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Evaluation of Norway's Engagement in Somalia 2012–2018



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Tana Copenhagen in association with Chr. Michelsen Institute

Written by

Erik Bryld (team leader), Charlotte Bonnet, Christine Kamau,
Mohamed S Mohamud, Abdikadir Osman, Joar Svanemyr, Elling
Tjønneland, Simon White

This report is the product of the authors, and responsibility for the accuracy of data included in this report rests with the authors alone. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions presented in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the Evaluation Department.

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Foreword


The purpose of this evaluation is to draw lessons from Norway's involvement over time in a country affected by conflict. Norway's support to countries in fragile situations has increased in recent years. Such support requires a different approach than support to more stable countries. Often there is a need for peacebuilding, humanitarian aid and long-term development assistance at the same time.

The strategic framework for Norwegian engagement in fragile states and regions emphasises that Norway should have a high tolerance for risk, while at the same time adhere to principles of "do no harm". This raises several dilemmas.

This evaluation aims to provide some insights into how these dilemmas and challenges are managed by Norwegian actors. We hope this insight can be of use in future support to countries in fragile situations.

The evaluation was carried out by a team from Tana Copenhagen in collaboration with Chr. Michelsen's Institute (CMI).

Oslo, October 2020



Siv J. Lillestøl

Acting Evaluation Director



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Executive Summary

The Somali Context

Somalia has been marred by civil war, frequent droughts and flooding since the early 1990s and has been a significant recipient of humanitarian assistance for many years. Since the Federal Government of Somalia was formed in 2012, development aid to the country has increased considerably.

Norway has been a core contributor to this process. From 2012–2018, Norway spent NOK 3.2 billion on funding for Somalia. This catapulted Norway into the top six Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) donors to Somalia and the top 10 among all donors to the country. Although Somalia is a Norwegian focus country, Norway does not have a permanent diplomatic mission in Somalia. Norwegian development aid in Somalia is managed from Oslo and its embassy in Nairobi.

Evaluation Purpose and Methodology

The evaluation covered by this report took place from October 2019 till June 2020. It sought to identify lessons from Norway's engagement in the challenging environment of Somalia and to assess whether Norway's assistance was effective, coherent and conflict-sensitive. And it paid specific attention to identifying how Norway managed three dilemmas arising from engaging in the complex Somali context.

The evaluation identified Norway's objectives for engaging in Somalia and the aid provided to the country from various Norwegian channels. It provided an overall analysis and recommendations on what worked and what did not work in achieving these objectives. The team used a sample of 10 specific interventions to gather additional field data to examine in more depth the relationships between three elements of Norway's engagement: its policies, management and interventions.

The evaluation team reviewed extensive documentation from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norad and the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Nairobi, in addition to a large number of resources from Norway's implementing partners, other donors and online research. The team travelled to Somalia and Kenya, visiting Mogadishu, Baidoa, Hargeisa, Garowe and Nairobi. Team members interviewed 120 people who had first-hand knowledge of Norway's engagement in Somalia in 2012–2018, including representatives from all key stakeholder organisations.

Key Findings

Overall, the evaluation found that Norway was able to identify a number of individual engagements that were effective in meeting the planned objectives, but that the combined results of Norway's engagement in Somalia were mixed. Norway's limited use of a systematic approach to conflict sensitivity, communication and learning means that it could have achieved more and minimised risks.



The evaluation found that the many times when Norwegian engagement in Somalia was effective were because:

- It supported partners that understood the fragile context
- Decision-makers in Norway were prepared to risk taking the first step
- Norway could respond swiftly to partner requests when emergencies occurred.

Norway aligned its aid with the Federal Government of Somalia's plans and priorities and contributed to developing joint coordination mechanisms in the country. However, these mechanisms were not effective in coordinating a fragmented donor community. Norway is now working to improve this.

Managing Norway's support in Somalia was divided between the Norwegian Embassy in Nairobi, the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad and was not systematically coordinated. Although this was a weakness, these aid channels did not appear to be in conflict.

Although Norway's strategies in Somalia were very broad, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its embassy in Nairobi focused on statebuilding, primarily enabling the country's new federal government to function financially. Norway was effective in this, largely because of the Special Financing Facility it established at a time when other donors refrained from direct engagement with the federal government. This support also paved the way for World Bank involvement in building the government's capacity. Norway's statebuilding support yielded better results at the federal government level than within its member states.

Norway has not been effective in the promotion of democratic values at the federal and member state level. The legitimacy of the federal member states remains challenged by the lack of public dialogue and

democratic processes during their formation and the Norwegian support to the UN constitutional process has not been able to improve this situation.

While stability remains challenging in large parts of Somalia, Norway contributed to outputs aimed at stabilising areas that had been recently liberated from al-Shabaab. It did this by supporting immediate needs, such as infrastructure projects. However, the evaluation has not been able to identify long-term results from these engagements. Norway also made important contributions beyond areas prioritised by its Somalia country strategies – particularly the education sector.

In terms of humanitarian effectiveness, Norway responded swiftly to partner requests during crises in Somalia and supported partners who could access people in need. The recently introduced Norwegian three-year funding frameworks provided an opportunity for more long-term support across the humanitarian–development nexus. Norway, as well as other donors, however, are still challenged in delivering in accordance



with all the humanitarian principles. The evaluation found that this concerned the ability to promote the Grand Bargain localisation agenda as well as ensuring access across all of Somalia.

The most significant unintended consequence of Norway's engagement in Somalia was the development of misconceptions about the motivations for its support. Norway's rather opaque approach, combined with its emphasis on supporting Somalia's federal government and oil sector, means that Norway was not always considered a neutral partner.

Gender equality and vulnerable groups are global priorities for Norway. Norway prioritised support for combatting female genital mutilation in Somalia. Its focus on women, peace and security, as outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 1325, was not significant in 2012–2018. With the humanitarian funding, Norway supported internally displaced persons and championed the need to target people living with disabilities. But groups experiencing ethnic and clan-

related marginalisation in Somalia were not prioritised by Norway or its implementing partners.

Although Somalia was, and still is, a conflict setting, Norway did not systematically articulate how conflict was affected by, or affected, its engagement in the country. Conflict was discussed with partners and within Norway's embassy and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but its full effect on Norway's engagement was not formally recorded. Some of Norway's strategically relevant programmes, like the Special Financing Facility launched in the first part of the evaluation period, never underwent a conflict-sensitivity analysis. However, the team found that in the latter part of the evaluation period most Norwegian-funded projects applied a conflict-sensitive approach.

Contextual and conflict analysis were not institutionalised or applied systematically in Norway's engagement in Somalia. However, interviews with respondents made it clear that Ministry of Foreign Affairs and embassy staff did use conflict analyses

from selected implementing partners when deciding Norway's approach in Somalia. Similarly, Norway did not regularly summarise results or systematically track its overall performance in Somalia. It took steps to assess many individual interventions, but did not institutionalise results-based management.

During the period evaluated, Norway faced several dilemmas in Somalia. These particularly concerned its relationship with the federal government, which was, and remains, an enabler, a spoiler and a potential contributor to conflict in Somalia. Norway did act on these dilemmas but never explicitly articulated the pros and cons of its decisions, nor described the conflict potential around these dilemmas.



Recommendations

- 1. Take advantage of Norway's ability to take the first step in making its engagements in fragile settings effective.** Norway has proven that taking a risk can make a difference in a fragile and conflict-affected context. Norway's risk appetite has bought considerable goodwill with the Federal Government of Somalia and with major donors like the World Bank.
- 2. Further expand Norway's country strategy process to include discussions and decisions around dilemmas.** Explicitly articulating dilemmas and the choices made around them will allow Norway to design a comprehensive approach to its engagement – a strategy with a clear theory of change. This would allow Norway to be clear about the risks relating to its choices and develop risk mitigation measures.
- 3. Apply a systematic approach to conflict-sensitive country portfolio management.** Norway needs to operationalise conflict sensitivity in both its individual interventions and its overall country portfolio. At the intervention level, each project or programme must be assessed through a conflict lens, identifying the intervention's effect on the conflict and vice versa. At the country portfolio level, Norway needs to assess the effects of its strategy on conflict.
- 4. Develop and implement a comprehensive communication and dissemination plan.** A Norwegian strategy should ensure transparency about engagement for its beneficiaries, and also instil trust in Norway among its partners. Norway needs to engage in dialogue with different stakeholders, proactively explain the rationale for its engagement and provide information about the funding it provides to Somalia.
- 5. Formalise dialogue and coordination between Norway's embassy in Nairobi, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad to enhance strategic alignment.** Norway should ensure that the globally managed aid provided to a Norwegian partner country complements funding guided by Norway's country strategy. In addition, the country strategy should recognise Norway's global objectives and funding priorities.



Introduction

Somalia has been marred by conflict since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1992. Somalia's civil war and complex political economy present significant challenges to providing aid. Following years of humanitarian assistance, the international community began to focus on stabilisation and development assistance after the Federal Government of Somalia was formed in 2012. Like many other donors, Norway increased its development aid to Somalia, eventually becoming the sixth largest OECD-DAC donor to the country.

This report presents the findings of the evaluation of Norway's engagement in Somalia from 2012–2018. It examines what worked well and what did not to identify traits required to enhance the effectiveness of Norway's engagement. The report evaluates the aid provided by Norway but also assesses its alignment with Norwegian political and diplomatic work, as well as the coherence among the various aid channels managed by different Norwegian government entities.

The evaluation sought to identify the lessons learned from Norway's engagement in the challenging environment of Somalia. How did it handle the dilemmas arising from both humanitarian and long-term development needs in a fragile context? How did it manage competing priorities of its foreign policy and development objectives? And how did it engage in Somalia in a way that was sensitive to the conflict and the needs of vulnerable groups in the country?

The challenging and fragile context of Somalia also gives this report an opportunity to analyse the conflict-sensitivity of Norwegian engagement at the level of individual interventions as well as its overall approach. Finally, this report presents the evaluation findings on how Norway has used learning from its 2012–2018 engagement in Somalia to inform subsequent and future interventions.

In the following sections, this report first presents the evaluation methodology and approach. In Chapter

3, it presents the evaluation findings, covering the effectiveness of Norway's engagement and the coherence of its aid, specifically referring to the dilemmas faced in Somalia, Norway's conflict sensitivity and its ability to learn from its engagement. Chapter 4 outlines conclusions, and Chapter 5 lists recommendations for Norway's future engagement in Somalia and other fragile states.



Methodology and Approach

2.1 Evaluation Focus

The evaluation covered Norwegian engagement and aid provision in Somalia in 2012–2018. The objective of that engagement, as articulated in Norway's 2016–2018 engagement strategy, was to contribute to peace, stability, democratic development and poverty reduction in Somalia. The evaluation assessed what did and what did not work in terms of meeting Norwegian objectives. The evaluation did not assess the relevance or effectiveness of activities not funded by aid, such as diplomatic, political or military efforts. It did not assess the results of individual interventions against their own objectives but rather whether those interventions contributed to achieving Norway's overall engagement objectives.

Norway's engagement in Somalia from 2012–2018 was informed by earlier contextual and political developments, such as the root causes of conflict, 2011 preparations for the launch of the Somalia Compact, and the 2011 drought. The evaluation focused on evidence from 2012–2018 but considered pre-2012 findings where there is evidence that they influenced Norway's 2012–2018 engagement. In terms

of geographical scope, the evaluation covered large parts of Somalia, visiting three federal states and the capital region.


2.2 Methodology

This evaluation of Norwegian aid engagement in Somalia in 2012–2018 aimed to provide overall conclusions on what worked and what did not in achieving Norway's objectives. It aimed to draw lessons from this, to influence recommendations to guide future

Norwegian interventions in Somalia and other fragile settings.

Norway's objectives for engaging in Somalia were outlined in Norwegian policy and strategy documents. These strategies were operationalised by official Norwegian agencies, managed by units located in Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norad and the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Nairobi (hereafter referred to as 'the embassy'). The support evaluated covers the strategic level, the aid management and exemplifies the support by assessing individual interventions, as outlined in Figure 1.

Figure 1 Overview of Norwegian Engagement in Somalia, 2012–2018



2.2.1 EVALUATION CRITERIA

Based on the evaluation Terms of Reference (listed in full in Annex 1), this section highlights how the evaluation approached the evaluation questions.¹

Evaluation objective 1: Map and assess the effects of Norwegian engagement in Somalia during the evaluation period

Effectiveness is defined as the extent to which the objectives of development or humanitarian interventions were achieved or are expected to be achieved.² The evaluation identified and categorised all Norwegian-funded aid interventions according to priority areas based on Norwegian aid statistics, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad documents. The evaluation team then assessed Norway's engagement in Somalia against:

- Progress indicators for key Norwegian priorities in Somalia
- 10 sample interventions in Somalia (see section 2.2.2), assessed through a desk review and field-level data collection

¹ For full definitions see Annex 7.

² See OECD–DAC's glossary: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/2754804.pdf>

- Norway's humanitarian effectiveness, including its access to, and reach in, emergency areas, and the timeliness and relevance of its response to emergency needs
- A desk assessment of other relevant reviews and evaluations.

Unintended consequences were assessed through desk assessments and interviews, and were mapped at the outcome and/or impact level.³

The evaluation assessed the impact of Norway's engagement in Somalia on women, men and vulnerable groups by focusing on how, and how far, Norway pursued this in policy dialogue with authorities and in coordinating with donors, and how these issues were addressed in the selected sample. In particular, the evaluation assessed how gender – as a cross-cutting priority in Norwegian aid policy – was mainstreamed in Norwegian-supported interventions.

³ See the Norad report on unintended consequences: <https://evalueringsportalen.no/evaluating/unintended-effects-in-evaluations-of-norwegian-aid-a-desk-study/Unintended%20Effects%20in%20Evaluations%20of%20Norwegian%20Aid.pdf/@inline>

Evaluation objective 2: Assess the coherence of Norway's engagement in Somalia

This question relates to the coherence of Norway's engagement in Somalia in terms of its internal and external coordination and alignment, and how it responded to competing priorities (dilemmas).

The evaluation defined coherence in line with the latest OECD–DAC evaluation criteria, to cover internal synergies and links in Norway's engagement, the external consistency of its engagement with that of other actors, and their alignment with, and relevance to, Somalia federal government country priorities.

The evaluation mapped Norway's identified priorities against those of Somalia's federal government, as outlined in the Somali Compact 2014–2016,⁴ the National Development Plan for 2017–2019 and government humanitarian plans.

⁴ The Somali Compact is part of the New Deal for engagement in fragile states. It provides the first comprehensive national development plan owned by the Federal Government of Somalia. It is accompanied by partnership principles to which all key development partners in Somalia agreed. For more information see: <https://www.odi.org/publications/10786-new-deal-somalia-independent-review-somali-compact-2014-2016>



The evaluation assessed Norway's role in coordination through a desk review of relevant reports, and field-level interviews with Somali authorities and donors. It paid specific attention to Norway's role in relation to the national Somalia Reconstruction and Development Framework. It assessed the coordination of Norwegian development and humanitarian support by mapping its management structure and aid distribution through different channels.

Finally, the evaluation assessed the dilemmas faced by Norway and the actions it took to address them. The evaluation team defined a dilemma as a problem or challenge offering two or more alternative responses and requiring a decision. Dilemmas and options were identified through desk analysis and research participant interviews. The evaluation assessed Norwegian analyses of these dilemmas by reviewing discussions in Norwegian strategies, embassy workplans and related documentation. It assessed how Norway handled these dilemmas by reviewing its actions in terms of financial prioritisation and policy dialogue.

Evaluation objective 3: How and to what extent has Norway's engagement in Somalia been conflict-sensitive?

The evaluation assessed the conflict sensitivity of Norway's engagement in Somalia based on the Governance and Social Development Resource Centre definition,⁵ which considers conflict sensitivity to entail:

- Gaining an understanding of the operational context
- Understanding the interaction between an intervention and the context (how the context affects the intervention and vice versa)
- Taking action based on the understanding of this interaction in order to avoid negative effects and maximise positive effects.⁶

Norway's application of conflict-sensitive measures was assessed at the desk research stage, analysing project documentation and appraisal documents. In the field, the evaluation gauged how far conflict sensitivity was part of the dialogue among Norway's implementing partners and its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, embassy

⁵ The Governance and Social Development Resource Centre is a partnership of research institutes, think tanks and consultancy organisations providing bespoke research and consultancy services originally initiated and funded by the UK Department for International Development.

⁶ Haider, 2014.

and Norad staff. It also assessed the conflict sensitivity of Norway's approach in Somalia, specifically with respect to engaging in statebuilding⁷, a core objective of its engagement.

How far conflict and the context affected Norway's engagement was assessed through a desk review of strategy documents, embassy workplans and decision documents. This was used to identify changes to Norway's approach based on contextual and conflict-related developments in Somalia, as well as any changes to the 10 sample interventions during the evaluation period.

Evaluation objective 4: How did Norway demonstrate learning, from both the available knowledge and experience, to inform its engagement in Somalia?

The evaluation defined learning as Norway's ability to document the lessons learned from implementing its engagement in Somalia and to use these lessons to adapt its country portfolio or individual interventions.

⁷ In this report statebuilding refers to an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations. For more details on statebuilding, see OECD, 2011a



The evaluation assessed Norwegian learning by reviewing conflict and context analyses and risk assessments in strategy documents, embassy workplans and decision documents. This was supplemented by findings from interviews with Ministry of Foreign Affairs, embassy and Norad staff.

The content and quality of the conflict and contextual analyses Norway used were assessed against the evaluation team's own conflict analysis. However, only one specific Norwegian analysis was commissioned in Somalia during the period under review. The evaluation therefore assessed how far the conflict assessment used by Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and embassy (reporting from partners such as the UN, Nordic International Support Foundation and the Somalia Stability Fund) fed into Norwegian strategies, decision documents and embassy workplans. Finally, the evaluation assessed whether the 10 sample interventions were conflict-sensitive in their design.

Whether Norway was able to use lessons learned to inform its decisions was assessed at the intervention level, using the 10 sample interventions, and at the strategic level, assessing embassy workplans and related strategy documents. This assessment included

determining whether Norway used information from implementation partners in this process.

Evaluation objective 5: What are the main lessons learned and recommendations that can inform Norway's future engagement in Somalia?

The main lessons from the evaluation were drawn from all of the evaluation objective findings outlined above. The evaluation assessed which findings had the greatest effect on Norway's engagement, drawing lessons from them.

2.2.2. SAMPLE INTERVENTIONS

The sample interventions used for this evaluation were individual projects, programmes or unearmarked Norwegian funding to organisations or agency operations in Somalia, primarily Norwegian non-governmental organisations (NGOs).⁸ On the basis that Norwegian interventions demonstrated its

strategic priorities, the evaluation gathered data from the field relating to 10 sample interventions. This supplemented findings from the desk review relating to both the sample interventions and other interventions.

The evaluation encompassed Norway's whole aid portfolio to Somalia. However, visiting all interventions in the field or talking to all partners funded by Norway since 2012 was not feasible. Therefore, the research team selected 10 sample interventions to explore relationships between the three elements of Norwegian engagement in Somalia – strategy/policies, management and individual interventions – using new evidence gathered from the field. The sample interventions were identified at the evaluation mapping and inception stages, based on the following criteria:

- All interventions were clearly linked to a Norwegian strategic priority outlined in Norway's strategy documents
- The sample should include interventions that were significant in terms of Norway's budget allocation

⁸ According to OECD–DAC, an intervention encompasses all types of development and humanitarian efforts that may be evaluated using OECD–DAC evaluation criteria, such as a project, programme, policy, strategy, thematic area, technical assistance, policy advice, institution, financing mechanism, instrument or other activity. It includes development interventions, humanitarian aid, peacebuilding, climate mitigation and adaptation, normative work and non-sovereign operations.



To explore the relationship between Norway's strategies and support on the ground, the evaluation team selected 10 interventions.

- The whole sample should:
 - include development and humanitarian projects
 - include multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental organisation funding
 - reflect the whole geographical area of Somalia
 - take into consideration Norwegian funding priorities and cover different funding channels.

The evaluation team did not select sample interventions that had been recently reviewed or assessed through other evaluations.⁹

One criterion for assessing the sample interventions was that they should have a reasonable degree of attribution to Norwegian funding. Norway supports a number of global funds and multilateral partners through core funding and unearmarked grants, which indirectly contribute to its priorities in Somalia. As

these pooled global funds do not involve specific Norwegian funding linked to the country's priorities in Somalia, the evaluation did not include them in the sample interventions but did include them when mapping Norwegian support. The evaluation also considered global funds and core funding to multilateral organisations when assessing the coherence of Norwegian engagement in Somalia. The final sample of 10 interventions included:

- Three NGOs
- Five multilateral interventions
- Two bilateral interventions initiated by Norway.

Based on methodological considerations and the selection criteria, 10 sample interventions were subject to field studies in Somalia (see Table 1 for the list of interventions and Annex 4 for further details). Thematically, the sample includes governance, stabilisation, emergency response, livelihoods, vocational training and civil society capacity-building.

⁹ For example, the 2016 desk review of support for education through NGOs and the recent review of results from main female genital mutilation projects implemented through the UK Department for International Development and the Norwegian Church Aid/Save the Children partnership.



Table 1 [Intervention sample](#)

Intervention	Description
Special Financing Facility	Bilateral engagement, considered as a core and innovative element in early Norwegian support for statebuilding
World Bank Multi-Partner Fund	The largest recipient of Norwegian funding to Somalia and the main vehicle for statebuilding support through the Special Financing Facility
Nordic International Support Foundation	A Norwegian NGO that became a main bilateral channel for support to statebuilding and stabilisation
Norwegian Refugee Council	The largest single recipient of Norwegian humanitarian aid to Somalia. An example of support in the humanitarian–development nexus
Food and Agricultural Organization fisheries project	An example of a Norwegian-supported livelihood project terminated by Norway before the project was completed
The Somali Humanitarian Fund	The largest multilateral humanitarian actor in Somalia. In 2012–2018, Norway was among its top five donors
The UN Constitutional Review Project	A project supporting Somali federalisation, a core objective of Norwegian engagement. In 2012–2018, Norway funded 60% of its budget
The Joint Programme for Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery	An example of statebuilding from below, which operated in Somaliland and Puntland in the first years of the period under review up until 2016 and then expanded to also engage in other parts of Somalia. It received funding from Norway throughout the period evaluated
Norwegian Red Cross (NorCross)	The longest operating Norwegian NGO ¹⁰ in Somalia. It has accessed the whole country through its national partner, the Somali Red Crescent Society. It received funds from Norad's civil society grant to strengthen the capacity of its partners
Serendi	A Norwegian-initiated project to reintegrate former al-Shabaab combatants into Somali society

¹⁰ NorCross is a national society established by law and mandated through the Geneva Convention. Although Red Cross organisations are usually referred to as humanitarian organisations or national Red Cross societies, funding from Norway to NorCross falls under the NGO category, so this report refers to it as an NGO.

2.2.3 DATA COLLECTED

Evaluation data was collected through desk research, interviews, focus group discussions and workshops. The evaluation team had access to more than 2,000 documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norad and the Norwegian Embassy in Nairobi, in addition to a large number of resources from implementing partners, other donors, and online and database research.

The key document types and their validity for the evaluation include:

- Documentation such as published policy and strategy documents (e.g. government budgets, white papers, strategy and action plans), embassy workplans, half-yearly reports, and internal strategy documents and briefings to ministers or similar personnel. These documents include Norway's assessment of the situation in Somalia and its planned and/or executed actions. These are used in this report as direct references to Norway's position.
- Partner progress reports and similar documents. These provide the partner's assessment of the context and progress. Although they are insufficient as standalone evidence, findings from these reports were verified through multiple other sources, including

other evaluations and research informant interviews.

- Background documentation from individuals (e.g. in notes and books). These often provide useful analysis but were not used as standalone evidence. Findings from these documents were verified through multiple other sources, including evaluations and interviews.
- General country data from recognised institutions like the World Bank or the UN Development Programme Human Development Index, which are cited directly in this report with reference to the source. The evaluation team cannot verify the quality of these sources.
- External independent evaluations and peer-reviewed articles. These have been subject to external review mechanisms and serve as evidence when combined with the evaluation's own findings. The team assessed the methodology of other evaluations to ensure the quality of their findings.

The data collection phase included multiple visits to Oslo for interviews in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad headquarters and interviews with other stakeholders, such as Norwegian NGOs operating in

Somalia. In January and February 2020, the evaluation team went to Somalia twice and visited major cities and towns where Norway supports interventions including Mogadishu, Hargeisa, Garowe and Baidoa, as well as Nairobi in Kenya, to interview beneficiaries, implementing partners, resource staff, and government and donor representatives.

In total, 120 people were interviewed either individually for the evaluation, in small focus groups or through workshops. Interviewees included representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norad, the Federal Government of Somalia, the governments of Somaliland, South West State and Puntland, NGOs, UN agencies, the World Bank, donors, implementing partners, beneficiaries and resource persons.

Evaluation findings were presented and discussed with stakeholders at various points during the evaluation.¹¹

¹¹ This included:

- A discussion on the methodology presented in the inception report in Oslo in December 2019
- A presentation and discussion of the desk research report in January 2020
- A debriefing with the embassy in Nairobi in February 2020
- A presentation on the main findings and discussions with implementing partners in Mogadishu in February 2020
- A presentation and discussion on the first draft of the full report with stakeholders in Oslo on 29 April and 4 May 2020.



2.2.4. LIMITATIONS

Assessing Norwegian support in a difficult-to-access environment and the fact that some activities were implemented up to seven years ago presented challenges for the evaluation. The most significant challenges and the evaluation team's responses were:

– *Bias from the evidence base*

The evaluation relied on staff from Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norad and NGOs for data sources. In addition, the team sourced data from implementers receiving Norwegian funding. The heavy reliance on people who either came from the Norwegian Government or depended on its funding provided for potential bias in the dataset. To mitigate this, the team sought to ensure that its findings were complemented by desk evidence from evaluations and other research independent of Norwegian funding. Furthermore, to test the evidence, the team identified additional interviewees, including Somali and international academics and people with knowledge of the Somali context who did not directly engage with Norway during the period evaluated.

– *Working in a conflict-affected environment*

Somalia is marred by pockets of conflict and regular terrorist attacks in different locations. Working in a

conflict area had a number of consequences for the evaluation. First, at times primary data could not be collected from specific areas. The evaluation team did manage to visit four states in Somalia, although no places occupied by al-Shabaab. Secondly, in Somalia, where access is difficult and information scarce, 'the truth' is often an early casualty. The team did encounter interviewees whose statements or data could not be verified. The team accessed data from multiple sources, to triangulate and weed out single pieces of evidence that could not be verified by other sources.

– *Attribution versus contribution*

The evaluation focused on the macro level, where the effects of Norway's engagement were often the products of multiple inputs, including joint approaches with other donors and/or multilateral contributions. This made it difficult to attribute any changes specifically to Norway, meaning the evaluation's primary focus was on Norway's contribution. However, using sample interventions offered the chance to refer to more detailed, on-the-ground, Norway-specific results, and in some instances apply attribution. While engaging with the multi-partner funds and joint programmes in which Norway was involved, the evaluation assessed how

Norway's engagement influenced the functioning of these mechanisms and whether it enhanced or impeded their effectiveness.

– *Availability of staff*

There is a high turnover of international staff in Mogadishu, of local project and programme staff across Somalia and of staff based in Nairobi who deal with Somalia. The evaluation's longitudinal nature meant that some interviewees in Somalia or Kenya had moved on or were unavailable. The team invested resources in tracking down such individuals and conducting Skype interviews when needed and where feasible. However, the team was unable to contact some people who had left Somalia or found new jobs.

Most importantly, in terms of managing limitations, the evaluation team emphasised the rigorous triangulation of evidence. All findings were confirmed, either verbally or in writing by independent sources or through an independent evaluation or review. Finally, statistics and background information were referenced directly from primary sources.



2.2.5 ETHICS

The evaluation team adopted a highly ethical approach. The evaluation was conducted in line with OECD–DAC evaluation quality standards and criteria, as well as Tana Copenhagen's ethical research guidelines.¹² These principles emphasise the need to produce good research while avoiding doing any harm to research participants or consultants. They mean that the evaluation findings and approach must be relevant, of high quality and clearly in accordance with the Terms of Reference so that findings can be reliably used for their intended purpose.

The evaluation should be undertaken with integrity, honesty and should ensure inclusive views. Interviewees should understand the voluntary nature of their participation, the evaluation's purpose and their right to withdraw from the process. The anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants should be protected. Tana is fully committed to transparency and openness in publishing, communicating and disseminating all evaluations and research within its contractual remit. This includes providing full methodological details and information about who has undertaken research and who funded it.

¹² See: <https://tanacopenhagen.com/about-tana-copenhagen/>



Findings

Norway was a major donor to Somalia throughout 2012–2018, in terms of both long-term development assistance and humanitarian assistance. Norway's engagement was guided by a combination of strategies, funding priorities and funding decisions taken during the period.

This section outlines Norway's goals and priorities for its engagement in Somalia according to its strategies, actions and funding priorities. This is followed by an assessment of the effectiveness of Norwegian aid, its coherence and conflict sensitivity. Finally, this section examines how far Norway has learned from its engagement to improve both its effectiveness and its ability to adapt to changes in the Somali context.

3.1 Norway's Goals and Priorities In Somalia, 2012–2018

Somalia has been a focus country for Norwegian development aid since 2014. Since then, development assistance to the country has increased significantly, supplementing the previous focus on humanitarian assistance. A significant focus of Norwegian

development engagement in the country has been supporting statebuilding and stabilisation, coupled with efforts to link development assistance and humanitarian support. Somalia is the only Norwegian focus country without a permanent diplomatic mission. Norwegian development aid in Somalia is managed from Oslo and the embassy in Nairobi.

Q 1.1 What have been Norway's goals and priorities in the evaluation period?

The evaluation found that Norwegian development support during the period under review was guided both by country-specific strategies and by global Norwegian development and political priorities. The context-specific strategies were presented in two country strategies for Somalia, covering 2012–2015 and 2016–2018.¹³ They are also reflected in Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs strategy documents and Norway's annual development aid budgets.

There is complementarity between the two strategies

covering Norwegian engagement in Somalia, though the second strategy is slightly more narrow in scope. Both strategies covered multiple thematic areas, allowing for support to multiple sectors, and also non-aid priority areas such as emigration from Somalia to Norway and piracy. They both focused on directly supporting statebuilding processes. Both strategies related to human rights and gender equality, with the second having a more explicit focus on gender and women, peace and security. The second strategy was also more explicit on tackling counter-terrorism and organised crimes, including reaching young men. Neither strategy identified baselines or indicators to assess progress.

Norwegian development aid in Somalia was also shaped by overall Norwegian development priorities as expressed in white papers, action plans and global thematic budget allocations. Furthermore, Norwegian engagement was also shaped by other Norwegian interests and concerns linked to issues such as migration, maritime security or terrorism. Some of these global priorities and concerns were reflected and prioritised in the Somalia country strategies. However, others were not and mainly manifested in considerable

¹³ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013a and 2015b.

Norwegian funding allocations to NGOs and core contributions to multilateral organisations and global funds.

The roots of Norway's 2012–2015 Somalia strategy and engagement lie in Norway's 2001–2002 membership of the UN Security Council. Norway was then the pen holder on Somalia and became involved in a number of global initiatives related to reconciliation and peacebuilding in the country. Norwegian funding to Somalia during this first strategy period largely comprised different types of humanitarian assistance, typically accounting for about two-thirds of the annual allocation of NOK 200–300 million to Somalia.¹⁴

The unpublished Strategy for Norwegian Somalia Policy dated 23 August 2012 states,¹⁵ *'The overall objective for Norway's policy on Somalia is to contribute to stability and development by supporting initiatives which can provide a foundation for peace, national reconciliation, and the establishment of well-functioning authorities in the country.'*

¹⁴ The disbursement in 2011 surpassed NOK 600 million because of drought-related emergency relief provided that year.

¹⁵ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013a.

The strategy document emphasises several issues, including:

- Increasing emphasis on long-term development assistance
- Rebuilding the state through support for capacity-building and improved governance
- Providing support to stabilise newly liberated areas, with a focus on providing infrastructure and services, and support for a possible stabilisation fund
- Supporting the government's justice sector and promoting human rights
- Supporting education targeting youths, to contribute to employment and growth, and provide alternatives to joining al-Shabaab
- Expanding support to Somaliland (which had self-declared its independence from Somalia), including support for peacebuilding dialogue between Somalia and Somaliland
- Providing continued support to Puntland as part of anti-piracy support

- Tackling corruption
- Ending support for mapping the continental shelf and preparing for an economic zone due to political controversies
- Considering future support for coastal and fisheries management.

The strategy's political side focused on peace, national reconciliation and well-functioning authorities in Somalia. This included support to building capacities to enable the new state structure. The strategy foresaw this as part of a stabilisation process and viewed the statebuilding process as part of ensuring government legitimacy. The strategy emphasised the need for capacity development, to foster constructive political dialogue and effective governance between central and regional authorities. It further emphasised that this should be done in partnership with other international actors.

In terms of how Norway would achieve its objectives, the policy outlined Norway's comparative advantage as 'a neutral partner' 'without any political or financial interests' and underscored the importance of Norway's flexibility and its swift responses to changing needs.



Shortly after the 2012 strategy was launched, the Federal Government of Somalia was established, and Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs increased its political and financial focus on enabling the federal government to perform its mandate. This came to pass with the launch of the Norwegian project the Special Financing Facility, and the political work of both Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its newly created position of Special Envoy to Somalia. In the latter part of the strategy period, Norway launched its 2014 global strategy on female genital mutilation, with Somalia as a pilot country.

Norway's 2016–2018 strategy for Somalia was adopted in late 2015, following consultations and input from stakeholders in Norway. However, the final strategy was classified and remains so.¹⁶ Most of its planned interventions were also in the Norwegian Government's annual development aid budgets covering this period. The 2016–2018 strategy had four objectives, with one objective specifically referring to humanitarian assistance. In the main body of the text, three objectives and associated sub-objectives are outlined

¹⁶ The main points are summarised in the terms of reference for this evaluation. One of the evaluation team members with a security clearance had full access to the document.

to guide Norwegian engagement in Somalia. These may be summarised as follows:

1. Support political stabilisation, good governance, human rights and democratic values:
 - a. Support federal and regional states in terms of capacity development and state-level projects
 - b. Support stabilisation, focusing particularly on support to areas newly liberated from al-Shabaab to increase authorities' legitimacy
 - c. Support women's rights and gender equality, with a focus on female genital mutilation
 - d. Emphasise the nexus of humanitarian and long-term aid.
2. Support peace and reconciliation, and protect civilians against terrorism, organised crime and piracy:
 - a. Support reconciliation and trust-building in cooperation with the federal government
 - b. Counter violent extremism, with a focus on youths

- c. Strengthen maritime security by tackling violent extremism, terrorism and organised crime
 - d. Support the work of the African Union and the UN
 - e. Mainstream women, peace and security in the programme portfolio.
3. Contribute to inclusive growth, job creation and social development:
 - a. Sustainable management of natural resources, including considering Oil for Development
 - b. Support technical and vocational education and job creation for youths.

The 2016–2018 objectives were confirmed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs white paper on selecting partner or focus countries for Norwegian development aid,¹⁷ which acknowledged that Norway has focused on peace, reconciliation, stabilisation and democracy in Somalia since 2012. The white paper also underscored the importance of economic and sustainable development, the fight against gender-based violence

¹⁷ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017.



and good governance as the largest priority areas supported by Norway. The white paper explicitly mentioned the Special Financing Facility as ‘key to enabling the Federal Government of Somalia to pay its employees and support infrastructure’.¹⁸

As in the previous strategy documents, the white paper highlighted the role of the Norwegian Somali diaspora as an important contributor to rebuilding the country.

The white paper stressed Norwegian alignment with the Somali Compact (2014–2016), and the federal government’s National Development Plan for Somalia (2017–2019). Furthermore, it outlines Norway’s emphasis on providing support through the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Framework’s coordination and alignment mechanism.

3.1.1. OPERATIONALISING THE COUNTRY STRATEGIES

The evaluation found that Norway’s support in Somalia managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the embassy was aligned with the two country strategies but had a significantly narrower focus on the federal government and statebuilding. The two entities prioritised enabling the Federal Government of Somalia

to undertake financial functions and ensuring that all support aligned with federal government priorities.

The country strategies allowed for funding a variety of interventions. Management responsibility was divided between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norad and the embassy. A significant development was the appointment of a special envoy for Somalia in 2012, who came from an NGO background (Norwegian Refugee Council and the Nordic International Support Foundation) and initiated a much stronger focus on working directly with the new federal government. Norway adopting Somalia as a focus country in 2014 and subsequently expanding development aid to the country shifted management responsibility for support in Somalia from Oslo to the embassy in Nairobi.

According to interviewees, the special envoy still plays a key role in facilitating aid and engaging directly with authorities and stakeholders in Somalia as Norway has not established a permanent mission in Somalia, and aid continues to be managed from Nairobi. The diplomatic staffing in Nairobi was reduced in 2016. Since then, Norwegian aid to Somalia has been handled by just three diplomats who are also responsible for managing aid to Kenya.

The evaluation found that Norway’s development aid to Somalia was based on a de facto theory of change that was fairly simple but was not clearly detailed on paper.¹⁹ The approach focused on statebuilding, which was understood as enabling the Federal Government of Somalia to perform its financial functions.

Norway’s particular focus on working with the federal government began with establishing the Special Financing Facility for Somalia. This was initiated by the Special Envoy in 2012 and was followed later that year by an agreement between Norway’s Minister for International Development, Heikki Holmås, and President Hassan Sheikh of Somalia. Since the launch of the Special Financing Facility in 2013, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and embassy have primarily supported the Federal Government of Somalia via the Special Financing Facility and World Bank Multi-Partner Fund, as well as through related programmes, such as support to the constitutional review process. Norway’s priority in enabling the Somali government to function related to financial processes and management. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs interviewees believed that if the federal government did not have

18 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017, p.68.

19 According to all Ministry of Foreign Affairs, embassy and Norad staff interviewed for the evaluation.



basic financial capacities, such as providing salaries, it could not operate and secure even basic legitimacy.

The embassy workplans confirm the strong alignment between Norwegian engagement and Somali priorities. From 2014 onwards, embassy workplans and related communication indicate that enhanced attention was paid on aligning with the New Deal Compact for Somalia, which was launched in 2014 and ran until 2016. The evaluation identified alignment between Norwegian strategy objectives and the compact's peace and statebuilding goals. The emphasis on aligning with the compact was also based on Norway's stated commitment to Somali 'ownership and responsibility' to ensure its successful development.²⁰

3.1.2 THE HUMANITARIAN STRATEGY

The two Norwegian country strategies for Somalia made limited references to humanitarian support. The 2016–2018 strategy had an emphasis on ensuring that humanitarian principles were upheld. With limited strategic pointers, Norway's humanitarian support in Somalia was based on its overall humanitarian policies. This strategy specifically referred to the Grand Bargain, with a greater focus on the localisation agenda

²⁰ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014a.

and using cash programming to guide Norwegian assistance.

In 2012–2018, Norway's humanitarian support was underpinned by the strategic objectives of its 2008 Humanitarian Policy, to:

- Ensure that people in need are given the necessary protection and assistance
- Fund humanitarian efforts on the basis of the international principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence
- Equip the international community to meet future global humanitarian challenges
- Prevent and respond to humanitarian crises and initiate reconstruction in their wake.

In 2016 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs developed a Guidance Note²¹ for partners on how they could ensure respect for humanitarian principles in their

²¹ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016.

operations. This was updated in 2019²² after the 2018 Humanitarian Strategy was developed. The note recognised the dilemmas that can arise in delivering humanitarian action and the need for dialogue to find the most appropriate response.

In line with the 2017 Strategic Framework for Norwegian Engagement in Vulnerable States and Regions,²³ Norway's approach to humanitarian support was part of a broader strategy to support fragile states by addressing urgent humanitarian needs, alleviating suffering and providing assistance to refugees. The strategic framework recognised the barriers to peace and inclusive development posed by the marginalisation of large population groups, and the need for long-term humanitarian assistance.²⁴ In Somalia, Norway's strategies further articulated the need for humanitarian aid to provide a foundation for peace and security.²⁵

²² Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019.

²³ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017.

²⁴ The strategy highlights the relevance of six priority areas in engagement in fragile contexts: 1) Inclusive political settlements, 2) security, 3) human rights, governance and the rule of law, 4) inclusive growth and better living conditions, 5) a longer-term perspective on humanitarian aid and greater flexibility in long-term development aid, and 6) supporting regional platforms.

²⁵ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012.

Norway's Humanitarian Policy, updated in 2018, outlines goals around protecting civilians, responding to crises and supporting the global humanitarian sector, all under the lens of humanitarian principles. The 2018 strategy is more explicit about adopting a rights-based approach. In the period between the two policies – 2008–2018 – global discourse on humanitarian assistance culminated in the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit²⁶ and the ensuing Grand Bargain.²⁷ Norway's 2018 strategy reflects the thrust of commitments made during the summit, specifically around funding for, and reform of, the humanitarian sector. The strategy's goals are:

- Ensuring that people in need receive the necessary protection and assistance, in line with humanitarian principles
- Promoting an integrated and rights-based approach to prevent humanitarian crises and reduce humanitarian needs
- Pushing for innovation and reform in the humanitarian sector
- Promoting effective, flexible and predictable funding for humanitarian efforts.²⁸

The evaluation found that Norway was already promoting some elements of the Grand Bargain to its partners and these being implemented in Somalia even before its 2018 Humanitarian Strategy, such

as the localisation agenda²⁹ and greater use of cash programming.^{30, 31}

3.1.3 NORWEGIAN AID TO SOMALIA

Norwegian funding to Somalia mostly supported strategy priority areas, primarily good governance and emergency assistance. However, Norway also funded

26 The summit was convened in May 2016 by former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. It sought to generate commitments from international actors to deliver better support to people in humanitarian crises.

27 The largest donors and humanitarian organisations committed to getting more resources into the hands of people in need, and improving the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian action. There are currently 61 signatories (24 member states, 21 NGOs, 12 UN agencies, two Red Cross movements and two intergovernmental organisations). See: <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/grand-bargain#:~:text=The%20Grand%20Bargain%2C%20launched%20during,efficiency%20of%20the%20humanitarian%20action>. For full details of Grand Bargain commitments, see: <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/grand-bargain/grand-bargain-shared-commitment-better-serve-people-need-2016#:~:text=The%20Grand%20Bargain%3A%20A%20Shared%20Commitment%20to,Serve%20People%20in%20Need%2C%202016&text=We%20live%20in%20a%20world,their%20Ohunger%2C%20safety%20and%20survival>.

28 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018.

29 There is no universal definition of localisation. The aim of localisation, as articulated in the Grand Bargain document, is to engage with local and national responders to reinforce rather than replace local and national capacities. In the Grand Bargain, under the heading of 'more support and funding tools to local and national responders', signatories committed to 'making principled humanitarian action as local as possible and as international as necessary' while continuing to recognise the critical role played by international actors, particularly in situations of armed conflict. See: <https://media.ifrc.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2018/05/Localization-external-policy-brief-4-April-2.pdf>. Grand Bargain signatories agreed a categorisation of local actors for the purposes of measuring their financial commitments. This includes local and national government authorities and, for non-state actors, 'organisations engaged in relief that are headquartered and operating in their own aid recipient country and which are not affiliated to an international NGO'. See: <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/iasc-definition-local-and-national-actors-barrier-achieving-grand-bargain-localisation>.

30 An independent evaluation of donor adherence to the Grand Bargain indicates Norway's commitment to enhanced cash programming in humanitarian assistance, where Norway is a co-convenor – with the UK as lead – of the High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Cash Transfers. See: https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/nn_-_grand_bargain_report_final.pdf

31 Since 2017 Norway has provided self-reports to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee on progress on its Grand Bargain commitments.




areas outside the strategies in sectors aligned with global Norwegian priority areas – especially education. However, some priority areas identified in the two Somalia country strategies, such as employment and national reconciliation, received limited funding.

Norway's support for Somalia during the period was mostly channelled through Norwegian NGOs and multilateral agencies. Funding provided through multilateral organisations not managed by the embassy in Nairobi is not reflected in the aid statistics or the two strategy documents. The evaluation found that multilateral organisations' implementations supported by Norway in Somalia did not always align with Norwegian priorities.

Overall, NOK 2.7 billion of Norwegian funding was disbursed to Somalia in 2012–2018, as shown in Figures 2 and 3.³² Although there were minor decreases from 2013–2016 and from 2017–2018, the yearly expenditure more than doubled over the course of the period under review.

Figure 2 Norwegian Aid to Somalia 2012–2018, by value



Country / Region: Somalia
Norwegian development aid 2012–2018

Norad.no

³² According to Norwegian aid statistics.

These statistics do not capture all transfers to Somalia, most notably Norwegian core funding to UN agencies and global programmes, some of which funded major activities in Somalia. Table 2 provides an estimate, based on OECD-DAC guidelines, of the share of Norway's core funding to multilateral organisations that was disbursed to Somalia in 2012–2018.

The main multilateral organisations, based on 2017 disbursements, were the UN Central Emergency Response Fund, the UN Development Programme, the World Food Programme and two global health funds (Gavi, the vaccine alliance, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria).

In addition, Norway provided core funding to the UNICEF's Education Fund and the Global Partnership for Education, which both have projects in Somalia. Data on these disbursements is not available for the full evaluation period, but in 2017 the estimated share of Norwegian support disbursed to Somalia via these two funds was about NOK 8.2 million. Additionally, Norway provided bilateral support to various pan-African and global programmes with activities in Somalia. These include the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the Eastern African Standby Force. The Norwegian-funded, Africa-wide

Figure 3 Norwegian Aid to Somalia 2012–2018, by sector




Table 2 Norwegian Support to Somalia 2012–2018, through Earmarked Grants and Core Funding to Multilateral Organisations, in NOK (millions)*

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Disbursement to Somalia	204	370	364	346	340	547	543	2,714
Share of core funding to multilateral organisations disbursed to Somalia (estimated)	29	28	31	48	49	93	(93)**	371
Total	233	398	395	394	389	640	636	3,085


*Data provided by Norad's statistical office, which estimated the share of core funding disbursed to Somalia based on guidelines from OECD–DAC. See <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/oecdmethodologyforcalculatingimputedmultilateraloda.htm>.

** Data for 2018 was not available at the time of writing. The evaluation team estimated that disbursements would be similar to those in 2017.

Training for Peace programme provided pre-deployment training for police officers and civilians working with the African Union Mission in Somalia. Through its capacity facility, Norway³³ also funded the deployment of civilian experts with the African Union Mission in Somalia.

The evaluation team estimates that total Norwegian support to Somalia in 2012–2018, across all funding channels, amounted to NOK 3.2–3.3 billion.

Figure 4 Support to Norwegian NGOs in Somalia, 2012–2018



33 Operated by the Norwegian Refugee Council.

The main channel for Norwegian aid to Somalia during this period was Norwegian NGOs, which received about 50% of the total Norwegian funds. They included the five biggest Norwegian NGOs: the Norwegian Refugee Council (who received NOK 332 million from Norway in 2012–2018),³⁴ Norwegian Church Aid (NOK 192 million), NorCross (NOK 197 million, of which NOK 80 million was passed on to the International Committee of the Red Cross), Save the Children Norway (NOK 110 million) and Norwegian People's Aid (NOK 77 million). Additionally, a few small or medium-sized NGOs received Norwegian support. These include the YME Foundation (NOK 80 million), the Adventist Development and Reconstruction Agency (NOK 58 million), the Oslo Centre (NOK 44 million), the Development Fund (NOK 31 million) and Digni (NOK 27 million).

The Nordic International Support Foundation emerged as a new channel for Norwegian funding, receiving some NOK 185 million during the period evaluated. Some bigger NGOs – especially the Norwegian Refugee Council and Nordic International Support Foundation –

³⁴ This excludes NOK 24.6 million designated for activities by the Norwegian Capacity recruitment facility – a programme managed by the Norwegian Refugee Council on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

also received significant funding from other donors for their Somalia programmes.

Norway also provided funding to international NGOs, such as the National Democratic Institute, Conflict Dynamics International, the Danish Refugee Council, Concern Worldwide and Interpeace (less than NOK 20 million each during the period). Of the total Norwegian aid, 8% was channelled through the public sector in Norway and other donor countries, the former mostly relating to financial management and Oil for Development projects.

Some 33% of Norwegian aid was channelled through multilateral organisations, including the World Bank and various UN agencies and programmes.³⁵ This funding was dominated by contributions to the World Bank's Multi-Partner Fund (NOK 377 million) and the UN's Multi-Partner Trust Fund (NOK 187 million).

³⁵ Specifically, the UN Development Programme, the UN Support Office in Somalia, the Food and Agricultural Organization, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the World Food Programme, UN Women, the International Organization for Migration and the Somalia Humanitarian Fund/UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

Programmes implemented by other bilateral donors also received Norwegian funding, mainly three programmes managed by the UK Department for International Development: the Somaliland Development Fund in 2013 and 2015 (NOK 30 million), the Somalia Stability Fund (NOK 142 million since 2012) and the Department for International Development Programme Against Female Genital Mutilation (NOK 20 million since 2017).

Direct financial transfers from Norway to Somali authorities and government institutions were limited, mainly confined to 2013 and 2014 through the Norwegian-initiated Special Financing Facility (NOK 102 million including management funding). Since 2015, the Special Financing Facility has been incorporated into the World Bank's Multi-Partner Fund.

Norway's emergency and disaster prevention and preparedness support to Somalia for 2012–2018, totalling NOK 752 million, is presented in Table 3. This humanitarian support was channelled through NGOs and multilateral agencies, notably the UN. Norwegian and other donor support for humanitarian interventions has recently started to be recorded by the Federal Government of Somalia Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, although



the figures recorded by donors and the federal government differ.³⁶

Norway supported a number of NGOs delivering humanitarian assistance in Somalia, including Save the Children, NorCross, Adventist Development and Relief Agency Norway and Norwegian Church Aid. In assessing Norway's humanitarian assistance, the evaluation paid

particular attention to Norwegian Refugee Council, NorCross and the Somalia Humanitarian Fund, a UN pooled country fund for Somalia.

Outside the aid budget – and beyond the scope of this evaluation – were the sizeable remittances from the Somali diaspora in Norway to relatives in Somalia.³⁷ The exact volume of these remittances remains unclear.

Based on currency transfers, Norwegian authorities reported that individuals in Norway transferred more than NOK 500 million to recipients in Somalia in 2017 and around NOK 360 million in 2016.³⁸

Table 3 Norwegian humanitarian funding to Somalia, in NOK (millions)

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Multilaterals	31,870	23,500	2,000	4,000	15,000	67,600	44,000	187,970
Norwegian NGOs	40,131	64,146	115,476	78,475	46,745	118,900	76,096	539,969
International and local non-governmental organisations	4,412	5,000	10,000	5,000	–	–	–	24,412
Total								752,351

36 These differences are due to different ways of classifying aid, e.g. when donors categorise funds as humanitarian but some elements, e.g. education and health, are classified as development by MoPIC, Aid Coordination Unit, Office of Prime Minister Federal Republic of Somalia, 2017 & 2018.

37 In 2019 about 28,640 immigrants from Somalia lived in Norway. About 14,000 others were born in Norway to immigrant parents from Somalia. Data from Statistics Norway. See: <https://www.ssb.no/innvbef>.

38 See: <https://www.faktisk.no/faktasjekker/QQA/i-lopet-av-forste-halvar-2018-sendte-privatpersoner-over-95-millioner-kroner-til-djibouti>



3.2 Effectiveness

Q.1.2 To what degree has Norwegian engagement contributed to achieving Norway's priorities and objectives?

In three sub-sections, this chapter outlines the effectiveness of Norway's 2012–2018 support in Somalia, and how far it aligned with Norwegian strategies, followed by an overview of the effectiveness of Norwegian support to NGOs and global funds operating in Somalia. Finally, it examines the effectiveness of Norway's humanitarian support in the country.

3.2.1 EFFECTIVENESS OF STATEBUILDING AND STABILISATION

Statebuilding

Statebuilding became a core objective of Norway's interventions in Somalia during the evaluation period.³⁹ As the former Norwegian special envoy to Somalia stated, *'If we are not supporting the*

39 Norwegian staff showed an understanding of statebuilding in interviews for the evaluation, largely aligned with INCAF's 2011 definition: *'an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations'* OECD 2011b, p.20.

Federal Government of Somalia and providing all our support through the federal government, nothing else matters'.⁴⁰ Overall, Norwegian-supported statebuilding was effective in enabling Somalia's federal government to operate financial services and also at the local level through local governance support. Statebuilding was less effective at the federal member state level, due to a combination of capacity constraints and the limited effectiveness of interventions.

Norway focused strongly on the financial aspects of statebuilding in Somalia. Establishing well-functioning institutions and improved governance was a core feature of both Norwegian strategies and in implementation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the special envoy and the embassy. The evaluation found that Norway provided critical support to the financial capacity of Somalia's federal government in its early years from 2012 onwards, primarily via the Special Financing Facility. This effectively helped the federal government to perform basic financial functions, such as paying salaries, and paved the way for the World Bank's engagement with the government.⁴¹ Norway's

40 Statement by former special envoy to Somalia Jens Mjaugedal in an interview with the evaluation team on 13 January 2020.

41 The World Bank were able to engage with the federal government earlier

effectiveness in this area is attributed to its willingness to take the first step, laying the ground for others.

Other donors interviewed during the evaluation and some Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff viewed the Special Financing Facility as a major risk, believing that it was implemented 'too early'. At the time, according to interviewees, Somalia had not managed donors' funds through its own systems for 24 years – except for Somaliland and Puntland. As Somalia was the country with the highest perceived corruption in the world,⁴² the Special Financing Facility's fiduciary risk was considerable. When the facility launched, there were no transfer agreements between Somalia and international banks, nor electronic systems to pay federal government staff or facilitate government implementation of activities.

The Norwegian-supported Special Financing Facility was in many ways effective in kick-starting the

than anticipated as a consequence of the Special Financing Facility capacity development work according to interviewees from the World Bank and the Norwegian MFA. Interviewees explained that the World Bank had long-term plans to engage, but required basic financial operations in place. Norway enabled this through the Special Financing Facility.

42 Transparency International, 2019. Available at: <https://www.transparency.org/cpi2019>

federal government's financial operations. The facility established international transfers to the Central Bank of Somalia and enabled electronic transfers of salaries to federal government staff. With the facility's support, some core federal government financial functions became operational shortly after the government was established. The Special Financing Facility was designed with input from the World Bank, which confirmed that the facility paved the way for the subsequent World Bank Multi-Partner Fund in Somalia. The facility enabled the World Bank to engage with the federal government and provide more rapid capacity assistance. Several donor, government and partner interviewees explained that Norway took the first fiduciary risks in engaging with the federal government, allowing others to follow. The Special Financing Facility is thus an example of Norwegian risk appetite contributing to an effective engagement.

Norway continued its support to Somalia's federal government by funding the World Bank Multi-Partner Fund, the largest single recipient of Norwegian assistance to Somalia during the period evaluated (see Annex 4). The evaluation assessed this fund as having performed well, implementing 90% of its planned outputs, including increased tax revenue for the federal

government and the regular payment of salaries.⁴³ Government and donor interviewees, and Norad's own technical assessments,⁴⁴ confirmed that the World Bank operations significantly increased the federal government's financial management capacity, allowing for the approval of Somalia's pre-arrears clearance of USD 80 million, and potentially Highly-Indebted Poor Countries debt relief. This debt relief was also made possible by Norway's willingness to provide a bridging loan to the World Bank for Somalia. Debt relief would allow for Somalia to access considerably more aid in the future.⁴⁵

Statebuilding in Somalia in 2012–2018 went beyond the federal government, also entailing the federal states and local-level authorities. Norway sought to support these institutions through the World Bank Multi-Partner Fund, which was originally designed to provide capacity development to the federal states in balanced manner. The fund provided elements of federal state support,

43 See World Bank Multi-Partner Fund, 2019, Norad, 2018d and interviews with donor and Somali federal government representatives.

44 Norad, 2018d.

45 International Monetary Fund, 2020. Available at: <https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/SOM/key-questions-on-somalia>. See also: <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalia-reestablish-financial-relations-world-bank-group-after-thirty-years>

but the World Bank has struggled to provide capacity development at the federal state level due to limited capacity. A 2019 review of the Multi-Partner Fund found that it could do more to ensure political alignment between the Federal Government of Somalia and its member states.⁴⁶

Norway supported other federal member state activities and infrastructure development through the Somalia Stability Fund and the Special Financing Fund-Local Development (the World Bank's follow-up to the Special Financing Facility infrastructure component). This local development fund implemented only three of 13 planned projects in Norway's 2013–2015 implementation period and seven more during the World Bank period since 2016. Norwegian funds to the Nordic International Support Foundation and the joint Somalia Stability Fund programme also provided project support to federal member states.

At the local level, Norway's main vehicle for statebuilding in Somalia was its long-term support to the Joint Programme for Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery. A recent evaluation

46 World Bank, 2019.

Statebuilding in Somalia in 2012–2018 went beyond the federal government, also entailing the federal states and local-level authorities.

of this programme,⁴⁷ and interviews conducted for the evaluation covered in this report, assessed the programme as successful in establishing accountable local governance in Somaliland and Puntland (see also Annex 4).

However, there are indications that ensuring the legitimacy of Somalia's federal government through funding to its member states was not achieved. A 2017 survey conducted by the Somalia Stability Fund, found that citizens felt that Somalia's federal government was not visible at district level. This finding runs counter to Norway's objective of support to federal member states being designed to enhance the legitimacy of the federal government among the people of Somalia.

The legitimacy of the federal member states was also challenged by the lack of public dialogue and democratic processes during their formation.⁴⁸ Formalising the federal member state process requires amending Somalia's provisional constitution. Norway supported the constitutional review project managed by the UN Development Programme, initially as the

47 The Joint Programme for Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery, 2019.

48 HIPS, 2019 and interviews with resource staff.

sole donor. This process remains unfinished, and constitutional elements pertaining to power and resource sharing remain disputed.⁴⁹

National reconciliation, democracy and human rights

Although national reconciliation in Somalia was a stated priority in its 2012 country strategy, Norway was not directly engaged in interventions specifically focusing on national reconciliation until 2019. Norwegian support provided through the Somalia Stability Fund and other bilateral NGO projects did incorporate some reconciliation efforts, but none focused explicitly on national level reconciliation. Norway is a lead donor in a national reconciliation programme that launched in late 2019 and will therefore provide direct support to this issue.

Democratic practices supported by Norway had a mixed track record in Somalia in 2012–2018. The most significant result in this area was the broader female representation in the elections (see Section 3.2.5 on gender). Facilitating a more pluralistic and representative society was not a major component of Norwegian support, as evidenced by Norway's project

49 See, among others, HIPS, 2019 and HIPS, 2020.



portfolio (see Annex 3). Somalia as a whole has not managed to improve political pluralism through a more diverse political leadership.

Human rights in Somalia remain challenged by al-Shabaab and other militant groups. They are also compromised by some federal member state and federal government representatives being involved in human rights abuses and curtailing freedom of speech.⁵⁰ Norway initiated support to the UN human rights project and also provided some support in this area through Norwegian NGOs, but human rights was not a priority in all Norwegian engagements in 2012–2018. Norway did not mainstream human rights when prioritising supported projects and programmes (see Section 3.2.5 on gender and vulnerability, information on the dilemmas of working with Somalia's government in the Dilemma 1 part of Section 3.3 and in Annex 4).

Stabilisation

Facilitating stabilisation in Somalia, understood as supporting former al-Shabaab areas through small-scale infrastructure projects and local reconciliation

⁵⁰ See, among others, US Department of State, 2020, and 2018 country reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia HRW, 2020.

processes, was a prominent feature of Norway's strategies and project support.⁵¹ Norway contributed to stabilising such areas in 2012–2018. Stabilisation results are evident at the output level but the evaluation team was unable to document outcome level results, and stabilisation remains challenged in large parts of Somalia.

Norway expected its support for infrastructure projects and services in newly liberated areas to help progress towards greater political stability and government legitimacy. This support began in 2012, via the Nordic International Support Foundation, by installing solar streetlights in Mogadishu. It continued with a major bilateral programme in 2016, with a strong focus on creating jobs for youths, women and marginalised groups that included funding a technical and vocational training centre in Mogadishu. In addition, Norway was a major contributor to a pooled donor fund that aimed to promote stabilisation – the Department for International Development-led Somalia Stability Fund.

⁵¹ Stabilisation is a broadly contested word, for a full overview of the use of the terms see: Tana, 2019. In this evaluation report, stabilisation concerns projects and programmes specifically referred to as stabilisation by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the embassy, as outlined in the 2016–2018 Somalia strategy referring to support to newly liberated areas.

In 2014 the embassy in Nairobi commissioned an external review of most Nordic International Support Foundation's activities supported by Norway.⁵² The review was highly positive, concluding that this work was relevant to both government and direct beneficiaries. It concluded that some support to Somalia's federal government was instrumental in enabling its institutions to function efficiently and effectively. Constructing the solar streetlights had several positive effects, according to this review: the number of businesses increased, shops stayed open longer, transport was increasingly available, and security improved. The evaluation was unable to verify whether these quick-impact electrification projects increased the visibility of, and trust in, governing authorities – a key assumption in the programme theory underlying stabilisation support. Furthermore, the review noted that the maintenance and sustainability of the solar electricity projects were challenging.

Several conclusions can be drawn from that review, and also this evaluation team's interviews and observations. Firstly, the Nordic International Support Foundation was

⁵² The evaluation covered three main Norwegian grants and was implemented by Transtec. See: Transtec 2015, SOM-2051 SOM 14/0020 Nordic International Support Foundation. Revised Evaluation Report (unpublished).



highly regarded in Somali and Norwegian government circles and among donor agencies, who considered its work highly relevant to stabilisation efforts in Somalia. Secondly, the foundation has a strong record of implementing projects under difficult conditions. Reports and the evaluation team's observations from Mogadishu and Baidoa also indicate that the organisation delivered its planned activities and outputs.⁵³

The main challenge is assuming a link between successfully implementing the stabilisation projects and achieving political stability. The evaluation was unable to identify robust evidence to prove this assumption. That is not unique to this project – the same applies to most stabilisation projects in Somalia and elsewhere. Available data from the Nordic International Support Foundation indicates the challenges involved in improving the legitimacy of the government and its institutions at the local,

53 In 2016–2019 the Nordic International Support Foundation installed a hybrid solar electricity grid system for a public hospital and 545 solar streetlights on key roads and at stadia in eight districts. About six kilometres of roads were repaired in two towns. These projects targeted women and vulnerable groups. Some 500 labourers were engaged in these infrastructure initiatives, receiving training and daily wages.

regional or federal level.⁵⁴ The foundation takes a long-term, incremental approach to stabilisation, working with authorities and institutional support and using security, economic opportunities and social cohesion indicators to measure progress (see details in Annex 4).⁵⁵

In terms of stability at an outcome level, the results of Norwegian support in Somalia were mixed. On the one hand, al-Shabaab now controls fewer urban areas than in 2012, having withdrawn from Mogadishu in 2011 and Kismayo in 2013. On the other hand, the number of casualties increased from 3,334 in 2012 to 5,934 in 2017.⁵⁶ Conflicts involving clan militia

54 See also the third-party monitoring reports of the Nordic International Support Found (NIS) stabilisation project, particularly Forcier Consulting, 2017, NIS-BLIS Quarterly RTE Report No 1, April–June (unpublished) and Forcier Consulting, 2018, Mogadishu Stadium Rehabilitation, Baseline Evaluation, Oct–Nov (unpublished).

55 An external evaluation on the NIS programme was concluded in December 2019. The evaluation was only presented to the team conducting the Somalia evaluation after the evaluation was completed. The evaluation of the NIS programme has therefore not informed this evaluation. 2019, Axiom Monitoring & Evaluation. External Impact Evaluation of the Bilateral Labour-Intensive Stabilization (BLIS) Programme in Somalia. The evaluation was commissioned by NIS.

56 ACLED, 2016 and ACLED, 2018.

increased during the period,⁵⁷ with a rise in non-al-Shabaab fatalities involving such militia, indicating an increase in the level of conflict.⁵⁸ Furthermore, conflict incidents occurred in more areas of Somalia in 2017 than in 2012.

However, there are patches of enhanced stability in areas of Somalia bordering Kenya and Ethiopia, as well as in the north of the country, with high levels of long-term stability in Somaliland (except in Sool and Sanaag)⁵⁹ and an increase in the number of resolved conflicts across Somalia. One way of measuring stability is through the Federal Government of Somalia fragility index,⁶⁰ which combines indicators relating to security, local governance, social cohesion and community recovery. The index does not take into consideration security incidents, or actions by al-Shabaab or other militant groups. It only covers 24 of Somalia's 90 districts and is therefore not a representative sample, but it does offer a different perspective. According to this index, as of 2019 two of

57 ACLED, 2017a.

58 ACLED, 2017b.

59 Ibid. and BBC, 2015.

60 Federal Government of Somalia, 2019.



these 24 districts are stable, 11 are becoming more so, 10 are vulnerable and one is fragile.

There are reports of an increase in peace mediation cases and conflicts being reconciled locally, some of which were supported by Norway.⁶¹ However, most drivers of conflict remain in place in Somalia – notably clan differences, disputes over land and other resources, and tensions between some federal member states and the government.⁶² (For an overall assessment of key development indicators in Somalia, see Annex 6.)

The significant funds Norway allocated to improving stabilisation through statebuilding has evidently contributed to enhancing some government capacity. Norwegian stabilisation support was effective at the outcome level in terms of statebuilding. Its interventions that more directly targeted stabilisation, such as support to the Nordic International Support Foundation, Serendi and Somalia Stability Fund, produced multiple results at the output level. However, evidence for long-term outcomes cannot be documented.

61 Cf. Somalia Stability Fund reporting.

62 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 2019b.

3.2.2 EFFECTIVENESS IN OTHER AREAS

Norway supported multiple thematic and sub-thematic areas in Somalia in 2012–2018. The evaluation found mixed results in these areas. Its support to education stands out as a positive result, having delivered access to education across Somalia through different implementing partners. Similarly, Norway provided support in Somalia through civil society, though developing the capacity of Somali civil society was limited to a few initiatives.

Norway's support to countering violent extremism stands out as innovative yet risky. However, the evaluation found that this counter-terrorism support was not sufficiently adapted to the Somali context and only become effective when Norway was no longer in control. Finally, Norway has paid attention to the Somali diaspora in Norway by funding diaspora initiatives. However, funds were limited and the diaspora's role in influencing strategic policies and priorities is not evident. Instead, individual people of Norwegian and Somali nationality engaged in dialogue with Norwegian representatives in their role as representatives of Somali government institutions or as implementing partners.

The Norwegian support to stabilisation through statebuilding has contributed to enhancing some government capacity.



Countering violent extremism

Countering violent extremism⁶³ and interventions to rehabilitate and reintegrate former al-Shabaab combatants were important objectives of Norway's engagement in Somalia. Norway's most significant direct intervention in this area was funding the Serendi camp in Mogadishu from 2011–2015. This project aimed to rehabilitate former al-Shabaab fighters by providing them with secure accommodation, training, education and healthcare, before securely returning them to their home communities. The project was considered unique at the time in offering former combatants a safe and secure way back to a meaningful life.

The Serendi project is an example of an innovative Norwegian-initiated and -funded project. Support to Serendi was initially funded through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and its Section on Peace and Reconciliation to a Danish security consultant for a pilot project in 2011, which led to a series of short-term (annual) grants ending in 2014. Bridging funds were provided in 2015 by the MFA and managed by

the embassy until the Department for International Development (DFID) took over and was the lead donor from April 2015.

The project had strong ownership by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), in particular the Ministry of the Interior and the National Intelligence and Security Agency. When MFA ended its funding at the end of 2014, the President of Somalia appealed directly to Norway's Foreign Minister for bridging funds to ensure that the project would not collapse before the new lead donor (DFID) was ready to take over.

During the project period, Serendi reported having received about 1,000 former al-Shabaab combatants, with most, by their own accounts, being successfully repatriated into their communities. In 2014, however, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict strongly criticised Serendi, accusing the centre and the National Intelligence and Security Agency of little transparency. Many former combatants were children, and many had been at the centre for months or years without any possibility of challenging the decision to put them there. This was followed by reports from international human rights organisations claiming that maltreatment and abuse was taking place. These accusations

also revealed insufficient and poor management, including the weak reporting of results. Reports and interviews conducted by the team also revealed that the project suffered from poor reputation among key Somali stakeholders and that the Serendi model was insufficiently adapted to the Somali context.

The new lead donor from April 2015 put new management in place. Subsequent reports indicate strong improvement. While certain challenges remain, between 2015 and 2018 Serendi was gradually converted into a functional centre in terms of its conditions and services offered (see the case study of Serendi in Annex 4).

The Serendi example reveals the need for careful design and monitoring, and management support. The evaluation found that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not provide sufficient management support to this project and failed to act on suggestions for change (see Annex 4). A main lesson is that Norway responded to an emerging need for rehabilitating former combatants, when other were more reluctant, but that this project should have been better adapted to the Somali context.

Education

Norway provided significant financial support to

⁶³ This may also be classified under stabilisation, but is included as a specific sub-objective as it falls under a different sub-heading in the 2016 Norwegian strategy for Somalia.



education in Somalia, even though only technical and vocational education was prioritised in its country strategies. Education support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad was justified by referring to Norway's global aid priorities. Education disbursements were mainly through unmarked allocations to global mechanisms (UN Children's Fund Education Fund and the Global Partnership for Education) and earmarked contributions to Norwegian NGOs, in particular the Norwegian Refugee Council, Adventist Development and Relief Agency, Norwegian Church Aid, YME Foundation, Nordic International Support Foundation and Save the Children Norway. Most of these NGOs delivered primary education and teacher training, and supported education infrastructure and policy. Other organisations focused on technical and vocational training or providing alternative basic education, targeting refugees and internally displaced persons.

A 2017 desk review of Norwegian educational support to Somalia in 2008–2017 concluded that interventions aligned well with Somali federal government and federal state priorities.⁶⁴ The evaluation covered in this report found that Norwegian support had increased access to quality education for children, including girls and

internally displaced persons and in newly liberated areas of Somalia. These initiatives delivered increased access to safe, child-friendly learning environments by supporting the building and rehabilitation of school facilities, although the standards developed by the Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies were not systematically applied. However, they were not wholly successful in recruiting and retaining the targeted numbers of girls or teachers in education, or in facilitating child-friendly teaching methodologies to the extent planned.

Technical and vocational education and training was specifically prioritised in Norway's country strategies. Norway supported a number of initiatives, including projects implemented by Norwegian NGOs throughout Somalia. These were justified because they created jobs for youths and contributed to economic growth and/or stabilisation. Through the Nordic International Support Foundation, the embassy has since 2016 funded a vocational training centre in Mogadishu that has benefitted about 150 youths, with the first group of graduates completing their training in 2019. Some of the students received training in installing and maintaining solar power systems. In 2018, a solar excellence centre was established within this centre. In 2012 the embassy also provided funding through

the YME Foundation to construct a vocational training centre in Galkayo, which is now funded by Norad through Adventist Development and Relief Agency (subcontracting to the YME Foundation). Norad also supported technical and vocational education and training projects through Adventist Development and Relief Agency and Norwegian Church Aid.

The evaluation did not assess the effectiveness of these technical and vocational education and training projects but noted that they appear rather scattered, with no formal coordination between them. This educational sub-sector suffers from weak or non-existent direction from the federal government, and poor donor coordination. The embassy informed the evaluation team that it had encouraged Nordic International Support Foundation to explore the possibility of facilitating government and donor coordination in this sector but this failed to materialise.

Civil society support

Civil society support in Somalia was not a priority area in Norway's country strategies. Much of its funding for this support came from the global civil society grant managed by Norad. This includes ongoing funding to NorCross, Save the Children, Norwegian Church Aid and the Development Fund, and past support delivered

⁶⁴ See: Norad Evaluation Department, 2017.



Disbursements from the civil society grant to Norwegian NGOs are not formally based on Norway's country strategies or country contexts but rather on the quality of the project application.

through NGOs such as Norwegian People's Aid. Disbursements from the civil society grant to Norwegian NGOs are not formally based on Norway's country strategies or country contexts but rather on the quality of the project application.

Norway's use of Norwegian NGOs for civil society support has been especially high in fragile countries like Somalia. Much of this funding is managed by the embassy (e.g. support to Nordic International Support Foundation, the Oslo Centre and a few international NGOs in the past) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (for humanitarian aid). This funding does not have a particular focus on civil society strengthening and is more concerned with service delivery.

Norwegian Church Aid was the largest recipient of support for Somali civil society during the period under review, receiving NOK 192 million from Norway's aid budget. It implemented programmes and projects relating to multiple sectors, with civil society support as a cross-cutting issue throughout.⁶⁵ As of mid 2020,

⁶⁵ These include water and sanitation, female genital mutilation, gender-based violence and protecting women and vulnerable children, rural development/livelihoods, education/training and capacity-building support to district councils and reconciliation projects.

its main activities are in Gedo in southern Somalia and Puntland, but it also has projects in Mogadishu/Lower Shabelle. It has worked with nine local partners 2012–2018 and is putting effort into building their capacity, with a focus on financial management. Norwegian Church Aid representatives informed the evaluation team that four partners are now able to provide audited accounts – the others are 'accompanying partners' for whom Norwegian Church Aid does this.

The Development Fund implemented several programmes in Somaliland and (from 2017–2018) in Puntland to strengthen food security and build resilience to drought by increasing agricultural production and improving water harvesting. It has worked with four local partner NGOs 2017–2018 in Somaliland and one in Puntland. A 2017 review concluded that the Somaliland programmes' performance was mixed but that there is strong overall effectiveness across Development Fund programmes in Somalia, including the civil society support component.⁶⁶ NGOs involved in these programmes had considerable influence both in Somali civil society and within the federal government. The review found they

⁶⁶ See Development Fund, 2017.



were well equipped and well placed to contribute to widely participatory policy development, contributing significantly to developing and strengthening local cooperatives and community-based organisations.

Most Norwegian NGOs work with local partners, which are often service providers that are critically dependent on the NGOs for both funding and professional guidance. Efforts to support organisational development have mainly focused on strengthening financial management capacity. Norcross's support to the Somalia Red Crescent Society – the oldest partnership between Norwegian and Somali civil society organisations – is a good illustration. For the past decade, this organisational support has focused on strengthening a financial management unit via salaries, equipment and training. Somalia Red Crescent Society's head office technical capacity has improved, but this does not always translate into increased fundraising abilities or improved financial management at lower organisational levels.⁶⁷

Overall, the evaluation did not have sufficient data

⁶⁷ The recent organisational review of NorCross, which includes a Somalia case study, contains more on this. See: O'Regan 2019 and the presentation of NorCross in Annex 4.

to draw firm conclusions about Norwegian NGOs' contributions to strengthening civil society. Most NGOs work with local partners, and most pay attention to strengthening them a few can operate on their own. The main results appear to be in their specialist sectors and in their ability to provide services to beneficiaries.

Somali diaspora

The role of the Somali diaspora – numbering more than 40,000 in 2020 – has been important in various ways. Firstly, and most visibly, is the large number of Somali politicians and development actors with roots in Norway, or even with Norwegian citizenship. This includes Somalia's current Prime Minister, the former Parliament Speaker and the Nordic International Support Foundation's Country Director for Somalia. Secondly, remittances from the diaspora have expanded significantly and may now exceed the total official Norwegian aid to the country (see Annex 3). The diaspora is involved in providing development support and humanitarian relief in Somalia. However, diaspora members are not neutral or technical providers of support. Their role is multifaceted, engaging with communities, clans and local politics in Somalia in different ways.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ See also Kleist, 2018.

The Somali diaspora has also been important to Norwegian engagement in Somalia, and its role is highlighted in Norway's 2012 and 2016 country strategies. Norway thought that diaspora members' knowledge of, and insights into, Somalia may give them an important role in rebuilding the country. It considered working with this community to be an important way to limit and prevent support for al-Shabaab and radical Islam. Furthermore, Norway was keen to facilitate the return of Somali migrants to Somalia. Its focus on the diaspora led to several Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiatives to engage in dialogue with diaspora members and organisations.

Some Norwegian development aid was channelled through NGOs emerging from the diaspora or those with close links to them. However, this was limited, with several projects coming to an end in the latter half of the evaluation period – partly linked to the decision to lessen aid management burdens by reducing the number of contracts. Some bigger Norwegian NGOs also attempted to work closely with the diaspora, most notably the Development Fund's projects in rural Somaliland.⁶⁹ Another example is the YME Foundation, a small NGO that received funding from the embassy

⁶⁹ Development Fund, 2017, especially Chapter 3 on the diaspora.



in 2012 to construct a vocational training centre in Galkayo. For several years, Norway-based Somalis covered this centre's running costs.

According to some interviewees in Somalia and Kenya, Somali-Norwegians in prominent positions in Somalia may have facilitated Norway's close access to, and relationships with, key Somali politicians and stakeholders. However, the evaluation did not find any solid evidence to confirm this. The role of the diaspora in Norway in influencing and shaping strategic policies and priorities is not evident. While it has been suggested that the diaspora was important in decisions leading up to the launch of the Special Financing Facility, the evaluation did not find evidence to support this.⁷⁰

3.2.3 HUMANITARIAN EFFECTIVENESS

The evaluation found that Norway's humanitarian engagement in Somalia aligned well with the goals of its 2008 Humanitarian Policy and 2018 Humanitarian Strategy. Norway contributed to saving lives and alleviating suffering by responding to changes in humanitarian needs, as evidenced by its response

⁷⁰ See also Horst et al, 2017, which suggests a stronger diaspora role than does this evaluation.

to the droughts of 2011–2012 and 2017. Norway's swift response enabled its partners to move between emergency and recovery activities with agility, allowing them to respond to evolving needs. However, like other donors, Norway struggled to adhere closely to humanitarian principles due to the complexities posed by the operating context in Somalia.

The evaluation found that Norway's effectiveness in humanitarian assistance was strengthened by its decision to work through well-established and experienced partners on the ground. By providing support to its partners, Norway adhered to its Grand Bargain commitments. But local actors maintained that Norway and other donors could do more to work more directly with local partners, indicating that the localisation agenda promoted by the Grand Bargain needs further attention. Such an approach would require monitoring and management resources that will stretch the limited human resources at the embassy in Nairobi.

Assistance in line with humanitarian principles

The first objective of Norway's 2008 Humanitarian Policy is to 'ensure that people in need are given the necessary protection and assistance'. According to the implementing partners, the Norwegian embassy

and Ministry of Foreign Affairs are quick to respond to requests for assistance, and Norway has been a donor that can be relied upon to fulfil its humanitarian funding pledges in a timely fashion and to go above and beyond its initial pledged funds when the need arises.⁷¹ With regard to funding channels for achieving this objective, Norway's humanitarian support is primarily through the United Nations and NGOs, and as articulated in the 2008 humanitarian policy, '*financing these organisations is one of the ways in which Norway can reach out to individual people, in terms of both response and prevention*'.⁷²

Norway's second objective under this policy was to 'fund humanitarian efforts on the basis of the international principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence'. According to its implementing partners, Norway was a strong proponent of providing humanitarian assistance in line with these humanitarian principles in Somalia in 2012–2018. Somalia is a challenging environment for both humanitarian and development actors. The clan-based nature of many aspects of Somali life challenges

⁷¹ The crises of 2011 and 2017 were indicated as being illustrative of this, where Norway provided additional funds to support response efforts.

⁷² (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008)



the principles of impartiality and neutrality. Limited access⁷³ to remote locations that host a large number of people in need of assistance, primarily due to the constant threat of al-Shabaab attacks, constrains organisations. Limited access can be viewed from two perspectives:

- External limitations, due to factors like insecurity, interference by vested interests or non-state actors or even by infrastructure limitations
- Organisations' self-imposed limitations, e.g. those brought about by donor interests in terms of focusing on specific geographic areas, counter-terrorism legislation or measures to counter violent extremism.⁷⁴

Related to delivering assistance in the context of counter-terrorism legislation and measures to counter violent extremism, respondents stated that Norway was one of the least restrictive donors due to the unearmarked

⁷³ Hammond, 2012.

⁷⁴ Counter-terrorism legislation to which all OECD-DAC donors subscribe lays out stringent restrictions and penalties in relation to any aid ending up supporting terror groups. This is a challenge in Somalia, where many of the most vulnerable people live in areas controlled by al-Shabaab, which levies taxes for operating in, and sometimes even travelling through, those areas.

nature of its humanitarian funding. This flexibility enabled its partners to engage in a broad range of sectors and regions in Somalia. Interviewees also stated that the embassy was open to listening to and supporting organisations seeking a way to adhere to counter-terrorism legislation without compromising their ability to reach people in al-Shabaab-controlled areas. This enabled the implementing partners to fulfil their mandate of providing assistance impartially and with humanity. The evaluation's desk review and interviews also showed that Norwegian-supported organisations strove to adopt and demonstrate their impartiality and neutrality to counter the challenge posed by Somalia's clan-based nature.

Norway's Guidance Note on Humanitarian Principles⁷⁵ recognises that adhering to humanitarian principles is not always possible in some contexts. Although the note did not have a significant influence on Norwegian-supported NGOs' operational practices, it did not conflict with them.

The Somali Red Crescent Society and NorCross operate largely outside the UN cluster system, especially because many research participants perceived that the UN is

⁷⁵ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019.

Norway's swift response enabled its partners to move between emergency and recovery activities with agility, allowing them to respond to evolving need.



deeply engaged in Somali politics. As such, the Somalia Humanitarian Fund had access to remote areas, including those administered by al-Shabaab.⁷⁶ Despite this, its staff still faced access challenges⁷⁷ similar to those of other humanitarian actors, although perhaps to a lesser degree. A 2019 evaluation of the Somalia Humanitarian Fund found some, albeit weak, evidence of the use of humanitarian principles in its activities.⁷⁸ This was confirmed by interviewees who indicated that there was scope for increasing awareness among partners about what humanitarian principles mean in practice. The interviews did not provide any evidence that Norway specifically engaged on issues of principled humanitarian assistance during the period under review.

Humanitarian access

Norwegian Refugee Council was the largest NGO recipient of Norwegian humanitarian funding in Somalia, receiving NOK 332 million over the evaluation period.⁷⁹ Respondents perceived the organisation to

⁷⁶ Verhoeff, 2016.

⁷⁷ Norwegian Red Cross, 2018.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ This excludes NOK 24.6 million for activities conducted by the Norwegian Capacity recruitment facility – a programme managed by the Refugee Council on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

enjoy significant reach in Somalia, including in hard-to-reach areas. A 2018 evaluation⁸⁰ found that, in emergencies, funds from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency) enable Norwegian Refugee Council to be among the first organisations to deliver assistance in hard-to-reach places. Its ability to deliver quickly was confirmed by interviewees, who stated that its extensive grassroots network among both local authorities and communities is a key factor in this. In emergencies, both Norwegian Refugee Council and NorCross representatives mentioned that they did not have to seek approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to access Norwegian humanitarian funding, unlike with other donors.⁸¹ They stated that this means NGOs can reduce their response time and are more able to reach people affected by crisis rapidly.

Partnerships with local partners are key to reaching people in need in less-accessible areas. According to interviewees, Norwegian Refugee Council's humanitarian responsiveness was especially enhanced by its partnerships with local Somali agencies that

⁸⁰ Daniels, 2018.

⁸¹ Justification for such expenditure is expected in reporting to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

could access remote areas. One evaluation found that, while Norwegian Refugee Council was perceived as being able to negotiate access to hard-to-reach areas, it could improve its reach by further enhancing its local partnerships.⁸² This was confirmed by interviews for the evaluation covered in this report, in which interviewees expressed concerns that Norwegian Refugee Council and other agencies in Somalia were located in relatively safe zones, creating a 'pull factor' for people who need assistance. On the other hand, interviewees recognised that the agency had a more extensive reach than many NGOs. As discussed in the section on dilemmas (Dilemma 3), engaging with local organisations can be both a boon and a challenge. A boon in terms of enabling agencies to gain access to hard to reach or insecure areas, but a constraint due to challenges around their degree of neutrality, transparency and accountability.

Norway ceased supporting the Somalia Humanitarian Fund in 2013, following the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group report that detailed how far humanitarian aid was unlawfully diverted in Somalia. Norway resumed funding in 2017 when the fund demonstrated its new and extensive risk management

⁸² Daniels, 2018.



mechanisms as a result of that report (see Annex 4). Since 2017, Norway has consistently been in the top five donors to the fund, with allocations in 2012–2018 totalling NOK 128 million.⁸³ Through its partners, this fund can reach people in need in inaccessible and insecure areas of Somalia. Some 46%⁸⁴ of its funds are channelled through local Somali organisations that tend to have better access to these areas than international NGOs. However, all agencies, including the Somalia Humanitarian Fund, struggle to access some areas of Somalia, especially due to counter-terrorism legislation and measures to counter violent extremism that constrain access to al-Shabaab-controlled areas. How far Norway engaged in dialogue around access in 2012–2018 is unclear, but it is a member of an informal humanitarian donor group that works on enhancing access through the Access Working Group.⁸⁵

Representatives from the Somalia Humanitarian Fund, Norwegian Refugee Council and NorCross all mentioned the embassy's keen interest in both their activities and bilateral dialogue with them. They lauded the openness

83 Financial Tracking Service (FTS), n.d. Converted into NOK 29 May 2020.

84 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 2019c.

85 UN OCHA, 2019c.

of, and their access to, embassy staff, and believed this enhanced Norway's responsiveness in times of need. An interviewee from the Somalia Humanitarian Fund gave an example of embassy staff visiting Baidoa in 2017, which resulted in the fund receiving additional Ministry of Foreign Affairs funds to support its response to that year's drought.

Localisation

The third objective of Norway's 2008 Humanitarian Policy concerns '*equipping the international community to meet future global humanitarian challenges*'. The policy states that Norway recognises the particular role that the UN and country-pooled funds can play in ensuring a coordinated and effective humanitarian response. The evaluation found that Norway was a keen supporter of humanitarian reform efforts, including greater use of local partnerships, evidenced most recently through its support for, and endorsement of, the Grand Bargain.⁸⁶

A 2017 briefing report⁸⁷ showed that, despite the Grand Bargain, most donors in Somalia, including

86 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018.

87 Network for Empowered Aid Response (NEAR), 2017.

Norway, still could not fund local NGOs directly. Reasons cited for this include the lack of capacity of many local NGOs, and oversight challenges when donors cannot directly ascertain organisations' activities on the ground; their level of neutrality and accountability at organisational level as well as to the targeted aid recipients on the ground. Capacity-building for local and national NGOs has been a priority for Norway.⁸⁸ As indicated in the 2013 annual report on its Humanitarian Policy, Norway actively worked with the Somalia Humanitarian Fund⁸⁹ on '*enabling local and national organisations to receive... funding, by helping to strengthen the organisations' administrative systems*'. The evaluation found that, for Norway and other donors, this fund provides an avenue to increase partnerships with local Somali organisations. The fund channelled 39% of its funds through local organisations by 2017, and 46% in 2018,90 far surpassing the 25% benchmark set by the Grand Bargain. Interviewees stated that capacity-building conducted by the fund focused primarily

88 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008.

89 The Somalia Humanitarian Fund was previously known as the Somalia Common Humanitarian Fund. It was renamed in 2016, as part of standardising UN OCHA-managed pooled funds.

90 UN OCHA, 2019c.

Respondents mentioned that flexible funding allowed NGOs to experiment with what works, which is important in a complex crisis. Lessons from such experimentation can then be used to scale up successful approaches.

on ensuring local organisations' compliance and accountability rather than developing their capacity.

Resilience

In terms of objective four of Norway's 2008 Humanitarian Policy, *'preventing and responding to humanitarian crises and initiating reconstruction in their wake'*, some of Norway's 2018 Humanitarian Strategy goals relate to education and rehabilitating schools and health clinics. All three humanitarian assistance agencies supported by Norway in Somalia (NorCross, the Norwegian Refugee Council and the Somalia Humanitarian Fund) provided assistance relating to these areas. NorCross was most notable in health provision, with extensive coverage across Somalia thanks to its local partner. The Norwegian Refugee Council stands out in the field of education in emergencies. The Somalia Humanitarian Fund, through its large cohort of partners, engaged in all of these areas.

Among the evaluation case studies, Norway's support to the Norwegian Refugee Council provides the best evidence of a keen focus on resilience.⁹¹ The NGO has

⁹¹ Resilience is the ability of communities to manage and recover from major shocks or stresses without significant weakening of their prospects for long-term development.

a strong background in providing resilience support in Somalia, notably through the Building Resilient Communities in Somalia programme.⁹² It is also an implementing partner of the Somalia Humanitarian and Resilience Programme. Both organisations are funded by the UK but, crucially, Norwegian funding to Norwegian Refugee Council is unearmarked. According to respondents, although Norway did not fund these programmes directly, the flexibility of its funding allowed it to contribute, especially when opportunities to synergise or link activities arose. Respondents also mentioned that flexible funding allowed NGOs to experiment with what works, which is important in a complex crisis. Lessons from such experimentation can then be used to scale up successful approaches.

⁹² Since 2013, the Norwegian Refugee Council has been the lead organisation in a consortium of five INGOs delivering Building Resilient Communities in Somalia Programme, a large resilience programme operating in 22 districts in southern and central Somalia. This programme works along the spectrum of humanitarian and development areas, combining short-term humanitarian support with longer-term development-oriented interventions to build communities' capacities to deal with shocks.



3.2.4 UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

Q.1.3 Has Norway's engagement likely had any unintended consequences, either positive or negative?

The evaluation found that Norway communicated poorly about its engagement in Somalia. This has led to a number of misinterpretations by donors, implementing partners and their Somali counterparts about Norway's objectives and actions in the country. The evaluation found that several of these misconceptions risk undermining Norway's impact in Somalia.

Norway's close relationship with the Federal Government of Somalia, combined with the fact that the Prime Minister of Somalia is also a Norwegian citizen, gave multiple interviewees in the international community⁹³ the impression that Norway had a very close relationship with federal government leaders. This has led some partners to perceive Norway as not being a neutral partner and consider limiting the information they share with the country, which is a concern. Interviews and assessments of media reports show that Norway's strong emphasis on backing

⁹³ Resource staff, donors and implementing partners interviewed for the evaluation.

the federal government, combined with donors' and partners' poor understanding of Norway's support to Somalia, provided a breeding ground for rumours.⁹⁴

The evaluation found that the security classification of Norway's strategy for Somalia did not improve the perception of its opaque approach.

The evaluation found that Norway's non-transparent approach to its engagement in Somalia influenced many Somalis' perceptions of the country. Since 2018, Norway has supported Somalia through the Oil for Development programme, aiming to enhance the effectiveness and transparency of oil management. This support is provided bilaterally with limited information on the Norad website and limited knowledge among Somalis and partners about its nature. Land- and sea-based oil extraction could significantly increase revenue for Somalia, while exacerbating existing disagreements on resource allocation between the federal government and its member states. Therefore, foreign nations' interest in Somali oil attracts significant attention. Several interviewees in Somalia and Nairobi stated that, as Norway is an oil-producing country, and with Norwegian companies reportedly engaged in oil

⁹⁴ Several interviewed resource staff, government representatives and donors had limited knowledge of Norway's specific funding to Somalia.

exploration in Somalia,⁹⁵ Norway is seen as having a commercial interest in Somali oil.

Norway has also supported Somalia in demarcating its maritime boundaries, which may have an impact on the ownership of oil reserves discovered in the future.⁹⁶ In this process, Norway was perceived as siding with Somalia in a border dispute with Kenya, which has negatively affected Kenyans' views of Norway.⁹⁷ Limited knowledge about Norway's engagement in the Somali oil sector means that many Somalis see Norway's role in the sector as being for commercial reasons rather than development assistance. This is evidenced by the significant number of social media reports on Norway and oil in Somalia.⁹⁸ This is in stark contrast to Norway's

⁹⁵ See: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_801.pdf and <https://www.reuters.com/article/somalia-oil/somalia-accuses-norwegian-oil-explorer-dno-of-destabilising-country-idUSL5N0R44HV20140903>

⁹⁶ See: Norad, 2012.

⁹⁷ See, among others: <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Norway-in-Kenya-Somali-maritime-row-/1056-5161214-e1m9h8z/index.html>

⁹⁸ Searching for the combined keywords 'Norway', 'oil' and 'Somalia' yielded multiple media reports that confirm this, ranging from reputable media such as the Daily Nation in Kenya to Twitter, as well as multiple Somali social media sources that are widely used in Somalia. Examples include: <https://allafrica.com/stories/201904300464.html>, <https://qz.com/africa/1743984/us-uk-france-norway-pick-sides-in-kenya-somalia-maritime-row/> and <https://www.>



own claims of being perceived as a neutral partner in Somalia, as described in its 2012 country strategy.

The evaluation found no evidence of the concerns raised by its partners and the Somali media related to Norway's engagement in Somalia. But evidence on misconceptions does point to Norway's need to enhance transparency around its engagement in Somalia and proactively challenge misconceptions as they arise. The evaluation tried to assess the potential effect of such misperceptions on Norway's impact in Somalia. Trust issues mean that some information does not reach Norway, which likely has a negative effect on Norway's engagement. On a more positive note, according to respondents, none of the misperceptions seem to have affected the work of the implementing partners Norway supports.

reactorreview.com/?p=7112. The evaluation team found that these examples are not properly researched articles but they reflect the sentiments aired in discussions with selected Somali partners and international interviewees. The issue is further challenged by the role of specific Norwegian companies in oil exploration in Somalia. See: <https://www.reuters.com/article/somalia-oil/somalia-accuses-norwegian-oil-explorer-dno-of-destabilising-country-idUSL5NOR44HV20140903> and the UN 2015 UN Monitoring Group report to the Security Council, available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_801.pdf. The issue is likely to stem from the 2013 UN Monitoring Group Experts' claims regarding Norway's commercial interests in Somalia: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-un-norway-idUSBRE96M13120130723>

A third, less political, unintended consequence of Norway's approach to engaging in Somalia was Norway's reduced visibility as its support became increasingly multilateral in the 2016–2018 strategy period. Its support to bilateral initiatives, such as the Special Financing Facility, Nordic International Support Foundation and Serendi, gave Norway a high profile in Somalia. Somali government officials explained that regular interaction and dialogue with Norway at different levels of government improved their working relationships with Norway. Shifting Special Financing Facility funds to the Multi-Partner Fund and increasingly engaging via the UN's Multi-Partner Trust Fund meant that interviewees from the federal government engage less with Norway now than before.⁹⁹ While interviewees stated that Norway remained very engaged with Somalia's Prime Minister and President, its engagement with lower levels of government has lessened.

⁹⁹ In humanitarian circles, respondents noted that Norway's visibility in Somalia was minimal, with most respondents referring to the Norwegian Refugee Council or Nordic International Support Foundation when prompted about Norwegian engagement in humanitarian dialogue forums, including in many high-level sessions. Some respondents acknowledged that the embassy has minimal staff and that this explains their absence from many meetings in Somalia. This is also a consequence of the fact that humanitarian funding is managed from Oslo.

For Norway, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and embassy interviewees, the move towards a more multilateral approach was a way of ensuring that Norwegian funds were aligned with the priorities of the Somali federal government and the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility. They also stated that Norway relied on the multilateral framework for conflict sensitivity, monitoring and evaluation in Somalia's challenging operational environment. Evidently, the enhanced multilateralisation of aid comes at the cost of diminished Norwegian visibility.

3.2.5 WOMEN, MEN AND VULNERABLE GROUPS

Q.1.4 Have men, women and vulnerable groups been affected differently by Norway's engagement?

Norway cited women as target beneficiaries in dialogue with its implementing partners and emphasised support for combatting female genital mutilation in Somalia. However, its attention on women, peace and security in Somalia (in line with UN Resolution 1325) was not significant in 2012–2018. With the humanitarian funding, Norway supported internally displaced persons and championed the need to target people living with disabilities. However, support for groups who are marginalised on the basis



of their ethnicity or clan received little attention from Norway or its implementing partners.

Women

In 2014 the Norwegian Government launched its Strategy for Intensifying International Efforts for the Elimination of Female Genital Mutilation for 2014–2017. Somalia was selected as a priority implementation country, with an estimated NOK 71 million allocated towards this in 2014–2018. Most of these funds were channelled through the UK Department for International Development and Norwegian Church Aid (in cooperation with Save the Children). The Department for International Development programme prioritised addressing social norms, and mobilising community leaders and members to tackle female genital mutilation. Its central plank was challenging and changing gender norms, and increasing women's social and economic empowerment. The Norwegian Church Aid/Save the Children programme had a narrower scope, focused on preventing female genital mutilation, and early and child marriage.

In 2018, Norad undertook a review of Norway's Strategy for Intensifying International Efforts for the Elimination of Female Genital Mutilation for 2014–2017 based on experiences in Ethiopia and Somalia. This review assessed how far the strategy was realised,

its results, and how far its implementation channels and partners helped to achieve its objectives.¹⁰⁰ The review found that chosen channels and partners all reflected the strategy and showed promising results. The organisations used approaches that were in line with a holistic, integrated and multi-sectoral approach, which is now established as 'best practice'.¹⁰¹

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and embassy funding and policy dialogue to increase gender equality and women's empowerment, including the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 focus on women, peace and security, was not significant in 2012–2018. Interviews show that ministry and embassy staff recognised that Norway paid relatively limited attention to gender equality in Somalia. Some interviewees were concerned about potential conflict drivers around promoting the role of women in the Somali context. However, Norway's

¹⁰⁰ See Norad, 2018g.

¹⁰¹ None of the multilateral organisations tracking progress, such as the World Bank or the UNFPA, have statistics for these areas. However, there are plenty of indications of the seriousness of the challenges. As the UN Development Programme wrote, '*Somalia has extremely high maternal mortality, rape, female genital mutilation and child marriage rates, and violence against women and girls is common, though statistics are difficult to find*'. See: United Nations Development Programme, n.d., p.2 and, among others: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/07/20/most-girls-in-somalia-experience-genital-mutilation-the-ritual-just-killed-a-10-year-old/>

There is hardly any mention of gender in the main statebuilding interventions supported by Norway, which were a cornerstone of its strategy for Somalia.



partners in Somalia recognised that gender equality was on Norway's agenda in 2012–2018. Interviews with partners show that Norway did raise gender equality in dialogue processes – nearly all of Norway's implementing partners mentioned this.

Gender was only mainstreamed to a limited extent in most of the interventions assessed for the evaluation. For example, there is hardly any mention of gender in the main statebuilding interventions supported by Norway, which were a cornerstone of its strategy for Somalia. Of the 10 sample interventions, two did not include gender and vulnerability in their design or implementation, five incorporated these issues to some extent, and only two included them more comprehensively.

Other vulnerable groups

Norway paid specific attention to people living with disabilities and displaced persons in Somalia, primarily through its humanitarian funds. According to interviewees from Somali federal government, donors and civil society organisations, Norway was a strong champion of, and advocate for, people living with disabilities. Norway played a key role in advocating for improved legislation around disabilities and including people living with disabilities in Somalia's constitutional

review process. Interviewees pointed to Norway raising the issue of people living with disabilities in relevant fora and in dialogues with several implementing partners. Some Norway-supported interventions had specific activities that reached out to people living with disabilities, such as the constitutional review project. The Somalia Humanitarian Fund, with assistance from NorCross, has supported people living with disabilities since 1981. In 2011–2015 the fund supported 43,312 people with disabilities, an average of 8,600 people annually.¹⁰²

With support from Norway, the Somalia Humanitarian Fund, Norwegian Refugee Council and NorCross all targeted displaced people in Somalia during the period under review. The Norwegian Refugee Council provided emergency and resilience assistance to internally displaced persons and refugee returnees. It also provided assistance related to shelter security and tenure, a significant problem for internally displaced persons who were exposed to multiple arbitrary evictions and limited financial and social resources (see Annex 4). The Somalia Humanitarian Fund worked with local organisations that were better able to access vulnerable people in their home areas. These three

¹⁰² Verhoeff, 2016.

organisations took the approach that it is important not only to reach the most vulnerable people, who also tend to have less ability to migrate to safer areas of Somalia, but also to reduce people's need to move to cities. Rural-urban migration was mentioned by several respondents as a particular challenge, as rising cases of displacement increase both pressures on host communities and competition for already meagre basic services,¹⁰³ often leading to resource-based conflict.

None of the Norwegian-supported interventions assessed in the evaluation paid specific attention to including groups marginalised because of their ethnicity or clan. While Norway remains committed to supporting vulnerable groups, there is limited evidence of it specifically engaging in improving the lives of marginalised groups in Somalia, such as Bantus or those from minority clans, even though many internally displaced people come from such groups. Norway is not alone in its neglect; many other donors also fall short in this regard.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ Webersik et al., 2018.

¹⁰⁴ See e.g. Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 2019.



To varying degrees, Somalia's clan system excludes women and men who do not belong to one of the country's four major clans or whose ethnic group is a local minority. This exclusion may prevent citizens from accessing resources formally (such as via land registration and financing) or informally (such as through unfair treatment by the informal justice system).¹⁰⁵ These inequalities can trigger the use of violence as a way of changing the status quo. For example, al-Shabaab attracted a large number of young male Bantus, an ethnic group that represents 10–25% of the population in Somalia.¹⁰⁶ (For further details on gender and vulnerability, see the assessment matrix in Annex 5.)

3.3 Coherence

Norway's 2012–2018 engagement in Somalia aligned with the Federal Government of Somalia's plans and priorities and contributed to developing joint coordination mechanisms in the country. However, these mechanisms have not been effective in

¹⁰⁵ See, among others: International Institute for Environment and Development and Tana, 2020, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 2019, Tana, 2018 and Accord, 2009.

¹⁰⁶ See: Accord, 2009 and Institute for Security Studies, 2014.

coordinating a fragmented donor community. Norwegian support for Somalia was managed by its embassy in Nairobi, different sections of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad without systematic coordination. Nevertheless, the evaluation found that Norway's different aid channels were complementary in their aid prioritisation and found no evidence of contradiction between different Norwegian aid policies.

During the period evaluated, Norway faced a number of dilemmas that required decisions, particularly in terms of its relationship with Somalia's federal government. Norway's 2012–2018 engagement in the country emphasised statebuilding, while recognising that the federal government remained in conflict with several of its member states. The evaluation found that Norway acted on these dilemmas but neither articulated the pros and cons of its decisions nor explicitly described their potential conflicts of interest.

Q.2.1 To what extent was the Norwegian engagement coordinated and aligned with the goals and objectives of Somali authorities, and the strategy of overall international engagement in Somalia?

The evaluation found that both Norwegian development and humanitarian support was aligned and coordinated

with Federal Government of Somalia priorities in 2012–2018. In most cases, it was also aligned with the priorities of federal member states.

Somali government priorities were formally outlined in the Somali Compact 2014–2016, the Somaliland Special Arrangement for the same period and the Somali National Development Plan 2017–2019. These plans were approved by the federal government and allowed donors to align to them bilaterally or through the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Framework. The funds that were channelled through the World Bank and UN funding windows in the Somali Development and Reconstruction Framework was fully coordinated and aligned with federal government priorities. Norwegian funding not channelled through the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Framework were still aligned with the priorities set out in the federal government plans.

In Somaliland, funding provided by Norway through the Somaliland Development Fund was aligned with the Somaliland Special Arrangement and general Somaliland priorities. Following the move to terminate funding to that fund, Norwegian funding was not by default aligned with the priorities of the Somaliland government.



During the period evaluated, Norway faced a number of dilemmas that required decisions, particularly in terms of its relationship with Somalia's federal government.

The Somalia Development and Reconstruction Framework was designed to be used by all international donors to enable their alignment and coordination. However, just 20% of OECD–DAC funding to Somalia was channelled through the Somali Development and Reconstruction Framework since its establishment.¹⁰⁷ Norway's funding through this fund from its launch in 2014 to 2018 was limited to an estimated one-third of Norwegian aid to Somalia.¹⁰⁸ According to donors and government interviewees, this low level of funding rendered the fund ineffective.

In addition to funding implementations in Somalia through the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Framework windows, Norway also provided funding through the Somalia Stability Fund, which was led by the Department for International Development. This joint funding mechanism and steering committee ensured international coordination of interventions in Somalia. Many of the funds under the Somalia Stability Fund umbrella were provided based on federal member

¹⁰⁷ The three Somalia Reconstruction and Development Framework windows are: the World Bank Multi-Partner Fund, the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund and the African Development Bank window.

¹⁰⁸ E.g. funding to the World Bank Multi-Partner Fund and the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund.

state priorities, ensuring their alignment with these priorities.

At the national level, humanitarian assistance in Somalia during the period under review was coordinated through Humanitarian Response Plans, which since 2017 have been guided by Somalia's 2017–2019 National Development Plan.^{109, 110} Interviews conducted by the evaluation team and a document review showed that the agencies supported by Norway aligned their activities to federal government priorities.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ UN-OCHA, 2019a.

¹¹⁰ In 2018, to support Somalia's efforts to break out of consistent cycles of drought, vulnerability and humanitarian crisis, the Federal Government of Somalia, with support from international partners, developed the Recovery and Resilience Framework under the National Development Plan to guide efforts towards early drought recovery and work towards longer-term resilience and disaster preparedness. See: Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development, 2018.

¹¹¹ NRC's Somalia country programme is underpinned by the National Development Plan, incorporates elements of the Recovery and Resilience Framework and takes account of Norwegian humanitarian policy. Evaluations have found that NRC's activities are well coordinated not only with other humanitarian agencies but also with local authorities and government agencies on the ground. Field interviews confirmed NRC's engagement in coordination efforts, and Somali government officials indicated that NRC staff, both in Mogadishu and in area offices, strive to engage with them at various project stages and align with their priorities. Somali Humanitarian Fund activities are guided by the Humanitarian Response Plan, which is aligned with



Respondents stated that Norway emphasised alignment with Somali country priorities in its dialogues. As indicated by some respondents from humanitarian agencies, one drawback of this interest in alignment was that Norway could be seen as pushing for the federal government to become more engaged in agencies' humanitarian activities. These interviewees felt that stronger humanitarian engagement by the federal government was still premature, especially in terms of transferring facilities. The table in Annex 5 provides a snapshot of how Norway's humanitarian policy in Somalia aligned with Somali national policies and priorities.

Q.2.2 To what extent has Norway contributed to coordinating international engagement and alignment with country development plans?

The evaluation found that Norway actively worked to improve aid coordination in Somalia in 2012–2018, but that this coordination remains flawed. In contrast, humanitarian aid coordination was ensured by supporting the established

the National Development Plan and the Recovery and Resilience Framework. NorCross activities are implemented in close coordination with the Ministry of Health at both the federal government and federal member state levels. In this way, Norwegian humanitarian assistance is well in line with Somali national priorities.

humanitarian aid coordination mechanisms for Somalia.

All interviewees perceived Norway as a leader and an advocate for coordination and multilateralism in Somalia. They also recognised Norway's lead role in developing and implementing the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility and funding windows, the formal mechanism for coordinating and aligning aid with the federal government. As highlighted in the previous section, this fund never became an effective coordination mechanism. Interviews illustrated that Norway is well aware of the facility's deficits and is currently leading a process to reform it.

As co-chair of the Somalia Donor Group in 2013 and in 2019, Norway also led policy dialogues and donor coordination in the country. Other donors recognised Norway's role in trying to lead coordination. However, many interviewees portrayed the donor community as fragmented, with limited joint direction and limited agreement on key issues, such as the appropriate level of engagement with the federal government.

The evaluation found that the challenge of uniting donors and enhancing their coordination has become greater with the increased presence of non-OECD-

DAC donors¹¹² in Somalia. These include Turkey,¹¹³ Qatar, China and the United Arab Emirates. None of these donors provides funding through the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility. While Turkey has occasionally been an observer at fund meetings, interviewees believed there has been no coordination between, and limited transparency around the funding from, these countries in Somalia. In revamping the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility system, Norway is, according to the embassy, working towards a fund that will enable the involvement of these new donors.

In terms of donor coordination around humanitarian assistance, in addition to supporting the Somalia Humanitarian Fund, Norway has funded the UN Central Emergency Response Fund since its launch in 2006. Norway's support to these two funds¹¹⁴ means that its humanitarian assistance to Somalia is subject to both funds' coordination mechanisms.

The international community has shifted towards

¹¹² Often referred to as 'non-traditional donors'.

¹¹³ An OECD member that reports to, but is not a member of, DAC.

¹¹⁴ At the global level, in 2014, Norway chaired the Pooled Funds Working Group with OCHA. See: (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014).



longer-term funding for humanitarian activities, especially in light of the enhanced focus on resilience and greater coherence across the triple nexus of humanitarian, development and peacebuilding interventions. As of July 2020, Norway has three-year framework agreements with Norwegian Refugee Council and NorCross covering the two humanitarian assistance interventions assessed in the evaluation.¹¹⁵ Respondents were adamant that the otherwise short timeframes of humanitarian funding constrained how far they could more strategically coordinate their efforts with development efforts, whose implementation cycles are typically longer. Multi-year funding would enhance the effectiveness of their resilience efforts and enable them to achieve better coherence in nexus-related activities supported by Norwegian funding.

Q.2.3 To what extent have Norway's humanitarian and long-term assistance been coordinated?

The evaluation found a lack of formalised coordination between the different Norwegian aid channels in Somalia. This may have weakened the overall effectiveness of Norwegian aid by limiting the sharing of lessons learned across channels. It also presented a

¹¹⁵ This is a new arrangement for NorCross. The Norwegian Refugee Council held it from 2017–2020.

potential risk of funding activities not being aligned with Norway's country strategies and/or of these strategies failing to take into account the global priorities that fund activities in Somalia. However, the evaluation did not find examples of Norwegian funding priorities contradicting its country strategy priorities. There is therefore evidence of policy coherence in Norway's support provided to Somalia.

Linking humanitarian and long-term assistance was a key feature of Norway's 2016 strategy for Somalia. The evaluation team learned from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the embassy that this will be further emphasised in the upcoming country strategy. It is also a key feature of the ministry's global strategy documents.

The evaluation found that, in practice, formalised coordination between Norwegian-supported humanitarian and long-term development assistance was limited during the period under review. Humanitarian assistance provided through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was based on Norway's overall humanitarian policy framework and global priorities. The embassy provided reports to the ministry's humanitarian section and provided feedback when required but, according to interviews and the document

review, there has never been a formalised mechanism to ensure coordination between humanitarian support and long-term assistance provided through these channels.

However, some humanitarian funding provided in Somalia was more long-term. Norwegian Refugee Council, as an example, also supported education programmes – rehabilitating schools, providing learning materials and paying teachers. Similarly, through the Somalia Humanitarian Fund, NorCross supported health facilities across Somalia, taking a more recovery- and development-oriented approach. NorCross received funds for implementations in Somalia from both Norad and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The flexibility of the ministry's humanitarian funding enabled NorCross to adapt quickly to an emergency stance when disasters hit. As such, although the Somalia Humanitarian Fund ran health facilities that can be considered as providing recovery- and development-oriented support, its ability to mobilise quickly in times of crisis enabled it to bridge the humanitarian–development divide with ease.

A significant portion of Norway's funding allocations to Somalia in 2012–2018 were not directly based on Norway's country strategy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs country focus, or embassy workplans and



priorities. Rather, they were based on Norwegian global aid priorities. This led to a number of Norwegian-funded interventions that may not be aligned to Norway's country strategy.

These disbursements mainly related to the civil society grant managed by Norad's civil society department, and core funding to multilateral agencies and global funds, a significant portion of which was allocated to projects in Somalia. Funding from the civil society grant was mainly based on applications from Norwegian NGOs. In the first half of the period under review, this was primarily linked to the goal of strengthening civil society. In the latter half, it was increasingly coupled with other global priorities, especially those related to health and education. A similar situation is evident in relation to multilateral organisations and global funds. The evaluation identified an increase in the use of these channels for a significant amount of humanitarian aid, health and education funding to Somalia.

Most Norwegian funding was well aligned with country priorities, for example the Norad grant to NorCross for supporting the Somalia Humanitarian Fund or female genital mutilation project support through Norwegian Church Aid and Save the Children Norway. However, this can lead to funding areas, such as education, that

are global priorities in Norwegian strategies but not priorities in the country strategy.

Despite Norway's lack of formal internal coordination of its aid, the evaluation team did not encounter significant discrepancies between its application of humanitarian and long-term assistance, nor in the different policies guiding the aid. For example, the support provided by Save the Children was, according to interviewees, aligned with and worked through Somalia's federal member state structures and thus supported Norway's emphasis on building the capacity of the state system.

The only case of potential divergence between different Norwegian funding channels was support to the Education Cannot Wait global funds. Some interviewees stated that this funding bypassed Somali state structures and thus undermined Norway's efforts to build the capacity of the Somali state. However, the evaluation team was unable to confirm this in interviews with other actors involved in the education sector.

The evaluation found evidence of coordination among Norwegian-funded NGOs. This included cooperation between Adventist Development and Relief Agency and the YME Foundation, and between

The evaluation found a lack of formalised coordination between the different Norwegian aid channels in Somalia.



Save the Children Norway and Norwegian Church Aid. However, respondents from Norwegian NGOs expressed a desire for greater collaboration, especially between humanitarian agencies and those working on stabilisation and development, to capitalise on emerging opportunities and synergies. The embassy in Nairobi facilitated twice-yearly meetings for Norwegian NGOs working in Somalia, three of which were held in Mogadishu. The sessions were appreciated, but respondents said that they could have been better used to further collaboration and more structured learning among agencies.

Q.2.4 What dilemmas has Norway faced in its engagement in Somalia?

Q.2.5 How has Norway assessed various options in different phases related to central dilemmas? (Which assessment had more weight?)

Q.2.6 To what extent was conflict-sensitivity and policy coherence for development important in Norwegian decision-making related to these dilemmas?

Norway faced three major dilemmas in its engagement in Somalia:

- How to support a federal government that was a vehicle for statebuilding but also a driver of conflict as it was not fully inclusive or representative
- How to support the autonomous region of Somaliland that had made more democratic progress than the rest of the country while promoting an inclusive federalisation process
- Providing humanitarian support when aid was sometimes diverted or misused for political and militant purposes.

Norway did not articulate any of these dilemmas explicitly in its strategies or internal documents. However, interviews with Ministry of Foreign Affairs and embassy staff explicitly outlined the dilemma around supporting the federal government and the trade-offs. Norway acted on all three dilemmas, showing an understanding of the need to prioritise funding.

As none of these dilemmas were covered in detail in Norwegian documentation, no conflict-sensitive analysis has been applied to any of them, even though all three include potential conflict drivers. The evaluation found there was policy coherence in Norway's response to these dilemmas. Its responses to the first two were

aligned with its country strategies and none of its responses to the dilemmas contradicted its strategies.

Dilemma 1: Supporting a new government that was not fully inclusive or representative

The context

The dilemma that Norway and other donors faced from 2012–2018 was whether (and how) to support state formation and statebuilding processes which were far from inclusive and democratic. In 2012, while most of Somaliland and Puntland enjoyed long-term stability and there were occasional pockets of stability in places such as Galmudug, most of south-central Somalia suffered from internal conflict, notably from the ongoing war with al-Shabaab. While there was a considerable democratic deficit in Somalia's political settlement and the operation of its federal government and member states in 2012–2018, there was no alternative to the federal government for most of the country (the whole area south of Puntland, see Figure 5 page 57).

Before 2012, neither Somalia's Transitional National Government or Transitional Federal Government had the necessary clan backing or international recognition to operate as a recognised state. The 2012 creation



of the Federal Government of Somalia was the first time since 1992 that the international community had an opportunity to work directly with a formalised government in the country.

While Somalia's federal government presented donors with a new opportunity for statebuilding, it remained unrepresentative, having been selected by 13,000 clan leaders, without broad recognition across the country.¹¹⁶ The government's level of inclusiveness remained limited, although it did provide Somalia's first parliament since the 1980s, chosen by a broader group than clan leaders alone. Somalia is a diverse society, where kin and clan have long played key roles in political processes and access to resources.¹¹⁷ For centuries, Somalia has been dominated by four major clans, each of which dominates a federal member state.¹¹⁸ The clan system is, and has been, both a cause of disputes and an avenue for settling them. Many of the country's (often fragile) political settlements have been based around the '4.5 formula', evenly distributing political influence among

116 See, among others: Sahan, 2015, p.12 and Menkhaus, 2017.

117 See, among others: Accord, 2009 and Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 2019.

118 See, among others: HIPS, 2019.

these clans, with additional (0.5) representation for minority clans and ethnic groups.

Clan dominance also drives marginalisation, as the ethnic Bantu group and minority clans are poorly represented across Somalia's federal leadership. Although the Bantu group comprises up to 25% of Somalia's population, it is disproportionately excluded from political structures.¹¹⁹ These groups are also generally discriminated against in access to land, services and security, making them vulnerable to recruitment by al-Shabaab.

Similarly, women's participation in politics has long been a challenge due to the patriarchal nature of Somali society. The 2017 elections had a 30% quota for female parliamentarians, achieving 23%. Still, claims of intimidation, and a selection process dominated by male and conservative clan elders, curtailed women's ability to compete on an equal footing. The politicisation of clan identity was perceived as one of the most significant barriers to women's political participation and leadership.¹²⁰

119 See, among others: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 2019, Tana, 2018, Accord, 2009 and World Bank, 2005.

120 East African Research Facility (EARF), 2017.

The 2017 federal government ballot was more representative than in 2012, using an electoral college system whereby 14,025 delegates elected the 275 members of the lower house. The 54 members of the upper house were nominated by the federal member states and endorsed by their parliaments. However, representation of marginalised groups, including Bantu people, remained minimal.

Most of the federal member states, which still await final constitutional endorsement, were established in just two years, through clan negotiations and some use of force.¹²¹ In 2019 and 2020, these states held elections, which were challenged by security and fighting between sub-clans, as well as interference from the federal government and presidency on behalf of allies in Mogadishu.¹²² In several cases the interference from the federal government led to direct confrontation between federal government forces and member state militia. Most significant was the still ongoing struggle with Jubbaland state.

121 See, among others: The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS), 2019.

122 Ibid.






Figure 5 Location of Puntland and Jubbaland

Norway's actions

The evaluation found that Norway chose to respond to this dilemma by providing its full support to the establishment and operations of Somalia's federal government, via financing and policy dialogue. Strong support for the federal government is not explicit in the documentation. However, interviews indicated an understanding among present and past leading Ministry of Foreign Affairs figures that the government must lead and operate effectively in order for stability and development to thrive in Somalia, irrespective of the occasional conflict triggering role of the federal government.

Among interviewed representatives from the donor community, the federal government and implementing partners, Norway was recognised as being among the government's strongest supporters.¹²³ This is demonstrated by its funding decisions, from establishing the Special Financing Facility and providing ongoing support to the government via the Multi-Partner Fund, several smaller bilateral projects and the Nordic International Support Foundation. Although most funds

¹²³ Several interviewees from donors, implementing partners and Somalia's federal government pointed to Norway being 'the' strongest federal government supporter among donors.

passing through the embassy targeted the federal government, some contributions to the World Bank Multi-Partner Fund and Nordic International Support Foundation also targeted federal member states. From a policy-dialogue perspective, several federal government staff, implementing partners and donors interviewed noted Norway's emphasis on working through the federal government when funding activities in Somalia.

This choice provided Norway with a platform for dialogue with the federal government that, according to interviewees, gave it greater access to government leaders than most other donors. As highlighted in Section 3.2, Norway's federal government-centred approach enabled it to support certain core government functions from an early stage. However, several interviewees from implementing partners, donors and resource people doubted Norway's objectivity in ongoing disputes between the federal government and its member states because of this approach. According to embassy staff and the special envoy, Norway countered this imbalance through its support to the federal member states, via NGOs such as Nordic International Support Foundation, through the Somalia Stability Fund and through regular visits by the special envoy.




Figure 6 Location of Somaliland

Several donors expressed the view that Norway could use its close relationship with the federal government to be more vocal in policy dialogues on human rights

in Somalia. One example given was that Norway did not take full advantage of being inclusion pen holder in the Somalia Partner Forum to focus on the need for the federal government to improve its human rights record.¹²⁴ While Norway may not have been very vocal on human rights, it did support some human rights initiatives through its development aid, as detailed earlier in this report.

The evaluation found no explicit reflection of conflict sensitivity and gender in documentation relating to Norwegian actions in response to this dilemma.

Dilemma 2: How to deal with the federal member state of Somaliland, which had declared independence, while supporting a ‘whole of Somalia’ statebuilding process

The context

As Somaliland sees itself as independent state, its government has not engaged in the Somali government federalisation process¹²⁵ and has objected to engaging

in any development activity that includes any federal government approval or endorsement. The dilemma for the international community, including Norway, was whether and how to support a de jure federal member state that has effectively fostered peace, stability and elements of democracy while also supporting a federalisation process for all of Somalia. This is compounded by the fact that the Somaliland Government and the Federal Government of Somalia have been unable to find an amicable solution to this challenge.

Somaliland was the most stable area of Somalia in 2012–2018. In colonial times, ‘British Somaliland’ was under British occupation, while the rest of what is now Somalia was under Italian occupation. Somaliland became an independent country in 1960 but soon after decided to join the state of Somalia. By opposing the increasingly authoritarian Siad Barre regime in the late 1980s, Somaliland was plunged into civil war with south-central Somalia, resulting in the bombing of Hargeisa and an estimated 50,000–90,000 casualties.¹²⁶

¹²⁴ In the Somalia Partnership Forum on 1–2 October 2019, Norway stated that human rights remain a challenge in Somalia but stopped short of asking Somalia’s federal government to engage more actively with this issue.

¹²⁵ Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 2019.

¹²⁶ McConell, 2010.

Following this dispute, initial internal skirmishes and clan negotiations, Somaliland established itself at the Boroma Conference in 1993. The new state had its own governance structure, with an elected parliament and an upper house (the Guurti). Although they were often delayed, its presidential and parliamentary elections were classified as relatively free and fair by international observers. While there have been authoritarian tendencies in all Somaliland presidents to date, and the judiciary and administrative systems favour the Isaaq majority clan, the region has remained stable and largely kept Islamic terrorists at bay. This stability has also enabled long-term development assistance, focusing on statebuilding and human rights.

Norway's actions

Interviews with staff involved in the decisions around Somaliland pointed to Norway's failed attempt to involve Somaliland in the federalisation process, given its stance on independence. Some interviews also pointed to other countries' bilateral agreements with Somaliland (including Ethiopia, Kenya and the Arab states) undermining the federalisation process that Norway was promoting. Others saw Norway withdraw from Somaliland as it prioritised relations with Somalia's federal government.

Norway's 2012 Somalia strategy specifically mentioned the need to support Somaliland. Subsequent documentation reviewed for the evaluation featured no explicit references to Norway's position on the Somaliland dilemma. Norway supported the democratisation process in Somaliland and provided other support to the region throughout the period evaluated. In 2017 Norway phased out its support to the Somaliland Development Fund, the primary vehicle for international funding through Somaliland government systems.¹²⁷ This reduction in engagement with the Somaliland government was also evident from embassy workplans, which prominently featured this topic until 2013, had less focus on it in 2014–2015 and barely mentioned it from 2016 onwards.¹²⁸ Since then, Norway has mainly provided support for Somaliland through Norwegian NGOs and humanitarian aid, and via the Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery. In short, Norway acted on this dilemma by reducing funding for Somaliland but did not articulate these actions in any documentation.

¹²⁷ The evaluation team was not able to triangulate evidence on why Norway decided to continue funding the Somaliland Development Fund.

¹²⁸ Embassy of Norway, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018

Norway faced three major dilemmas in its engagement in Somalia, but did not articulate any of these dilemmas explicitly in its strategies or internal documents.



The lack of explicit mentions of Norway's relation to, and engagement with, Somaliland in the documentation, mean there was no evidence of conflict sensitivity and gender in its actions around this dilemma.

Dilemma 3: Ensuring humanitarian support when there is a high risk of aid divergence

The context

The dilemmas of providing humanitarian assistance in Somalia include:

- The political economy of aid and the inadvertent role it plays in cementing and even legitimising predatory power structures
- Counter-terrorism laws and political measures to counter violent extremism, and their effect on the operational capabilities of humanitarian agencies

- Risk transfer, which has gained greater significance in humanitarian dialogue, particularly since the Grand Bargain commitment to localise aid.¹²⁹

In the 1970s Somalia hosted over 600,000 Ethiopian-Somali refugees displaced by border disputes between the two countries. During this Cold War period, the Somali government received high levels of aid from various countries. Since then, various Somali governments have relied on aid as a major revenue source, incorporating it into Somalia's political economy.¹³⁰ Studies have described aid's effect on conflict dynamics and how aid has propped up and even legitimised non-state armed actors in Somalia.¹³¹ Some argue that, in the 1990s, warlords used funding from international sources (including humanitarian organisations) to legitimise their standing and

¹²⁹ According to the OECD, risk transfer 'refers to situations where exposure to a particular type of risk is transferred from one party to another', e.g. when agencies limit their presence in insecure zones, and transfer implementation, management and monitoring responsibilities to partners. Risk-sharing, 'refers to the agreement of several actors to expose themselves to risk and to spread the burden of potential losses, for example in pooled funds'. See: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/2014-10-30%20Approaches%20to%20Risk%20FINAL.pdf>

¹³⁰ Hammond, 2014.

¹³¹ Sherine El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, 2017.

their claims to power.¹³² Studies indicate that the humanitarian sector has historically been the largest source of contracts for the private sector in Somalia,¹³³ preceded by food aid. Aid diversion and corruption were especially prevalent with food assistance in Somalia, as evidenced by the 2010 UN Monitoring Group Report.¹³⁴

With the introduction of cash programming by most humanitarian agencies, private sector actors involved in aid have diversified, but agencies remain dependent on a few powerful business actors for their supply of goods. Businesspeople who benefitted from the early days of food distribution in Somalia now constitute the country's wealthiest and most politically influential figures, who have cultivated ties with politicians.¹³⁵ Somalia's operating environment remains highly constrained for humanitarian agencies, who face significant access restrictions. Businesspeople, therefore, charge premium rates for providing humanitarian and other aid workers with services

¹³² Hammond et al., 2012.

¹³³ Jaspars, 2019.

¹³⁴ Bailey, 2010.

¹³⁵ Sherine El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, 2017.



including accommodation, transport and security.¹³⁶

Amid fears that al-Shabaab was benefiting from humanitarian assistance to Somalia, especially food aid, in 2009, the US Office of Foreign Assets Control suspended its humanitarian aid to Somalia.¹³⁷ These concerns deepened after 2010, when the UN Monitoring Group reported on the diversion of food aid, causing more donors to cancel or drastically reduce their humanitarian funding in the country. Research indicates that donors' zero-tolerance policies around funding militias and proscribed groups have had a significant negative effect in Somalia and were a contributing factor to the international community's slow response to the 2011 famine. Humanitarian agencies were constrained in their duty to deliver assistance with impartiality and neutrality.¹³⁸

Agencies cannot work directly in locations controlled by al-Shabaab, as that would require paying al-Shabaab taxes (see the following risk transfer section).¹³⁹

¹³⁶ Webersik et al., 2018.

¹³⁷ Muggah, 2013.

¹³⁸ Laura Hammond, 2012.

¹³⁹ Sherine El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, 2017.

However, most of Somalia's marginalised and vulnerable groups live in these areas. Agencies do not dare expose themselves to incurring criminal sanctions if they appear to have provided support to terrorist groups, breaking various domestic, regional and international laws. This fear undermines humanitarian operations and, for Norway and many other donors, contradicts their humanitarian policies of providing assistance to the most vulnerable.

Agencies cannot tolerate corruption or support al-Shabaab, as diverting aid in this way denies the most vulnerable people life-saving assistance. But agencies in Somalia have had to deploy increasingly time-consuming, and sometimes costly, mechanisms to screen contractors, partners and suppliers, leading to a proliferation of third-party monitoring activities.¹⁴⁰ This vetting tends to adversely affect smaller organisations that might lack the compliance capacity of larger ones, leading to 'donor herding', where a few organisations become funders' partners of choice and routinely win contracts.¹⁴¹

¹⁴⁰ Chaudhri, 2017.

¹⁴¹ Hamsik, 2019.

The 2016 World Humanitarian Summit culminated in the Grand Bargain, in which donors and partners committed to work more consistently with local organisations. While local Somali organisations have welcomed this, it has raised the issue of risk transfer. International NGOs are increasingly risk-averse,¹⁴² especially in relation to counter-terrorism legislation and measures to counter violent extremism – both of which are significant factors in Somalia.

To access vulnerable groups in hard-to-reach and insecure areas, NGOs increasingly sub-contract or partner with local NGOs who have greater access to those areas. To gain access to most of those areas, local organisations must establish or use existing networks, which might include costly access negotiations with al-Shabaab. This taxation was commonly acknowledged by interviewees. Al-Shabaab demands payment at roadblocks and checkpoints on major roads and also levies taxes on businesses.¹⁴³ But donor funds to local NGO partners do not take

¹⁴² For organisations, the cost of contravening existing counter-terrorism measures is high: they can potentially be blacklisted from receiving funding. In recent years, Somalia has been keen to engage with international efforts to enact counter-terrorism policy, which has made agencies operating in the country very cautious about how they engage.

¹⁴³ Sherine El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, 2017.



this taxation into account. Despite having greater access to hard-to-reach areas, local NGO staff still face security risks. This is rarely reflected in donor funding so local organisations bear the costs. Therefore, most risks relating to humanitarian access are devolved from donors to international NGOs and then local organisations, without commensurate funding to help local NGOs manage these risks^{144, 145}

International NGOs experience a similar risk-transfer challenge when dealing with donor agencies, who are perceived as transferring the risks of operating in Somalia to their NGO partners. Current discourse is around risk-sharing, both for local NGO–international NGO partnerships and between donors and their international NGO partners. Partnerships with local organisations also present other risks, such as selective capacity development that does not address local agencies' sustainability challenges. Capacity development is often linked to partnerships around specific interventions or budgets rather than at a more

144 Hamsik, 2019.

145 Costs relating to risks are implicitly assumed to be included in organisations' overhead costs. But high competition for funding means that local organisations cut costs where possible to remain competitive, compromising their ability to cover such risks.

strategic level with, for example, joint implementation design, planning and budgeting.

Norway's actions

Recognising the dilemmas that it encountered on the ground, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs produced guidance notes on applying humanitarian principles in conflict contexts. These notes also provided direction to partners regarding how the ministry viewed the myriad dilemmas that arise, how to deal with them, and the ministry's expectations on transparency and reporting around them.

Respondents said that Norway, through its embassy staff, engaged in regular bilateral dialogue with NGOs, including candid discussions on the challenges of principled humanitarian actions in Somalia. Norway is part of the informal humanitarian donor group that works with the Somalia Humanitarian Fund. Through this fund and the Access Working Group, donors engage in discussions together and with the Federal Government of Somalia about increased access. As yet, these efforts have not developed concrete ways to help agencies reach areas controlled by al-Shabaab.

To tackle the political economy challenge around providing aid to Somalia, agencies, such as the

Somalia Humanitarian Fund, Norwegian Refugee Council and NorCross, have instituted measures to mitigate against doing harm, but they have limited options. In applications and reports to its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway requires partners to clearly articulate the conflict sensitivity of their interventions, and their efforts to reach the most vulnerable people. The partners that Norway funds have proven strong institutional mechanisms to deal with these issues, as well as the capacity to conduct regular assessments and analyses to inform programming decisions.

Marginalisation changes with location, and higher-level political economy analyses are likely to overlook localised marginalisation and power structures. During interviews, partners expressed the view that, considering the fluid nature of the Somali context, Norway should require its partners to conduct area-based political economy analyses. These would improve understanding of the best entry points into communities and power structures, and enable them to identify marginalised people more effectively.



Norway did not systematically analyse how conflict was affected by, or affected, its overall engagement in Somalia.

NGOs have set up an advocacy working group in Norway to work with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on risk transfer and risk-sharing.¹⁴⁶ Digni¹⁴⁷ led the process in requesting dialogue and producing an advocacy letter addressed to the ministry concerning the delivery of both humanitarian and development aid.¹⁴⁸ Dialogue on this issue has continued since September 2019. According to respondents, the intention is that Norway will institute measures to improve risk-sharing, then act as an advocate with other donors to find workable solutions to the problem of risk transfer.

3.4 Conflict Sensitivity

Norway did not systematically analyse how conflict was affected by, or affected, its overall engagement in Somalia. The conflict was discussed internally and with partners, but the impact of Norway's approach in Somalia was not put on paper. Some of Norway's strategic programmes, such as the Special Financing

¹⁴⁶ Initiated by Digni after Norway published its new zero-tolerance policy for financial irregularities in 2019. See: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/about_mfa/zero_tolerance/id2623676/#kap2

¹⁴⁷ An umbrella organisation for 20 Norwegian mission societies and churches engaged in long-term development cooperation.

¹⁴⁸ Digni, 2019.

Facility, were never subject to a conflict-sensitivity analysis. Norway relied on its partners and other donor agencies to provide analytical inputs. However, over time, most Norwegian-funded projects have begun to apply a conflict-sensitive approach.

Q.3.1 To what extent have conflict-sensitive measures been applied in Norway's engagement?

Q.3.2 To what extent has the Somali conflict or context affected Norway's engagement (and vice versa)?

The application of a conflict-sensitive approach required an up-to-date understanding of the conflict situation in Somalia. Most interviewees agreed this understanding existed among Norwegian staff but was never written down. With one exception in 2018,¹⁴⁹ Norway did not undertake its own conflict assessments. Instead, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and embassy staff relied on those made by partners. Most interviewees from the ministry and the embassy in particular stated that regular conflict assessments performed by the Norwegian-co-funded Somalia Stability Fund informed

¹⁴⁹ The NUPI report findings were not explicitly reflected in embassy workplans or half-yearly reports – see NUPI, 2018.



their work. Implementing partner interviewees also confirmed that Norway had a good understanding of the conflict and potential conflict. Conflict elements fed into programming via discussions at donor, Somalia Stability Fund and World Bank steering committee meetings, according to the embassy, and also with partners, such as the Somalia Humanitarian Fund and Norwegian Refugee Council.

Elements of the ongoing conflict were reflected in the embassy's half-yearly reports and in some workplans, as well as in its weekly political reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹⁵⁰ Conflict assessments were included in the risk assessments of several individual projects. This was reflected in documents, including decision documents, appraisals and reviews. However, Norwegian documents assessed for the evaluation included no major drivers of conflict in Somalia, such as land rights and differences between clans.¹⁵¹ Similarly, they did not include reflections on the conflict elements of Norway's core dilemmas in Somalia.

¹⁵⁰ Embassy of Norway in Kenya, 2012a, 2013a, 2014a, 2015a, 2016a and 2018a.

¹⁵¹ Despite the fact that these two areas are assessed to be the major drivers of conflict in Somalia. See, among others, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 2019.

Disputes between the Federal Government of Somalia and several of its member states (in particular Jubbaland and Puntland) around power and resources, as well as the dispute between the federal government and the Government of Somaliland, were (and remain) potential conflict triggers. Norway's actions around these two dilemmas could have potentially influenced the conflict pattern in Somalia. Interviews and country portfolio assessments showed that Norway was aware of these dilemmas, which was one of its reasons for supporting the federalisation process. However, the potential conflict implications of Norway's support to the federal government were never made explicit. Norway limited conflict analyses and their application in country portfolio design and programming to the risk sections of its documents.

The level of conflict awareness and conflict sensitivity among the 10 interventions sampled by the evaluation differed considerably, although most included an analysis of the conflict situation in the project's background analysis (see Annex 5). Some programmes, like the Norwegian Refugee Council, the Nordic International Support Foundation and the Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralized

Service Delivery,¹⁵² included strong reflections on conflict and the intervention's contribution to conflict mitigation. Other interventions, such as the Special Financing Facility, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization Fisheries project and the Constitutional Review Project, contained limited reflection on how the intervention influenced, and was influenced by, conflict in decision or programme documents.¹⁵³

The evaluation found that the dialogue on conflict sensitivity between Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff and implementing partners varied by intervention, and interviewees acknowledged this. According to ministry and embassy interviewees, Norway's strong reliance on the World Bank and the UN for implementation also helped to ensure that its engagements were conflict-sensitive, in line with the respective organisations'

¹⁵² For the Joint Programme for Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery this was particularly relevant for the second part of the period evaluated – see Annex 5.

¹⁵³ See Annex 6. In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs risk assessment for establishing the Special Financing Facility listed eight major risks. None related to the conflict potential of supporting the federal government or links to the federal member states – see Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013f.



guidelines.¹⁵⁴ But this was not always the case. For example, the evaluation found that the UN Development Programme's constitutional review project had neither a specific conflict-sensitivity framework nor any analysis of the project's consequences on the existing conflict. This is despite the fact that constitutional review would facilitate the drafting of federalisation power- and resource-allocation frameworks, which influence Somalia's major conflict fault lines. Similarly, the evaluation found that the Multi-Partner Fund did not fully integrate conflict sensitivity into its approach. Norad did point to the lack of conflict sensitivity in its 2014 appraisal of the fund.¹⁵⁵ The limited reflection on conflict sensitivity by the World Bank and the uneven distribution of the Multi-Partner Fund's support to different member states being a potential conflict trigger was noted again in a 2018 Norad assessment of the fund.¹⁵⁶

154 The World Bank and UN Development Programme do refer to conflict drivers in their country strategies and have tools for analysing and adapting to conflict, which they can apply in Somalia. See e.g.: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/214578-1111751313696/20480168/CPR+5+final+legal.pdf> and <https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/democratic-governance-and-peacebuilding/conflict-prevention-and-peacebuilding/conflict-analysis-and-risk-assessment/>

155 Norad, 2014b.

156 Norad, 2018d.

In summary, Norway was knowledgeable about the conflict in Somalia and supported projects that were increasingly conflict-sensitive. However, Norway neither formally documented the effects of its development approach on conflict in Somalia nor applied a systematic approach to conflict-sensitive programming.

Q.3.3 Has Norway supported specific conflict sensitivity initiatives promoting peace on a political, portfolio and project level?

Norway supported several conflict sensitivity initiatives in Somalia, such as peacebuilding and statebuilding projects that interviewees or documents identified as having contributed to peace and stability. Without specific analysis of the conflict potential of these projects, several of these also risked contributing to conflict.

Peace and national reconciliation were part of Norway's overall objectives in its engagement in Somalia, as expressed in its strategies. Norway's country portfolio did include different types of peacebuilding or conflict-sensitive elements.

The evaluation found that Norway, through its political and diplomatic work, directly supported conflict mitigation, peacebuilding and conflict mitigation. Its peacebuilding interventions included actions specifically related to the constitutional process, in which Norway, according to interviewees, played a key role in sorting out misunderstandings and enabling the different parties to cooperate.¹⁵⁷ Norwegian aid supported various forms of peacebuilding and reconciliation in Somalia's political and socio-economic sectors through multiple NGO and UN initiatives, the largest being its contribution to the joint Somalia Stability Fund programme. In principle, Norway has also committed to Somalia's national reconciliation since its 2012 country strategy. Norway eventually initiated support for this in 2019 with the national reconciliation project to which it is a leading donor.¹⁵⁸

Norway's support to peacebuilding and reconciliation in 2012–2018 included aid to African Union Mission in Somalia, which was supplemented by Norwegian diplomatic and political work. At the regional level,

157 The Ministry of Constitutional Affairs, the Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission, and the Parliamentary Oversight Committee.

158 According to Ministry of Foreign Affairs interviewees. The team did not have access to the documentation.



Norway has a long-term engagement with the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. Norway supported the latter's leadership and organisational structures, which have negotiated various peace agreements in Somalia since the first such agreement, which culminated in the 2000 Transitional National Government.¹⁵⁹ Other Norwegian-supported reconciliation efforts included peace agreements leading to establishing the Transitional Federal Government in 2004 and the 2008 Djibouti Agreement.¹⁶⁰ As recently as 2017, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development facilitated the peace agreement between Galmudug regional leadership and the armed group Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama.¹⁶¹

Donor support to the African Union Mission in Somalia made a positive contribution to peacebuilding. The various peace agreements it brokered paved the way for, and eventually culminated in, establishing the Federal Government of Somalia in 2012. The mission provided or enabled the space for political dialogue and

¹⁵⁹ Grosse-Kettler, 2004.

¹⁶⁰ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009.

¹⁶¹ IGAD, 2018.

reconciliation between Somali political elites, facilitating the establishment of regional administrations that later became the country's federal member states.

According to past research, reviews and evaluations, the peacebuilding efforts of both the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the African Union Mission in Somalia had both positive and negative effects. The former faced criticisms that pre-2012 reconciliation efforts, and to some extent later efforts,¹⁶² focused largely on Somalia's elite groups and alienated civilians.¹⁶³

Norway's statebuilding support in Somalia was also seen by Ministry of Foreign Affairs interviewees as a peacebuilding project, which enhanced stability by strengthening the federal government and its member states. However, the statebuilding project was fragile, as highlighted in the dilemma section. As tensions between the federal government and Somaliland, and between the federal government and Jubbaland, illustrate statebuilding is itself a potential conflict trigger.

¹⁶² SOSSENSA, 2018.

¹⁶³ Williams, 2018 and Grosse-Kettler, 2004.

3.5 Learning and Adaptability

Q.4.1 How far did contextual and conflict analyses influence Norway's chosen goals, priorities, channels, partners and interventions? What was the content and quality of these analyses?

As detailed in Section 3.4, Norway did not regularly produce or systematically apply contextual and conflict analyses. However, interviews with embassy and Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff indicated that contextual and conflict analysis did play a role in managing Norway's engagement in Somalia. Interviewees confirmed that Norway's approach aimed to enhance stability in Somalia by formalising the federalisation process. Interviewees also confirmed that they attended regular meetings at the embassy to discuss conflict and Norway's approach to it. Similarly, interviews with other donors and implementing partners confirmed that Norway had a good understanding of conflict in Somalia, even if not everyone agreed with Norway's response. As the evaluation team did not participate in these meetings or dialogues, it cannot assess the quality of Norwegian discussions around conflict or context analysis.



In terms of the quality of conflict analysis in the Norwegian documentation, the evaluation found that several reports included descriptions of progress and setbacks in the conflict but did not include major conflict drivers in their assessments. Specifically, none of the assessed reports contained reflections on land rights or clan-driven politics.

Q.4.2 To what extent has knowledge of results been used to inform decisions? How far have lessons learned, or contextual and conflict analyses from partners receiving funding from Norway, informed decisions about Norway's engagement?

The evaluation found that Norway neither summarised its portfolio results nor systematically tracked its overall portfolio performance in Somalia. Norway took steps to assess many individual interventions, but systematically applying results-based management remains to be institutionalised.

The evaluation found no tradition in either the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the embassy of summarising results or using the results from interventions in a combined way. In the first years of the period being evaluated till 2015, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs directly supported most of Norway's interventions in

Somalia, and there is no combined overview of results from these interventions. This remained the case after the embassy in Nairobi took over management responsibility. The embassy's half-yearly reports contained no explicit reflection on the performance of individual projects, and this did not appear in the rationale for new projects identified in embassy workplans. In addition, Norway's funding to Somalia in 2012–2018 has still not been subject to full country portfolio reviews or evaluations.

The evaluation found that individual interventions funded by Norway were subject to different levels of assessment. Some of the 10 sample interventions involved performance-based changes to projects. For example, Norway's support to the Nordic International Support Foundation included a strong emphasis on analysis, risk assessment and results management. This was most evident in 2015, when the embassy consolidated various contracts with the foundation were consolidated into a single contract. The embassy reported that it took much more time and energy than expected to address weaknesses and improve the foundation's capacity to resolve them. This included technical support from relevant sections and departments of Norad and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The evaluation found that the assessment of results and learning relating to Norway's engagement in Somalia did not feed into its portfolio programming in a systematic way.



The embassy relied on multilateral funds' reviews and appraisals to influence Norway's funding in the follow-up phases of some of the sample projects. For example, the embassy terminated its funding to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization Fisheries project due to poor performance. The embassy also commissioned Norad to conduct a final review of the 2016–2019 stabilisation projects, which mainly focused on results management and highlighted several reporting shortcomings.¹⁶⁴ The embassy commissioned a separate review of the stabilisation programme's education component.¹⁶⁵ It also commissioned a third-party monitoring review of Nordic International Support Foundation throughout the project period.¹⁶⁶

Norway did not appear to lack interest in individual project performance, but neither did it take a systematic approach to reporting on the overall performance of its portfolio. The evaluation found that a combined performance overview of the full portfolio should have included non-embassy-managed projects,

¹⁶⁴ See Norad, 2019a

¹⁶⁵ See NIS, 2019b

¹⁶⁶ This was carried out by the consultancy company Forcier, which provided regular reports on the implementation of the NIS programme.

including humanitarian funding and Norad civil society funding.

With respect to measuring the results achieved through humanitarian support, interviewees believed the Somalia Humanitarian Fund had a strong focus on outputs. This is understandable, as activities supported by the fund were largely short-term and did not lend themselves well to outcome monitoring.¹⁶⁷ The Norwegian Refugee Council had a more elaborate results-monitoring system, with reports indicating a strong focus on outcomes.

NorCross progress reports to Norad and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided information on both outputs and outcomes, although they focused more on output indicators. A recent organisational review found that NorCross had a greater focus on quality control in the services it provided and little on monitoring and evaluation. That review concluded that monitoring required greater attention, especially in building the Somalia Humanitarian Fund's monitoring capacity.¹⁶⁸ This gap is especially relevant in southern Somalia

¹⁶⁷ UN-OCHA, 2019a

¹⁶⁸ Norad, 2019b.

and Puntland, areas that NorCross staff cannot visit because of security concerns.¹⁶⁹ According to respondents, monitoring humanitarian support was not a significant focus area for the embassy in Nairobi, whose interest lay in ensuring that support was relevant and responsive. In contrast, both monitoring and reporting results were a key focus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo.

The evaluation's findings on learning and results-based management were consistent with those of the recent Norad evaluation department evaluation of Norwegian support to South Sudan¹⁷⁰ and the Norwegian Auditor General's report on Norwegian development support to the education sector. Overall, Norway could have done more to ensure reliable and relevant information on the results of its interventions in Somalia.¹⁷¹ In addition, a 2016 Norad evaluation department evaluation of the planning organisation and management of the Norwegian assistance related to the Syria regional crisis found a lack of a strategic frameworks, and limited learning and accountability,

¹⁶⁹ The security procedures for NorCross staff were revised after the abduction of an International Committee of the Red Cross staff member in Mogadishu in 2018.

¹⁷⁰ Norad evaluation department, 2020.

¹⁷¹ Office of the Auditor General of Norway, 2019.



Box 1: Monitoring in Somalia

Monitoring in Somalia was, and remains, challenged by limited access. Donor staff and government officials highlighted the lack of a permanent Norwegian presence in the country as an impediment to policy dialogue.

Several donors have offices in Mogadishu (and some also in Hargeisa in Somaliland). However, most donors, including Norway, fly in to meet Somali representatives and implementing partners. Norway has an office near Mogadishu airport and facilities for overnight stays, which is more than many other donors.

Mogadishu provides only one side of the story in Somalia, and proper monitoring requires regular in-country travel and access. Several donors have institutionalised third-party monitoring to counter this. Norway experimented with this on several occasions but has otherwise relied on partner reporting, complemented with reviews and embassy travel around the country.

in aid provision.¹⁷² Similarly, a 2018 Norad evaluation of Norway's aid administration practice of results-based management found severe shortcomings within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad.¹⁷³ This follows earlier Norad Evaluation Department studies addressing results-based management, including the 2017 *Quality of Reviews and Decentralised Evaluations in Norwegian Development Co-operation*.¹⁷⁴

Q.4.3 To what extent have context and conflict analyses included gender issues and analyses of vulnerable groups?

Norway did not systematically use conflict analysis as part of its engagement in Somalia. As referenced above, it relied on an ad hoc basis on analysis by external partners, such as the Somalia Stability Fund or the UN. The contextual and conflict analyses outlined in some of the embassy's annual workplans and reporting included reflections on gender or vulnerability. Only half of its half-yearly reports

mentioned gender or vulnerability, mostly in relation to female genital mutilation.

¹⁷² Norad Evaluation Department, 2016a.

¹⁷³ Norad Evaluation Department, 2018a.

¹⁷⁴ Norad Evaluation Department Norad, 2017.



Conclusions

Norway is a major international donor to Somalia. Its engagement in Somalia grew in 2012–2018 and it is now one of the top six OECD-DAC donors to the country. The evaluation found that Norway was a partner that other donors and Somali federal government officials recognised as important in policy dialogue with the federal government.

In 2012–2018, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the embassy had a strong focus on federal-level statebuilding in Somalia and was effective in enhancing the federal government's financial management capacity. This Norwegian focus started in 2012, with political and financial emphasis on enabling Somalia's new federal government to undertake its financial administration. The evaluation found that Norway was effective in meeting its objective of enabling federal government financial operations. In particular, the Norwegian-initiated Special Financing Facility is credited with facilitating its basic operations

such as paying salaries electronically and paving the way for World Bank engagement with the federal government. Results of Norway's statebuilding support at the federal member state level in Somalia were less significant than those at the federal level. Norway, was however effective in contributing to decentralised capacity development at the municipal and district level by funding the UN engagement in partnership with a range of other donors. However, the effectiveness in terms of ensuring stability between federal government and member states and the promotion of democratic values has been limited. The legitimacy of the federal member states remains challenged by the lack of public dialogue and democratic processes during their formation and the Norwegian support to the UN constitutional process has not been able to improve this situation.

Norway's stabilisation work is credited with having delivered planned outputs in areas of Somalia that

had recently left al-Shabaab control. The evaluation team has however not been able to document results at the outcome level. Somalia's overall stability is still debatable, as the number of casualties from militant clashes around the country has risen in recent years. There are locally resolved conflicts and service delivery in newly liberated areas supported by projects that Norway funded either partially or fully.

The evaluation found that Norway was swift at responding to humanitarian needs in Somalia, but that Norway struggled to adhere closely to humanitarian principles due to the complexities posed by the operating context in Somalia. Norway adhered to its Grand Bargain commitments, but still needs to strengthen the localisation agenda as part of the Grand Bargain. Norway, however, remains a flexible partner which has enabled its partners to have a longer-term focus on resilience, thus supporting the humanitarian–development nexus.



Where Norway was effective in delivering development and humanitarian aid in Somalia it was largely a consequence of several features of its assistance.

These include:

1. Norway provided support to partners that understood the context
2. For humanitarian support specifically, Norway was quick to respond to requests for changes needed to adapt to crises
3. Norway provided unearmarked funding, which supported a partner-driven approach
4. In the Somalia context, Norway was willing to take the first step in interventions, notably in its game-changing support to the Special Financing Facility. Its support to Norwegian bilateral initiatives the Nordic International Support Foundation and Serendi also demonstrated Norway's willingness to take risks and eventually attracted other donors.

The evaluation found that Norway was good at supporting projects to tackle female genital mutilation, but that it did not prioritise efforts to ensure that women had roles in Somali decision-making and

peacebuilding activities. Similarly, Norway did not focus on including groups that were marginalised on the basis of ethnicity or clan, except through its humanitarian support to internally displaced persons.

In terms of coordination and alignment, the evaluation found that Norway's support was aligned with federal government priorities throughout the period evaluated. Norway also played an active role in promoting coordination and alignment among donors, even though the international community in Somalia remains fragmented.

Norway's aid in Somalia was divided between many aid channels and covered by various policy objectives. In 2012–2018 Norway had two strategies that informed its development aid in Somalia, managed by its embassy in Nairobi and its Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, more than half of the funds provided to Somalia were guided by Norwegian global development and humanitarian priorities not reflected in these strategies. The evaluation did not find that the different funding channels counteracted Norway's engagement, but concluded that some global funds were provided to thematic areas that were not prioritised in its country strategies. The evaluation found that there were no formalised mechanisms to coordinate or share lessons

learned across funding channels. Thus, Norway's aid management structure was not conducive to strategic alignment.

In its engagement in Somalia, Norway faced three main dilemmas. The most significant was how closely to support and engage with the federal government at a time when it was not only an enabler of, but also a hindrance to, statebuilding and democratisation. Norway took a clear stance on this by being one of the federal government's strongest international partners. The conflict potential of this decision was not reflected in Norwegian documentation. For all the dilemmas identified by the evaluation, none were explicitly raised in Norwegian documentation. Without clearly articulating the potential risks of its responses to these dilemmas, Norway also refrained from designing explicit risk-mitigating strategies.

Norway's limited justification for its engagement choices were also reflected in its approach to conflict sensitivity in Somalia. The evaluation did not find any written reflections on how Norway's overall approach in Somalia was affected by, or affected, conflict. The failure to explicitly articulate choices around dilemmas and conflict heightened the risk of Norway negatively contributing to conflict. With that said, on a political



level the evaluation found that Norway was active in aiding dialogue between the federal government and its member states. Despite the challenges pertaining to the conflict sensitivity of Norway's overall approach in Somalia, the evaluation found that many, but not all, interventions funded by Norway applied a conflict-sensitive approach at the project level.

Norway was not successful at explaining its engagement in Somalia to its partners or the people of Somalia. This opaque approach led to a set of unintended consequences. Norway's close relationship with the federal government, combined with the Somali Prime Minister's dual Norwegian citizenship and Norway's support to the Somali oil sector, fuelled a number of unverified misperceptions about Norway's engagement in the country. These included controversial but strong perceptions expressed in Somali social media and news outlets that Norway was in Somalia to secure access to Somali oil. There is thus an urgent need for Norway to be transparent about its engagement in Somalia.

From a learning perspective, Norway can do more to document its results and lessons learned and feed

them into its programming. The evaluation found that the assessment of results and learning relating to Norway's engagement in Somalia did not feed into its portfolio programming in a systematic way. There were evidently discussions around the performance of, and adjustments to, individual interventions but never a full reporting on the performance of Norway's portfolio.

In summary, the team identified examples of Norway's support to Somalia which were effective in meeting the planned objectives in a context that was, and remains, a very fragile and difficult. The overall Norwegian engagement have contributed to mixed results. Norway's limited use of systematic approaches to conflict-sensitivity, communication and learning meant that it missed opportunities to achieve more and minimise risks during implementation.



Recommendations

The following recommendations are based on the evaluation findings.

1. Take advantage of Norway's ability to take the first step in making effective engagements in fragile settings

Norway has proven that taking a risk can make a difference in a fragile and conflict-affected context. The evaluation found that this risk appetite was particularly clear in the first years of the period evaluated. As donors are becoming more risk-averse and less willing to experiment, Norway should capitalise on its risk appetite in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. This risk appetite has proven effective in development aid and has also bought Norway considerable goodwill with Somalia's federal government and major donors such as the World Bank. Norway should prioritise risk-taking in situations where the risk taken has the highest probability of contributing to implementing

its theory of change and meeting its engagement objectives. The evaluation learned that what is needed to identify and initiate support to risk-prone interventions is:

- An understanding of needs on the ground
- An analysis of an intervention's political-economic and conflict consequences
- The willingness of decision-makers in Norway to take the first step, with a willingness to accept failure if every step was taken to try to make the intervention work and mitigate intervention risks.

2. Further expand the Norwegian country strategy process to include discussions and decisions around dilemmas

Particularly in conflict-affected and fragile settings, donors face multiple dilemmas in which decisions

must be made about the approach and strategy to be applied. Stating these dilemmas explicitly and detailing the choices made around them will allow Norway to design a comprehensive approach to its engagement. A detailed strategy with a clear theory of change will allow for a joint understanding of Norway's engagement by all Norwegian departments and agencies working in a country. A strategy would also serve as a reference point for new staff members. Describing dilemmas in a strategy would allow Norway to be explicit about the risks relating to its choices and to develop risk mitigation measures. A theory of change should not be static – the assumptions underpinning it should be regularly tested and the theory adapted accordingly. Finally, the strategy should be based on comprehensive conflict and political-economy analyses.



3. Apply a systematic approach to conflict-sensitive country-portfolio management

In line with the recommendations of the Norad Evaluation Department's brief on conflict sensitivity,¹⁷⁵ Norway needs to operationalise conflict sensitivity in both individual interventions and its country portfolio. At the intervention level, each project or programme should be assessed through a conflict lens, identifying its effect on the conflict and vice versa. At the country portfolio level, Norway needs to assess the effects of its strategy on conflict. A more systematic, conflict-sensitive approach should reveal the potential for positive peace and steps that Norway can take in support of this. To be effective, the conflict-sensitive approach should not only deal directly with conflict drivers but also include an analysis of the country's political economy. This would help to identify stakeholders that can enable peace and are willing to use their political capital to make change happen.

4. Develop and implement a comprehensive communication and dissemination plan

Norway needs to develop and implement a comprehensive communication strategy to counter misconceptions about Norway's intentions. The strategy should ensure that there is transparency about Norway's engagement for the beneficiaries of the Norwegian support as well as to instil Norwegian partners' trust in Norway. Norway needs to engage in dialogue with the different stakeholders, more proactively explain the rationale for its engagement and provide information about the actual funding provided to Somalia.

5. Develop more explicit requirements to include marginalised groups in Norwegian aid

With some estimates placing marginalised groups such as Bantus as comprising up to 25% of Somalia's population, including these groups needs to be made explicit in funding decisions. Such explicit requirements to partners would ensure that all marginalised groups are recognised in interventions, with specific and targeted measures of how to engage with them. Marginalisation can be contextual, so Norway and its implementing partners need to have a better understanding of power dynamics and exclusion in intervention localities.

6. Formalise coordination among Norway's embassy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad to enhance strategic alignment

Norway should ensure that globally managed aid provided to a Norwegian partner country complements the funding guided by Norway's country strategy. In addition, this strategy and its design process should recognise global objectives and funding priorities. Norway should formalise internal dialogue around prioritising global grant-making to civil society and multilateral institutions to ensure complementarity with its country strategies.

¹⁷⁵ <https://norad.no/en/toolspublications/publications/2020/blind-sides-and-soft-spots-an-evaluation-of-norways-aid-engagement-in-south-sudan/>



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Annex 1: Terms of Reference

TERMS OF REFERENCE: EVALUATION OF NORWAY'S ENGAGEMENT IN SOMALIA 2012–2018

Background

The number of people living in fragile contexts is expected to grow from 1.8 to 2.3 billion by 2030. Poverty is also increasingly concentrated in fragile contexts. According to OECD, about 80% of the world's poor could be living in these contexts by 2030.¹⁷⁶ Support to countries directly or indirectly affected by conflict, great humanitarian challenges and high degree of fragility, requires different approaches than support to more stable countries. Most often in these contexts, there is a need for humanitarian assistance, long-term development efforts and peace building all at the same time.

Norway's approach to engagement in fragile states is anchored in the New Deal principles¹⁷⁷ agreed at Busan in 2011. In 2014, Norway defined its approach to engagement in fragile states through

a designated category of focus countries for fragile states. This was later elaborated in White paper 17 (2017–2018) "Partner countries in Norwegian development policy".¹⁷⁸ White Paper 37 (2014–2015) Global security challenges in Norway's foreign policy emphasises engagement in fragile states linking global security and development.¹⁷⁹ The priority to engage in fragile contexts is also reinforced from a sustainable development perspective in White paper 24 (2016–2017) "Common responsibility for common future" where it is stated that "*prevention of violent conflict is a precondition for sustainable development. This requires increased engagement in regions and countries with high degree of fragility*".¹⁸⁰ Norway's goal of increasing support to fragile states and regions was further re-confirmed in the white paper *Setting the course*

for Norwegian foreign and security policy (Report 36, 2016–2017) followed by a new *Strategic framework for Norway's support to fragile states and regions* in 2017.¹⁸¹ In August 2018, a new humanitarian strategy was launched, supplementing the strategic framework. The strategy emphasizes the need for a coherent and holistic approach where the interaction between humanitarian assistance, long-term development policy and peace building is seen together.¹⁸² The strategy reconfirms Norway's international commitments to a new way of working in humanitarian response.¹⁸³

The Norwegian aid administration has been described in evaluations and OECD DAC peer reviews as flexible and open to adaptation, with comparatively swift

¹⁷⁶ OECD 2018, States of Fragility 2018, OECD Publishing, Paris: 37

¹⁷⁷ www.newdeal4peace.org/about-the-new-deal

¹⁷⁸ Meld. St. 17 (2017-2018) Partnerland i utviklingspolitikken

¹⁷⁹ Meld. St. 37 (2014–2015) Globale sikkerhetsutfordringer i utenrikspolitikken—Terrorisme, organisert kriminalitet, piratvirksomhet og sikkerhetsutfordringer i det digitale rom

¹⁸⁰ Meld. St. 24 (2016–2017): 23.

¹⁸¹ MFA 2017, Strategisk rammeverk for norsk innsats i sårbare stater og regioner

¹⁸² Strategi for norsk humanitær politikk. Handlekraft og helhetlig innsats. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018

¹⁸³ Ref. for example The Grand Bargain – A Shared Commitment to Better Serve People in Need. Istanbul, Turkey, May 2016



decision making.¹⁸⁴ In some respects, this is seen as an advantage. But it is also seen as a disincentive to a more strategic approach some would say is needed for protracted crises and fragile contexts.¹⁸⁵

For its engagement in Somalia, Norway has a strategy covering the period 2016–2018¹⁸⁶, although it has not been publicly available. Country strategies have not been the norm in the Norwegian aid administration up to now. However, in accordance with the strategic framework for fragile states (2017), to ensure

184 See for example: OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Norway 2013, OECD Publishing. Evaluation Department Report 8/2014 Evaluation of Norway's Support to Haiti after the 2010 Earthquake. Evaluation Department Report 4/2016 'Striking the Balance' Evaluation of the Planning, Organisation and Management of Norwegian Assistance related to the Syria Regional Crisis; Evaluation Department Report 5/2016 Evaluation of Norway's support for advocacy in the development policy arena; Evaluation Department Report 9/2017 Evaluation of Norwegian support for education in conflict and crisis through civil society organisations. More information about Norwegian Aid Management, see guide, last updated April 2017: <https://norad.no/en/toolspublications/publications/2017/guide-to-norwegian-aid-management/>

185 See for example: OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Norway 2013, OECD Publishing. Evaluation Report 9/2017; Evaluation Report 5/2016; Evaluation Report 4/2016; Evaluation Report 8/2014. More information about Norwegian Aid Management, see guide, last updated April 2017: <https://norad.no/en/toolspublications/publications/2017/guide-to-norwegian-aid-management/>

186 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Somaliastategi, dated 13.10.2015, approved 25.10.2015

coherence of Norwegian engagement at country level, country strategies are now being developed for all partner countries¹⁸⁷, including a new strategy for Somalia 2019–2021.

Based on Norway's priority to fragile contexts in recent years, as described above, the Evaluation Department is planning to conduct evaluations examining overall Norwegian support in selected countries in fragile contexts.¹⁸⁸ There has been no previous evaluations looking at the totality of Norwegian support in Somalia.

The Context of Norwegian Engagement in Somalia

OECD characterises Somalia as a chronically fragile context.¹⁸⁹ Challenges facing Somalia are multidimensional, though they vary across regions and political and social contexts.

Following years of civil war and lack of stable federal government structures, in 2012, a provisional constitution was adopted, a new Somali Federal Parliament elected and a new Somali President

187 MFA 2017: 4.

188 An evaluation of Norway's engagement in South Sudan is scheduled to start in February 2019

189 OECD (2018), States of Fragility 2018, OECD Publishing, Paris

appointed, followed by the establishment of a new Somali Federal Government. As part of the New Deal for fragile states, the Somali Compact was agreed in September 2013, which set out the goals and priorities of the government of Somalia and its international partners under the five peace and state building goals.¹⁹⁰ This laid the foundation for international support to stabilisation and state building, and more long-term engagement by international partners. It was followed by the Somalia National Development Plan 2017–2019.¹⁹¹ Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility is the main coordinating mechanism, including the World Bank managed Multi Partner Fund and the UN Multi Partner Trust Fund managed by UNDP.

Humanitarian needs continue to be high, due both to violence/insecurity and recurring droughts and floods. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs currently estimates 2,6 million to be internally displaced (October 2018) and more than 4,6 million people to be in need of humanitarian assistance.¹⁹²

190 http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/new-deal-for-somalia-conference/sites/default/files/the_somali_compact.pdf

191 <http://mop.gov.so/index.php/ndp/somali-national-development-plan/>

192 <http://www.unocha.org/somalia> (accessed 19 October 2018)



Insecurity is a major constraint to humanitarian access as well as political stability and economic development. Al-Shabaab remains the most immediate threat to security and stability. Tension between federal member states and the Federal Government administration over power and resources adds to a complex process of state building and consolidation.¹⁹³

Somaliland declared its independence as a republic in 1991 but has yet to gain international recognition, although its development and stability gains in an otherwise volatile region are recognised.¹⁹⁴

Remittances also play a key role in the country's economy, currently constituting about 20% of GDP.¹⁹⁵ Somali international diaspora contribution to humanitarian response is also substantial.

Norway's Engagement in Somalia

The goal of Norway's engagement in Somalia is to

193 ICG reports 2018 (<https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia>); UNSC (2018) Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, S/2018/1002; Economist Intelligence Unit Somalia Country Report January 2019

194 Norad (2017) Country Evaluation Brief Somalia. Evaluation Department report no 3/2017

195 Norad (2017) Country Evaluation Brief Somalia. Evaluation Department report no 3/2017

contribute to peace, stability, democratic development and poverty reduction. Four overall objectives are expressed in a strategy covering Norway's engagement 2016–2018¹⁹⁶:

- Support political stabilization, good governance, human rights and democratic values;
- Support peace and reconciliation, and protection of civilians. Counter terrorism, organized crime and piracy;
- Respond to humanitarian crises in line with the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence;
- Contribute to inclusive growth, job creation and social development.

According to the strategy, Norway's engagement in Somalia is to be framed within the Somali Compact, ensuing National Development Plan 2017–2019, and relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. The main channels for Norway's aid to Somalia has been

196 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Somalistrategi, dated 13.10.2015, approved 25.10.2015

assistance through the World Bank Multi Partner Fund and UN Multi Partner Trust Fund (managed by UNDP).¹⁹⁷ Other main channels have been DIFD/ Somalia Stability Fund, Nordic International Support Foundation (NIS), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the Red Cross.¹⁹⁸

Total Norwegian aid (ODA) to Somalia in the period 2012–2017 amounted to 2,2 billion NOK.¹⁹⁹ The share of humanitarian assistance was 35 per cent in 2017. It has varied between 20–40 per cent of total Norwegian aid over the past ten years, with peaks in connection with the droughts in 2011 and again in 2017.²⁰⁰

Norwegian engagement in Somalia gained its momentum as Norway held a seat in the UN Security Council in 2001–2002. Norway supported peace and reconciliation efforts financially, and were

197 Evaluation Department is currently undertaking an evaluation of the Norwegian Multilateral Partnerships Portfolio. This evaluation covers the functioning of the two funds. Findings of this evaluation will be available for the planned evaluation of Norway's engagement in Somalia.

198 Please refer to Annex 1, Evaluation Department (2018) Mapping and Analysis of Humanitarian Assistance and Support in Fragile States. Background paper 1/2018

199 Annex 1

200 Annex 1



observers at the negotiations in Kenya 2002–2004. In 2006, Norway with the US, initiated and chaired the International Contact Group for Somalia (ICG).²⁰¹ In the years that followed, Norway was engaged in peace talks at various levels, while aid was primarily humanitarian or support through NGO channels.

Beyond its humanitarian, development and foreign policy engagement, Norway also has trade, migration and security interests that frame its engagement in Somalia.

Somali diaspora in Norway have been important in shaping the Norwegian engagement²⁰², and play important roles in Somali politics and civil society at various levels. Norwegian–Somali diaspora members hold prominent political positions in Somalia, with Speaker of the House, Mohamed Osman Jawari (2012) and later with Prime Minister Hassan Khairi (2017) being Norwegian citizens.²⁰³

201 Tellander and Horst (2017) 'A Foreign Policy Actor of Importance?' Foreign Policy Analysis 14(1), 1–19

202 Tellander and Horst (2017)

203 Webersik, Hansen and Egal (2018) 'Somalia: A Political Economy Analysis'. NUPI/University of Agder

Existing Knowledge

A synthesis study of evaluations of the international development engagement in Somalia²⁰⁴ found a general lack of evaluation relative to the resources spent in the country and that evaluations suffer from lack of reliable data. Some main channels of Norwegian ODA have been evaluated in the past few years:

A review of the Somali Compact 2014–2016²⁰⁵ found the compact to be highly valuable in terms of building trust between states and Federal Government, transparency in terms of mutual accountability between Federal Somali Government and development partners, reengagement with IFIs, and beginning process of obtaining debt relief. However, it raises concerns about effectiveness and progress on the multiple milestones; unduly burdensome dialogue processes, failure to provide space for real engagement with Somalis; slow progress in tackling core governance issues, corruption and increasing domestic revenues; parallel coordination fora; and lack of coherence of humanitarian and development efforts. The review also found a lack of

204 Evaluation Department Norad (2017) Country Evaluation Brief Somalia. 3/2017

205 ODI (2017) 'The New Deal in Somalia. An independent review of the Somali Compact, 2014–2016' Overseas Development Institute, April 2017

evidence on gender as a cross cutting issue.

A mid-term evaluation of the Somalia Stability Fund (SSF) (2016) found investments to be broadly relevant and contributing to development of governance structures and conflict resolution and mitigation, but raised questions as to the evidence base, conflict sensitivity of interventions, gender mainstreaming and effectiveness in contributing to local stability²⁰⁶

An evaluation of UNDP in Somalia 2016 found weak results within capacity development in government institutions, and mixed results on drafting the Provisional Constitution. The evaluation noted a general lack of reliable data and weak M&E system²⁰⁷

Coherence in fragile contexts could be challenging. Donors in fragile contexts face real dilemmas. In facing these, donors make decisions that may affect the

206 e-pact 'Somalia Stability Fund Evaluation. Final report – draft. July 2016; also Oxford Policy Management Evaluation of the Somalia Stability Fund, phase 2, 2016–2018

207 Independent Evaluation Office UNDP (2016) 'Assessment of Development Results Somalia. Evaluation of UNPDs contribution'. <http://web.undp.org/evaluation/evaluations/adr/somalia.shtml> See also Norad 'Review of the Norwegian Support to the United Nations Multi-Partner Trust Fund in Somalia 2015–2016' (Dec. 2016)



context in one way or another, and may also affect the coherence of the support. Dilemmas may arise from contextual factors, but also between the development policy and other policy areas, like migration and security. Donors' own national interests add another layer of complexity. In Somalia, international aid is an important part of the country context, and peace, stabilization and state building processes. Dilemmas could range from overall policy and strategy decisions like geographic priority, sector priority and institutional collaboration, to the day-to-day strategic choices within each project and partnership. One example of a dilemma is the need for coordinating and integrating long term efforts and humanitarian assistance, without at the same time compromising the impartiality of humanitarian actors, and thereby in turn constraining access to the affected population.

There is limited explicit knowledge about how dilemmas and challenges are discussed and handled by Norwegian actors in fragile contexts, and on which basis decisions are made during different phases and at different levels.²⁰⁸ The evaluation may therefore give more insight into how important dilemmas have been

discussed and addressed by Norway in Somalia.

Purpose and Objectives of the Evaluation

The main purpose of the evaluation is to assess effects of the Norwegian engagement in Somalia, consider whether the engagement has been coherent and conflict-sensitive, and assess how the Norwegian engagement has been adapted to the context.

The main intended users of the evaluation are the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as responsible for developing Norwegian policy on the engagement in Somalia, and as responsible for ensuring policy coherence in Norway's engagement. The Norwegian Embassy in Nairobi and Norad will also be main users of the evaluation. Other users include Norwegian government agencies engaged in the context, Norwegian and international civil society partners, other donors and multilaterals. The evaluation aims to contribute to both accountability and learning.

The objectives of the evaluation are to:

1. Map and assess effects of Norwegian total engagement in Somalia during the evaluation period, including any positive or negative unintended effects of the engagement

2. Assess whether Norwegian engagement in Somalia has been coherent
3. Assess conflict sensitivity of Norway's engagement in Somalia
4. Assess how Norway used learning, both by utilizing available knowledge and by learning from experience, to inform the engagement in Somalia
5. Formulate lessons learnt from Norway's engagement in Somalia and provide recommendations on how to adjust the engagement in the future

Evaluation Object and Scope

The evaluation object is the Norwegian engagement in Somalia. The evaluation will cover the totality of Norwegian engagement, including other policy areas than development, such as migration, security and trade, to the extent that these affect the operationalization, implementation and effects of Norwegian development policy affecting Somalia.

The evaluation period is 2012– 2018. In this period international engagement in the country went from being predominantly humanitarian to being framed by peace and state building goals under the New Deal

208 Evaluation Department Norad (2018) Evaluation of Norwegian Efforts to Ensure Policy Coherence. 8/2018



framework. In order to understand the background for decisions related to evaluation objectives 2–4 it will be necessary to also consider what happened before 2012.

The evaluation will cover the evaluation criteria of effectiveness, relevance and coherence. A first step will be to document Norway's goals and priorities in Somalia in the evaluation period. The evaluation will assess the effects of Norway's engagement based on already existing documentation from actors that have received support, such as NGOs, multilateral organisations and trust funds, and others.²⁰⁹ The evaluation will not evaluate the organisations' performance in itself. The evaluation will rely on already existing documentation and try to say something about the effects of the support both based on the organisations own donor reporting, own evaluations, and other donors' evaluations of the organisations in the country. The team will also look at what kind of information Norway asks for and whether the information is used to inform decisions about what and whom to fund.

In addition to documenting effects of the Norwegian

²⁰⁹ Please refer to Norwegian Aid Statistics, International Development Statistics and Annex 1: Mapping and analysis of humanitarian assistance and support in fragile states (2018)

engagement, the evaluation will assess the coherence of Norway's engagement. Related to this there are some guiding policies for Norway's engagement. Norway has committed to ensure that its policy affecting developing countries is coherent for development.²¹⁰ We understand Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) as OECD has defined it, which is *“to ensure that policies do not harm and where possible contribute to international development objectives”*. This means ensuring that wider aspects of development in addition to development aid, such as trade, migration, investments, climate change, and security are coherent with the development policy. This includes coherence between the different initiatives in Norwegian development and foreign policy (including advocacy and diplomacy), but also coherence between Norway and other actors (for example national government, donors, multilaterals, NGOs and local actors).

The evaluation will also assess whether the engagement has been conflict-sensitive.²¹¹ Conflict

²¹⁰ White Paper 25 (2016– 2017) “Common Responsibility for Common Future”

²¹¹ The Evaluation Department is planning to conduct a separate evaluation of Conflict sensitivity in Norwegian development aid, cf. the Evaluation Programme 2018–2020. The evaluation of the Norwegian engagement in Somalia, will be one contribution related to this.

sensitivity is highlighted by the government as an operational principle that should guide all country and regional efforts in fragile contexts.²¹² Conflict sensitivity means working in a way that reduces the risk of fuelling a conflict (do no harm) and contributes to reducing the level of conflict. It involves the analysis of the conflict and its actors, understanding how engagement may affect the context (and vice versa), and using this knowledge to adjust and adapt the engagement in a way that reduces the probability of negative impacts, and contributes to positive change.

‘Stabilisation’ is central in Norway's and the international engagement, as part of preparation for efforts to achieve long term development and peace building. It will be necessary to look at what stabilisation has meant in the Norwegian engagement in Somalia, in terms of the choice of partners and channels, implementation of efforts, and their effects, including effects for vulnerable groups.

²¹² MFA 2017: 23



Evaluation Questions

The following questions will guide the evaluation:

1. *Assess and document the effects of the Norwegian engagement in Somalia during the evaluation period*

- What have been Norway's goals and priorities in Somalia in the evaluation period?
- To what degree has Norwegian engagement contributed towards the achievement of Norway's priorities and objectives?
- Has Norway's engagement had any likely unintended consequences, positive or negative?
- Have men, women, and vulnerable groups been affected differently by Norway's engagement?

2. *To what extent has Norway's engagement in Somalia been coherent?*

- To what extent has the Norwegian engagement been coordinated, and aligned to the goals and objectives of Somali authorities and the strategy of the overall international engagement in Somalia in the period?

- To what extent has Norway contributed to coordination of the international engagement and to alignment to country development plans?
- To what extent has Norway's humanitarian and long-term assistance been coordinated?
- What dilemmas has Norway faced in its engagement in Somalia?
- How did Norway assess different options in different phases related to central dilemmas? Which assessments had more weight in these decisions?
- To what extent was conflict-sensitivity and policy coherence for development important in decision-making related to these dilemmas?

3. *How and to what extent has Norway's engagement in Somalia been conflict-sensitive?*

- To what extent have conflict-sensitive measures been applied in Norway's engagement?

- To what extent has the conflict or the context affected Norway's engagement?
- Has Norway supported specific conflict-sensitivity initiatives promoting peace, both on political, portfolio and project level?

4. *How did Norway demonstrate learning, both from available knowledge and from experience, to inform its engagement in Somalia?*

- To what extent did context and conflict analyses influence choices in terms of goals and priorities, channels, partners and interventions? What was the content and quality of these analyses?
- To what extent has knowledge of results been used to inform decisions? To what extent have lessons learnt, context and conflict analyses from partners receiving funding from Norway informed decisions for Norway's engagement?
- To what extent have context and conflict analyses included gender issues and analyses of vulnerable groups?



5. *What are the main lessons learnt and recommendations to inform Norway's future engagement in Somalia?*

Possible Approach and Methodology

The evaluation team will propose an outline of a methodological approach that optimizes the possibility of producing evidence-based assessments. All parts of the evaluation shall adhere to recognised evaluation principles and the OECD DAC's quality standards for development evaluation in addition to their guidelines for evaluations in settings of conflict and fragility, as well as relevant guidelines from the Evaluation Department. The methodological approach should rely on a cross-section of data sources and using mixed methods to ensure triangulation of information through a variety of means.

The evaluation *will include* the following components:

- *Conflict context:* The consultants should base their work on a clear understanding of the conflict context, its key drivers, political economy, dynamics and actors. This way they can assess the conflict analyses used by Norway. The team will also have to analyse how their own activities will interact with and impact the context. This will be included in the inception report.

- *Identification of dilemmas:* The evaluation will identify and analyse dilemmas faced by Norway in Somalia. Which possible dilemmas to analyse will be suggested in the inception report. The evaluation will identify all key actors involved in Norway's engagement, also outside the Norwegian aid administration. The evaluation will analyse, interpret and discuss decisions made by Norway in different phases of the engagement in light of the knowledge and opportunities available at the time and changes in the context.
- *Document effects:* The evaluation will assess results of the support through the main channels of the Norwegian support. This will include an overview of the Norwegian goals and priorities in Somalia, including cross-cutting priorities, in the period of the evaluation, including which channels and modalities that have been used to achieve the Norwegian objectives.
 - A description of priorities and objectives in the evaluation period, will be included in the inception report.
 - A separate deliverable with an analysis of achieved results based on already available

documentation as described in the first two bullet points in the proposed methodology will be completed as a separate deliverable after the inception phase. The analysis will uncover potential gaps in the data and a plan for how to respond to these gaps in the main evaluation phase.

The evaluation team will:

- Collect and analyse relevant internal documents relevant to identify Norway's goals and priorities in Somalia in the period.
- Consult all relevant programme documents and reports, reviews, evaluations and research carried out in the evaluation period of Norwegian assistance as well as relevant studies, evaluations, research and reviews of other donors' and or national comparable assistance to Somalia during the same period.
- Consult strategic development documents, of the international engagement in Somalia, including Somali government plans.



- Collect and analyse existing statistical data, household surveys, programme monitoring, or any other already available material (from government, NGOs/civil society organisations, multilateral organisations and other research) that can shed light on the results of Norwegian assistance.
- Interview a wide range of stakeholders and experts in Norway, Somalia and Kenya, group discussions or stakeholder survey(s) to identify stakeholder perception and analysis, to supplement and qualify other methods and to enable direct inputs from stakeholders to selected evaluation questions. It will be important to involve relevant national and local actors in Somalia, including government representatives at federal, state and local level, traditional leaders, civil society, academics, journalists, diaspora members and others that may contribute to shed light on the Norwegian and international engagement in the period of evaluation.
- Conduct field visits to locations in Somalia as far as the situation permits. Visits will be balanced, to cover various parts of the country, at least Mogadishu and Hargeisa, preferably one or two other sites.

The evaluation team will synthesise the above in an evaluation matrix in the inception phase. The evaluation matrix will include an assessment of the evaluation questions in terms of whether these are realistic to respond to and if so how they will be responded to, in addition to an overview of availability and access to existing data. The evaluation matrix will be presented in the inception report and used as the key organizing tool for the evaluation.

The evaluation team may propose an alternative approach that responds to the purpose and objectives in this Terms of Reference in other ways than those laid out above, demonstrating comparable rigor and ability to respond to the evaluation questions. Innovative methods of data collection and use of existing data is encouraged.

Challenges and limitations

The evaluation team will in the inception phase identify potential areas where the evaluation process could have a negative effect – on the evaluation process, the evaluand or stakeholders. Based on the potential risks identified, the team will develop mitigation strategies. This will need to be continuously updated during the evaluation period. Some potential risks may be:

Security: The security situation may affect the evaluation in terms of timing of field visits and access to people and areas in Somalia. This requires flexibility and will have to be carefully considered during the evaluation.

Access to and availability of data: Any limitations to the data as well as to the methods and analysis should be stated clearly in the inception report. Some challenges may be:

- Documents in the archives (such as decision memos, project documents and reports, reviews, appraisals and correspondence) may not be sufficiently complete or structured. It will therefore be especially important to triangulate these sources.
- Working with the archival documents of the MFA may require an appropriate security clearance as some relevant documents may be classified according to different levels of sensitivity.
- A large share of Norwegian funds are channelled as core support to multilateral organisations and may be challenging to track. The evaluation team will have to find a way to address this.



Ethics

The evaluation process itself should be conflict-sensitive. The evaluation process should show sensitivity and respect to all stakeholders. The evaluation shall be undertaken with integrity and honesty and ensure inclusiveness of views. The rights, dignity and security of participants in the

evaluation should be protected. Anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants should be protected. An introductory statement to the evaluation report may explain what measures were or were not taken to ensure no harm/conflict sensitivity of the evaluation itself, as well as the security of the interviewees.

Organisation of the Evaluation

The evaluation will be managed by the Evaluation department, Norad. The evaluation team will report to the Evaluation department through the team leader. The team leader shall be in charge of all deliveries and will report to the Evaluation department on the team's progress, including any problems that may jeopardise the assignment. The evaluation department and the team shall emphasize transparent and open communication with the stakeholders. Regular contact between the evaluation department, team

and stakeholders will assist in discussing any arising issues and ensuring a participatory process. All decisions concerning the interpretation of this Terms of Reference, and all deliverables are subject to approval by the evaluation department.

The team should consult widely with stakeholders pertinent to the assignment. In some evaluations, the Evaluation department participates in parts of the field visits to better understand the context of the evaluation. This may also be discussed for this evaluation. Stakeholders will be asked to comment on the draft inception report and the draft final report. In addition, experts or other relevant parties may be invited to comment on reports or specific issues during the process. The evaluation team shall take note of all comments received from stakeholders. Where there are significant divergences of views between the evaluation team and stakeholders, this shall be reflected in the final report. Quality assurance shall be provided by the institution delivering the consultancy services prior to submission of all deliverables. Access to archives and statistics will be facilitated by Norad and stakeholders. The team is responsible for all data collection, including archival search.

Budget and Deliverables

The evaluation should not exceed an estimated maximum of 50 weeks (2000 hours), to cover all phases of the evaluation including travel time, debriefing and dissemination to stakeholders. All costs including costs for research assistants, all travel costs including allowances, and costs for data collection will be specified in the budget.

Deliverables:

- Inception report not exceeding 20 pages, excluding annexes. Draft analysis of effects of Norwegian support (15 pages) will be included as an annex.
- Analysis of effects of Norwegian support based on already available data and reports, not exceeding 15 pages, including figures and tables.
- Debrief at the Norwegian embassy in Nairobi, presenting initial findings after field visit.
- Draft report, not exceeding 30,000 words (approx. 50 pages). The Evaluation Department will circulate this to stakeholders for comments.



- Workshop in Oslo on draft findings and conclusions to inform recommendations.
- Final report not exceeding 30,000 words (approx. 50 pages) excluding summary and annexes.
- Evaluation brief on a topic identified during the evaluation process, not exceeding 4 pages.
- Presentation at a seminar in Oslo

Phases and Deadlines

The evaluation will be organised into five work phases; (i) inception phase; (ii) analysis of results based on existing documentation; (iii) data collection – country visits and interviews; (iv) analysis and report writing; and (v) dissemination. Please refer to deadlines in the tender document. Time frame and deadlines will be subject to change if necessary, due to security and other relevant factors in the context.



Annex 2: List of Interviewees

POSITION	ORGANISATION
The Norwegian Embassy in Nairobi	
Minister counsellor	Embassy
Development aid counsellor, Kenya and Somalia	Embassy
First Secretary Migration	Embassy
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	
Special Envoy for Somalia from 2018 (and former Minister counsellor, Embassy in Nairobi 2014-2018)	Section for Peace and Reconciliation, MFA
Department for UN and humanitarian affairs, Section for Humanitarian Affairs	MFA
Section for Human Rights, Democracy and Gender Equality, Dept. for UN and humanitarian affairs	MFA
Retired, Former special envoy (2012-2015), and NIS (2011-12)	MFA, NIS, NRC
Former desk officer in MFA and before that counsellor at embassy Nairobi with responsibility for Somalia 2008-2014	MFA
Norad	
Senior advisor, Knowledge Bank, Former first secretary (Nairobi from August 2013, to mid 2016)	Norad
Senior Advisor, Section for development policy and financial management	Norad
Somalia focal point, Civil Society Department (former special assistant for the DSRSG Somalia - when?)	Norad
Senior advisor, Education Section (former first secretary and counsellor on Somalia at Embassy from mid-2013 to mid-2017)	Norad
Senior advisor, Evaluation Department (Counsellor, Embassy Nairobi, 2011 - 2015)	Norad



POSITION	ORGANISATION
Senior advisor, Department for Economic Development, Gender and Governance, Section for Human Rights, Governance and Fragility (Former councillor (aid), Embassy in Nairobi, 2012-15)	Norad / Embassy of Norway in Kenya
Coordinator, Fish for Development, Knowledge Bank	Norad
Senior Advisor, Department for Climate, Energy and Environment Section for Climate, Forest and Green Economy (former councillor, Nairobi, 2015-18)	Norad
Senior Advisor, Norad Civil Society Department, Section for Civil Society, Education, Health and Coordination of Comprehensive Agreements	Norad
Norwegian NGOs	
Programme Director, Oslo	ADRA Norway / Adventist Development and Relief Agency
Programme adviser, Oslo	ADRA Norway / Adventist Development and Relief Agency
Senior Partner, Oslo	NIS / Nordic International Support Foundation
Country Director Somalia, Mogadishu	NIS / Nordic International Support Foundation
Program and Technical Director, Mogadishu	NIS / Nordic International Support Foundation
i-STAND Program Manager, Mogadishu	NIS / Nordic International Support Foundation
Senior Partner, Oslo	NIS / Nordic International Support Foundation
Head of NIS office, Baidoa	NIS / Nordic International Support Foundation
Project officer, Baidoa	NIS
Cobble stone engineer, on secondment since 2017 from Ministry of Public Works to NIS, Baidoa	NIS



POSITION	ORGANISATION
Somalia Focal Point and Former Deputy Head of International Development Cooperation, Oslo	The Development Fund
Associate Area Coordinator, East Africa, Oslo	Save the Children Norway
Program Director/Norad grant, Somalia	Save the Children, Somalia Country Office, Nairobi
Deputy Country Director – Program Development & Quality	Save the Children, Somalia Country Office, Nairobi
Advisor, M&E / GBV in International Department, Oslo	Norwegian Church Aid
Learning and evaluation coordinator, Oslo	Norwegian Red Cross
Country Programme Manager for Somalia & Kenya, Nairobi	NorCross Kenya & Somalia
Deputy Regional Representative/Country Manager, Nairobi	NorCross Kenya & Somalia
Prosjektleder for NORCAPs kapasitetsutviklingsprosjekt for Somalia	NORCAP/NRC
Head of Office, Baidoa	NRC Somalia
Country Director Somalia	NRC Somalia
Head of Programmes	NRC Somalia
NRC Grants Coordinator	NRC
WASH Specialist	NRC
Competency Specialist HLP	NRC
Senior Regional Advisor, East Africa and Yemen, Oslo	NRC
General Secretary, Nairobi	ADRA Somalia / Adventist Development and Relief Agency
WASH Manager, Mogadishu	NRC Somali Country Office



POSITION	ORGANISATION
ICLA Manager, Mogadishu	NRC Somali Country Office
Mogadishu Area Manager	NRC Somali Country Office
Research Director	Peace Research Institute, Oslo
Programme Manager (part-time), Nairobi	YME Foundation
Federal Government of Somalia	
Minister	Ministry of Women and Human Rights
Director General	Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs
Senior Advisor on Disaster Risk Management	Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs
Director of Humanitarian Affairs	Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs
National Humanitarian Coordination Centre Coordinator	Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs
Director General	Ministry of Constitutional Affairs
Senior Stabilization Coordinator	MOIFAR
Minister of Posts, Telecommunications and Technology, former Serendi focal point	Ministry of Posts, Telecommunications and Technology
RCRF/PFM Coordinator	Ministry of Finance
RCRF/PFM Deputy Coordinator	Ministry of Finance
SFF-LD Project Coordinator	Ministry of Finance
Director General for Revenue	Ministry of Finance



POSITION	ORGANISATION
Government of South West State	
Minister of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management	South West State of Somalia
Minister	Ministry of Public Works, Reconstruction and Housing, South West State
Former Mayor of Baidoa	Baidoa Municipality
Governor	Bay Region, Baidoa
Director of Programs and General Relations	Banadir Regional Administration
Senior Stabilization Coordinator	Ministry of Interior, Local Government and Reconciliation, South West State
Deputy District Commissioner/Deputy Mayor, Security and Political Affairs	Baidoa
District Commissioner/Mayor	Baidoa
Deputy District Commissioner/Deputy Mayor for Social Affairs	Baidoa
Deputy District Commissioner/Deputy Mayor Administration and Finance	Baidoa
Government of Somaliland	
Local Government Expert	Hargeisa, Somaliland
Director General	Ministry of Interior
Mayor	City of Hargeisa
Head	Local Government Champion Office
Director	Ministry of Livestock and Fishery Development
Former DG	Ministry of Fisheries



POSITION	ORGANISATION
Director of Fisheries Development Department	Ministry of Livestock and Fishery Development
Director General	Civil Service Institute, Somaliland
Adviser to the Minister	Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources
Government of Puntland	
Minister	Ministry of Interior, Federal Government Affairs and Democratization
Director General	Ministry of Interior
RCRF-II Project Manager	Puntland Ministry of Finance
Vice President	Puntland Local Government Champion
Mayor Bossaso	Government of Puntland
Mayor Galkayo	Government of Puntland
Mayor Garowe	Government of Puntland
Executive Director	Association for Local Government Authorities in Puntland
Other Somali Representatives	
Director of Hospital	Keysanay Hospital
Director of Rehab Center	SRCS Rehabilitation Centre/NorCross
President	Somaliland Women Entrepreneurs Association
Chairwoman	Somalia Fisheries Association, Berbera Somaliland



POSITION	ORGANISATION
Owner	Berbera Fibreglass Factory
Programmes Director	Gargaar Relief Development Org
Manager	Hidig Boat Factory, Bossaso
International Organisations and Development Funds	
Resident Representative	UNDP
Communication specialist, MPTF	World Bank
Somalia Lead	World Bank
Somalia focal point	World Bank, MPTF team
SFF / WB MPTF implementer	Abyrinth
CTO	JPLG / UNDP
Chief Technical Adviser & Program Manager	UN Capital Development Fund / JPLG
Programme manager	UN Habitat Nairobi
Senior adviser	International Labour Organization, Nairobi
Programme manager	FAO Somalia
Field coordinator	FAO Somalia, Bossaso Puntland
SHF Manager	Somalia Humanitarian Fund
Deputy Resident Representative Programme	UNDP
Programme Operations Manager	UNDP
Humanitarian Affairs Officer/Pooled Fund Manager-Accountability	OCHA



POSITION	ORGANISATION
Senior researcher	Independent
Executive Director	Sahan Research
Professor	Institute of International environment and development studies, Noragric
Embassies and Donor Agencies	
Former Head of Governance and Security	DFID
Deputy Head of Mission	Embassy of Denmark
First Secretary	Embassy of Denmark
Team Leader, Democratic Governance & Security Sector Reform	EEAS, Delegation of the European Union to Somalia
Head of Resilience, Infrastructure and Productive Sectors – EU Somalia	EEAS, Delegation of the European Union to Somalia
Programme officer	Embassy of Sweden in Nairobi
Regional Director of International Cooperation, Horn of Africa	SDC. Embassy of Switzerland (to Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Somalia)
Programme Coordinator	DANIDA, Hargeisa
Programme Officer	USAID Somalia



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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency	FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
AIWA	African Initiative for Women in Africa		
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia	FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
ASWJ	Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama	FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
AU	African Union	FMS	Federal Member States
BRCiS	Building Resilient Communities in Somalia Programme	FTS	Financial Tracking Service
		GBV	Gender Based Violence
CBPF	Country-Based Pooled Funds	GiZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Development and Co-operation Agency)
CHF	Somalia Common Humanitarian Fund		
CRSP	The Constitutional Review Support Project		
CSO	Civil Society Organisation	GSDRC	Governance and Social Development Resource Centre
DEVCO	International Cooperation and Development (European Commission)	HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)	ICLA	Information Counselling and Legal Assistance
DRC	Danish Refugee Council	ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
EC	European Commission	IDP	Internally Displaced People
ECHO/DG ECHO	Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (Formerly European Community Humanitarian Aid office)	IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
EU	European Union	IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
		IMF	International Monetary Fund



Acronyms and Abbreviations

IOM	International Organisation for Migration	PLWD	People Living with Disabilities
IPPF	International Planned Parenthood Federation	PSG	Peace and Statebuilding Goals
JPLG	The Joint Programme for Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery	RCRF	Recurrent Cost and Reform Financing Instrument
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation	RRF	Recovery and Resilience Framework
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	SC	Save the Children
MPF	World Bank Multi-Partner Fund	SDF	Somaliland Development Fund
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid	SDRF	Somalia Reconstruction and Development Framework
NDP	National Development Plan	SFF	Special Financing Facility
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation	SFF-LD	Special Financing Fund – Local Development
NIS	Nordic International Support Foundation	SHARP	Somalia Humanitarian and Resilience Programme
NORCAP	Norwegian Capacity (Operated by NRC)	SHF	The Somali Humanitarian Fund
NorCross	Norwegian Red Cross	Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid	SRCS	Somali Red Crescent Society
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council	SSF	Somalia Stability Fund
OECD-DAC	The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee	TFG	Transnational Federal Government
OfD	Oil for Development	TNG	Transnational National Government
PFM	Public Financial Management	ToR	Terms of Reference
		TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
		UAE	United Arab Emirates



Acronyms and Abbreviations

UN	United Nations
UN CERF	United nations Central Emergency Response Fund
UN MPTF	United Nations Multi-Partner Trust Fund
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations Refugee Agency
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WASH	Water, Hygiene and Sanitation
WFP	World Food Programme
WPS	Women, Peace and Security



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www.norad.no
post-eval@norad.no

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