

EVALUATION DEPARTMENT


REPORT 3/2018 COUNTRY EVALUATION BRIEF



Norad

Haiti

Evaluation Portrait



Commissioned by
The Evaluation Department

Carried out by
Particip GmbH in consortium
with Menon Economics

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interpretations, and conclusions presented
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views of the Evaluation Department.

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Cover photo: UN Photo/Logan Abassi/Flickr
*Haitians set up impromptu tent cities throughout
the capital after an earthquake measuring
7 plus on the Richter scale rocked
Port-au-Prince, Haiti, January 12, 2010.*

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1 Haiti – Evaluation Portrait

1.1 2017

1.1.1 Learning from a Mid-Term Evaluation of FONHDAD in Haiti

<i>Evaluation</i>	<i>Learning from a Mid-Term Evaluation of FONHDAD in Haiti</i>
Published (year)	2017
Author/Agency	Kelsey E. Hopkins
Commissioned by	Clark University
Type of evaluation	Mid-Term project evaluation
Project period	2015-2017
Keywords	Agriculture, food security, capacity development
Abstract	The Haitian Foundation for Sustainable Agricultural Development, FONHDAD, is a non-profit organization in Haiti which aims to modernize Haiti's agriculture by introducing new techniques, fertilizers, seeds, and equipment. FONHDAD implemented the USAID funded REFERANS (Project to strengthen the agricultural production in the communes of Ganthier and Croix-des-Bouquets) project which provided agricultural support to farmers in two communes both located less than 30 kilometres from Port-au-Prince. During the first year of the project, REFERANS established baseline data, conducted agricultural interventions and trainings, and impacted over 1,000 rural households. Evaluation data was primarily based on the production of corn and sorghum. Data was not available for analysis of beans. A pest management strategy was also utilized which included a targeted pest control campaign. Nonetheless, pests negatively influenced the yield of sorghum. Data was not available to truly understand the extent of the pest control campaign and if it targeted sorghum or not. The project evaluation noted that one major area for improvement would be data management strategies to reduce inconsistencies and gaps in the available data. Available gender data was included throughout the evaluation to highlight progress towards FONHDAD's goal to include female farmers in available programs. The performance indicator data showed varying levels of female inclusion, with rates for female training higher than for other activities. This included short-term agricultural productivity or food security and global climate change training.
Cross-cutting issues	Gender, training
Link to evaluation	http://commons.clarku.edu/idce_masters_papers/111

1.1.2 Évaluation en temps réel: Réponse à l'ouragan Mattieu en Haïti

<i>Evaluation</i>	<i>Évaluation en temps réel: Réponse à l'ouragan Mattieu en Haïti</i>
Published (year)	2017
Author/Agency	URD/HERE- Geneva
Commissioned by	DFID/URD
Type of evaluation	Thematic: RTE of disaster event
Project period	Nov-Dec 2016
Keywords	Preparedness, communication, logistics, clusters
Abstract	On 3 and 4 October 2016, a category 4 hurricane, known as Matthew,

	struck the Grand'Anse and Sud Departments in southwestern Haiti affecting an estimated 2.1 million people. As the first major disaster since the May 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) held in Istanbul, the international response took place in a particular context. The report focussed on several issues that reflected the commitments listed in the Grand Bargain such as: disaster preparedness, mobilisation of international actors, telecommunications; data management and needs assessments, logistics and related challenges. While providing detailed evidence on these areas, the evaluation's main overall finding was that there had been significant improvement in the international response to the humanitarian consequences of hurricane Matthew compared to earlier disasters in Haiti, even though the improvement has been uneven. Among donors and operational humanitarian agencies, there were major differences in terms of how they understood the scale and complexity of this disaster. They responded at different speeds, with different levels of investment from headquarters, and have done well in some sectors, but far less well in others.
Cross-cutting issues	None described
Link to evaluation	http://www.urd.org/Rapport-de-l-evaluation-en-temps

1.2 2016

1.2.1 British Red Cross' Haiti Urban Regeneration and Reconstruction Programme (URRP) Final Evaluation

Evaluation	<i>British Red Cross' Haiti Urban Regeneration and Reconstruction Programme (URRP) Final Evaluation</i>
Published (year)	2016
Author/Agency	Advisem Services, Inc.
Commissioned by	BRC British Red Cross
Type of evaluation	Thematic: urban regeneration
Project period	June-Sep 2015
Keywords	Urban, reconstruction, livelihoods
Abstract	The British Red Cross (BRC) commissioned a final evaluation of the programme to reflect on and learn from its experience in Haiti. The specific objectives of the evaluation were to review the extent to which BRC's engagement in Haiti achieved its objectives across different interventions. The British Red Cross generally accepted all (7) recommendations presented by the evaluators. The evaluation team believed that, even though the results appeared to be mixed, the Urban Regeneration and Reconstruction Programme (URRP) still represented a major achievement, considering the conditions that prevailed in Delmas 19 and the significant constraints within which the BRC had to work. On the whole, the housing and infrastructure component achieved fairly good results, especially in public infrastructure. The livelihoods component achieved modest results and could have done more, had it not been for the lack of time and the high turnover in programme staff. Of all three components, governance was the most severely affected by the programme's tight implementation deadlines. Some progress was made in building the skills and capacities of local stakeholders; however, in the absence of any meaningful follow-up, this progress is unlikely to be sustainable. The evaluation highlights that the canal and other drainage and paving infrastructure works "had the greatest and most positive impact upon the community".
Cross-cutting issues	Marginalized groups

Link to evaluation	http://www.urban-response.org/resource/23685
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1.2.2 Haiti: What did we learn? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haiti Earthquake

Evaluation	<i>Haiti: What did we learn? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haiti Earthquake</i>
Published (year)	2016
Author/Agency	The World Bank
Commissioned by	Habitat for Humanity, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, UN Human Settlements Program, Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR)
Type of evaluation	Thematic: Shelter
Project period	2010-2016
Keywords	Shelter, Reconstruction, humanitarian response
Abstract	The report was intended to help housing and shelter practitioners improve future post-disaster shelter responses and housing recovery programs and the integration between them. The report covered the shelter and housing responses in Haiti, and looked especially at how early decisions about sheltering affected the housing response. The analysis also covered other interrelated topics that heavily affected work on shelter and housing: disaster risk management (DRM), the urban context, and recovery financing. The report served as an input to work of the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) to improve disaster recovery, in particular, the development of the Guide to Developing Disaster Recovery Frameworks (DFR Guide). Soon after the initial emergency phase was completed, it was evident that Haitians and international actors were not working in concert. There was lack of familiarity with the cluster system by Haitian actors, a failure to adapt it to Haitian requirements, and friction from language and cultural differences. Government was not successful at coordinating the international actors and there was turnover and instability in the cluster system. A further difficulty was maintaining continuity during the nearly yearlong election and early post-election period. Ultimately, the shelter response consisted almost exclusively of camp support and a massive T-shelter program. The T-shelters supported property owners more than renters, by committing disproportionate funding to T-shelters, which required access to land, and alternatives, such as rental subsidies and hosting arrangements, were underfunded.
Cross-cutting issues	Protection
Link to evaluation	https://www.gfdr.org/what-did-we-learn-the-shelter-response-and-housing-recovery-in-the-first-two-years-after-the-2010-haiti-earthquake

1.2.3 Evaluación del Programa de País Haití 2011-2015

Evaluation	<i>Evaluación del Programa de País Haití 2011-2015</i>
Published (year)	2016
Author/Agency	IADP
Commissioned by	Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo
Type of evaluation	Country
Project period	2011-2015
Keywords	General development, transportation, WASH, education
Abstract	The country strategy with Haiti for the 2011-2015 period was the Inter-

	American Development Bank's (IDB) first post-earthquake strategy and coincided with the start of the mandate of the Ninth General Increase in the Resources of the IDB (IDB-9). The IDB-9 commitments for Haiti included debt forgiveness and expanded the IDB Grant Facility with a view to providing Haiti with US\$200 million per year over a period of 10 years (2011-2020), subject to annual approval by the Governors. The IDB-9 commitments modified the Bank's relationship with Haiti by converting the Bank's entire portfolio to a grant portfolio. Adjustment to the IDB-9 requirements also included to create in the Vice Presidency for Countries (VPC) a Haiti Department (CDH), to ensure the efficient and effective management of the unprecedented amount of resources allocated by IDB-9 (document AB-2764) to the Haiti program. The country strategy achieved limited results in relation to the initial targets, with significant challenges in terms of the operational and financial sustainability of investments. The investment portfolio made progress on infrastructure works, albeit with differences from sector to sector, but the coverage and expansion targets initially proposed under the country strategy were not met. Sector specifics follow: • Transportation: the results fell short of the targets in terms of road network quality (kilometers rehabilitated) and maintenance. • Energy: rehabilitation programs for the Péligre hydroelectric plant and the distribution system experienced significant delays and cost overruns (close to US\$110 million). • Agriculture: the sector portfolio was positive in terms of the construction of flood protection infrastructure and the expansion of irrigable area, but limited in terms of raising crop yields. • WASH: increase in coverage and financial performance of the operators, were limited for Port-au-Prince but showed improvements in midsized city programs. The rural water program, despite achieving the beneficiary targets, did not meet the coverage and sanitation targets. • Education: improvements in access, through the construction of schools, were limited, while the tuition waiver program yielded better outcomes. In terms of quality of education, progress was confined to teacher training and the provision of materials. Progress on the governance pillar was significant.
Cross-cutting issues	None described
Link to evaluation	https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/8057?locale-attribute=es&locale-attribute=en

1.2.4 Rapport de la Commission Indépendante d'Evaluation et de Vérification Electorale Elections de 2015

Evaluation	Rapport de la Commission Indépendante d'Evaluation et de Vérification Electorale Elections de 2015
Published (year)	2016
Author/Agency	Commission Indépendante d'Evaluation et de Vérification Electorale (CIEVE)
Commissioned by	Commission Indépendante d'Evaluation et de Vérification Electorale (CIEVE)
Type of evaluation	Process
Project period	2015
Keywords	Electoral system, voting transparency
Abstract	The number of complete files expected (3,235) compared to those found (294) shows the weakness of the documentary surveillance chain whose mission was to protect chronological documentation or any documentary

	trace related to the seizure, detention, control, transfer, analysis, and storage of physical and / or electronic evidence of electoral ballots. The proportion of non-retractable votes (29%) applied to the total of valid votes (1,560,631) means that the Voting Bureaux would have authorized 448,000 citizens to vote without confirming and certifying inadequacy, as stipulated in the electoral decree. The second critical element is the proportion of the number of correct National Identity Cards (CINs) compared to signatures and or fingerprints. The percentage of false CINs found is 16.2%. For the 1,112,600 registered votes (valid votes reported on minutes minus the number of hand-inscribed CINs) 180,250 would then be false CINs for a total of 628,000 irreducible votes. The number of unreliable votes (628,000 votes, or 40% of valid votes) is higher than the number of votes obtained by the candidate placed at the top of the list according to the results of the evaluation, higher than the sum of votes obtained by the second and third candidates, and higher than the difference between the first and fifth candidates. Moreover, by applying certain criteria defined by the CIEVE according to article 171.1 of the electoral decree, the situation becomes even more serious because the percentage of valid votes is reduced to 9% of the total votes. In line with the CIEVE's mandate to essentially purify the process in order to restore the confidence of the political actors, it recommends the resumption of the process, while taking the necessary steps to ensure and respect the right to vote of citizens and the right of candidates (to be fairly elected).
Cross-cutting issues	None described
Link to evaluation	http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Rapport_CIEVE.pdf

1.2.5 Comparative Assessment of Livelihood Approaches Across Humanitarian Organizations in Post-Earthquake Haiti Camp Resettlement

Evaluation	<i>Comparative Assessment of Livelihood Approaches Across Humanitarian Organizations in Post-Earthquake Haiti Camp Resettlement</i>
Published (year)	2016
Author/Agency	Concern Worldwide
Commissioned by	Concern Worldwide
Type of evaluation	Impact: shelter
Project period	2013-2016
Keywords	Resettlement, gender, livelihoods
Abstract	This report focused on an evaluation of Income Generating Activities (IGA) that accompanied rental subsidy programs in Haiti between 2013 and 2016. The original objectives were to evaluate the impact of supplemental support on the economic situation of house-holds, the livelihoods approaches from a quality/ cost/ effectiveness point of view and to feed into current reflection process of parties concerned with sustainable livelihood approaches. The consultants reviewed reports for humanitarian organisations that provided rental subsidies, conducted 10 focus groups with beneficiaries and aid workers, and surveyed a sample of 1,399 rental subsidy beneficiaries. The study found: 1) A relationship between aid money received and those who remained in rental subsidy housing. Those who received the greatest amount of money—over 25,000 HT--were most likely to have left the house for economic reasons. The relationship is likely related to the fact most vulnerable beneficiaries received the most aid, i.e., they were also the

	most likely to have to seek lower income housing. 2) The most statistically significant indications of a relationship between training and any response variable were a relationship between professional training and still being in the rental subsidy house or having left it for non-economic reasons. Specifically, the evaluators found that 73% of those who had professional training had either remained in the house or left for non-economic reasons vs. 60% for the overall sample population. 3) A relationship between Breadwinner Status and having Received Tools or Materials. Eleven percent of those who had received tools progressed from being a non-breadwinner or a less than primary breadwinner to being a second or the primary household breadwinner. 4) The evaluators found a statistically significant ($p=.05$) higher proportion of beneficiaries who had received training remained in the rental subsidy home or left for non-economic reasons. Specifically, only 41 percent for those who had received no training remained or left the rental unit for non-economic reasons vs. 55 percent for the nearest humanitarian aid agency, that of Goal.
Cross-cutting issues	Gender
Link to evaluation	http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IGA_Report_FINAL_10_07_2016.pdf

1.3 2015

1.3.1 Evaluation of Canada-Haiti Cooperation 2006-2013 - Synthesis Report

Evaluation	<i>Evaluation of Canada-Haiti Cooperation 2006-2013 - Synthesis Report</i>
Published (year)	2015
Author/Agency	Development Evaluation Division
Commissioned by	Government of Canada
Type of evaluation	Country evaluation
Project period	2006-2013
Keywords	General development, cooperation, health, education
Abstract	This report presented the findings, conclusions, lessons and recommendations stemming from the evaluation of Canada-Haiti development cooperation for the 2006-2013 period. The evaluation, conducted from May 2013 to March 2014, assessed a sample of 47 out of the 170 projects implemented during the review period, 17 of which were visited in the field. Sectors included health, education, sustainable economic development, food security, governance, environmental sustainability. Gender equality was also addressed through improved access to health and education. Based on the sample, the evaluation concluded that overall, the initiatives Canada supported were relevant and effective. Canadian cooperation helped in the following sectors: • Health sector: established a national health policy, reduced maternal and child mortality, and improved coordination between national and international actors. • In the education sector: improved school attendance and student retention rates among both boys and girls, although it could not be determined whether this contribution had an impact on passing and graduation rates. • Sustainable economic development: helped build infrastructure in Haiti, which should generate future economic benefits. The

	program introduced innovations, particularly as part of the municipal integrated planning approach and sustainable agriculture in target areas. A key achievement was implementation of an agricultural insurance and credit system. However, the evaluation found a need for greater focus on agricultural reform, marketing, and support for value chains. • Food security sector: helped introduce micro-credit to encourage small-scale food production with potential for replication on a wider scale. Several civil society organizations were supported in improving management of rural agriculture. • Governance sector and human rights: a tangible contribution increased universal suffrage and created a space for exercising civic and fundamental rights. Canadian support helped Haiti to produce its first reports on the human rights situation, in accordance with UN conventions. The evaluation found that Canada-Haiti cooperation has been contributing to progress in the area of gender equality (GE), including the decrease in maternal and child mortality since 2006, and improvement of the attendance and retention rates of both boys and girls at the elementary school level. Canadian cooperation also helped strengthen women's roles in rural organizations in the targeted areas. The most successful projects were implemented by large Canadian NGOs.
Cross-cutting issues	Gender, environment
Link to evaluation	http://www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc/publications/evaluation/2015/dev-eval-canada-haiti01.aspx?lang=eng

1.3.2 Évaluation finale : Plans d'implémentation de programmes (pip) livelihoods et gestion des risques/préparation humanitaire (2011-2014)

Evaluation	Évaluation finale : Plans d'implémentation de programmes (pip) livelihoods et gestion des risques/préparation humanitaire (2011-2014)
Published (year)	2015
Author/Agency	Oxfam
Commissioned by	Oxfam
Type of evaluation	Programmes (2)
Project period	2011-2014
Keywords	Livelihood, DRR, gender
Abstract	This was a joint evaluation of two Program Implementation Plans (PIP)—a) Livelihoods and b) DRR/Humanitarian Preparedness—implemented by OXFAM USA (OUS) with the support of several actors over the 2011-2014 period in the departments of Artibonite, Nippes, and Ouest, Haiti. Each PIP was built around a number of projects/actions, most of which were implemented by local partners, such as community-based organizations (CBO), civil society organizations (CSO) in collaboration with local authorities, and sectoral state institutions. The evaluation findings were obtained through a participatory methodology used with the different stakeholders involved in both PIPs. These included state actors and sector regulatory institutions, implementation partners, local authorities, and direct beneficiaries/primary change agents. The data collected was complemented with data from secondary sources (e.g. project reports, sector planning document, evaluation reports, sector statistics). The Livelihoods PIP's implementation brought about a number of changes in the lives of primary change agents (at the individual, community, and organizational levels). The DRR/Humanitarian PIP actions brought about changes at the individual, community, and organizational levels in target

	areas.
Cross-cutting issues	Gender
Link to evaluation	https://policy-practice.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/files/Haiti_Program_Evaluation_2011-2014_-_French_Report.pdf

1.3.3 The Listen and Learn Project - Improving Aid Accountability in Haiti 2014

Evaluation	<i>The Listen and Learn Project - Improving Aid Accountability in Haiti 2014</i>
Published (year)	2015
Author/Agency	Dara/Keystone Accountability
Commissioned by	Conrad N. Hilton Foundation
Type of evaluation	Programme
Project period	2013-2015
Keywords	Accountability mechanisms, donor accountability
Abstract	The purpose of the Listen and Learn project, a joint DARA/Keystone initiative funded by the Conrad N. Hilton Foundation, was to improve the accountability of aid efforts in Haiti and to provide a model for greater beneficiary accountability in relief and recovery efforts for this context and others. The first component implemented by DARA, was based on face-to-face interviews with aid organizations in Haiti and representatives of governments, international organizations, NGO networks, foundations and private contractors in Washington DC, New York, London and Rome. The second component tested a new way to gauge the perceptions of disaster-affected people and to assist organizations to incorporate that perspective into program design and implementation. The goal was to make affected people the unit of account in aid-related decision-making by asking a representative sample of beneficiaries a few questions continuously, and then using the answers to guide improved performance. The field research confirmed the preliminary findings of the previous desk analysis of dozens of evaluations and reports: very few of the UN agencies, NGOs, charities or private contractors operating aid programs in Haiti have a functional beneficiary accountability framework or guidelines in place beyond informal accountability tools (e.g. surveys, quality control procedures to track satisfaction among beneficiaries, etc.). The lack of formal procedures in implementing accountability mechanisms made the organization dependent on the initiative of those leading the projects on the ground, at times jeopardizing the long term sustainability as staff rotation is often high. Accountability to beneficiaries simply was not a priority in programming for many organizations.
Cross-cutting issues	None described
Link to evaluation	http://daraint.org/2015/01/12/5271/listen-learn-project-improving-aid-accountability-haiti/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+daraint%2FobwK+%28dara%29

1.3.4 Evaluation of Norwegian Multilateral Support to Basic Education: Synthesis Report

Evaluation	<i>Evaluation of Norwegian Multilateral Support to Basic Education: Synthesis Report</i>
Published (year)	2015
Author/Agency	University of Southern California

Commissioned by	Norad
Type of evaluation	Outcomes, output, value added
Project period	2009-2013
Keywords	Education, fragile states, gender
Abstract	Norway places education on top of the development agenda with much funding for basic education channelled mainly through then multilateral actors United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and Global Partnership for Education (GPE). UNICEF and GPE received 74% and 24% respectively, of Norway's multilateral aid to basic education during the period of 2009-2013. A recent white paper explicitly stated that better results reporting and delivery is expected. This was the main rationale for the current assessment; to understand the effectiveness and value added of this modality of development cooperation. The evaluation synthesized results of a desk study of 10 countries that included Haiti. The main evaluation questions focused on the intended and unintended outputs and outcomes of the basic education initiatives that Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs funded through GPE and UNICEF, and the value-added to Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs of using GPE and UNICEF as conduits for investments (aid management). The findings of this report were that both UNICEF and GPE lack transparent and easy access to their key documents pertaining to upstream work on the program cycle on their websites by county and operation. The second basic question that this evaluation was expected to answer was the value-added to Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs of using GPE and UNICEF as conduits for its investments in basic education. The findings indicate that while both UNICEF and GPE added value, neither added as much value as it could, especially UNICEF. For the GPE programs in Haiti during the evaluation period (2010-2015), the evaluation team found little or no change in the percentage of children enrolled in participating schools for more than one year reading at grade level in grade 3. Gender equality was not addressed in the GPE project. However, the number of children in disadvantaged or marginalized areas enrolled through provision of tuition waivers is seen to be partly positive or fulfilled. In Haiti, the UNICEF Country Programmes did not have learning outcomes on their agendas. UNICEF also failed to put forward any expected results for gender equality. However, the evaluation team found improved access to quality early learning and basic education for low income and rural area children and equality for marginalized groups.
Cross-cutting issues	Fragile states, gender
Link to evaluation	https://www.norad.no/en/toolspublications/publications/2015/evaluation-of-norwegian-multilateral-support-to-basic-education/

1.3.5 Independent Evaluation of SDC's Performance in Basic Education 2007 – 2014

Evaluation	<i>Independent Evaluation of SDC's Performance in Basic Education 2007 – 2014</i>
Published (year)	2015
Author/Agency	Columbia University
Commissioned by	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC
Type of evaluation	Independent/outcomes SDC's performance in basic education
Project period	2007-2014
Keywords	Education, fragile states, marginalised children
Abstract	Basic education (BE) and vocational skills development help to ensure

	access to resources and services for all. The evaluation of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) in the fields of education included case studies and desk studies (Haiti). The efforts of the SDC were best articulated along three main axes: 1) Promoting a holistic vision of education based on the right to education in the framework of the political dialogue on the post-2015 agenda. 2) Strengthening the quality and relevance of education by better matching supply with educational demand. 3) Access to basic education / training for excluded populations (children, out-of-school and out-of-school youth, illiterate adults, girls and women, rural populations, etc.). Six features of SDC programmes/projects in Haiti were noticeable and relevant for consideration in the Independent Evaluation of SDC's BE programmes: 1) The comprehensive approach that integrates humanitarian and development assistance both in terms of programming as well as organisational structure in the Swiss Cooperation Office. 2) The combination of infrastructure/rehabilitation support and quality improvement in education as reflected in the vocational-skills development of construction workers. 3) SDC's dual role as an implementer and a funder of programmes carried out in one and the same country. 4) The implementation of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States to overcome fragility, establish peace and stability, and to ensure equitably access to resources and services. 5) The close collaboration with government institutions from the onset of the project ensured a successful scaling-up and institutionalization of the programmes. 6) The success with scaling-up and institutionalizing standards and training programmes nationwide that were first funded as innovations or pilot programmes.
Cross-cutting issues	Low income, marginalised children (homeless)
Link to evaluation	http://www.oecd.org/derec/switzerland/Evaluation%20of%20SDC%E2%80%99s%20Performance%20in%20Basic%20Education%202007%20%E2%80%93%202014.pdf

1.3.6 Evaluation of Norway's Support to Haiti after the 2010 Earthquake

Evaluation	Evaluation of Norway's Support to Haiti after the 2010 Earthquake
Published (year)	2015
Author/Agency	Particip GmbH
Commissioned by	Norad
Type of evaluation	Hum / Dev Action
Project period	2010-2015
Keywords	Earthquake, capacity building, human rights
Abstract	Soon after the earthquake hit Haiti on 12 January 2010, Norway joined the massive international response to the appeals for humanitarian aid. Norway was among the first countries to also pledge support to medium and long-term reconstruction and development needs. A major challenge was knowing how to utilize funds optimally. Adding to a humanitarian crisis of enormous magnitude and the loss of infrastructure, the combination of an inflow of international actors often poorly coordinated and the destruction of already weak state institutions, created challenges of unprecedented magnitude for the national and international efforts to

	help rebuild Haiti. This evaluation looked at the Norwegian assistance to Haiti after the earthquake. First, it looked at the effectiveness of Norwegian assistance to Haiti. At the time of the report, it was too early to conclude on effects from the Norwegian support, since most of it was aimed at long-term development efforts. However, the report presented and discussed findings that can tell us whether it is likely that the Norwegian support will lead to achievement of intended objectives in the future. Second, the evaluation sought to improve future Norwegian development assistance in comparable situations elsewhere. It did so by extracting lessons on the ability of the Norwegian aid delivery system to manage knowledge and to navigate in complex political and institutional dynamics, making the best possible strategic and practical decisions. The effects of Norwegian support on the Haitian population were moderate. Norwegian assistance actively supported the four priority themes with differing twists. Natural Resource Management (NRM) efforts were appreciated by all stakeholders interviewed but show little tangible results to date. Norwegian efforts in dialogue/governance seem to be most effective at the central level. Beyond the humanitarian phase (when Norway managed to insert it on the international agenda), protection of vulnerable groups was not effectively made a focus of support. Working mainly from the central level, valuable efforts, such as in protecting women victims of SGBV often laboured in isolation. Explicit Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) was the weakest portion of the Norwegian portfolio, also with scattered efforts not adding up to an effective programme. While it was, in fact, unreasonable to expect visible results at this early stage, it is uncertain to which degree they are likely in the future. Overall, Norwegian development assistance is unlikely to produce tangible improvement directly for poor people in Haiti, except in very focused settings, such as in supported fishing cooperatives in the Département du Sud, but, even there, the sustainability of the effects can still be questioned. Although more likely, evidence is lacking to link indirect support to tangible improvements for the poor. Accepting the strengths of Norway as the quintessential flexible donor and partner, it is important to recognise the benefits of a country strategy. Although they should include logical frameworks and more carefully chosen goals and indicators, strategy documents can and must remain moving targets, incorporating genuine on-going learning as a rule. To capitalise on this learning, Norway will need to put into place and enforce more structured learning systems, such as informal opportunities for learning ("brown bag lunches") and a system for better sharing and archiving of trip reports.
Cross-cutting issues	Capacity building, human rights
Link to evaluation	https://www.norad.no/en/toolspublications/publications/2015/evaluation-of-norways-support-to-haiti-after-the-2010-earthquake/

1.4 2014

1.4.1 'We are here' - IFRC's experience with communication and feedback channels for affected populations in Haiti

Evaluation	'We are here' - IFRC's experience with communication and feedback channels for affected populations in Haiti
Published (year)	2014
Author/Agency	ALNAP/ CDA
Commissioned by	ALNAP, German Foreign Ministry, IFRC
Type of evaluation	Process

Project period	November 2012 - May 2013
Keywords	Accountability, relocation, internally displaced persons
Abstract	The objective of this joint research initiative was to produce evidence-informed guidance for operational agencies on strengthening the effectiveness of feedback mechanisms for affected populations in humanitarian context. This case study on Haiti primarily focused on two-way communication and feedback processes in IFRC's Return and Relocation Programme, which supported people displaced by the earthquake to move out from the crowded camps and informal settlements into safe housing. A distinctive feature in the Haiti case study was the use of technology to enhance and expand communication and feedback loops. The humanitarian response to the Haiti earthquake was characterised by an unprecedented degree and scale of application of new and innovative crowd mapping platforms, mobile technology and call-in radio shows that provided information in real time. The IFRC's impressive investments in multiple and complementary two-way communication channels produced important lessons for its global affected population communications and accountability work. IFRC Haiti operations greatly benefited from the expertise available through (its global network of experienced delegates and local experts during the testing and design of the TERA and IVR systems. The increased attention on information and communication technology (ICT) application during the Haiti Earthquake response allowed for the testing of new communication channels and previously untested organisational structures. The evolving role of the IFRC's Beneficiaries Communication Team (BCT) during the various phases of the response was another important area for consideration in future responses. While in the immediate post-disaster response information provision and mass communication approaches are most helpful, in subsequent phases the BCT has the potential to support programmes in a much closer way by targeting questions to improve programme relevance and quality and to help with data analysis.
Cross-cutting issues	None described
Link to evaluation	http://www.alnap.org/resource/12815

1.4.2 How law and regulation supports disaster risk reduction: Haiti case - study report

<i>Evaluation</i>	<i>How law and regulation supports disaster risk reduction: Haiti case - study report</i>
Published (year)	2014
Author/Agency	Croix-Rouge Haïtienne; Canadian Red Cross (CRC)
Commissioned by	Croix-Rouge Haïtienne; Canadian Red Cross (CRC)
Type of evaluation	DRR landscape
Project period	2010-2014
Keywords	Law, regulation, DRR
Abstract	This study analysed the extent to which legal frameworks in Haiti support national and local efforts towards disaster-risk reduction (DRR). The study covered a broad scope of law and regulation relevant to DRR for natural hazards, including issues such as the integration of DRR into disaster risk management laws and institutional arrangements, responsibility and liability for DRR, early warning systems, infrastructure, building codes, land use planning, environmental management, and awareness-raising and education. Its methodology of speaking with stakeholders at national, sub-national and local levels was also designed to identify gaps, challenges and good practices in the way the legal framework was implemented.

	The good practices identified in this report are: 1) National DRM system and the creation of DRM committees at departmental, municipal and local levels. 2) Haiti has a working national Early Warning System in place for hurricanes as well as a flooding EWS that is technical in nature and covers the highest risk areas in the country. 3) The existence and nascent implementation of the National Building Code is a clear example of good practice in this sector. 4) Proposed legal framework for environmental impact assessments: Haiti already possesses a brief but important legal framework for the environmental impact assessment process, and some limited capacity at national level to enforce it. 5) Forest protection under law: a large body of law relates to protection of forests in Haiti, and whilst enforcement and capacity in the sector is severely lacking, a legal framework exists that seeks to limit human impact on Haiti's depleted forests, and to prevent risks such as forest fires. 6) DRR has yet to be included as part of the national education curriculum however, a significant amount of good practice exists elsewhere. Gaps that exist in law and practice identified in the evaluation include: 1) A lack of a legal framework for DRR and the national system for DRM; 2) Responsibility and accountability for DRR; 3) Lack of coordination in the early warning systems and risk mapping; and 4) Lack of legislation that regulates and informal and precarious settlements.
Cross-cutting issues	Environment
Link to evaluation	http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/IDRL/country%20studies/HAITI%20DRR%20Report.pdf

1.4.3 Evaluation de la coopération de l'UE avec la République d'Haïti

<i>Evaluation</i>	<i>Evaluation de la coopération de l'UE avec la République d'Haïti</i>
Published (year)	2014
Author/Agency	Particip GmbH
Commissioned by	EC Development and Cooperation EuropeAid
Type of evaluation	Outcome
Project period	2008-2012
Keywords	Road infrastructure, economic governance, democratic governance, education, risk and disaster management, food security
Abstract	The main objectives of the evaluation were to provide an independent and comprehensive evaluation of the EU's past and present cooperation and partnership relations with the Government of Haiti and to identify key lessons and formulate recommendations to improve the EU's current and future strategies, programs, and activities. The scope of the study covers all cooperation strategies, agreements and other official commitments between the EU and the Republic of Haiti, as well as their implementation, during the 2008-2012 period. The challenges encountered during this evaluation are mainly related to the impact of the 2010 earthquake on the cooperation context (loss of life, change of personnel, physical loss of data, changes in the focus of development / cooperation strategies, etc.). Measuring the long-term effects of support was made difficult by many factors specific to fragility contexts. Findings include: 1) EU support was focused on main fragility issues at two levels of intervention: a) the strengthening of the State and the economic

	reconstruction of the country (budgetary support and rehabilitation of large infrastructures); b) support in high-priority social areas (education) and support for the most vulnerable populations (food security and local development). 2) The EU support strategy was adapted to the context of fragility and the framework was correctly adjusted following the successive shocks (cyclones, soaring commodity prices, earthquakes, etc.). In particular, it proved wise to emphasize the strengthening of the State and the consolidation of the structuring processes initiated in the previous period without neglecting certain "social" issues of high priority (including security food security, education, and risk prevention and management). 3) Significant effects were achieved in the macroeconomic area and the legitimization of the State with budget support. But budgetary support played a limited role in terms of strengthening public financial management, and did not contribute to targeting allocations and strengthening sectoral policies. In particular, the use of this modality of support was based on weak policy dialogue and political dialogue. 4) The EU provided support both at the level of the central state and that of civil society. However, the EU did not aim for genuine synergies between the two forms of support. While it had positive effects at the local level, support to non-state actors has not been included in processes for strengthening strategies and public institutions at the sectoral level. 5) Finally, EU visibility at the policy level was good but below what was feasible, especially given the financial weight of its support and the level of financial and political risk associated with budgetary support.
Cross-cutting issues	Fragility
Link to evaluation	https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/strategic-evaluation-eu-cooperation-republic-haiti-2008-2012_en

1.5 2013

1.5.1 Review of Three Programmes for Natural Resource Management and Disaster Risk Reduction in Departement du Sud, Haiti

Evaluation	<i>Review of Three Programmes for Natural Resource Management and Disaster Risk Reduction in Departement du Sud, Haiti</i>
Published (year)	2013
Author/Agency	International Law and Policy Institute
Commissioned by	Gov. of Norway, ILPL
Type of evaluation	Programme
Project period	2010-2012
Keywords	Law, natural resource management, DRR
Abstract	This report presented a review of three programmes that were set up to address natural resource management and disaster risk reduction in the aftermath of the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The Government of Norway funded the programmes through the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF). The programmes are: • Haiti South West Sustainable Development Programme (SWSD), executed by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS); • Vulnerability Reduction in Watersheds/Agriculture, executed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO); • Natural Disaster Mitigation in the Southern Department, executed by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the Ministry

	of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (MARNDR). As a forward-looking review, it recommended improvements and adjustments to the three programmes and the coordination between them with a view to strengthen local ownership. The overarching recommendation was for Norway to continue funding programmes in the Southern Department. The first phase of programming put in place a valuable base for continued programming. The UNDP project should be considered the core initiative, with UNEP providing support in a limited number of focus areas, such as the energy programme. The review team supports the decision to redirect the funding of the IADB programme funding to the on-going, co-financed project to protect Parc Macaya and a renewable energy programme. Norway should commit funding for a minimum of three years. Predictability of funding is necessary to enable long-term planning. The transaction cost of the present phased funding approach has been high, and there is now a need to shift attention fully to programming. Decisions on the distribution of funding should be based on an informed assessment of the capacity of the implementing partners to use the funds efficiently. Fragmentation of activities should as far as possible be avoided, and the division of responsibilities between partners should be as clear as possible.
Cross-cutting issues	Gender
Link to evaluation	https://www.norad.no/en/toolspublications/publications/2013/review-of-three-programmes-for-natural-resource-management-and-disaster-risk-reduction-in-haiti/

1.5.2 Mid-term Evaluation of IDB-9 Commitments

<i>Evaluation</i>	<i>Mid-term Evaluation of IDB-9 Commitments</i>
Published (year)	2013
Author/Agency	Office of Evaluation and Oversight /IADB
Commissioned by	Office of Evaluation and Oversight /IADB
Type of evaluation	Evaluation of effective implementation of support
Project period	2010
Keywords	Debt forgiveness; financial commitments, Government of Haiti
Abstract	The objective of this report was to assess the full and effective implementation of the Bank's support to Haiti in the wake of the 2010 earthquake, in fulfilment of the mandates of IDB-9, which included full debt forgiveness, delivery of concessional resources in 2010, and expansion of the Bank's Grant Facility to provide Haiti US\$200 million per year for a period of 10 years (2011-2020), subject to annual approval by the Governors. The evaluation confirmed that the financial mandates included in IDB-9 were fulfilled. The Bank wrote off Haiti's debt and transferred resources to the Grant Facility to approve grants to the country over the amount previously established, for US\$231.6 million in 2010. In 2011 and 2012, the Bank transferred US\$200 million per year in Ordinary Capital resources to the Grant Facility. The Bank financed a programme for an amount that exceeded the transfers made, totalling US\$231.0 million in 2011 and US\$228.0 million in 2012. The intervention strategy adopted by the Bank emphasized long-term efforts in the sectors where it had been operating, rather than reconstruction, and had very ambitious targets given the limited management capacities of the Government of Haiti. Execution problems, such as poor designs and pre-investment studies, combined with low execution and supervision capacity in executing units, limited the results

	of these programmes. New programmes for development in the northern hub, along with institutional support at the sectoral level, involve risks that need to be addressed in a timely manner to ensure results in the long term. Meanwhile, the urgent need for approval and disbursement of US\$200 million each year for 10 years does open up new opportunities for establishing a long-term country strategy, but is hindered by the slow, complex process of institution building. The result is pressure on specialists from the Bank and in the country, and this does not necessarily lead to disbursements or to effective efforts to overcome the problems of Haitian society.
Cross-cutting issues	None described
Link to evaluation	http://www.iadb.org/en/office-of-evaluation-and-oversight/mid-term-evaluation-of-idb-9-commitments,7990.html

1.6 2012

1.6.1 Haiti Humanitarian Assistance Evaluation - From a Resilience Perspective

Evaluation	Haiti Humanitarian Assistance Evaluation - From a Resilience Perspective
Published (year)	2012
Author/Agency	Disaster Resilience Leadership Academy, Tulane University
Commissioned by	Tulane University
Type of evaluation	Recovery programming
Project period	2010-2012
Keywords	Resilience, DRR, protection
Abstract	In an effort to advance effective humanitarian assistance, the Tulane University's Disaster Resilience Leadership Academy (DRLA) in partnership with the State University of Haiti (UEH), conducted the Haiti Humanitarian Assistance Evaluation. The evaluation attempted to build a framework for analysing resilience and the effects of humanitarian assistance on resilience outcomes. The research process was dynamic, allowing the evaluation team to explore the theme of resilience and humanitarian assistance led by and between Haitians in stakeholder workshops in impacted communities. Guided by these discussions, the evaluation team developed a resilience framework based upon seven dimensions of resilience (wealth, debt and credit, coping behaviours, human capital, community networks, protection and security, and psychosocial) and used primary data collected through a national household and community key informant surveys, to measure the relationship between the earthquake, Haitian resilience, and exposure to humanitarian assistance and resilience outcomes. Resilience outcomes were measured at the household and individual levels. This evaluation found that humanitarian assistance provided did not make a detectable contribution as defined by the seven dimensions of resilience and in some instances, may have been associated with undesirable outcomes. It demonstrated the importance of engaging the impacted community from the on-set of the disaster to lead strategy, policy, and implementation based upon a thorough understanding of resilience and coping mechanisms that should be integrated into humanitarian programming starting at the beginning and continuing through the recovery process. The framework for measuring resilience defined and used in this evaluation can serve as a catalyst for future discussions related to Haitian resilience and to support and refine the monitoring and evaluation strategy for Haiti's recovery. However, more resources are needed to strengthen

	Haitian capacity to further develop evaluation methods and metrics (particularly metrics that track resources through the value chains to Haitian end user organisations and beneficiaries) that will allow for a deeper understanding of resilience and provide evidence to support data driven programming.
Cross-cutting issues	Protection
Link to evaluation	http://www2.tulane.edu/drla/upload/UEH-Tulane-DRLA-Haiti-Humanitarian-Aid-Evaluation-ENGLISH-May-2012.pdf

1.6.2 Review of Norwegian Support to Strengthening Citizens' Political Influence in Haiti through the National Democratic Institute (NDI)

Evaluation	<i>Review of Norwegian Support to Strengthening Citizens' Political Influence in Haiti through the National Democratic Institute (NDI)</i>
Published (year)	2012
Author/Agency	International Law and Policy Institute (ILPI)
Commissioned by	Norad
Type of evaluation	Final evaluation programme
Project period	2010-2011
Keywords	Political voice, civil society, Initiative Committee
Abstract	This report on "Norwegian Support to Strengthening Citizens' Political Influence in Haiti through the National Democratic Institute (NDI)" was delivered to Norad under the contract with the International Law and Policy Institute to review a civil society democracy building programme in Haiti implemented by the National Democratic Institute (NDI). The programme has been funded by Norway since August of 2010. The review was based on a study of available literature, programme documentation and field work which included eight sites covered by the programme, as well as interviews with NDI staff and a wide range of stakeholders. The core element in NDI's civil society programming in Haiti is the Initiative Committee (IC), a democratically elected eleven-member group. NDI encouraged the formation of hierarchically nested ICs. Village level "section" ICs coalesce into municipal level "communal" ICs, which in turn coalesce into Department level ICs. The principal objective of the programme was to encourage citizen participation and advocacy around reconstruction and development issues via these ICs. An additional objective was to create broader municipal or departmental units called platforms and advocacy coalitions that organize around specific issues. NDI's contribution to ICs was to organize them through intensive training in a village or urban neighbourhood and to support them logistically through event financing at the communal and departmental levels. This entailed use of Norwegian funds to rent a meeting space, to pay for food and drink at meetings. The programme successfully met the quantitative goals of forming more ICs and of activating platforms and coalitions, yet several problems are identified within the programme (e.g., managerial, budgetary, and conceptual). Despite problems, the report concluded that NDI had effectively fulfilled its part of the agreement at least in terms of activities, if not of results. The evaluation recommended that MFA and NDI deal with the conceptual, budgetary and managerial issues raised in the report and continue in partnership. The recommendation was also made for the creation, in the next phase, of local action funds (LAF) that will permit at least some local level of concrete action for mature ICs that have yet to receive resources from the State. The IC will not be sustainable unless years of dialog are transformed into some form of visible action.

Cross-cutting issues	Gender
Link to evaluation	https://www.norad.no/om-bistand/publikasjon/2012/review-of-norwegian-support-to-strengthening-citizens-political-influence-in-haiti-through-the-national-democratic-institute-ndi/

1.6.3 Giving with one hand: Evaluation of Post-Earthquake Physical Rehabilitation Response in Haiti, 2010 – a systems analysis

Evaluation	<i>Giving with one hand: Evaluation of Post-Earthquake Physical Rehabilitation Response in Haiti, 2010 – a systems analysis</i>
Published (year)	2012
Author/Agency	International Centre for Evidence in Disability/ London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine
Commissioned by	Christian Blind Mission/International Centre for Evidence in Disability
Type of evaluation	Impact
Project period	2011
Keywords	Early response, coordination, people with disabilities
Abstract	CBM supported an evaluation of the post-emergency rehabilitation response in order to assess the impact of the emergency response on the rehabilitation sector following the 2010 earthquake; what had been achieved, learn from good and not-so-good practice, and promote the development of an effective rehabilitation sector in the future. The evaluation provided evidence to inform CBM and other humanitarian organisations about what must be done in a post-disaster situation so that people with disabilities have access to relief and protection on an equal basis with others, and what is required in the long-term to develop a good rehabilitation service. Coordination and relationships with national authorities are aspects considered in the evaluation. The main findings are: 1) The rehabilitation sector in Haiti after the earthquake was composed of a variety of actors with sometimes conflicting approaches. Full participation of national authorities was challenged by personnel turnover, political instability and unclear division of responsibilities. 2) The coordination mechanism focused on day-to-day activities, neglecting the building of a common vision for the future. The creation of the Injury, Rehabilitation and Disability Group within the Health Cluster had a positive impact on emergency response coordination. 3) The range of services offered to people with disabilities in Haiti was greater after the emergency response thanks to the introduction of new services.
Cross-cutting issues	Vulnerable groups
Link to evaluation	https://www.cbm.org/article/downloads/84419/Evaluation_of_Post-Earthquake_Physical_Rehabilitation_Response_in_Haiti_2010_-_a_systems_analysis.pdf

1.7 2011

1.7.1 "Die deutsche humanitäre Hilfe im Ausland Länderstudie Haiti" EN: German humanitarian aid abroad: a country study on Haiti

Evaluation	<i>"Die deutsche humanitäre Hilfe im Ausland Länderstudie Haiti" EN: German humanitarian aid abroad: a country study on Haiti</i>
Published (year)	2011
Author/Agency	Ralf Otto und Lioba Weingärtner with contributions from Kelcie Joseph

	Dumorné and Gladys Berrouët / Channel Research, AGE Consultants eG
Commissioned by	BMZ: Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung EN: Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
Type of evaluation	Program outcome, field management/internal coherence
Project period	2010
Keywords	LRRD, development aid, gender
Abstract	This evaluation of German humanitarian aid abroad, which began as early as in the beginning of 2009 (during the previous legislative term), was the first inter-ministerial, independent and comprehensive analysis and assessment of Germany's humanitarian assistance abroad. It focused on the humanitarian aid provided by the Federal Foreign Office (AA) and on the development-oriented emergency and transitional aid provided by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) in the period 2005-2009. The evaluation's main purpose was to gather insights to help the two ministries govern these fields of activity and to serve accountability purposes. The evaluation found that, Germany's humanitarian aid in Haiti was relevant and broadly appropriate. In terms of effectiveness and coverage, technical implementation of most projects examined appeared to be good, however innovative was often lacking. It was noted that smaller and shorter projects could generally be considered less efficient than larger and longer ones due to higher start-up costs distributed over a shorter timeframe. The overarching impacts of the measures were difficult to establish given a lack of information. It could be noted that interventions and organisations financed by Germany had played a part in improving the lives of the victims of the earthquake. Without further adaptation, however, it is questionable if longer-term effects can be achieved. The context of Haiti did not allow for the application of the LRRD approach in its ideal-typical, linear and phased way. State funding from Germany alone is insufficient to reach the rehabilitation phase of 'LRRD'. Long-term and development oriented engagement by Germany depends largely on the resources organisations already have, which do not stem from the ministries (own resources and financing from other donors). A coordination system for humanitarian aid was established after about half a year and was largely functional. Regarding cluster coordination, there was rarely coordination beyond information exchange and coordination in geographic targeting. Coordination with existing local coordination mechanisms and the participation of local capacities was found to have been insufficient. On the one hand, coordination management between the two ministries (AA and BMZ) took place in Berlin quickly in multiple meetings of the crisis unit in the AA with BMZ participating. On the other hand, the usual procedures for reciprocal information and consultations in connection with project approvals were applied between and within the ministries. The informational and coordination needs of participants were not always properly covered. In Haiti, no specific coordination measures could be observed for interventions financed by AA and BMZ.
Cross-cutting issues	Gender
Link to evaluation	https://www.oecd.org/derec/49865501.pdf

1.7.2 Haiti External Evaluation of the Emergency Relief & Response Fund (ERRF), 2008-2011

Evaluation	<i>Haiti External Evaluation of the Emergency Relief & Response Fund (ERRF), 2008-2011</i>
Published (year)	2011

Author/Agency	OCHA/Moriniere
Commissioned by	OCHA/Moriniere
Type of evaluation	Programme
Project period	2010-2011
Keywords	Funding for earthquake response
Abstract	The Haiti Emergency Relief & Response Fund (ERRF) was activated in 2008 (start-up funding by Sweden) with the goal of enabling the international community to better support local authorities by providing rapid and flexible funding to meet unforeseen needs in the event of disasters of natural origin. The aim of this evaluation was to explore how the mechanism contributed to a more timely, predictable, effective and accountable humanitarian response. The evaluation compiled evidence from in-depth key informant interviews, focus group discussions, grant registry analysis, an e-survey and site visits to six projects. 1) Despite analysis indicating slower than ideal (and even expected) proposal and grant processing, ERRF/Haiti is still considered a rapid response mechanism and evidence indicates that the mechanism was rapid when speed was most important—at the onset of crises. Evaluation findings align to conclude that ERRF/Haiti was more effective than efficient. 2) Based on evidence compiled from key informants, the Haiti/ERRF team appears to have been effective under heavy constraints. 3) Although relatively effective despite all constraints, ERRF/Haiti did not function efficiently. 4) ERRF is connected to other funding mechanisms (through jointly funded efforts—the majority of the portfolio. 5) Vulnerable target groups were routinely addressed by ERRF/Haiti projects. This quality of ERRF was one of the most commonly recognized among E-survey Respondents. Gender equity elements and marginalized groups were systematically targeted by the portfolio. Despite all of its weaknesses, voices converge to say that ERRF was, and should remain, a pertinent pillar in the humanitarian architecture in Haiti.
Cross-cutting issues	Gender, vulnerable groups
Link to evaluation	http://www.alnap.org/resource/11680

1.7.3 Assisting Earthquake Victims: Evaluation of Dutch Cooperating Aid Agencies (SHO) Support to Haiti in 2010

Evaluation	<i>Assisting Earthquake Victims: Evaluation of Dutch Cooperating Aid Agencies (SHO) Support to Haiti in 2010</i>
Published (year)	2011
Author/Agency	Dutch Cooperating Aid Agencies
Commissioned by	OECD/Min FA Netherlands
Type of evaluation	Programme
Project period	2010-2011
Keywords	Donor response, children, protection
Abstract	The evaluation undertaken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' independent Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) covers "Stichting Samenwerkende Hulporganisaties" (Foundation of Cooperating Aid Agencies or SHO) organisations' emergency relief and recovery activities.. It assessed SHO-funded activities of SHO organisations and their

	implementing partners in the following sectors: Shelter (and non-food items); WASH; Food security; Livelihoods; Healthcare; Education; Protection; and DRR. Some of the main findings include: 1) The approach followed by the SHO organisations and their partners has been consistent with internationally accepted humanitarian practices. 2) The organisations involved in the SHO Haiti campaign were sufficiently able to provide the required support. 3) The SHO organisations and their affiliates conducted rapid needs assessments in the first days and weeks immediately following the earthquake. 4) The involvement of the Haitian government, NGOs and representatives of the population in the initial needs assessments and shaping the emergency operation was very limited. 5) Interventions supported with SHO funding were undertaken largely without the benefit of national plans and strategies. 6) The activities supported by SHO were appropriate. 7) In general, linking relief, rehabilitation and development was a major methodological and operational issue. 8) The evaluation was unable to ascertain compliance to all standards. 9) It proved difficult to assess effectiveness by comparing achievements with plans, because of the weakness of proposals (which differed in quality and detail), the weak link between achievements reported and objectives in the proposals, and inconsistencies in reporting. 10) Activities undertaken with SHO funds in 2010 did address the immediate needs of those affected by the earthquake; other longer-term needs were also gradually addressed. 11) Very few rigorous investigations have been done on the outcomes of the humanitarian support provided in 2010. A number of evaluations covering the response as a whole have been critical about the results achieved in terms of outcome. The present evaluation obtained only illustrative information on beneficiary satisfaction about a number of SHO-funded interventions.
Cross-cutting issues	Children, protection, gender-based violence
Link to evaluation	https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2011/11/15/iob-evaluation-assisting-earthquake-victims-evaluation-of-dutch-cooperating-aid-agencies-sho-support-to-haiti-in-2010

1.7.4 Real-time evaluation of humanitarian action supported by DG ECHO in Haiti

Evaluation	<i>Real-time evaluation of humanitarian action supported by DG ECHO in Haiti</i>
Published (year)	2011
Author/Agency	Groupe URD
Commissioned by	ECHO
Type of evaluation	Outcome
Project period	2010-2011
Keywords	LRRD, rehabilitation, development, cholera
Abstract	The evaluation, which included a field visit and covered the work of the Disaster Preparedness ECHO (DIPECHO) programme, the Global Plan and presents the general conclusions about DG ECHO's strategy and operations as well as the evaluation recommendations. The full report describes the results for the main operational sectors funded by DG ECHO (Nutrition and Food Security, WASH, Health, Shelter- Housing,

	Coordination) and for the secondary sectors of Protection and Security. The main findings presented include that the programmes supported and strategies adopted were relevant on the whole; effectiveness is limited by institutional constraints; aid into urban areas present major challenges yet to be overcome; funds allocated for political reasons to the detriment of programme quality; difficulties linking relief, rehabilitation and development despite the shared will to do so; cross cutting issues not sufficiently taken into account and; the country context remains volatile.
Cross-cutting issues	Gender, protection
Link to evaluation	http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2011/Groupe-URD_evaluation_Haiti_en.pdf

1.8 2010

1.8.1 Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment a Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment (REA) of the response to January 12th earthquake for USAID through a grant provided by CHF

Evaluation	<i>Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment a Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment (REA) of the response to January 12th earthquake for USAID through a grant provided by CHF</i>
Published (year)	2010
Author/Agency	CHF International-Sun Mountain Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment (REA)
Commissioned by	USAID
Type of evaluation	Impact
Project period	2010
Keywords	Environment, rural and urban disasters
Abstract	USAID commissioned a Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment (USAID REA) and involved the collection and synthesis of information on relief and recovery operations, and from disaster survivors in Port au Prince, rural earthquake-affected areas and destination areas for earthquake affected. The assessment identified the following critical earthquake-related environmental issues and provided recommendations where appropriate: Coordination, Management and Information, Geophysical and Hydro-Meteorological Hazards Monitoring, Sewage and Solid Waste, Sanitation Access, Hazardous Waste, Biohazards, Health-Related Issues, Shelter Sites, Emergency and Transitional Shelter, Debris Management, Livelihood Security, Food Security, and Medium to Long Term Issues that includes asset distribution, land tenure, governance of relief effort, environmental resilience, deforestation. The assessment also found that to implement the shift from immediate relief operations to sustainable recovery, the assessment recommended the following in the clusters of coordination, management and information. A wide range of USG organizations, including the US military, USAID, Department of Health and Human Services and others have responded to the Haiti earthquake. Specific and dedicated environmental management capacity has been incorporated into some elements of this response (e.g., SouthCom) but not others (e.g., USAID). There is, at the time of this report, no cross-organizational coordination on environmental issues or on how to manage potential negative environmental impacts related to USG assistance. Further, there is uneven dissemination and sharing of information on the USG response, making the monitoring and assessment of environmental issues difficult and the likelihood of negative environmental impacts high. USAID/Haiti staff, normally responsible for environmental issues, are

	overworked and unable to dedicate sufficient time to the more than full time requirements of overseeing a multi-million-dollar emergency program. The Government of Haiti also does not appear to have had time to establish a coordinating capacity on environmental issues and impact. UNEP, charged to coordinate the environment as a cross-cutting issue through the InterAgency Standing Committee (IASC) Cluster coordination system is underfunded, and no Cluster has yet dedicated internal environmental support.
Cross-cutting issues	Environment
Link to evaluation	http://www.alnap.org/node/6541.aspx