As GIZ’s impressive list of achievements in the field of migration and development shows, this long-term engagement pays off, and new opportunities, resources and contributions to include diaspora in development cooperation are thus recognized.

A second cluster of activities focuses on **strengthening capacities** of diaspora organizations and individuals within them. This can be done by supporting umbrella organizations, organizing networking events and providing trainings and workshops. In Norway, the former Development School (*bistandskolen*) offered introductory courses in professional development cooperation for

diaspora organizations and small Norwegian voluntary organizations, with diaspora members making up roughly two-thirds of all participants. Courses were held on topics such as project cycles, financial management, measuring project results, gender equality, corruption, the environment etc. and were funded by Norad. The courses were appreciated for providing an opportunity to both share experiences and learn from each other, and build relevant networks with both Norwegian civil society organizations and other diaspora organizations.

Thirdly, diaspora-development activities focus on supporting diaspora organizations with **project funding and** supporting the **temporary return** of diaspora individuals to their countries of origin as experts. While there are general funding mechanisms that diaspora organizations can apply to, they often do not manage to fulfill the criteria on the basis of which these proposals are evaluated. To mitigate the consequent gap, several donors have put separate funding mechanisms in place for diaspora, with or without training and capacity building components. The Danish Refugee Council (DRC) is one such organization that provides a holistic approach to project support, offering not just humanitarian and development funding but also workshops, training and support with temporary return. They also support business entrepreneurs.

One of DRC's initiatives is the DEMAC programme, which stands for Diaspora Emergency Action and Coordination. The programme offers all these components and builds on the understanding that humanitarianism cannot just be provided by international aid agencies but requires a 'whole of society approach', where the different actors providing help need to coordinate their efforts better in order to more efficiently provide humanitarian aid to those in need. The combination of capacity building activities, networking and project support that DRC provides – and has done so over a long period of time – offers an integrated approach that has proven to work both in terms of strengthening development outcomes and in terms of strengthening capacities of the different stakeholders in the diaspora programme.

A final cluster of diaspora engagement activities aims to **mainstream diaspora contributions in professional development aid**. This approach starts from the acknowledgement that diaspora already contribute to development in very crucial ways – often by far outweighing official development assistance (ODA). Remittances are used to support the provision of education in Senegal by sponsoring the building of classrooms or paying for teachers' salaries, Sri Lankan doctors in exile return to Sri Lanka during their summer holidays to offer free medical services, and Norwegian-Somalis have used their agricultural competence from the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU) and other places to introduce new forms of crop cultivation in parts of Somaliland. Rather than developing separate programmes that aim to create new opportunities for diaspora volunteers, then, this final cluster of activities aims to find better ways of building on the tremendous financial and human capital that diaspora already contribute to development every year.

The inclusion of diaspora in mainstream development activities can take various forms: first, diaspora-led organizations can partner with other NGOs to develop and implement projects in equal partnerships. Second, professionals with migrant background can be hired with the particular aim of contributing their professional as well as language- and cultural competences to mainstream development organizations. This requires a closer look at recruitment policies, and in particular what individual characteristics are seen as assets and liabilities. Third, diaspora engagement can be mainstreamed by including professionals with migrant background in boards and advisory committees or setting up direct and open consultation processes, as for example the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs has done systematically on a yearly basis. All of these activities start from the assumption that diaspora have much to offer the field of development. They also build on the efforts that already exist, rather than creating parallel structures. These activities thus

take a ‘whole of society’ approach to development, where international aid is but one of the many factors affecting development and diaspora contributions are a part of that.

In this final cluster, there is still room for creative thinking on how best to build on the synergies that different forms of development support can offer. One such area for further exploration relates to the role of entrepreneurs and the private sector. Besides remittances and voluntary work, another key contribution to development is offered by the investments that diaspora individuals and collectives make in their country of origin. While establishing a business is first and foremost a way of making a living for oneself, creating jobs for others and offering new services and thus making a meaningful contribution to economic development and stability in the country of origin is often a strong motivational factor.

Box 2. Experiences from the UK

Diaspora development engagements have been on the radar in the United Kingdom for several decades, with actors such as Comic Relief and AFFORD receiving DFID funding for diaspora-development projects. A review of experiences, focused on diaspora members’ views, concluded that:

- Diaspora communities have a natural affinity with the overarching goals of development
- Diaspora communities do not always find a trusted interlocutor in the mainstream development sector
- Diaspora communities respond negatively to simplified narratives and images, and positively to factual messages
- Different generations have different views about development and different ways of relating to their countries of ancestry
- Faith organizations can be a meeting point for diaspora communities and development organizations
- Diaspora communities consume a wide variety of media to learn about development, yet face-to-face interaction is welcome.

Based on these findings, a set of recommendations was developed, centring on the importance of:

- Acknowledging the contribution of diaspora communities to development
- Building trust
- Joining voices for development
- Using development narratives to break down negative stereotypes
- Recognizing generational interests and preferences
- Understanding the role of faith in diaspora communities.

Source: What development means to diasporas, BOND, UK (2015).

Box 3. North American Approaches

Initiatives in Europe could benefit from North American approaches. In Canada, the Mosaic Institute has published a report on diaspora communities and Canadian foreign policy. Brender et al. (2011) compare diaspora engagement with the general increase in public participation in a range of policy areas. They argue that the input of interested and experienced stakeholders across a wide variety of public policy areas is common practice in Canada, contributing to improved educational, health and agricultural policies. In their view, diaspora stakeholders contribute in a similar fashion to improving Canadian foreign policy. In European societies, as in Canada, there is an increasing wish to more actively involve Europe's citizens in public policy, in order to 'enhance both the efficiency and the legitimacy of European governance' (Magnet 2003). As the composition of European citizenry is becoming increasingly diverse, these inputs will also increasingly be solicited from and provided by citizens with a migrant background. As Brender et al. (2011) argue, cooperation with diasporas thus serves two purposes: as a reality check to policy makers, and as a way of fostering a greater sense of attachment among migrants to their country of settlement. In the United States, similarly, USAID relates to diasporas as a 'diverse community that have not only powered the development of the United States, but also hold the potential for transforming developing countries around the world.'

5.2. Summarizing Norwegian experiences: A decade on

In Norway, two separate Norwegian White Papers in 2009 emphasized the value of transnational ties and networks, including the possible contributions of immigrants in Norway to development in countries of origin, as well as acknowledging migrants' contribution and belonging to Norway. Resulting from this political emphasis in the field of diaspora-development engagement was a prioritization of three areas: 1) recruitment to secure a more diverse development sector; 2) reduction of remittance-transaction costs and a resolution to the lack of legal transfer channels for several migrant groups; 3) a pilot project to test out modes of diaspora-development cooperation with the development sector.

The main conclusion from the evaluation of the pilot project, which lasted from 2008 to 2010, before being dismantled, was that long-term commitment and investment of time and resources is absolutely key to any success in this field. Three further conclusions were that:

- Diaspora and development efforts cross different bureaucratic and administrative entities' boundaries, which entails a sense of a fragmented field. This fragmentation leads to a situation where specific issues may fall between different entities and mandates, with no one taking responsibility at an overarching level.
- Diaspora and development efforts need not fit within the cast of the system which the development industry adheres to, as many voluntarily organized development projects might yield good results outside of this frame (see Figure 2). Thus, diaspora-development engagements should not be viewed singularly through the prism of a given development agency's practices. Mainstreaming diaspora-development efforts to foster equality is good and well, but not sufficient if efforts falling beyond the scope of these funding mechanisms are ignored.

- Diaspora-engagements toward development exist, and recognizing these ongoing efforts should be a goal in its own right. Such recognition is crucial, not least with regard to inclusion in the Norwegian society as such.

Taking stock, ten years on, of the three areas prioritized in 2010, it appears that recruitment targets for the development sector to reflect the diverse population composition in Norway have been created, but not yet met. Remittances-transfer costs are monitored, and comparing prices is made easy by a government-funded web portal. Furthermore, the money transfer operator regulations in Norway have been aligned with those in the EU, enabling operators who transfer money to most parts of the world to operate legally in Norway. As for diaspora-development engagements, and their mainstreaming within the development sector in Norway, while there have been efforts made by Norad, the MFA, and civil society organizations (not least the Development Fund and Caritas Norway), aside from a handful of diaspora-led small-scale organizations receiving project support via the regular Norad funding mechanisms, progress appears very limited.




Figure 2. Schematic representation of actors and how they interact

Here, the lessons learned from the Pilot Project Pakistan, would be useful to reassess, more than a decade after its closure. When the project was evaluated, the pilot and follow-up initiatives were seen to have value added on three dimensions: 1) potential for increasing the development impact and process of diaspora initiatives that are taking place irrespective of external support, 2) acknowledgement of diaspora as contributors to development, strengthening social inclusion, and 3) more nuanced and diversified understandings about development processes amongst mainstream development actors (Erdal & Horst 2010). The strength of the model was seen in its support from strong resource organizations in Pakistan and Norway, its enabling of networking opportunities and its participatory approach; elements to be reconsidered were identified in its demand for 50 percent own funding (which could not be provided in kind, recognizing the labour of volunteers), the short-term engagement and commitment, the lack of coordination and the lack of a proper needs assessment.

While the evaluation clearly recommended the establishment of a long-term diaspora resource centre, while also highlighting the need to simultaneously invest in facilitating remittances and recruitment, the pilot project was instead discontinued without further follow-up. This may have jeopardized the relationship between diaspora organizations and governmental and non-governmental development actors, damaging the trust that the project had worked to build up.

Beyond reviewing Norwegian policy documents, we also looked to Norwegian journalism in order to capture another view of how integration may be understood as connected (or not) to migrants'

development engagements. We reviewed two Norwegian media outlet's publications, *Bistandsaktuelt* and *Utop* (see Appendix 1 for a full list of identified stories, including titles and links), as a way of surveying how civil society actors such as members of the migrant community and the development sector, among others, over time have voiced their opinions and concerns related to diasporas, development and integration, through the media.

Box 4. What Do Development and Integration Media Outlets Have to Say?

The different profile of the two publications means that *Bistandsaktuelt* [Development aid news] primarily writes about the Norwegian diaspora-development link in terms of its potential importance for humanitarian engagement and development aid in countries of origin, while *Utop* [literally 'outcry', a weekly, the first Norwegian newspaper with an explicit multicultural focus and target readership, including articles in simpler Norwegian for those learning the language] underlines more strongly the value of diaspora-development engagement in terms of importance for integration. There are many similarities in their coverage, chiefly in how both repeatedly underline the importance of remittances and diaspora-development engagement in general. One example of these similarities is the many stories dedicated to Norad's Pilot-Pakistan project, applauding its launch, lamenting its closure, and asking for an expansion of these kinds of projects. Both *Bistandsaktuelt* and *Utop* are also quite research-driven, using existing research actively. Both publications began reporting on diaspora-development engagements early compared to discussion (or lack thereof) in Norwegian society at large, with *Utop* and *Bistandsaktuelt* first featuring pieces in 2004 and 2006, respectively. Moving into and through the 2010s, the value and importance of remittances is a repeated focal point for journalism in both publications. In their journalism, *Bistandsaktuelt* and *Utop* are simultaneously reactive and proactive. For example, they reacted positively to Norad's diaspora inclusion effort, while criticizing the lack of such in a 2013 White Paper on Norwegian development policy. More proactive writing can be seen repeatedly in appeals for an inclusion of the diaspora in the Norwegian development sector, calls for recognition of the self-driven and self-organized diaspora engagement already happening, and calls for acknowledgement in general of the value of diaspora development engagement and the voluntary effort it takes to fund these development projects.

6. The role of international stakeholders and agendas

While various European governments and NGOs have played a crucial role in diaspora-development initiatives, a number of international actors have played a central role as well. The IOM, for example, is taking a keen interest in the topic of diaspora-development engagement, with a stated aim ‘to enable, engage and empower transnational communities as agents for development’ in close collaboration with governments at both ends of the migration cycle, in countries of origin as well as settlement. The key programmes the IOM operates focus on the temporary return of experts, as well as the permanent return of qualified professionals. IOM also runs programmes intended to contribute to lowering remittance transaction costs (in line with the Sustainable Development Goals), as well as country-specific programmes facilitating diaspora-development engagement projects.⁴

Considering the broader landscape within which national-level initiatives are taken, the international agenda is clearly relevant. Here, first and foremost, the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), as an inter-state forum, is worth highlighting. A review of evidence on the GFMD suggests that this international arena, established in 2006 on the initiative of the UN Secretary General, but not a UN body, has come to play a vital role in agenda-setting on migration-development issues globally. Meanwhile, the impacts of this agenda-setting for policy implementation, practice and downstream impacts are perhaps not yet very clear-cut (Gasper 2011; Matsas 2008; Omelaniuk 2016; Roldan & Gasper 2011; Rother 2012; 2019; Wee et al. 2018).

As regards integration in relation to migrants’ development engagements, considering GFMD-discussions is pertinent especially in that this offers some lessons on perspective, scale and priorities in the global community. Migrants’ conditions in their countries of immigration are indeed a key theme of debate within GFMD settings. However, these are not necessarily countries of settlement, but more often countries of temporary stay, where migrant worker rights may be at risk.

Thus, the emphasis within the GFMD on migrant worker rights stems from the sheer volume of international labour migration, especially labour migration within different regions of the world, notably including migration to the Gulf states from countries in the Middle East and Asia. Notably, this is migration that might be permanent, long-term or short-term, and which might rely on corridors or multi-directional migration movements. Also, in this context, availability of cheap, reliable, and legal money transfer options for sending remittances has been a longstanding concern. The use and impact of remittances in countries of origin, including for development purposes, has been a key theme throughout the GFMD’s history. Given the dynamics of a forum of states meeting to debate migration, negotiation positions start from self-interest, and for predominantly migrant-sending countries, this often centres on migrant protection. For countries that are more mixed in their emigration-immigration balance, or who are predominantly immigration countries, agendas do not always align, and questions of present-day migration management often trump other and more long-term considerations.

During the January 2020 GFMD meeting in Quito, Ecuador, the key themes of discussion were: the governance of labour migration in the context of changing employment landscapes, skilling

⁴ Available at: diaspora.iom.int.

migrants for employment, leveraging new technologies to empower migrants, migrant protection, realizing SDG goals and managing the future of human mobility. These themes illustrate the perspective, scale and priorities held by a significant share of participating governments. The years to come will likely bring interesting developments in these areas on both national and international levels.

7. A need for dialogue between and beyond development and integration policy

Evidence from across different countries points in one direction: links between migrants' engagement in development in countries of origin and integration processes in countries of settlement exist – and they matter.

Simultaneously, it is worth acknowledging that migrants' engagements in development in countries of origin are neither top-of-the-agenda for integration policy, nor for development policy. For integration processes, migrants' transnational engagements are usually quite a marginal factor. Similarly, for development processes overall in migrants' countries of origin, migrants' contributions are not the primary vehicle of development, despite the close to universal agreement that remittances are important. Nevertheless, the links between integration and development exist, and moreover they matter for migrants and for their descendants, and they also matter at a societal level in both contexts of origin and of settlement.

We find a clear case for the need for dialogue between and beyond development and integration policy, aiming to address the **persistent lack of policy coherence** between policies on integration, development and migration management. Indeed, a **long-term investment** in dialogue between development and integration policy has proven to show results in both fields, as examples from Germany, among others, illustrate. A lack of sustained effort and institutional commitment over time appears to stand in the way of synergies materializing.

However, dialogue must move **beyond development and integration policy, to include 'migration management'** policy. Migration policy explicitly and implicitly affects integration policy, and in recent years also intersects with development aid aims, necessitating a holistic approach if fragmentation and piecemeal policies that risk cancelling each other out are to be avoided. A key question, meanwhile, remains: is there a common goal within the migration policy field?

The following example may serve to illustrate the need for dialogue between policy about integration, development and migration management. Return policies to countries of origin, for return of individuals without a legal right to stay, are defined as 'development' as a point of departure, by the way in which such policies are placed and tied to development funding in state budgets, including in Norway. While the migration management objective of removing individuals without a legal right to stay from the country's territory may be legitimate enough, as a policy connecting migration and development, it throws up more questions than answers. For instance, it is well documented that migrants who have a legal right to stay in their country of settlement are far more likely to return to a country of origin to invest or to work than those without such legal documents. Indeed, for return in general, it is argued that safe legal status in both contexts is the measure which is the most likely to yield higher levels of return, because a safety net option exists. Furthermore, in order to contribute to development in countries of origin, it is neither necessary, nor sufficient, for a migrant to return on an assumption that this is a permanent return, and without a clear or specific commitment to the return project itself.

Meanwhile, the **lack of dialogue and policy coherence has particularly negative ramifications in the field of integration**. When migrants' contributions to development in places of origin are

given recognition as forms of civic participation on par with other forms of civil society international solidarity, this proves inclusion in both practical and rhetorical ways. By contrast, when such recognition is lacking, or is confounded by conflicting messages, 'integration' may be negatively affected.

The lack of policy coherence on integration, development and migration management is damaging to the positive contributions that individual migrants can and do make for development in their countries of origin, which in turn are closely intertwined with their everyday lives in countries of settlement. At a minimum, government efforts toward policy coherence should actively ensure that policies do not hinder or get in the way of migrants' development contributions in countries of origin. Regulations pertaining to family reunification are a case in point. What is the effect on migrants' development engagements – or of migrant descendants' engagements – which often require longer stays in the country of origin (or ancestry), when migrants know that marriage to a partner from the country of origin, and life in Norway thereafter, may well hinge on *not* having spent a significant amount of time in the country of origin?

Both the intended and unintended, and the foreseen and unforeseen effects of policies – and of their interplay – matter. It is precisely such compound effects of policies, including on the unintended side, which may matter the most at the intersection of integration and development policy. If policy attention – for legitimate and valid reasons – is focused on what a government identifies as problem-areas, which are associated with the existence of transnational ties among many migrant communities, what is the effect on policy areas which are not problem-framed, such as migrants' remittance-sending, or entrepreneurship which requires extended stays in countries of origin?

Arguably, the problem-oriented framing of specific transnational ties dominates in the Norwegian context, which is not unique, to the extent that it drives a degree of scepticism toward remittance-sending specifically, and transnational ties more generally. This has implications for migrants who are transnationally engaged, and hence is relevant both for considerations about their integration processes, and for their potential contributions to development in countries of origin. For, what is the effect of government attention to the issue of long-term stays abroad for children of migrants? While these stays may for some be extremely problematic, as has been well evidenced, for others, these are international spells akin to those that the children of diplomats are always exposed to. But what impression is the policy community left with, on the topic of transnational ties overall, when the transnational ties that receive attention are those with assumed negative human costs? What is the effect of *not* scrutinizing the transnational ties which do not come to the fore because they do not drive problems for individuals or integration process in Norwegian society?

The implications of failing to recognize diaspora development contributions as civic engagement, both 'here' and 'there', are likely to be especially adverse for the descendants of migrants, who are born and raised in countries of settlement, and usually citizens of these countries – sometimes alongside also being citizens of their parents' countries of origin. It is pertinent to reflect on why the international solidarity activism of some might be considered differently from the international solidarity activism of others, based simply on whether or not they have parents who are immigrants. Is a relief collection to draught victims in Somalia, organized by youth whose families originate from Somalia, different from the collections for relief to Afghanistan organized by the Norwegian Afghanistan committee? And is the mosque-organized transfer of funds for charitable purposes linked to the Islamic calendar, for Eid for instance, seen differently than collections taken up by Norwegian Church Aid? If so, why? While perhaps an uncomfortable reality – differential treatment without good justification breaches Norwegian egalitarian norms –

these are questions that need to be addressed if a society desires to face the reality of increasing migration-related diversity among its citizens in equitable ways (Erdal and Borchgrevink 2015; Horst 2019).

The need for policy dialogue between different ministries and directorates involved with different aspects of international migration is of course not a new theme. Past examples of such meeting platforms and cooperation are plentiful, largely inspired by engaged individuals within the bureaucracy. Yet, a lacking demand for these policy fields to work consistently together is also a clear trend, resulting in the persisting lack of policy coherence over time, which is confounded by limited institutional memory, and extremely vulnerable to the changing staff composition within specific ministry or directorate sections. In turn, many of these challenges can and should be traced back to limited political will at the highest political decision-making levels to invest in enhancing policy coherence between and beyond the fields of integration, development and migration management.

8. Possible pathways ahead for policy development

Diaspora development contributions in countries of origin, as an empirical reality, bring integration policy, development policy, and migration management policy into action in different ways. This reality means that also a ‘no policy policy’ has effects, which are not planned, and therefore likely not only unintended, but perhaps also undesirable. Therefore, at an overarching level, **recognition is needed of policy’s roles** in proactively affecting the interplay of migrants’ development engagements in countries of origin and integration processes in countries of settlement, involving not only migrants themselves, and migrants’ descendants, but societies overall.

At a more specific level, a number of possible goals or action points are necessary in future policy development:

Joint initiatives across policy fields

- **Harnessing the potential of participation in GFMD meetings:** The Global Forum on Migration and Development meetings provide an international arena where Norwegian presence has been prioritized and invested in over time since 2007. More often than not, Norwegian delegations are composed of representatives from Ministries responsible for integration, development (and foreign policy) and migration management. These meetings offer an opportunity to develop and present Norwegian initiatives, and their plans for follow-up, implementation and evaluation. This provides a context for collaboration on shared Norwegian policy goals.
- **Aligning diaspora development efforts with citizen engagement in development:** Migrants’ development engagements can be discussed in terms of ‘diaspora development efforts’, but might equally be described as citizen engagements, on par with other civil society solidarity efforts. Thus, a long-term goal might be to align diaspora development efforts with citizen engagement in development. Clearly, this is a goal that requires involvement from both the development policy side and the integration policy side. An important question here is: how do we value these types of engagements and contributions at the societal level?
- **Developing a step-wise strategy to achieve policy coherence:** The apparent conflict of interest in the three policy fields of integration, development, and migration management, in terms of diaspora development engagements in countries of origin, is worth further attention. What exactly are the elements of conflict of interest, at the level of actual policies which are being developed and implemented? Conversely, a path toward policy coherence in this field will necessarily need to address any apparent or real conflicts of interest in order to succeed. Arguably, such conflicts of interest may be stronger at the level of appearance and political rhetoric than in substance.
- **Successfully reaching diversity management and awareness targets:** Diversity management and awareness is a cross-cutting goal in the public sector, which becomes

particularly pertinent in the context of work on diaspora development engagements in countries of origin and integration in countries of settlement. This matters in terms of recruitment, representation in meetings and events (internal or external), and in terms of valuing diverse views and perspectives. Now is an opportune moment for using this area of intersecting policies on an issue that is not top-of-the-agenda to constructively engage and further diversity agendas across policy fields in relevant ministries, recognizing the full breadth of diversity – countries of origin, minorities within migrant communities, including religious, ethnic, sexual, as well as generational diversity within migrant groups too. Here, lessons can be learned from the success that Norway has had in issues of gender equality and inclusion.

- **Communicating the relevance of transnational engagements for integration processes:** This remains a task where none of the relevant policy fields have proactively contributed. Both *Bistandsaktuelt* and *Utop* have repeatedly covered these themes in the last 10–15 years, providing examples of public awareness. Yet, further work remains: first, in terms of raising public awareness of the phenomenon as such; second, in terms of contributing to better understanding of the totality and (aimed for) coherence of migration policies; and third, as part of a policy drive for inclusion and equality, where zero-sum game approaches to belonging are countered, and individuals' rights to claim equal, legitimate and recognized belonging is not only not challenged, but actively supported.

Measures to meet knowledge needs

- **Policy analysis** is needed. First, we need analysis about the long-term impacts of lacking policy coherence in this field. Second, policy analysis that examines what inadvertently gets in the way of positive contributions to development would offer important insights for future policy development: what is being done, which policies intersect and matter, and what effect does this really have?
- **Research about the empirical patterns** of diaspora development contributions and integration processes, systematically comparing individual trajectories and choices, could provide valuable evidence to guide future policy development. One avenue to pursue lies in the survey on living conditions among immigrants (last round 2016–2017), where questions are asked about remittance-sending, but also about contributions to development and humanitarian organizations in countries of origin. Analyses of these in relation to integration questions are yet to be fully conducted and interpreted. Furthermore, long-term impacts can only be traced over time, underscoring the importance of some questions for future survey rounds, as well as for other research initiatives.

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10. Appendix 1: Documentation of Norwegian diaspora-development initiatives

10.1. Search methodology

The compiling of information on Norwegian diaspora-development initiatives has been done through targeted keyword searches in *Bistandsaktuelt*, a humanitarian NGO and development sector trade magazine, as well as in *Utrop*, a newspaper that presents current issues, news-items and exchanges of opinion on a variety of aspects of multicultural Norway. The keywords used for each publication are listed below. Please note that the slight difference in search terms used in *Bistandsaktuelt* and *Utrop* reflect a need to better navigate the amount of search hits generated in each respective publication, as well as ensuring a level of overall search comprehensiveness. To summarize the search process in short, a combination of several terms into one search (for example “*utvikling AND diaspora AND integrasjon/integrering*”) was the most fruitful, particularly in the case of *Utrop*.

Both publications are available both physically and digitally. The results list below, where *Bistandsaktuelt* has page numbers while *Utrop* does not, reflects that the former follows a publishing model in which the PDF directly mirrors the print copy, while the latter has an online news section that is continuously updated, rather than operating with distinct publication issues.

10.2. Search terms used in *Bistandsaktuelt*

- Bistand
- Innvandrere AND utvikling
- Migrant
- Migrasjon
- Pengeoverføring
- Utvikling AND diaspora

10.3. Search terms used in *Utrop*

- Bistand
- Innvandrere AND utvikling
- Migrant AND utvikling
- Migrasjon
- Pengeoverføring
- Utvikling AND diaspora AND integrasjon/integrering

10.4. Search results – *Bistandsaktuelt*

- *Skatt er medisinen for land som har rusa seg på bistand*, Maria Lavik, Nr. 5 Dec 2019, page 5, *Bistandsaktuelt*
<https://bistandsaktuelt.no/globalassets/pdf-utgaver/bistandsaktuelt-1905.pdf>

- *Slik vil de forandre «gamlelandet»*, Tor Aksel Bolle, Nr. 5 Dec 2019, page 12–13, *Bistandsaktuelt*
<https://bistandsaktuelt.no/globalassets/pdf-utgaver/bistandsaktuelt-1905.pdf>
- *Etiopia – et stort økonomisk eksperiment*, Knut Aril Thonstad, June 21, 2019, online only, *Bistandsaktuelt*
<https://bistandsaktuelt.no/arkiv-kommentarer/2019/etiopia---et-stort-okonomisk-eksperiment/>
- *En bistandsgigant som kan presse fra resultater?*, Gunnar Zachrisen, Nr. 1 Feb 2019, page 3, *Bistandsaktuelt*
<https://bistandsaktuelt.no/globalassets/pdf-utgaver/bistandsaktuelt-1901.1.pdf>
- *Migranter sender hjem 100 bistandsbudsjetter*, Asle Olav Rønning, Nr. 5 Sept 2017, pages 27–31, *Bistandsaktuelt*
<https://bistandsaktuelt.no/globalassets/pdf-utgaver/bistandsaktuelt-1705.pdf>
- *«Tungt å være vitne til at Somalia igjen rammes»*, Ubah Aden, March 23, 2017, online only, *Bistandsaktuelt*
<https://bistandsaktuelt.no/arkiv-kommentarer/2017/diaspora-mobiliserer-for-somalia/>
- *Frontsoldater for mødre-helse*, Espen Røst, Nr. 5 Sept 2016, pages 10–13, *Bistandsaktuelt*
<https://bistandsaktuelt.no/globalassets/pdf-utgaver/bistandsaktuelt-16052.pdf>
- *Uganda ønsker mer diaspora-investering*, Nicole Rafiki, May 24, 2015, online only, *Bistandsaktuelt*
<https://bistandsaktuelt.no/nyheter/2015/uganda-onsker-diaspora-investeringer/>
- *Alt-mulig kvinnen*, Asle Olav Rønning, Nr. 5 Jun 2014, page 32, *Bistandsaktuelt*
<https://bistandsaktuelt.no/globalassets/migrerte-bilder-og-pdf/filarkiv/utgaver/bistandsaktuelt-1405.pdf>
- *Norads krav er for strenge*, Gunnar Zachrisen, Nr. 4 May 2014, pages 4–5, *Bistandsaktuelt*
<https://bistandsaktuelt.no/globalassets/migrerte-bilder-og-pdf/filarkiv/utgaver/bistandsaktuelt-1404.pdf>
- *Dialog med den somaliske diasporaen*, Christiane Seehausen, Nr. 10 Dec 2013, page 30, *Bistandsaktuelt*
<https://bistandsaktuelt.no/globalassets/migrerte-bilder-og-pdf/filarkiv/utgaver/bistandsaktuelt-1310.pdf>
- *Katastrofe-vante filippinerehjelper seg selv*, Hege Opseth, Nr. 9 Nov 2013, pages 2–3, *Bistandsaktuelt*
<https://bistandsaktuelt.no/globalassets/migrerte-bilder-og-pdf/filarkiv/utgaver/bistandsaktuelt-1309.pdf>
- *Dugnadssjefen*, Tiril A. Skarstein, Nr. 2 Mar 2012, pages 20–21, *Bistandsaktuelt*
<https://bistandsaktuelt.no/globalassets/migrerte-bilder-og-pdf/filarkiv/utgaver/bistandsaktuelt-1202.pdf>
- *«Pilot Pakistan» avvikles*, Liv Røhnebæk Bjergene, Nr. 1 Feb 2010, page 13, *Bistandsaktuelt*
<https://bistandsaktuelt.no/globalassets/migrerte-bilder-og-pdf/filarkiv/utgaver/201001.pdf>
- *Fra hvitt til fargerikt – June 2009 – Bistandsaktuelt*
<https://bistandsaktuelt.no/globalassets/migrerte-bilder-og-pdf/filarkiv/utgaver/200905.pdf>
- *Bruk immigranter til utvikling, oppfordrer forskere*, Martha Camilla Wright, March 17, 2009, online only, *Bistandsaktuelt*
<https://bistandsaktuelt.no/migrering/eldre-nyheter/ba-artikkel-2009/2009/bruk-immigranter-til-utvikling-oppfordrer-forskere/>

- Vil investere hjemsendte penger, unknown author, Nr. 10 Dec 2007, page 19, *Bistandsaktuelt*
<https://bistandsaktuelt.no/globalassets/migrerte-bilder-og-pdf/filarkiv/utgaver/200710.pdf>
- Migrasjon og utvikling, Jon Bech, Nr. 1 Feb 2006, page 3, *Bistandsaktuelt*
<https://bistandsaktuelt.no/globalassets/migrerte-bilder-og-pdf/filarkiv/utgaver/200601.pdf>

10.5. Literature list – *Utrop*

- Landet som ikke finnes, klarer seg bra!, unknown author, Jan 26, 2018, *Utrop*
<https://www.utrop.no/plenum/mangfoldige-meninger/32788/>
- Sender hjem 100 bistandsbudsjetter, Anna Aronsen Oftedal, Dec 14, 2017, *Utrop*
<https://www.utrop.no/nyheter/verden/32665/>
- Fem råd til tamilene, Majoran Vivekananthan, Jan 29, 2015, *Utrop*
<https://www.utrop.no/plenum/kommentar/28283/>
- Kraftfull transnasjonalisme, Navjot Sandhu, Nov 6, 2014, *Utrop*
<https://www.utrop.no/plenum/kommentar/28098/>
- Historisk 17. mai-feiring i Mogadishu, May 20, 2014, *Utrop*
<https://www.utrop.no/nyheter/verden/27355/>
- Ekskludert i ny stortingsmelding, Tika Sofia Leon, May 29, 2013, *Utrop*
<https://www.utrop.no/nyheter/nytt/25181/>
- Diasporaen kan forandre Somalia, Claudio Castello, Dec 23, 2012, *Utrop*
<https://www.utrop.no/nyheter/nytt/23927/>
- Vil ha skattefradrag for pengeoverføringer, Uzma Rana, Oct 27, 2011, *Utrop*
<https://www.utrop.no/nyheter/nytt/20546/>
- Lanserte ny tjeneste for pengeoverføring, Claudio Castello, Nov 10, 2010, *Utrop*
<https://www.utrop.no/nyheter/nytt/19435/>
- Invitasjon til lansering for Sendepengerhjem.no, Majoran Vivekanathan, Oct 28, 2010, *Utrop*
<https://www.utrop.no/det-skjer/kurs-og-seminar/19358/>
- Premier privat pengehjelp, Claudio Castello, Oct 27, 2010, *Utrop*
<https://www.utrop.no/nyheter/nytt/19346/>
- Staten skal hjelpe innvandrere med å sende penger hjem, Majoran Vivekanathan, Oct 27, 2010, *Utrop*
<https://www.utrop.no/nyheter/nytt/19350/>
- Innvandrere bidrar til utvikling av hjemlandet, unknown author, Apr 18, 2008, *Utrop*
<https://www.utrop.no/nyheter/nytt/14724/>
- Med en hånd i hvert land, Brit Lynnebakke, Jan 25, 2007, *Utrop*
<https://www.utrop.no/nyheter/kultur/12399/>
- Ønsker tettere samarbeid med innvandrergupper om utvikling, Brit Lynnebakke, Sept 12, 2006, *Utrop*
<https://www.utrop.no/nyheter/nytt/11375/>
- Skaper fred med nye tanker, Alfredo Blamont, Apr 19, 2006, *Utrop*
<https://www.utrop.no/live-plus/10527/>
- Somaliland, en godt bevart hemmelighet, unknown author, Apr 7, 2006, *Utrop*
<https://www.utrop.no/live-plus/10261/>
- Se Afrika og Norge som ett land!, Lorenz Khazaleh, Nov 20, 2004, *Utrop*
<https://www.utrop.no/live-plus/11981/>

11. Appendix 2: Bibliography of academic literature on diaspora development engagements and connections with integration

11.1. Search methodology

The methodological approach used was three-pronged: first, keyword searches were conducted in Google Scholar (GS) and Web of Science (WoS), using the search terms listed below. Second, a more targeted search was conducted by looking for pertinent literature that had cited a selection of nine seminal articles we preselected. Third, the search was expanded to include relevant articles that referred to literature that in turn had cited our original nine designated starting articles. The targeted searches were the most fruitful ones (both among 1st and 2nd generation of citations, as explained above), whereas general key word searches provided too many hits, “noise” and duplicate entries.

In selecting what literature to include, we were guided by the criteria that the works would, in the main, exclusively target the intersection of diasporas, development and integration, to ensure we did try to attempt to tackle the sizable amount of literature on migration and development. This literature, while both relevant and interesting, is one that several members of the team have been working closely with for several years. Therefore, in order to ensure we brought attention to the most recent research, a further focus was put on the years 2010–2020 for work covering the trifecta of diaspora, development and integration. However, in the interest of being comprehensive and bringing potential new research findings to the table, we did also review literature on migration and development published between 2015 and 2020, if there was at least a mention of the integration aspect.

The findings have been grouped according to a self-devised categorization of primary topics and themes treated in the literature, which are not mutually exclusive thematically.

11.2. Search terms

- Diaspora AND Development AND Integration/Inclusion, in combination and separately
- Migrant(s) AND Integration/Inclusion AND Development AND Country of Origin/Sending country/Home
- Remittances
- Transnationalism

11.3. Search results

1. General reference articles on the topic of diasporas, development and integration:

Bastia, T., Skeldon, R. (eds) (2020) *Routledge Handbook of Migration and Development*. London: Routledge.

Dos Reis, A.A., K. Koser and M. Levin (2017) 'Private Sector Engagement in the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration', in McAuliffe, M. and M. Klein Solomon (Conveners) (2017) *Ideas to Inform International Cooperation on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration*, IOM: Geneva.

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2. Work focusing on **migrants' development engagement**, based on research in countries of settlement (CoS), occasionally also in countries of origin (CoO), with a particular focus on settlement country issues:

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Kadhum, O. (2019) Assessing co-development projects for civil society building in Iraq: the case of the Iraqi diaspora and Swedish institutions following the 2003 intervention in Iraq. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 46(2): 222–241.

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3. Work that explores the **drivers of diaspora development engagement** and at least refers explicitly to integration/inclusion aspects, even if this is not the main emphasis:

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4. **Relationships between remittance-sending, integration and development in countries of origin**, including both collective remittances and remittances at the family level, as long as there is a clear integration-angle to the piece:

Baudassé, T., Bazillier, R. and Issifou, I. (2018) Migration And Institutions: Exit and Voice (From Abroad)? *Journal of Economic Surveys*, 32: 727–766.

Bilgili, Ö. (2015) Economic integration to send money back home? *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies*, 13(4): 379–400.

Chaudhary, A. R. (2018) Organizing transnationalism and belonging among Pakistani immigrants in London and New York. *Migration Studies*, 6(3): 420–447.

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5. **The simultaneity of integration and transnational practices** – where transnational practices might be remittance-sending for collective purposes i.e. with a development project/agenda in mind:

Gabrielli L., Gsir S., Zapata-Barrero R. (2017) Political and Civic Participation of Immigrants in Host Countries. An Interpretative Framework from the Perspective of the Origin Countries and Societies. In: Weinar A., Unterreiner A., Fargues P. (eds) *Migrant Integration Between Homeland and Host Society Volume 1. Global Migration Issues*, vol 7. Cham: Springer.

Geurts, N., & Lubbers, M. (2019) The role of country of origin engagement in second-language proficiency of recent migrants. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 42(16): 120–140.

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Mügge, L. (2016) Transnationalism as a research paradigm and its relevance for integration. In *Integration Processes and Policies in Europe* (pp. 109–125). Cham: Springer.

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Rezaei, S., & Goli, M. (2020) Prometheus, the double-troubled–migrant transnational entrepreneurs and the loyalty trap. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 46(10): 2045–2066.

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Şimşek, D. (2019) Transnational activities of Syrian refugees in Turkey: hindering or supporting integration. *International Migration*, 57(2): 268–282.

6. Relationships between citizenship and political status in CoS and civic engagement in CoO – including remittance and development activities:

Ambrosetti, E., Cela, E., & Fokkema, T. (2013) The differential impact of the legal status of migrants in Italy on transnationalism: just a matter of time and integration? *Journal of Mediterranean Studies*, 22(1), 33–60.

Sinatti, G., & Horst, C. (2015) Migrants as agents of development: Diaspora engagement discourse and practice in Europe. *Ethnicities*, 15(1): 134–152.

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Østergaard-Nielsen, E. (2011) Codevelopment and citizenship: The nexus between policies on local migrant incorporation and migrant transnational practices in Spain. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 34(1): 20–39.

Integration and Development: Need for Dialogue

This PRIO Paper examines how the integration experiences of migrants and their descendants in settlement countries affect development processes in countries of origin. We review eight specific conduits for diaspora contributions to development, including remittance-sending, voting and activism, and participation in official development cooperation.

Each of these mechanisms are intertwined with integration experiences, and potentially shaped by policy measures in both countries of settlement and of origin. Evidence from across different countries points in one direction: links between migrants' engagement in development in countries of origin and integration processes in countries of settlement exist – and they matter.

Therefore, recognition of the roles for policy in proactively affecting the interplay of migrants' development engagements in countries of origin and their integration processes in countries of settlement is needed. There is a need for dialogue, and policy coherence, where policy concerns in the fields of integration, development and migration management intersect.

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