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ANNEXES 3-7

Evaluation of Norway's Engagement in Somalia 2012-2018

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
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ANNEX 3: OVERVIEW OF NORWEGIAN AID TO SOMALIA

Volume, channels and sectors


NOK 2.7 billion, according to Norwegian aid statistics, has been disbursed to Somalia in the 2012-2018 evaluation period. It was NOK 204 million in 2012, increasing to NOK 330-370 million annually in the 2013-16 period, and then jumped to nearly 550 million in the 2017 and 2018 (547 million in 2017 and 543 million in 2018). See Fig A below

Fig A: Norwegian aid to Somalia 2012-2018. Disbursement trends by year



These disbursements have gone to a variety of programmes and projects. In Norwegian aid statistics using OECD DAC classification codes, 28% is classified as emergency assistance. 38% is classified as good governance which covers support for peace and reconciliation and support for capacity building, institutional strengthening and civil society. 17% is for the purpose of economic development and trade (mainly current support to the World Bank's multi donor fund and the early support for fishery development). 11% is classified as support for education.

Fig A: Norwegian aid to Somalia 2012-2018 by sector



Country / region: Somalia
 Norwegian development aid 2012 - 2018 by sector
 Total 2 713.7 Million NOK

norad.no

Table A below shows the disbursement by year.

Table A: Norwegian aid to Somalia by year and sector

2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Total, all sector	203.6	370.4	364.0	345.8	339.9	546.8	2 713.7
In donor costs and unspecified	0.9	-	3.9	4.9	4.0	0.6	16.0
Health and social services	10.4	31.0	15.1	9.2	32.1	20.3	133.0
Good governance	74.1	155.4	136.8	132.5	149.0	177.3	1 018.9
Environment and energy	-	17.2	10.8	2.5	-	-	30.5
Emergency assistance	76.4	92.6	127.5	87.5	61.7	186.5	752.4
Education	42.0	55.6	40.7	65.0	33.6	29.8	299.2
Economic development and trade	-0.1	18.5	29.2	44.4	59.5	132.3	463.6

There are some transfers to Somalia that are not captured in these statistics. The most significant of these are Norwegian core funding to UN agencies and global programmes. Some of them have major activities in Somalia funded from these contributions. Table B provides an estimate – based on OECD DAC criteria - of the share of core funding to multilateral organisations disbursed to Somalia.

Table B: Norwegian support to Somalia 2012-2018 through earmarked grants and share of core funding to multilateral organisations, NOK Mill*

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Disbursement to Somalia	204	370	364	346	340	547	543	2714
Share of core funding to								

multilateral organisations disbursed to Somalia (estimated)								
	29	28	31	48	49	93	(93)**	371
Total	233	398	395	394	394	640	636	3085

*These data are provided by Norad's statistical office estimating the share of core funding being disbursed to Somalia. They rely on guidelines from OECD DAC in making the calculations. See <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/oecdmethodologyforcalculatingimputedmultilateraloda.htm>.

** Data for 2018 was not available at the time of writing. They are estimated by the team to be similar to disbursements in 2017.

The main multilateral organisations (based on 2017 disbursements) are the UN Central Emergency Response Fund, UNDP, the World Food Programme and two global health funds (GAVI and GFATM).

In addition to this core funding, there is also Norwegian core funding to the UNICEF's Education Fund as well as to the Global Partnership for Education, both with projects in Somalia. Data on the disbursements for the evaluation period is not available, but in 2017 the estimated share for Norwegian support being disbursed to Somalia from these two funds was about USD 1 million. Additionally, there is also bilateral Norwegian support to various regional, pan-African and global programmes with activities also in Somalia. This includes some of the bilateral support to especially the AU and IGAD, but also Eastern African Standby Force, for their work on Somalia. The Norwegian-funded Africa-wide Training for Peace programme has provided pre-deployment training for police officers and civilians deployed with AMISOM. Through the NORCAP facility Norway has also funded deployment of civilian experts with AMISOM.

In total, the team estimates that Norwegian support to Somalia in the evaluation period is somewhere between NOK 3.2 and 3.3 billion.

The team has classified the Norwegian interventions in the 2012-18 period in four main areas based on primary objective or main focus of the intervention.

State building, stabilization and security

This main programme area has included high-profiled Norwegian bilateral and multilateral support, originally with a focus on strengthening the institutional capacity and legitimacy of the Federal Government. More recently this has also included support for federal member states.

Special Financing Facility (2013-15) (NOK 100 million +)

Norwegian bilateral aid to improve public financial management and enhance the capacity of the Somalia Ministry of Finance and Planning. This included funds for payment of salaries to civil servants as well as the setting up of a temporary implementation unit in the Ministry of Finance responsible for implementing projects aimed at contributing to the federal government's effort of rebuilding the

country's infrastructure (stabilisation). When the World Bank's trust fund became operational in 2014 it took over (from July 2014) SFF's main component: payment of salaries to civil servants (this included monthly payment to about 2000 individuals, about 2/3 of the civil servants). Norway ended the support to implementation unit in mid-2015. This was also continued through the World Bank trust fund. The different components in SFF are:

Funds via MFA/Deloitte client account for Somalia Federal Government: NOK 75 million (2013 and 2014) + 0.5 million to Deloitte as administrative agent.

PWC financial agent for SFF: NOK 16 million (2013-16) (The tasks were later transferred to a consultancy company: Abyrint – established by former PWC staff): The tasks were to ensure good management of the Special Financing Facility and increase capacity in the Somalia Ministry of Finance. Expected results: 1. Operational SFF systems and procedures; 2. Capacity in Financial Management Unit and Temporary Implementation Unit increased; 3. Verification and certification of payment requests; and 4. Monitoring and reporting. The financial agent also provided technical assistance to Somalia in the negotiation with IMF and donors linked to debt negotiation. This agent (Abyrint) continued to provide these services through the World Bank fund when SSF closed with costs covered by Norway as in-kind support to the Fund.

NIS: NOK 11.4 million in 2013 and 14. Technical assistance in setting up SFF and the temporary implementation unit and later for supervision/secretariat (see also more on NIS under stabilisation below).

The launch of the establishment of this facility was led by Norway based on a formal request from the Somalia federal government in late 2012. It was an attempt to establish a facility for direct support to government as interim measure before the World Bank fund would be operational. The anticipation was that other donors would also support the facility, but only Norway did so.

World Bank Multi-partner fund (2015-current, 377 million)

The main objective of this fund is to provide a platform for coordinated financing for the sustainable reconstruction and development of Somalia, with a focus on core state functions and socio-economic recovery. Norway disbursed 212 million in the first 2015-2017 period and has committed 450 million for the 2018-2020 period. A main focus of the fund is The Recurrent Cost and Reform Financing Instrument (RCRF) which builds on the Special Financing Facility (see above). It shall be scaled up in the 2018-2020 phase. It is intended that payment of salaries for civil servants will free government funds for social services and infrastructure development. Disbursements from RCRF is linked to progress in economic reform.

The fund will – together with IDA finance - provide funding for the World Bank first country strategy for Somalia (2019-22).

NORCAP (2017-19, NOK 25 million): Deployment of senior officials to the federal government

On behalf of the Embassy NORCAP managed a recruitment facility and paid salaries to senior officials in the Prime Minister's office and other federal government departments. Some of these functions was transferred to NIS in early 2019. The programme through NORCAP was ended in late 2019.

DFID: Somaliland Development Fund (2013 + 2015, NOK 30 million)

This programme was intended to support the authorities to put in place rigorous budget and fiscal processes for prioritising and managing the budget and will lay the foundations for a more open and

accountable budget process. The intended impact of the intervention will be a more stable and prosperous Somaliland. The intervention will, in the medium-term, lead to the following outcome: core state functions improved and better resourced for the people of Somaliland.

Norway has also supported two major and expanding programmes in stabilisation focusing on securing improved living conditions in liberated and government-controlled areas and to increase the legitimacy of the government. Two major initiatives – one bilateral through the Nordic International Support Foundation (NIS) and one through the DFID-managed Somalia Stability Fund.

DFID: Somalia Stability Fund (2012- current, NOK 142 million)

The Somali Stability Fund is a DFID-managed multi-donor fund with support from 7 donors. Norway is the second biggest donor in the evaluation period. The planned impact is to enhance stability in Somalia through a series of projects in newly liberated and government-controlled areas. The overall objective is to ensure that targeted government institutions are more legitimate and capable to perform their functions, violent conflict has been reduced, gender equality enhanced, and opportunities for socio-economic development are accessible to a wider section of the population in the targeted areas. Furthermore, the Fund also addresses relations between Federal Government and Member States (“political fault lines”) and has funded several activities dealing with trust and reconciliation both at the district and member state level. This has led the Fund to focus more – in the second phase from 2016 – on political and governance aspects of stabilisation.

NIS: Quick impact and stabilisation (2012-current, NOK 160 million)

The Nordic International Support Foundation or NIS was established in 2011 as a Norwegian NGO focusing on Somalia. The objectives of NIS were to implement projects that would cater for the most immediate needs of the people, including security, basic amenities/infrastructure, and livelihoods. At the same time, it was considered crucial that the projects were implemented in close cooperation with the authorities in ways that would boost their legitimacy and political reputation among the population.

NIS has received substantial Norwegian funding since its establishment – first with a support directly from MFA (Peace and Reconciliation Section) and then additionally from the Embassy (from 2013) for several quick impact projects, beginning with solar streetlights in Mogadishu. From 2016 all Norwegian funding came from the Embassy, mainly through a 3-year stabilisation programme focusing on infrastructure development and youth engagement. From 2019 a new 3-year programme was supported – now termed the Initiative for Stabilisation, Transition and National Development.

The bilateral NIS project has evolved over time – from quick impact projects in the first half towards paying more attention to sustainability and wider social and economic benefits in the second.

The support to NIS has also included several additional small and big projects and technical assistance to help implement and assist Norway’s interventions. This has included technical support to the implementation of components of the Special Financing Facility (see above), reconciliation initiatives and staff salaries for senior staff in the Prime Minister’s office.

Maritime security

UN Office on Drugs and Crime (2012-17), about 17.5 million (2012: piracy prison – Puntland/Somaliland – 10 million, + 2015-17: maritime crime/Somalia programme).

The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (2017-18, 3.4 million). Trust fund to manage the

work of the Contact group. It used to be managed by UNODC but is from 2017 managed by UNDP multipartner trust fund, see below.

Additionally, there has been substantial, and much bigger Norwegian non-aid funded support to projects linked to piracy and maritime security.

Serendi – Countering violent extremism (NOK 26 million, 2012-15)

Funding provided through a Danish consultant to develop and manage a camp for rehabilitation and reintegration of former Al-Shabaab fighters.

Conflict Dynamics International (2012-15), 17.5 million (political accommodation Somalia/Somaliland)

UN Women (2014 only), 3 million (WPS/1324 related activities)

Radio Bar Kulan (2012, 2.5 million) (Somali public broadcasting, linked to AMISOM)

Governance, democratisation and human rights

UNDP – UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund (UN MPTF). 2015-18: 187 million (Additionally about 80 million to the UNOCHA/Somalia Humanitarian Fund was channelled through this mechanism for the drought response in 2017-18).

The current agreement includes Norwegian support to: The Constitutional Review Project, Human Rights Project and Joint Programme on Local Governance. The main objective for this agreement is to support crucial state building processes under the Inclusive Politics Pillar and at the same time make sure to keep a focus on Human Rights. Additionally, funding for the Contact Group dealing with maritime security is from 2017 also channelled through this fund.

Earlier support to/via UNDP

- Joint programme for local government and service delivery (25 million, 2013 – 14)
- UNDP country programmes (38 million, 2013, 2015)

Norway also supported several NGO-activities linked to governance and democratisation issues. This included:

The **Oslo Centre** (NOK 44 million 2012-17) - focus on training for parliament and political organisations.

Two international NGOs:

National Democratic Institute (2013-14), About 10 million for training/workshops for public officials and politicians (there was also support in the 2005-11 period).

Interpeace (2012-15). 17,5 million (democratization programme, dialogue)

At the end of the evaluation period Norway also launched two programmes that seeks to build government capacity and improve governance:

Oil for Development (2017-18, 3 million).

A new bilateral project. The funds disbursed has been related to preparation and planning in 2017 and

-18. This is mainly linked to the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate and Statistics Norway as well expenditures in connection with dialogue meetings. In June 2018, the planning of an OfD programme in Somalia was formally approved and in October 2018, the first joint planning workshop was held with all relevant government institutions in Somalia, including representatives from the Federal Member States.

Intosai's Development Initiative (2018, 3.1 million)

This is hosted by the Norwegian Auditor General and the funds are for a project to provide peer support to the auditor general in Somalia.

Migration has been an important dimension in the relations between Norway and Somalia. This has led to ongoing support, primarily through IOM, to the Federal Government:

IOM Migration management (NOK 14 million in 2013 and 2015- 16)

Organisational capacity building of the Departments of Immigration under the Federal Government and regional authorities. In 2018 decided to provide funding (NOK 3 million) channelled through the UN Office for project services for the construction of a headquarter for the Directorate of Immigration (2018 planning, NOK 3 million disbursed in 2019).

Civil society support has traditionally been a major focus for Norwegian NGOs active in Somalia. Most the local partners are providing services to the Norwegian NGOs, but there has been stronger emphasis and dedicated funds to improve the organisational and management capacities of local partners.

Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) is the biggest Norwegian NGO active in Somalia with support for civil society (faith-based organisations and CSOs) as a major crosscutting issue in its programme (More funding is channelled through the Norwegian Refugee Council but they do not have focus on civil society strengthening). It received NOK 192 million from the aid budget in the evaluation period. NCA currently has its main activities in Gedo in Southern Somalia and in Puntland, but it also has projects in Mogadishu/Lower Shabelle.

NCA's 2018 disbursement on their Somalia programme was about NOK 54 million of which 36 million was received from the Norwegian aid budget. NCA's current Somalia programme is divided in different areas: water, sanitation and hygiene; economic empowerment (vocational skills training, business skills training, value chain development and easing market access for agropastoral communities); education (primary and secondary education); protection against gender-based violence; and emergency response.

The **Development Fund** implements several projects but is geographically focused on Somaliland and Puntland and thematically on supporting pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities (see also below). One of their programmes specifically seek to support capacity building of local partners and support to their efforts to be involved in policy and development processes. They have received about 31 million from the aid budget since 2013. Of these 16 million were disbursed in 2017 and 2018. The Development Fund also works with the Somali diaspora in Norway (4 organisations).

In addition to these there were also civil society components in three other main recipients of Norwegian aid: **Save the Children Norway** (2012- current), 110 million, mostly for emergency relief, including health clinics and education – see below). They also have significant funding from other donors, especially the African Development Bank. The support from Norway includes about NOK 24 million for issues related to child rights, including advocacy. Save the Children Norway implements through Save the Children International and their country office.

NorCross (2012 - current, 197 million). This is mostly for humanitarian relief, but it also includes one

project to strengthen their local partner. Much of the amount - about 80 million – is a response to appeals from the International Red Cross/Red Crescent. Nearly 15 million has been provided (2013-18) for NorCross work to strengthen the capacity of the Somali Red Crescent Society.

YME Foundation is a small Norwegian NGO (now based in Arendal). It has mainly worked on water and sanitation and other water projects, in addition to some work on reconciliation in local communities and technical and vocational training. NOK 80 million in the 2012-18 period. Funding from Norway is now limited to a vocational training centre in Galkaya implemented through a local partner. Norwegian funding is now channelled through ADRA (see below).

Other:

BBC Media Action (2018-): 2,7 million (radio broadcasts, Somali women, awareness).

African Initiative for Women in Africa (AIWA Forum), (NOK 1 million in 2013 and -14) (Somali-based NGO).

Economic development and livelihoods

Most of the ongoing Norwegian support in this area is classified under stabilisation (job creation for youth) and financial management (framework conditions). Then there is support to Norwegian NGOs for various rural livelihoods projects as well as a number of projects focusing on technical and vocational training (discussed under education below).

Development Fund (2014 – present, 31 million).

Their current programmes (all related to pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities in Somaliland and – from 2017 - Puntland) are (1) improved food and nutrition security (training in sustainable agriculture, diversification of agricultural production, and improved livestock management); (2) economics and access to markets (strengthening women's income opportunities, processing of agricultural products, and vocational and entrepreneurship training for youth); (3) participation and equality (capacity building of local partners and support to their efforts to be involved in policy and development processes); and (4) policy and advocacy (mainly related to activities to ensure improved policies for seed security).

NCA (2012 – current, 13.5 million).

NCA assist the agro-pastoral communities in Gedo and Puntland, riverine farmers in Gedo and fishing communities in coastal areas of Puntland so that beneficiaries have greater control of their products from production to selling.

NPA rural/livelihoods NPA: NOK 40 million for rural livelihoods (2012-15).

The was implemented in the Sool and Sanaag regions in the north (NPA ended its development programme in 2015, only humanitarian mine action thereafter, see below).

YME Foundation (2012-17, NOK 51 million).

Support for water management projects in South Central Somalia.

FAO Fisheries sector development programme (NOK 34 million, with disbursements in 2013-14 and in 2016, the total agreement was NOK 85 million).

The Embassy entered into a 3-year agreement with FAO concerning fishery sector support in December

2013. The main components of the programme were: 1. Fisheries Policy and Regulatory Action; 2. Monitoring, Control and Surveillance; 3. Infrastructure: port rehabilitation in Berbera, Bossaso, Kismayo and Mogadishu (14% of budget); 4. Fleet Renewal (31% of budget); 5. Fisheries Research (32% of budget); and 6. Fish consumption (4% of budget). Norway funded component 3-6.

FAO (2014, 10 million).

Livestock/veterinary services

Norfund (2018, NOK 6.8 million committed/not disbursed per 31.12).

Norfund initiated and is the anchor of the Nordic Horn of Africa Opportunities Fund – a commercial investment fund targeting small and medium sized enterprises in Somalia. Launched with Shuraako and Danish IFU. Initial capital target of USD 10 million. The fund also partners with the Development Fund.

Education and social services, gender

This area has also received much support, mainly through Norwegian NGOs. The majority of these deliver primary education and provide support to education infrastructure and policy whilst a number of organisations also focus on provision of alternative basic education and on technical and vocational training. In addition to support via NGOs, Norway provides non-earmarked support to UNICEF's Education Fund and the Global Partnership for Education – both with big projects in the Somalia. Similarly, there is funding through the global health funds.

DIGNI (2012-ongoing): 28 million.

Mainly for secondary education and some healthcare in first half of period, now only secondary education in Sahil region in Somaliland, implemented by Norwegian Pentecoastal Mission with local partner.

ADRA (2012 – ongoing, 58 mill).

Teacher training, technical education, building of schools (Mogadishu, Afgoye and Baidoa regions). ADRA has emphasised technical and vocational training for youth and has led an NGO consortium advocating for this.

NRC (2012 – 15, 97 million).

Education and school construction in Somaliland + basic education in South Central Somalia

NCA (from 2012 and ongoing, 42 million).

Several projects, mainly primary and secondary education in Gedo, also smaller projects in technical and vocational training.

Save the Children Norway (2013 – ongoing, 50 million).

Several projects in primary education and teacher training, main focus on Puntland but also in South Central.

YME (2012 and 2014, 10.5 million).

Construction of vocational training centre for youth, Galkayo, South Central Somalia (now managed with funding from Norad through ADRA which as subcontracted YME).

Isha Development Committee (2012-15, 1.8 million).

School project in Sool

Kaalmo health organization (2012-16, 2.6 million).

Health services in northern Somalia.

UNICEF (2012, 6 million) education.

Female Genital Mutilation and Gender based violence

In 2014, the Norwegian government launched the *Strategy for intensifying international efforts for the elimination of female genital mutilation for the period 2014–2017*. Somalia has been selected as a priority country for implementation. The main funding is channelled through DFID and the NCA (in cooperation with Save the Children).

NCA FGM programme (2012 – ongoing, 12 million) .

Major expansion from 2016 in cooperation with Save the Children Norway. The objectives are to transform dominant social norms, make communities and faith actors commit to end FGM and Child Early & Forced Marriage (CEFM), ensure access to adequate and appropriate support services for women and children exposed to harmful practices, and contribute to the improvement and implementation of laws, policies and budgets to end FGM. The programme covers six districts in Gedo and Puntland.

DFID FGM programme (2017-ongoing, NOK 20 million).

Support to NGO consortium, led by Save the Children International. Challenging gender discriminatory social norms to break the cycle of poverty by helping reduce violence against women and girls, including female genital mutilation (FGM) and Child Early Forced Marriage (CEFM). This programme is part of a bigger DFID programme - the *Social Norms and Participation* programme - that started in November 2015 and aims to increase women's participation in decision-making and to challenge harmful social norms in Somalia. The programme covers six of the seven federal Member States of Somalia, including urban and rural populations and hard-to-reach areas. The project seeks to challenge harmful social norms and to increase women's social and economic empowerment through interventions at the individual, household, community, and societal levels.

IPPF (2015-18, 12 million). Funding is provided for IPPF to work with its local partner (member association), Somaliland Family Health Association, on a project to abandon FGM practice in Somaliland.

Fokus (Norwegian NGO, work with local partner on FGM – 2012-13): 0.7 mill

NCA, Gender Based violence (2014- ongoing, with Save the Children from 2016):

2014-15: 15 mill, 2016-18: about 20 mill (Gedo and Puntland) (also other areas related to emergency/psycho social support to victims).

Humanitarian aid emergency assistance

The Norwegian disbursements are guided both by global appeals from the UN and the ICRC and by the disbursement through Norwegian NGOs based on thematic competence and geographic presence. In addition, there is emphasis (NOK 53.3 million) on humanitarian disarmament (demining). The single biggest recipient is the Norwegian Refugee Council. Some of the support for alternative education

(NRC, NCA, Save the Children), work against gender-based violence (NCA) and water (YME) are listed under relevant sections above although some of this is funded by MFA's humanitarian grant. In addition to the recipients listed below, there is also core funding to a number of multilateral organisations providing humanitarian aid to Somalia.

UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2012 – ongoing, 131 million).

Funding is partly for OCHA's work in Somalia (office and coordination efforts) with 16 million. 115 million has been disbursed to the Somalia Humanitarian Fund.

NRC (2012-ongoing, 234 million).

Norwegian funding from the humanitarian section in MFA is core funding to its operations in Somalia.

NCA (2017-18, 20 million).

Water and sanitation.

NorCross/IFRC (2012- ongoing, 191 million).

Save the Children

Education in emergencies (project in Baidoa, South Central).

World Food Programme (2013-17, 48 million).

Food aid.

Dansk Flyktningshjælp (2012-2015, 18.2 million).

Concern Worldwide (2012-15, 24.4 million).

UNHCR (2016 only), 7 million.

Humanitarian disarmament

NPA (2013 – ongoing, 36 million).

This included mine clearance in the disputed area between Somaliland and Puntland (similar activities in South Central Somalia were funded from DFID and other non-Norwegian sources). In addition to mine clearance activities, survey (including impact assessment) and mine risk education activities were carried out both by NPA independently as well as through national consortium partners of the Somalia Explosives Management Authority.

Mines advisory group (2013, 2 million).

Police, community weapons safety

HALO Trust (2012-15, 15.3 million).

Mine clearance Somaliland.

ANNEX 4: PROJECT NOTES

Norad Somalia evaluation project note – Norwegian Refugee Council

Introduction

NRC started operating in Somalia in 2004 with an office in Somaliland, and later in the south in 2007, with an office in Mogadishu. The organisation now has three area offices and eight field offices spread across various parts of Somalia, from the North to central and south Somalia. These offices are located in Kismayu, Dollow, Dhoble, Baidoa, Hargeisa, Erigavo, Bossaso, Galkayo, Garowe, Mogadishu and Burao. NRC provides a mix of short, medium and long-term support as the situation demands. NRC delivers emergency assistance to Somalis who have been forcibly displaced, and those affected by disasters. For those who are in protracted displacement situations, NRC provides long-term support in the settlements of internally displaced people (IDPs).

NRC's areas of work include: i) education, both to IDPs as well as to the host communities in which they reside; ii) shelter and non-food items to IDPs, with the shelter ranging from temporary, semi-permanent and permanent; iii) livelihoods and food security through cash programmes, training and awareness raising around nutrition, food production and alternative livelihoods; iv) Information, counselling and legal assistance (ICLA), that undertakes advocacy and awareness raising around the protection and rights of displaced populations, along with information, legal counselling on housing, land and property rights, as well as securing shelter tenure for IDPs and returnees; and finally v) Water, hygiene and sanitation (WASH) support.¹

Norway's funding to NRC for the years 2012 – 2018 are as indicated below. NRC Somalia has seen falling contributions to its overall budget from the NMFA, with funding from Norad having ceased in 2015. From a share of 34%, Norway's contribution to NRC has fallen to about 10% of the organisation's overall funding, partly due to an increase in other funding sources for NRC, and partly due to a reduction in the funding amounts from Norway. Over the evaluation period, the highest funding from Norway was witnessed between 2013 and 2016, which coincides with the time during which Norway had halted its support to the Somalia Humanitarian Fund. Other funding sources to NRC over the evaluation period have included SIDA, ECHO, EC, DFID, DEVCO, OCHA (SHF), UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, UN-Habitat, and GIZ.²

NRC lauded Norway's flexible funding model. This flexibility enabled the organisation to more easily adopt an integrated approach in its activities as NRC can deploy Norwegian funding to supplement with additional activities where other donors have ear-marked their funds. Further, NRC staff indicated that the flexibility of funding and the operational procedures agreed with the NMFA ensures that, NRC can act fast without the need for securing approval first, as long as they can justify the expenditure to the NMFA in their reporting later. In emergencies, such leeway to act is crucial in ensuring quick action to save lives and alleviate suffering.

¹ (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2017)

² (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2016)

YEAR	Annual Funding (NOK) Norway + other sources	NMFA & Norad (NOK)	Percentage
2012	-*	47,300,000.00	-*
2013	198,000,000.00	66,600,000.00	34%
2014	194,000,000.00	73,600,000.00	38%
2015	212,258,968.00	66,800,000.00	31%
2016	193,000,000.00	43,000,000.00	22%
2017	413,000,000.00	37,000,000.00	9%
2018	309,000,000.00	32,000,000.00	10%

*Not available. Source NRC Somalia Country Office, Mogadishu.

Effectiveness

The engagement of NRC in Somalia and its quality of work has earned the organisation a place of respect among actors, as evidenced by the various respondents contacted during the evaluation. Respondents indicated that NRC is among the first organisations to respond when a crisis hits. The speed of response has improved over the years, as an evaluation in 2013 found significant delays in the distribution of food vouchers during drought.³ Such responsiveness is possible due to the level of preparedness of the country office to deal with emergencies when they strike. In addition to having access to unearmarked funding from the NMFA, speed of response is also due to NRC having an extensive network on the ground, and due to good relations with the communities as well as with the authorities.⁴

In food security and livelihoods, some of the outcomes achieved as documented in evaluations include the fact that NRC's approach to food distribution, which works through local suppliers, to procure and distribute the food is an effective method of minimising cost⁵ and ensuring that the food procured is acceptable to the local communities. Also of importance is that this approach supports the local economy. Evaluations indicate that food distribution and cash voucher support by NRC has helped households to increase the number of meals they eat during drought periods.⁶

NRC has been working increasingly through a resilience and durable solutions lens. Respondents indicated that the organisation strives to deliver an integrated package of support wherever it operates in order to support this resilience focus. Since 2013, NRC has been the lead organisation in a consortium of five INGOs delivering a large resilience programme, operating in 22 districts in south and central Somalia - the Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS) Consortium. BRCiS works along the spectrum of humanitarian and development areas combining short-term humanitarian support alongside more longer-term development oriented interventions aimed at building the capacities of communities to deal with shocks.⁷

Under its ICLA activities, NRC is part of the housing land and property sub-cluster in Somalia that is

³ (Ternstrom Consulting, 2013)

⁴ (Georgina Anderson, 2018)

⁵ Ibid

⁶ (David Guillemois, 2012)

⁷ (NRC Somalia, 2016)

advocating for greater shelter security and more lawful evictions of IDPs. NRC is leading the eviction monitoring in Somalia, collecting of data to support the advocacy activities of other concerned actors around HLP issues for displaced populations.⁸ It has provided numerous shelters to IDP families across various locations in Somalia, both permanent and transitional. A 2013 evaluation found that NRC's response to IDPs is integrated and provides shelter activities that also address needs over the full spectrum of relief, recovery and development.⁹

With regard to access in hard to reach areas, NRC staff indicated that the organisation works alongside local NGOs that have greater access to insecure areas, thus enabling NRC to reach vulnerable communities located in such areas. This is confirmed by evaluations that found that NRC's degree of access in hard to reach areas is commendable. In the contested areas of Sool and Sanaag regions for example, only NRC and CARE were present, with NRC providing support through its Erigavo office. This notwithstanding, a 2018 evaluation also found that despite its strategic location, this Erigavo office was understaffed and under-funded, which hinders its potential.¹⁰

Vulnerability and gender

NRC staff and other respondents indicated that NRC has a rigorous approach in selecting and targeting beneficiaries. One evaluation found this to be a strength within NRC¹¹, but it also found that the organisation needed to do more in terms of reviewing and updating beneficiary lists in order to ensure that the right people were being supported at all times. As indicated above, NRC makes a concerted effort to access vulnerable people in hard to reach areas, although evaluations also note a capacity gap in terms of staff ability to incorporate gender in programming design.¹² Their location in South West State for example, means that they are predominantly assisting Bantus, more so the ones who are displaced from Lower Shabelle region to SWS.¹³ According to NRC area manager for Baidoa, they also specifically target one of the most marginalised groups in SWS, the Eyle community. The Eyle are hunter-gatherers and have historically been a marginalised group. NRC targets beneficiaries from this community with cash and shelter.

Unintended consequences

It was noted by numerous respondents that the location of INGOs in safer locales or in urban areas has long been acting as a 'pull factor'. NRC has also encountered this challenge in some of the locations where they operate. To mitigate this, NRC partners with local Somali organisations to gain better access to the harder to reach areas so that support is offered in the home regions of the vulnerable to negate their need to move cities.

Coherence

Responses from interviews indicate that NRC ensures that its activities are aligned with the country and FMS plans as necessary. In South West State, for example, Government representatives confirmed

⁸ (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2016)

⁹ (Ternstrom Consulting, 2013)

¹⁰ (Georgina Anderson, 2018)

¹¹ (David Guillemois, 2012)

¹² Ibid

¹³ As of September 2019, Baidoa had 359,994 internally displaced persons, consisting of 51,322 households on 435 sites.

<https://www.iom.int/news/somalias-26m-internally-displaced-citizens-need-water-shelter-and-health> . These are predominantly Bantus. NRC is one of the key actors assisting IDPs in SWS.

that NRC's activities are aligned to the SWS Strategic Plan 2017-2019, segments of which informed the Somali NDP 2017-2019. They also stated that NRC is an active participant in all the coordination forums in Baidoa, of which a number are in operation:

- Durable solutions technical working group led by IOM
- Resilience coordination meetings led by WB, held every 2 months
- SWS Humanitarian Forum

NGOs including NRC and NIS have their own community action plans, but NRC is usually keen to ensure that its plans are in line with the FMS own community action plans. In assessing some of the reports and documents commissioned by NRC,¹⁴ it is evident that NRC pays close attention to ensuring that it is aligned with Somali Government priorities. An evaluation of NRC's food security programming found that the active participation of NRC country coordination meetings represents an important source of information for NRC from which to prioritise areas of greatest need.¹⁵

According to NRC staff, one of the dilemmas for NRC in working closely with the authorities is that they have difficulty in accessing some locations that are under the control of al-Shabaab. To get around this, they partner with local organisation that have a greater ability to operate in such areas.

NRC either leads or participates in a variety of analytical activities that go towards informing the planning and design of its programmes. Some of these analyses include:

- Detailed Site Assessments of IDP locations for the CCCM cluster, most especially in Mogadishu¹⁶
- Joint Multi-Cluster Needs Assessments¹⁷
- Post Return Monitoring with UNHCR Protection and Return Monitoring Network (PRMN)¹⁸
- Somalia Protection Monitoring system (PMS)¹⁹ managed by the Somalia Protection Cluster
- In partnership with the Benadir Regional Administration (BRA), in 2018, NRC conducted an Eviction Risk Assessment exercise in Mogadishu that is now updated monthly.

Conflict sensitivity

NRC carries out numerous assessments prior entering into a new location, and after that, they continue with periodic assessments to update their information. One of its strategies to alleviating potential conflicts is ensuring that at least 30% of its support is provided to host communities where IDPs reside. NRC also has a protection policy guiding how it operates in communities. This policy provides guidelines on appropriate clan/ethnic group-sensitive approach, meaning that assistance is proportionately distributed among different clans/groups to avoid conflict.²⁰

NRC staff indicated that in their engagement with Norway around conflict sensitivity, it is more that the Embassy or the MFA this is more focused on gaining knowledge or getting a specific update on a situation, rather than the MFA providing guidance on conflict sensitivity. As evidenced from their documentation, NRC also provides detailed information around conflict sensitivity in its applications

¹⁴ Such as the Displacement and Housing, Land and Property Disputes in Puntland, or its participation in the ReDDS Consortium which is aligned to the NDP and RRF.

¹⁵ (Georgina Anderson, 2018)

¹⁶ <https://cccm-cluster-somalia.github.io/OPSMAP/>

¹⁷ <https://www.reachresourcecentre.info/country/somalia/theme/multi-sector-assessments/>

¹⁸ <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/58901>

¹⁹ <http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/2019/12/16/somalia-protection-monitoring/>

²⁰ (Georgina Anderson, 2018)

to the MFA.²¹

Lessons learnt

When NRC started its operations in Somalia, the staff indicated that its NFI assistance packages were primarily sourced from outside of Somalia. But numerous assessment and reviews indicated the advantage of sourcing from within Somalia, and now, where possible, most of its assistance materials are sourced from within the country.²² This, respondents said, has helped to enhance the capacity of Somalia private sector suppliers in terms of being responsive to tenders and procurement guidelines.

Another lesson is that by participating in consortia arrangements, with regard to M&E, where the systems have to be harmonised in order to work sufficiently for all partners in a consortium, such harmonisation helps NRC to attain a good level of M&E data in Somalia.²³ This is especially useful seeing as a number of evaluations founds that NRC had gaps in its M&E systems.^{24 25}

²¹ (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2016)

²² (Georgina Anderson, 2018)

²³ (Glyn Taylor, 2019)

²⁴ (David Guillemois, 2012)

²⁵ (Georgina Anderson, 2018)

Norad Somalia evaluation project note – Norwegian Red Cross

Introduction

Norwegian Red Cross (NorCross) has been operating in Somalia for over 35 years now, since 1981.²⁶ It works in partnership with the Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS). NorCross works through national societies to deliver services, and with the aim too of enhancing the operational capacity of such national societies. In Somalia, along with the SRCS, and with funds primarily from Norad and the MFA, as well as its own funding, NorCross has been providing healthcare services as well as organisational development of the Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS). The health component aims to improve the health status of targeted populations in by providing curative and preventative primary healthcare. NorCross also supports three rehabilitation centres, one each in Somaliland, Puntland and in south Somalia. The rehabilitation centres are run with Norad support. The MFA supports SRCS' fistula treatment project at Keysaney hospital in Mogadishu, providing free services to women suffering from obstetric fistula. In addition, Norad supports the financial capacity building project for the SRCS, as well as the SRCS' South Central cholera control project. In the evaluation period, NorCross has received NOK 191 million.

The SRCS was established in 1965 and is one of the largest national humanitarian organisations in Somalia with branches in all the 19 regions of the country. In addition to humanitarian assistance, SRCS also engages in longer term development programs mainly focusing around disaster risk reduction and health.

NorCross operates on a three-year framework agreement for humanitarian support, with annual reviews. Its development funding from Norad is based on four-year agreements for development. Discussions are ongoing to change the humanitarian agreement to four years as well. In its support of the SRCS, NorCross works closely with other Red Cross Society partners ICRC, IFRC.

Effectiveness

Key results include:²⁷

- Support to SRCS' three physical rehabilitation centres, which are the only facilities offering physical rehabilitation support in Somalia.
- NorCross supports eight SRCS clinics in the Mudug region of Puntland that deliver preventive and curative primary healthcare services.
- Support to SRCS' fistula ward at Keysaney hospital in Mogadishu, which helps women suffering from obstetric fistula. There are currently no other permanent fistula facilities in South Central Somalia. The clinic was initiated in 2016 with MFA funding, at an annual budget of about NOK 5million.²⁸ Norway's support to the clinic includes training the medical team at Keysaney to treat Fistula cases, training of volunteers and staff to provide psychosocial support to patients, both at the hospital and in the community, strengthening the referral system through the primary health clinics, and creating awareness through the local communities and volunteers. The clinic complements SRCS's activities Maternal, New-born and Child Health program through the primary health clinics that is partly funded by NORAD.²⁹

²⁶ The first cooperation agreement was signed in 1982 but NorCross and SRCS have worked closely together since the 1960s. (O'Regan, 2019)

²⁷ (Norwegian Red Cross, 2019)

²⁸ (SRCS, 2017)

²⁹ (SRCS, 2017)

- Technical expertise in the areas of finance development. NorCross has been assisting SRCS to establish financial structures and systems to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in the implementation of humanitarian activities. This support, which is provided in collaboration with ICRC has helped SRCS with staff remuneration in order to improve staff retention and motivation, as well as in training and capacity-building of management staff at the coordination offices and branch level together, including with the recruitment of additional finance staff. This support has enhanced the degree of accountability of activities.
- Health care in danger where NorCross and SRCS have been looking to improve the degree of access to its facilities especially in the more volatile locations. This has been through instituting guidelines around not having firearms in a health facility, and raising awareness around the danger of landmines and other unexploded ordnance, and holding campaigns for their elimination.

An organisational review carried out in 2019 found that NorCross is considered to be a ‘reliable and credible partner that is focused on sustainability of its partners rather than its own visibility’.³⁰ During the field visit to Somalia, this was found to be true where the SRCS is the face of the healthcare facilities visited.

NorCross operations can move with flexibility between development and emergency depending on the situation. Having both Norad and MFA funding, both of which are flexible enables NorCross to engage with long-term planning strategies more easily, in terms of sustainability of facilities and operations on the ground, unlike if the organisation only focussed on humanitarian assistance.

Vulnerability and gender

Women and children are the main users of the health facilities. NorCross and SRCS activities are designed to support women reproductive age, as well as ensuring the health and nutritional support of children. Reports provided during the evaluation indicate that data includes gender and age disaggregated data. Through volunteers, SRCS engages in awareness raising activities that focus on influencing community leaders and decision makers around the health needs of women and children, and to encourage them to facilitate that expectant women access health facilities to mitigate on the number of complications arising due to pregnancy and child-birth.

In Somalia, women play a central role in healthcare which is seen more as a woman’s domain, so attracting female staff and volunteers has not been such a challenge for SRCS. SRCS has also secured female management staff at some of its facilities; for example, in Somaliland, the health programme coordinator, rehabilitation centre and finance directors are all female, and in Mogadishu, the Director of the rehabilitation centre is also female. At field level, 70% of SRCS youth and volunteers are female, and the Primary Health teams are made up mainly of women.³¹ Since the bulk of healthcare facilities attend to female patient or mothers, this configuration helps to ensure better access and communication, especially considering the highly patriarchal nature of Somali society. Additionally, NorCross partners with SRCS because of its ability to reach the most vulnerable people. In the Somalia context, SRCS is renowned for its stance on neutrality and impartiality, and is thus able to provide reliable primary healthcare services that reach all regions and tribal groups.

³⁰ (O'Regan, 2019)

³¹ (Norwegian Red Cross, 2019)

Coherence

The militarisation of humanitarian Aid is a real concern for NorCross and SRCS, since AMISOM, for example, is used by UN to ensure humanitarian access. NorCross and SRCS operate strictly long Red Cross Red Crescent (RCRC) Principles of impartiality and neutrality. As such, although they do work to fulfil the health needs of the Somalia people, which is also in line with the NDP, they do not overtly seek to be associated as closely with the Government. For example, the SRCS health facilities fall under the mandate of the Ministry of Health, and SRCS does collaborate with the Ministry in the running of the facilities, for example by being a member of the national and local co-ordination networks that includes health sector committees, and chaired by MoH. For the referral system to work, SRCS staff need to collaborate with MoH health officers. But the SRCS's guiding principles are those of the Red Cross Society.

SRCS has two coordination offices based in Hargeisa and Mogadishu which oversee the coordination of SRCS's activities with those of other actors in Somalia; for example in terms of division of labour. There are also formal and informal coordination platforms that support in aligning RCRC movement partners work with SRCS, such as its partners in the Red Cross movement such as ICRC and IFRC.

One of the dilemmas that NorCross and SRCS has encountered has been a focus by Norway for greater ownership of the facilities by the Government, by starting a hand over process. The opinion is that the Government does not yet have the capacity to run these facilities adequately to offer continued health services to the population.

Conflict sensitivity

All applications to the Norad and to the MFA have clear stipulations around how NorCross and SRCS approach conflict sensitivity. SRCS has continued to provide humanitarian assistance to communities in all 19 regions of the country during the entire period that the country has been in conflict. As such, it has extensive networks on the ground, and through its track record, is a trusted actor by the communities. The SRCS operates strictly along humanitarian principles, with neutrality and impartiality proving to be particularly useful in ensuring continued access even in hard to reach areas, when other organisation have been unable to. In order to protect these humanitarian principles, NorCross and SRCS are not members of the UN cluster system, which is perceived on the ground to be close allies with the Government.

Recruitment of staff and volunteers pays particular attention to transparency in the process, as well as ensuring diversity of those recruited, more to with regard to making sure that the staff reflect the ethnic diversity of the communities in which they operate.

In Health facilities, SRCS works through community health committees, which have representation from the local communities. In addition to the running of facilities, these committees are also responsible for awareness raising and for conflict resolution.

NorCross has its own conflict sensitivity guidelines that are in line with IFRC and ICRC guidelines. These are clearly articulated in proposals, but have not engaged in extensive conflict sensitivity discussions with MFA or Norad, but at Embassy and Diplomatic Office levels, this subject sometimes comes up.

Lessons learned

The applications and reports to MFA and Norad include information around risks and how NorCross mitigates them. In terms of M&E, NorCross faces a challenge due to the Kenya and Somalia Country Manager as well as other international staff being unable to travel to central and south Somalia.

Nevertheless, NorCross does receive monitoring and progress reports from SRCS, as well as from its other partners on the ground such as ICRC, which supplements their own reporting. However, NorCross staff indicated that there is room for improvement in terms of M&E reporting to include indicators related higher level outcomes. Similarly, a recent organisational review found that NorCross has a greater focus on quality control and little on monitoring and evaluation, and that quality control was an area that required greater attention, more so with regard to building SRCS's capacity in M&E.³² The challenge of M&E is also a particular challenge in South Somalia since NorCross staff cannot travel there due to security restrictions.

Norway's diplomatic mission in Somalia holds briefing and information sharing sessions of all Norwegian NGOs in Somalia. But this is adhoc and has not happened since the new country manager Jacinta six months ago. Learning among NGOs and Embassy would happen during these events. Respondents indicated that it is a good forum for horizontal and vertical learning to take place and should be regularised.

³² (O'Reagan, 2019)

Norad Somalia evaluation project note – Somalia Humanitarian Fund (SHF)

Introduction

In 2010, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia upgraded the existing Humanitarian Response Fund to create the Somalia Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF). The fund is a multi-donor Somalia country-based pooled fund mechanisms that operates as part of the country-based pooled fund mechanisms CBPF of the UN. CBPFs enable donors to contribute unearmarked funds to support humanitarian efforts. In 2016, as part of standardizing OCHA-managed pooled funds, the Somalia CHF was renamed as the Somalia Humanitarian Fund (SHF).

The objectives of the SHF are to: i) allocate funding for the most urgent life-saving interventions in Somalia, 2) ensure timely allocation and disbursement of resources, 3) enable effective humanitarian action, and 3) strengthen coordination. SHF does not implement projects but works through implementing partners, including International NGOs, local NGOs and UN agencies, which carry out approved activities. These partners submit proposals through an online database managed by OCHA, and these are assessed against the overall strategic objectives of SHF. The SHF has two funding windows: i) The Standard Allocation, where funding needs and gaps are developed from a country needs assessment, and included in the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP); ii) The Reserve Allocation, used to address urgent/emergent needs in case of sudden onset disasters that are typically not included in the initial planning and allocations.³³

Through funds to the CERF, Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been supporting the SHF since its inception,³⁴ although the funding stopped in 2013 after the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia published a report about aid diversion during the 2011/2012 famine in Somalia. The MFA started funding the SHF again in 2017. In the evaluation period, the MFA has supported SHF with a total of 115 million NOK.

Effectiveness

Some important results achieved by the Fund since 2012 include:

- A well-developed risk management and mitigation mechanism since the drop in funds in 2012 occasioned by the negative Monitoring Group Report.³⁵ An independent evaluation found that the system was much enhanced with stringent measures in place including around project monitoring ensure accountable and effective management of funds.³⁶
- Due to the various improvements in transparency, accountability, risk management and monitoring systems, SHF staff indicated that the SHF is now used as a bench mark for other country-based pooled funds, with the Fund seconding staff to assist other country pooled funds.
- Enhanced accountability and transparency with regard to:
 - Proposal/application review for funding where an independent advisory board oversees the process. This ensures independence in the selection of proposals to be funded. The diverse composition of the Advisory Board, which is made up of four members from the UN, two from INGOs, two from NNGOs (including Somalia NGO Consortium lead), and four from donors. The Board's review of proposals to be funded is said to have enhanced transparency of the process, as well as the timeliness of the fund.

³³ (UN OCHA, n.d.)

³⁴ (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014)

³⁵ (Andy Featherstone, 2019)

³⁶ (PWC Ltd, 2014)

- Bi-annual reports to donors detailing issues arising over the reporting period, including in relation to sensitive issues such as fraud cases identified, or issues around access. These reports are usually presented to donors in meetings held in Nairobi, where SHF staff indicated that Norway is a particularly engaged donor. In addition to these meetings, respondents indicated that Norway is one of the donors that usually calls for regular bilateral meetings with the SHF in Nairobi to receive periodic updates on the performance of the Fund.
- Due to the above measures, the SHF now enjoys enhanced trust from donors, which is maintained by the candid reporting they undertake in terms of risks, challenges, and actions taken by the SHF to address each of these. The Fund has seen an improvement in funding trends to the Fund since 2016
- SHF has encouraged and seen an increase in joint working across clusters which, where closer coordination between the clusters delivers programs that are better integrated to respond to the needs of communities

The SHF engages in a number of capacity development exercise for its partners, and over the years, partners indicated that such exercises have increased. On the other hand, according to respondents, most of this capacity development is focussed primarily on ensuring compliance and accountability processes rather than to enhancing the long-term capacity of the local organisations in general. Despite this, they also indicated that some of the compliance-focussed training did enable them to enhance their systems and skills in areas such as financial management.

Discussions with SHF revealed that Norway is considered to be a very engaged donor that provides timely funds according its pledges. Further, due to the open dialogue that the Fund has with the Norwegian Embassy in Nairobi, Norway is in tune with emerging crises, such as the 2017 drought, where the Embassy staff visited Somalia along with SHF to assess the situation on the ground. This resulted in the MFA providing additional funds to the help in responding to the crisis.³⁷

Access, vulnerability, gender

In line with the Grand Bargain commitment to localisation of aid, the SHF has been increasingly working to enlarge the share of funds that is channelled through local Somali organisations. In turn, respondents indicated that this has further enhanced the Fund's capability to access hard to reach areas where many of the vulnerable and marginalised communities, such as Bantus can be found. Although local organisations do facilitate greater access in hard to reach and insecure areas, there is also the element of risk transfer where these organisations have to manage the risks associated with operating in these areas. Evaluations have found that there is a need for the SHF and other funding agencies to support these local organisations to manage these risks.³⁸

Over the last number of years, the SHF has been providing stronger guidance to its partners on gender considerations and protection. The application and reporting mechanisms require partners to report on the numbers of women, men, boys and girls with disabilities who benefit from the project. This is supported by having an OCHA-based Protection (Disability) Advisor to guide on matters related to gender and disability inclusion,³⁹ as well as providing support to mainstreaming protection and gender for relevant stakeholders. On the other hand, a recent evaluation found that, in practice, the

³⁷ (Norway Embassy Nairobi, 2018)

³⁸ (Fisher, 2015)

³⁹ (The SHF, 2018)

application of gender sensitive approaches and feedback varied across the organisations supported by SHF, especially since consideration of gender and protection did not appear to affect the proposal evaluation process.⁴⁰

Unintended consequences

With the better mechanisms, the SHF has experienced increased funding, and in turn greater demands are made of the Fund. For example, there has been a push from donors and SHF partners for the Fund to engage more in resilience programming. However, funding to the fund does not take on a development profile and therefore SHF not able to engage in significant resilience-focused programming.⁴¹

After the slump in funding from 2013, the SHF instituted stricter risk management mechanisms. These initially resulted in delays in disbursement of funds, up to an average of 95.⁴² The Fund has been working to reduce this time, and at the time of the evaluation, was said to range at about 50 days for standard allocations and 30 days for the reserve allocations. Interviews indicate that the timeliness of funding has improved, but compared to the response speed of some INGOs, this could still be improved further, especially in cases of sudden onset disasters.

Coherence

SHF is delivering on the priorities of the Somalia Humanitarian Response Plans (HRP). Since the development of the NDP in 2017, the HRPs have been aligned to the NDP, and since 2018, to the Response and Recovery Framework (RRF) as well. Funding the SHF enables donors to deliver on their commitments to the Grand Bargain.⁴³

Dilemmas

One of the challenges that the Fund has been experiencing is a stronger push from a re-invigorated FGS to be involved more closely in the activities of the Fund. Staff indicated that when the Government cannot do this, they try to push for this through the donors. Further, donors too have their country agendas, which initially would challenge the direction that the SHF took. Currently, due to the elaborate mechanisms to ensure transparency, independence and accountability, this challenge has been mitigated. And additionally, donors now engage with the SHF through the informal donor humanitarian forum where they can make their collective voices heard by the Fund. Although Norway is part of this donor group though they have not held a leadership position in it, and further, the perception is that despite being an engaged and one of the top donors to the Fund, they are largely overshadowed by other donors.

In relation to donor interests, according to respondents, at times, the push by donors to work more strongly on gender is not realistic in a context such as Somalia. SHF staff indicated that the Fund does what it can while also ensuring that it recognises the operating environment. The Fund takes care that in its direction to partners around issues such as gender, that can be emotive in Somalia, it helps partners to operate in a manner that retains its and the partners' ability to continue engaging on the

⁴⁰ (Fisher, 2015)

⁴¹ (Andy Featherstone, 2019)

⁴² (Fisher, 2015)

⁴³ (The SHF, 2019)

ground.

Conflict sensitivity / humanitarian principles dilemmas

The SHF strives to adhere to humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality and independence. Neutrality and independence are particularly important in supporting conflict-sensitive programming in a context like Somalia. This said, the SHF works through partners who are provided guidance on humanitarian principles, but according to SHF staff, this has yet to be interpreted in terms of what applying humanitarian principles actually means for SHF in a context like Somalia.

SHF partners, by necessity, have to operate with or through existing power structures such as gatekeepers.⁴⁴ And to access the hard to reach or insecure areas, they have to negotiate access with non-state armed groups, including al-Shabaab, which could include paying tax to these groups. All DAC donor countries now have a zero tolerance policy towards funding terror organisations, which places organisations in a difficult position. Adhering to this policy and to humanitarian principles then becomes a challenge in a context such as Somalia, more so for local organisations who have to be more pragmatic in their approach in order to access the most vulnerable.⁴⁵ SHF staff indicated that one way in which it mitigates any blow back from donors with regard to these dilemmas is to keep them apprised of the situation on the ground.

Lessons learned

SHF staff indicated that SHF is not a good fit for donors seeking visibility in Somalia. For example, some non-traditional (non-DAC) donors such as Turkey that provide extensive emergency support in times of crisis are also keen for individual visibility.

With regard to analyses and ensuring contextualised response approaches, respondents indicated that periodic reviews and evaluations have informed the evolution of the SHF over the years, primarily since the Monitoring Group Report. The Fund adopts three kinds of monitoring: partner monitoring, internal SHF monitoring, as well as third-party monitoring and call centre facility. One challenge with SHF monitoring is that humanitarian actors, especially when responding to emergencies are not equipped or in location long enough to allow them to effectively track the outcomes of their projects, with most indicators being focused on outputs.

⁴⁴ (Andy Featherstone, 2019)

⁴⁵ (O'Leary, 2018)

Norad Somalia evaluation project note – Constitutional Review

Introduction

The Constitutional Review project has gone through two phases. The first phase from 2015-2016 and the second phase (the Constitutional Review Support Project (CRSP II)) 2018-2020. In the second phase, the project was part of an integrated joint UNDP programme on Support to building inclusive institutions of Parliament and engagement in constitutional review and inclusive political process in Somalia, but still supported by Norway (and other donors) as a separate project.

The expected outcome of the support is: Support an effective, transparent and accountable constitutional review process through strengthening inclusive political processes at all levels to develop a new social contract that meets the needs of Somali women and men, reflects political realities and is of good technical quality in order to foster equitable and sustainable development and peace.

The planned outputs of the two projects were:⁴⁶

- A finalised constitution agreed by all major stakeholders
- A national dialogue process and consultations with the Somali people
- Civic education and engagement to understand constitutional rights and duties
- Resolution on contentious issues at all levels

Norway played a key role in developing the provisional constitution from 2012, so it made sense that it took a leading role in the follow-up constitutional review process. Reaching political agreements in consensus across all stakeholders was a priority. Consequently, Norway was the first donor to the two new phases of the project, and is currently the largest, with a contribution covering 60% of the envelope of USD 11 million.

Effectiveness

The first constitutional review project phase was effective in assisting with establishing the key institutions leading the review process, including the Ministry of Constitutional Affairs, and with some support to counterparts in the Federal Member states (FMS).⁴⁷

A major output of the second phase of the constitutional review project has been the review and redrafting of 15 chapters of the provisional constitution. According to interviewees, five of these chapters are still contested and require political decisions to be finalised. Key outputs also include broad consultations in all member states (bar Somaliland), though it is not evident from data and interviews how these consultations have informed or shaped the updated constitutional draft.⁴⁸ The programme was originally envisaged by UNDP as a platform for reconciliation and inclusion⁴⁹, but both phases of the programme have first and foremost been technical, and while there has been consultations, the reconciliation elements of the constitution have not been addressed directly by the programme.⁵⁰

The implementation has been delayed several times, which according to interviewees and different

⁴⁶ (UNDP, 2020) Constitution Review Support Project, project brief

⁴⁷ (UNDP, 2019b) Independent Country Programme Evaluation: Somalia report. Unedited draft 1 - October

⁴⁸ See among others (UNDP, 2019a)

⁴⁹ (UNDP, 2017b) e-mail from UNDP to donors with project description attached 29 November

⁵⁰ Interviews and (UNDP, 2019b: 39)

studies⁵¹ is partly a consequence of the political discussions between FMS and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) on issues pertaining to wealth sharing and intergovernmental transfers, power sharing and judiciary authority. And partly a consequence of internal disputes between the three institutions supported by the project (the Ministry of Constitutional Affairs (MOCA, the Ministries of Constitutional Affairs in the FMS, the Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission (ICRIC), and the National Federal Parliament) as well as related FGS institutions. To be effective, the constitutional review will require a strong political will, which could be motivated by a political dialogue process. The effectiveness was further complicated by the fact that several FMS either had already drafted constitutions or were in the process of doing so before the new federal constitution was in place.

In short, the project has delivered on consultations and on technical inputs, but the key obstacles to finalising a constitution have not been solved.

The project has undertaken a broad range of consultations with citizens and special consultations with women and disabled persons across the FMS. Evidence shows that Norway did emphasise the importance of the inclusion of women and IDPs more explicitly in the programme.⁵² The importance of inclusion of women was already flagged by Norad in 2013, when the appraisal asked for more specific inclusion of women in the results framework of the programme.⁵³ Norway's emphasis on women in dialogue with the implementing partners was confirmed during the evaluation and were also stressed in internal talking points of the MFA.⁵⁴ According to interviewees, Norway remains proactive in ensuring that in particular Persons Living With Disabilities (PLWD) were included in the consultation process and also highlight the importance of women's representation.

Interviewees stated that Norway had on occasions with other donors engaged in dialogue with FMS and FGS. Norway also played a key role in finding consensus when there were internal issues in the programme. In 2017, there were misunderstandings within the FGS between MoCA and ICRIC and the Parliamentary Oversight Committee. Allegedly, the three institutions under the FGS had different approaches to the implementation of the constitutional review master plan and were at odds in terms of who was going to be in the lead. This severely delayed implementation. Norway took on a mediator role in this and opened up for more funding. Norway contributed to reconciling the three entities, who now – according to interviewees - have a good working relationship.

Norway is seen by interviewees as a facilitatory donor as it provides unearmarked funding, and is very flexible in its support to implementing partners and government.

Coherence

The funding to the Constitutional Review project was provided through the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund and thus in line with the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Framework (SDRF). With the alignment with the SDRF, the support is also fully aligned with the FGS. The programme cooperated with the few other related initiatives of NDI and Max Planck in the period evaluated as lead in the review process. UNDP furthermore had two complementary projects in-house, which include the Parliamentary support and the support to the boundaries commission, which were both implemented by (and thus coordinated with) UNDP.

⁵¹ (HIPS, 2019a)

⁵² (Embassy of Norway, 2015a) E-mail from the Embassy to the UNDP 9 December 2015

⁵³ (Norad, 2013a) SOM-13/2017 UNDP Strategic Programmes Somalia. Support to Parliament and Constitutional Review: Project Document Assessment, 26 November

⁵⁴ (MFA, 2018a) Internal MFA mail with talking points for an upcoming sector working group meeting on the constitutional review, 14 January

The constitutional review project was part of the core dilemma of engaging with the FGS and FMS in a situation with only partial accountability and transparency of the power holders (see main text in evaluation report). This dilemma was not addressed directly by the project, which is under the auspices of the Ministry of Constitutional Affairs (MoCA) under the FGS. However, the effect of the FGS-FMS dispute means that the legislative and financial roles of the FGS and FMS still remain unsolved. In addition, Somaliland was not part of the review process (as it has declared its own independence) and Jubbaland's participation varied as a consequence of long-term dispute with the FGS leadership.

The dilemmas around the constitutional review, federalisation as well as the link to Somaliland is only mentioned once in the documentation made available, and is also not something the project team relates to as per interviews. Instead, this dilemma is assessed as political and expected dealt with by Norway and other donors.

Conflict sensitivity

There were no conflict sensitivity measures in the CRSP II documentation, though it was commonly agreed on by interviewees that the constitution will in itself be a conflict mitigating factor. However, interviewees also pointed to the fact that an unbalanced constitution may escalate existing or potential conflicts. There was some reflection on the need to do no harm in the first project phase, but the past and current phases of the projects were otherwise implemented as technical capacity advisory projects without a political angle as per the project document and interviews and with no conflict sensitivity measures or risk management measures.

Norad did point out the need for enhanced attention to the political aspect and conflict sensitivity in 2013⁵⁵, but there is limited evidence in the documentation and from interviews of further discussion of conflict sensitivity with UNDP.

Lessons learned

The first phase of the programme was subject to an appraisal which clarified that the programme was designed in accordance with best practices. The team has not been able to identify an appraisal of the second phase of the programme. However, the second phase was developed using the UNDP Project Initiation Plan (PIP) system, which *de facto* is a design phase allowing the programme a longer development period with consultations and testing of approaches (though the process was delayed by internal disputes in FGS over benefits and leadership of the project – see above).⁵⁶

⁵⁵ (Norad, 2013a)

⁵⁶ (UNDP, 2017a) Revised Project Implementaiton Plan – Support to Constitution Review, signed 11 November 2017

Norad Somalia evaluation project note – Special Financing Facility (SFF)

Introduction to the project/partner

The idea of the Special Financing Facility (SFF) was originally nurtured between key Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff members and the Somali leadership shortly after the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in 2012, and informally agreed in talks between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of Somalia and the Norwegian Minister for International Development Heikki Holmås 20 December 2012. Following this meeting, the State Minister of Finance and Planning of Somalia, Mohamed Rashid Sheikh Dahir, formally requested the establishment of the SFF endorsed by Minister Holmås on 1 February 2013.⁵⁷

The SFF was established as a temporary channel of funding to be transferred to the World Bank Multi-Partner Fund (MPF) once the MPF was operational. In the first MFA background note on the SFF, the objectives described were (i) poverty alleviation, (ii) the payment of public salaries⁵⁸, as well as (iii) using the SFF as a tool to support FGS legitimacy and ownership and contribute to the stabilisation of Somalia.⁵⁹ In the final programme document, the objective is 'to contribute to the stability and enhance credibility of the FGS' through three main outputs:

- 1) Support to FGS salary payments (regular and timely monthly salary payments)
- 2) Support to selected small-scale local development initiatives (goods and service provision to build public confidence)
- 3) Enhancing the FGS Public Financial Management (PFM) capacity (develop first on-budget vehicle for donors and enhance transparency)

Norway allocated NOK 175 million for the SFF in addition to a series of extra funding to the monitoring agent for the SFF. The SFF became operational in August 2013. In July 2014, the salary payment and PFM elements were transferred to the World Bank MPF, while the small-scale infrastructure project part was transferred to the MPF in 2015.

The SFF is a cornerstone in the description of Norwegian support to Somalia as expressed by key MFA and Norad staff members involved in the design, implementation, advisory and monitoring of the support to Somalia since 2012. Close to all interviews with these Norwegian staff members are consistent in their description of what is *de facto* a theory of change of the Norwegian support to Somalia 2012 to this date – a theory of change that starts with the SFF. The Norwegian support to Somalia (political and in terms of aid) in 2012 onwards focused on the establishment of the FGS. Norway was committed to supporting the FGS and enabling the new government to perform its functions. At a time when the World Bank was not yet ready to engage fully, Norway stepped in and provided the first groundwork, ensuring that the financial systems were in place to allow the FGS to engage with international donors, undertake international transfers and pay its employees on a regular basis.

Norway continued to support its efforts of enabling FGS operations through the MPF (see separate project note). Thus, the SFF, according to interviewees, was the start of a Norwegian support to Somalia that from there on focused on enabling the FGS to function.

Effectiveness

⁵⁷ See commented version of (MFA, 2013a) Norwegian support to finance mechanism for Somali authorities, MFA Note of 25 January 2013

⁵⁸ (MFA, 2013b: 2)

⁵⁹ (MFA, 2013b: 4)

Reported results include (according to MFA and Norad reporting. Note that no independent review or evaluation has been undertaken, but most of these results were confirmed verbally by World Bank, the FGS and selected international donors):

- 1) 2,000 employees received regular monthly payments through an online system with biometric authentication
- 2) Established first financial transfer mechanism between Somalia and the outside world in 24 years operated by the central bank in Somalia
- 3) Provided first capacity development for improved control and financial management in the Ministry of Finance in Mogadishu (PFM processes had already been supported to Somaliland and Puntland ministries of finance at the time)
- 4) Established first annual financial accounts for the Central Bank of Somalia
- 5) Paved the way for the establishment of the first funding window under the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Framework (SDRF)

The SFF was thus effective in achieving several of the planned goals, and is by several interviewees seen as a key contributor to enabling FGS financial operations. Interviewees state that this process would have happened over time, but the Norwegian-supported SFF was able to fast-track these results.

The project was less effective in its infrastructure work. A mere 3 of 13 projects under the SFF local development window were implemented. As of today (this part of the SFF is today named SFF-LD) 10 out of 13 projects have been implemented.

There is no attention to gender issues in the reporting of the SFF. As stated in a Norad assessment note, there were no proactive activities improving gender equality envisaged for the SFF.⁶⁰

No unintended consequences were reported in the documentation or by interviewees.

Coherence

The SFF was launched by Norway as a specific request from FGS and the portfolio was in full alignment with the priorities of the FGS throughout its implementation. Norway would, according to documentation and interviewees, have preferred to have other donors join the SFF, but there was considerable scepticism at first in the donor community vis-à-vis the SFF. Several donors were of the opinion that the Norwegians were too early to engage with the FMS on fiscal transfers and salary payments, and several also expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that Norway only invited donors onboard once the framework of the SFF had been designed. However, as the SFF was transferred to the MPF, other donors *de facto* were able to join the follow-up support to the SFF through the World Bank from mid-2014.

The SFF was part of the core dilemma of engaging with the FGS and FMS in a situation with only partial accountability and transparency of the power holders (see main text in evaluation report). This dilemma was not addressed directly by the SFF, and the dilemma not discussed in the Norwegian documents.

⁶⁰ (Norad, 2013a: 3) Response to request: SFF Somalia, 30 August

Conflict sensitivity

The MFA was aware of the multiple risks related to establishing the SFF and provided some initial (if rudimentary) risk analysis and responses in the MFA background note to the SFF in January 2013.⁶¹ There is limited evidence of further conflict assessment and analysis in the remaining documentation. Similarly, the implications of the SFF support focus vis-à-vis the support to the FMS was not included in the assessments related to the SFF.

Lessons learned

There was insufficient time provided to Norad by the MFA to do a full appraisal of the SFF⁶², but a general advisory note was produced. The advisory note found the intervention relevant but raised some concerns related to SFF risk management and results framework. The MFA did develop a number of background notes before the SFF was approved, which included a risk assessment. A draft programme document was produced, which included most of the aspects required though with less attention to conflict sensitivity, gender and without a detailed results and indicator framework. Interviewees point to close dialogue and involvement of the World Bank in the design of the SFF, which was relevant in terms of using the World Bank experience and as the World Bank would eventually take over the programme in two tranches in 2014 and in 2015.

The follow-up reporting is very activity and input oriented with limited outcome reflections nor reflections related to gender and conflict sensitivity. However, there are relevant reflections on risk and risk management and comprehensive financial reporting and audits in place.

The draft programme document uses output-based goals with limited reflections on measuring outcome level indicators.

⁶¹ (MFA 2013b: 6-7) Somalia – Background, establishment and risks related to the SFF, MFA note 14 January 2013

⁶² (Norad, 2013a)

Norad Somalia evaluation project note – World Bank Multi-Partner Fund

Introduction to the project/partner

The World Bank Multi-Partner Fund (MPF) is one of the funding windows under the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF). It is thus aligned with the Somali Compact in the first years of the period evaluated and then aligned with the Somalia National Development Plan (NPD) and the New Partnership for Somalia principles. The MPF is thus a part of the aid architecture for Somalia and officially aligned with the Federal Government of Somalia's (FGS) development priorities.

The main objective of the World Bank MPF is to provide a platform for coordinated financing for the sustainable reconstruction and development of Somalia, with a focus on core state functions and socio-economic recovery. This is done through a portfolio of projects which reached 15 at the end of the period evaluated.

Norway disbursed NOK 212 million in the first 2015-2017 period and has committed NOK 450 million for the 2018-2020 period. In total NOK 377 million has been disbursed 2015-2019. As of 2020 this makes Norway the third largest donor to the MPF in terms of commitments after the EU and DFID. A main focus of the fund is the Recurrent Cost and Reform Financing Instrument (RCRF). This is expected to be scaled up in the 2018-2020 phase. In addition, Norway is funding Public Financial Management (PFM) projects under the MPF. It was the intention of the fund that payment of salaries for civil servants would free government funds for social services and infrastructure development. Disbursements from RCRF has been linked to progress in economic reform.

The MPF was a follow-up to the Norwegian initiated and funded Special Financing Facility (SFF) (see separate project note). Interviewees confirm that the World Bank was involved in the SFF design and eventually took over the salary payments of the SFF in July 2014 and the small-scale infrastructure component of the SFF (now SFF-LD) in November 2015.

It should also be noted that as a follow-up to the MPF and Norway's commitment to making the FGS perform its functions as a state, Norway has in the last part of the period evaluated worked towards improving Somalia's efforts towards qualifying for HIPC debt relief. This has resulted in Norway providing needed bridging loans to repay the debts to the World Bank and IMF after the period evaluated and pave the way for Pre-Arears Clearing of Somalia's debts (see also main evaluation report).

Effectiveness

The Embassy noted in a 2018 assessment that progress is strong and that RCRF is valuable and unique component in financial reform and statebuilding in Somalia.⁶³ The progress from the World Bank classify all projects as 'mostly satisfactory' with USD 156 million channelled through the fund 2015-2018. This includes progress in terms of tax revenue (increased to USD 142 million in 2017) and regular electronic payment of salaries. The World Bank procurement processes are however assessed to slow the pace of implementation.⁶⁴ In the period evaluated, the Bank has first and foremost worked on establishing a system enabling the state to operate financially, while there has been very limited actual service delivery facilitated by the fund. The SFF-LD has delivered 10 out of the original 13 urban infrastructure projects planned in 2012.

⁶³ See "Prinsippavklaring, Somalia – Verdensbankens flergiverfond», Memo from the Embassy in Nairobi to MFA (no date, but received in MFA 5 July 2019).

⁶⁴ See also (Norad, 2018a: 3-4) Response to Request: Assessment of first half-yearly progress report 2017 from the MPF, 17 January.

While the World Bank report progress on all major outputs of its programming, there is less reflection in the reporting on outcome level achievements. Norad has in its assessment of the MPF reported on this indirectly by stating that there is not always alignment between technical progress and political will. This in particular includes political commitment to align financial management and budget transfers between the federal and the member state level. Norad has also noted the lack of a common vision between the federal government and the member states.⁶⁵ The 2019 review of the Fund finds that the Fund could do more to ensure political alignment between the FGS and the FMS (see section on dilemmas below).⁶⁶

In terms of sustainability, there are concerns raised by Norad and by interviewees with the enhanced salary scales which are beyond those of the FGS and thus form a potential sustainability problem.⁶⁷

There are however more tangible results which include the approval of Somalia's Pre-Arrears Clearance (PAC) of USD 80 million from the World Bank as a consequence of the FGS reform progress.

There are reflections in the World Bank and Norad documentation of civil society playing a monitoring role of the fund performance, but the evidence of this is limited. There are also very limited reflections on gender and vulnerability, be it ethnic, IDPs or disabled for that matter.

Furthermore, in terms of ensuring FGS legitimacy there are indications that this is still not achieved as desired at district level. According to a 2017 survey by the Somalia Stability Fund (SFF) the citizens found that the FGS was not visible and district level. This finding thus runs counter to the objective of using the MPF to enhance the legitimacy of the FGS.

Coherence

From a coordination perspective, the MPF provides for a joined funding opportunity which comprise 10% of the total funds to Somalia and the MPF is thus *inter alia* coordinated. However, according to a 2019 review, there is room for improving the FGS and donor involvement in the coordination fora. Furthermore, in parallel to the MPF, DFID and the EU is funding the Public Resource Management in Somalia Project (PREMIS) and interviews and Norad notes show that there is room for improved coordination between the two.

Interviews and appraisal documents and notes show that Norway funded and continue to fund the World Bank MPF as it is aligned with the FGS priorities through SDRF and as the pooled mechanism provides for enhanced risk management and cost-sharing. Furthermore, it in principle provides for a key opportunity for joint policy dialogue with the FGS as well as with the federal member states.

The World Bank MPF is in particular concerned with the dilemma of working with PFM across all of Somalia. In the first design of the programme, the World Bank in recognition of the political-geographical realities in the country decided to not only establish a bank account with the Central Bank in Mogadishu, but also to establish bank accounts with the State Bank in Puntland and the Central Bank in Somaliland. As Norad explain in an appraisal document 9 September 2014, this 'entails a certain degree of recognition'⁶⁸. As Norad reflects it is a balance between ensuring ownership while moving towards unity. Note however that this dilemma is not discussed in the more elaborate MFA decision document on the first funding to the MPF.⁶⁹ A 2019 review of the MPF also notes that the

⁶⁵ (Norad, 2017a) Travel report from Nairobi about meetings related to the World Bank Multi-Partner Trust Fund 6-9 November 2017.

⁶⁶ (World Bank, 2019: 7-9)

⁶⁷ (Norad, 2015a: 4)

⁶⁸ (Norad, 2014a) Response to request: comments to the World Bank programme document/appraisal for its 40 USD million PFM program for Somalia

⁶⁹ (Embassy of Norway in Nairobi, 2013a) Decision Document, Multi Partner Trust Fund Somalia approved 27 May.

slow implementation has ‘adverse impacts on the trust of client counterparts, in particular in FMS.’⁷⁰

As the Federal Government becomes stronger, the World Bank changed its approach towards the federal member states and has since 2018 demanded that all support provided to all parts of Somalia (including Somaliland) be approved by the Federal Government. If the FGS does not approve of the World Bank activities in Somaliland this will mean that the World Bank will not be able to work in this member state in the future.

There is still limited evidence in the data available of the FGS or the FMS providing either direct services to the people of Somalia or indirectly facilitating service delivery at the end of 2019. Some national policies have been developed to cater for IDPs or sectoral related to e.g. education, but the implementation and roll-out of these policies remain limited. In addition, the poverty indicators for Somalia have not improved in the period evaluated.

Conflict sensitivity

In terms of conflict sensitivity, Norad was aware of the challenges faced by the World Bank and did criticise the limited reflections on conflict sensitivity by the Bank. As it is stated in the Norad assessment note: ‘What is lacking is a reflection of how this division of the support into three (banks) will influence the future political process – is this a solution which promotes cooperation and reduces conflict or will it yet again increase the conflict level?’⁷¹ Norad notes that this is a weakness in the programme documentation. This is followed by Norad’s concerns with limited reflections on how Somali partners are involved in the prioritisation of funds as a potential conflict trigger.⁷² Similarly the decision document does reflect on the fact that the MPF may trigger clan conflict though with limited reflections on mitigating actions.⁷³

A 2018 assessment of the half-yearly MPF progress reports also notes that the Bank is still not sufficiently attention to conflict sensitivity in its programming and implementation.⁷⁴

The 2019 review finds that the World Bank is good at managing risks at the individual project level, but less so at the overall portfolio level.

Lessons learned

The MFA and later the Embassy have used Norad technical assessment throughout the implementation of the MPF. Norad has on request assess project designs, progress reports and undertaken technical missions to Nairobi to discuss the progress with the World Bank. The assessments have included inputs to the dialogue process with the Bank. In this way there has been a regular follow-up and learning from the engagement.

Norad was originally concerned with the timeframe of the results framework but did not go into details in its assessment of the results framework in the first appraisal.⁷⁵ However, already in 2015 there is an enhanced focus on the quality of the results framework with specific criticism of the poor link of MPF indicators with development outcomes.⁷⁶

⁷⁰ (World Bank, 2019: 6) Mid-Term review of the MPF, Draft Report September 2019, Alep Strategies

⁷¹ (Norad, 2014a: 2)

⁷² (Norad, 2015a: 2)

⁷³ (Embassy of Norway in Nairobi, 2013: 16)

⁷⁴ (Norad, 2018a)

⁷⁵ (Norad, 2014a: 2)

⁷⁶ (Norad, 2015a) Review of Somalia Recurrent cost and Financing Project phase II 22 April.

Norad Somalia evaluation project note – Nordic International Support Foundation

Introduction

The Nordic International Support Foundation or NIS was established in 2011 by former senior officials in the Somalia office of the Norwegian Refugee Council. Their head office is in Oslo. The two co-founders had long experience from working in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. The objectives of NIS were to implement projects that would cater for the most immediate needs of the people, including security, basic amenities/infrastructure, and livelihoods. At the same time, NIS also considered it crucial that the projects were implemented in close cooperation with the authorities in ways that would boost the legitimacy and political reputation of the government among the population.

NIS has received substantial Norwegian funding since its establishment – first with a support directly from MFA (Peace and Reconciliation Section) and then additionally from the Embassy (from 2013) for several quick impact projects, beginning with solar streetlights in Mogadishu. From 2016 nearly all Norwegian funding came from the Embassy, mainly through a 3-year stabilisation programme focusing on infrastructure development, youth employment and business development. From 2019 a new 3-year programme was supported – now termed the Initiative for Stabilisation, Transition and National Development.

NIS has since expanded to other fragile countries and mobilised additional funding from a range of bilateral and multilateral donors. Their main operations are still in Somalia (although the operations in Myanmar are larger). NIS have occupied a very special place in Norway's Somalia engagement. One of the co-founders was appointed in 2012 as Norway's first Special Envoy to Somalia. The support to NIS has also included several additional small and big projects and technical assistance to help implement and assist Norway's interventions. This has included technical support to the implementation of components of the Special Financing Facility, reconciliation initiatives and staff salaries for senior staff in the Prime Minister's office. Some of this support – such as the ongoing support for reconciliation and trust between the Federal Government and the Member States are managed from MFA's peace and reconciliation section but provided as an addendum to the main contract between The Embassy and NIS.

The total Norwegian disbursement from Norway to NIS in the 2012-18 period was about NOK 160 million. The new 3-year programme from 2019 has doubled the Norwegian support compared to the 2016 programme (from USD 10 to 20 million). The new programme followed an open call for expression of interests.

Effectiveness

In the 2012-15 period Norway supported NIS through 4-5 grants. In 2014 the Embassy in Nairobi commissioned an external review covering most of NIS' Norwegian funded activities.⁷⁷ The review was highly positive. It concluded that it was relevant in relation to both government and direct beneficiaries, with some of the support to government also being instrumental in enabling the government institutions to function efficiently and effectively. Construction of solar streetlights also had a number of positive consequences according to this review: greater number of businesses, shops stay open longer, transport is increasingly available and security was improved. However, the review was not able to verify that these quick impact projects (all electrification projects) increased the visibility and trust in governing authorities – a key assumption in the programme theory underlying the approach to stabilisation. Furthermore, the review noted that maintenance and sustainability of

⁷⁷ The evaluation covered three main Norwegian grants and was implemented by Transtec. See Transtec (2015), *SOM-2051 SOM 14/0020 Nordic International Support Foundation. Revised Evaluation Report, 8 February 2015* (unpublished, 55 pages).

the solar electricity project seemed to be a challenge.

The new 2016-19 support for stabilisation through NIS was awarded following a tender process. The new consolidated programme was an expansion thematically and geographically. The new programme covered additional infrastructure projects (cobble stone roads, water canals) combined with a stronger focus on youth engagement and job creation employment. This also included support for a technical and vocational training centre in Mogadishu.

The Embassy commissioned Norad to do an end review of the stabilisation project in 2019. The report mainly focused on results management and highlighted several shortcomings in the reporting.⁷⁸ The Embassy also commissioned a separate review of the education component.⁷⁹ Additionally, the Embassy also commissioned a third-party monitoring review of NIS throughout the project period.⁸⁰

Based on findings from these reports and studies and the team's own interviews and impressions several conclusions can be made. The first observation is that NIS is highly regarded in government circles and among donor agencies. Its work is considered by these stakeholders to be highly relevant for the stabilisation efforts in the country. Furthermore, NIS also has strong record in implementing projects under often very difficult and challenging conditions. Reports and the team's own observations from Mogadishu and Baidoa also indicate that the organisation is delivering on planned activities and outputs. The impression is also that the NIS' projects also reaches certain of the planned outcomes in the sense that implementation has a number of important effects on beneficiaries – improved security and living conditions for targeted communities.

However, the main challenge is at the assumed link between successful implementation of such projects and political stabilisation. That link is hard to prove. There is not really any robust evidence available to prove this assumption. This is not unique. It applies to most stabilisation projects – in Somalia as well as elsewhere. Available data from the NIS project do indicate the challenges involved in getting from delivery of projects to improved legitimacy for the government and government institutions at local, regional or federal level.⁸¹ NIS itself takes a long-term incremental approach to stabilisation. They deliver in close cooperation with the authorities and emphasise linkages between the targeted communities and the authorities. They use three main indicators of stability by beneficiaries of the intervention: perceptions of security, economic opportunities and social cohesion as well as the authorities ability to deliver.

The team's observation and interviews related to solar streetlights, the cobblestone road rehabilitation (Baidoa) and the stadium rehabilitation (Mogadishu) confirm these findings. NIS stabilisation project is considered to be a highly relevant intervention, it has succeeded in implementing activities and immediate results in often very difficult areas, including areas newly liberated by the government or AMISOM from Al-Shabaab. Furthermore, NIS comes across as a very political well-connected NGO, able to operate under difficult conditions and to solve problems on the ground. It is a typical "doer". In the 2016-19 period NIS installed 545 solar streetlights for key roads and stadiums in 8 districts, a hybrid solar-electricity grid system for a public hospital. About 6 km of roads were rehabilitated in two towns. These projects targeted women and vulnerable groups. Some 500 labourers were engaged in the infrastructure initiatives and receiving skills and daily wages.

⁷⁸ See Norad (2019), *Review of Norwegian support to stabilisation programmes in Somalia* (unpublished 02.05.2019, 30 pages). The review also covered support to the multi-donor Somalia Stability Fund.

⁷⁹ See James Kabau (2019), *Review Report. Support to TVET Review in Somalia. Implemented by Nordic International Support Foundation (NIS)*, NIRAS-IP Consult (unpublished, 29 pages).

⁸⁰ This was carried out by the consultancy company Forcier which provided regular reports on the implementation of the NIS programme.

⁸¹ See also here the third party monitoring reports of the NIS stabilisation project provided by Forcier Consulting, in particular (2017), *NIS-BLIS Quarterly RTE Report No 1, April-June* (unpublished, 56 pages) and (2018), *Mogadishu Stadium Rehabilitation, Baseline Evaluation, Oct-Nov* (unpublished, 26 pages)

Result management and reporting have many shortcomings, especially related to planned outcomes, and the ability to address cross-cutting issues such as gender is uneven. The sustainability of some of the quick impact projects, especially in solar energy, remains a challenge. The team visited one health clinic in Mogadishu where NIS had installed solar electricity. The solar electricity had reportedly been out of order for a year. The clinic was managed by Somali Red Crescent Society with support from the Norwegian Red Cross.

The technical and vocational project in Mogadishu is a special case and a major new initiative by NIS in the 2016-19 programme. It was intended to contribute not just to job creation among youth, but also to building the technical and professional capacity in constructing, installing and maintaining solar energy supply. To achieve this a private sector company was also involved in addition to government authorities. The team has not assessed the effectiveness of this project. We do note that this vocational training centre has been providing vocational training to about 150 youth since the start-up with the first group of graduates completing their training in 2019. Some of the students are receiving training in installation and maintenance solar systems. In 2018, a solar excellence centre was established within the centre.

There are many donor-funded stabilisation programmes in Somalia, including by the EU, the US, the UN and multi-donor programmes such as the Somalia Stability Fund. It speaks to the relevance of NIS that it is an important implementing agent in several of these programmes. The effectiveness of stabilisation support through NIS can be further assessed by comparing it to the other main stability initiative supported by Norway – the Somalia Stability Fund.⁸² Norway has disbursed NOK 142 million to this DFID-led Fund and is the second biggest contributor. This fund provides funding for several similar stabilisation projects within infrastructure. In Baidoa for example, the Fund has provided funding for solar streetlights implemented by NIS while the Norwegian bilateral support to NIS has funded road rehabilitation in the same areas (the cobble stone project).

However, the Fund also focuses on other aspects of stabilisation not targeted by NIS in their stabilisation programme. They address relations between Federal Government and Member States (“political fault lines”) and has funded several activities dealing with trust and reconciliation both at the district and member state level. This has led the Fund to focus more – in the second phase from 2016 – on political and governance aspects of stabilisation.⁸³ The bilateral NIS project may have moved in a different direction – from quick impact projects towards paying more attention to sustainability and wider social and economic benefits. In this way the Norwegian stabilisation support through NIS and through the Somalia Stability Fund may supplement each other.

There are other differences between the two Norwegian-supported stabilisation initiatives. While the monitoring and evaluation is judged by the Embassy’s own assessment to be much weaker in the bilateral NIS-project it is considered fairly strong in the Stability Fund (even to the extent that the scope of assessments and reporting has reached a stage where the Embassy is worried that it have led to expanding “research bubble” that may slow down actual implementation).⁸⁴ NIS also emphasises, in their interviews with the team, that their projects in newly liberated areas differ from most others in the sense that they spend more time on consultations with stakeholders and only go in with larger projects (between 250 000 and one million) and turn down offers to do small projects.

The NIS stabilisation project does target women and marginalised groups. This applies in particular to the infrastructure component. The jobs for cobblestone project in Baidoa for example, is explicitly also

⁸² See also a document by the Embassy in Nairobi summarizing, comparing and assessing achievements through these two stabilisation initiatives: Norwegian Embassy (2018), *Stabilisation paper* (unpublished, 11 pages).

⁸³ See also Somalia Stability Fund (2016), *Somalia Stability Fund Strategy 2016-2020* (unpublished, 12 pages).

⁸⁴ See the 2018 Embassy document above (*Stabilisation paper*) as well as the Norwegian Embassy (2019), *Support to Stabilisation: Grant versus procurement. Embassy Decision Memo 10.05.2019* (unpublished, 2 pages).

targeting internally displaced and refugee communities. However, it is recognized both with NIS and at the Embassy that gender have mainly been an add on – and not really a crosscutting issue or mainstreamed in the projects.⁸⁵

The project documents report several unintended consequences – both positive and negative. On the negative side is the need for maintenance in some of the projects. On the positive side is the greater recognition that the stabilisation projects have a number of positive spin-offs for women as well as for local businesses. This in turn has helped shape further development of the NIS projects.

Coherence

The NIS project is pegged to the main policy and priorities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy. NIS also has strong coherence with Somalia policies and priorities as expressed e. g. in the Wadajir Framework for Local governance (2015), the Security and Justice Roadmap (2017), the Transition Plan (2018) and the National Stabilisation Strategy (2018) and the Federal Member States stabilisation plans (2018). Formally, Norway through the Embassy has presented the NIS and the stabilisation project with the Somalia Stability and Reconstruction Facility.

In general, NIS has demonstrated a close relationship with key stakeholders at different levels but particularly with the federal government. It has also shown a strong ability to respond to changes in the policy direction and adapt to changing contexts.

The NIS approach has also been well aligned and supplemented other Norwegian stabilisation support (see above on the Somalia Stability Fund).

The NIS's stabilisation project on technical and vocational training project is a bit of a stand-alone project. This education sub-sector suffers from weak or non-existent government direction as well as poor donor coordination. On the Norwegian side there are several projects on technical and vocational training in addition to the NIS projects. This is mainly implemented by ADRA, the Norwegian Church Aid and YME – all with projects located in different parts of the country (only NIS has a project in Mogadishu). There is limited or no coordination and cooperation between these projects. The project with YME – beginning as an Embassy-supported project in 2012 – is now supported from Norad through ADRA. The Embassy informed the team that they had encouraged NIS to explore the possibility of facilitating government and donor coordination in this sector. This failed to materialise. The Embassy has not capacity to do more on this and hoped that current initiatives by the EU and Germany will lead to an improvement. Germany was also considering scaling up and expanding the Norwegian project through YME.

The dilemmas and challenges facing stabilisation and the role of NIS has been captured in internal Embassy documents and in dialogue between the Embassy and NIS. The single biggest challenge is probably the assumed link between stabilisation project on the ground and improved legitimacy for the government at different levels⁸⁶.

Conflict sensitivity

The conflict and the project's intended impact on the conflict is a key feature in project documents. The risks are also well captured and analysed in internal Embassy documents from 2016. It is less well captured in the results framework and in formal reporting to the Embassy.

NIS is now undertaking periodic political, economic and security analysis in each of its target locations.

⁸⁵ See e.g. the 2019 decision document from the Embassy on the 2019-22 NIS project *Initiative for Stabilisation, Transition and National Development* (15 pages).

⁸⁶ See e.g. The Embassy (2016) «Mandat for årlig møte med NIS 7. januar 2016», (unpublished memo, 2 pages,

There also appears to be good mechanisms in place to minimise the risk of corruption. This includes procurement guidelines to help prevent the award of contracts to friends or relatives of public officials.

Lessons learned

There has been a strong emphasis on analysis, risks assessments and result management in the Norwegian support to NIS. This is mainly evident from 2015 when the Embassy took over the management of the support and the various contracts with NIS was consolidated into one. The Embassy reports that it has spent considerable more time and energy than expected to ensure that weaknesses are addressed and the capacity of NIS to deal with them are improved. This has according to the Embassy included use of technical support from relevant sections and departments in Norad and also MFA as well as commissioning of consultants to assist NIS. This has included results managements, reporting, attention to risks and how to address crosscutting issues such as gender.

The team's impressions from reading of documents and interviews are also that this has been welcomed by NIS, that they have been keen to learn and adapt, and lessons learned are addressed in project implementation and plans.

Norad Somalia evaluation project note – FAO Fisheries Project

Introduction

The Royal Norwegian Embassy entered into a three-year agreement with Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) to implement a fishery sector support programme in December 2013. The programme contained a number of components (see 2.1, below) not all of which were funded by Norway. Norwegian funds were committed to the following components: infrastructure development, focusing on port rehabilitation in Berbera, Bossaso, Kismayo and Mogadishu (Outcome 3); fleet renewal (Outcome 6); fisheries Research (Outcome 9); and fish consumption (Outcome 5). Other components were financed by Italy and FAO.

However, a little over a year of programme activities, Norway became concerned with the focus and management of the programme and, on 29 May 2015, informed FAO it was considering termination of the agreement.⁸⁷ This was based on several factors, including concern regarding the lack of progress made within the programme and the poor responses from FAO. There was also concern that the programme was not aligned to the New Deal structures and the ownership of the programme by the Somali government was unclear. Indeed, there were concerns the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) had established a parallel agreement with Fishguard Ltd. on fisheries management. Later, in January 2016, reiterated its concerns and, shortly after, programme activities were stopped.⁸⁸ It is also understood that Italy's support had also been suspended at this time. A no-cost extension was granted to the project, which extended it to 31 March 2017 to allow more time for the delivery of equipment, the completion of boat production, and the official handover of the Berbera jetty. Delays resulting from recent security risks were also cited.⁸⁹

Norway was a new entrant to the fisheries sector in 2013. Indeed, respondents interviewed for this review indicated that very few donor and development agencies were working in this sector at the time. This has changed in recent times with a number of donor and development agencies supporting various elements of fisheries sector development.

An FAO evaluation of its work in Somalia from 2007 to 2012 indicates that 'the fisheries sector has been very small although a new strategy for work in this sector promises expansion in the years to come.' Most work had been in Puntland and the thrust of FAO's interventions was on infrastructure, including the installation of processing centres, and training, along with limited provision of inputs such as fishing equipment (FAO, Office of Evaluation 2013; 14).

Internal memos show the following interests in supporting the programme:⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Indeed, this followed a number of consultations on this matter. For example, a letter from Vebjørn Hieness (Minister Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission) and Astrid Lervåg (Counsellor) at the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Nairobi to Richard Trenchard FAO Somalia, dated 29 May 2015, states the reasons the embassy is considering termination of the agreement with FAO are, among several reasons, 'the fisheries sector no longer is a priority for Norway in Somalia' and concern regarding 'the lack of progress made' under the agreement, the lack of alignment of the support to the New Deal structures and the unclear ownership of the programme from the Somali government'. This letter followed a similar letter, dated 11 February 2015, from the same embassy staff to FAO Somalia.

⁸⁸ There had been two disbursements to the programme: NOK15 million in Dec 2013 and NOK15 million in September 2014. Programme reporting in January 2015 showed that only 24 per cent of funds had been spent and there were severe delays.

⁸⁹ Letter from Richard Trenchard, FAO Representative, FAO Somalia to H.E. Victor Conrad Ronneberg, Norwegian Ambassador to Somalia, dated 5 December 2016, requesting a no cost extension. Letter from Vebjørn Heines, Minister Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission, Royal Norwegian Embassy in Nairobi to Richard Trenchard, FAO Representative, FAO Somalia, dated 4 January 2017, approving a no-cost extension.

⁹⁰ Minutes of the Annual Meeting between the Norwegian Embassy and FAO, 27 January 2016 (SOM-2047 SOM-13/0016 Fisheries Sector Support Somalia).

- Under-developed nature of the sector, which show high potential for expansion on the basis of livelihoods and economic development;
- Distribution of responsibilities between governments in Puntland, Somaliland compared with the FGS, which appears to be under-performing (e.g. a lack of policy framework, and poor fisheries resources such as mapping, licenses and surveillance);
- FGS Ministry of Natural Resources Management has a very large area of responsibility, with responsibility for both natural resources, minerals, agriculture, fishing and livestock.⁹¹
- Traditional fishing along the coast of Somalia is coastal. Most small boats are five to eight metres and usually travelling no further than 15-20 nautical miles.⁹²
- Other donors (i.e., Italy, EU and JICA, among others) had expressed interest in the other projects. Thus, instead of many individual projects, Norway proposed further discussions on the possibility of a programme approach where different donors inject funds.

The Royal Norwegian Embassy's review of the FAO proposal in 2013 indicated the programme was 'informed and inspired' by the Economic Recovery Plan and the Somali 'New Deal' Compact. The proposed programme was linked to the peace and state building goal in the Compact aiming at revitalising and expanding the Somali economy focusing on livelihood enhancement, employment generation and broad-based inclusive growth (Royal Norwegian Embassy 2013).

The internal Decision Document dated 3 December 2013, recommended funding for the project on the basis it was 'highly relevant for the needs of Somalia, and if successful, can contribute to food safety, increased trade, and sustainable management of fisheries resources' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MFA 2013).⁹³ It describes the project as relevant, 'feasible and realistic', despite anticipating implementation delays 'in a setting such as Somalia.' The document highlights a concern regarding the results frame, which the MFA had sought at least two revisions to, especially regarding the disaggregation of data by gender. It recommends a phased approach to implementation to address concerns regarding the capacity of government to absorb project inputs.

Effectiveness

The project objective was to improve food security and resilience to shocks through strengthened and sustainable livelihoods within the fisheries sector of Somalia. Nine programme outcomes were pursued by the programme.

No independent evaluations of the project were carried out. An undated 'Terminal Report', along with other annual and progress narrative reports have been reviewed for this study, along with interviews with key stakeholders.

Outcome 1: Strategic policy framework for the fisheries sector established. The project supported the preparation of a draft Fisheries Strategic Plan and Fisheries Policy in September 2014. However, this was not approved by project's end and it is unclear it has subsequently been adopted. However, interviewees for this review suggested that these drafts contributed to further policy and legal developments. Indeed, a new Fisheries Act was passed by the Parliament in October 2014, but only promulgated in 2016 as the Fisheries law of the Federal Republic of Somalia (Review of 2016).⁹⁴ This

⁹¹ FGS had awarded private contracts for coastguard and development of fisheries management without competition, and without adequate legislation.

⁹² Fish caught are red snapper, lobster, and grouper, which live on the bottom. When it comes to pelagic fish, shark and tuna are most preferred according to FAO. Fishing of pelagic fish like sardine is under-developed.

⁹³ Indeed, an earlier document by Einar Telnes, Director, Department for Climate, Energy and Environment, NORAD, supports the project because it presents 'a good opportunity for economic development and reduced unemployment' (Telnes 2013).

⁹⁴ Somalia declared a 200 nm territorial sea in 1971, but this declaration did not follow accepted

Act makes provision for the management and conservation of (principally) marine aquatic resources and habitat and the development of the fishery industry in Somalia. It designates the Somali coastline of 200 nautical miles width and within a protection zone that protects coastal fishermen of 24 nautical miles. Only coastal fishermen are allowed to fish within 24 nautical miles.⁹⁵ Glaser et al., (2015; xii) describe new fisheries legislation as ‘important first steps.’⁹⁶

In late 2018, the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) issued offshore fishing licenses in legally and transparently. The first licenses were issued in mid-November 2018 and formally announced on 12 December 2018. This was the first time this had been done in over two decades. Licenses were issued in line with the National Security Council agreement of February 2018, for the exclusive exploitation of tuna and tuna-like species beyond 24 nautical miles from Somalia’s coast, outside of the zone reserved for Somali fishers. The issuance of these licenses allowed Somalia to raise over one million USD in revenue for the country, deposited in a bank account at the Central Bank of Somalia (World Bank 2019).

Outcome 2: Monitoring control and surveillance capabilities established to protect marine resources and generate created and revenue. Efforts were made to establish an independent, federal-level fisheries authority to license legal fishers and enforce regulated fishing.⁹⁷ This was not completed by the end of the project, although there have been further developments in recent years.⁹⁸ As yet, no authority has been established.

There was great interest in this topic among the government at federal and state levels, as well as by the private sector. This included substantive inputs from the Italian Ambassador to Somalia, H.E. Fabrizio Marcelli, who has spoken strongly in the need for such an authority and expressed major concerns with considerations being given to commissioning a private firm to manage the national fisheries resource (FGS 2014). Indeed, the ambassador raised concerns with the signing of a contract between the FGS and the private British company, Fishguard.⁹⁹

During project implementation, the FGS became an active member and signatory to the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, FISH-i Africa and the Agreement on Port State Measures Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing.¹⁰⁰

international law [5]. Even though Somalia ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1989, their Exclusive Economic Zone was not formally declared until the Somali federal government did so in 2014 (Cashion, et.al., (2018).

⁹⁵ Fisheries law of the Federal Republic of Somalia (Review of 2016): <https://www.ecolex.org/details/legislation/fisheries-law-of-the-federal-republic-of-somalia-review-of-2016-lex-faoc171668/>

⁹⁶ Glaser et al., (2015; 5-6) describe this legislation as ‘a positive development in terms of fisheries governance.’ However, further work is required for ‘acceptance by the regions, and implementation and enforcement, need to be addressed. Somalia’s low capacity for law enforcement poses challenges to the efficacy of the law.’ They also indicate that ‘significant steps in data collection and analysis are needed before estimates of the status of fish stocks and benchmarks for optimum sustainable yield can be generated.

⁹⁷ Including a national consultative workshop on the possibility of establishing a federal Somali fishing authority in Mogadishu on 21-22 October 2014 (FGS 2014).

⁹⁸ Though extensive discussions were held, including international meetings in the Seychelles, Addis Ababa and Mogadishu with the signing of meeting agreements at the time, in the end stakeholders were unable to reach a final agreement on the type and working modules of the fisheries authority.

⁹⁹ Email correspondence from Guglielmo Giordano, Representative, Italian Cooperation Office, Italian Embassy in Nairobi to Andrew Read, FAO Somalia, dated 11 May 2015, entitled ‘Institutional strengthening of the Ministry of Fishery’.

¹⁰⁰ To build the capacities of the three participating fisheries ministries, 25 federal and state ministry staff were trained on Standards of

Outcome 3: Critical fisheries infrastructure sites safeguarded. In the Berbera port area, an environmental impact assessment was conducted and various construction, feasibility, gender and conflict, financial and economic analysis reports were prepared. The jetty rehabilitation was completed. The project termination report suggests that the Berbera jetty rehabilitation benefits all 324 registered fishers in addition to many other unregistered fishers, as well as a range of businesses. However, the review team was unable to verify these numbers independently. In Mogadishu, a construction feasibility analysis and financial and economic assessment was conducted, while a construction feasibility analysis and financial and economic assessment was prepared for the Kismayo port area. The project termination report suggests 'insufficient funds' were available for infrastructure works in Kismayo.¹⁰¹ While Lido and Jazeera fish landings were identified for the development of cold store and ice facilities, security problems prevented this.¹⁰²

Outcome 4: Improved post-harvest management. The programme sought to train operators in post-harvest management. Combined with the improvement of relevant infrastructure and facilities, such as these described in Outcome 3, above, these activities would improve the ability of fishing workers to manage the harvest and improve fish quality. However, beyond three training workshops, the results of which are undocumented, there is not clear outcome achieved.¹⁰³

Outcome 5: Increased local consumption of fish. The project undertook a nutrition and household survey in Bossaso in late 2014 and fisheries baseline surveys were conducted in five coastal locations in Puntland and two in south Somalia. No impact assessment conducted. FAO developed a low-cost way of processing a dried fish product of high nutritional value and with potential for income generation.¹⁰⁴ This work is continued through another FAO project to expand product lines, trainees and market analysis.

Outcome 6: Improved efficiency of the artisanal fishing fleet and reduction of post-harvest losses. To improve the longer-term efficiency of fishers, increase their revenue and reduce their fuel expenses, as well as improve their safety at sea, the project supported the construction of newly designed vessels according to FAO safety standards. The boatbuilding activity was initiated in Bossaso and Berbera in 2015 and expanded to Mogadishu in 2016. The project reports hands-on training was provided to 34 artisans engaged with local boatyards as well as the Berbera Maritime and Fisheries Academy through full involvement in the process of mould development and boat construction. The moulds and their sizes were designed according to Somali preferences and adapted to international and FAO safety standards. By the end of the project, 16 boats had been built.¹⁰⁵

The programme's Master Fisher conducted training for more than 30 local fishers to improve boat handling and fish catch, and 54 fishers received training on vessel use. With funding from other partners, the FAO claim that up to 170 fishers received basic training in drop-lining, enabling them to benefit from the fish aggregating devices deployed by FAO in late 2015.¹⁰⁶

Training Safety and Watch-keeping, Port Inspections and as Fisheries Observers. An additional five Puntland MFMR officials were trained on Indian Ocean Tuna Commission standards as Fisheries Observers (FAO Somalia, no date, 'Terminal Report').

¹⁰¹ This reflects a change in budget priorities and allocations once Norway had indicated it was considering termination of the agreement.

¹⁰² Business plans were developed for the ongoing management of these facilities. However, these have not been used as the facilities were not developed.

¹⁰³ Three training workshops on fish handling were conducted in Mogadishu (April 2015), Bossaso and Berbera (May 2015) (FAO Somalia, no date, 'Terminal Report').

¹⁰⁴ The project provided training on these techniques to 94 people, including 12 youth, 47 internally displaced persons, four MFMR staff, four fishers' association members, four fishers and 23 traders. Simple, diagram-based training materials on drying techniques were developed (FAO Somalia, no date, 'Terminal Report').

¹⁰⁵ There is some confusion over the precise number. This confusion was highlighted by email correspondence between Einar Telnis, Counsellor, Royal Norwegian Embassy, Nairobi, and John Purvis, FAO Somalia, dated 25 July 2017 and later on 29 August 2017.

¹⁰⁶ FAO suggest that business plans developed under another FAO project are now being used to help fishers purchase the newly designed

Through ongoing arrangements with other FAO projects underway, the boatyards have since received orders for more boats.¹⁰⁷ In November 2017, the FAO reported the handing over of 12 fishing vessels with inboard diesel engines to the Puntland Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources and then to active fishing co-operatives working on the Puntland coast. This was a part of the EU-funded Coastal Communities Against Piracy Project, which works to develop the fisheries sector by providing decent employment opportunities for young people along the fisheries value chain.¹⁰⁸

Outcome 7: Improved employment conditions in the fisheries sector. The programme proposal highlights concern regarding fisher safety, including the safety of the boats in use. The design of new boat types and the introduction of new construction techniques was intended to address these problems, along with the provision of safety equipment, such as radio, distress and navigation systems. The FAO terminal report suggests the new vessels are fully compliant with IMO and FAO safety requirements, and the FAO boat designs (Outcome 6) included built in shade provision and insulated ice boxes. However, the respondents interviewed for this review did not share these views. While these respondents may be influenced by the prevailing social norms in the fishing sector in Somalia, they did not consider safety a major problem and did not think the FAO boats were any safer than the other types of fibreglass boats available to them at a lower price. The terminal report indicates that daily fishing vessel log forms developed by FAO Field Officer are now in use in Puntland with both new and old vessels. However, our review could not confirm or refute this.

Outcome 8: Somali policies and plans for the fisheries sector are established on the basis of reliable scientific information. No management plans and policy documents were established.

Outcome 9: Research capacity is developed within the universities of Somalia to inform public policy, monitor its implementation, support innovative and sustainable fisheries management and provide trained managers. While the project had planned to enhance research capacity in Somalia, only minimal progress was made in contracting an international university to link with Somali institutions as project faced funding shortages as less funds were available than originally planned. Thus, funding was prioritised for boatbuilding.

Vulnerability and gender

The FAO project proposal (FAOSOM 2013) makes specific reference to the issue of gender, claiming that the role of gender in the fisheries sector is ‘ill-understood in the Somali context.’ The proposal anticipates ‘careful analysis of stakeholders and livelihoods will reveal complex relationships between and among men and women as fisher folk household members, boat owners, processors, traders, and sellers’, despite there being ‘very little information available’ (p. 5). Later, the proposal indicates the project would conduct gender analysis while recognising ‘gender disaggregated needs of the ultimate beneficiaries who are in fisheries dependent populations’ (p. 19). However, no specific strategies for dealing with women or other vulnerable groups are presented.

The MFA (2013) Decision Document identifies concerns regarding the project’s incorporation of gender issues and, specifically, the competence of the team in this regard. It recommended follow-up actions around the inclusion of a gender perspective in the project activities, the formulation of

boats (FAO Terminal Report).

¹⁰⁷ The programme termination report indicates that, following completion of boat construction, tests confirmed the four vessel designs’ compliance with International Maritime Organization and FAO safety standards and requirements. In addition, a Master Fisher conducted fishing trials using the boats with the Bossaso and Berbera fishers’ associations.

¹⁰⁸ FAO (2019) ‘FAO hands over 12 fishing vessels to fishing co-operatives in Puntland’, FAO website, 28 November 2019, accessed 22 February 2020: <http://www.fao.org/emergencies/fao-in-action/stories/stories-detail/en/c/1253133/>

gender-disaggregated baseline data, and the identification of lessons learned from experiences elsewhere where women have been trained in the fisheries sector.

While it is clear there were many concerns raised by Norway regarding the lack of gender sensitivity in the programme design and execution, this review found some positive results in this regard. A number of respondents to this review praised the programme for its inclusion of women from fishing communities. Indeed, two out of the four boatbuilders trained in Berbera were women and the programme supported one woman who claims to be the only female boatbuilder in Africa.

Unintended consequences

A number of respondents suggested that Norway was a relatively early donor to the fisheries sector in Somalia. Since this programme began in 2013, many more donor and development agencies are supporting development in the fisheries sector. For example, the UK DfID funded Promoting Inclusive Markets (PIMS) in Somalia, the Italian-funded Somalia-Reconstruction Fisheries Livelihoods in Puntland and Mudug areas with vulnerable youth, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Growth, Enterprise, Employment, and Livelihoods (GEEL) project and the current EU, FAO-implemented project entitled, 'No piracy: alternatives for youth living in coastal communities of Puntland, Galmudug and Mogadishu'.

There are a variety of views expressed on the domestic demand for fish, especially in Somaliland, where some respondents indicated that, traditionally, Somalilanders are not significant consumers of fish. However, many respondents claimed that this is changing quickly, and it is easy to see local retailers stocking and selling fish. Thus, this programme may have contributed to a greater local demand for fish, as the quality of fish available has improved and the nutritional value of fish is promoted.

From the time of receipt of the initial proposal, it is clear that Norway had concerns regarding this programme. It requested at least two revisions and the Decision Document contained a number of recommendations to refine the programme design, implementation and monitoring. As presented above, there were a number of instances where the Norwegian embassy requested further information from the programme or raised concerns. Ultimately, these concerns led to the early termination of the programme agreement.

FAO respondents expressed their appreciation of Norway's ability to assist them in obtaining short-term technical specialists. For example, the Norwegian embassy in Nairobi was often able to help the programme identify specialists to assist in boat design and feasibility studies.

Coherence

Fishing is an important potential resource to Somalia as the country has one of the longest coastlines in Africa, extending for 3,300 km with two separate marine environments—the Indian Ocean in the South and the Gulf in the North. Various estimates put Somalia's sustainable marine fish production close to 300,000 tons per year with very high potential for tuna. Cashion, et.al., (2018) report it is likely that total catches taken from Somali waters from 1950 to 2015 were 80 per cent higher than officially reported data. Fishing is not yet a major livelihood for many because its potential has never been developed despite considerable investments in the 1980s, and it is not a traditional food source in Somalia (FAO, Office of Evaluation 2013).

The project was clearly framed by national policies and development frameworks, as witnessed by the Project Proposal (FAOSOM 2013) and the Decision Document (MFA 2013). This includes the Economic

Recovery Plan 2014-2015 and the New Deal Compact 2014-2016.¹⁰⁹ However, the lack of a national fisheries policy or strategy for the fishery sector suggested the proposed programme would not be rooted in a national program for the sector. Norway expressed a number of concerns regarding the institutional anchoring of the project (see MFA 2013, Telnes 2013).

Norwegian policy documents (i.e., strategy and annual government budgets) indicate that support for fisheries in Somalia could be revived, if feasible. The fish for development coordinator said that top people in MFA and policy makers were in favour, but that they (i.e., NORAD fisheries) had no capacity to do this now. They are concentrating on the three priority countries (i.e., Ghana, Colombia, Myanmar) with only marginal engagement in other countries like Somalia. In relation to Somalia the University of Tromsø runs a distance training programme in fishery management with Somali participants.

Dilemmas

The project's support for the creation of a national fisheries authority led to major debates concerning the allocation of fishing royalties between federal and state authorities. For example, the FGS (2014) report on the National Consultative Workshop on the Possibility of Establishing a Federal Somali Fishing Authority, held in Mogadishu on 21-22 October 2014, highlights considerable tensions among delegates from Puntland and Jubba regarding resource sharing.

Interviews with project partners for this reviewed revealed that the boats built by FAO were eventually given away for free to various fishing operators. Indeed, this was a concern raised by NORAD in its initial comments on the draft project proposal (Telnes 2013). Moulds for various sized FAO-designed boats were handed over to participating boat manufacturers. These practices go against the generally agreed approaches for market systems development. The rationale was that as other saw the FAO boats being used, they would be convinced of the value in them and place new orders with local boat builders. However, the FAO designed boats are double the cost of other models and, while FAO claim these designs are superior, it is unclear that local fishers see value in these features. Of the two boat builders interviewed for this study, none had received orders for an FAO designed boats. While these boat builders had benefited from the training provided by FAO, there are no signs that a market for the new boat designs had been established. In one case, the boat builder was given a mould for an FAO-designed boat but did not know if she was allowed to use it.

Julien Million, from the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Nairobi, initiated the establishment of an informal Donor Group on Somalia Fisheries sector and chaired this group. More recently, with his departure, the chair of this group has been taken over by USAID. This group was considered important for further engagement with the sector and the Ministry of Fisheries.¹¹⁰

Conflict sensitivity

The project proposal makes an explicit link between fisheries sector development and conflict:

The fisheries sector has played a key role in the piracy problem yet has the potential to be part of the solution. Helping understand the role of fishing in household livelihoods and to develop livelihoods of the fishing coastal communities would

¹⁰⁹ The compact incorporates a Special Arrangement for Somaliland, which represents Somaliland's peace building and state building goals priorities and is the result of several consultations. These priorities are framed by the five peacebuilding and state building goals of the New Deal and represent agreement on what is required to move towards peace and recovery. It aims to foster the resilience of Somali people and institutions, restoring the Somali people's trust in the state and its ability to protect and serve their basic needs for inclusive politics, security, justice, an economic foundation and revenue and services, in full respect of human rights (FSG 2013).

¹¹⁰ Minutes from the last Annual Meeting with FAO on Somalia Fisheries, Internal Memo, prepared by Gunvor Skancke and Einar Telnes, 17 November 2017.

contribute to increasing household incomes while reducing the pool of potential pirate recruits (FAOSOM 2013, 3).

The proposal describes a series of ‘conflict sensitive approaches’ the FAO would apply (p. 40-41). These include:¹¹¹

- Integrating conflict sensitivity as a core principle to guide administration and field operations;
- Building the capacity of the partner institutions on conflict sensitivity approaches by training staff and organising joint reflection sessions on specific interventions;
- Developing resource material (e.g. manuals and case studies) to support staff efforts to practice conflict sensitivity approaches;
- Training partners on conflict sensitivity approaches to encourage adoption and practice at their level;
- Involving the FAO conflict analyst to guide adoption and implementation of conflict sensitivity approaches in the project.

The FAO Conflict Analysis Expert was involved in the project’s formulation. In response to Norway’s concerns regarding the incorporation of conflict sensitive approaches, FAO Somalia highlighted its constant monitoring of security issues through ‘a set of risk mitigation measures’ along with the implementation of its Risk Management Framework and Fraud Control Plan.¹¹²

Interviews with programme management suggest there was a constant recognition of the context in which the programme was implemented. Incidences were cited where the programme activities in Berbera were halted for a number of weeks due to a local escalation in conflict. There is also some documentary evidence that conflict analyses were undertaken. For example, FAO undertook feasibility assessments in Berbera, Mogadishu and Kismayo ports, which included economic, conflict and gender studies FAO (2014).

As indicated above, Norway’s concerns regarding sensitivity are well documented. Norway regularly raised questions of FAO regarding its assessment of conflict and its ability to mitigate identified risks.

A travel report prepared by Brit Fisknes, Senior Adviser, Fisheries, in the Norwegian Department for Climate, Energy and Environment, in February 2015, identifies the difficulties created by the security situation in Somalia. The adviser questions the extent to which ‘it is practical to expect the authorities to do their part in achieving responsible management of their fisheries resources’ within a state of conflict. Indeed, the adviser strongly recommends an extension of the project on this basis.¹¹³

Lessons learned

FAO prepared the project document as a proposal for Norwegian support. There were a number of concerns with the initial proposal outlined by the Royal Norwegian Embassy (2013). These included:

- The lack of a national fisheries policy or strategy for the fishery sector, which suggested the proposed programme would not be rooted in a national program for the sector;

¹¹¹ Annex 1 of the project proposal presents significant detail on the FAO’s experience in working in conflict affected contexts and how this guide programming and the implementation of the project (FAOSOM 2013).

¹¹² Email correspondence from Aruna Gujral, Head, Planning and Coordination Unit, FAO Somalia to Beate Bull, Royal Norwegian Embassy, dated 18 November 2013.

¹¹³ Fisknes, B. (2015) Report visit Kenya 21-23 January 2015. Prepared by Brit Fisknes, Senior Adviser, Fisheries, in the Norwegian Department for Climate, Energy and Environment, NORAD.

- None of the actions in the proposed programme had been planned in line with results-based management principles, while it also lacked a gender analysis, results framework or gender sensitive indicators;
- The proposed programme did not describe any consultations that had been conducted in the design of the programme and did not appear to include women from fishing communities;¹¹⁴ and
- The proposed programme did not present a phased approach in which government policy and strategy would be developed.

As a result of the above critique, it was recommended that the RNE request FAO to revise the proposal ensuring the programme:

- Adopted a phased approach in which policy and strategy would be developed first;
- Was based on a gender analysis that identifies possible negative effects of the different actions, and identifies how the programme will contribute positively to women's economic and social empowerment;
- Adopted a conflict sensitive approach that includes consideration of gender issues;
- Formulated a results framework is developed that identifies goals and targets, baselines, as well as indicators and an M&E system with appropriate sex -disaggregated data.

The Norwegian Embassy expressed a concern regarding the lack of conflict analysis in the programme design from the beginning.

A lengthy risk analysis and contingency plan is presented in the programme document. However, none of the risks identified identify the aspects of the programme that actually brought it to a close, being slow implementation, poor reporting by FAO.

¹¹⁴ It is relevant to note that the FAO Office of Evaluation (2013) expressed a concern that FAO had generally performed poorly when it came to consultations for programme design (p. 10).

Norad Somalia evaluation project note – Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery

Introduction

The Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery in Somalia (JPLG) is in its third phase after beginning in 2008. Norway has supported the JPLG since its inception. Phase 1 (JPLG I) ran from April 2008 to December 2012; Phase 2 (JPLG II) from January 2013 to June 2018; while Phase 3 (JPLG III) began in July 2018 and is due to conclude in June 2023. Norway is one of a number of bilateral and multilateral donor agencies contributing to the Multi-Donor Trust Fund to support JPLG. Other donors include Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, the Peace Building Fund and the European Union. This report focuses on JPLG II, while recognising the foundations laid by JPLG I and the issues arising in JPLG III.

The programme document cites a budget of USD145,618,908. However, the recent (November 2019) evaluation report describes this as ‘aspirational’ and, in fact, JPLG II received a little over USD88 million in its second phase. The programme, in its second phase, disbursed on average USD17 million a year, with the lowest amount being spent in 2013 (USD11m), a transition year, and the highest amount being spent in 2016 (USD23m).

A consortium of five United Nations agencies manage the programme, each with specific roles and activities summarised as follows:

- International Labour Organization (ILO): assisting local governments in the area of public works, procurement, Public-Private Partnerships, and local economic development;
- United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF): fiscal decentralization policy reforms, local revenue improvements and local development funds;
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP): policy, administrative reforms and core capacity development for local governments and gender;
- United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat): municipal finance, urban planning and land governance; and
- United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF): participation, social accountability, access to services and gender inclusion.

While the programme focusses on state building, respondents to this review suggested it is relatively unique in Somalia in its focus on supporting state building at subnational levels (i.e., in the states of Puntland and Somaliland, as well as local governments).

Effectiveness

All respondents interviewed indicated that JPLG is an extremely successful programme that has created structures and processes supporting bottom-up development planning, project management and decentralised service delivery. It has produced tangible, demand-oriented benefits in local communities that local people have valued, and which have been a reward for participation in local governance and planning structures. For example, the Vice President of Puntland, in 2018, claimed the JPLG has one of the most successful programmes in promoting participation and ownership of development and local government processes by Somali people.¹¹⁵ The 2015 mid-term review reported a ‘high degree of ownership’ among government counterparts (Integrity 2015). The JPLG II evaluation report says the Local Development Fund-financed construction of roads, and the rehabilitation of elementary schools and health centres have been well received (de Tommaso 2020). One respondent noted that the future of the JPLG was raised in one of the public presidential debates

¹¹⁵ Quoted in Donor Mission Report from JPLG Steering Committee Meetings 1-5 July 2018 in Garowe and Hargeisa (Email correspondence attachment from K. Svedberg, 9 August 2018).

in the last elections in Somaliland.

The objective of JPLG II was to promote improvements in local governance quality that can contribute to peace consolidation, development and equitable service delivery. This is pursued through three mutually reinforcing strategies (i.e., outcomes), presented below. UNDP commissioned an evaluation of JPLG II in late-2019, which has been reviewed for this report (de Tommaso 2020).¹¹⁶ This evaluation rated the programme as 'Moderately Satisfactory'. An earlier mid-term review conducted in 2015 was critical of the programme and its implementation (Integrity 2015). This led to a revision of the programme design.

In Somaliland JPLG II provided assistance to eight districts, mainly in large urban areas: Berbera, Borama, Burao, Gabiley, Hargeisa, Odweine, Sheikh, and Zeyla. In Puntland, JPLG II provided assistance to nine districts: Bosaso, Gardo, Garowe, Galkayo, Bandarbeyla, Eyl, Jariban, Burtinle, and Galdogob. JPLG also supported the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) Ministry of Interior and carried out basic local governance interventions and rehabilitation work principally in the Banadir Regional Administration, Jubbaland and the south west states as well as Adado District in Galmudug State. While the programme has focused on selected Federal Member States (FMS) and districts, it has expanded its reach over time and provided a model of state development and service delivery that can be replicated across Somalia.

Output 1: Supporting policy and legislative reforms for functional, fiscal and administrative decentralisation that clarify and enhance the role of local government, its relationship to central government, and as a means to improve local service delivery. This strategy was designed to address weaknesses in policy and legal framework for decentralisation in Somaliland and Puntland. The programme designed decentralisation policies for the governments of Somaliland and Puntland, which gave district councils the authority to deliver selected services in priority areas of education, health, water, sanitation and roads, and to make decisions on planning, finance and human resources. In 2018, the Vice President of Somaliland, Mr Abdirahman Adbilahi Ismail, described how the programme's support to devolution and improved financial systems had led 'to better education and health facilities in target districts, which has increased student enrolment, access to health facilities, access to roads, and local revenue.'¹¹⁷

JPLG II developed functional and fiscal decentralisation and revenue mobilisation strategies, roadmaps and action plans. These efforts led to ongoing reforms for Public Financial Management (PFM) and the codification of methods for sharing of revenue between participating FMS and local authorities. The programme established decentralisation and local governance champions in the office of the vice president in Somaliland and Puntland and supported the establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Committees on Local Government. Somaliland and Puntland local government associations were also established.¹¹⁸

Output 2: Improving local government capacity for equitable service delivery. JPLG II provided a comprehensive package of training and technical support covering the basic elements of local administration. It supported improvements to the coordination between districts and the centre in planning and programming to ensure better consistency and use of resources, while increasing locally generated revenues. This included support to local projects through the Local Development Fund (LDF), discussed further below. The programme strengthened district coordination with

¹¹⁶ Giulio Tommaso from Consilium Group Advisors (Washington DC) was commissioned to prepare an evaluation of JPLG II. The evaluation was conducted between 5 October and 5 December 2019.

¹¹⁷ Quoted in Donor Mission Report from JPLG Steering Committee Meetings 1-5 July 2018 in Garowe and Hargeisa (Email correspondence attachment from K. Svedberg, 9 August 2018).

¹¹⁸ In Somaliland, this initiative has had some success and the LGA is working effectively. The association is now charging fees to members and by doing so has become 100 per cent self-sufficient. In Puntland, the LGA is still very much work in progress.

deconcentrated central government ministries and supported the development of district development frameworks, which were aligned with sectoral plans and national development plans.

The programme helped local governments generate or attract additional revenue, by identifying new sources of revenue and strengthening fiduciary systems. The UN programme manager indicated that, on average and across all participating districts, local government revenues have increased ten per cent per year. Programme reports show that, by 2014, local government tax and customs revenues in Somaliland had increased 40 per cent, and 24 per cent in Puntland, while 'own source revenue' had increased 24 per cent in Somaliland and 38 per cent in Puntland (JPLG 2016, *LDF Graduation Guidelines*). Increases in revenue collection have allowed local governments to allocate more resources to health, education and other services. Respondents in Somaliland and Puntland reported that these districts are now contributing the biggest proportion to providing services identified by the communities.¹¹⁹

JPLG II supported the development of public management systems in selected districts, standardising accounting and billing functions and codifying procurement procedures.¹²⁰ These systems have strengthened local government abilities to report financial data more accurately and have been instrumental in increasing the collection of greater revenues from taxes on property and business licensing. However, the World Bank and other donors are supporting national efforts to standardise PFM practices across the FGS and the FMS, including Somaliland and Puntland. As a result, the JPLG systems are being replaced by the Somali Financial Management System, which differs in terms of architecture and requirements.

JPLG continued financing activities under the LDF. This is a joint donor-government development facility which provides annual financial support to local authorities in the form of block grants local governments use for a range of approved projects identified through community consultations mechanisms. In Somaliland and Puntland, the LDF has been operational since 2011. In 2018, the governments of Puntland and Somaliland increased their contributions to the fund from ten to 15 per cent.¹²¹

Finally, in Somaliland the programme supported the establishment of a local governance unit in the Civil Service Institute to train district employees. When visited by the review team, this institute displayed a high level of financial and technical sustainability. It's director and other senior staff have been directly involved in running training programmes at village, district and state levels. Similar initiatives are being considered in Puntland but are yet to be realised.

Output 3: Improving and expanding the delivery of sustainable services to citizens in an equitable, responsive and socially accountable manner and promoting local economic environment. JPLG supported improvements in the delivery of local services by collaborating more closely with central line departments, engaging more directly with non-state providers and enhancing the accountability of local governments to their constituents. Support was also given to local economic development (LED) to promote private investment and enterprise and creating more and better job opportunities.

¹¹⁹ As one local government champion reported, JPLG in Somaliland has led to 'an improved capacity to collect revenue, the districts supported under the JPLG program, have been empowered to take over delivery of most of the services under the service delivery model.' The district administration in Berbera now supports 45 schools with 9,000 students.

¹²⁰ This included the introduction of the Accounting Information Management System (AIMS) and Billing Information Management System (BIMS).

¹²¹ Correspondence from Director General, Puntland Ministry of Interior and Local Government to the JPLG Senior Programme Manager, dated 19 June 2018; Correspondence from the Director General, Somaliland Ministry of Finance to UNCDF Chief Technical Adviser, dated 9 September 2018.

JPLG designed service delivery models (SDMs) for devolved services which lay out norms, models and practices in line with preferred standards of good governance in each sector. These included procedures and mechanisms to encourage equitable access, sustainability, accountability. SDMs were implemented on a pilot basis in a few districts to test the model's adequacy and determine sustainability of the proposed devolution. The programme also helped selected local governments to assess the feasibility of public-private partnerships (PPPs) for delivering services and stimulating local economic development. It supported the development of a PPP policy framework and drafted institutional and legislative frameworks for PPPs in Somaliland and Puntland. Respondents across board also reported increased community participation in their development. Local projects are identified and prioritised by the communities. This was said by many review respondents to have improved accountability.

Vulnerability and gender

The programme has been broadly criticised for its lack of a clear gendered approach (see IPE Africa 2017a, 2017b and de Tommaso 2020).¹²² A 2017 gender review of the programme, recommended by the donors on the Programme Steering Committee, described the work of JPLG II as 'gender light', lacking an overarching strategy and not 'systematically' capturing gender data (IPE Africa 2017a).

The current UN Somalia Gender Equality Strategy 2018-2020 states that 'women's participation in leadership and decision-making roles, in public and political spheres at all levels—national, state, local, remains low with a majority of women in these roles lacking capacity to fully engage' (p.2).¹²³ Despite this current and continuing challenge, the programme has, since its beginning, sought to focus on addressing vulnerability and gender in its design. While the JPLG II evaluation report found 'there is some evidence that women concerns are being addressed', it was concerned that there was no 'logical framework nor any information available that directly links the programme' to gender outcomes. This led to a rating of 'Moderately Unsatisfactory'. It describes the programme's approach to gender and social inclusion as 'unfocused and haphazard' (de Tommaso 2020). Moreover, the concerns regarding gender connect with a broader concern identified with the programme's M&E system, which is discussed later in this report. For example, the programme does not capture the extent to which District Development Plans incorporate the concerns of women and fails to determine how each intervention affected women's access to services, which is at the basis of increased mainstreaming and opportunities for this group.

Earlier in the life of JPLG, in July 2010, the UNDP Evaluation Office cited an instance where the programme's gender equality focus had improved the representation of women in district councils. The Galkayo council was reported to have six women members whereas previously it had none.¹²⁴ Indeed, the JPLG II gender review indicated that 'district level staff in all jurisdictions say they prioritise the needs of women, girls and vulnerable groups in planning processes.' However, they also cited women's activist groups in Puntland and Somaliland who felt that women were not always included in

¹²² The IPE Africa (2017b) gender review report found that the programme had neglected gender equity and social inclusion in six key areas: a) in setting clear objectives for gender equity and social inclusion; b) in developing a strategy and action plan; c) in identifying accountable and responsible partners to drive a gender equity and social inclusion agenda forward; d) in supporting policy development and capacity strengthening with an on-going programme of research; e) in systematic evidence gathering and learning to inform programme implementation; and f) in developing an M&E framework with clear indicators to measure results.

¹²³ This is consistent with IPE Africa (2017a, 2017b).

¹²⁴ UNDP Evaluation Office (2010) *Assessment of development results: Somalia*, UNDP, New York.

key debates and decisions (IPE Africa 2017a).

In Phase 3, the programme has prepared a Gender and Inclusion Strategy based, in part, on the findings of a gender review conducted in 2017.¹²⁵ This strategy adopts a two-pronged approach involving gender mainstreaming while ‘introducing a dedicated outcome on gender and inclusion.’ There are signs the supporting donor agencies are concerned with the programme’s ability to promote gender inclusion for some time.¹²⁶

There are some signs that partner governments are adopting gender strategies in their own policies and programmes. For example, in his letter to the programme on 24 August 2018, the President of the South West State, H.E. Shariff Hassan Sheikh Aden, reiterates the state’s commitment to gender empowerment and inclusion by ensuring 20 per cent minimum women membership in local councils.¹²⁷

While JPLG has sought to support the role of women in local development and governance processes, it has generally not focused on other marginalised groups, such as internally displaced people or Bantus. Programme implementers interviewed suggest this is a sensitive topic. Rather than focus overtly on these groups, the programme has instead focused its support on those districts where these groups are highly represented.

The 2017 gender review reported that, young boys feel ‘government sees them exclusively as a security risk’ which ‘adds to their feeling of isolation’ and ‘sends a message that they have no role to play (IPE Africa 2017a).

Unintended consequences

It is difficult to determine whether there are results that are unintended or whether they, indeed, were planned, but not fully expressed in the programme document. For example, respondents described how the programme has built a demand for decentralised planning and accountability. Respondents to this review described how the success of the programme in creating tangible outcomes (see section 2.1, above) has led to a greater expectation being placed on federal and state governments to decentralise and to create opportunities for local, bottom-up planning and development. Similarly, local participation in district councils was cited as a mechanism for increasing local demands.

Norway’s ability to facilitate effectiveness

While Norway has been a partner in this multi-donor programme, there is clear evidence it has advised and guided the programme to address specific concerns. For example, Norway has shared the concerns of other donors, such as the United Kingdom, regarding the administration costs of the programme. This included efforts to assess and improve the value for money offered through the programme.¹²⁸ The 2015 mid-term review raised concerns regarding the high running costs of the programme (Integrity 2015).

¹²⁵ JPLG (2017) Programmatic Review and Country Context Analysis on Gender.

¹²⁶ Email correspondence from Jirdah Nomi Mohamoud from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, suggests that donors were encouraging the programme to increase its attention on gender inclusion in the district council formation process and the upcoming elections in Somaliland and Puntland (Email correspondence from Jirdah Nomi Mohamoud, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, SDC, to JPLG Steering Committee, entitled ‘Joint donor feedback and key take-aways’, 10 July 2018).

¹²⁷ Correspondence from the President of the South West State, H.E. Shariff Hassan Sheikh Aden, to Paul Simkin, Senior Programme Manager, UN-JPLG, dated 24 August 2018.

¹²⁸ Email correspondence between Paul Simkin, Senior Programme Manager, UN-JPLG, and Kristina Svedberg, dated 9 May 2018. Furthermore, value for money concerns were raised by a number of donors (e.g., mail correspondence from Adam Sparee Splied, Danida, to the supporting donor agencies, dated 9 August 2017).

Many Puntland and Somaliland government representatives interviewed indicated they have very little engagement with Norway. While this was often described in positive terms, some expressed a desire to better understand Norway's interests and aspirations in supporting the programme.

There is evidence that Norway, along with other contributing donor agencies, was eager to see the programme steering committee transformed into a body that 'provides strategic advice and guidance on key issues and ensures alignment with national priorities such as the NDP.'¹²⁹ Discussions with programme management also highlighted the important role Norway played in mobilising broader support from the programme among other current and potential donors.

Coherence

The programme's alignment with national policies and priorities have strengthened over time. While the first phase of the programme was, indeed, broadly aligned with national policy and development frameworks, many respondents described how its central focus on decentralisation and bottom-up planning and development was not equally shared with federal government ministries.¹³⁰ Federal ministries were described as adopting a more centralised approach to planning and service delivery. However, respondents from both state governments and programme management described how JPLG I and II came to demonstrate the value in decentralised service delivery and local development. This led to an increased understanding of how the state can support bottom-up service delivery and development planning. For example, the governments of Puntland and Somaliland have adopted a more formalised approach to decentralisation and have increasingly committed to a programme of fiscal decentralisation in selected portfolios.¹³¹ JPLG has increased the awareness of how decentralisation works among the governments of Puntland and Somaliland. It introduced a methodology to working in selected districts to support bottom-up development planning. Government partners interviewed in Puntland and Somaliland described a process whereby their understanding of the value of decentralised planning and delivery improved as the programme worked in selected districts. They indicated that local planning and development projects built a local demand for better service delivery and government accountability.

The programme strengthened district coordination with deconcentrated central government ministries and supported the development of district development plans, which were aligned with sectoral plans and national development plans. An indication of the programme's strong alignment with the priorities and plans of the participating state governments is found in the commitment of resources made by the governments of Puntland and Somaliland to an expansion of JPLG-like programming in those areas not covered by the programme.¹³² Both state governments have established Inter-Ministerial Committees for Local Governance and continue to organise quarterly meetings on the implementation of their respective decentralisation policy and roadmap with sector ministries.

¹²⁹ Email correspondence from Jirdeh Nimo Mohamoud, Swiss Development Corporation to supporting donor agencies, dated 4 August 2017, entitled 'JPLG III – comments'.

¹³⁰ This broad alignment includes, for example, the principles of the May 2017 London Conference which includes the principle that development should be Somali owned, and Somali led. However, there were concerns raised by Norway that the programme's alignment with the Security Pact should be strengthened (Email correspondence from Ms. K. Svedberg to supporting donor agencies, dated 8 August 2017, entitled 'JPLG III – comments').

¹³¹ In email correspondence to donors involved in a stakeholders review of the programme, the local government champions unit in the Somaliland Office of the Vice President, dated 24 March 2018, claimed that JPLG had made 'an important contribution towards the implementation of the national decentralisation policy by developing and testing of decentralised Service Delivery Models (SDMs)'... while the programme had 'succeeded in generating broad support for the decentralisation of basic services at all levels of government...'

¹³² Ms. K. Svedberg described in December 2018 how Somaliland government will invest USD 510,000 to expand JPLG into three new districts and, while not allocating its own funds, the state government of Puntland is increasing its contribution to JPLG from ten to 15 per cent to expand to two new districts (Email correspondence from K. Svedberg, Programme Manager Somalia, Royal Norwegian Embassy, Nairobi, to JPLG Donor Meeting, dated 13 December 2018).

At the federal level, the FGS has come to recognise the value of decentralisation and are increasingly engaged in ways to implement this. For example, the Wadajir Framework is the first national government programme to be fully planned and prepared by the Somali Government. It is a holistic community-owned and led process leading to the formation of permanent administrations at both the district and regional levels. Known as ‘Social Healing and Governance in Practice and Peace Dividend Projects’, the Wadajir Framework promotes durable solutions for returnees and internally displaced people, increases their social cohesion with host communities, and improves governance at FMS and district levels. It includes inclusive community planning frameworks through participatory land and urban planning and land dispute resolution. The FGS says the Wadajir Framework is key to advancing the establishment of a third tier of government. Accordingly, JPLG has supported building relations among the different levels of government in line with the federal arrangements and focused on strengthening the government’s leadership and coordination role.

Somalia’s Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia was endorsed in July 2012 and has been in a process of review and renegotiation since then. In recent months, the FGS, a number of Somalia’s State administrations and key national bodies involved in the constitution-making process, have all recommitted to agreeing a final constitutional settlement as a matter of priority. This provides an opportunity for incorporating the role of local government and decentralisation. The current Provisional Constitution states that the Federal Republic is composed of two levels of government: The Federal Government and the Federal Member States, ‘which is comprised of the Federal Member State government, and the local governments’ (Article 48). This somewhat tacit recognition of local government authorities could be strengthened in the review and renegotiations process.

Dilemmas

While JPLG has established local planning, implementation, monitoring, and accountability structures and processes that have been strengthened over time and entrenched in state and local government institutions, there is evidence these are being side-stepped by donor and development agencies. There are increasing concerns that donor and development agencies are adopting parallel processes to engage with state and local governments to implement projects. There have been many discussions on this topic. For example, in July 2018, the Swiss government representative on the programme’s steering committee noted the need for donors to align with country systems, explaining the ‘general agreement that donors will need to take leadership and advocate for other programmes to start to use country systems and use of (sic) local governments for the delivery of change.’¹³³ Currently, the World Bank is supporting new infrastructure projects and applying its own programme management, procurement and monitoring arrangements that supersede those of state and local governments. This presents a danger of undermining JPLG’s efforts and eroding the processes established and tested with state and local authorities.

Alignment and coordination

The findings regarding coordination and management are mixed. While the programme and government respondents interviewed for this review were generally positive about the programme’s management, the recent evaluation was harsh in its criticisms.

Respondents to this review described coordination between the five UN agencies as effective, despite some reports from government representatives in Somaliland and Puntland of a competition for programme resources among these agencies. No respondents expressed any concern with the coordination of the programme between ministries and district administrations. Coordination

¹³³ Email correspondence from Jirdah Nomi Mohamoud (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, SDC) to JPLG Steering Committee, entitled ‘Joint donor feedback and key take-aways’, 10 July 2018.

between the UN agencies and the governments of Puntland and Somaliland were also reported to be good across the board. However, the November 2019 JPLG evaluation rated programme management as Moderately Unsatisfactory (de Tommaso 2020). The draft report recognised the relevance and appropriateness of the UN system in delivering cross-sectoral and multi-dimensional interventions but describes the management unit as lacking a ‘unity of purpose and willingness to pool resources appropriately’. Neither financial or human resources are pooled; these resources remain within the control of each UN agency and the programme management unit is limited in its ‘ability to steer the programme.’

The implementing agencies interviewed for this review described a high-level of satisfaction with the support provided by Norway. Norway did not earmark funds for specific activities and was generally content to receive monitoring reports in line with the other participating donors. Norway was characterised by a number of UN agency respondents as an ‘integral, long-term and reliable supporter’ of the programme.

It was also reported that Norway had provided important strategic support for the programme by lobbying for support from other donor agencies. Indeed, while there have been periods where some agencies appeared to be reconsidering their interest in providing further support to the programme, Norway was seen as rallying its partners behind the scenes to encourage an increase and continuation of donor support into the third phase. Programme management respondents highlighted the importance of donors championing the programme by encouraging other donor agencies to engage with the programme as a long-term investment. Norway was cited as playing an important role in this regard.

Conflict sensitivity

There is documented evidence that JPLG is sensitive to the drivers of conflict (e.g. programme document and other programme reports). It has refined its programme design to take direct measures to mitigate the risk of increased conflict through its interventions. For example, it has described the process it undertakes to assess risk and conflict sensitivity in all programme activities. JPLG II focused on incorporating good practices from programmes carried out in other fragile and conflict affected areas.¹³⁴ However, the recent evaluation suggests otherwise. It recommended an increased focus on understanding the political economy.

The core of the programme is focused on giving a voice to those who are often overlooked by elites and formal, centralised state structures. JPLG II supported a highly participatory process of local planning, project management and monitoring. The procedures for local planning and project development, outlined in programme manuals, present deliberate efforts to move beyond tribal elders and powerbrokers to involve local men and women. While respondents described a danger that these new processes could create conflict among those who feel their power is usurped, they suggested the broad participatory nature of the programme had led to a groundswell of support for these efforts and the tangible benefits they provide (e.g. roads, street lighting, schools, clinics). This was often referred to by review respondents as a ‘peace dividend.’ JPLG II interventions were seen as providing a framework in which local competition for government resources could be mediated. As one respondent in the government of Puntland put it, disagreements around priorities are normal. What is needed is a framework around which local priorities and concerns can be discussed and agreed to. Similarly, the programme provided a mechanism through which local people can monitor projects. Many respondents spoke of an increase in local government accountability.

¹³⁴ Principles for engaging in fragile states include: (i) take the context as the starting point; (ii) focus on state building as the central objective; (iii) do no harm, (iv) act fast and stay engaged; (v) Harmonise processes and practices for more effective programme delivery; and (vi) Ensure effective coordination mechanisms to ensure efficient and effective implementation.

The JPLG II evaluation further noted how ‘the situation on the ground evolves very quickly’, making it difficult for programmes to carrying out normal planning and budgeting (IPE Africa 2017a). JPLG II provided training modules on conflict resolution, civic education and local elections. This training was seen as contributing to the transparent election of council representatives and the appointment of mayors or district commissioners. While these were initially provided by the programme, in Somaliland the civil service institute is now delivering this training. A similar modality is envisaged for Puntland, but this is yet to be realised.

JPLG II has set strict criteria to be met before it enters a district.¹³⁵ This includes the formal establishment of a district council in which local people are able to elect councillors and through which local area planning can be organised. State finance respondents highlighted the importance of such ‘conditional’ arrangements, which were seen as creating incentives for local communities to become formally organised. However, an implication of this and related requirements is that JPLG II has largely operated in areas where there is some degree of stability. The Wadajir Framework also provides a mechanism for dealing with conflict sensitivities, such as through its use of participatory pre-implementation conferences.

In its current third phase, the programme has been encouraged to move into areas where local conditions are not entirely stable and where there remains a strongly centralised approach to government programming and service delivery. This includes districts in the southern FMS, such as the South West State. The 2015 mid-term review raised concerns regarding conflict sensitivity requirements in these new areas (Integrity 2015). As indicated above, the governments of Puntland and Somaliland have already instigated programmes to expand decentralisation efforts into districts where JPLG is not operating.

JPLG II supported local governments in selected districts to conduct urban planning exercises as a basis for efficient construction of infrastructure. It also supported local government efforts to plan, control and administer land by assisting relevant ministries to draft policies and legislation and clarify roles, responsibilities and procedures in addressing land governance. Because land is a significant source of conflict the programme established local conflict management systems to address land issues. However, there is little documentary evidence to determine whether these tribunals have contributed to peace and stability. JPLG II has since dropped its support to land dispute resolution. Programme management interviewed suggested this was because of concerns that the programme was spreading itself too thinly.

The programme employed local people, recruited from across the country. Programme respondents described how this has allowed the programme to benefit from local knowledge and to be alert to possible or emerging conflicts.

Norway has often cited concerns regarding the capacity of the programme to respond to conflict concerns. For example, the donor committee raised a concern with the programme in July 2017

¹³⁵ The programme had clear minimum criteria for engagement with districts, including: (a) the district should be stable and not within territory that is subject to disputed control or authority; (b) Central government in the relevant zone must agree to the best of their ability to maintain safety and security in the district to permit programme operations; (c) the district must be one recognized as such in 1991 at the time of the fall of the Siad Barre regime; (d) a legitimate local council recognized by central government must already be established in the district as the client and recipient of JPLG support; (e) Central government in the relevant jurisdiction must formally approve JPLG intervention in the district; and (f) the district administration must be capable of performing basic tasks, such as planning, budgeting, financial management and delivery of some services (de Tommaso 2020).

regarding the extent to which JPLG was managing the risks associated with al-Shabaab and returnees from Dadaab and Yemen. In response, the programme management admitted this was ‘a weakness of the programme’. Building systems of accountable governance makes the programme a ‘natural target of al-Shabaab attacks’, which had been experienced in Galkayo in 2016.¹³⁶ In response, the programme management said it was working with UN’s Community Recovery and Extension of State Authority/Accountability team on applying ‘a common fragility assessment model’, in addition to ‘quality products already developed by the Somali Stability Fund.’¹³⁷ An internal Norway memo, dated 10 May 2015, recognises that the programme ‘is working in difficult circumstances and that it is sometimes challenging to predict consequences and risks.’ However, at the same time, ‘the risk assessment of this specific project [civil education in Baidoa] was most likely not extensive enough.’¹³⁸

The 2017 gender review found that JPLG II did not include social or gender exclusion in its conflict assessments and recommended this be done (IPE Africa 2017a).

In 2016, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) commissioned Ernst & Young to perform a due diligence and risk assessment on JPLG. This rated the overall risk of the programme as ‘medium’ and found it had the necessary internal control systems and relevant policies and procedures to achieve its mandate. However, it also identified a number of risks the joint programme faced that required mitigation, many of which stemmed from the challenges facing the individual implementing agencies.

Lessons learned

The design of the programme applied a number of lessons drawn from experiences of JPLG I as well as lessons learned in PFM and public sector management reforms in other countries that had emerged from conflict and fragility at the time. Lessons were also drawn from the *2011 World Development Report: Conflict, Security and Development*. This included support for capacity development in the absence of strong government organisations; strong engagement with the diaspora community who were encouraged to participate in the government reform implementation team; embedding technical assistance into ministries and agencies to aid the transfer of skills in the medium-term; and support to joint reform oversight mechanisms to encourage mutual accountability.

Taking into account Somalia’s institutional challenges, the overall risk rating for the programme was assessed in programme documents as high. The programme design correctly identified these risks and attempted to take them into account in programme design by identifying mitigating measures. However, the recent evaluation was critical of the programme’s procedures for assessing and managing risk. It recommended a strengthening of the knowledge base and understanding of local circumstances and an increased understanding of the political economy of the districts in which the programme operate. While dealing with all programme operations, these recommendations included improvements to the social and economic analysis contained in LDF investment feasibility studies (de Tommaso 2020).

Norway’s interactions with the programme often display an understanding of its direction and purpose, and context it is operating in. Within government and other programme partners, ownership of the programme at entry was strong, especially in Somaliland and Puntland.

¹³⁶ Indeed, the 2017 gender review indicated that security is an issue Mogadishu, ‘as Al-Shabaab purposefully target women in senior and management positions’ (IPE Africa 2017a).

¹³⁷ Email correspondence from Paul Simkin to donor colleagues, ‘Responses to questions’, dated 6 June 2017, with attached document: JPLG response to AR 2016 comments from donors. This issue was also raised in email correspondence from Jirdeh Nimo Mohamoud, Swiss Development Corporation to supporting donor agencies, dated 4 August 2017, entitled ‘JPLG III – comments’.

¹³⁸ Svedberg (2017) ‘Note to file: Assessment of Annual Report JPLG 2016’, Internal Memo by Kristina Svedberg, 10 May.

The 2019 JPLG II evaluation report describes the M&E systems as the weakest part of the programme and its implementation. Programme reporting was not found to follow a harmonised format that can be used by all UN agencies working on the programme. Instead each UN agency reports accordingly to its criteria and standards. Documents are shared, but not consistently (de Tommaso 2020). Indeed, this issue was raised by Norway and other donors in 2017.¹³⁹ Similarly, the 2015 mid-term review reported concerns with the M&E system and identified the need for further elaboration on the theory of change and ‘a much sharper focus on the link between activities, outputs and outcomes’ (Integrity 2015).

As indicated above (section 4.2), there is evidence that Norway often expressed concerns. However, ultimately these concerns were assuaged by FAO’s previous experience in Somalia, its internal capacity to assess and work in conflict situations and its internal policies.¹⁴⁰

There is evidence that Norway was concerned with the extent to which the programme was addressing gender inclusion (as discussed in section 2.2, above). This concern appears to have been shared by other supporting donor agencies. For example, the representative from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation was found to propose that donor it and other supporting donors encourage the programme to increase its attention on gender inclusion in the district council formation process and the upcoming elections in Somaliland and Puntland.¹⁴¹

Discussions concerning results-based measurement most focused on the programme’s M&E system. Concerns regarding the M&E system were identified by both the mid-term and final JPLG II evaluation (de Tommaso 2020, Integrity 2015).

¹³⁹ Email correspondence from Ms. K. Svedberg to supporting donor agencies, dated 8 August 2017, entitled ‘JPLG III – comments’.

¹⁴⁰ Email correspondence from Paul Simkin to donor colleagues, ‘Responses to questions’, dated 6 June 2017, with attached document: JPLG response to AR 2016 comments from donors. This issue was also raised in email correspondence from Jirdeh Nimo Mohamoud, Swiss Development Corporation to supporting donor agencies, dated 4 August 2017, entitled ‘JPLG III – comments’.

¹⁴¹ Email correspondence from Jirdah Nomi Mohamoud from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, suggests that donors were encouraging the programme to increase its attention on gender inclusion in the district council formation process and the upcoming elections in Somaliland and Puntland (Email correspondence from Jirdah Nomi Mohamoud, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, SDC, to JPLG Steering Committee, entitled ‘Joint donor feedback and key take-aways’, 10 July 2018).

Somalia evaluation project note - Countering violent extremism – the Serendi project

Countering violent extremism among especially youth has been a recurrent priority in Norwegian strategy and policy documents on Somalia. This has informed interventions in several areas from anti-piracy efforts to job creation and stabilisation. One main intervention was funded by MFA and its Section for Peace in Reconciliation from 2011 to 2015 - the Serendi project. It was intended to facilitate demobilization and reintegration of former al-Shabaab fighters through the establishment of a rehabilitation and education camp (Serendi) in Mogadishu.

Serendi was initiated by a Danish consultant with a background from counter insurgency, demobilisation and reintegration. MFA provided funding for a pilot phase in 2011 and continued providing in a series of grants up to the end of 2014. Additional funding was provided from Denmark (from 2012) and later also from Spain. MFA provided bridging funding (managed by the Embassy) in early 2015 with DFID coming in as the new lead donor from April 2015. DFID brought in new consultants (Adam Smith International) to manage the centre. Denmark continued as co-funder.

Effectiveness

The objective of this project was to rehabilitate disengaged former Al-Shabaab fighters through the provision of secure accommodation and provision of training, education and care. This was to be followed by secure return to the original home communities of each former combatant. The project was considered at the time to be unique in offering the target group a safe and secure way back to a meaningful life.¹⁴² The original idea was to run with two separate programmes. One for adults with focus on vocational training and one for children (under 15) with focus on basic education.

In the project period (2012-14), Serendi reported to have received about 1200 former Al-Shabaab combatants with most (70%), according to their own reports, being successfully repatriated into their communities.¹⁴³ However, in 2014 the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict came with strong criticism of Serendi, accusing the centre and the National Intelligence and Security Agency for little transparency. Several former combatants were children and many had been at the centre for months and years without any possibility for challenging the decision to put them there.¹⁴⁴ There were also strong rumours, according to persons interviewed by the team, the project suffered from poor support by key Somali stakeholders such as clan elders, from human rights abuses in the camp and from infiltration.

Following the UN report MFA commissioned a review of the Serendi project.¹⁴⁵ The review – focusing on the issue of children – found that 154 children from 12 to 17 years had been based at the Centre since the start with an average age of just under 16 years suggesting that most were in the early teens when arriving. Most were from the Mogadishu area and most seemed to stay for a year before exiting. The children interviewed by this review team all looked forward to leave, but they had not information about how and when. No independent information was available on the reintegration component.

Many of the children were not defectors, and not all were from Al-Shabaab. Many had been captured by the National Intelligence and Security Services. Since 2013, according to the review, children had

¹⁴² See also G41/Michael Taarnby (2011), *Rehabilitation Centre in Mogadishu for former fighters. Phase 1. Needs Assessment study*, (unpublished 21 pages), May/June. Norway funded phase 1 and then provided funding for phase 2 (pilot programme, 6 months) and phase 3 (semi-permanent facility, 6 months until February 2013) before moving to annual grants. See also the book by Michael Taarnby (2018), *Serendi. Inside Somalia's Terrorist Rehabilitation Project*, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform. Taarnby was the founder a manager of Serendi until the end of 2014.

¹⁴³ These figures are summarized in the MFA decision document from September 2014, See MFA (2014), *Beslutningsnotat. Serendi fase V – 2.addendum*, Oslo 17.09.2014

¹⁴⁴ See UNSOM (2014), *Press Release on SRSZ Zerrougui's visit to Somalia*, 23 August, UN Assistance Mission to Somalia. See also Human Rights Watch (2018), *"It's Like We're Always in a Prison". Abuses Against Boys Accused of National Security Offenses in Somalia*. Part IV deals specifically with Serendi. It should be added that the findings from the Special Representative reportedly was strongly influenced by UNICEF which has a tense relationship with Serendi and had refused attempts by Serendi and the Embassy to cooperate.

¹⁴⁵ See Altai Consulting and Tusmo Consulting (2014), *Serendi Defector Rehabilitation Project. Draft Report to MFA* (unpublished, 39 pages, November).

separate facilities. They were provided with education, but there was no psychological support or counselling.

All defectors and inmates at Serendi are men. Female defectors are reportedly returned directly to their families.

Following the shift to DFID as lead donor steps were taken to improve management and effectiveness. This included also better handling of the intake. The team has not reviewed subsequent development at Serendi, but note that recent independent studies have found that function and services have improved. This includes screening of intakes and reintegration in communities.¹⁴⁶

During the Norwegian-funded project period the Serendi also struggled with management. It was challenging to launch an innovative project under extremely tough political conditions, in a violent and volatile context, and with great logistical difficulties. A major challenge was to adapt this model of demobilization and reintegration to the Somali context. This led to failures to consult critical stakeholders such as clan elders in Mogadishu. Project management was also insufficient with poor attempt to address many of the challenges. With the shift to long-term implementation and needs for attention to planning and reporting it became evident that management was insufficient. When the issue of child soldiers exploded in mid-2014 the project was unable to cope and barely survived. There was little effort by the *de facto* lead donor, Norway, to address this and help facilitate improved management, programme implementation and reporting on results.¹⁴⁷ Above all, there was little attention to how the Serendi project could be better adapted to the Somali context.

Throughout the second half of 2014, MFA was still positive to continue to provide funding to Serendi, possibly at a reduced level and with DFID as a lead role. However, this did not materialize. Following suggestions from the Embassy as well from the President of Somalia the MFA - after first declining - agreed to provide bridging funding to help limit the risk of Serendi collapsing before DFID could take over from April 2015.¹⁴⁸

Coherence

The Serendi project has well aligned with on the key priorities in the 2012 Somalia strategy. It also had strong ownership by the Federal Government, especially the Ministry of Interior and the National Intelligence and Security Agency. When MFA ended its funding at the end of 2014 the President of Somalia appealed directly to Norway's Foreign Minister for bridging funding to ensure the continuation of the project until a new donor would be in place. However, there was insufficient and poor efforts to consult with other crucial stakeholders outside the government, such as clan elders.

Lessons learned

The Serendi project is a case of an innovative Norwegian initiated and funded project. It was also a project that was derived from global models for demobilization and reintegration and insufficiently adapted to the Somalia context. Furthermore, the project also revealed the importance of the need for careful monitoring and ability to provide management support. This requires, and perhaps especially in difficult and volatile contexts, strong management capacity on the donor side to help and assist if necessary, including ensuring that it is sufficiently adapted to local needs and contexts. The MFA, as *de facto* lead donor, did not provide sufficiently monitor and assess the implementation of the project and failed to act when this was required. This contrasts with the parallel MFA support for

¹⁴⁶ See J. Khalil et al (2019), *Deradicalisation and Disengagement in Somalia. Evidence from a Rehabilitation Programme for former members of Al-Shabaab*, London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (*Whitehall Report 4-18*). See also Linnéa Gelot and Stig Jarle Hansen (2019), "They are from within us: CVE brokerage in South-central Somalia", *Conflict, Security and Development*, vol. 19, No 6: 563-582.

¹⁴⁷ The team has reviewed decision documents and MFA's comments and feedback to reports from Serendi.

¹⁴⁸ See also a series of emails between the Embassy and MFA from January 2015.

Special Financial Facility where adequate support and assistance was provided to ensure that the project became viable and effective. In the Serendi case, it was only after intervention by the Embassy that a possible collapse was prevented with bridging fund from MFA, enabling the survival of the project before a new international donor could come in and help turn Serendi into a more functional centre.

ANNEX 5: ASSESSMENT TABLES

Gender Assessment on Projects Funded by Norwegian Aid in Period 2012-2018

Assessment marker:

- 1. Gender/Vulnerability perspective greatly included
- 2. Gender/ Vulnerability perspective included to some extent
- 3. Gender/ Vulnerability perspective not included

GENDER INCLUSION

Partners	Projects	Gender Inclusion	Gender Inclusion Assessment
UNDP	Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralised Services (JPLG), Phase II	1 (1 in last phase, 2 in first phase)	The intervention in its second phase contains a number of cross cutting objectives designed to reduce gender discrimination. It also promotes gender equality, women’s empowerment and human rights by expanding voice and accountability the local level of government
FAO	Fisheries Sector Support Programme in Somalia	2	While there were many concerns raised regarding the lack of gender sensitivity in the programme design and execution, a number of respondents to this study praised the programme for its inclusion of women from fishing communities
NRC	NRC in Somalia	2	NRC makes a concerted effort to access vulnerable people in hard to reach areas, although evaluations also note a capacity gap in terms of staff ability to incorporate

			gender in programming design
NORCROSS	NorCross in Somalia	1	NorCross and SRCS activities are designed to support women in reproductive ages, as well as ensuring the health and nutritional support of children. Through volunteers, SRCS engages in awareness raising activities which focuses on influencing community leaders and decision makers around the health needs of women (and children) and to encourage them to facilitate that expectant women access health facilities to mitigate on the number of complications arising due to pregnancy and childbirth.
UN	Somalia Humanitarian Fund (SHF)	2	The evaluation finds the gender perspective is two-fold: On the one hand, there is strong guidance on gender considerations and protection in the SHF allocation strategies. On the other hand, a recent evaluation found that, in practice, the application of gender sensitive approaches and feedback varied across the organisations supported by SHF
UNDP	Constitutional Review	2	Norway has emphasised the importance of the inclusion of women explicitly in the programme. This was already flagged by Norad in 2013 when the appraisal asked for more specific inclusion of women in the results framework. Consultations are taking place with women. The actual outcome from these consultaitons are not evident
Bilateral (Norway)	Special Financing Facility (SFF)	3	No mention of gender
World Bank	Multi-Partner Fund (MPF)	3	There is very limited reflections of gender in the project documentation or project interviews
NIS	The Nordic International Support Foundation (NIS)	2	Gender is addressed in the NIS stabilisation

			interventions, and there are dedicated efforts to recruit among women. However, the gender focus has mainly been an ad-on and is not considered to be a crosscutting issue or particularly mainstreamed in the individual NIS projects
Bilateral (Norway)	Serendi	N/A	All defectors covered by Serendi are men. Women are sent back to their families

VULNERABILITY INCLUSION

Partners	Projects	Vulnerability Inclusion	Vulnerability Inclusion Assessment
UNDP	Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralised Services (JPLG), Phase II	3	Although the project has emphasised the role of women, it has generally not focused on any other marginalised group
FAO	Fisheries Sector Support Programme in Somalia	3	There is very limited reflections on vulnerability beyond gender in the project documentation
NRC	Noard Somalia evaluation – NRC in Somalia	1	NRC makes a concerted effort to access vulnerable people in hard to reach areas – primarily IDPs
NORCROSS	NorCross in Somalia	1	NorCross partners with SRCS because of its ability to reach the most vulnerable people. In the Somalia context, SRCS is renowned for its stance on neutrality and impartiality, and is thus able to provide reliable primary healthcare services that reach all regions and tribal groups
SHF	Somalia Humanitarian Fund (SHF)	1	Due to increased partnership between local Somali organisations in line with the Grand Bargain’s objective on localisation, the fund’s capability to access hard to reach areas where many of the vulnerable people can be found has increased.
UNDP	Constitutional Review	2	Norway has strongly emphasised the inclusion of disabled persons and IDP’s in the programme. According to interviewees, Norway remains proactive in ensuring that in particular Persons living with Disabilities are included in the consultations process. The outcomes from the consultaitons

			are not clear
Bilateral (Norway – Somalia)	Special Financing Facility (SFF)	3	No mentioning of vulnerability inclusion.
World Bank	The World Bank Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPF)	3	There is very limited reflections of vulnerable groups in the project.
NIS	The Nordic International Support Foundation (NIS)	2	Vulnerability has been addressed to some extent in the NIS stabilisation intervention, particularly IDPs, however the focus on other vulnerable groups such as youth has been lacking
Bilateral (Norway)	Serendi	2	Many of the children were not defectors, and not all were from al-Shabaab. Many had been captured by the National Intelligence and Security Services. Since 2013, according to the review, children had separate facilities. They were provided with education, but there was no psychological support or counselling

CONFLICT SENSITIVITY

Partners	Projects	Vulnerability Inclusion	Vulnerability Inclusion Assessment
UNDP	Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralised Services (JPLG), Phase II	1	There is clear evidence that JPLG is sensitive to the drivers of conflict and has taken direct measures to mitigate the risk of increased conflict through its interventions
FAO	Fisheries Sector Support Programme in Somalia	2	Interviews with programme management suggest there was recognition of the context in which the programme was implemented. Incidences were cited where the programme activities in Berbera were halted for a number of weeks due to a local escalation in conflict. There is also some documentary evidence that conflict analyses were undertaken. For example, FAO undertook feasibility assessments in Berbera, Mogadishu and Kismayo ports, which included economic, conflict and gender studies
NRC	Noard Somalia evaluation – NRC in Somalia	1	NRC carried out numerous assessments prior to entering new locations and continue with periodic assessments to update their information while in said locations. One of its strategies to alleviating potential conflicts is ensuring that at least 30 % of its support is provided to host communities where IDPs reside.
NORCROSS	NorCross in Somalia	1	All applications to the Norad and to the MFA have clear stipulations around how NorCross and SRCS approach conflict sensitivity. SRCS has provided humanitarian assistance to communities in all 19 regions during the entire period the country has been in conflict, therefore they have extensive networks on the ground and is a trusted actor in the communities. Recruitment of staff and volunteers pays

			particular attention to transparency in the process, as well as ensuring diversity of those recruited, more to with regard to making sure that the staff reflect the ethnic diversity of the communities in which they operate.
UN MPTF	Somalia Humanitarian Fund (SHF)	2	The SHF strives to adhere to humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality and independence. This said, the SHF works through partners who are provided guidance on humanitarian principles, but this has yet to be interpreted in terms of what it actually means for SHF in a context like Somalia. Partners being necessitated to work through power structures such as gatekeepers and other authorities on the ground does compromise these principles at times, but is the pragmatic approach if humanitarian actors are to reach vulnerable communities.
UNDP	Constitutional Review	3	There was no conflict sensitivity measures in the Constitutional Review project. There was some reflection on the need to do no harm in the first project phase, but the past and current phases of the projects were otherwise implemented as technical capacity advisory projects without a political angle as per the project document and interviews and with no conflict sensitivity measures or risk management measures.
Bilateral (Norway – Somalia)	Special Financing Facility (SFF)	3	The MFA was aware of the multiple risks related to establishing the SFF and provided some initial (if rudimentary) risk analysis and responses in the MFA background note to the SFF in January 2013. There is limited evidence of further conflict assessment and analysis in the remaining documentation. Similarly, the implications of the SFF support focus vis-à-vis the support to the FMS was not included in the assessments related to the SFF
World Bank	The World Bank Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPF)	3	There is a lack of conflict sensitivity in this programme.

NIS	The Nordic International Support Foundation (NIS)	1	NIS has demonstrated a good grasp of conflict sensitivity in the project planning and implementation, and they conduct security analyses in each of its target locations. However, this is less reflected in the results framework and reporting to the Embassy.
Bilateral (Norway)	Serendi	1	The project was launched to address a conflict driver

Assessment of alignment between Norwegian humanitarian priorities and the FGS humanitarian priorities and objectives

Norway humanitarian priorities	Somalia humanitarian priorities and objectives
<p>Norway's humanitarian policy 2008 articulates four main objectives. Below we have taken excerpts from the policy that elaborate on these objectives.</p> <p>Objective 1: Ensure that people in need are given the necessary protection and assistance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Civilians and the wounded in wars and armed conflicts have a right to protection, respect and assistance, regardless of which side they are on ○ Women and children have a special need for protection in humanitarian crises. Women must be given far greater influence in humanitarian activities ○ Give priority to programmes to protect women and children from sexual abuse and strengthen the gender sensitivity of the UN and other humanitarian actors ○ Prioritise measures to protect refugees, internally displaced persons and other vulnerable groups, including measures to strengthen the rights of internally displaced persons <p>Objective 2: Fund humanitarian efforts on the basis of the international principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Strengthen international humanitarian law ○ Humanitarian protection and assistance for individuals must in some cases be safeguarded and protected from other political considerations ○ Humanitarian assistance must not become a political instrument in a struggle for power <p>Objective 3: Equip the international community to meet future global humanitarian challenges</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Improve financing, strengthen coordination and rationalise the division of work ○ Maintain the necessary flexibility in Norwegian humanitarian assistance to meet changing humanitarian and political needs <p>Objective 4: Prevent and respond to humanitarian crises and initiate reconstruction in their wake</p>	<p>The NDP sets out The Somali Government's priorities in social and human development:¹⁴⁹</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Basic service delivery (food & nutrition, WASH, health, education) • Livelihoods • Gender • Children's rights <p>Below we include excerpts from the NDP on the above elements, as well as an indication of the thinking around humanitarian law.</p> <p>Protection</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The plan recognizes the role women have played and will continue to play. The plan promotes their economic empowerment and participation in political and public decision making processes. ○ Protection of women, and young girls in the context of the armed conflict and against violence ○ Respect for the rule of law and all human rights (protection) of IDPs and stateless women, girls and young people ○ Restore and maintain internal security, protect civilians with special attention to securing the rights of women, youth and children ○ Housing, water and sanitation are needed to provide adequate living conditions to IDPs, returnees, urban poor and other vulnerable groups ○ Reverse the trend of protracted displacement and substantially reduce the number of IDPs and address underlying causes of their displacement and its protracted nature <p>Humanitarian law</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Increase equitable access to justice that contributes to rule of law, applies human rights standards, and adheres to international humanitarian law. <p>Disaster risk reduction, resilience and durable solutions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Strengthen the capacity of relevant authorities to anticipate, prevent and mitigate natural disaster impacts and reduce disaster-related displacement ○ Establish bodies and infrastructure which will mitigate against future crisis ○ Shift the approach concerning IDPs from classic humanitarian assistance towards more durable solutions ○ Reduce the current humanitarian caseload by connecting those people with developmental solutions and priorities in place of humanitarian actions ○ By 2030, build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events

¹⁴⁹ (Ministry of Planning, International and Economic Cooperation, 2016)

- **Recovery activities should begin quickly whenever possible, and carried out in parallel with humanitarian activities.**
- **Wherever possible, activities must be based on local resources.**
- **The continued strengthening of international humanitarian efforts must not take place at the expense of the development of essential local capacity for preparedness and response.**
- **Better coordination between humanitarian aid, climate adaptation and development cooperation to deal with climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction**

The above priorities are also articulated in the RRF through the following five strategic objectives of the RRF:

- **SO1:** Strengthen government capacities for inclusive drought recovery and disaster risk planning, management and monitoring
- **SO2:** Sustainably revitalize, strengthen and diversify economic sectors, livelihoods, and key infrastructure
- **SO3:** Promote durable solutions for displacement affected communities
- **SO4:** Enhance sustainable management of environmental services and access to renewable energy
- **SO5:** Improve basic service delivery in (affected) urban and peri-urban settings.¹⁵⁰

¹⁵⁰ (Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development, 2018)

ANNEX 6: KEY INDICATORS FOR SOMALIA

Key Indicators	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Economic							
GDP (US\$, billion)**	-	3.892	3.964	4.049	4.198	4.509	4.721
Population in multidimensional poverty (headcount, thousands)*	-	6.941	7.104	7.104a	7.104a	-	8.813
Population in multidimensional poverty (%)*	-	81,2	-	-	81,8	-	82,2
Population in severe poverty (%)*	-	65,6	63,6	63,6	63,6	-	67,5
Population vulnerable to poverty (%)*	-	9,5	-	8,3	8,3	-	8,7
Health							
Life expectancy at birth, Male**	53,1	53,5	53,9	54,3	54,7	55,1	55,1
Life expectancy at birth, Female**	56,4	56,8	57,2	57,6	58	58	58,4
Maternal mortality rates (deaths per 100.000 per live births)**	-	-	850	-	-	-	732
Mortality rates (per 1000 live births) infant**	90,7	88	85,6	83,1	81	78,8	76,6
Mortality rates (per 1000 live births) under-five**	147,2	142,3	137,9	133,4	129,4	125,5	121,5
Adult mortality rate (per 1000 male adults)**	350,3	345,9	341,3	336,7	332,1	327,6	-
Adult mortality rate (per 1000 female adult)**	291,3	287,5	283,7	279,9	276,1	272,3	-
Mortality rate due to malaria (per 100.000 people per year)*	33,5	33,5b	33,5b	33,5b	33,5b	-	-
Total Fertility Rate (birth per woman)**	6,7	6,5	6,5	6,4	6,3	6,2	-
Adolescent fertility rate (births per 1000 women ages 15-19)**	110,4	108,3	106,3	104,2	102,1	100,1	100,1
Physicians (per 10.000 people)*	0,4a	0,4a	-	0,4a	0,4a	-	-
Number of infant deaths**	48.775	48.245	47.875	47.497	47.322	47.145	46.967
Number of under-five deaths**	78.063	76.871	74.937	74.974	74.360	73.743	73.135
Education							
School enrolment, Primary (% of primary school-age population)*	79a	79a	79a	79a	-	-	-
School enrolment, Secondary (% of secondary school-age population)*	7a	7a	7a	7a	-	-	-
Labour Force							
Labour force participation rate (% ages 15 and older) Male*	75,6	75,5	-	-	75,9	-	74,3
Labour force participation rate (% ages 15 and older) Female*	37,2	37,2	-	-	33,2	-	18,6
Child labour (% ages 5-14)*	49a	49a	-	49a	49a	-	-
Human Security							
Refugees by country of origin (thousands)*	1136.1	-	1080.8	-	-	986.4	986.4a
Internally displaced persons, millions**	1.350	1.100	1.107	1.223	1.107	0.825	2.648
People of concern, millions****	-	-	-	-	1.623	2.187	2.769
Battle related deaths (thousands)**	2.624	0.913	1.111	1.197	1.925	1.913	2.207
Environmental Impacts							
Population living on degraded land (%)*	26	26	26,3a	26,3a	-	-	-
Number of deaths due to natural disasters (annual average per million people)*	2	2	16	-	-	-	-
Impact of natural disasters, population affected (per million people)*	-	-	145.928	120.989	-	-	-
Political/ Human Rights							
Seats in national parliament (% female)**	13,8	13,8	13,8	13,8	13,8	24,4	24,4
Press Freedom Index (out of 180 countries)***	-	175/180	176/180	172/180	167/180	167/180	164/180
Corruption Perceptions Index (score out of 100, 0 = highly corrupt 100 = very clean)*****	8	8	8	8	10	9	10
Freedom rating (1= Best, 7 = Worst)*****	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Civil liberties (1 = Best, 7 = Worst)*****	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Political rights (1 = Best, 7 = Worst)*****	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Perception of Government							
Trust in national government (% answering yes)*	-	-	-	63	78	-	-
Actions to preserve the environment (% answering yes)*	-	-	-	75	92	-	-
Confidence in Judicial system (% answering yes)*	-	-	-	49	58	-	-
Source							
* Human Development Report							
** World Bank							
*** Reporters without borders							
**** UNHCR							
***** Freedom House Index							
***** Transparency International							

ANNEX 7: DEFINITIONS

<i>Term</i>	<i>Definition</i>
<i>Assumption</i>	<i>An expected precondition necessary for realizing the theory of change of a development engagement</i>
<i>Attribution</i>	<i>It represents the extent to which observed development effects can be attributed to a specific intervention or to the performance of one or more partner taking account of other interventions</i>
<i>Baseline</i>	<i>An analysis describing the situation prior to an intervention, against which progress can be assessed or comparisons made</i>
<i>Beneficiaries</i>	<i>The individuals, groups, or organisations, whether targeted or not, that benefit, directly or indirectly, from the intervention</i>
<i>Conflict sensitivity</i>	<i>Conflict sensitivity entails i) gaining an understanding of the operational context; ii) understanding the interaction between an intervention and the context, that is, how the context affects the intervention and how the intervention affects the context); and iii) taking action based on the understanding of this interaction, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts</i>
<i>Coherence</i>	<i>The need to assess security, developmental, trade and military policies as well as humanitarian policies, to ensure that there is consistency</i>
<i>Coordination</i>	<i>Horizontal coordination of development goals, funds and policy dialogue among donors</i>
<i>Dilemma</i>	<i>A dilemma is as a problem or a challenge offering two or more possibilities for at the time. A dilemma usually does not have unambiguously acceptable or preferable, yet a decision will have had to be made at the time</i>
<i>Donor</i>	<i>Bilateral or multilateral institution providing development and/or humanitarian funding to a developing country</i>
<i>Effectiveness</i>	<i>The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance</i>
<i>Efficiency</i>	<i>A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, organisation, time, etc.) are converted to results</i>
<i>Engagement</i>	<i>A project, programme, or a clearly defined activity (including a policy dialogue process) funded by a donor. Synonymous with intervention</i>
<i>Evaluability</i>	<i>Extent to which an activity or a programme can be evaluated in a reliable and credible fashion</i>
<i>Finding</i>	<i>Triangulated evidence (see main report) which allow for a factual statement</i>
<i>Impact</i>	<i>Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by an intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended</i>
<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to measure achievement, to reflect the changes connected to an intervention, or to help assess the performance of a development actor</i>

<i>Input</i>	<i>The financial, human, and material resources used for the development intervention</i>
<i>Intervention</i>	<p><i>According to OECD-DAC an intervention is the subject of an evaluation. Intervention encompasses all the different types of development and humanitarian efforts that may be evaluated using the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria, such as a project, programme, policy, strategy, thematic area, technical assistance, policy advice, an institution, financing mechanism, instrument, or other activity. It includes development interventions, humanitarian aid, peacebuilding, climate mitigation and adaptation, normative work, and non-sovereign operations.</i></p> <p><i>In terms of the sample interventions used for this evaluation the following applies: A sample intervention has been used to cover individual projects and programmes, as well as Norwegian non-earmarked funding to organisations or agencies' operations specifically in Somalia. The latter in most cases concerns Norwegian NGOs</i></p>
<i>Lessons learned</i>	<i>Generalizations based on evaluation experiences with projects, programs, or policies that abstract from the specific circumstances to broader situations</i>
<i>Monitoring</i>	<i>A continuing function that uses systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing development intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated funds</i>
<i>Objective</i>	<i>Intended impact contributing to physical, financial, institutional, social, peace-related, environmental, or other benefits to a society, community, or group of people via one or more interventions</i>
<i>Outcome</i>	<i>The likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs. Note: an implementer is not fully in control of the outcome, yet accountable in terms of ensuring effectiveness of the engagement in meeting the said outcome</i>
<i>Output</i>	<i>The products, capital goods and services which result from an intervention; may also include changes resulting from the intervention which are relevant to the achievement of outcomes. Note: an implementer is fully in control of and accountable for an output</i>
<i>Partner</i>	<i>The individuals and/or organisations that collaborate to achieve mutually agreed objectives. Note: partners may include governments, civil society, non-governmental organisations, universities, professional and business associations, multilateral organisations, private companies, etc.</i>
<i>Performance</i>	<i>The degree to which a development intervention or a donor operates according to specific criteria/standards/guidelines or achieves results in accordance with stated goals or plans</i>
<i>Relevance</i>	<i>The extent to which the objectives of an intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirement, country needs, global priorities and partners' and donors' policies</i>
<i>Result</i>	<i>The output, outcome or impact (intended or unintended, positive and/or negative) of a development intervention</i>
<i>Results-Based Management</i>	<i>A management strategy and application focusing on performance and achievement of outputs, outcomes and impacts</i>

<i>Stakeholder</i>	<i>Agencies, organisations, groups or individuals who have a direct or indirect interest in the development intervention or its evaluation</i>
<i>Sustainability</i>	<i>The continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed. The probability of continued long-term benefits. The resilience to risk of the net benefit flows over time</i>
<i>Theory of Change</i>	<i>A comprehensive description and illustration of how and why a desired change is expected to happen in a particular context. It illustrates the causality between the inputs provided and the objectives sought and the assumptions underpinning this expected causality</i>
<i>Triangulation</i>	<i>The use of three or more theories, sources or types of information, or types of analysis to verify and substantiate an assessment</i>
<i>Unintended consequences</i>	<i>Unforeseen/unplanned events taking place as a result of programme/project activities. Can be positive or negative.</i>