




Support to Legislatures

Report 2/2010 – Synthesis Study



Norad

Norwegian Agency for
Development Cooperation
P.O.Box 8034 Dep, NO-0030 Oslo
Ruseløkkveien 26, Oslo, Norway

Phone: +47 22 24 20 30

Fax: +47 22 24 20 31

Photos: Assembleia Nacional Angola (Photo: Inge Amundsen/CMI)

Design: Agendum See Design

Print: 07 Lobo Media AS, Oslo

ISBN: 978-82-7548-477-0

Support to Legislatures

**Synthesis study
January 2010**

Arne Tostensen
Inge Amundsen

Chr. Michelsen Institute

Preface


Support to democracy building in developing countries increased after 1990. It is gradually seen less as a technical exercise and more as a challenging, politically sensitive area of cooperation. Norway has supported the strengthening of democratic institutions with approximately 12 billion kroner in the last ten years, and as seen in this study a relatively small share was allocated to legislatures.

The study discusses different models of legislatures and political and electoral systems, with particular emphasis on fragile states. It also presents an overview of agencies specialised in this field, and of trends of donor support.

The authors find relatively few systematic evaluations of the results of support to legislatures, but identify some lessons from the literature for future work in this area: 1) understand political economy, 2) have a long-term, comprehensive approach, 3) mobilise sufficient expertise, and 4) establish (in the case of Norway) strategic donor partnerships.

The Evaluation Department commissioned the study as a basis for future evaluations in this area. We hope that the report can be of use to others that are engaged in this field.

Oslo, February 2010



Hans Peter Melby
Acting Director of Evaluation

Acknowledgements

The Evaluation Department of the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) engaged the services of the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) to undertake a synthesis study of the experiences and lessons learned by the donor community with respect to parliamentary strengthening. The Terms of Reference (ToR, annex 9) defined the assignment as a desk study, meaning that the bulk of the work would be reviewing and synthesising existing material – both published work and so-called grey literature. However, the team took two further steps to enrich the data material. First, we conducted a limited survey with key donors as respondents with a view to compiling a factual overview of interventions in terms of a set of variables. Second, we visited and otherwise contacted key actors in parliamentary strengthening to add qualitative insights beyond the quantitative overview.

This report presents the synthesis and recommendations of the study. The annexes provide the factual overview with tables and graphs depicting the situation in terms of certain variables as well as trends over time. It should be noted, however, that many data gaps remain owing to the incomplete information obtained from respondents and the many shortcomings of the reporting systems in this field of aid. The new aid architecture with the devolution of decision-making authority to embassies has apparently affected the information flow adversely.

The study team would like to thank the respondents for providing us with information and those we have interviewed face-to-face or by phone. Their insights and advice have been invaluable. The archives of Norad and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also deserve thanks for being very forthcoming. A special word of thanks goes to Mona Frøystad who assisted us in collecting the quantitative data from the survey respondents.

The usual disclaimer applies: this report does not reflect the policies or views of any particular donor or Norad. The responsibility for its contents and any remaining errors rests entirely with the study team.

Bergen, January 2010

Arne Tostensen
Inge Amundsen

Contents

Preface	iii
Acknowledgements	v
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations	ix
Executive Summary	xv
1. Introduction	3
1.1 Background	3
1.1.1 Transition and democratisation	4
1.1.2 Legislatures in presidential and parliamentary systems	4
1.1.3 External support and donor policies	6
1.2 Approach and Methodology	7
2. Functions of Legislatures	12
2.1 Core functions	12
2.1.1 Lawmaking	13
2.1.2 Oversight	14
2.1.3 Representation	15
2.2 Quality criteria	16
2.3 Weaknesses of parliaments	17
3. Evolution of Donors' Governance Support	20
3.1 Democracy and good governance	20
3.2 Elections, political parties and civil society	21
3.3 Budget support	22
4. Forms of Parliamentary Support	23
4.1 Direct support to parliaments	24
4.1.1 Physical infrastructure	24
4.1.2 Institutional structure and capacities	24
4.1.3 Skills and performance of parliamentarians	26
4.2 Indirect support to parliaments	27
4.3 Typology of donor support	29
5. Actors in Parliamentary Support	30
5.1 Bilateral donors	30
5.2 Multilateral donors	31
5.3 International parliamentary organisations	32
5.4 Party-affiliated foundations and institutes	33
5.5 Other organisations	33

6.	Norwegian Support to Legislatures	34
6.1	State agencies	34
6.2	Non-state actors	39
7.	Lessons Learned and Recommendations	40
7.1	Contextualisation	41
7.1.1	Regime types and features	41
7.2	Long time horizon	48
7.3	Comprehensive approach	48
7.4	Demand-driven donor support	49
7.5	Political sensitivity	50
7.6	Issues as entry points	51
7.7	Analytical tools	51
7.7.1	Political economy analysis	52
7.7.2	Governance assessments	53
7.7.3	Parliamentary performance	54
7.8	Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness	56
7.9	Some open questions	57
8.	Recommendations specific to Norway	60
8.1	Institutional memory and learning	60
8.2	Strategy	61
8.3	Strategic partnerships	61
8.4	Human resources development	62
Annex 1	References and Bibliography	67
Annex 2	Details on selected actors involved in parliamentary support	76
Annex 3	Data Analyses, Figures and Tables	93
Annex 4	The Dataset	105
Annex 5	Norway's parliamentary strengthening projects	121
Annex 6	Questionnaire	126
Annex 7	Typology sheet	128
Annex 8	List of persons consulted	132
Annex 9	Terms of Reference: Study of experiences with support to legislatures	133

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAPPG	Africa All Party Parliamentary Group
ACP	African Caribbean Pacific
AIDS	Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome
AIPU	Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union
AMANI	Great Lakes Parliamentary Forum for Peace
APNAC	African Parliamentarians' Network Against Corruption
APU	African Parliamentary Union
ARD Inc.	Consulting Company (US)
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development (Australia)
AWEPA	Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa
BMZ	Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (Germany)
BTC/CTB	Belgian Technical Cooperation agency (Belgisch agentschap voor ontwikkelings-samenwerking)
CGA	Country Governance Analysis
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency (Canada)
CLD	Centre for Legislative Development International
CMI	Chr. Michelsen Institute (Norway)
CPA	Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (UK)
CPIA	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (WB)
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DAI	Development Alternatives Inc. (US)
DCAF	Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DCHA/DG	Office of Democracy and Governance of the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (US)
DCP	Democracy Consolidation Programme (Malawi)
DCPD	Donor Consultation on Parliamentary Development
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DgCiD	Direction générale de la Coopération internationale et du Développement (Office for International Co-operation and Development of the French Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs) (France)
DGIS	Directorate-General for International Cooperation (Dutch Ministry Foreign Affairs)
DoC	Drivers of Change (analytical tool)
DRC	Democractic Republic of Congo
EALA	East African Legislative Assembly

EC	European Commission (EU)
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit (UK)
EU	European Union
EURO	Euro (currency)
EuropeAid	European Aid Agency (EC)
FES	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Germany)
FIPA	Inter-Parliamentary Forum for the Americas
GOPAC	Global Organization of Parliamentarians against Corruption
GPPS	Global Programme for Parliamentary Strengthening
GSDRC	Governance and Social Development Resource Centre
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (Germany)
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HR	Human Rights
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
IDBs	International Development Banks
IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (Sweden)
IDF	Institutional Development Fund (World Bank)
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IGO	Inter-governmental Organisation
INCAF	International Network on Conflict and Fragility
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IPU	Inter-Parliamentary Union
IRI	International Republican Institute (US)
IT	Information Technology
ISPOS	Institute for Advanced Social Studies (Haiti)
KAS	Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Germany)
LICUS	Low Income Country Under Stress
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund (Sudan)
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Norway)
MinBuZa	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the Netherlands)
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Member of Parliament
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NCHR	Norwegian Centre for Human Rights
NDI	National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (US)
NDS	Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIMD	Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (Netherlands)
NIS	National Integrity System
NOK	Norwegian Krone (currency)
Norad	Norwegian Agency for International Development (Norway)
NORDEM	Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights
ODA	Official Development Assistance

ODI	Overseas Development Institute (UK)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPIC	Olof Palme International Centre (Sweden)
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PA	Palestinian Authority
PACT	NGO (US)
PARLINE	Parliamentary Database
PBAs	Programme based approaches
PC	Parliamentary Centre (Canada)
PEMFA	Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability
PF	Parliamentary Forum on Small Arms and Light Weapons
PFM	Public financial management
PGA	Parliamentarians for Global Action
PHARE	Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies (EU)
PLC	Palestinian Legislative Assembly
PR	Proportional Representation
PRIO	International Peace Research Institute Oslo (Norway)
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSP	Parliamentary Strengthening Programme
RFPAC	Réseau de Femmes Parlementaires d'Afrique Centrale (Network of Women Parliamentarians of Central Africa)
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SEAL	Support to the Establishment of the Afghan Legislature
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sweden)
SoD	State of Democracy
STD	Sexually transmitted disease
SUNY/CID	State University of New York/Center for International Development
SWAP	Sector-wide Approach
TI	Transparency International
ToR	Terms of Reference
UDF	United Democratic Front (political party in Malawi)
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development (US)
USD	United States Dollar (currency)
WB	World Bank
WFD	Westminster Foundation for Democracy (UK)

Executive Summary



Executive Summary

The legislature epitomises the very idea of democracy; a strong parliament is indicative of a healthy democracy and a good governance system.

Parliament performs three core functions: (a) representing the electorate; (b) lawmaking (including budget making); and (c) oversight of the executive branch of government ('checks and balances').

The 'checks and balances' of a democratic political system is embedded in *horizontal accountability*, i.e. the balance of powers between the three branches of government (executive, legislative and judicial); and in *vertical accountability*, i.e. the ability of the electorate (citizens) to hold elected officials to account through regular, free and fair elections.

A general governance problem is presidential domination. In 'winner-takes-all' and 'first-past-the-post' electoral systems, the opposition is left out, accountability is weak, and the checks and balances are inefficient. Parliaments are generally weak in most developing countries, partly reflecting their place in political systems with a strong presidency. For democratic developments and processes to take place, strengthening parliament (and the judiciary) is important.

Donor agencies are supporting parliaments as an element of their good governance strategies. This sub-field of donor assistance is a latecomer; donor assistance to parliaments gained momentum only in the early 1990s.

Moving into a politically charged field (parliamentary support, and support to political parties) has been slow, because aid has conventionally been conceived as an apolitical, technical matter. There is still some way to go before donors fully accept that politics is not an optional extra, or something that gets in the way of development, but central to any endeavour towards good governance and democratisation.

The outcomes and impact of parliamentary assistance are exceedingly difficult to gauge, and there is little systematic research about the effectiveness of parliamentary strengthening. The knowledge base on donor support to parliaments is relatively limited, albeit growing.

To fill some of the knowledge gaps, Norad commissioned this report to map 'who is doing what', to review and synthesise international experiences and to summarise lessons learned in order to determine what works and what does not.

A plethora of organisations and agencies are engaged in parliamentary strengthening activities. They include bilateral donors such as the USAID, DFID, CIDA, Sida and Norad, and multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and the UNDP, as well as political party foundations and international networks and interest organisations of parliamentarians.

Norwegian support to parliaments has been limited and *ad hoc*, without much coherence or policy guidance; the approach has been unsystematic. Very few interventions have in a comprehensive manner addressed the challenges facing legislatures.

Notwithstanding difficulties, Norway has provided support to a number of legislatures over the years, for instance to the Palestinian Legislative Council; to the implementation of the strategic plan of Malawi's Legislative Assembly; to strengthening parliamentary democracy in Timor-Leste; to the training of parliamentarians in Haiti; to parliamentary strengthening in Mongolia; to parliamentary capacity building in Ethiopia; to the SADC parliamentary cooperation programme; to the training of provincial parliamentarians in South Africa; and to making a strategic plan for the parliament of Zimbabwe.

Donor practices in support of parliaments have taken two basic forms: direct and indirect support. Direct support has the explicit objective of strengthening parliaments for democratisation and good governance purposes. Indirect support is given to parliaments (and other institutions) as an element of promoting specific policy goals, such as poverty reduction, environmental protection, peace and reconciliation, human rights adherence, HIV and AIDS prevention and treatment, etc.

Direct parliamentary support projects typically benefit individual country parliaments (and occasionally federal or sub-national parliaments), or international organisations of parliaments or parliamentarians. They involve capacity building (training, expertise, networking), infrastructure and physical facilities, human support services (secretarial and library services, for instance), but also institutional reform and development. Because the capacities, skills and performance of parliamentarians bear decisively on the functioning of parliaments as institutions, the preferred donor means of support has been training and transfer of knowledge, skills and experiences through seminars, conferences, partnership, exchange programmes, networking, study visits and the like.

The major overriding lesson learned is that *there is no generic, one-size-fits-all approach to parliamentary strengthening*. Contextualisation is the watchword. The variety of parliamentary structures, political systems, party systems, and electoral systems is so great that one must customise approaches to the prevailing conditions. A blueprint approach is not advisable because politics and parliaments are dynamic. They are moving targets that require flexibility over time. Contextualisation

requires politically savvy analysts who can monitor developments, produce political economy analyses and adjust interventions accordingly.

Parliamentary strengthening requires a long time horizon. Effectiveness, let alone long-term impact, in terms of functioning parliaments can only be achieved through patient work over the long run. A decade would by no means be excessive. It should be recalled that electoral cycles are typically 4–5 years. Hence, the duration of an intervention over two electoral cycles would be justified, preferably even three or more.

A country's parliament is an integral part of the political system and cannot be treated as a discrete entity. *Parliamentary strengthening requires a comprehensive approach.* The functionality of a parliament is relational and depends on a host of factors outside the parliament itself. First, no parliament is likely to function well without political parties. Second, the electoral system affects parliamentary conduct. Third, the nature of the political system (presidential or parliamentary) also influences the functionality of parliament.

Aid Interventions to strengthen parliaments should be demand-driven and anchored in domestic needs and demands. Parliamentary strengthening efforts stand a chance of succeeding only if they are based on thorough needs assessments produced in conjunction with the parliament concerned.

Parliamentary strengthening is inherently political in nature and very sensitive. Bilateral donor agencies from former colonial powers or major players on the global scene could easily be suspected of having ulterior motives. Three insights emerge from this political sensitivity with a view to diffusing tension and ensuring effectiveness. First, *multilateral agencies* (e.g. the UNDP) are often seen as less liable to pursuing agendas at variance with the wishes of the recipient countries. (Although the UNDP may have such a comparative advantage, it may not be as efficient in its operations as bilateral agencies, and an alternative to UNDP is basket funding by multiple donors, coordinated by one). Second, the merit of donor harmonisation and coordination should not be taken to the extreme. The tendency of donors to hyper-coordinate has a downside; it may be perceived as 'ganging up' against the recipient or monopolising the expertise and the models advanced. *A measure of pluralism* may be permissible. Third, *peer advice* is generally more acceptable to aid recipients than donor guidance. The involvement of fellow parliamentarians from other countries through parliamentary associations may be helpful.

Parliaments deal with a range of policies and issues and parliamentarians are often in dire need of information and knowledge about specific policy areas. *Issue-based approaches may provide useful entry points.* Training programmes addressing substantive issues – as distinct from procedural change or institutional reform – are convenient entry points, e.g. gender relations; budget tracking; HIV and AIDS; environmental protection; climate change, etc.


To take account of the lessons learned the donors have at their disposal an array of analytical tools for the design of interventions to support parliaments, above all *in-depth, country-specific political economy analysis*.

Donor assistance to parliaments should be based on the precepts of the *Paris Declaration*, especially its principles of harmonisation, alignment and ownership.

It is a perennial problem in donor agencies that the institutional memory and learning is far below par. There is a dire need, therefore, for establishing workable *systems of institutional memory*, learning, knowledge management, and retrieval.

In addition to the generic lessons and recommendations and in view of the *ad hoc* and haphazard nature of Norwegian parliamentary support to date, there is a need for charting a new Norwegian strategy in this field of aid within a broader governance context. Given the relative dearth of Norwegian organisations and milieux with the required competence and experience in parliamentary strengthening, there is a need for developing strategic partnerships beyond Norway. Furthermore, acknowledging the relative low level of political emphasis and prioritisation, expertise, knowledge and competence on parliamentary strengthening in Norad and the MFA at present, a human resource policy should be evolved to ensure a modicum of in-house expertise and experience.

Main Report



1. Introduction

This report starts with a background section on the role of parliaments in governance systems, and on the methodology we adopted. It goes on to specify the core functions of parliament – lawmaking, oversights and representation – and the criteria by which parliamentary performance may be assessed. The third section recounts the evolution of donor support to parliaments, followed by an overview of types of parliamentary support. The fifth section profiles the main international actors in parliamentary support and a sixth separate section on Norwegian support to legislatures. The most important subsequent section enumerates the main lessons learned by the donor community in the area of parliamentary support. And the final section makes specific recommendations to Norway. A series of annexes provide further details.

1.1 Background

The legislature (interchangeably referred to as parliament or national assembly) of a country is potentially the most powerful of all government branches in a democracy. The legislature epitomises and embodies the very idea of democracy; a strong parliament is indicative of a healthy democratic governance system (Fish 2006). It is normally tasked to perform three core functions: (a) representing the electorate; (b) legislation or lawmaking, including the passage of the national budget as law; and (c) oversight of the executive branch of government (Mezey 1985). Additional functions are normally subsumed under those three.

For a parliament to fulfil the above functions effectively, it must first of all be elected freely and fairly through periodic elections and thus be representative of the full range of constituencies in society. The electoral institution confers legitimacy onto parliament which, in turn, is a precondition for playing its democratic role of representing the people. Second, for lawmaking to be effective the legislators need to have the requisite skills for scrutinising bills emanating from the executive and to some extent have its own capability to draft bills. To do so, MPs need knowledge and insights into an array of societal issues and policy fields and be able to deliberate on them. The national budget is arguably the most important law passed by parliament because it distributes state resources to priority areas of development. Third, a well functioning parliament must have the requisite powers and be equipped with adequate means to restrain and hold the executive to account. In performing these functions, parliament can contribute effectively to guaranteeing the people's rights and liberties, securing civil peace and ensuring harmonious and sustainable development.

1.1.1 Transition and democratisation

Political absolutism, with parliament serving as the sovereign's advisory council, was overcome in the history of England with the *Magna Carta*, which established that the king could not levy or collect taxes without the consent of the council. The gradual democratisation of parliament ensued with a broadening of the voting franchise and the increasing parliamentary role of controlling the king and the government. In France the Estates General was replaced by the National Assembly through the French revolution. In most of these transitions from absolutism to some form of democratic rule, the legislature or some other form of a supreme, representative body made a decisive impact on the outcome. The main role of the legislatures in these transitions was constitution-making, i.e. establishing the new fundamental 'rules of the political game' with attendant laws, institutions and elections after the departure of the former authoritarian ruler.

In more recent history, we have seen a similar significant role played by parliaments in Eastern and Central Europe in the transition from communism, in particular by legitimising the new order and establishing new constitutions. Likewise, the third wave of democratic transitions in Africa in the early 1990s included the formation of sovereign assemblies (for instance the *Conférence Nationale Souveraine* in Mali, Benin, Togo and Zaire), which took over power from the de-legitimised and/or overthrown presidents and established new constitutions. Latin-America and Asia saw somewhat different trajectories, often involving the demise of military regimes. Common to most of these modern democratic transitions was a degree of involvement by representative political bodies exerting pressure from below on the autocratic regimes when fissures began to appear in the ruling power bloc, thus paving the way for new democratic state forms.

Today, donor agencies are supporting parliaments as an element of good governance strategies. However, the donor community is a latecomer to this particular sub-field of assistance. The same applies to political party support. These sub-fields have long been considered too political to enter; hence the reluctance to become involved.

1.1.2 Legislatures in presidential and parliamentary systems

Legislatures are known by many names, the most common being parliament, legislature, national assembly and congress, although these terms may have specific connotations. For instance, the legislative body of a parliamentary system (with the powers to dismiss governments) is usually called *parliament* or *national assembly*, whereas in some presidential systems (e.g. in the American tradition) where the executive does not derive its powers from the legislative body it is often referred to as *congress*. However, in this report the terms legislature, parliament and congress are used interchangeably, disregarding variations of connotation and usage.

The legislature is one of three branches of government in a system of separation of powers. In this model each branch has separate and independent powers and areas of responsibility. The most common separation of power is between the *executive*, the *legislature*, and the *judiciary*. The executive branch comprises the

office of the president or the prime minister, including her/his cabinet or council of ministers as politically appointed heads of government ministries, and with the entire civil service at its disposal. The executive is charged with policy-making and the preparation of bills, including the budget and with the execution of the decisions made by parliament. The legislative branch, on the other hand, is the parliament, congress or national assembly, with the power to make and change laws, including the state budget. The judiciary, with its hierarchy of courts from magistrates' courts to the Supreme Court at the top, interprets and applies the law. Normally, the judiciary has the power of judicial review, i.e. determining whether the laws passed by the legislature are consistent with the provisions of the constitution.

While all legislatures serve the same core functions, regardless of political system, there are some notable differences of nuance with regard to the relationships between the branches of government, depending on whether the systems are presidential or parliamentary, or hybrids thereof (van de Walle 2002). In *presidential systems* the president is elected directly by the electorate and often holds the dual position of both head of state and government in one office. Between elections he or she can only be removed through an elaborate impeachment process of legal character. Depending on the specific constitutional dispensation, considerable executive power is vested in the presidency, often at the expense of the legislature. In the developing world, the overwhelming majority of countries have singularly presidential systems.

In *parliamentary systems*, by contrast, there is normally a separation of the office of an executive prime minister or premier as head of government and that of head of state who may be an elected president or a non-elected, hereditary monarch. The constitutions prescribe the functions of the head of state, which are largely of a ceremonial nature. The prime minister holds executive power with his/her cabinet that may be composed of elected politicians or non-elected technocrats, as the case may be. In the discharge of her/his functions the premier is dependent on the confidence of the legislature. This means that at any point in time, the legislature may pass a vote of no confidence in the cabinet (or sometimes individual ministers), in which case the premier and her/his cabinet must step down. This mechanism is a powerful tool for holding the executive to account and exemplifies *horizontal accountability*, i.e. how the branches of government hold each other to account at the same level (O'Donnell 1998). *Vertical accountability*, on the other hand, has to do with the relationship between those elected to office and those who elected them, typically between members of parliament and their constituents. Vertical accountability is a key element of one of the core functions of parliament: representation of voters at the central level of the political system.

While presidential systems adhere to a strict separation of powers between the three branches of government, parliamentary systems do not to the same extent. The executive, which consists of a prime minister and his/her cabinet, is generally drawn from among the ranks of parliamentarians. In some systems non-elected persons may serve in ministerial positions on the strength of their professional competence rather than elective support. Although the legislative and executive branches are thus somehow connected in parliamentary systems, the cabinet's

linkage with the legislature does not afford the former unlimited legislative influence. And an independent judiciary is retained.

In parliamentary systems, the legislature is formally supreme and also serves as the recruitment base of the executive. The Scandinavian parliamentary systems are cases in point. In these systems the cabinet ministers are subject to parliamentary scrutiny and dependent on parliamentary confidence. In this sense, the executive and legislative branches are intertwined, yet horizontal accountability is exercised, albeit differing from that of presidential systems. There are many hybrid political systems, however, i.e. in-between systems combining elements of parliamentarism and presidentialism as set out in the constitutions and prevailing political practices.

Legislatures often comprise one or more chambers or houses: assemblies that deliberate and vote upon bills. A legislature with only one house is called *unicameral*, while a *bicameral* legislature has two separate chambers, usually designated as upper (e.g. a senate) and lower (e.g. a house of commons, representatives or deputies). Their duties and powers differ, as do the methods for the election/selection of their members.

Other critical components of legislatures are the *committee system* and the *party groups*. The bulk of parliamentary work takes place in the committees as effective working groups, the majority of which addresses the policies and issues handled by line ministries, e.g. finance, agriculture, health, education, transport and communications, etc. (Shaw 1998). These committees deliberate on bills and policies within their respective sectoral remits, and subsequently report to the plenary for further debate and eventual adoption. Normally, a legislature also has standing and *ad hoc* committees. The former cuts across substantive or policy fields and often relate to administrative matters, public appointments or auditing, while the latter may be appointed to deal with specific issues of a transient nature. The party groups (also called parliamentary group, caucus or conference) are composed of parliamentarians (deputies, MPs) from the same political party or coalition. Both usually have formal and informal duties and obligations, a leadership (chair and a whip), and a secretariat.

1.1.3 External support and donor policies

There has always been some circulation of ideas and principles from one country (and continent) to another regarding parliamentary development. Parliaments and other state institutions have partly been designed and supported by former colonial powers in the process of de-colonisation and latterly buttressed by the international community in the process of democratisation after the demise of the Soviet system in Eastern and Central Europe, in Central Asia and in other parts of the world affected by Cold War rivalry. Similarly, parliaments in states emerging from violent conflict have been supported by external actors/donors.

Donor assistance to parliaments gained momentum in the early 1990s. Today, the international community, both through NGOs and government organisations (including developed country parliaments and donor agencies) at bilateral and multilateral levels run programmes intended to support parliamentary institutions in the developing world. Strengthening parliaments has become a regular feature

of the programmes of some organisations such as the UNDP, the European Commission, the USAID, DFID and others (IPU 2003:4). Donor assistance to parliaments is seen as an important element in achieving development aid effectiveness in general. It is generally assumed that recipient countries can and should develop their own oversight capacity and accountability mechanisms, including those exercised by parliaments. The changing aid architecture with the devolution of project execution to recipients attests to that, perhaps best exemplified by the increasing use of budget support as an aid modality in line with the principles of harmonisation, ownership and alignment stemming from the *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*. It is assumed that ownership of national development strategies is reinforced if parliaments and citizens are genuinely engaged and involved in the planning and use of aid flows.

However, moving into politically charged fields such as parliamentary support has been slow on the part of the donor community. Conventionally, aid has been conceived as apolitical and largely a technical matter (Unsworth 2009: 886):

The implicit assumption is still that the obstacles to better governance and development performance are primarily financial, technical and managerial, and that progress can be made through more appropriate policies, capacity building, strengthening demand from civil society and dialogue or conditionality to change the behaviour of key individuals.

This apolitical conception thus lingers as evidenced by the still modest support for parliaments and the associated field of political party support. The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of the donors embracing political approaches and elements in their strategies when good governance was put forcefully on the agenda. Acknowledging, after decades of meagre results, that the main stumbling blocks to effective aid delivery is of a political nature has led to the acceptance – however reluctant – of political considerations in aid programmes and negotiations. Even so, throughout most of the 1990s governance was interpreted rather restrictively to mean economic governance or sound management of the economies of recipient countries, thus retaining a considerably technical imprint. Some donors gradually started to apply political economy analysis to the countries with which they cooperate. But there is still some way to go before donors fully accept that “politics is not an optional extra, or something that gets in the way of development. It is central to the whole endeavour (Unsworth 2009: 891).” Including parliamentary support as an integral element in donors’ aid strategies is one step in the right direction.

1.2 Approach and Methodology

Parliamentary assistance is a field of aid whose effects, outcomes and impact are exceedingly difficult to gauge. That is probably a main reason why the ODI/PC report on *Parliamentary Strengthening and the Paris Principles* (Hudson and Tsekpo 2009: para 2) stated that:

... there is little systematic research or analysis about the effectiveness of parliaments or about the effectiveness of parliamentary strengthening. This makes it difficult for those considering whether and how to spend resources on parliamentary strengthening to make well-informed decisions.

As in other governance areas, the methodological challenges in measuring effects are formidable for a host of reasons. A recent global survey of legislatures (Fish and Kroenig 2009) acknowledged the methodological difficulties and opted for a combination of two qualitative methods to assess the power of parliaments: (a) a close reading and interpretation of constitutional provisions; and (b) inter-subjective validation by a panel of experts with long-standing experience and deep country-specific knowledge of the parliament in question. These experts answered a series of key questions about the power relationship between the legislative and executive branches of government. This combination of methods captured informal practices that complemented the review of the constitutional texts, and eventually a *Parliamentary Powers Index* (PPI) was arrived at, ranging from 1 to 0, where one suggests a total parliamentary power over the executive and zero suggests a total parliamentary subservience to the executive.

The weakness of this approach concerns basis for generalisation and measurement of developments over time. The detailed information on each country case does not lend itself easily to generalisation. Furthermore, the snapshot recording of the state of affairs at one particular point in time only and the lack of a time series renders this approach unsuitable for tracking changes over time. Despite its weaknesses this method is probably as good as it gets with the methodological toolbox currently available.

A well known statistical instrument is the World Bank Institute's *Worldwide Governance Indicators* (WGI), based on good composite time-series data on a range of governance indicators.¹ They capture six key dimensions of governance: (a) voice and accountability; (b) political stability and lack of violence; (c) government effectiveness; (d) regulatory quality; (e) rule of law; and (f) control of corruption. The data have been compiled since 1996 in over 200 countries, based on close to 40 data sources produced by over 30 different organisations worldwide and updated on an annual basis since 2002 to date.

Although the relative importance of the dimensions can be questioned, as well as the quality of the data sources, the WGI are suitable for comparing countries and capturing change over time. The relevance of these indicators to parliamentary functions and developments is limited, however, as the "effectiveness of parliament as lawmaking and oversight institution" is addressed by only one (incomplete) dataset of the five underlying the 'voice and accountability' indicator, and the background data are impossible to extract and re-use.

Another global indicator on parliaments measures (changes in) the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments, expressed as a percentage of all seats. This is actually one of the *Millennium Development Goal* indicators (and the only governance-related MDG indicator).² However, while the proportion of women parliamentarians may perhaps be used as an indicator of representation, it does not say much more. Apart from numbers it is critical what women MPs actually do

1 See <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>.

2 See UN statistics on women seats in national parliaments at <http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=557> and IPU *Women in National Parliaments* statistics at: www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm.

once elected. An increase in the proportion of women does not necessarily strengthen parliament as an institution or the democratic process. In Angola the substantial increase of women parliamentarian (up from 15 to 37.3 per cent) merely increased the number of ruling party backbenchers and presidential clients, and might rather indicate a further marginalisation of parliament.

Yet another possible indicator might be the number of laws that the legislature is able to debate and pass in a session or a term. However, while such an indicator may, on the face of it, suggest efficiency in the law-making function of parliament, it might just as well reflect subservience to the executive by rubber-stamping legislation without real deliberation.

In terms of the representational function, a potential indicator might be the number of questions asked in parliament about issues that are at the centre of concern for the MPs' constituents. If parliament operates in a transparent manner the constituents are likely to become aware of the issues that their MPs raise. However, a weakness of such an indicator is perhaps that it will only record superficially what happens in plenary sessions rather than the actual impact of such questions. Such an indicator would also not take into account the work in the interest of their constituents that MPs perform in committees.

In other words, there is no general agreement on the role of parliaments in liberal democracies, and little systematic data on parliamentary performance that is comparable in time and space. Furthermore, there is still relatively little systematic, let alone comprehensive, knowledge of the basic facts and figures on donor support to parliaments, and even less on the structural conditions under which such assistance can be effective and efficient.³

In view of these methodological constraints, the knowledge base on parliamentary performance and on donor support to parliaments is relatively limited but growing, yet not easily accessible. At the same time, a consensus seems to be emerging on international minimum standards and benchmarks for democratic legislatures (NDI n.d, CPA 2006). Specific reports have also been produced on selected parliamentary functions, especially in the budget process and financial accountability, presumably because economic governance has been given priority by the donors (Pelizzo and Stapenhurst 2004; Pelizzo, Stapenhurst and Olson 2005; Sharkey, Dreger and Bhatia 2006; Wehner 2004 and 2007; and DFID, UNDP and WBI 2007).

There are also some prescriptive guides and handbooks for designing parliamentary strengthening projects (Center for Democracy and Governance 2000; IPU 2006 and UNDP 2009a).

Recently, some systematic overviews on donor support to parliaments have also been compiled, and a few evaluations have been made of major programmes. They include the 2003 IPU/UNDP report *Ten Years of Strengthening Parliaments in Africa*,

³ This is lamented, for instance, in a report from a donor coordination meeting on parliamentary support in October 2008 (DFID, UNDP and WBI 2008; DFID, WBI and CPA 2008).

1991–2000; the 2005 Sida report *Approaches to Parliamentary Strengthening. A Review of Sida's Support to Parliaments* (Hubli & Schmidt 2005); the 2007 mid-term evaluation report on the *Global Programme for Parliamentary Strengthening II: Mid-term Evaluation Report* (Murphy and Alhada 2007); the 2007 ODI/DFID report *Parliamentary Strengthening in Developing Countries* (Hudson & Wren 2007); the 2008 AAPPG report *Strengthening Parliaments in Africa: Improving Support*; the 2009 ODI/PC report *Parliamentary Strengthening and the Paris Principles: Synthesis Report* (Hudson and Tsekpo 2009); and the WBI retrospective report on the World Bank Institute's Parliamentary Strengthening Programme *Strengthening Parliaments – Strengthening Accountability* (WBI 2007).

Other studies and information management initiatives are in the pipeline, e.g. the ongoing joint UNDP/DFID/WBI project on a *Parliamentary Development Knowledge Portal* and a synthesis study commissioned by the European Commission on *Strategies and methodologies on EC action in support to parliaments* (see annex A2 7 and 7 below).

To fill some of the knowledge gaps, Norad commissioned this report with a view to reviewing and synthesising international experiences to date and to summarising lessons learned with regard to parliamentary strengthening in order to determine what works and what does not, and to indicate reasons why some interventions work while others do not. A secondary purpose was to provide as complete an overview as possible of Norwegian assistance in this field since the mid-1990s because no such overview exists at present.

The assignment is defined as a desk study, which means that there has been no scope for primary data collection. Consequently, no fieldwork has been carried out; the study has relied on secondary material, i.e. available donor agency and study reports, evaluations, and grey literature as well as published academic works. This lack of first-hand information on the functions and development of parliaments has rendered impossible any independent assessment of the effects, let alone long-term impact, of donor support to parliaments. Anyhow, the ToR did not require fieldwork to be done.

Notwithstanding the desk study nature of the assignment we have taken a few steps further. For the purpose of getting the facts right about who is doing what (and at what cost), we have conducted a small survey with a few basic questions regarding type of parliamentary support, geography, amounts, partners, etc. The respondents have been donor agencies as sources of funding for parliamentary projects and other organisations acting as conduits for such agencies in trust funds and similar arrangements. In the specific case of Norway, we have also sought information in the archives of Norad and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, we have approached the Norwegian embassies in view of the new aid architecture, which means devolution of considerable decision-making authority to embassies. The fact that the reporting system from embassies to headquarters in Oslo is deficient necessitated that we approach the embassies directly. Sometimes the data sets were readily available for use, but in most cases we requested the

basic facts to be compiled and submitted to us. We have entered the information received in a matrix that is appended to this report.

Complementary to the limited survey, we have also conducted in-depth interviews in person or by phone to acquire more detailed information and insights. The range of stakeholder interviewees covered Norad, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Sida, DFID, the UNDP Brussels office, International IDEA, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA), the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD), the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MinBuZa), Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA), the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI).

We recognise the methodological constraint that the objectivity and impartiality of secondary sources may be questionable and that their limited coverage may have caused a bias. There is always a risk that internal reviews and self-evaluations, including agency considerations of relevance, efficiency and effectiveness, may be self-congratulatory and over-rate the performance of interventions. This problem is less pronounced when external evaluators and experts conduct the evaluations and reviews. Overall, however, with the triangulation of methods – perusal of secondary material, a survey and in-depth interviews – we are reasonably confident that our findings are valid, despite constraints of time and resources.

2. Functions of Legislatures

In terms of democracy and governance, the donor community generally takes as its point of departure and normative foundation of its policies and actions the notion of liberal democracy. In a most stylised form Francis Fukuyama (1992) claimed that history had come to an end in the sense that liberal democracy had won the historical battle and become ‘the only game in town’. While recognising that other conceptions of democracy do exist, this report sticks to the predominant normative framework espoused by the donors.

The academic literature as well as the practitioners’ guides and manuals seem to agree that legislatures as key institutions of governance have three core functions: lawmaking or legislation, including the adoption of the national budget as law; oversight; and representation. Some political scientists add other functions such as recruitment, socialisation and training, and legitimation. When fulfilling these functions parliaments contribute to democratic consolidation over time. There also appears to be agreement in the literature on four quality criteria by which parliaments may be assessed: transparency; accountability; participation; and policy impact.

It should be pointed out, however, that there is a discrepancy between academic analyses and the discourse among practitioners in the donor community. While academics increasingly emphasise the importance of including the ‘informality of politics’ or clientelism in their analyses (e.g. Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Chabal and Daloz 1999), the majority of reports and guidelines emanating from the donors generally neglects these aspects of governance, including the functionality of parliaments. The latter mode of thinking tends to stick to the formal rules and regulations as the underpinnings of aid interventions. We strongly feel this neglect of informality and clientelism jeopardises the potential success of interventions. There is a case, therefore, for taking account of the informal dimensions of governance when designing interventions, with due consideration to the context at hand.

2.1 Core functions

The three core functions of parliaments – lawmaking, oversight, and representation – are briefly discussed below. While this report is not the place for a lengthy discussion of parliamentary functions it is nevertheless necessary to provide rudimentary information as to what these functions entail as a backdrop to the subsequent discussion of experiences and lessons learned. Thus the readers can get an appreciation of the donors’ justification of parliamentary support which is precisely to assist parliaments in fulfilling these functions better.

It is acknowledged, however, that the circumstances of many developing countries do not necessarily conform to the precepts of democratic theory. The element of informality normally occupies a much larger space in governance institutions than is the case in established democracies. However, institutionalisation means that over time the scope for informal practices will be diminished as formal rules are enforced and hence the unpredictability of outcomes will also be reduced.

2.1.1 Lawmaking

The very name of the legislature suggests precisely that lawmaking is its primary function. As an elected assembly in a representative democracy the members of parliament (MPs) have been mandated, through free and fair elections, to represent the constituents and to make laws on their behalf. The fundamental principle that no legislation can be passed without the consent of the people is thus exercised through elected representatives. In other words, consent is given via proxies by the indirect means of election.

Bills are normally prepared by the executive branch and tabled in the legislature for approval after debate in relevant committees and in plenary. However, in many systems MPs are at liberty to table so-called private members' bills if the executive is perceived to neglect certain issues that require attention, or if MPs prefer to table alternative bills that differ in substance from those advanced by the executive. Sometimes civil society organisations (CSOs) apply pressure on MPs to table bills on matters perceived to be urgent.

Beyond the legal text passed, it is common practice for legislatures to delegate to the relevant ministry to adopt subsidiary legislation, i.e. rules and regulations that specify and explain further how a legal text is to be understood and applied. Such subsidiary legislation is in many instances very significant and can give rise to controversy.

Arguably the most important law is the budget. In other words, parliament holds the 'power of the purse' and the executive may not spend money without parliamentary approval. The national budget determines the allocation of state resources to an array of purposes and thus involves issues of taxation and the incurring and servicing debts. As a result, it invites lively debate on priorities. Diverse interests expressed through party caucuses and demands from constituencies pull in different directions. It is important, therefore, that parliament is given adequate time to review the budget proposal tabled by the executive. In the end, a compromise is found mandating the state to pursue revenue collection and begin disbursing money in accordance with the budget as agreed.

While constitutions are normally framed through dedicated processes involving special commissions and wide consultation, any resultant constitutional proposal must be approved by the legislature before taking effect. The same applies to subsequent constitutional amendments.

Apart from domestic legislation, it is common that accession to international treaties must be approved by the legislature. In a globalising world where the

Westphalian state system is increasingly being displaced by international regulatory regimes in specific spheres, this aspect of law-making is particularly significant (Chayes and Chayes 1998).⁴ Regardless of the legal system of a country being monistic or dualistic, ratification by parliament is required. In dualistic systems international and domestic law are two separate systems. Hence, a special implementation act is required to make international law applicable on a par with, or superior to, domestic legislation. The monistic legal tradition, by contrast, posits that international law automatically becomes part of domestic law, normally from the time of promulgation. In such legal systems the provisions of conventions and treaties are considered 'self-executing', i.e. they are formulated in such a manner that they can be applied directly by the domestic judiciary. This underscores the central role of the legislature in all lawmaking.

The procedures for making laws may vary from one country to another, depending on their parliaments being unicameral or bi-cameral, and other stipulations laid down in standing orders and the constitution. In situations where there is tension between the executive and the legislature these procedures are critical. For example, what mechanisms are in place for parliament to block or veto bills tabled by the executive?

Distinct from legislative matters, parliaments are at liberty 'to parley' on any subject of local, national, or international interest. Parliament is a forum for deliberation and exchange of views. Stemming from such debates, parliaments have the right to adopt resolutions or other non-binding expressions of will. Often such debates are spurred by policy documents tabled by the executive, e.g. white papers on certain policy issues. These debates form part of a wider policy-making process where the views of the legislatures are given particular weight. In this sense, parliaments may play a role in policy-making which is normally the prerogative of the executive.

2.1.2 Oversight

The second core function of parliament is oversight, which simply means scrutinising and monitoring the actions and inactions of the executive. Ultimately, the executive is accountable to the legislature. The oversight function, which epitomises horizontal accountability, may be exercised in various ways. The mechanisms range from impeachment in presidential systems and a vote of no confidence in parliamentary systems – or the threat of such action – to summoning officials and cabinet ministers, and question time in parliament. A well functioning parliamentary committee system is a key element in exercising oversight, not only through the dedicated oversight committees such as the public accounts and public appointments committees, but also through the substantive committees dealing with sectoral matters within the remit of line ministries. The legislature is empowered to demand information from the executive in order to be able to exercise the oversight function meaningfully. It is also common that executive appointees to non-elected public office are vetted by the legislature. This sometimes includes senior judges.

⁴ The 1648 *Treaties of Westphalia*, which ended the Thirty Years War, established a system of sovereign states possessing the monopoly of force within their mutually recognised territories. Inter-state relations are conducted by means of formal diplomatic ties between heads of state and governments, and international law consists of treaties made between sovereign states. However, globalisation has meant the gradual erosion of Westphalian state system as a web of international legal regimes increasingly restrains the exercise of state sovereignty.

Parliaments have the authority to create commissions of inquiry to investigate matters where executive impropriety or malfeasance is suspected. Such commissions are authorised to call executive officials and other witnesses to give evidence under oath. Their reports, often containing recommendations, are generally debated in the public arena and represent a powerful mechanism of oversight.

In its oversight role, special institutions of restraint normally complement the parliament. These include the supreme audit institution, ombudsmen, anti-corruption bureaux, human rights commissions, etc. which ideally operate autonomous of the executive. In many systems they report to parliament.

For a legislature to operate autonomously and exercise effective oversight of the executive branch it must be financially independent, i.e. control its own budget. The legislature must not rely financially on the very same institution it is meant to hold to account. Similarly, control of the parliamentary calendar is critical. If the timing and duration of the sittings of parliament occur at the whim of the executive one cannot expect any effective oversight.

2.1.3 Representation

The legislature is an elected assembly. As such it represents the electorate. Apart from any other duties, each legislator is duty-bound to represent her/his constituents. The ways in which this representational function is performed – typifying vertical accountability – varies according to the electoral system of a country. Very many developing countries have adopted the first-past-the-post system in single member constituencies, which means that the candidate with the plurality (but not necessarily the majority) of the votes cast is elected. If there are many candidates contesting, the winning candidate may thus enjoy the support of only a minority of the electorate. It is a ‘winner-takes-all’ system because the losing candidates are totally left out, even if they jointly command a majority of the votes cast. The main arguments in favour of this system are its simplicity, which makes it easy to administer and understand, and the close relationship it tends to foster between the elected representative and the electors, which, in turn, promotes direct accountability; constituency service tends to become paramount. The main counter-argument is that the first-past-the-post system ‘personalises’ politics, i.e. that politics becomes centred on personalities rather than policies and issues.

By contrast, a proportional representation (PR) electoral system is based on party lists of candidates. The distribution of winning candidates is proportional to the number of votes garnered by each party. Such systems are considered more ‘just’ in terms of representation because the winner does not take all. Instead, there is close to mathematical fairness of proportional representation. In some cases there are even national compensatory seats allocated to parties whose votes are spread too thin across constituencies. To discourage the proliferation of many small parties, however, minimum thresholds may be introduced, i.e. that a party needs to garner, say, at least five per cent of the national vote to be represented in parliament.

Additionally, this system is perceived to be advantageous because it encourages attention to policies and issues espoused by political parties rather than focusing on personalities. A problem is, however, that it presupposes reasonably functioning political parties and party systems capable of articulating the concerns and grievances of the electorate and that the contesting parties espouse political alternatives that are discernible to the ordinary voters. This presupposition rarely holds true. In the developing world political parties tend to be dominated by rich and strong personalities who practically 'own' their parties. Election manifestos are often indistinguishable and the organisational capacities of parties are deficient. The upshot is a faulty party system.

It is possible to combine the two main types of electoral system and the permutations are legion. Some countries have gone that route, apparently with a measure of success. But generally alternative electoral systems are rarely debated.

Notwithstanding the existing electoral systems, it is expected of the elected MPs to be both responsive *ex ante* to the demands of their voters during election campaigns and accountable *ex post* to the same voters once elected into office (Gloppen et al. 2003). The degree to which a political candidate is responsive to the concerns of the constituents will bear on his/her chances of election, and correspondingly the degree of accountability will determine the chances of re-election. The electoral institution provides the principal mechanism of vertical accountability, i.e. the means by which the voters may express their satisfaction or disapproval of the performance by their elected representatives. Some countries' constitutions also contain provisions for the recall of elected representatives during the parliamentary term.

2.2 Quality criteria

Parliamentary strengthening programmes address an array of institutional variables in order to buttress the institution's ability to fulfil its core functions. As a corollary, the performance of parliaments must be judged in terms of the degree to which they actually fulfil them. This study is not an evaluation of parliamentary support programmes as such. It is rather a synthesis of cumulative experiences and lessons learned by the donor community, stemming from evaluations undertaken previously. Still, it is useful to insert a number of caveats as to the quality of such evaluations.

Four quality criteria are commonly applied to assess the general performance of parliaments in underpinning their core functions: transparency, participation, accountability, and policy impact.

Transparency of operation is the hallmark of democratic institutions. For example, if the budget process is fairly closed – i.e. considered a matter of negotiation only between the executive and the legislature – thus denying access for extra-parliamentary actors who have a stake in the outcome, it can hardly be called democratic. This applies even if parliamentarians in a representative democracy are supposed to represent the interests of their constituents. Open debate about budgetary provisions will not only make the process more democratic, it will also provide broader ownership of the budget and contribute to building its legitimacy as

a key document. The International Budget Partnership (IBP) compiles on an annual basis an *Open Budget Index* which evaluates whether central governments give the public access to budget information and opportunities to participate in the budget process. It also examines the ability of legislatures and auditors to hold their governments to account.⁵

Closely linked to transparency is extra-parliamentary participation in parliamentary affairs, which reinforces the democratic nature of parliamentary processes. For example, public hearings may be organised on salient policy issues to air proposals and to get feedback from diverse interests and broad sections of society. In some countries CSOs, or coalitions of CSOs, are given policy documents informally, e.g. parts of the budget, in advance of the relevant parliamentary debate. This affords them an opportunity to study the documents thoroughly and prepare a well-considered response. Again, it might be argued that in a representative democracy the MPs act on behalf of their constituents. It does not follow, however, that delegating authority to representatives means a demobilised and voiceless citizenry between polling days. In a democratic dispensation, political participation is not exercised only once every 4-5 years when casting a ballot paper. Continuous engagement by citizens and lively public debate only serve to reinforce democratic rule.

Accountability is a broad, two-dimensional concept. First, it comprises answerability, i.e. the provision of information, explanation and justification of one's actions or inactions. In this context it means that parliamentarians are required to explain and justify their policy decisions to the people, citizens, and voters. Second, it also entails enforceability, i.e. the capacity to impose sanctions on miscreants, in this case on other state institutions, so as to enforce its decisions (Wang 2005:1-2). The legislature has an accountability relationship to the executive (horizontal accountability) and to the electorate (vertical accountability) alike. In the former, the legislature holds the executive to account, whereas in the latter the legislature is held to account by the electorate, mainly through elections.

Bearing in mind the methodological difficulties, it is virtually impossible to gauge the degree to which parliaments produce long-term policy impacts. It must be recalled that parliaments are moving targets that are not easily captured.

2.3 Weaknesses of parliaments

In general, parliaments are weak in most developing countries, partly as a reflection of their operation in political systems with a strong presidency but also for other reasons. The characterisation of African parliaments by the UN Economic Commission for Africa in its *African Governance Report 2005* is probably indicative of the state of parliaments across the developing world, albeit allowing for some nuance (UNECA 2005: 201-203):

... many African legislators lack the education, knowledge, information, freedom and independence to perform their constitutionally mandated functions efficiently and effectively. Lack of adequately stocked libraries, electronic equipment, documentation

⁵ See <http://www.openbudgetindex.org/>

facilities and professional staff are common capacity gaps. The executive in many African countries still largely overpowers the legislature. (...) [and] may use various methods, including intimidation, financial squeeze and patronage to subdue the legislature. This has eroded the freedom and independence of the legislature in many African countries. (...) Legislative committees in many countries are also very weak due to low educational standards of members, the lack of a professional team to serve those committees and the fact that political patronage is often a key determinant of who serves in a committee and in what capacity.

A recent academic study of African parliaments has confirmed their continued weakness, yet found that they are becoming increasingly significant when asserting their independence and claiming a role as more than the mere rubber stamps of the executive (Barkan 2009).

Political parties are central to the functioning of parliaments in accordance with international norms and standards. If individual political parties function poorly in terms of interest articulation, policy formulation, nomination of candidates, and election campaigning, the party system is also likely to suffer from serious shortcomings.

Quite apart from structural and other weaknesses of parliaments in the developing world, the incentives for candidates to stand for office are a major problem. In a few countries the level of remuneration is so excessive that it threatens to undermine the position of the legislature; individualised motivations take precedence over social and political responsibility of the elected MPs (LSE 2007/2008). A case in point is Kenya where an MP is paid USD 120,000 per year. Her or his homologue in Ethiopia is paid merely USD 3,240 per year (*Economist* 15–21 August 2009:29). In the latter case, the low level of remuneration is a serious impediment to legislators fulfilling their roles. Similarly, fringe benefits vary from extraordinary ‘gratuities’ paid out by the president – sometimes exceeding the annual official payment, such as in Angola (Hodges 2004:61) – to parliamentarians who are compelled to cover most of their expenses themselves. Such ‘perverse’ pay incentive structures are often reinforced by informal rewards and punishments stemming from existing power relations, which may be shifting over time and thus introduce a capricious element to parliamentary behaviour.

Text Box 1: Malawi – Major Recipient of Parliamentary Support

The Malawi parliament has been a major recipient of donor support over many years, with funding from multiple donors, including the USAID, DFID, Norway and Sweden. In the earlier phases support was channelled through a basket funding arrangement under UNDP auspices. In late 2007 an agreement was signed in support of the implementation of the strategic plan of Malawi's legislative assembly. The total grant amounted to NOK 10 million, split equally between Norway and Sweden for the period 2008–2009. The executing agency is the Malawi National Assembly itself. It appears not to have been possible to continue the erstwhile basket fund arrangement. As a result, several bilateral donors have entered into separate agreements.

Between the elections in 2004 and the recent ones in 2009, there was an impasse between the executive and the legislature. The president had been elected on the ticket of the United Democratic Front (UDF) but had since defected and formed his own party, taking with him a large number of other MP defectors. The opposition therefore invoked section 65 of the constitution which says that MPs who 'cross the floor' could have their seats declared vacant by the Speaker to compel them to stand afresh in a bi-election. The president managed to stall for nearly five years, even defying a Supreme Court ruling in favour of the opposition's view, until the May 2009 elections when his new party won a landslide victory. On the face of it (notwithstanding the complexity of executive-parliamentary relations), the oversight power of the legislature had not been strengthened much through donor support. The presidential system in Malawi continues to relegate parliament to a subordinate position (Dulani and van Donge 2005; Patel and Tostensen 2006 and 2007). The case of parliamentary strengthening in Malawi highlights the centrality of informality in the life of political institutions, i.e. that the formal rules of the political game are easily circumvented if opportune to do so (see Rakner et al. 2004).

3. Evolution of Donors' Governance Support

Given the pivotal role of parliaments in democratic governance systems, and in the consolidation of democracy, donors are poised to provide assistance to enable parliaments to fulfil those roles more effectively. When many developing countries became independent in the early 1960s, most of them inherited the political institutions of the former colonial power, sometimes with significant assistance to make them function properly (IPU 2003:1). Although success was modest – as most of the new states in Africa soon moved to authoritarian, one-party, presidential or military regimes – the experience was valuable.

With the end of the Cold War, Western governments extensively supported the post-communist parliaments of Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, for instance through the US House of Representatives' task force, through the Ford Foundation, through a number of individual parliamentary partnerships, various organisational initiatives and through the European Commission's PHARE programme (Olson and Norton 1996:5-6). With EU membership as an incentive additional to financial and technical support, the foreign factor was very important in Eastern European transitions.

With the democratisation processes in Eastern Europe and Africa in the early 1990s, donor support to parliaments picked up momentum. Conventional infrastructure and technical assistance projects were broadened to encompass other elements to improve the political functioning of parliaments (IPU 2003:2). Gradually, assistance programmes considered parliaments as institutions, i.e. focused on building those institutions through a range of activities for parliamentarians such as skills and competence enhancement, outreach, and constituency relations.

3.1 Democracy and good governance

When Africa entered its 'third wave' of democratic transitions at the beginning of the 1990s, some of the sovereign national assemblies, particularly in Benin, received significant external support, politically and materially. This support enabled the parliaments to fulfil their constitution-making role in the transition process. Furthermore, as African parliaments began successively to assert themselves, it became evident that this enhanced role was not matched by an increase in available resources commensurate with the tasks at hand. On the contrary, in the struggle between incumbent presidents in personalised presidential systems and the resurging and sometimes ambitious parliaments, the former often used asphyxiation tactics to preserve its powers. Therefore, some resource-starved African

parliaments turned to the international community for assistance, which generated some external support to help the democratisation processes to move forward.

The ideal of democracy – including popular participation, accountability and transparency, rule of law, respect for human rights, and human and economic development – has expressly been at the heart of debates on donor assistance over the past two decades. Regardless of positions taken in these debates, the pivotal role of a properly functioning parliament has been recognised as an integral element of democratic rule and good governance.

Although a necessary political institution, a functioning parliament is not a sufficient precondition for a democratic system to work. Donors have had to consider parliamentary strengthening projects in a broader context. Such contextualisation includes political economy and regime characteristics, the role of the electoral system and the political parties, and political culture. Parliament does not exist in a cocoon; it is linked to society at large, to constituencies, civil society, organised interests, the media, political parties, ministries and government agencies, international bodies, etc., all of which having a considerable bearing on its functioning. This contextualisation has not only made parliamentary strengthening projects more challenging and complex to design and implement, but also more difficult to evaluate *ex post*. With lofty and vague ideals and ideas of democracy as the very purpose of parliamentary strengthening, it has been difficult to arrive at clear-cut criteria for judging the efficiency and success of such projects and programmes. There is a host of structural, historical, circumstantial and intervening factors that determine the path of democratisation of a given country, and donor intervention in one institution such as parliament cannot easily be isolated and evaluated separately (see section 1.2 above).

3.2 Elections, political parties and civil society

The donors' good governance agenda has overwhelmingly centred on economic governance, i.e. managing the economy well in a rather technocratic fashion so as to get the macro-economic fundamentals right. In this regard, parliaments have not featured prominently. Rather, the donors' partner institutions have been the various ministries of the executive branch of government, in particular the ministries of finance and planning, as the case might be. Involvement with parliaments was perceived to be an overtly political field in which donors feared to tread. Why a partnership with the executive would be considered less political is difficult to fathom. After all, in a democratic system of governance *all* branches of government have critical roles to play, not only the executive. It is as if one leg (parliament) of the democratic tripod would be neglected and to some extent also the second one (the judiciary). It goes without saying that such a tripod would be very unstable, if at all capable of maintaining balance.

One political arena in which donors have not hesitated to become involved is elections. Election-related projects are arguably the principal channel of aid for governance purposes or democratisation more broadly since the early 1990s. Large sums of donor money have been spent on the administration of elections in newly democratising states around the world. But again, the approach has been largely

technocratic, i.e. providing technical and financial assistance to election management bodies in efforts to ensure free and fair elections. Scores of election observation missions have been fielded to judge whether the elections have matched international standards. This electoral emphasis is consonant with the myopic notion of democracy as principally a matter of elections, leading to what has sometimes been called ‘electoralism’, while neglecting other key facets of a democratic system.

Apart from parliamentary support, which is the subject matter of this report, assistance to political parties has long been neglected in the governance debate. The reticence to enter political arenas has probably been even stronger in respect of political parties than of parliaments. Yet, nobody would disagree that political parties play a decisive role in any governance system.⁶ With a few exceptions, most donors have chosen not to embark on major political party support programmes because it was considered unduly intrusive.

While shying away from political parties and less so from parliaments as recipients of aid, the donor community has embraced civil society organisations (CSOs) engaged in advocacy (as distinct from development and charity NGOs). These CSOs have typically championed single issues or clusters of issues, be it health, education, human rights or governance in broad terms. Given the weakness of political parties, some of the larger CSOs with the support of donors, may, in effect, have displaced political parties in the public debate on salient issues.

3.3 Budget support

In recent years the aid architecture has been changing. In the interest of harmonisation, alignment and recipient ownership, donor agencies have endeavoured to move away from discrete, short-term projects that tend to be small and with comparatively high transaction costs, towards larger programmes, which increasingly tend to cover entire sectors such as health and education. They have been dubbed sector-wide approaches (SWAPs). A further move has been towards budget support. Linked to the changing modes of donor support, increasing decision-making authority has been devolved to embassies.

Underlying this changing aid architecture is the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness from 2005. The Paris principles of ownership and alignment have strengthened the role of the recipient partner in the aid relationship. General budget support is now the preferred aid modality as seen by the recipients because it affords greater control of the inflow of resources. Budget support has also drawn renewed attention on the role of parliaments in ensuring financial accountability and budget oversight. Now, donors are attempting to take a comprehensive approach, looking at the entire budget cycle, while considering the multiple political and capacity constraints faced by developing legislatures. Potentially positive approaches include encouraging partnerships between parliament and civil society and supporting independent parliamentary budget offices.

⁶ Only Uganda professed to have a no-party democracy from 1986 until the referendum in 2005 when multi-partyism was reintroduced. In Afghanistan parties do exist but the candidates in the 2009 election contested as individuals, not on party platforms.

4. Forms of Parliamentary Support

There are several possible and actual forms of support for parliaments. Different donors seem to prefer divergent strategies and support models. In order to categorise the existing (and theoretically possible) forms of donor support to parliaments, we have, for the purpose of this study, made a distinction between direct and indirect support, depending on whether the objective is to strengthen parliament for democratisation and good governance in general, or for specific policy purposes. This categorisation does not suggest any evaluation of efficiency or impact; it is simply a theoretical and practical distinction.⁷

Direct support should be understood as support to parliaments as key political institutions for the purpose of democratisation, checks and balances and good governance. Normally the recipient parliament is the direct beneficiary and counterpart (or some parliamentary sub-unit, including commissions, secretariat, and groups of parliamentarians). The contractual partners can be the parliament in question, but sometimes it can be international parliamentary networks and organisations, international NGOs and intergovernmental organisations (IGOs, such as the WBI, the UNDP, UNIFEM and other UN agencies), especially when these are implementing the projects.

Indirect support can be defined as support for the purpose of promoting policy goals such as poverty reduction, HIV and AIDS prevention, environmental protection, decentralisation, and anti-corruption. This form of indirect support has also been called ‘issue-based’ approaches to parliamentary strengthening (Hubli and Schmidt 2005:6–7). This form of support has a particular substantive policy- or issue-based focus rather than general support. It seeks to raise the awareness of parliamentarians on these policy issues with a view to enhancing the debating ability of MPs. Such approaches are thus incremental in that they do not address the entire political system where strong interests may be opposed to a general reform agenda. Instead, they provide suitable entry points and a step-by-step route to democratic practice while at the same time highlighting and strengthening the mechanisms through which certain issues can be addressed by parliament.

Indirect support approaches normally include organisations other than parliaments as recipients, contractual partners and implementers, e.g. government agencies and NGOs. Nevertheless, indirect support projects will normally comprise an element of parliamentary strengthening that contributes to enabling parliament to

⁷ This distinction is not always unequivocal; there may be overlaps, which compounds donor categorisation and reporting.

pass legislation, debate and approve the plans, provide funding through the state budget, exercise oversight, and to establish procedures.

4.1 Direct support to parliaments

The partners in direct parliamentary support projects are typically individual country parliaments as main recipients and contract partners, occasionally regional parliaments, or international organisations of parliaments or associations of parliamentarians. The objectives of direct parliamentary support projects are normally reform of parliament itself as an institution or the entire political system, for instance democratisation and good governance projects/programmes aimed at constitutional reform and reform of the electoral system, in which the improvement of the working environment of parliament and parliamentary strengthening may be important ingredients.

In most cases of direct support individual parliaments are the recipients through the speaker's office; sub-units such as specific committees (finance, health, education, constitutional affairs, etc.); the clerk's office for administration and services (support staff, library, research, IT, protocol, or security) or designated groups of parliamentarians (such as the opposition, party groups, women's caucus, youth groups, or minorities). A few regional parliaments (e.g. the East African Legislative Assembly) have also received donor funding. In a few cases, sub-national or provincial parliaments (state parliaments in federations) have also benefited.

4.1.1 Physical infrastructure

In the early history of parliamentary support, the former colonial powers and donor agencies emphasised parliament as an institution. Projects focused on infrastructure and physical facilities as well as institutional structure. The infrastructural needs were glaring in poor developing countries and donors were keen to fill the gaps: the construction of new and the rehabilitation and refurbishment of existing buildings, including conference and meeting facilities; installation and provision of information technology; provision of photocopying and printing equipment, library and documentation premises, including book holdings; improved office facilities, including the provision of furniture.

4.1.2 Institutional structure and capacities

The initial institutional set-up was largely determined by the constitutional provisions at independence, often modelled on that of the former colonial powers, sometimes indeed replicas. However, with the passage of time and the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, parliamentary reform and institution-building assumed greater significance. Initially, however, such matters received little donor attention, because they were regarded as domestic rather than international concerns. Only gradually, with the new emphasis in the 1990s on good governance and democratisation, did support for parliamentary reform and institutional development move slowly up on the agenda. This was linked, of course, to constitutional reform.

It became important to delineate clearly the relationship between the executive and the legislature, and other forms of horizontal accountability; to define unequivocally the authority of parliament to pass legislation and approve budgets; to specify

organisational aspects such as the committee structure, the office of the speaker, party groups, and the role of the opposition. Similarly, the representational function was highlighted. In all these aspects laying down procedures for handling them was considered part of the institution-building endeavour, in order to preclude arbitrariness. Institution-building means achieving predictability in the processing of bills and other policy matters through the iterative application of rules and procedures that are known and routinely adhered to. Institutionalisation means narrowing the scope for individual whims.

The purpose of direct parliamentary support is relatively straightforward: to enhance the capacity, legitimacy and efficiency of the core functions of parliaments, so as to enable them to fulfil their constitutional and political role better. Among the capacities of parliaments, which may possibly be strengthened by external support, we list the following:

- *Legislative capacity.* This is a core parliamentary function. Buttressing this capacity involves legal competence building, including the drafting of bills; transfer of know-how; training in the application of parliamentary procedures; the strengthening of key parliamentary committees on selected policy and legislation issues – for instance implementing peace agreements, gender-sensitive legislation, reproductive health (HIV and AIDS), poverty reduction, resource management, budgeting, anti-corruption and other pertinent policy issues.
- *Representational capacity.* This is also a core parliamentary function which involves education, training workshops, conferences and seminars for ordinary parliamentary members and leaders (speakers, presiding officers, committee chairs and party whips), in particular for opposition MPs. To enhance the representational capacities of MPs their communication skills need to be improved in order to articulate the views and demands not only of their constituents but also of other interest groups in civil society (women, youth, minorities) and to channel them into a national political arena such as the legislature. Imparting communicative skills through the mass media is likewise a must.
- *Oversight capacity.* This is the third core function of parliaments. To strengthen this capacity the MPs need training in the processes of lawmaking, not least in highly complex budgetary matters. The communicative skills which are important in enhancing the representational capacities are equally critical in communicating with CSOs as allies in the scrutiny of executive action, for example in public hearings. CSOs can be valuable sources of information that MPs can use in its exercising the oversight function. Being able to communicate with civil society is therefore of great importance.
- *Administrative capacity.* This is not a function of parliaments but rather a capacity that is needed to fulfil the core functions. Without such administrative support services parliamentarians will be severely constrained in the discharge of their duties. These services include secretarial support, information technology, libraries and document handling, and short-term assistance to meet emergency administrative expenses. Administrative capacity projects have traditionally received the greatest percentage of donor funds.
- *Institutional reform processes.* This is another example of interventions designed to reinforce the ability of MPs to fulfil their tasks. It moves beyond the mere

provision of tools and instruments to include institutional reform, in order to enhance institutional efficiency. It could encompass a restructuring of the committee system; the institution of a new parliamentary calendar and sitting frequency; a revision of parliamentary procedures; or the introduction of new internal regulations, e.g. codes of conduct.

4.1.3 Skills and performance of parliamentarians

In addition to the enhancement of the general functions and capacities of parliaments, some direct parliamentary support projects are focused on the parliamentarians themselves and specific categories of parliamentarians. This emphasis stems from the idea that the calibre of MPs and their general level of skills in parliamentary work need to be enhanced, and that certain groups need particular attention and support. It should be recalled that institutions are made up of individuals, in this case elected MPs. The capacities, skills and performance of individual parliamentarians therefore bear decisively on the functioning of parliaments as institutions. Although the institutional framework in terms of infrastructure and procedures is a necessary precondition for a workable parliament, it does not help much if the calibre of the MPs is below par. Unfortunately, a fair proportion of elected MPs in the developing world have limited formal education, some may even be only semi-literate.

Typically, projects in this category engage in knowledge and skill transfer through training, seminars, conferences, partnership programmes, parliamentary exchange programmes, networking and study visits. Furthermore, the trainers are either peers (parliamentary networks, international and regional parliaments, national (donor country) parliaments and parliamentarians) or experts (IGO and INGO professionals and thematic experts).

Donors, and whoever run training programmes on their behalf, have designed training modules covering a wide range of issues: the rights and responsibilities of MPs; constitutional and legal knowledge; proficiency in process and procedure; budgeting; committee work; policy issues; international co-operation; networking; time management; computer skills; voter outreach; language and communication training, etc. The potential issues are unlimited.

The training of parliamentarians, however, is a Sisyphean task. Not only will the implementation of training programmes constantly generate new needs for knowledge and greater proficiency, but once one batch of MPs have been trained, a large proportion of them will lose the next election and be replaced by novices. The turnover rate of parliamentarians often reaches 30–50 per cent, sometimes even more. Thus, the training efforts will have to start all over again.

Apart from the need for general skill enhancement, certain groups of parliamentarians may have specific needs in order to assert their interests. Many parliaments now have women's caucuses. While the female and male MPs alike may need training in gender issues, the former usually take the initiative to organise gender sensitisation sessions. Their purpose is partly to counter gender discrimination, sexist practices and attitudes in male colleagues in committees and elsewhere and

to ensure fair female representation in the committee system. More broadly, gender sensitisation will help to bring gender thinking into the legislative process. Another special parliamentary group that deserve greater attention is persons with disabilities. They face obstacles in their parliamentary work that other MPs can easily negotiate past. It is in order, therefore, that persons with disabilities in parliament receive special training regarding their rights and how to exercise them.

The performance of parliamentarians is greatly influenced by the assistance they receive from the permanent staff of the institution, i.e. the clerk's office, the library and research staff. Consequently, it is mandatory to include such vital support staff in the training programmes, tailor-made to their needs.

4.2 Indirect support to parliaments

Indirect support to parliaments includes projects and programmes addressing specific policy issues other than democratisation and good governance in general. They are typically implemented jointly with partners outside parliament such as CSOs and academic institutions or think-tanks. Such elements contain elements of parliamentary strengthening, because they are normally geared towards the need that parliamentarians have to handle the issues tabled. Parliamentarians need substantive knowledge of the issues embedded in the laws they pass.

Indirect support projects are orientated to specific themes and policies: poverty reduction, education, health, energy, women representation, environmental protection, climate change, HIV and AIDS, decentralisation, security/terrorism, anti-corruption, etc. When linking up with CSOs and the media the public debate is broadened. Below we provide some examples of themes that indirect support projects have addressed.

Poverty reduction is such a central concern for developing countries that the legislature must have a good grasp of what it entails, what produces and reproduces poverty and what strategies may be adopted to reduce poverty. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and similar home-grown strategies have in many countries become key policy documents that influence the budgeting process. For example, some budget items are labelled 'pro-poor expenditure'. Training of MPs on poverty issues is therefore a priority in many developing countries.

Similarly, the equal participation of men and women on the political arena is a central feature of the democratisation process. This is a matter that goes to the core of the representational function of parliaments. No parliament can claim to be representative without the participation of both men and women. Recent years have seen a steady increase in the proportion of women MPs, although the world average of less than 17 per cent remains far from the goal of gender parity. The election of women to the highest positions of state and government in several countries has also contributed to the changing face of politics.

However, for the proportion of women MPs to increase it is necessary for parliamentarians – men and women alike – to understand what impediments women candidates face when vying for political office, so as to be able to remove them.

While the road to election is a difficult one, the challenges for women do not stop there. Once women enter parliament or other political bodies, they are faced with many new challenges. Parliament is traditionally a male-orientated domain, and usually men have written the rules and practices. It is an ongoing challenge, therefore, to transform parliament into a gender-sensitive environment, to ensure that actions are gender-sensitive and to guarantee that gender is mainstreamed throughout the legislature. An in-depth understanding of gender relations in society is a must for progressing towards greater equality, and training can make a contribution towards that end.

Environmental protection and climate change have become increasingly urgent matters that parliamentarians need to grasp in depth if they are to take action to remedy damage already done and to prevent further deterioration. One aspect is an appreciation of international conventions adopted to counter adverse trends; another is to take measures domestically of both adaptation and mitigation in relation to climate change. These are extremely complex issues and parliamentarians need to engage with scientists to acquire a better understanding of them before acting.

Many developing countries, especially in Africa, have high rates of HIV infection. The resultant death rates when the infection develops into full-blown AIDS have caused the life expectancy at birth to drop dramatically and produced an increasing number of AIDS orphans. Similarly, the burden on health budgets is crippling in many countries. How to prevent the further spread of this scourge and how to deal with the consequences are policy issues that MPs must face. But knowledge about prevalence and remedy is necessary as a basis for action. Hence the need for training.

In a review of support to African parliaments, the IPU observes that a number of parliaments – Benin, Kenya and Uganda – have been at the forefront of anti-corruption campaigns in these countries (IPU 2003:4). Some literature contributions on this matter are worth mentioning. *Controlling Corruption: A Parliamentarian's Handbook* (GOPAC 2005) in its third edition has proved a useful reference for practitioners interested in strengthening anti-corruption measures. *The Role of Parliaments in Curbing Corruption* (Stapenhurst et al. 2006) describes how parliaments can oversee and hold government to account through audit institutions, ombudsmen and anti-corruption agencies, and in promoting accountability through constituency outreach, public hearings, and parliamentary commissions. It is imperative that parliamentarians are trained in the use of such manuals.

A fair number of fledgling democracies have experienced violent conflict. Burundi and Rwanda are cases in point. Their parliaments have made important contributions to the peace process, by fostering dialogue and by establishing a legislative framework for the restoration of the rule of law in these countries scarred by civil war. Similarly, the parliament of Mozambique has endeavoured to establish itself as an effective forum for debate and policy-making by bringing together former warring parties (IPU 2003:4). Parliamentarians certainly have a potential for making contri-

butions to peace building but probably need some training in that regard (O'Brien 2005).

4.3 Typology of donor support

In their report to Sida, Hubli and Schmidt (2005:4–5; 29–45; 46–52) suggested a categorisation of ten parliamentary support ‘models’ in a typology based on a number of (not mutually exclusive) factors, e.g. executive agency and form of financing. In this report we will add a few more criteria of categorisation, and thus design a set of typologies that are largely overlapping with those of Hubli and Schmidt, but with some additions and clarifications.

We are making a few more categorisations to the projects, as reflected in our questionnaire, typology sheet as well as in the data matrix (see annexes A6, A7 and A4/A5). In addition to the direct/indirect distinction, we have asked for project basics such as project name (code/number), funding agency, recipient country/region, project value, and duration. This information has allowed us to discover trends over time. More importantly, we have also asked for categorisation into five project types:

- Is the project *basket funded*? That is, is the project/programme financed by one individual donor or jointly by several (bilateral and/or multilateral) agencies (multi-donor basket funding)? Yes/no.
- By what *agency/organisation* is it *implemented*? That is, what is the implementing organisation and contractual partner(s)? Is it the recipient parliament or a government agency, an inter-governmental organisation, INGOs, NGOs, or others?
- Who is the *beneficiary*? That is, within the parliament in question who or which entities are targeted as in need of strengthening or beneficiaries of improved capacity? The parliament leadership, specific committees, sub-groups (women, minorities), local assemblies, administrative staff or others? And who else, if not a direct parliamentary beneficiary?
- What is the *policy focus*? That is, what is the thematic focus (priorities) of the project/programme; what parliamentary policies, sector issue capacities or functions are to be improved? Democratisation and good governance, budgeting, legislation, peace and reconciliation, human rights, civil society participation, poverty alleviation, gender issues, HIV/AIDS, environment, or what?
- What are the *means of support*? That is, what form or method of support is employed; what are the means of intervention or activity undertaken? Training and transfer of knowledge, partnership programmes and networking, organisational reform, infrastructure improvement, improved support services, or other?

5. Actors in Parliamentary Support

An increasing number of organisations and agencies are engaging in activities intended to strengthen parliaments in developing countries. They include bilateral donors, multilateral agencies, interest organisations of parliamentarians, and political party foundations. Even international NGOs and private companies are active in this field. This section describes the most important of these clusters of actors (for details on the individual organisations and associations and their profiles, strategies, publications etc., see annex A2).

5.1 Bilateral donors

The *United States Agency for International Development* (USAID) is definitely the largest of the bilateral donors in terms of spending, with an average of USD 20 million per year since 2000 and almost USD 200 million provided over the past ten years. DFID is second biggest, with an average of USD 6 million per year. Furthermore, donor support to parliamentary strengthening worldwide is increasing in terms of money volume and number of parliaments assisted (see annex A3.1 figures 1 and 2).

With more than 50 years of experience the USAID is probably also the agency with the longest history of parliamentary assistance. The USAID has the single largest project (in our sample) with its USD 24 million – *Iraq Legislative Strengthening Program* – followed by the second largest of USD 15.5 million – *Afghanistan Parliamentary Assistance Project* (see the dataset, annex A4).

USAID stands apart with regard to inter-donor cooperation by normally operating alone in parliamentary strengthening. Less than 5 per cent of USAID funding (average for 2006–2008) is channelled through basket funding arrangements, whereas the medium-sized donors cooperate with other donors at a much higher level (see annex A3.1 figure 6). Furthermore, the USAID deviates from other donors' practices by *not* running programmes benefiting regional parliaments or parliamentary organisations. Besides, the USAID differs significantly from the other donors by *not* relying on inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) as implementing organisations, and the USAID differs significantly from the other donors by sub-contracting a large share (some 42 per cent) of its aid effort to private, commercial companies (consultancy cum academic companies) (see annex A3.2 and A3.3, figures 10 and 11).

The *Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency* (Sida) is a medium-sized donor in terms of parliamentary support, together with DFID, Norad and CIDA. Sida is almost equal to CIDA with roughly USD 18 million provided over the last ten

years (see annex A3.1 figure 1). Since 2005, there has, however, been a slight decrease in Sida funding for parliamentary strengthening projects (see annex A3.1 figure 3).⁸

Sida runs, as does Norway, rather small projects in terms of average size (USD 640,000), and Sida's projects have a relatively short project duration (3.4 years). On the other hand, Sida is among the more 'harmonising' agencies, with about 80 per cent in basket funds (see annex A3.1 figures 4 and 5). In terms of policy focus, the data lend support to Sida's claim to a strong 'bottom-up' approach; at least Sida's policy focus is the broadest (see annex A3.4 figure 12).

The *Canadian International Development Agency* (CIDA) is along with DFID the agency with the most significant and steady growth, especially since 2005. It is now a medium-sized donor in the field, with approximately USD 20 million committed to parliamentary strengthening in total over the last 10 years (see annex A3.1 figures 1 and 3).

A number of other bilateral donors are involved in parliamentary strengthening, to varying degrees. However, most of these are probably contributing less than the two largest and three medium-sized donors described above. These include the *German Technical Cooperation* (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, GTZ GmbH) and the *German Federal Ministry for Economic Development and Cooperation* (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, BMZ); the *Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs* (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, MinBuZa) and the *French Ministry of Foreign Affairs* (Ministère des Affaires étrangères), which has had activities in this area for a long time, in particular in Francophone Africa. The *Belgian Technical Cooperation agency* (Belgisch agentschap voor ontwikkelings-samenwerking, BTC/CTB) and the *Australian Agency for International Development* (AusAID) are smaller but worth mentioning.⁹

5.2 Multilateral donors

The multilateral donors engaged in parliamentary strengthening in the developing world include a few inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) and a few multilateral donors and development banks. In many cases, these organisations are conduits of resources from bilateral donors, coordinators of basket funds, or executing agencies on behalf of consortia of funders in conjunction with recipient institutions. However, some multilaterals also contribute from their own sources.

The most important multilateral donors in terms of funding size are the *World Bank*, the *European Commission* (European Union, which runs some projects in parliamentary strengthening through its agency *EuropeAid*) and UN organisations, principally the *UNDP*. The UNDP seems to emerge as the main conduit or implementer of basket funding to parliaments, not least through the *Global Programme*

⁸ Thus, our analysis of the project data provided by Sida differs somewhat from a 2007 Sida evaluation report, which states that Sida "has increased significantly the volume of its disbursements to parliamentary strengthening projects over the last few years" (Schmidt 2007:2–3).

⁹ We have little or no information on several potentially important bilateral donor agencies, such as Denmark, Ireland, Finland, and Arab and Asian donors.

for *Parliamentary Strengthening* (GPPS). The *OECD* is relatively active, and the regional development banks also appear to be entering this field of assistance.¹⁰

A few other multilateral donors are to a smaller extent engaged in parliamentary strengthening, including regional organisations such as the *Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe* (OSCE) and the multilateral development banks. The OSCE has an interest in elections and in the role of parliaments in EU integration, and has i.e. the Open Parliament project in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The *African Development Bank* is involved in training and seminars on the role of parliament in good governance and in poverty reduction, and in a few parliamentary development projects. The *Inter-American Development Bank* is working on parliaments and budget processes.

5.3 International parliamentary organisations

There is a relatively large number of international parliamentary organisations, associations and networks. These are basically interest organisations for parliaments and parliamentarians, working to promote the status and relevance of parliamentary work in general, as well as particular policy issues, through networking, seminars, knowledge generation and transfer.¹¹ There are even a few regional parliaments with some real powers – the *European Parliament* in Strasbourg/Brussels and the *East African Legislative Assembly* (EALA) of the East African Community.

Some international parliamentary organisations are active in the field of parliamentary support, mainly through networking (meetings, thematic seminars and conferences), fact-finding (data, statistics and information provision), and handbook production (standards, guidelines, manuals). Some also act as partners and technical implementers of projects financed by different donors, providing networks, facilities, standards and experience. These include the *Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa* (AWEPA), the *Inter-Parliamentary Union* (IPU), the *Commonwealth Parliamentary Association* (CPA), the *Parliamentary Centre* (PC) and the *Parliamentarians for Global Action* (PGA).¹²

There is, however, a multitude of other international parliamentary organisations and networks, global and regional, general and policy-specific, of which we can mention but a few: the *African Parliamentary Union* (APU); the *Arab Inter-parliamentary Union* (AIPU); *L'Assemblée Parlementaire de la Francophonie*; the *SADC Parliamentary Forum*; the *Parliamentary Network on the World Bank* (PnoWB); the *AMANI Great Lakes Parliamentary Forum for Peace*; the *Parliamentary Forum on Small Arms and Light Weapons* (PF); the *Inter-Parliamentary Forum of the Americas* (FIPA); the *Réseau de Femmes Parlementaires d'Afrique Centrale* (Network of Women Parliamentarians of Central Africa – RFPAC); the *Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption* (GOPAC) and *African Parliamentarians' Network Against Corruption* (APNAC).¹³

10 For details on these associations, see annex A2 6–9 below.

11 For a complete list of Parliamentary Organizations' Secretariats Worldwide, see the World Bank interactive map at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/PARTNERS/EXTPARLIAMENTARIANS/0,,contentMDK:20242065--menuPK:498327--pagePK:64165880--piPK:64165858--theSitePK:464534_00.html

12 For details on these associations, see annex A2 10 below.

13 See www.african-pu.org; www.arab-ipu.org/english; <http://apf.francophonie.org>; www.sadcpf.org; www.pnowb.org; www.amaniforum.org; www.parliamentaryforum.org; www.e-fipa.org; www.gopacnetwork.org; and www.apnacafira.org.

Although engaged in election observation, some peace and reconciliation projects, anti-corruption and the promotion of women and young people in politics, none of these organisations seem to be implementers of donor-funded projects or otherwise involved in donor assistance to parliaments.

5.4 Party-affiliated foundations and institutes

In addition to the bilateral and multilateral donors and the parliamentary organisations, there is also another type of organisation involved in parliamentary strengthening, namely the political party-affiliated foundations and institutes. These are (more or less closely) related to one or several political parties, which cooperate with likeminded parties abroad.¹⁴ There are altogether at least 32 European and two American party-affiliated foundations and institutes. These are either based on or affiliated to one party, such as the German *Stiftungen*, or based on several political parties in a country, i.e. the *Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy* (NIMD).¹⁵

In terms of democracy assistance, the focus of the party-affiliated foundations and institutes is rather on political parties ('sister parties') than on parliaments in the developing world. Some projects and activities are nevertheless contributing to parliamentary strengthening. In particular, some of the bigger foundations have programmes aimed at enhancing the political parties' knowledge and skills in state budgeting, lawmaking, accountability and transparency and reform of the entire political system. This also includes political parties in parliament and in parliamentary committees.

5.5 Other organisations

Donor support to parliaments is also sometimes given indirectly via national and international governmental and non-governmental organisations that work for the promotion of democracy. Of particular interest to donors in parliamentary support is the *International IDEA* (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance), which supports democracy worldwide and is dedicated to strengthening democratic institutions and processes. It works with governments, UN agencies, regional organisations and others engaged in democracy building at the international, regional, national and local levels. International IDEA will for instance develop a practical guide and a training module for EC staff and others in parliamentary strengthening.¹⁶

There are also some private sector actors in the field of parliamentary assistance, i.e. international (for profit) consultancy companies, 'think tanks' and academic companies. One of these is the *Centre for Legislative Development International* (CLD International), based in the Philippines.¹⁷ Others are the American companies *SUNY/CID*, *ARD*, and *DAI*.¹⁸

¹⁴ It is a moot point what 'likeminded' or 'sister party' means in countries where the political cleavages informing the political party system are often very different from those of Europe or the US.

¹⁵ For details on NIMD, the UK-based *Westminster Foundation for Democracy* (WFD), the German foundations *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung* (FES) and *Konrad Adenauer Stiftung* (KAS), the US party-linked organisations *National Democratic Institute* (NDI) and *International Republican Institute* (IRI), and the Swedish *Olof Palme International Center* (OPIC), see annex A2.11 and Amundsen 2007.

¹⁶ See the IDEA homepage for more information: http://www.idea.int/parties/parliament_support.cfm.

¹⁷ The CLD "assists in legislative strengthening and making legislatures efficient and effective democratic institutions. It specializes in organizing, designing, and managing legislative support systems; designing and conducting legislative needs assessments; conducting policy research and analysis; formulating policy or legislative agenda; developing legislative proposals; and packaging legislative or policy information", according to its homepage www.cld.org.

¹⁸ See www.cid.suny.edu/index.htm; www.ardinc.com and www.dai.com.

6. Norwegian Support to Legislatures

The most recent report to the *Storting* (parliament) on Norway's development policies emphasises three salient themes: climate, conflict and capital.¹⁹ This emphasis notwithstanding, the importance of a well functioning, legitimate state is considered a precondition for a positive development that benefits the citizens in the partner countries. Good governance and participation in decision-making processes are underscored, even though parliamentary strengthening is not mentioned explicitly. But democratic reforms and elections are on the agenda. It follows, therefore, that parliamentary support programmes fit squarely into the Norwegian aid portfolio.

The Norwegian actors operating in this field are very few, however, principally the bilateral *Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation* (Norad) and the *Ministry of Foreign Affairs* including embassies, and a few non-state actors. Their activities are described below.

6.1 State agencies

Not only has the international aid architecture been changed, so has the aid administration in Norway. Norad, which used to be an agency tasked with the execution of projects and programmes, has been transformed into an advisory organ that provides professional advice to the MFA and the embassies abroad when new projects are being initiated, appraised, reviewed and evaluated. With regard to parliamentary strengthening, Norad is currently in the process of building up its competence in this field. Norad also has an evaluation department that scrutinises aid interventions *ex post*.

Norwegian support to parliaments has been rather limited and *ad hoc*, without much coherence. Interviews with key officials and a closer look at the archives of Norad and the MFA dating back to the mid-1990s confirm that the approach has been unsystematic. The majority of archival entries identified by keywords such as parliament, legislature and national assembly cover disparate, one-off activities such as study trips and conferences for and by parliamentarians; observation of parliamentary elections; constitutional reviews; support for electoral commissions and the administration of elections. While all of these discrete activities are relevant to the functioning of parliaments, very few interventions have addressed in a comprehensive manner the challenges facing legislatures.

¹⁹ See Report No. 13 to the Storting (2008-2009): *Climate, Conflict and Capital: Norwegian Development Policy Adapting to Change* [Stortingsmelding nr. 13 (2008-2009), *Klima, konflikt og kapital: Norsk utviklingspolitikk i et endret handlingsrom*], Oslo: Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available online at <http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dok/regpubl/stmeld/2008-2009/report-no-13-2008-2009-to-the-storting.html?id=552810>.

Apart from the haphazard approach to parliamentary strengthening, it is difficult to distinguish such support from general governance support; a range of governance activities is lumped together in the same broad category. The project registration system is deficient in this regard. It was only in 2008 that the *Development Assistance Committee* of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/DAC) introduced a new code for parliamentary support in its Official Development Assistance (ODA) statistics, which means that statistical results cannot be expected until 2010. This belated breakdown of statistical categories probably reflects the relatively low priority of this field of development assistance to date.

Furthermore, the available documentation is patchy and to some extent inconsistent or ambiguous with regard to contractual commitments and actual disbursements. This is an added difficulty in determining the volume of such assistance and its disbursement by year.

The above difficulties notwithstanding, Norway has provided support to a number of legislatures over the years, and actually seems to be the third largest contributor to parliament strengthening (according to our data sample), with about USD 27 million over the past ten years (1999–2009). CIDA and Sida are trailing, with USD 20 and 19 million, respectively. However, the increase in funding to this sector from Norway seems to have abated (see annex A3.1 figures 1 and 3).

Norway has been supporting relatively small interventions of fairly short duration, only 265,000 USD in average project size and only 2.7 years on average (see annex A3.1 figures 4 and 5). On the other hand, Norway cooperates with other donors with respect to almost 70 per cent of total funding (see annex A3.1 figure 6).

Looking at the four medium-sized donors (DFID, Norad, CIDA and Sida), it appears that support to Haiti, Ghana, Sudan and Timor-Leste is on the rise (the bulk of the grants have been given over the last 4–5 years), whereas support for Palestine is on the decline (having received all of its support before 2007). The most aided country in terms of parliamentary strengthening is Malawi, also as far as Norway is concerned. Timor-Leste, Uganda and Zimbabwe and Mongolia follows. Timor Leste and Uganda are countries receiving increasing parliamentary support from Norway (with larger, recent projects). Palestine appears to have been phased out (no new projects initiated) (see annex A3.2 figures 8 and 9, and annex A5).

Norway, along with the other medium-sized donors, is extending *direct support* to parliaments (including parliamentary committees and government agencies) in recipient countries as contractual partners and implementing institutions. For Norway, international and national NGOs (including international parliamentary organisations) are less important. Norway seems to prefer IGOs to INGOs/NGOs (see annex A3.3 figure 11). In terms of policy focus, peace and reconciliation, civil society involvement and the gender perspective are issues important to Norway, in addition to the general good governance and democratisation agenda (see annex A3.4 figure 12).

Below we summarise support programmes of some magnitude and range without claiming exhaustive coverage.

1. Palestinian Legislative Council

During the period 2005–2007 support was extended for capacity building in the *Palestinian Legislative Council* (PLC). The goal of the programme was to improve and strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of PLC performance in the discharge of its functions. The specific objectives included (a) the rationalisation of the PLC structure; (b) increased operational efficiency; and (c) the enhancement of the skills and capabilities of PLC staff. The total financial grant amounted to NOK 6 million over the period.

The basis of the implementation of the project was a reform plan elaborated by the PLC, which was based on a diagnostic study of needs and challenges. Through a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Denmark, Germany, Norway and the Palestinian Authority (PA), signed in September 2005, a commitment was made to harmonising donor procedures and to providing supplementary funding by Denmark and Germany. The PA itself was the executing agency with Norway acting as a donor secretariat to facilitate communication with the PA.

2. Implementation of the Strategic Plan of Malawi's Legislative Assembly

In late 2007 an agreement was signed in support of the implementation of the strategic plan of Malawi's legislative assembly. The total grant amounted to NOK 10 million, split equally between Norway and Sweden for the period 2008–2009 (Norway has since 2001 administered Swedish bilateral development assistance to Malawi through an agreement that comes to an end in 2010). The executing agency is the *Malawi National Assembly* itself.

The stated goal of the strategic plan is to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the national assembly to execute its constitutional mandate for the promotion of democratic governance and the achievement of sustainable development. Furthermore, the objectives are to provide a forum for deliberation on the needs and aspirations of the Malawian people, to enact legislation, to maintain oversight of the executive and to represent the interests and aspirations of constituents.

Other donors are also contributing to the financing of the strategic plan, e.g. the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the European Commission (EC), the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), the UNDP, and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), on an *ad hoc* basis, with the level of support varying from one year to another. The ongoing construction of the new parliamentary building is funded by China.

Prior to the latest bilateral agreement financed through the Norwegian embassy in Lilongwe, Norway has since 1998 provided parliamentary support to a basket fund administered by the UNDP for two phases of the Malawi Democracy Consolidation Programme (DCP). The total financial frame of the DCP (phases I and II) was USD 11.3 million or approx. NOK 90 million. The combined Norwegian and Swedish contributions amounted to NOK 40 million for the duration of phases I and II. The

DCP is still ongoing without a Norwegian contribution. However, the scope of this programme is broader than parliamentary support; it comprises the entire governance agenda: (a) civic education; b) civil society; c) access to justice; (d) alternative dispute settlement mechanisms; e) media; (f) human rights; g) code of conduct for parliamentarians; and h) training of MPs. It is operated on a demand-driven basis, which means that calls are issued for applications. The majority of the applications are received from civil society organisations, but also from parliament (clerk or Speaker). It is difficult, however, to determine the proportion that accrued to parliamentary support.

3. Strengthening parliamentary democracy in Timor-Leste

In 2003 the UNDP embarked on a parliamentary strengthening programme in Timor-Leste and requested a Norwegian contribution to a multi-donor funding basket. Norway responded with a pledge of NOK 2,450,000 for the two-year period 2004–2005 under a cost-sharing arrangement.

The goal of the programme was to support the national assembly to achieve the objectives set in the national development plan: (a) to promulgate effective legislation; (b) to foster multi-partisanship and good governance; and (c) to create opportunities for constructive engagement between parliamentarians and the people of Timor-Leste. Emphasis was put on capacity building and staff training. Project execution was assigned to the National Parliament through a project steering committee in liaison with the UNDP.

4. Parliamentary support in Haiti

Two parliamentary support projects have been implemented in Haiti. *Norwegian Church Aid* received a grant of NOK 1,108,800 for the period 2007–2008 with a view to providing technical support to two parliamentary committees, on border issues and education, respectively. The objectives were enhanced efficiency and improved legal framework for the educational sector. Outputs included better physical infrastructure (office furniture, printer, etc.) and broad consultation seminars regarding solutions to the educational challenges facing Haiti, as well as legal work to revise existing legislation. The Haiti parliament was the executing agency with technical inputs from Institut de Formation en Sciences de l'Éducation (IF-HOSED), an institute specialised in education issues. The Lutheran World Federation Haiti (LWF) was responsible for financial management.

The other project – still ongoing – is administered by the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) for the purpose of building capacity in the Haitian parliament. Above all, the project is seeking to speed up the legislative agenda in 2009 with 31 bills and 10 agreements pending approval. Norway provided USD 133,260 to this project to finance national consultants, workshops, outreach activities and debate fora.

5. Parliamentary strengthening in Mongolia

Norway has contributed NOK 5.5 million in tranches to a basket fund on a cost-sharing basis for the purpose of strengthening the Mongolian Parliament. The donor basket was administered by the UNDP but the Mongolian parliament itself was the

executing agency of the project. Based on the Strategic Plan for Parliamentary Development 2002–2008, the activities comprised human resources development; information management; oversight functions; legislation; institutional learning capacity building; and the constituency linkages of MPs. The project materialised after a thorough preparation process in which the Canadian Parliamentary Centre (PC) was involved in needs assessment and project design.

6. Parliamentary capacity building in Ethiopia

In 2002 Norway provided NOK 1 million to a basket fund administered by the UNDP, which was also the executing agency. This amount was a contribution to phase III of the intervention, which sought to consolidate the two previous phases. The emphasis was put on the parliamentary oversight function and explicitly ruled out the physical construction of buildings. It comprised training of permanent parliamentary professional and non-partisan staff; library support; information networking; constituency relations; committee training, including the women's affairs committee; and human rights.

7. SADC Parliamentary Cooperation Programme

This intervention has involved the training of parliamentarian in the *Southern African Development Community* (SADC). The training sessions have centred on substantive issues that parliamentarians address as elected representatives: HIV and AIDS; poverty reduction; women's empowerment, etc.

Other Nordic donors and Ireland have also made contributions to the programme, which has been executed by the Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA) in conjunction with parliaments in the region. The programme has been running in successive phases over a considerable period of time. However, owing to a number of contract addenda it is not entirely clear from the available documents how much has been spent in total. But the total amount would probably be in the order of NOK 6 million or more.

8. Training of provincial parliamentarians in South Africa

As from 2002 the provincial parliaments of South Africa have benefited from training, especially speakers, party whips and parliamentary staff to enable them to perform their roles better. Substantive themes addressed have included gender relations, traditional affairs and youth. The intervention has been executed by AWEPA in conjunction with the respective provincial parliaments.

9. Needs study for the Strategic Plan of the Parliament of Zimbabwe

Norway contributed a smaller amount (NOK 65,000) to the *Public Affairs and Parliamentary Support Trust* in Zimbabwe earmarked for a needs study to underpin the preparation of a strategic plan 2003–2007. The plan was intended to support the work of MPs at the constituency level, involving administrative support functions, training, regional information and documentation resource centres, awareness-raising on HIV and AIDS as well as gender relations.

6.2 Non-state actors

The larger Norwegian NGOs have a development or humanitarian orientation in their programmes. Very few Norwegian NGOs have supported parliaments through their good governance and democratisation programmes. The involvement by *Norwegian Church Aid* (NCA), jointly with a local institute in Haiti is a case in point (see above), but then acting as conduits for state support. The *Norwegian Centre for Human Rights* (NCHR) has given limited parliamentary support indirectly through activities related to legal reform and human rights.

The party-affiliated *Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support* (NDS) has rendered only indirect support to good governance through political parties. The centre has been closed down, however, and an evaluation has been undertaken to assess its record.²⁰ A new model for party-to-party support is reportedly being developed.²¹ Since the centre has confined its activities to political party support we will not consider it in this report.

²⁰ Evaluation of the Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support 2002-2009. See: www.norad.no/evaluation

²¹ According to a news report at <http://e24.no/makro-og-politik/article2981817.ece>.

7. Lessons Learned and Recommendations

Assistance to parliaments seeks to improve governance in developing countries and to promote democracy, transparency, poverty alleviation, participation and a host of other policy issues, both in transitional, developing and post-conflict societies. Donors have for some time tended to work primarily with the executive branch of government and with civil society organisations, but they are increasingly recognising that parliaments do have an important role to play in building democracy, in delivering governance and government services, in reducing poverty and more. The Parliaments are indispensable components of national governance systems through their key functions of legislation, oversight and representation. Through well-designed interventions, donors can contribute to creating such a workable system of governance. However, in order to contribute positively, donors must summarise the lessons learned to date and heed those lessons when designing further interventions. This section pulls together the gist of the experiences reaped by the donor community over the years in the field of parliamentary support.

Having perused a considerable number of reports by aid agencies, research, academic institutions and parliamentary associations, a number of robust lessons, appear to have emerged, and around which a consensus has been formed. These lessons stem from the experiences of the main actors in this field of development assistance as stock has been taken of parliamentary support programmes. They represent cumulative experiences from a series of evaluations at the country level.

All of them emphasise the inherently politicised nature of interventions in support of parliaments and the attendant difficulties to which they give rise. Such a politically charged field of assistance is unpredictable, therefore, and the achievements susceptible to relapse. Moreover, precisely due to the politicised nature of parliamentary strengthening it is not an aid modality that lends itself to a logical framework approach akin to that applied to conventional interventions. On the contrary, it calls for caution and contextualisation, i.e. customising interventions to the circumstances at hand in the countries concerned. A deep and thorough understanding of political dynamics – based on formal rules as well as informal practices – is inescapable if interventions are to be successful.

We list below, in order of importance, six key lessons learned – highlighted in italics – and offer our comments and qualifications:

7.1 Contextualisation

Several reviews, positioning papers, and evaluations by different donors have stressed and reiterated the need for better contextualisation of interventions designed to strengthen parliaments (Schmidt 2007:2 and 5; Sida 2006:6). Already in 2000, a leading donor (USAID 2000b:8) made it clear that:

... legislative strengthening is not a one-size-fits-all or a 'cookie cutter' exercise. Indeed, donors must take the time to understand the political culture of the nation with which they are working; they should be sure that the program they recommend meets the needs of the legislature, perhaps by allowing the host legislature to play an important role in assessing its own needs. Legislative strengthening projects have not always sufficiently analyzed and taken into account the way traditional political cultures interact with a country's institutions and laws.

This lesson is robust indeed: there is no generic, one-size-fits-all approach to parliamentary strengthening. Contextualisation is the watchword. The variety of parliamentary structures, political systems, party systems, and electoral systems is so great that one must customise approaches to the prevailing conditions. Furthermore, a blueprint approach is not advisable because politics and parliaments are dynamic. They are moving targets that require flexibility over time. For donors, contextualisation requires politically savvy analysts who can monitor developments in an impartial manner, produce political economy analyses and adjust interventions accordingly.

To defray the costs of such demanding tasks and to avoid duplication of effort it is advisable that donors join forces and pool resources for this purpose. Working in conjunction with local expertise is similarly advisable, although making sure that local experts are not tied up with particular political forces so as to introduce biases.

The imperative of contextualisation means *inter alia* that parliamentary assistance must be mainstreamed to democracy assistance in general. International assistance projects designed to strengthen parliaments should in particular consider regime type, political parties and electoral system as key elements.

7.1.1 Regime types and features

When designing parliamentary support interventions, the most fundamental distinction donors need to make is between presidential and parliamentary systems and the hybrid variants in between. In presidential systems the president is elected directly and usually holds the dual position of head of state and government, thus commanding considerable executive power, often at the expense of the legislature. A president can only be removed from office through an impeachment process. In parliamentary systems, however, there is normally a separation of the office of prime minister as head of government and that of head of state. While the head of state is largely ceremonial, the prime minister holds executive power but is dependent on the confidence of the legislature.

Beyond regime type along the presidential-parliamentary continuum, regimes in place may vary in nature along several related dimensions, which have a bearing on the actual and potential powers of parliaments. Considerable variation may be found in terms of maturity of democratisation, degree of consolidation, fragility and resilience. These are important contextual features to consider when designing parliamentary support projects.

For analytical and practical purposes, we will address stable authoritarian regimes, 'fragile states', and newly democratised/democratising countries.²² These three categories differ considerably with regard to power distribution, political reform will, and institutionalisation.

A number of countries have relatively authoritarian (non-democratic) and apparently stable governments. These include the neo-patrimonial regimes (often presidential regimes characterised by clientelism and endemic corruption); one-party regimes based on ideology and personal dictatorships. Their apparent 'stability' derives from various forms of subtle or less subtle repression, often with the use of pervasive security and intelligence-gathering apparatuses. These *stable authoritarian countries* are only paying lip service to democratic principles and probably holding sham elections, if at all. According to the IEU *Index of Democracy*, stable authoritarian countries include Mauritania, Morocco, Rwanda, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Cuba, Cameroon, Kazakhstan, Niger, Angola, Côte d'Ivoire, Azerbaijan, Swaziland, Gabon, Yemen, Congo (Brazzaville), Sudan, Zimbabwe, Vietnam, Tajikistan, Togo, Eritrea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Laos, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic, Myanmar, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Chad and North Korea. Whether this is a definitive list is disputable. One could add and subtract depending on the application of somewhat fuzzy criteria. It is a moot point, furthermore, to what extent they are in fact stable. Some of them may be candidates for a democratic transition whereas others may find themselves on a slippery slope into the category of fragile state, or even that of failed state.

The stable authoritarian countries present particular challenges for parliamentary support because they tend to lack support for democratic reform from the president and the ruling elite, and, in effect, little pressure from below due to the repressive nature of these regimes. The elites of such regimes prefer maintaining the *status quo*, from which they benefit. To that end, they are using the existing institutional set-up to safeguard their privileged position. In these countries it would be well-nigh impossible for donors to find suitable entry points with respect to parliamentary strengthening.

The donor community has long been preoccupied with finding partners whose structures and policies are conducive to making effective use of aid flows. While this is still the case, the donors are facing an increasing number of potential recipient countries whose structures are fragile – many of them emerging from violent conflict. In other words, they do not match the normal standards of an effective aid relationship. However, abandoning them may not be ethically defensible. Hence, a

²² In addition to these, we could also add *conflict-affected countries* (see for instance the *Armed Conflict Dataset* maintained by PRIO and Uppsala University at <http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/>).

donor interest has emerged in 'fragile states'. On account of the large and increasing number of fragile states we find it warranted to discuss this issue in some detail.

The concerns of the donors have arisen on account of several factors: (a) human security and peace building; (ii) the relationship between state effectiveness and development; and (iii) a belief that underdevelopment and insecurity (individual and international) are related (McCloughlin 2009). In situations of fragility, aid delivery cannot be 'business as usual'. While fragile states are 'under-aided', aid flows are excessively volatile, poorly coordinated, and often reactive rather than preventive.

The concept of '*fragile state*' is highly controversial and contested. Besides, it is vague and difficult to operationalise, which makes it awkward to apply analytically and practically. Within the donor community the OECD/DAC definition represents perhaps a consensus (OECD/DAC 2007:2):

States are fragile when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations.

Notwithstanding this arguably authoritative definition, the controversy persists. The concept has been criticised for its normative import, especially its element of political will. Most bilateral donors have adopted their own definitions. As a result of the persistent ambiguity of definitions, a plethora of labels are being used to denote the state of states on a sliding scale towards total collapse: 'hybrid state', 'state in crisis', 'failed state', 'weak state', 'conflict-affected state', 'warlord state', 'quasi state', 'parallel state', 'country in transition', and 'Low Income Country Under Stress (LICUS)'. Some have tried to launch typologies of states in different stages of fragility: weak states; failing states; failed states; and collapsed state. This proliferation of labels obfuscates the debate. These various classifications have been widely criticised for being arbitrary, methodologically questionable, and lacking in transparency, and for producing only a snapshot of the condition of a state at a particular point in time, rather than explaining how change occurs. Owing to this conceptual ambiguity and lack of precision, 'fragile state' is a designation that covers a range of regime types. At worst, it is a residual category, covering any regime type from strong authoritarianism to feckless democracy.

The OECD/DAC International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) uses a fourfold classification of fragile states: (i) post-conflict/crisis or political transition situations; (ii) deteriorating governance environments, (iii) gradual improvement; and (iv) prolonged crisis or impasse. DFID's typology of fragile states, on the other hand, includes four types of environments: (i) 'Monterrey' cases of strong capacity and reasonable political will; (ii) 'weak but willing' where government capacity is an obstacle to implementing policy; (iii) 'strong but unresponsive' where state capacity is directed to achieving development goals; (iv) 'weak-weak' where both state capacity and political will are lacking. There are many ways of cutting the cake and whichever one chooses, will leave problems.

Fragility results from an interplay between internal factors (e.g. violent conflict, poverty, economic and structural conditions, weak formal institutions) and external factors (including international political economy, regional and global insecurity). Fragility is often associated with violent conflict and widespread poverty. The internal factors centre on incentive structures within public institutions. But the fragility of flawed internal institutions is also affected by the international political economy. Internal institutional deficiencies often emerge when triggered by exogenous factors such as global economic downturn and climate change.

Text Box 2: South Sudan – Complex Aid Picture in Fragile Situation

South Sudan fits the designation of a fragile state. Overall, the state structures are very fragile and hardly functioning at all. They need to be built up almost from scratch. Hence, the absorptive capacity is limited. It is not easy to get a grasp of the inflow of aid funds to South Sudan. A major multi-donor trust fund (MDTF) under World Bank auspices has been established with contributions from many donors, including Norway and the other Nordic countries, the Netherlands, the UK, Canada, Germany and the European Commission. In addition, several bilateral donors run their own programmes. An overall aid strategy appears to be lacking, though.

The South Sudanese parliament was not elected but appointed according to a formula as part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2005. Owing to the non-election of the MPs the South Sudanese parliament lacks legitimacy and, hence, it is easily sidelined by the executive. However, an election is scheduled for 2010, although it has been postponed several times before.

The project portfolio of the MDTF does not include support for parliament. It nevertheless appears that some bilateral support has been given in a piecemeal manner to parliament, mostly for workshops and training purposes. The greatest challenge facing donors in strengthening parliament in this fragile situation is that (a) pending the 2010 parliamentary election, the legislature lacks legitimacy; and that (b) the legislature needs to be reconstructed from a very rudimentary level.

Source: <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/SUDANEXTN/EXTAFRMDTF/0..contentMDK:20884870--menuPK:2317424--pagePK:64168445--piPK:64168309--theSitePK:2193668,00.html#portfolio>

Measuring state fragility is even more difficult than determining which countries to classify as fragile. The methodological frameworks for undertaking this task are legion. The World Bank has developed the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) as its tool, which is widely used. It rates the quality of a country's policies and institutional arrangements against a set of criteria grouped in four clusters: (i) economic management; (ii) structural policies; (iii) policies for social inclusion and equity; and (iv) public sector management and institutions. It emphasises economic governance and devotes less attention to the political sphere. The World Bank's definition of fragile states applies to low-income countries scoring 3.2 and below on the CPIA. Most of these are all low-income countries that are falling behind, or not making much progress.

How can the Paris principles be applied in situations of fragility? Harmonisation of donor policies and aid flows may be feasible, although in practice it has proven difficult for reasons that a volatile environment may have given rise to. The situation in Southern Sudan is a case in point, despite efforts to coordinate in multi-donor basket funds. Arguably, the principles of alignment and ownership are even harder

to apply in fragile situations. The very fact of fragility and the attendant rudimentary state structures in place make it very hard to discern with what donors can align. Similarly, the poor state of state structures makes it correspondingly hard to locate where ownership can be anchored. This state of affairs underscores yet again the need for politically savvy country-specific assessments of government capacity and policies in the fragile states concerned.

If *ex ante* appraisal of aid interventions are difficult, their *ex post* evaluation is equally hard to undertake, probably more so. Many argue that existing methodologies cannot meaningfully be applied to interventions in very complex and volatile environments. In practice, monitoring and evaluating in fragile settings present huge methodological and logistical challenges. Reliable data are often lacking or non-existent, or it is unfeasible or too dangerous to collect them. More so than in conventional evaluations, it is inherently difficult to demonstrate causality or attribution in volatile situations, or to measure changes in key factors such as state legitimacy or inclusion (Mcloughlin 2009: 42).

According to Mcloughlin (2009:43), a number of evaluations of aid programmes in fragile states stress the need to prioritise a limited reform programme, based on sound political analyses responsive to a varied and volatile environment. This would require flexible funding arrangements that are inclusive and accountable. The political economy analysis should endeavour to identify potential change agents and on that basis develop locally appropriate strategies with the change agents in the driving seat.

Given the extremely weak and faulty institutions of fragile states the donors have a role in state-building, understood as an ongoing, long-term, and endogenous process of establishing and/or developing effective and legitimate state institutions and state-society relations. The approach has three main prongs: (a) supporting the legitimacy and accountability of states through democratic governance (elections and constitutional processes); (b) economic liberalisation; and (c) strengthening the capacity of states to fulfil their core functions in order to reduce poverty. These activities are seen as essential for the development of 'reciprocal relations between a state that delivers services for its people and social and political groups who constructively engage with their state' (OECD/DAC 2008:1).

The donor community has funded elections to underpin the legitimacy of elected offices such as the presidency and the legislature but been rather reticent about following up with support to parliaments once elected. The literature on fragile states has for a long time been conspicuously silent on parliamentary strengthening specifically. The debate on the core functions of the state within state-building efforts centred on (a) the monopoly over the legitimate use of force; (b) revenue generation; (c) safety, security and justice; (d) basic service delivery; and (e) economic governance. The legislative and oversight functions of parliaments were left out, and only recently has the representational and legitimacy aspects of parliaments in fragile states been taken into account, by for instance the OECD/DAC and in particular by DFID.

It is a defining characteristic of fragile states that they find themselves in crises of legitimacy in the sense that citizens may not accept the state's basic right to rule. In divided societies, which are often typical of fragile states, legitimacy may be enjoyed in only segments of the population. State legitimacy and the development of trust between state and society have long been considered a critical dimension of state-building processes in the political science literature (Bellina et al. 2009). There are many types of legitimacy (including grounded, embedded, charismatic, international, self-legitimacy) and sources of legitimacy (including performance in terms of certain functions, representation, accountability, citizenship, rights).

A particularly vexing question is whether a 'fragile state' – however defined – is in the midst of a trajectory of increasing fragility towards collapse or on a path in the opposite direction, out of conflict towards greater resilience? Accepting that state fragility does not denote a clear-cut condition and that it is more appropriate to consider degrees of fragility along a continuum from a well-functioning state, at the one extreme, to a collapsed state, at the other extreme (Anten 2009:210), in what direction is a particular designated fragile state actually moving? Again, a thorough political economy analysis would be helpful to answer that question, which would have a bearing on donors' aid strategies.

In fragile states, parliament has the potential of being an effective institution for conflict management. However, legislatures play an equivocal role. On the one hand, they represent a plurality of interests in society and can thus play a significant role to ensure that the voices of minorities or the marginalised are heard. On the other hand, legislatures are also arenas of contestation where various societal interests are pitted against one another, which, in turn, could contribute to heightening tension. While acknowledging this equivocal role, parliaments have a comparative advantage in transferring stakeholder grievances from the battlefield to the political sphere. As long as divergent interests talk and deliberate by means of words, they do not fight with guns. Such 'war of words' could result in power-sharing arrangements as negotiated compromises with a view to bringing all segments of society into the political framework (Dutta et al. 2007:v).

All societies are inherently conflictual if one defines conflict as the pursuit of incompatible goals by different groups and individuals. After all, politics is a struggle over the distribution of resources in society. This is where a democratic system of governance is relevant, including parliaments as an institution of conflict management. Parliaments can play constructive roles in preventing conflicts escalating into armed conflict (O'Brien 2005).

In a situation of pronounced fragility the design of aid interventions is exceedingly difficult. It would probably be advisable, therefore, to opt for a minimalist, gradualist approach. One option might be to establish a parliamentary resource centre available to all political parties represented in parliament – from the incumbent party and the opposition alike. The idea would be to facilitate exchange of views and experiences rather than superimposing models and solutions. To have an impact, such a centre would have to be well resourced and with competent non-partisan professional staff for research purposes, legal advice with regard to legislative

processes, including the drafting of bills, and economic expertise related to budget matters and economic policies. It is believed that such an inter-party resource centre could be instrumental in building ownership. If initially successful, a centre of this nature could, in turn, serve as a basis for a more elaborate phase of institution-building.

By contrast to fragile states, '*democratising countries*' are in a process of democratisation; more than cosmetic changes have taken place, there has probably been a regime change through a negotiated settlement between the incumbent and the opposition and/or according to the will of the people (e.g. a 'watershed' election). There is also a demonstrated political will to deepen and consolidate the democratic system through continuous efforts of institutionalisation and reform processes. Democratising countries are sometimes post-conflict countries, and typically in a slow, long-term process of democratisation and democratic consolidation.

Countries in a process of democratic transition, in a process of regime change from authoritarian (or external) exercise of power to democratic forms of government, are particularly 'open' to parliamentary support projects. We have seen this from the experience of the democratisation processes of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, in different waves of democratisation in Africa, and in the transition of particular countries such as South Africa and Nicaragua. Parliamentary strengthening is particularly opportune in such situations.

No parliament is likely to function well without *political parties*, which are the main vehicles for articulating demands and grievances from the voters to the top of the political system. However, a recurrent problem for donors and development agencies to engage with political parties is that they are "being considered too political and therefore too sensitive" (AAPPG 2008:51). Political party development (as an entry point to assisting parliaments) has for a long time ranked low on the list of international policy priorities for development cooperation. Engaging with political parties, however, is necessary for supporting multi-party democracy and for working with parliaments. Whatever the political sensitivities involved, it is essential that donors develop the expertise and financial instruments in order to better address this fundamental area.

We have seen a tendency, albeit weak, of linking parliamentary support projects to political parties. Most donors still keep an arms-length distance to political party support because of the political sensitivity (and because foreign funding of political parties is simply prohibited by law in many countries). Support is left to political party foundations, with relatively little donor engagement, supervision or impact. Regardless of the source of political party support, the institutionalisation of political parties remains a matter of paramount importance. In most developing countries political parties are only rudimentary organisations hampered by serious deficiencies in terms of their financial foundation, stability of membership, and profile discernible to the electorate. Many political parties are effectively 'owned' by their strong leaders. With weak and unstable individual political parties one cannot expect a stable *party system* that is so important for underpinning the functionality of the legislature.

The *electoral system* and the *electoral process* have a strong impact on parliament and the wider political system. For instance, the first-past-the-post electoral system in single member constituencies as distinct from that of proportional representation – and any combination thereof – will have profound implications for the functionality of parliaments. Similarly, polls taken across the world show that the manner in which elections are conducted also contributes to shaping the way in which parliaments operate. The administration of elections also affects the legitimacy of parliaments.

The free and fair management of elections, including the independence of electoral commissions, election observation and the design of electoral systems must therefore be taken into consideration as contextual variables in adopting customised approaches to parliamentary strengthening.

7.2 Long time horizon

Few, if any, aid interventions ever provide ‘quick fixes’ to a challenge and this certainly applies to parliamentary strengthening. *Parliamentary strengthening requires a long time horizon*. Effectiveness, let alone long-term impact, in terms of functioning parliaments can only be achieved through patient and painstaking work over the long run. A decade would by no means be excessive. It should be recalled that electoral cycles are typically 4–5 years. Hence, the duration of an intervention over two electoral cycles would be justified, preferably even three or more. It should be recalled that politics is dynamic and political institutions such as parliaments are moving targets, an aspect of which being the high turnover of parliamentarians at every election. A long-term intervention would allow for the flexibility that a moving target demands.

Continuity of personnel on both sides of the relationship is crucial in the implementation of parliamentary assistance programmes, because they involve building relationships based on trust, which can only be achieved in the long term. While MPs come and go, parliamentary staff is normally employed on a permanent basis and could thus provide continuity. It is a major problem, however, that the turnover of donor personnel is high, which undermines both continuity and institutional memory. In fact, it would be a great advantage for donor to have a field presence of senior staff who are politically astute.

Development partners’ human resource policies and processes are essential in this respect. The pool of donor expertise and experience in parliamentary strengthening is relatively small (only the USAID has a full-time agency expert on parliamentary assistance). As parliamentary strengthening moves up the international development agenda, the quality of parliamentary strengthening work must be boosted. Development partners must ensure that they have sufficient numbers of staff with the right skills, professional background and inter-personal qualities to operate effectively in a parliamentary environment (AAPPG 2008:45).

7.3 Comprehensive approach

A country’s parliament is an integral part of the political system and cannot be treated as a discrete entity in a piecemeal fashion. *Parliamentary strengthening*

requires a comprehensive approach. The functionality of parliament is relational and depends on a host of factors outside parliament itself. For example, no parliament is likely to function well without political parties which are the main vehicles for articulating demands and grievances from the voters to the top of the political system, and for elaborating policy options. Similarly, a series of constitutional issues have a strong bearing on the operations of parliament. First, the electoral system contributes to shaping the way in which politics is conducted. Second, the nature of the political system (presidential or parliamentary) also influences the functionality of parliament. These wider contextual factors must be taken into account when parliamentary interventions are designed as pointed out above (see section 7.1 on the need for contextualisation).

The realisation that the approach must be comprehensive thus calls for multiple elements in efforts to deepen the democratisation process. Donors who are not prepared to enter those other sub-fields associated with parliamentary support because they are deemed too politically sensitive ought to desist from engaging in parliamentary strengthening altogether. However, given the high sensitivity and acknowledging the Paris Declarations principles of ownership and alignment, an appropriate approach would be that of facilitation rather than imposition. Instead of championing specific models of political systems or extolling the merits of particular electoral systems, donors could assist in bringing together stakeholders for unprejudiced debate on these matters. Such debates could in due course lead to the maturing of new ideas and nudge developments in a positive direction.

7.4 Demand-driven donor support

The Paris Declaration stresses local ownership and alignment, which sums up the donor experiences over many years that conditionality and impositions from abroad do not work and are not sustainable. Interventions must be anchored in domestic needs and demands. *Interventions to strengthen parliaments should be demand-driven.* Parliamentary strengthening efforts stand a chance of succeeding only if they are based on thorough needs assessments produced in conjunction with the parliament concerned. However, parliaments are not monolithic entities speaking with one voice, and probably operate with a dose of patronage. The planning of interventions should, therefore, bring on board parliamentary permanent staff (partisan and non-partisan), MPs, the political parties and other relevant stakeholders. The speaker and the clerk are key actors and need at a minimum not to be opposed to parliamentary strengthening projects; their active participation would no doubt be an advantage. A suitable vehicle for implementation would probably be a steering committee comprising a variety of interests represented in parliament.

Interventions should preferably be based on strategic plans for parliamentary development that are owned locally. The origin of such plans is critical and questions of whose ownership are relevant. Are governments, parliaments, or other societal actors the owners? To reinforce domestic ownership it would be worth bringing in stakeholders outside parliament who are nonetheless interested in strengthening parliament's functions, e.g. CSOs. In this regard, there is a dialectic in the interaction between various domestic actors, on the one hand, and the donors, on the other. The latter may find justification for 'reasonable intrusion' –

albeit with circumspection – if authoritarian forces are reluctant or slow in proceeding. At any rate, the implication for donors is that getting started may take considerable time. On the other hand, forging ahead without due consideration to local hindrances is likely to backfire. Short-term expediency and impatience will probably lead to long-term failure.

7.5 Political sensitivity

It must be acknowledged that *parliamentary strengthening is inherently political in nature and very sensitive*. This political sensitivity reinforces the previous lessons about ownership and alignment. Bilateral donor agencies from former colonial powers or major players on the global scene could easily be suspected of having ulterior motives, e.g. promoting specific models or advancing foreign policy positions. Their interventions might be perceived to be politically motivated. Two insights emerge from this political sensitivity with a view to diffusing tension and ensuring effectiveness.

First, multilateral agencies such as the UNDP are often seen as more acceptable and less liable to being suspected of pursuing agendas at variance with the wishes of the countries concerned. Some respondents have maintained, however, that although the UNDP may have a comparative advantage in the sensitive field of parliamentary support, it may not be as efficient in its operations as bilateral agencies. An alternative to UNDP coordination might be basket funding by multiple bilateral donors, coordinated by one of them. This could possibly dissipate some of the sensitivity. Apart from redressing the sensitivity problem basket funding also has the advantage of saving transaction costs and pooling professional resources, which accords well with the principle of harmonisation. On the other hand, while there is merit in donor harmonisation and coordination it should not be taken to the extreme. There is a tendency for donors to hyper-coordinate, which has a downside. It may be perceived as ‘ganging up’ against the recipient or monopolising the expertise and the models that are advanced. Therefore, a measure of pluralism may be admissible and leave the choices to be made to sophisticated MPs. Whatever the case might be, an impartial stance is mandatory.

Second, peer advice is generally more acceptable to aid recipients than donor guidance. Consequently, the involvement of fellow parliamentarians from other countries through parliamentary associations may be helpful. We have thus seen a move by some donors away from international parliamentary organisations and partnerships with donor country parliaments, to a stronger emphasis on regional parliamentary organisations. This regional approach to parliamentary strengthening is also based on the idea that peer-to-peer knowledge transfer and shared experiences are more likely to ‘sink in’ than international (read: Western) experiences and standards. For instance, the Sida position paper and thematic review favoured an expansion of the range of support to parliamentary networks to include local and regional networks (Sida 2006:7 and 9; Hubli & Schmidt 2005:6–8). An inter-party steering committee would probably also be useful to diffuse tension and build trust to overcome the sensitivity.

7.6 Issues as entry points

Parliaments deal with a range of policies and issues. Therefore, parliamentarians are often in dire need of information and knowledge about specific policy areas: *issue-based approaches provide useful entry points*. Donors have experienced that training programmes addressing substantive issues – as distinct from procedural change or institutional reform – have been convenient entry points and met with approval, even enthusiasm. Such substantive issues or themes could cover anything across the board of parliamentary work, e.g. gender relations; budget tracking; HIV and AIDS; environmental protection; climate change, etc. Such interventions could help to reduce sensitivity, build trust and pave the way for other types of intervention, which might be considered more sensitive. They could also serve to bridge party divides and promote inter-party consensus on important policy matters.

Even though issue-based approaches may provide useful entry points, it should not be forgotten that thematic events run the risk of being futile efforts if not linked to parliamentary work. It is necessary, therefore, to include participants who are conversant with parliamentary procedures with a view to exploiting the imparted knowledge for parliamentary purposes such as preparing laws or policy papers. Over-zealous thematic experts and CSO representatives could undermine the very purpose of such events unless they are committed to the parliamentary process. Peer-to-peer exchanges would be helpful if coupled with a modicum of contextual knowledge; not all parliamentary experiences are readily transferable to other countries.

7.7 Analytical tools

In view of the lessons learned, what analytical tools do donors have at their disposal to design aid interventions to strengthen parliaments and to assess results? By way of introduction to this section it must be underscored that the analytical toolbox is filled with a range of instruments – some suitable for crude analysis only, others more sophisticated. Substantial work has been done in order to develop analytical tools and methodologies, and more is on its way, but there is still a need for comprehensive, comparative and systematic analysis. In particular, much is still lacking in terms of initial problem analysis, discussion and agreement, and in terms of parliamentary performance assessment.

But it is not justified to claim that the donor community has agreed on a uniform set of tools to be used. On the contrary, there is an inclination to launch ostensibly 'new' approaches, which in effect are 'old wine on new bottles' with the only difference of the distinct labels of particular donors.

Nevertheless, at the general level it can be said that donor assistance to parliaments must be based on a thorough analysis of the political (and economic) situation of the recipient country concerned, as outlined above (contextualisation). Donor assistance plans must factor in local conditions before any specific approach and programme can be designed.

7.7.1 Political economy analysis

At the general and global level, there are several high-quality democracy and regime typologies, indices and assessments. One of the more widely published democracy indices is The Economist Intelligence Unit's *Index of Democracy*, which lists the democracy score of 165 independent states and two territories, and suggests a possible typology four regime types depending on their democracy score: (a) full democracies, (b) flawed democracies, (c) hybrid regimes, and (d) authoritarian regimes (EIU 2008).

Another important democracy assessment is International IDEA's framework for assessing the *State of Democracy* (SoD), which differs methodologically in using a bottom-up approach. The SoD is a tool intended for use by citizens to assess the quality of their democracy, and define priority areas for policy and democratic reform.²³ Examples of indices on African countries include the Ibrahim Index of African Governance and the Index on African Governance based at the World Peace Foundation in Boston.²⁴

At a less generalised, country-specific level *political economy analysis* is widely used. Political economy refers to interdisciplinary studies that draw on economics, law and political science in order to understand how political institutions, the political environment and economic factors influence each other. There is a huge body of academic literature on forms of government, regime types and on levels of democracy.

In the donor community, political economy analyses have been used mainly to understand and analyse the relationship between economic and political power within states, political elites and authoritarian governments, and to unravel informal and customary political systems, patrimonialism and patronage.²⁵ Norad recently undertook a political economy analysis of Kenya as a basis for reassessing the country programme (Sundet and Moen 2009).

Sida has, for its part, developed a *power analysis*, which serves to stimulate thinking about processes of change and what can be done about informal and formal power relations, power structures and the actors and institutions contributing to them. The purpose is to make development cooperation more strategic within realistic time frames, provide indicators for judging progress, and make donor agencies more amenable to risk analysis and alternative approaches, rather than being locked into traditional technical interventions that try to bypass elites (Bjurmalm 2006).

A more well-tested way of studying elites, institutions and change is the DFID-initiated *drivers of change* (DoC) analysis, which emanates from the development community's increased recognition that effective programmes must be grounded in an understanding of the economic, social and political factors that are operative in

23 See IDEA's SoC pages at www.idea.int/sod/.

24 See the Ibrahim Index of African Governance at <http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/the-ibrahim-index> and the Index of African Governance at http://www.worldpeacefoundation.org/2009Index_FinalBookv4_FINAL10.2.pdf.

25 See for instance the "How to" note by DFID on "Political Economy Analysis" at <http://www.odi.org.uk/events/2009/07/23/1929-dfid-note-political-economy-analysis.pdf>

a country. The DoC approach is a way of applying political economy analysis to the development of donor strategies. The DoC methodology seeks to identify the political institutions, structures and agents that can act as key levers for enabling change and therefore improving the effectiveness of aid as well as the 'spoilers' of change that need to be neutralised. Various DoC studies have been carried out involving in-depth, country-level analysis.²⁶

The concept of *National Integrity System* (NIS) studies is also an example of political economy analysis, but with a stronger focus on formal state institutions. NIS analysis has been developed and promoted by Transparency International as part of its holistic approach to countering corruption. The NIS comprises the key institutions, laws and practices that contribute to integrity, transparency and accountability in a society. By diagnosing the strengths and weaknesses of a particular system, an evaluation based on the NIS can help to inform anti-corruption advocacy and reform efforts.²⁷

A recent paper on the evaluation of democracy support, hints at one indicator of successful parliamentary strengthening: peoples' perceptions. By virtue of this indicator, if successful a project/programme should eventually lead to a better public image of the parliamentary institution (Burnell 2007:108):

... a programme for strengthening a parliament should increase public trust in the parliament. Although we acknowledge that public opinion reflects several components, and external influences play a relevant role, it is important to monitor changes in public opinion and look for correlations between such opinion and programme results.

7.7.2 Governance assessments

Many development agencies are engaged in assessing governance by means of governance indicators. Governance indicators are intended to measure aspects of state governance in a country, but in contrast to democracy indicators they are usually specifically focused on specific areas of governance such as electoral systems, corruption, human rights, public service delivery, civil society, and gender equality.

Most governance assessments are driven by policy dialogue, detailed planning of governance enhancement activities and strategic decisions regarding aid to specific countries. Governance assessment approaches seem to have been developed mostly in response to individual agency needs and concerns. There appears to be less interest in learning about the links between governance factors and development outcomes in different country contexts. This might explain why the assumptions underlying particular general governance assessment tools are usually not made explicit and that, despite many differences, there are also striking similarities between approaches (OECD/DAC 2008:4).

26 Drivers of change studies have been carried out in Angola, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cambodia, Georgia, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. The Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) has developed special resources on political economy as well as DoC, and lists downloadable reports on the methodology, approach and country studies. For further details see www.gsdrc.org/index.cfm?objectid=597A76DB-14C2-620A-2770D688963DF944.

27 See TI's NIS studies pages (www.transparency.org/policy_research/nis), with the full text of NIS studies from a long list of countries. Please note that some of these studies date back to 2000 and are in need of updating.

Governance assessments cover a broad range of issues and processes. The wide spectrum of factors, actors and time perspectives in various assessment tools is due to the fact that they are all based on different sets of underlying assumptions and values. Most tools use secondary data, and almost all of them draw on perception-based information primarily derived from surveys and panels of experts. Assessment tools producing indicator sets tend to be perceived as more methodologically rigorous than other tools.²⁸

One of the most important and widely used analytical tool on government assessments is the quantitatively orientated *World Governance Indicators* (WGI) by the World Bank Institute (WBI). However, the more qualitatively orientated framework of the DFID, the *Country Governance Analysis* (CGA), is also gaining popularity.²⁹

The problem with governance indicators is, among other things, that they mainly refer to the 'rules of the game' rather than the outcome of the game; to government institutions rather than the interplay between government, politics and the rest of society; to the formal institutions rather than the interplay between formal and informal institutions; and to governance a 'technical' rather than a 'normative' and political concept. Besides, there is much confusion surrounding measuring, assessing, analysing, understanding, benchmarking, describing, monitoring and evaluating governance (OECD/DAC 2008:7). Another problem with governance indicators is that they rarely include parliamentary performance, and when they do, these are of poor quality and limited value.

7.7.3 Parliamentary performance

Methodologies for assessing the performance of parliaments are inadequately developed. The political nature of legislatures, the particular functions for which they are responsible, and different role they can take in democratic transitions and consolidation, the constantly changing membership and political composition of legislatures lead to significant challenges in establishing indicators (see section 1.2 above).

Much of the literature and practice in parliamentary assessments stresses that parliamentary development needs to be placed within a broader historical and social context of democratic development, and be assessed in terms both of the local realities of democratic development and of the need to remain focused on overall democratisation.

Thus, parliamentary assessments can serve a larger purpose by measuring the progress of a legislative institution in terms of its internal reform and modernisation process, and in terms of one element in the overall democratic development of the legislative institution. However, the methodologies for assessing parliaments are still weak on the key issue of how parliaments can increase its potential to fulfil its core functions when they are embedded in 'patrimonial' and 'clientelist' political systems.

28 OECD's Development Co-operation Directorate (DAC) has made a *Survey of Donor Approaches to Governance Assessment* (OECD/DAC 2008).

29 See <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>, and DFID 2008. For a comprehensive list of governance indicators, see UNDP's *Government Assessment Portal* (GAP) at www.gaportal.org, and UNDP's *Governance Indicators – A Users' Guide* (UNDP 2007).

The current state of the art regarding indicators of parliamentary effectiveness is partly embedded in the governance assessments, although these are weak on parliamentary performance, and partly on parliamentary 'score cards' and 'benchmarks' which are detailed on specific roles and tasks, but hard to employ for assessing developments over time and comparing performance across countries.

The USAID is leading the way in trying to develop tools for assessing parliamentary performance. The USAID *Handbook on Legislative Strengthening* (2000a) contains a framework of questions on context and functions, and a list of questions on parliamentary needs and priorities (USAID 2000a; page 15 and appendix A). Another example of a global indicator on parliaments is the Parliamentary Centre's *Indicators of Parliamentary Performance in the Budget Process*.³⁰ This indicator is confined to parliaments' role in the budget process and their ability to prevent and combat corruption; the data are based on the perceptions of researchers and peer reviewers. This indicator is specific to one parliamentary function only.

A more general set of indicators is the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association's *Benchmarks for Democratic Legislatures*.³¹ This tool is a long and detailed list of how parliaments should (ideally) behave with respect to elections, procedure, remuneration and benefits, sessions, debates, committees and a host of other matters, including political parties and parliamentary staff.

The *Parliamentary Centre* (PC), in cooperation with the *World Bank Institute* (WBI), is now developing a tool kit for measuring parliamentary performance. The objective is to provide parliamentarians, parliamentary staff and others who study parliaments with the practical means to evaluate parliamentary performance against general standards adapted to the circumstances of each country.

The first step in the process was to develop a conceptual framework for parliamentary performance expressed in the form of a *parliamentary report card* (Paul 2002).³² The report card tests parliamentary performance in areas of activity that are almost universally regarded as being key aspects of parliamentary service, namely legislation, budget, oversight and representation; and in lines of service, namely level and range of activity, openness and transparency, participation, accountability, and policy and programme impact.

Even when attempting to keep it simple, the PC/WBI approach illustrates that parliamentary performance (and thus parliamentary strengthening projects) can be evaluated in terms of the core functions of parliaments (law making, budgeting, oversight, representation) and in terms of several basic qualities of parliaments (transparency, participation, accountability, and impact).

Clearly, more work is needed to establish valid indicators and an evaluation framework suitable for capturing the institutional functionality of parliaments. Such

30 See: www.parlcent.ca/indicators/budget_process_e.php.

31 See: <http://sdnhq.undp.org/governance/paris/docs/CPA%20Benchmarks%20Report%20-%20FINAL%20-033007.doc>.

32 See www.parlcent.ca/indicators/index_e.php with the cross-table with the four times five indicators.

improved methodologies would assist the donors in assessing the effectiveness of parliamentary strengthening projects.³³

7.8 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness

The *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* of 2005 is based on the donor community's experiences in general.³⁴ It was a milestone by which OECD/DAC countries agreed to coordinate policy and provide multi-year financing. In return, the developing countries agreed to improve governance and financial management and to involve parliaments and civil society more closely in drawing up and implementing development policy. It was also agreed that developing countries and donors would be accountable to each other for their policies. Although not specifically referring to lessons learned from parliamentary strengthening, donor assistance to parliaments should nevertheless adhere to the precepts of the Paris Declaration, especially the principles of harmonisation, alignment and ownership. The relevance of the Paris principles to parliamentary strengthening is palpable.³⁵

The principle of *ownership* implies that parliamentary strengthening requires the (recipient) parliament to exercise effective leadership over efforts to improve its capacity and performance, for instance by adopting a clear strategy for parliamentary development that is respected by the development partners, along with a programme to put it into action. Ownership in parliamentary strengthening implies that support and strengthening projects are demand-led and responsive to the needs of parliament.

The principle of *alignment* implies that parliamentary strengthening needs to be based on the parliament's own development strategy; based on using the (recipient) parliament's own systems for managing resources; and based on the provision of funds in a predictable and timely manner that fits well with parliamentary and political timetables.

The principle of *harmonisation* implies that parliamentary strengthening needs to be coordinated between the development partners/donors, using common arrangements and procedures, with each partner focussing on its areas of expertise rather than duplicating efforts. At the very least, harmonisation in parliamentary strengthening implies that donors begin with a clear map of the landscape of parliamentary strengthening before thinking about how they can best add value. For instance, the *Sida Position Paper* argues that Sida should, in line with this principle, "increase its participation in joint funding programs with a comprehensive and long-term approach to parliamentary reform" (Sida 2006:8).

Development partners must demonstrate their commitment to greater harmonisation and transparency. It is often necessary for donors to approach parliamentary strengthening from different angles – for example with certain donors focussing on working with civil society and others working with parliament more directly. A single

33 A third donor coordination meeting on parliamentary strengthening (March 2010) will focus on indicators and benchmarks (see annex A3.7, footnote 47). An interesting newcomer in this field is the *African Legislatures Project* based at the University of Cape Town (see <http://www.africanlegislaturesproject.org/>).

34 Full text available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf.

35 This section is largely based on Hudson and Tsekpo 2009.

project or common management approach, therefore, may not necessarily be appropriate.

A lot has been done to promote donor harmonisation and cooperation. We will emphasise the work on a central information system that will enable development partners to share information and benefit from their respective experiences through the UNDP/DFID/WBI project on a *Parliamentary Development Knowledge Portal* (see section 8.1 below), and the role of the UNDP in taking the lead on long-term, holistic, multi-donor programmes. We will also emphasise the role of the OECD/DAC in donor co-operation.

Much more needs to be done, however, to improve coordination. Where appropriate, this includes forming common arrangements at country level for planning, funding, disbursement, monitoring, evaluating and reporting. They must also create an appropriate division of labour between donors in terms of their comparative advantages. As donor support to parliaments increases, diversifies and deepens it is important that these efforts reinforce one another (AAPPG 2008:49).

While development partners should work in step with one another, their approaches need not be uniform; there is some scope for pluralism. Sharing information and insights, reducing duplication and leaving one agency in the driver seat in local coordination groups is one thing, and dividing labour according to comparative advantage is another.

The principle of *managing for results* implies that parliamentary strengthening should be driven by a focus on increasing parliamentary effectiveness. This principle implies that developing countries *and* donors shift focus to development results, and ensures that inputs and results get measured. This would imply putting in place and making use of frameworks for monitoring and evaluating progress on parliamentary strengthening and making decisions about future activities on the basis of such monitoring and evaluation. However, the use of indicators and benchmarks should not be taken too far (see section 1.2 above).

The principle of *mutual accountability* implies that development partners/donors and parliaments are conducting joint assessments of progress on parliamentary strengthening, and that parliaments are sharing information with their citizens and voters, and that the development partners are sharing information with other partners and the public in the donor countries.

7.9 Some open questions

In the course of our work on this synthesis study, a number of questions has arisen to which we have no ready answers, partly because they fall outside the ToR and partly because there are no lessons to be drawn as yet. Some of these questions are politically sensitive, and would require substantial original, in-depth research to be answered fully. They are nevertheless important questions to be considered for follow-up.

What are the pros and cons of an issue-based approach to parliamentary strengthening? Will, for instance, enhancing a parliament's capacity to pass legislation on children rights or the environment necessarily strengthen its overall capacity, including its role in democratic development by buttressing its autonomy and facilitate the functions of checks and balances? Or, can a policy-based approach divert parliamentary attention, capacity and competence away from the fundamental functions? Under what circumstances should donors be careful *not* to present a parliament with policy issues and appurtenant donor resources/aid?

How can donor support be better harmonised and aligned with recipient country priorities? A major challenge is that many parliaments need to make analytical studies, procuring legal and economic expertise and advice, and buying secretarial services, while at the same time the prices of such expertise and services are increasing owing to limited supply and high demand – partly driven by donors (Rocha et al. 2007:8). Donors have been reluctant to provide parliaments with necessary core funding for fear that doing so would pull them 'into politics'. Another consequence might be that budget support would then be scaled down and that core support would be unsustainable in the longer run.

When talking about ownership and demand-led reforms, what are the sources of demand for parliamentary reforms and strengthening? Given the fact that many parliaments are subservient and subordinated to the executive branch, many presidents are not interested in a strengthened parliamentary institution capable of overseeing and holding the executive to account. Who are the reformers, the 'drivers of change' who can make a formal request for parliamentary reform?

A related question is that of political interest. What political interests and incentives are involved in parliamentary strengthening? In whose interest is it to block or restrict the development of an efficient, legitimate and democratic parliament? What are the sources of demand for parliamentary development work? Who are the reformers upon whose attention and support donors can call – politically, financially and practically? And who are the 'spoliers' whom the donors and the reformers wish to neutralise and by what means?

For parliamentary strengthening projects as well as development aid in general, there is a risk of donor dependency, in which case donors tend to acquire a greater say over policy than the recipient governments. Such a state of affairs does not accord with the Paris principle of mutual accountability. The privileged position of a recipient government might cause it to lose sight of the need for domestic integrity, participatory decision-making, accountability and parliamentary scrutiny. Furthermore, the donor community has – perhaps unwittingly or unintentionally – contributed to disempowering parliaments (and a number of other state institutions) through their predominant engagement with the executive branch of government. To the extent recipient governments have become accountable to external donors for large shares of their budgets (for instance, through budget support and PRSPs), donor engagement in aid dependent countries can have the effect of marginalising the role of parliamentary oversight (Hudson and Wren 2007:4).

Text Box 3: Summary of Lessons Learned

- **Parliamentary strengthening requires thorough contextualisation**
 - a) Parliamentary assistance must consider regime type, political parties and electoral systems;
 - b) Parliamentary assistance must be mainstreamed to democracy assistance in general;
 - c) Countries in a process of democratic transition are particularly 'open' to parliamentary support projects;
 - d) In stable, authoritarian systems with a lack of 'political will' for change, parliamentary support interventions should approach 'from below';
 - e) Interventions in fragile states must be made with great circumspection.
- **Parliamentary strengthening requires a long time horizon**
 - a) Continuity of politically astute personnel is critical;
 - f) Good systems of information management and institutional memory are mandatory.
- **Parliamentary strengthening requires a comprehensive approach**
 - a) Political parties and the electoral system bear decisively on parliamentary performance;
 - g) Donors could facilitate unprejudiced debate among stakeholders on political parties and electoral system.
- **Interventions to strengthen parliaments should be demand-driven**
 - a) Interventions must be anchored in domestic needs and demands;
 - b) Interventions should bring on board MPs, parliamentary staff, political parties and other stakeholders;
 - c) The speaker and the clerk should not be opposed to parliamentary strengthening projects;
 - d) Interventions should be based on locally owned strategic plans for parliamentary development;
 - h) Bring in stakeholders outside parliament who are interested in parliamentary strengthening.
- **Parliamentary strengthening is inherently political in nature and very sensitive**
 - a) Multilateral agencies are often seen as more acceptable;
 - b) Peer advice is generally more acceptable;
 - i) An inter-party steering committee can be useful to diffuse tension and build trust.
- **Issue-based approaches can provide useful entry points**
 - a) Events conveying substantive knowledge on policy issues to MPs could be helpful;
 - j) Such events (seminars and training sessions) must be contextualised and orientated to parliamentary strengthening.
- **Parliamentary assistance requires good analytical tools**
 - a) Political Economy Analyses; Drivers of Change; Power Analysis; and Governance Assessments are useful analytical tools;
 - k) Handbooks, benchmarks and performance indicators exist but remain inadequate.
- **The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness should apply**
 - a) Donors should coordinate and harmonise policies and financing;
 - b) Recipient parliaments should exercise effective ownership;
 - c) Interventions should be aligned to recipient parliaments' own institutional strategies;
 - d) Donors should be transparent and accountable;
 - e) Inputs and results should be monitored and evaluated.

8. Recommendations specific to Norway

All the generic lessons learned and the attendant recommendations set out in the preceding sections would apply to Norway's interventions in the field of parliamentary strengthening. However, there are a few recommendations that are specific to Norway's efforts. This section lists them.

8.1 Institutional memory and learning

It is a perennial problem in donor agencies – including the MFA and Norad – that the institutional memory and learning is far below par. Parliamentary strengthening is no exception. The decentralised nature of project programming and responsibility (between Norad and the MFA with its embassies) aggravates the problem. The different educational backgrounds, interests and experiences of project and advisory staff, as well as the high turnover of staff further compound it. There is a dire need, therefore, for establishing workable systems of institutional memory, learning and knowledge storage and retrieval. In this respect, we recommend the following:

- A system of *knowledge management* should be established to ensure institutional learning and memory regarding parliamentary support (procedures and routines for reporting, data filing, and project search and information retrieval). The existing project registration system is inadequate, either because its design is faulty or because it is not being used properly, e.g. that staff do not observe the established procedures in a timely fashion. Furthermore, we have had occasion to observe that the linkage between the project registration system and the statistical compilation does not work as intended. Hence, a fresh look needs to be taken of these two supposedly interlinked systems to improve their performance.
- A system of *knowledge storage and retrieval* should be established to ensure easy access to and quick dissemination of knowledge in the field of parliamentary assistance to relevant Norwegian project and advisory staff. The work currently undertaken by the UNDP to establish a 'portal' is a major step in the right direction: *Parliamentary Development Knowledge Portal*. But such a portal will only work satisfactorily to the extent bilateral and multilateral agencies feed it with information of statistical nature and in the form of documents (strategy papers, analyses and evaluations). Once established and if well maintained on a continuous basis such a portal would provide Norwegian staff access to a rich depository of information from all donors in this aid area. This information could, in turn, be exploited and adapted to Norwegian priorities, administrative systems, organisations and practices. It might also be feasible to design *training modules* for a variety of purposes (based, for instance, on the World Bank

courses and workshop modules and the forthcoming EC/IDEA Training Module). Norway should support the current efforts to establish this portal.

8.2 Strategy

In view of the *ad hoc* and haphazard nature of Norwegian parliamentary support to date, there is a need for charting a strategy in this field of aid within the broader context of governance. We cannot see that Norway has a comparative advantage in this regard. The justification for continued engagement in parliamentary strengthening is rather that parliaments are integral parts of the governance system of any country. No donor can turn a blind eye to the functioning or malfunctioning of parliaments and simultaneously claim to be serious about governance issues.

We would therefore like to recommend that Norway (in effect Norad as the advisory outfit) – as a matter of urgency – begin work on a strategy in parliamentary strengthening, not as a separate strategy but rather as an integral part of a broader governance strategy. The resultant strategy paper would outline the overall Norwegian policy directions in line with the relevant white paper on development policy and other policy documents.³⁶ Furthermore, it would draw on the lessons learned enumerated in this report and be based on the principles of the Paris Declaration and the OECD/DAC Principles. Specifically, it should outline policy priorities, strategies, and methods for Norwegian parliamentary assistance.

As indicated by our analysis of the project data, Norway's project activities have been spread relatively thin, both in terms of the funding of each project, and in terms of the large number of countries assisted, in terms of multiple policy foci, and in terms of very short average project duration. This is problematic because it indicates a lack of underlying strategy and an *ad hoc* approach. It also makes monitoring and evaluation difficult. The principle of contextualisation is probably not given adequate attention in these projects, and we have reason to doubt that the principles of the Paris Declaration have been adhered to (e.g. parliamentary strengthening driven by demand from the recipient country). We find it justified, therefore, to recommend that Norwegian efforts in support to parliaments be concentration to *fewer* and *larger* programmes with a *longer-term* perspective. A few larger projects would be easier to align to a Norwegian strategy, and easier to monitor and evaluate.

The concentration in fewer, larger long-term programmes should be based on considerations made in the strategy paper, including the considerations of country selection and existing democratisation and good governance programmes that might deserve to be enlarged.

8.3 Strategic partnerships

Given the relative dearth of Norwegian organisations and milieux with the required competence and experience in parliamentary strengthening, there is a need for

³⁶ The basic principles and priorities are laid down in Report No. 13 to the Storting (2008-2009) *Climate, Conflict and Capital: Norwegian Development Policy Adapting to Change*, Oslo: Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available online at <http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dok/regpubl/stmeld/2008-2009/report-no-13-2008-2009-to-the-storting.html?id=552810>. See also Norad's Strategy towards 2010 at www.norad.no/en/Tools+and+publications/Publications/Publication+Page?key=109554, and the MFA's Platform for an Integrated Africa Policy at www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Utvikling/africa_platform_web_optimized.pdf.

developing strategic partnerships beyond Norway as parliamentary strengthening moves up the international development agenda.

In effect, Norway has already been in a strategic partnership with the NDI in this field of assistance. The NDI has a long-standing involvement in such activities and has acquired considerable expertise and experience over the years. Hence, this relationship could be formalised as a strategic partnership and given substance in accordance with the expected strategy paper.

Parallel to parliamentary strengthening we have repeatedly stressed that electoral systems have a bearing on the functioning of parliaments. Consequently, there is a case for considering alternatives to existing electoral systems. The *International Foundation for Electoral Systems* (IFES) is an independent, non-governmental organisation providing professional support to electoral democracy. Through field-work, applied research and advocacy, IFES has established itself as a centre of excellence in all matters related to elections, including different electoral system. Norway could consider developing a strategic partnership with IFES with a view to initiating and facilitating debates in some recipient countries on alternative electoral systems and their bearing on parliaments.

Although the *Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights* (NORDEM) has largely confined itself to election observation in the past, there might be a case for developing a capability within NORDEM to handle electoral systems. This should not be ruled out as a complement to IFES involvement, even if it seems a bit far-fetched at the moment.

In view of the closing down of the *Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support* (NDS) and pending the establishment of a reconstituted entity in one form or another, Norway needs to develop a strategic partnership with an organisation that can handle political party support as a complement to parliamentary strengthening. The *Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy* (NIMD) suggests itself as an obvious candidate for such a partnership (see section 5.4 above).

Even though *International IDEA* is not an executing agency for projects, it is an important knowledge base for all aspects of democratisation, including parliaments. Therefore, IDEA could also be considered a strategic knowledge partner along with the forthcoming portal under UNDP auspices.

8.4 Human resources development

Given the relative low level of political emphasis and prioritisation, expertise, knowledge and competence on parliamentary strengthening in Norad and the MFA, a human resource policy should be evolved to ensure a modicum of in-house expertise and experience in this field.

In this respect, we would recommend that at least *one person* (and/or office in Norad or MFA headquarters) be assigned the task of overseeing Norwegian parliamentary strengthening projects and of ensuring the quality in Norwegian parliamentary strengthening work. There is a need for a focal point to ensure cooperation and

harmonisation of projects and strategies, integration with wider democracy and good governance programmes, to collect, collate and follow up on international developments and experiences, to ensure that Norway lives up to international obligations, and to advise country offices, project implementers and consultants on Norwegian policies, methods, and preferred partners.

A dedicated officer skilled in parliamentary strengthening at Norad headquarters could also ensure that Norway is flexible and able to act quickly, in addition to thinking in a long-term, strategic, well-planned, coordinated and cooperative manner.

Annexes



Annex 1

References and Bibliography

- AAPPG (2008), *Strengthening Parliaments in Africa: Improving Support*. A report by the Africa All Party Parliamentary Group, London: Africa All Party Parliamentary Group. Available at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/StrengtheningParliamentsinAfrica.pdf> (accessed 25 Aug 09).
- Amundsen, Inge, Cesaltina Abreu and Laurinda Hoygaard (2005), *Accountability on the Move. The Parliament of Angola*, Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI Working Paper WP 2005:11). Available at www.cmi.no/publications/file/?2021=accountability-on-the-move (accessed 22 June 09).
- Amundsen, Inge (2007), *Donor Support to Political Parties: Status and Principles*, Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI Report R 2007: 6). Available online at <http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/?2705=donor-support-to-political-parties> (accessed 7 Oct 09).
- Anderson, Göran et al. (2002), *Strengthening the Capacity of the Office of the Vietnam National Assembly*, Stockholm: Sida (Department for Democracy and Social Development). Sida Evaluation 02/12. Available online (search title) at <http://www.sida.se/Svenska/Om-oss/Publikationer/> (accessed 17 Aug 09).
- Anten, Louise (2009), *Fragile States: State Building is Not Enough*, in de Zwaan, J., E. Bakker and S. van der Meer (eds.), *Challenges in a Changing World*, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, pp. 209–219.
- AusAID (2008), *Annual Report 2007–2008*, Canberra: AusAID. Available online at www.aid.gov.au/anrep/rep08/pdf/anrep07_08.pdf (accessed 27 Aug 09).
- Barkan, Joel (ed.) (2009), *Legislative Power in Emerging African Democracies*, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Bellina, Séverine, Dominique Darbon, Stein Sundstøl Eriksen and Ole Jacob Sending (2009), *The Legitimacy of the State in Fragile Situations*, Oslo: Norad (Report 20/2009 Discussion).
- Bhardwaj, Romesh Chander (2001), *AWEPA Parliamentary Capacity Building Programme in Tanzania (1996–2000): Evaluation Report*, New Delhi.
- Bjuremalm, Helena (2006), *Power Analysis – Experiences and Challenges*, Stockholm: Sida. Concept Note, Department for Democracy and Social Development. Available online at <http://www2.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=118&a=24300> (accessed 20 Aug 09).

- Bratton, Michael and Nicolas van de Walle (1997), *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Burnell, Peter (ed.) (2007), *Evaluating Democracy Support. Methods and Experiences*, Stockholm: International IDEA and Sida. Available online at http://www.idea.int/publications/evaluating_democracy_support/upload/evaluating_democracy_support_cropped.pdf (accessed 13 Aug 09).
- Center for Democracy and Governance (2000), *USAID Handbook on Legislative Strengthening*, Washington DC: Center for Democracy and Governance, U.S. Agency for International Development. Technical Publications Series. Available online at www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnacf632.pdf (accessed 10 Sept 09).
- Chabal, Patrick and Jean-Pascal Daloz (1998), *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*, Oxford: James Currey.
- Chayes, Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes (1998), *The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements*, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- CPA (2006), *Benchmarks for Democratic Legislatures: A Study Group Report*, London: Commonwealth Parliamentary Association.
- Danida (2006), *Evaluation of Parliamentarians for Global Action, Peace and Democracy Programme*, Copenhagen: Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Evaluation 2006-05 by COWI. Available on-line at www.um.dk/NR/ronlyres/E4AFCE49-EBCB-44CB-B90E-4790E2F6C66D/O/200605PGA.pdf (accessed 14 August 09).
- DFID (2004), *Helping Parliaments and Legislative Assemblies to Work for the Poor: A Guide to the Reform of Key Functions and Responsibilities*, London: Department for International Development, Policy Division. Available online at www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/helping-parliaments.pdf (accessed 5 Oct 09).
- DFID, UNDP and WBI (2007), *Donor Consultation on Parliamentary Development and Financial Accountability, Report*, hosted by the Government of Belgium and held in Brussels on 21–22 May.
- DFID, UNDP and WBI (2008), *Donor Coordination Meeting on Parliamentary Development*, hosted by DFID, 31–31 October 2008.
- DFID, WBI and CPA (2008), *Enhancing the Effectiveness of Parliaments: Challenges and Opportunities*, 934th Wilton Park Conference 27–28 October. Available at <http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/documents/conferences/WP934/pdfs/WP934.pdf?633966565258125000> (accessed 17 Dec 09).
- DFID (2008), *Country Governance Analysis*, A DFID practice paper/How to note, London: Department for International Development. Available online at www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/how-to-note-country-gov-analysis.pdf (accessed 5 Oct 09).

- DFID (2009), *Eliminating World Poverty: Building our Common Future*, London: Department for International Development. DFID White Paper. Available online at <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/whitepaper/building-our-common-future.pdf> (accessed 17 December 2009).
- DGCID (2007), *L'action de la DgCiD en matière de gouvernance démocratique (2005–2006)*, Paris: Ministry of Foreign Affairs DGCID/DPDEV. Available on-line at www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/367_Int_FR.pdf (accessed 12 August 09).
- Dulani, Boniface and Jan Kees van Donge (2005), 'A Decade of Legislature-Executive Squabble in Malawi, 1994–2004', in Salih, Mohamed M.A. (ed.), *African Parliaments: Between Governance and Government*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 201–224.
- Dutta, Nikhil; Christina Hajdu, Paul Oh, Bacharee Puengpak, Sarah Peterson, Simon Sternin, Suman Sureshbabu (2007), *Strengthening Legislatures for Conflict Management in Fragile States*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University. Available online at www.humansecuritygateway.info/documents/WOODRRROW_Strengthening_Legislature_FragileStates.pdf (accessed 15 Sept 09).
- European Commission (2008), *Terms of reference – Study on Strategies and Methodologies for EC Action in Support to Parliaments*, Brussels: European Commission. Unpublished ToR.
- European Commission (2009), *Annual Report 2009 on the European Community's Development and External Assistance Policies and their Implementation in 2008*, Brussels: European Commission (COM(2009)296). Available online at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/multimedia/publications/documents/annual-reports/europeaid_annual_report_2009_en.pdf (accessed 20 July 09).
- Fish, Steven M. (2006), 'Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracies', in *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 5–20.
- Fish, Steven M. and Matthew Kroenig (eds.) (2009), *The Handbook of National Legislatures: A Global Survey*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fukuyama, Francis (1992), *The End of History and the Last Man*, London: Penguin.
- Gloppen, Siri, Lise Rakner and Arne Tostensen (2003), *Responsiveness to the Concerns of the Poor and Accountability to the Commitments to Poverty Reduction*, Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI Working Paper WP 2003:9).
- GOPAC (2005), *Controlling Corruption: A Parliamentarian's Handbook*, Washington DC: Global Organization of Parliamentarians against Corruption (GOPAC) & World Bank Institute (WBI). Available online at www.u4.no/pdf/?file=/document/literature/Parliamentarians-handbook-controlling-corruption-2005.pdf (accessed 11 Sept 09).
- Hodges, Tony (2004), *Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State*, Lysaker: Fridtjof Nansen Institute.

- Hubli, K. Scott and Alicia P. Mandaville (2004), *Parliaments and the PRSP Process*, Washington DC: World Bank Institute, (Series on Contemporary Issues in Parliamentary Development). Available online at [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/wbi37231HubliMandavilleweb .pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/wbi37231HubliMandavilleweb.pdf) (accessed 7 Oct 09).
- Hubli, K. Scott and Martin Schmidt (2005), *Approaches to Parliamentary Strengthening. A Review of Sida's Support to Parliaments*, Stockholm: Sida Evaluation 05/27. Article No: SIDA21313en. Available online at www.sida.se/English/About-us/Sidas-Publications/ (accessed 23 June 09).
- Hudson, Alan, and Claire Wren (2007), *Parliamentary Strengthening in Developing Countries*, London: ODI and One World Trust. Final Report for DFID. Available online at www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/103.pdf (accessed 23 July 09).
- Hudson, Alan and Anthony Tsekpo (2009), *Parliamentary Strengthening and the Paris Principles Synthesis Report*, London: ODI and Parliamentary Centre. Available online at www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/3374.pdf (accessed 26 Aug 09).
- Kingham, Tess (2003), *E-Parliaments: The Use of Information and Communication Technologies to Improve Parliamentary Processes*, Washington DC: World Bank Institute, (Series on Contemporary Issues in Parliamentary Development). Available online at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/EParlmanents.pdf> (accessed 7 Oct 09).
- EIU (2008), *The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy 2008*. Available online at [http://a330.g.akamai.net/7/330/25828/20081021185552/graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Demcracy% 20Index %202008.pdf](http://a330.g.akamai.net/7/330/25828/20081021185552/graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Demcracy%20Index%202008.pdf) (accessed 10 Sept 09).
- IPU (2003), *Ten Years of Strengthening Parliaments in Africa, 1991–2000: Lessons Learnt and the Way Forward*, Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union. Available online at www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/africa2000_en.pdf (accessed 22 June 09).
- IPU (2005), *Making Reconciliation Work: the Role of Parliaments*, Geneva and Stockholm, IPU and International IDEA. Handbook for Parliamentarians no.10. Available on-line at www.ipu.org/PDF/publications/reconciliation_en.pdf (accessed 12 Aug 09)
- IPU (2006), *Parliament and Democracy in the Twenty-First Century: A Guide to Good Practice*, Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union.
- IPU (2009), *Activities of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in 2008*, Geneva: IPU. Available online at www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/SG08_en.pdf (accessed 28 June 09).
- Johnson, John K. (2005), *The Role of Parliament in Government*, Washington DC: World Bank Institute.

- Johnston, Niall and Arusha Stanislaus (2008), *Mid-Term Evaluation of the UNDP Timor-Leste Parliamentary Project: Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy in Timor-Leste*, Oslo: Norad. Available online at <http://www.norad.no/items/12476/38/6620675824/Mid-Term%20Evaluation%20of%20the%20UNDP%20Timor-Leste%20Parliamentary%20Project%20Strengthening%20Parliamentary%20Democracy%20in%20Timor-Leste.pdf>
- LSE (2007/2008), *The Dynamics of Legislative Rewards: An Empirical Analysis of Commonwealth Countries for the World Bank Institute*, London: London School of Economics.
- Mcloughlin, Claire (2009), *Topic Guide on Fragile States*, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) Available online at <http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/CON67.pdf> (accessed 9 Oct 09).
- Mezey, Michael L. (1985), 'The Functions of Legislatures in the Third World', in Loewenberg, Gerhard (ed.), *Handbook of Legislative Research*, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Miller, Robert, Riccardo Pelizzo and Rick Stapenhurst (2004), *Parliamentary Libraries, Institutes and Offices: The Sources of Parliamentary Information*, Washington DC: World Bank Institute. Series on Contemporary Issues in Parliamentary Development. Available online at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/ParliamentaryLibrariesInstitutesandOffices.pdf> (accessed 7 Oct 09).
- MinBuZa (2007), *Our Common Concern: Investing in Development in a Changing World*. Policy note Dutch Development Cooperation 2007–2011. The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Development cooperation). Available online at www.minbuza.nl/dsresource?objectid=buzabeheer:32207&type=pdf (accessed 28 June 09).
- Murphy, Jonathan and Alkache Alhada (2007), 'Global Programme for Parliamentary Strengthening II: Mid-term Evaluation Report', New York: UNDP. Available online at <http://sdnhq.undp.org/governance/parls/docs/GPPS%20Mid-Term%20Evaluation%20Final.pdf>
- NDI (n.d.), *Towards the Development of International Minimum Standards for Democratic Legislatures: A Discussion Document for Review by Interested Legislatures, Donors and International Organizations*, Washington DC: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs.
- O'Brien, Mitchell (2005), *Parliament as Peacebuilders: The Role of Parliaments in Conflict-Affected Countries*, Washington DC: World Bank Institute (WBI Working Papers).
- O'Brien, M.; Stapenhurst, R. and Johnston, N. (eds.) (2008), *Parliaments as Peacebuilders in Conflict-Affected Countries*, Washington DC: World Bank.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo (1998), 'Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies', in *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 112–126.
- OECD (2005), *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability*; Paris: OECD. Available online at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf (accessed 15 Aug 09).

- OECD/DAC (2007), *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States & Situations*, Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Available online at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/45/38368714.pdf> (accessed 8 Oct 2009)
- OECD/DAC (2008), *Survey of Donor Approaches to Governance Assessment*, Paris: OECD/DAC Network on Governance. Available online at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/5/40049776.pdf (accessed 10 Oct 09).
- OECD (2008), *State Building in Situations of Fragility*, Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Available online at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/9/41212290.pdf> (accessed 10 Oct 2009).
- Olson, David M. & Philip Norton (1996), 'Legislatures in Democratic Transition', in Olson, David M. & Philip Norton (eds.), *The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe*, London, Routledge.
- Patel, Nandini and Arne Tostensen (2006), *Parliamentary-Executive Relations in Malawi 1994–2004*, Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI Working Paper WP 2006:10). Available online at <http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication/?2336=parliamentary-executive-relations-in-malawi-1994> (accessed 11 Dec 09).
- Patel, Nandini and Arne Tostensen (2007), *The Legislature*, in Patel, Nandini and Lars Svåsand (eds.), *Government and Politics in Malawi*, Zomba: Kachere, pp. 79–108.
- Paul, Samuel (2002), *Holding the State to Account: Citizen Monitoring in Action*, Bangalore: Books for Change.
- Pelizzo, Riccardo and Rick Stapenhurst (2004a), *Tools for Legislative Oversight: An Empirical Investigation*, Washington DC: World Bank Institute. Series on Contemporary Issues in Parliamentary Development. Available online at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/ToolsforLegislativeOversight.pdf> (accessed 7 Oct 09).
- Pelizzo, Riccardo and Rick Stapenhurst (eds.) (2004b), *Legislatures and Oversight*, Washington DC: World Bank Institute. Series on Contemporary Issues in Parliamentary Development.
- Pelizzo, Riccardo; Rick Stapenhurst and David Olson (2005), *The Role of Parliaments in the Budget Process*, Washington DC: World Bank Institute. Series on Contemporary Issues in Parliamentary Development. Available online at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/TheRoleofParliamentsintheBudgetProcess.pdf> (accessed 7 Oct 09).
- Rakner, Lise, Luke Mukubvu, Naomi Ngwira, Kimberly Smiddy, and Aaron Schneider (2004), *The Budget as Theatre – the Formal and Informal Institutional Makings of the Budget Process in Malawi*, London: DFID.
- Rocha, Alina Menocal, Verena Fritz, and Lise Rakner (2007), *Assessing International Democracy Assistance and Lessons Learned: How Can Donors Better Support Democratic Processes?* Background note (4) prepared for the Wilton Park Conference on Democracy and Development, 23–25 October 2007. Available on-line at <http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/documents/wp874/background%20note%204%20%20international%20democracy%20assistance.pdf> (accessed 16 Sept 09).

- Santiso, Carlos (n.d.), *Budget Institutions and Fiscal Responsibility: Parliaments and the Political Economy of the Budget Process in Latin America*, Washington DC: World Bank Institute. Series on Contemporary Issues in Parliamentary Development. Available online at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/CarlosSant.pdf> (accessed 7 Oct 09).
- Schmidt, Martin (2007), *Inventory of Sida's Parliamentary Strengthening Programmes in 2006*, Stockholm: Sida. Unpublished paper by SPM Consultants for Sida.
- Sharkey, Katrina; Theodore Dreger and Sabina Bhatia (2006), *The Role of Legislatures in Poverty Reduction: Experiences and Future Directions*, Washington DC: World Bank Institute. Series on Contemporary Issues in Parliamentary Development. Available online at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/roleoflegislatures.pdf> (accessed 7 Oct 09).
- Shaw, Malcolm (1998), 'Parliamentary Committees: A Global Perspective', in *Journal of Legislative Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 225–251.
- Sida (2002a), *The Political Institutions: Parties, Elections and Parliaments*, Stockholm: Sida Division for Democratic Governance. Available online (search report) at <http://www.sida.se/Svenska/Om-oss/Publikationer/> (accessed 10 Sept 09).
- Sida (2002b), *Good Governance*, Stockholm: Sida Division for Democratic Governance. Available online at www.sida.se/Svenska/Om-oss/Publikationer/ (search report) (accessed 10 Sept 09).
- Sida (2003), *Digging Deeper. Four Reports on Democratic Governance in International Development Cooperation. Summary*, Stockholm: Sida Division for Democratic Governance. Available online at www.sida.se/Svenska/Om-oss/Publikationer/ (search report) (accessed 10 Sept 09).
- Sida (2006), *Parliamentary Strengthening – Position Paper Revision 060529*, Stockholm: Sida Division for Democratic Governance. Available online at www.sida.se/Svenska/Omoss/Publikationer/ (search position paper) (accessed 14 Aug 09).
- Stapenhurst, Rick (2004), *The Legislature and the Budget*, Washington DC: World Bank Institute. Series on Contemporary Issues in Parliamentary Development. Available online at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/TheLegislatureandtheBudget.pdf> (accessed 7 Oct 09).
- Stapenhurst, Rick, Niall Johnston and Riccardo Pelizzo (eds.) (2006), *The Role of Parliaments in Curbing Corruption*, Washington DC: World Bank.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008–2009), *Stortingsmøling nr. 13 (2008–2009), Klima, konflikt og kapital: Norsk utviklingspolitikk i et endret handlingsrom [Climate, Conflict and Capital: Norwegian Development Policy Adapting to Change]*, Oslo: Det kongelige utenriksdepartement.
- Sundet, Geir and Eli Moen (2009), *Political Economy Analysis of Kenya*, Oslo: Norad, (Report 19/2009 Discussion).

- Svensson, Arne, Lina Lenefors, Allan Rosenbaum, Cristina A. Rodriguez-Acosta, Mohamed Salih and Stina Waern (2006), *Organizational Review of Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA)*, Täby: Professional Management AB. Report commissioned by Sida. Available online at www.professionalmanagement.se/artiklar/pga.pdf (accessed 14 Aug 09).
- Söderberg, Mimmi and Thomas Ohlson (2003), *Democratisation and Armed Conflicts in Weak States*, Stockholm, March 2003, Sida. Art no: SIDA2533en. Available online at www2.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=118&a=2724 (accessed 17 Aug 09).
- UNDP (2002), *UNDP Lessons Learned in Parliamentary Development*. Study prepared by the Institutional Development Group, Bureau for Development Policy, New York: UNDP. Available online at www.undp.org/governance/eventsites/policy_dialogue/30_UNDP_Lessons_Learned.doc (accessed 23 June 09).
- UNDP (2003), *Parliamentary Development: Practice Notice*, New York: United Nations Development Programme.
- UNDP (2006), *The Global Programme on Parliamentary Strengthening: Sustaining the Democratic Gains of Free and Fair Elections*, New York: United Nations Development Programme.
- UNDP (2007), *Governance Indicators: A Users' Guide*, Oslo: UNDP Oslo Governance Centre. Second Edition. Available online at www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs07/undp_users_guide_online_version.pdf (accessed 10 Aug 09).
- UNDP (2009a), *Parliamentary Development: UNDP Strategy Note*, New York: United Nations Development Programme.
- UNDP (2009b), *Parliamentary Development Knowledge Portal*, Brussels: UNDP. Unpublished inception paper.
- UNECA (2005), *African Governance Report 2005*, Addis Ababa: UN Economic Commission for Africa.
- Unsworth, Sue (2009), 'What's Politics Got to Do with It?: Why Donors Find It So Hard to Come to Terms with Politics, and Why This Matters', in *Journal of International Development*, Vol. 21, No. 6, pp. 883–894.
- USAID (2000), *Understanding Representation: Implications for Legislative Strengthening. Proceedings from the Second International Conference on Legislative Strengthening, November 2000*. Washington DC: Center for Democracy and Governance, U.S. Agency for International Development. USAID Occasional Papers Series. Available online at www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnach303.pdf (accessed 10 Sept 09).
- USAID (2001), *USAID's Experience: Strengthening Legislatures*, Washington DC: Center for Democracy and Governance, U.S. Agency for International Development. Available online at www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnach308.pdf (accessed 10 Sept 09).
- Van de Walle, Nicolas (2002), 'Africa's Range of Regimes', in *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 66–80.

- Von Trapp, Lisa (2008), *Lessons Learnt and the Way Forward – The Collaboration between East Africa Legislative Assembly (EALA) and the European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA), March 2005–April 2008*, Stockholm: Sida Evaluation 2008:52. Available online at www.sida.se/Svenska/Om-oss/Publikationer/ (search evaluation) (accessed 10 Sept 09).
- WBI (2007), *Strengthening Parliaments – Strengthening Accountability: The World Bank Institute’s Parliamentary Strengthening Program. Retrospective*, Washington DC: World Bank Institute. Available online at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/Retrospective-STRENGTHENINGPARLIAMENTS.pdf> (accessed 23 June 09).
- Wang, Vibeke (2005), *The Accountability Function of Parliament in New Democracies: Tanzanian Perspectives*, Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI Working Paper 2005:2). Available online at www.cmi.no/publications/file/?1954=the-accountability-function-of-parliament-in-new (accessed 03 Sept 09).
- Wehner, Joachim (2004), *Back from the Sidelines? Redefining the Contribution of Legislatures to the Budget Cycle*, Washington DC: World Bank Institute. Series on Contemporary Issues in Parliamentary Development. Available online at http://www.wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/06/23/000009486_20040623161800/Rendered/PDF/286150SidelinesOWBIOWP.pdf (accessed 7 Oct 09).
- Wehner, Joachim (2007), *Strengthening Legislative Financial Scrutiny in Developing Countries*. Report Prepared for the UK Department for International Development, London: London School of Economics.

Annex 2

Details on selected actors involved in parliamentary support

1 USAID (USA)

The *United States Agency for International Development* (USAID) is the largest donor in parliamentary support (in our sample of donors, and most probably the largest in the world) (see annex A3.1 figure 1, and annex A4) with almost USD 200 million provided over the past ten years (1999–2009; commitments for 2010 not included). The USAID has contributed more than all other donors combined and more than three times that of DFID, which is the second largest donor in parliamentary assistance. With more than 50 years of experience the USAID is probably also the agency with the longest history of parliamentary assistance.

The USAID considers parliamentary strengthening an essential element in its strategy of good governance and sustainable democracy, which includes transparency, accountability, and participation in government institutions and public policy reform processes at all levels. The USAID's assistance to parliaments seeks to improve the way legislatures and legislative processes and procedures work to uphold democratic practices. Programmes focus on improving legislative processes and the quality and effectiveness of laws and regulations. Programmes are also designed to increase the legislature's capacity to be responsive, to enhance public participation, to engage in policy-making, to hold the legislative and the executive branches accountable, and to oversee the implementation of government programmes, budgets, and laws.

Within the USAID, the *Office of Democracy and Governance of the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance* (DCHA/DG) handles parliamentary assistance. The role of the DG office is to help USAID field missions to design appropriate country programmes in the transition to and consolidation of democracy. To this end, the DG office has developed a strategic assessment framework designed to assess the state of democracy and to make programme choices. Core documents outlining the USAID practices and experiences include the *USAID Handbook on Legislative Strengthening* (USAID 2000a); *Understanding Representation: Implications for Legislative Strengthening* (USAID 2000b); and the *USAID's Experience Strengthening Legislatures* (USAID 2001).

Indicators of change in democracy and governance and quantitative measurements have been a sustained and evolving programme for the USAID at least for a decade, with the development of handbooks, cross-national quantitative studies, support for

research, and expert consultations.³⁷ The DG office has undertaken a comprehensive, long-term plan to measure the impact and effectiveness of various approaches to democratic development, and to incorporate the findings into USAID programmes.

The USAID is not only the largest donor in terms of funding, it is also at the top of the list in terms of project size, with an average of USD 3 million. CIDA comes second (USD 2.5 mill) and DFID third (USD 2.2 mill) (see annex A3.1 figure 4). The USAID has the single largest project (in our sample) with its USD 24 million – *Iraq Legislative Strengthening Program* – followed by the second largest of USD 15.5 million – *Afghanistan Parliamentary Assistance Project*. In terms of project duration, USAID has relatively long average project/programme of 3.3 years (only matched by CIDA and DFID, see annex A3.1 figure 5). On the other hand, the USAID stands apart with regard to inter-donor cooperation by normally operating alone in parliamentary strengthening. Less than 5 per cent of USAID funding (average for 2006–2008) is channelled through basket funding arrangements (see annex A3.1 figure 6), whereas Sida cooperates with other donors at the level of almost 80 per cent of its funding.

Furthermore, USAID deviates from other donors' practices by *not* running programmes benefiting regional parliaments or parliamentary organisations.³⁸ Besides, the USAID differs significantly from the other donors by sub-contracting a large share (some 36 per cent) of its aid effort to private, commercial companies (consultancy cum academic companies such as *SUNY/CID*, *ARD*, and *DAI*).³⁹ The USAID also differs significantly from the other donors by *not* relying on IGOs (inter-governmental organisations such as the WBI, the UNDP, and other UN agencies) as implementers, and by *not* emphasising partnership programmes as a means of operation (see annex 3, figures 10 and 11).

2 DFID (UK)

The *Department for International Development* (DFID)⁴⁰ is the second largest contributor to parliamentary strengthening projects worldwide (in our sample and probably also in the world), with USD 63 million over the past ten years. The growth in parliamentary strengthening of DFID has been steady and remarkable (see annex A3.1 figures 1 and 3).

Parliamentary strengthening and electoral assistance activities are integral parts of DFID's work to help to improve the capability of state institutions and strengthen accountability to the poor. Parliamentary strengthening is often embedded in DFID's wider efforts to promote democratic governance and deepen democracy. It is thus a part of DFID's good governance programme, which is a 'policy theme' in the fight

37 Critics would say that the USAID is obsessed with quantitative indicators, to the extent that the USAID purports that "in any given year an investment of \$10 million of USAID DG funding produces a five-fold (500%) increase in the amount of democratic change over what the average country would otherwise be expected to achieve" (USAID website at www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/technical_areas/dg_office/evaluation.html). The USAID is also the only agency to list project elements of research, methodology and indicators as parliamentary support.

38 At least the USAID is not including this in their reporting on 'parliamentary strengthening' projects, in contrast to most other donors.

39 CID is the acronym for the Center for International Development at the State University of New York. CID implements international technical assistance and training projects, conducts policy-oriented research, and contributes to both the theory and the practice of international development. ARD Inc. is a technical assistance and consulting organisation specialised in local governance, agriculture, natural resources, environment, infrastructure, and knowledge management. DAI (formerly Development Alternatives, Inc.) has a global team of 2,000 development professionals. See www.cid.suny.edu/index.htm; www.ardinc.com and www.dai.com.

40 Please observe that DFID is in a process of rebranding to 'UKAid'.

against poverty and an element of the MDGs. DFID has several *Parliamentary Strengthening Programmes* (PSPs), in among other countries Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Zambia, in most cases in co-operation with other donors (basket funding).

Core DFID documents on parliamentary strengthening include *Helping Parliaments and Legislative Assemblies to Work for the Poor* (DFID 2004) and the report *Parliamentary Strengthening in Developing Countries* (Hudson & Wren 2007). DFID uses a *Country Governance Analysis* (CGA) to monitor governance and partner governments' commitment to fighting poverty.⁴¹ The DFID White Paper *Eliminating World Poverty: Building our Common Future* (DFID 2009), chapter 4, sets out the DFID approach to state-building and peace building.

DFID has an increasing focus on fragile and post-conflict contexts. In addition to this, there is a reported focus on projects directed at strengthening parliament's role in poverty reduction (see annex A3.4 figure 12).

Institutional development and partnership programmes are the preferred approaches of DFID (see annex A3.5 figure 13). DFID (like the medium-sized donors Sida and Norad) is co-operating through baskets to a relatively high degree (about 62 per cent over the 2002–2008 period) (see annex A3.1 figure 6). DFID has also supported some CSOs and NGOs as watchdogs vis-à-vis parliaments.

The most aided country (by our sample of donors) in terms of parliamentary assistance is Malawi, largely on account of a substantial DFID contribution plus significant contributions from the USAID and Norad. In addition to Malawi, Congo DRC, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda are the main recipients of DFID support, with Ethiopia and Nepal coming up (see annex A3.2 figure 8).

3 Sida (Sweden)

The *Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency* (Sida) is a medium-sized donor in terms of parliamentary support. Sida is almost equal to CIDA and slightly smaller than Norad in parliamentary support with roughly USD 20 million provided over the last ten years (see annex A3.1 figure 1). Since 2005, there has, however, been a slight decrease in Sida funding for parliamentary strengthening projects (see annex A3.1 figure 3).

Sida runs, as does Norad, rather small projects in terms of average size (USD 640,000 and 645,000 respectively), and Sida's projects has a relatively short project duration (3.1 years; only Norad's projects has a shorter duration of 2.7 years on average) (see annex A3.1 figures 4 and 5). On the other hand, Sida is among the more 'harmonising' agencies, with about 80 per cent of its contributions going through basket funds since 2002 (see annex A3.1 figure 6).

The implementing agencies of Sida's support are, for a large part, international NGOs, including international parliamentary organisations and networks (e.g. PACT, AWEPA and PGA). IGOs and multilateral organisations such as the UNDP are also

⁴¹ See the DFID "How to note" on *Country Governance Analysis* (DFID 2008).

important to Sida, which seems not to use direct contracts with recipient parliaments and government institutions to any large degree (see annex A3.3 figure 11). Swedish state institutions (e.g. the Swedish Parliament) are minor partners or implementers (Schmidt 2007:3-4). Partnership programmes is Sida's preferred means of support (see annex A3.5 figure 13).

Sida has made several inventories and thematic evaluations of its support to parliaments. The most comprehensive general evaluation is *Approaches to Parliamentary Strengthening, a Review of Sida's Support to Parliaments* (Hubli and Schmidt 2005). Of importance to Sida's policy formulation in the area are Sida's position paper *Parliamentary Strengthening* (Sida 2006) and a number of background studies on democratic governance in international development co-operation.⁴²

Sida has also produced and published a number of project evaluations, including one on a parliamentary strengthening programme in Vietnam (Anderson et al. 2002) and one on Sida's support to the regional parliament EALA by AWEPA (von Trapp 2008). The next global evaluation of Sida's parliamentary support is planned for 2010 (Schmidt 2007:2).⁴³

In terms of policy focus, the data lend support to Sida's claim to a strong 'bottom-up' approach; at least Sida's policy focus is the broadest. In addition to the 'traditional' or 'top-down' focus on good governance, democratisation, budget, and legislation, Sida has allocated funds to themes such as peace, reconciliation and conflict settlement and earmarked funds for parliaments' role in safeguarding human rights and other policy issues like gender, HIV/AIDS, and environment (see annex A3.4 figure 12).

4 CIDA (Canada)

The *Canadian International Development Agency* (CIDA) has steadily been increasing its support for parliaments over the past 10 years. Along with DFID it is the agency with the most significant and steady growth, especially since 2005. It is now a medium-sized donor in the field, with approximately USD 20 million committed to parliamentary strengthening in total over the last 10 years (see annex A3.1 figures 1 and 3).

The average project/programme size of CIDA is USD 2.5 million; only the size of USAID projects is larger. CIDA is furthermore at the top of the list of long-lasting projects with an average project duration of more than 7 years, followed by the USAID (see annex A3.1 figures 4 and 5). At the same time, CIDA is significantly below the other medium-sized donors in terms of co-operation and basket funding (see annex A3.1 figure 6).

42 *Digging Deeper* (Sida 2003) is a summary of four reports on *The Political Institutions* (Sida 2002a), *Good Governance* (Sida 2002b), *Participation in Democratic Governance* and the *Legal Sector*.

43 Sida has furthermore commissioned a few background papers that are useful for parliamentary strengthening projects and project evaluations, in particular *Evaluating Democracy Support. Methods and Experiences* (Burnell 2007) and *Democratisation and Armed Conflict* (Söderberg and Ohlson 2003).

In terms of parliamentary beneficiaries and partners, CIDA stands out as having reported no projects benefiting parliamentary administrations (see annex A3.2 figure 10). On the other hand, CIDA (and Sida) seems to prefer INGOs/NGOs as channels of support, in particular international parliamentary organisations such as the Canadian Parliamentary Centre (PC), rather than IGOs such as the UNDP. As a consequence, CIDA is using direct projects/programmes to a lesser degree than other donors, and has a strong focus on training as the preferred method of intervention (see annex A3.3 and A3.5, figures 11 and 13).

In terms of policy focus, CIDA runs some projects dedicated to peace, reconciliation and conflict settlement, and has earmarked funds for parliament's role in safeguarding human rights. CIDA is also engaged in projects directed at poverty reduction and in keeping the gender perspective high on the agenda (see annex A3.4 figure 12).

5 Other Bilateral Donors

The *German Technical Cooperation* (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, GTZ GmbH) does not conduct projects with parliaments, due to the division of labour between the German development agencies. Parliamentary strengthening is mainly the province of the German political party-affiliated foundations (see section A2 11 below). The GTZ has, however, some experience through projects and programmes in co-operation with national parliaments and MPs as an element of other projects (indirect support), but it has been impossible to extract data on parliamentary strengthening projects or to estimate the total volume of GTZ funding. Neither are there any evaluations or assessment reports made by the GTZ.⁴⁴ The *German Federal Ministry for Economic Development and Cooperation* (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, BMZ) has some parliamentary strengthening projects, and is in the process of surveying the international project experience and elaborating recommendations for further action.

The *Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs* (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, MinBuZa) is managing development co-operation directly from its *Directorate-General for International Cooperation* (DGIS). According to their latest annual report (MinBuZa 2007:12):

... in many developing countries informal patronage systems are still more influential than formal democratic institutions. Parliaments are still too often a platform for specific interests, whether regional, ethnic or other. (...) Attempts by outsiders to replace existing systems with Western models of government can however unintentionally lead to greater instability, particularly where there is no economic growth or financial investment.

The above quotation notwithstanding, the DGIS is engaged in strengthening parliaments and political parties because this “is a good way of achieving good governance” and “a well-coordinated donor policy geared to supporting parliaments can

44 Information provided by GTZ per e-mail.

improve their performance and make them more representative” (MinBuZa 2007:18, 41).

The *French Agency for Development* (Agence Française de Développement, AFD) has no projects of parliamentary support.⁴⁵ However, the *French Ministry of Foreign Affairs* (Ministère des Affaires étrangères) has had activities in this area for a long time, in particular in Francophone African countries. The French did for instance support the Sovereign National Conferences in a number of West and Central African countries in the early 1990s. More recently, the Ministry had the responsibility of creating a parliament in Afghanistan in a joint venture with other donors, mainly Germany and the UNDP. The Ministry financed the training of the first 150 parliamentary functionaries and secretaries (in cooperation with both chambers of the French Parliament), and has rendered technical support to the first sessions of the Afghan parliament after the 2004 elections (DGCID 2007:34).

The *Australian Agency for International Development* (AusAID) is a relative newcomer and a small contributor only, with less than USD 5 million over the last ten years (see annex A3.1 figure 1). AusAID has been active in this field only since 2004, and AusAID has also the smallest reported projects. AusAID has for instance helped to design and construct a parliament building for the legislature of the newly independent Timor-Leste, and it has assisted in improving the capacity of the staff as well as the MPs of the Timor-Leste parliament as well as the parliament of the Solomon Islands (AusAID 2008:64 and AusAID homepage). Other recipient countries include Indonesia and Vanuatu.

The *Belgian Technical Cooperation Agency* (Belgisch agentschap voor ontwikkelings-samenwerking, BTC/CTB) is a public service provider supporting developing countries in their struggle against poverty on behalf of the *Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation*. The BTC has only one relatively large project on parliamentary support, in Burundi, with a focus on acquisition and training.⁴⁶

6 World Bank (WB)

The *World Bank* (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, IBRD) has remained somewhat careful about projects of strengthening parliaments, at least overtly. Due to its rather restrictive mandate, it has preferred to focus on the ‘good governance’ agenda, although it has engaged quite extensively in efforts to support civil society and provided some support to parliamentary strengthening (Rocha et al. 2007:2).

The World Bank’s *Institutional Development Fund* (IDF) is the main grant facility through which parliamentary support is given. The IDF is designed to finance quick and action-oriented capacity-building activities linked to the Bank’s more long-term economic work and lending facilities.

⁴⁵ This is confirmed by AFD per e-mail.

⁴⁶ Source: BTC website at www.btctb.org/doc/UPL_2009033110224413591.pdf

The *World Bank Institute* (WBI) is one of the World Bank's main instruments for developing individual, organisational, and institutional capacity through the exchange of knowledge. It designs and delivers learning programmes for development stakeholders to acquire, share, and apply global and local knowledge and experiences. The WBI works with policy-makers, civil servants, technical experts, business and community leaders, parliamentarians, civil society stakeholders, as well as other learning institutions such as universities and local training institutes to foster the analytical, technical, and networking skills that support effective socio-economic programmes and public policy formulation.⁴⁷ Through their work in conjunction with e.g. the UNDP and bilateral aid agencies, the WBI is an important player in parliamentary strengthening.

From the data provided, we can see that the WB/IDF is a relatively small contributor to parliamentary assistance projects with about USD 7.8 million over the last 10 years (see annex A3.1 figure 1). Its contribution prior to 2003 was negligible; the significant increase came in 2004. The project list of the WB/IDF displays a certain geographic emphasis on Latin America, and the policy focus is definitely on financial management and the role of parliaments in the budget process.

This policy focus is also reflected in the key documents on parliamentary support of the WB and its affiliates (basically published in the *Series on Contemporary Issues in Parliamentary Development*).⁴⁸ We note several titles on parliaments and the budget (budget cycle and process), and on parliaments and poverty reduction and the PRSP process (Stapenhurst 2004; Hubli and Mandaville 2004; Wehner 2004; Pelizz, Stapenhurst and Olson 2005; Santiso, n.d.; Sharkey, Dreger and Bhatia 2006). However, the extensive WB (and WBI) literature on parliaments also includes titles on parliaments as peace-builders, legislative oversight, parliamentary libraries, and e-parliaments (Kingham 2003; Riccardo and Stapenhurst 2004; Miller, Pelizzo and Stapenhurst 2004; and O'Brien 2005).

7 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

The *United Nations Development Programme* (UNDP) was one of the first multilateral organisations (IGOs) to launch parliamentary support initiatives. With some experience from Africa in the 1970s, mainly in terms of technical support to reinforce the infrastructures of some parliaments (libraries, documentary services and technical training for staff), the UNDP's activities in support for parliaments today account for a considerable share of its work to promote good governance (IPU 2003:2).

The *Global Programme for Parliamentary Strengthening* (GPPS) is a major endeavour executed by the UNDP, now in its third phase as from early 2009. It comprises a range of activities at country, regional and global levels, and partners with multiple stakeholders (e.g. Belgium, France, the IPU, the African IPU, and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)). The mid-term evaluation conducted in 2007 drew a largely positive conclusion (Murphy and Alhada

⁴⁷ See WBI flyer at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/ParliamentaryBrochureFinal.pdf>

⁴⁸ For an updated list, see <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/WBIPROGRAMS/PSGLP/0,,contentMDK:21013674~pagePK:64156158~piPK:64152884~theSitePK:461606,00.html>

2007). It noted that keys to success are innovative ideas, dedicated staff, and support from the major donors. The programme's lean organisational structure appears to allow flexibility, quick responses to problems that arise, and reasonable risk taking. The long-term nature of this intervention clearly contributes to its effectiveness. Moreover, operating at three levels (national, regional and global) has proved advantageous.

The evaluation report includes case studies from which are extracted success factors. For example, a project implemented in Algeria was successful because it enjoyed the support and commitment of the top leaders of both chambers of parliament plus the political and the administrative leadership of both chambers. Arguably, working with both chambers of parliament in this manner contributed to exceptional achievements, and could be used as a model to be emulated.

The third phase (2009–2010) of the GPPS is centred on developing parliamentary standards and benchmarks. To that end workshops are conducted at national, regional and international levels. A global conference is due in March 2010. Another element is the role of parliaments in conflict prevention and management, and post-conflict reconstruction, and yet another one on minority representation in parliament.

The evaluation of the UNDP legislative strengthening programme in Timor-Leste found that the project had been affected by Timor-Leste's political instability. It was also afflicted by a general lack of ownership by the political and administrative leaderships. However, significant results were produced with regard to oversight and legislative support. Moreover, bringing on board national economists and initiating an internship programme were considered best practices that should be replicated. Improved gender relations also resulted. The project's transparent and effective communications were appreciated across the board. Least positive impact was observed in the secretariat – probably stemming from lack of political will and ambiguity over roles in parliament. Other findings suggested mixed success:

- Recruitment lags and language difficulties impacted negatively on outcomes;
- The scope and expectations as set out in the project document were too ambitious;
- Although the project goals centred on building capacity, this was not a focus of implementation.

A particularly interesting aspect of the UNDP portfolio is the involvement in the singularly fragile state Afghanistan. The UNDP, in conjunction with the Afghan Parliament, recently embarked on the second phase of a parliamentary strengthening programme: *Support to the Establishment of the Afghan Legislature (SEAL II)*. Its overall goal is to develop 'an effective, efficient and accountable parliament supporting development and poverty reduction for the citizens of Afghanistan.' SEAL II is a follow-up to the original SEAL that ran during 2005–2008, funded by multiple donors. SEAL II is consistent with the interim *Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS)*, and it is designed to strengthen the legislative, oversight and representational capacities of the Afghan parliament, by targeting parliamentarians, the commissions, their support staff, and the parliamentary secretariats. The total

budget of the project is USD 15.3 million over four years (2008–2012). Apart from the UNDP, donors include Denmark and Sweden but there still remains a substantial funding gap.⁴⁹

At the behest of the donor coordination group, the UNDP Brussels office, jointly with the World Bank Institute and DFID, is currently in the process of creating an online mechanism for sharing parliamentary development expertise: the *Parliamentary Development Knowledge Portal* (dubbed *Agora*), which is expected to be fully operational by February 2010. Its purpose is to create a central depository of documents on parliamentary strengthening (evaluations, country-level material, methods, tools, good practices and success stories) – in effect an e-library – but also to identify knowledge gaps and to generate knowledge. The portal is intended to have two parts, both with interactive features: one part fully accessible to the public; and another part with restricted access. The latter will be useful for planning and coordinating missions among donors (UNDP 2009b).⁵⁰

Donor harmonisation and co-ordination is a core task of the UNDP. For instance, in May 2007 a first so-called DFID-UNDP-WBI *Donor Consultation on Parliamentary Development* meeting was held in Brussels. In this meeting some 35 participants were present, representing 10 different donors, development banks, parliamentary organisations and specialised organisations.⁵¹ A second consultation meeting was held in London in October 2008.

The UNDP Oslo Governance Centre claims not to be involved in parliamentary strengthening.

8 EuropeAid (European Commission)

The European Commission's agency *EuropeAid* runs several programmes for strengthening governance and upholding human rights (HR) and democracy. These programmes comprise 'bottom-up' projects assisting civil society and media to monitor the activities of and interact with public authorities, through advocacy, information and education on HR and democracy issues; and 'top down' institution building projects targeting electoral commissions; electoral processes and election observation; public finance management; reform and training of the judiciary; local government support; and direct support for parliaments.

According to the latest EuropeAid annual report (EC 2009:135):

... the essential role of democratically-elected citizen's representatives in strengthening both democratic legitimacy and the effectiveness of governance in their countries is clearly acknowledged by the Commission. Strengthening parliaments is seen as a means to improve the overall effectiveness and impact of development assistance, especially as EC assistance moves increasingly towards a sectoral approach and budgetary support.

49 http://www.undp.org/af/Projects/ProDocs/ProDoc_SFAL2_220609.pdf

50 See the BETA version at <http://workingversion.net/node/13>.

51 See the agenda, list of participants, background material and final report of the first DFID-UNDP-WBI consultation meeting on the UNDP-hosed website <http://sdnhq.undp.org/governance/parls/index.html>.

Specifically, the EC has contributed EUR 2 million to increase the effectiveness of the legislative process of the Uzbek Parliament; provided EUR 15 million in support of the South African central and provincial parliaments; given EUR 10 million for African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries participation in Joint Parliamentary Assembly meetings; and supported the Moldovan parliament in a twinning project (EC 2009:46; 98; 116; 136).

EuropeAid is furthermore targeting civil society and the media to improve interaction with parliaments, and to raise awareness on the importance of parliaments as key democratic institutions. Strengthening the role of parliaments takes place in areas such as public accountability and financial transparency, as well as the institutional, organisational and technical capacities of parliaments (EC 2009:136).

In 2008 a contract was signed between the EC and International IDEA for a *Study on strategies and methodologies for EC action in support of parliaments*, to be completed by early 2010. This study is expected to provide EC staff and others with stocktaking and analysis of the strategies, approaches, instruments, methods and interventions used to strengthen parliaments in the ACP countries (EC 2009:136). International IDEA will also develop a practical guide and a training module for EC staff and others in parliamentary strengthening.⁵²

9 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is not itself a donor but performs very important coordination functions within the donor community through its Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which is a key forum of major bilateral donors.⁵³ They work to enhance the effectiveness of their common efforts in support of sustainable development. DAC concentrates on two key areas: (a) how international development co-operation contributes to the capacity of developing countries to participate in the global economy; and (b) the capacity of people to overcome poverty and participate fully in their societies. The *Development Cooperation Directorate* (DCD), one of the OECD's substantive directorates, supports DAC's work. The DCD is generally considered DAC's secretariat because of this support function.

The OECD/DAC coordinates a series of substantive networks of donors on salient issues with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of aid, e.g. evaluation; governance; the environment; gender relations; poverty reduction, etc. These are important fora for the exchange of donor experiences and often produce management guidelines. Above all, the OECD collects statistics on aid flows and maintains statistical databases. Periodically, DAC undertakes peer reviews of the development policies and practices of the member states.

10 International Parliamentary Organisations

There are a relatively large number of international parliamentary organisations, associations, and networks. These are basically interest organisations for parliaments and parliamentarians, working to promote the status and relevance of

⁵² See the IDEA homepage for more information: http://www.idea.int/parties/parliament_support.cfm.

⁵³ See www.oecd.org/dac.

parliamentary work through networking, seminars and knowledge generation and transfer.⁵⁴ There are even a few regional parliaments with some real powers – the *European Parliament* in Strasbourg/Brussels and the *East African Legislative Assembly* (EALA) of the East African Community.

Some international parliamentary organisations are active in the field of parliamentary support, mainly through networking (meetings, thematic seminars and conferences), fact-finding (data, statistics and information provision), and handbook production (standards, guidelines, manuals). Some also acts as partners and technical implementers of projects financed by different donors, providing networks, facilities, standards and experience. Some of these are outlined below. None of them has any financial strength, and should therefore be regarded as technical assistance providers, conduits and project implementers rather than donors *per se*.

The Association of Western European Parliamentarians for Action against Apartheid (AWEPA) was established in 1984 to help in the struggle against *apartheid* in South Africa. In 1995 it changed its name to the *Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa* (AWEPA) and changed its mission to promote democracy, peace, human rights, and good governance in Africa.⁵⁵

AWEPA is an international non-governmental organisation that supports parliaments in Africa and works to keep Africa high on the political agenda in Europe. It has some 1500 current and former parliamentarians as members, from the European Parliament, almost all European Union member states, and Norway and Switzerland. Headquartered in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, AWEPA maintains offices (or staff) in Belgium, Burundi, DRC, Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, Southern Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.

AWEPA receives funding from the European Commission and several European governments such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland, plus UN agencies and various foundations. Sweden, EC, Belgium and the Netherlands are the biggest donors. For many years Sweden and Norway has provided core funding for AWEPA (without much coordination or information sharing, according to von Trapp 2008:5–6), in addition to the two countries using AWEPA as a conduit for channelling support to parliaments in Africa, principally for training purposes.

AWEPA implements capacity building programmes to strengthen the functioning of parliaments and their individual members and staff. Training sessions and seminars are conducted to enhance the skills of parliamentarians so as to enable them to better fulfil their legislative, representative and oversight functions. AWEPA currently works with some 25 parliaments in Africa, including provincial parliaments (South Africa), national parliaments, and regional parliamentary assemblies (EALA).

54 For a complete list of *Parliamentary Organizations' Secretariats Worldwide*, see the World Bank interactive map at <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/PARTNERS/EXTPARLIAMENTARIANS/0,contentMDK:20242065~menuPK:498327~pagePK:64165880~piPK:64165858~theSitePK:464534,00.html>

55 See the AWEPA website at www.awepa.org and the AWEPA annual report 2008 at www.awepa.org/images/stories/2009_2010/Resources/Annual_Reports/awepa%20annual%20report%2008lr.pdf.

The *East African Legislative Assembly* (EALA) a regional parliament, with members appointed by the legislatures of each of the member countries of the East African Community (EAC) – Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi.⁵⁶ The EAC was originally founded in 1967, but collapsed in 1977, and officially revived in 2001. The regional integration agenda of the EAC is ambitious, eventually aiming for a political federation with a common external tariff, a common currency and one president. But so far the customs union is the main achievement. The EALA mandate granted by the EAC treaty is limited.

Capacity building of EALA, including seminars, training, study visits, exchange programmes to similar institutions, and participation in international parliamentary conferences has been provided for several years by AWEPA, financed by Sida (as the largest donor, providing some 20 per cent of EALA's total funding in 2005–06), together with other donors, including Norway (von Trapp 2008:10). An evaluation undertaken in 2001 concluded that AWEPA's programme had had a positive impact on EALA (Bhardwaj 2001).

Created in 1889, the *Inter-Parliamentary Union* (IPU) is an international organisation that brings together the representatives of parliaments of sovereign states.⁵⁷ As of February 2007, Parliaments of 148 countries are represented in the IPU. The headquarters is in Geneva, Switzerland.

The organisation's activities include fostering the exchange of experiences among parliaments and parliamentarians worldwide; expressing its views on questions of international interest and bringing about parliamentary action; working for the defence and promotion of human rights, respect for which is an essential factor of parliamentary democracy and development; and improving knowledge of representative institutions and strengthening their means of action.

Alongside the UNDP the IPU was one of the first international organisations to provide technical support to parliaments in the Third World, beginning modestly in the 1970s. The IPU is particularly committed to bringing about reconciliation in countries affected by conflict. The IPU is active behind the scenes in the world's hot spots, helping to prevent or resolve conflict and to nurture fledgling parliaments in conflict and post-conflict situations. According to the IPU website:

[the] IPU believes that Parliament is uniquely placed to promote national reconciliation. It does so for two important reasons: a parliament which is fully representative of all components of society and which offers a national platform for a free and open exchange of views, is in itself an important sign that reconciliation is under way and an important factor in consolidating the reconciliation process. Moreover, parliamentary debate and action can shape the course, meaning and objectives of reconciliation, in particular when it comes to the use of transitional justice mechanisms, such as truth and reconciliation commissions, trials, reparation programmes and justice reforms.

⁵⁶ See the EALA website at www.eala.org

⁵⁷ See the IPU website at www.ipu.org.

The IPU has therefore been increasingly active in helping to ensure that post-conflict parliaments are inclusive and become part and parcel of national and international efforts to devise, implement and evaluate transitional justice mechanisms.

The IPU has published a number of 'Handbooks for parliamentarians', e.g. the handbook *Making Reconciliation Work: the Role of Parliaments* (IPU 2005). This reflects the IPU focus on fragile and post-conflict states. In addition to the IPU focus on conflict resolution and post-conflict parliamentary support, it works in several other policy areas, usually with the role of parliaments in mind: women in politics, human rights, human trafficking, trade, children rights, HIV and AIDS, climate change, etc.

In 2008, the IPU implemented direct technical cooperation projects to reinforce parliaments in Algeria, Burundi, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Laos, Maldives, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, and the United Arab Emirates (IPU 2009:29).⁵⁸ Through its technical cooperation programme, the IPU provides advice, guidance and technical support for parliaments, often in countries that are in political transition or emerging from war. The IPU is financed by the member parliaments (out of public funds) and associate members, and its technical cooperation programme by different donors, mainly CIDA, Irish Aid and Sida, but also Finland, Belgium, and the UNDP. Projects to strengthen national parliaments are often executed in conjunction with the UNDP.

The IPU is furthermore managing a flagship database, *PARLINE*, which is a unique online information tool that provides access to easily comparable data about all of the world's 188 national parliaments, with country-specific data pages and the possibility of comparing data across countries.⁵⁹

The *Commonwealth Parliamentary Association* (CPA) consists of the national, provincial, state and territorial parliaments and legislatures of the countries of the Commonwealth.⁶⁰ Active CPA branches now exist in 169 national, state, provincial and territorial parliaments, with a total membership of approximately 16,000 individual parliamentarians. The CPA headquarters is located in London.

[the] CPA seeks to build an informed parliamentary community and to further co-operation among its Parliaments and Legislatures [and] to promote parliamentary democracy and cooperation with other networks and organizations dedicated to good governance.

The CPA works with parliaments of the developing world in two ways: first, the CPA contributes to professional development by channelling expertise between the parliaments of the Commonwealth, and second, the CPA assists parliaments through its technical assistance programmes.

⁵⁸ See the IPU *Technical Cooperation Programmes* list with project fact-sheets at www.ipu.org/dem-e/projects.htm.

⁵⁹ See www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp.

⁶⁰ The CPA was originally called the Empire Parliamentary Association, which was founded in 1911. See the homepage at www.cpaHQ.org.

The professional development component addresses both elected members and parliamentary staff, and includes short induction courses for newly elected members (the 'never-ending story'), academic and practical training courses, and information and other services. In addition to thematic conferences and workshops, the basic activity is training provided by expertise and experienced parliament members.

The technical assistance programmes are donor-financed, integrated Parliamentary Support Programmes aimed at providing skills and support to protect and restore stable and functional democracies. These programmes channel Commonwealth parliamentary expertise to solve problems that would otherwise have weakened or completely undermined democratic governance. In this endeavour, the CPA is working with partner organisations such as DFID, CIDA, the UNDP, the Commonwealth Secretariat and the World Bank.

Technical assistance programmes are helping e.g. the Solomon Islands to restore a stable government after years of brutal inter-island conflict; Bougainville House of Representatives to develop internal self-government after a debilitating secessionist struggle with Papua New Guinea; the Maldives to move from non-party to multi-party politics; and Trinidad and Tobago to restore its parliamentary committee system. The CPA is also financing a staff organisational review for the Parliament of Namibia; and supporting the Parliaments of Saint Lucia, Zanzibar and Nigeria's Kwara state in making improvements to their research services. The programmes are quite small in total funding volume, roughly USD 250,000 each.⁶¹

In co-operation with the World Bank Institute and with support from UNDP and NDI, CPA has developed what is called *Recommended Benchmarks for Democratic Legislatures*,⁶² which is a list of best practices and a method of increasing accountability through the use of benchmarks and indicators. The benchmarks encompass the representative aspects of parliament: independence, effectiveness and accountability of parliament; parliamentary procedures; public accountability; the parliamentary service and parliament and the media.

The *Parliamentary Centre* is a Canadian non-profit, non-partisan organisation devoted to improving the effectiveness of representative assemblies around the world.⁶³ Founded in 1968 to strengthen the capacity of Canada's Parliament, the Centre is now a global actor in parliamentary development with projects supporting parliaments in Asia, Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe and the Middle East. The Centre's involvement with PRSPs is mostly in Africa and Asia. In all cases, the objective of the Centre is to enhance the capacity of parliamentarians to exercise their legislative, representational and oversight roles.

The PC runs *Capacity Building Projects* with offices in Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, and the Sudan, in addition to the *Africa-Canada Parliamentary Strengthening Program*

61 2006 figures, according to the CPA Annual Report.

62 See www.cpaq.org/uploadedFiles/Programmes_and_Activities/Professional_Development/Recommended%20Benchmarks%20for%20Democratic%20Legislatures.pdf and http://sdnhq.undp.org/governance/parls/docs/CPA%20Benchmarks_%20Report%20-%20FINAL%20-033007.doc

63 See the PC website at www.parlcent.ca.

and the *Legislative Accountability Program in Southern Africa* (South Africa and SADC). Canadian CIDA mainly finances the parliamentary support projects of the Parliamentary Centre; Canadian MPs and Senators are also involved in the Centre's overseas work.

The Parliamentary Centre employs a variety of means including assessment missions, capacity development programmes, seminars and workshops, study visits, inter-parliamentary networking, research, and publications. The Centre provides expertise in a number of areas, including research and information systems, budgetary analysis, parliamentary committees, organisation, and administration. The Centre also focuses on the role of parliaments in public policy making, with an emphasis on anti-corruption, poverty reduction, and gender equality.

Accountability capacities are strengthened through gender equality training, the development of parliamentary performance indicators to assess parliaments' effectiveness, quality control systems for financial and project oversight, handbooks for parliamentarians, and mapping of organisations working in the sector. Knowledge capacities are enhanced through applied research, better sharing of information between regions, and regional training sessions. Partnerships are also fostered and strengthened for greater collaboration and implementation effectiveness in parliamentary strengthening programs in the regions. These strengthening capacities are expected to yield greater development results for parliaments in developing countries and for the citizens that parliaments serve.

The *Parliamentarians for Global Action* (PGA) is a small network or non-profit and non-partisan international NGO of more than 1,300 elected legislators/parliamentarians from about 130 countries all over the world. Its objective is fostering democracy, conflict prevention and management, international law and human rights, population and sustainable development. The main office of the PGA is located in New York, in close proximity to the United Nations, while the seat of the PGA Foundation is in The Hague (The Netherlands).

The PGA set up a *Task Force on Peace and Democracy* in 1991, which engages in parliamentary peacemaking in liaison with intergovernmental systems. Conflict management work has taken place in Côte d'Ivoire, the Lusaka Peace process (Angola), and the Central African Republic, Haiti, Burundi, Suriname, Togo and Gabon.⁶⁴

The PGA operates an annual budget of USD 1–2 million, provided by about a dozen sponsors (foundations, international organisations and bilateral development agencies). Denmark, Sweden, the Ford Foundation and the Netherlands provide the bulk of the core funding, while most of the other sponsors provide earmarked project funding. However, since the PGA lacks a clear hierarchy of goals for its programmatic activities, it fails to systematically follow up efforts, have not elaborated results-based project documents and systems, and does not convincingly

64 PGA website at www.pgaction.org.

report on achievements, which has placed the PGA at a disadvantage when seeking new funding sources (Danida 2006:3 and 8).⁶⁵

11 Party-affiliated foundations and institutes

The UK-based *Westminster Foundation for Democracy* (WFD) is a significant actor in the democracy strengthening community.⁶⁶ It draws support from all UK parties, organised as a ‘non-departmental public body’. The WFD is sponsored by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and is accountable to the UK parliament. In terms of spending, half of its grants are distributed between the UK parties for bi-party cooperation, via the Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrats and the smaller parties, on a proportional basis. The other half is allocated by the WFD to democracy support projects, partly run by the WFD itself and partly allocated to national and international organisations. The democracy assistance projects (of the parties and of the WFD proper) are directed towards local governments, parliaments, civil society organisations, women and youth, elections, the rule of law and the media.

The *Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy* (NIMD) was established in 2001 by the Dutch political parties represented in parliament, with the mandate to support the development and consolidation of political parties in young democracies.⁶⁷ As such, it has a primary focus on support for political parties, with 90 per cent of its operational budget allocated to this purpose. NIMD is fully financed by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is one of the world’s best functioning organisations of multilateral party-to-party support. NIMD is functioning well first of all because it combines the forces of both incumbent and opposition parties in the Netherlands, and as such it is an expression of consensus and shared responsibility. Besides, NIMD draws upon a solid base of experience and expertise, and it incorporates party support with broader elements of democracy support.

In Germany, all political parties have a foundation (*Stiftung*) for democracy building, outreach, research and international cooperation. The two biggest are the *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung* (FES) of the Social Democratic Party, and the *Konrad Adenauer Stiftung* (KAS) of the Christian Democratic Union.⁶⁸ In terms of activities abroad, they support CSOs, business organisations, labour, women, etc. and they promote legal reform by working on legal and constitutional systems and strengthening elections and electoral systems.

The two main American party-based organisations are loosely linked to the two main US parties, the *National Democratic Institute* (NDI) and the *International Republican Institute* (IRI).⁶⁹ The NDI has an explicit approach on political party building, but is also actively involved in broader democracy support activities such as citizen and women’s participation, election processes and the strengthening of legislatures. The NDI also supports and assists parties from across the political spectrum, both bilaterally and in regional programmes, as a part of its wider de-

65 For a comprehensive evaluation of PGA, see Danida (2006) and Svensson et al. (2006).

66 See www.wfd.org.

67 See www.nimd.org.

68 See www.fes.de and www.kas.de.

69 See www.ndi.org and www.iri.org.

mocracy support efforts. In contrast to the NDI, the IRI is perhaps weaker in its analysis, but stronger in election observation and in its ideological commitment to fight for democracy in authoritarian countries such as Cuba, Belarus, Burma and Zimbabwe. The IRI is only slightly smaller than the NDI, and in the field the NDI and the IRI often work closely together, and to most people the two are hardly distinguishable.

The *Olof Palme International Center* (OPIC) is a Swedish non-governmental organisation with ties to the national labour movement, working with international development, co-operation and the forming of public opinion surrounding international political and security issues.⁷⁰ The Palme Center has approximately 30 member organisations within the Swedish labour movement. The Center works on international development co-operation in the Balkans, the Baltic States and Russia, Central America, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Southern Africa. Most projects are carried out directly by the member organisations, and are financed by Sida through a framework agreement.

⁷⁰ See www.palmecenter.se.

Annex 3

Data Analyses, Figures and Tables

Please note that the data presented in the data matrix (annex A4) and in the following tables are *not exhaustive*; there is over-reporting, double reporting and under-reporting. Besides, the figures are *approximate*, due to exchange rate fluctuations and other technicalities. We have, however, done our best to lessen the following methodological problems:

- There has been some *over-reporting*. For instance, some broader good governance and democratisation projects and programmes been reported as parliamentary strengthening projects. As a result, non-relevant project elements and funding may have been included.
- There has been some *double reporting*. For instance, contributions from other (several) donors have been reported as a single donor contribution, and some projects have been reported under different names.
- There has been some *under-reporting*, for instance have some projects been missed, and certain elements of parliamentary strengthening within broader good governance and democratisation projects may have been missed. In particular, *recently initiated and future* projects and programmes (2008–2010) are not reported adequately.
- Several *donors* are missing altogether from the dataset, such as Denmark, Ireland, France, Finland, the Netherlands, and Germany, as well as Asian and Arab donors.
- We have *deliberately omitted* some projects from the reported project lists, e.g. projects that are *unlikely* to be parliamentary strengthening projects; projects that *lack basic information* (on donor, funding, or beneficiary); one-off projects *smaller than USD 20,000*; projects *completed by 1999* or earlier, and projects in *developed* countries. We have also left out some projects financed by *loans* (i.e. some World Bank projects).
- Some figures are *estimates*. All figures and sums are given in *US Dollars* calculated by using an *average (historic) exchange rate*, and funding over several years has been assumed *evenly disbursed* over the programme period notwithstanding the actual years of disbursement.
- Figures are based on *approved financing* (legal commitments), not actual disbursements or verified accounts.

1 Aggregate Figures

Figure 1: Aggregate funding by donor (1999–2009)




Figure 1 shows that the USAID is by far the largest donor in parliamentary support in our sample of donors, and most probably the largest in the world. With almost USD 200 million committed over the past ten years (commitments for 2010 not included), the USAID has contributed more than all the other donors in the sample combined. DFID is the second largest contributor in our sample (and probably the second largest in the world) with almost 62 million committed over the past ten years. Norad,⁷¹ CIDA, and Sida are almost equal as funders, with USD 27, 20, and 19 million, respectively.

AusAID is a relative newcomer and a small contributor (with less than USD 5 mill.). The relatively modest figures for the WB/IDF and the UNDP (USD 8 and 1 million, respectively) are due to the fact that these are multilateral organisations that act predominantly as conduits of funds provided by bilateral donors; they do not contribute much from their own resources. Besides, the WB/IDF provides loans, whereas the table comprises grants only.⁷²

The total contribution by the nine donors in the sample amounts to USD 340 million for the years 1999–2009.

71 For the sake of simplicity, in the following text and figures, the term 'Norad' represents Norad and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and its embassies (in other words, *Norwegian* governmental assistance).

72 The four agencies WB/IDF, AusAID, UNDP and EuropeAid, all with less than USD 10 million contributed over the last 10 years, are consequently omitted from the following calculations and figures.

Figure 2: Aggregate funding by donor and year




Figure 2 clearly demonstrates the growth in donor contributions to parliamentary support, both overall and for most of the individual agencies. The growth has been strong and relatively stable, with an average yearly increase of 15 per cent from 1999 to 2008.

The drop in funding for 2009–2010 probably reflects a lack of reporting of recent and planned projects, rather than a real decrease. There is reason to believe that the increase will continue.

Figure 3: Aggregate funding volume by medium-sized donor and year




Figure 3 depicts the growth in contributions to parliamentary support by the medium-sized bilateral donors (excluding the USAID). The drop in 2009–2010 is

probably due to under-reporting of new and planned projects for all donors. DFID has had the most significant and steady growth. Sida stands out as its contribution peaked in 2005 and has decreased since.

Figure 4: Average project size by donor (1999–2010)




Figure 4 above illustrates the average size of the projects/programmes supported by various donor agencies for the entire period 1999-2010. The USAID is on top of the list with an average project size of almost USD 3 million; followed by CIDA (USD 2.5 mill.) and DFID (USD 2.2 mill.). Sida and Norad run significantly smaller projects on average (USD 640,000).

Figure 5: Average project duration by donor (1999–2010)




Figure 5 above illustrates the average project/programme duration of projects funded by various donor agencies. CIDA is on top of the list with an average project duration of 5½ years, followed by DFID, the USAID and Sida with slightly more than three years. Norad stands out with the shortest project duration of 2.7 years.

Figure 6: Share of basket funding by donor




Figure 6 provides the proportion of parliamentary support channeled through basket funds (projects with financial contributions by more than one donor) versus single-donor projects. Figures are the percentage of YES (percentage of basket funding/multi-donor projects) for each donor (by committed funding), per year.

Two issues are noteworthy. First, there is evidently an overall increase in funding through baskets and cooperative projects and programmes (which is an indication of better donor harmonisation and cooperation), to about 30 per cent overall. However, this increase took place primarily before 2003; from then onwards it stabilised.

Second, the medium-sized donors (Norad, Sida and DFID) are cooperating in basket-funded projects to a much higher degree than CIDA and the USAID, which tend to operate largely on their own. The USAID even recorded a significant decrease in basket funding to about 5 per cent (average for 2003–2009). Sida is cooperating most; on average 80 per cent of its contributions since 2003 have been channeled through basket arrangements, with Norad and DFID following suit with 68 and 61 per cent, respectively. The level of Norad cooperation through baskets is falling.

2 Beneficiaries

Figure 7: Recipient countries by donor and funding volume (1999–2009)





Figure 7 shows the twelve largest recipient countries of support to the parliament in our sample, by donor and volume. These ten recipient countries are the only countries to have received more than USD 10 million over the past 10 years. The most aided country in terms of parliamentary assistance is Malawi (despite a suspicion of some over-reporting). This is due to a substantial DFID grant, and significant contributions from USAID and Norad. Additionally, Malawi has received contributions through regional grants for Africa and Southern Africa, albeit not included in the above figure.

The second and third largest recipients are Afghanistan and Iraq, because of substantial USAID support. This support is recent, starting in 2004 and 2008, respectively. Afghanistan has also received a small Sida contribution, but no donor other than the USAID (in our sample) is involved with the Iraqi parliament.

Figure 8: Recipient countries by medium-sized donor and funding volume



Looking at the four medium-sized donors only (DFID, Norad, CIDA and Sida; omitting USAID), it appears that Malawi is still the biggest recipient of parliamentary support, followed by the DRC (supported by DFID only), Ethiopia, Bangladesh and Uganda. These five have received more than USD 5 million over the last 10 years from the four medium-sized donors.

A closer look at the figures (in absolute amounts, USD million for 1999-2009) also demonstrates the spread in agency preference; the biggest recipients of DFID aid to parliaments are Malawi, the DRC, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda. The biggest recipients of Norwegian aid are Malawi, Timor-Leste, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Mongolia. The biggest recipients of Sida aid are Vietnam, Afghanistan, Guatemala, Mozambique, Zambia, and Uganda; and the biggest recipients of CIDA aid are Haiti, Ghana, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and Bangladesh.

Furthermore, contributions to Ghana, Sudan and Timor-Leste are on the increase (with the bulk of grants given in the past 4–5 years), whereas Palestine appears to be phased out (having received all of its support before 2007).

Figure 9: Norway’s recipient countries for parliamentary support




Figure 9 shows (in absolute figures, USD million for 1999–2009) Norway’s ten largest recipient countries in terms of parliamentary support (by funding volume), of which Malawi is in the lead, followed by Timor-Leste, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Mongolia. Norway as well as all other donors seem to have phased out Palestine (no new projects initiated by any donor in our sample).

Figure 10: Parliamentary beneficiaries by donor




Figure 10 above indicates which parliamentary beneficiaries or entities that have been targeted for support in terms improved capacity (in relative terms, calculated on the basis of funding volume, not by the number of projects, for the period 1999 - 2010).

Support is generally given to the national parliament including its committees, parliamentary leadership and sub-groups within parliament such as women and minorities, plus sub-national parliaments (PNAT which includes the values PNAT, PCOM, PGEN, PLEA and PLOC of the dataset). However, federal parliaments, including regional and international parliamentary organisations (PINT) also receive funding. A smaller percentage of donor support is for parliamentary administrations (PADM), including for support staff and expertise. Support to other beneficiaries is negligible, which indicates good quality of the reporting; the donors have reported parliamentary strengthening projects/programmes only, not other related activities.

The USAID stands out in terms of beneficiary distribution by not supporting federal parliaments or international parliamentary organisations. Similarly, CIDA deviates from the 'norm' by not supporting parliamentary administrations. The USAID and Norad have the largest share of support going to parliamentary administrations and services (12 and 11 per cent of total funding). Sida stands out as the agency with the largest share of its support going to international parliamentary organisations (56 per cent).

3 Implementing Organisations

Figure 11: Distribution of implementing agencies by donor




Figure 11 shows the relative distribution of implementing organisations, as reported by the agencies in their project descriptions (for the period 1999 – 2010). The USAID differs significantly from the other donors by a large share (some 42 per cent) of projects being implemented by private, commercial companies (consultancy companies cum academic institutions such as SUNY/CID, ARD, and DAI). In particular, the huge Iraq Legislative Strengthening Program (USD 24 million) contributes to that overall figure. The USAID also differs significantly from the other donors by *not* using IGOs (inter-governmental organisations such as the WBI, the UNDP, and other UN agencies) as executing agencies.

The medium-sized donors all enter into direct contracts with parliaments and government agencies in recipient countries (PARL/GOV) as contractual partners and implementing institutions (what we have called direct support), although to different degrees. They also sign contracts with international and national NGOs (INGOs/NGOs, including international parliamentary associations) and inter-governmental organisations (IGOs such as the UNDP), what we have called indirect support, to varying degrees.

Norway seems to prefer IGOs, whereas CIDA and Sida seem to prefer INGOs/NGOs and particularly international parliamentary organisations. Sida and CIDA are using direct projects/programmes (PARL/GOV) to a lesser degree than the other donors.

4 Policy Focus

Figure 12: Distribution of policy focus by donor




Figure 12 shows the relative distribution of policy focus (for the period 1999 – 2010). Please note that many projects have several policy foci, and that, as a consequence, these figures are indicative of broad tendencies only.


Overall, the main focus is good governance, democratisation, and rule of law (GOV). Another policy focus is budgeting, public finance, income and expenditure, including corruption (BUD, COR), and a third is legislation, drafting bills and legal capacity (LEG). Taken together, these three policy areas (marked with three shades of blue) correspond roughly to the core functions of parliaments, to which the donors (in our sample) attach great importance. Three-fourths of the resources are allocated to these three policy areas of governance.

In addition to a general focus on good governance, there are a number of particular policy areas or sector issues that interest the donors. These are unevenly distributed among the donors. For instance, Sida, CIDA and to a lesser extent Norad have allocated some project funding to peace, reconciliation and conflict settlement (PEA) with a view to strengthening the role of parliaments in those endeavours. CIDA and Sida have also earmarked funds for the role of parliament in safeguarding human rights (HUR). DFID, followed by the USAID and Norad, has provided some funding to CSO and NGO activities (CSO), and to their watchdog function vis-à-vis parliaments. DFID and CIDA are also engaged in projects directed at parliaments' role in poverty reduction (POV).

The gender perspective (GEN) has received some emphasis by CIDA, Sida and Norad. HIV and AIDS (HIV) and the environment (ENV) are important to Sida, CIDA and Norad, while research and methodology appear important to the USAID.

5 Means of Support

Figure 13: Distribution by means of support



The bars in figure 13 show the relative distribution of the means of support (method, intervention) used by the donors in the period 1999 – 2010, as reported by the agencies in their project descriptions (project funding, not number of projects). It should also be observed that data are missing on a number of projects, and that a large number of projects have several reported activities. Hence, the figures are indicative of broad tendencies only.


Overall, the means of support (or types of intervention) is predominantly training and the transfer of knowledge/skills/experiences through seminars and conferences (TRA); this accounts for about one-third of funding). Second, partnership programmes (including parliamentary exchanges, networking and twinning) appear to be a preferred means of support (PAP), accounting for roughly one-fourth of the allocated funds).

Infrastructure improvement, including support for construction, renovation, acquisitions, library and IT (TRA) is a less used mode of support, with an overall percentage of 15. This is only slightly more than the two least preferred means of support: institutional reform and development (including codes of ethics and internal regulations) (ORG), and human services development, including legal and economic expertise, investigation and research, and technical advisory services (SER), both with an overall percentage of about 13.

The donors differ in their preferred methods of intervention. Training is very much the preferred method of CIDA, while Sida opts for partnership programmes. To a lesser degree, Norad prefers training activities, while organisational development and partnerships programmes are the preferred methods of DFID. By contrast, the

USAID does *not* emphasise partnership programmes, whereas Sida and CIDA do not emphasise institutional reform and development. Sida does not favour infrastructure development.

Figure 14: Medium-sized donors' means of support by type of intervention



The curves in figure 14 display the changes over time in donor priorities in terms of the means of support (or preferred method/intervention) for the medium-sized donors (DFID, CIDA, Norad, and Sida), in absolute figures (USD 1000/year, in the period 1999 – 2009).

The results are inconclusive and the data for 2009 only provisional, but there seems to be a steady overall increase in partnership programmes (PAP, which is now the preferred method of support) and institutional development (ORG), and a more recent decrease in training projects (TRA). There has also been a recent increase in infrastructure projects (INF) and a significant decrease in support for human and technical services (SER).

Annex 4

The Dataset

This dataset has been compiled with information provided by the donor agencies, checked against reports by donors to the UNDP, and against information obtained from archives, interviews and websites. Please note that the data presented in the matrix are *not exhaustive* and that the figures are *approximations* only and that all figures are in US Dollars.

Donor	Project	Bank	Implem.	Country	Value	Duration	Beneficiary	Focus	Form
USAID	Parliamentary and Political Training	NO	PARL	Angola	3 128 000	1996 - 2001	PNAT	GOV	TRA, INF
USAID	Parliamentary Assistance Programme	NO	PARL, PADM	Benin	978 000	2000 - 2002	PNAT	GOV, LEG	TRA, ORG
USAID	Parliamentary Assistance Programme	NO	PARL	Burundi	1 400 000	2002 - 2003	PGEN, PCOM	PEA, GOV	TRA
USAID	Strengthening the National legislature	NO	PARL	Cen Afr Rep	200 000	2000 - 2001	PNAT	GOV	INF, TRA
USAID	Leg Ass	NO	PARL	Cote d'Ivoire	450 000	n.d.	PNAT	LEG, BUD	TRA
USAID	Sustained Good Gov Cap Building of the Nat Parl	NO	PARL	Ethiopia	2 463 566	1998 - 2001	PNAT	GOV	TRA, INF
USAID	Public Policy Decisions Better Reflect Civil Input	NO	PARL	Ghana	3 975 000	1997 - 2000	PNAT	CSO	TRA
USAID	Strengthen. the Leg and Increasing Citizen Participation	NO	PARL	Ghana	1 400 000	1997 - 2000	PCOM, PADM	GOV, RES	INF, SER
USAID	Enhanced Effectiveness of Parliament	NO	PARL	Ghana	800 000	2000 - 2004	PNAT	GOV, LEG	INF, TRA
USAID	Legislative Strengthening	NO	PARL	Guinea Biss.	280 000	2005 - 2006	PNAT	GOV	TRA, PAP
USAID	Parliamentary Strengthening Programme for Kenya	NO	INGO	Kenya	4 138 621	2000 - 2004	PNAT	GOV	TRA, ORG
USAID	Parliamentary Strengthening Programme for Kenya	NO	INGO	Kenya	5 848 240	2005 - 2009	PNAT, PCOM	GOV, BUD	TRA, ORG

Donor	Project	Bank	Implem.	Country	Value	Duration	Beneficiary	Focus	Form
USAID	Political Process Strengthening Programme	NO	INGO	Liberia	940 000	2006 - 2008	PNAT, PADM	GOV, BUD	TRA
USAID	Strengthening Parliament and Civil Society	YES	INGO	Malawi	5 326 000	2000 - 2004	PNAT, PCOM	GOV, CSO	TRA, SER
USAID	Streng. Parl. oversight and Curb Corruption and Fisc	YES	PRI	Malawi	2 890 000	2006 - 2008	PNAT, PCOM	BUD, COR	n.d.
USAID	Streng. Dem. Institutions and Women's Participation	NO	PARL	Mali	200 000	2002 - 2003	PNAT, PCOM	COR, GEN	TRA, SER
USAID	Legislative Strengthening	NO	INGO	Mozambique	1 600 000	1997 - 1999	PNAT, PADM	GOV, RES	TRA, PAP
USAID	Consolidation of Democracy	NO	INGO	Namibia	1 863 000	1998 - 2000	PNAT, NGO	GOV	n.d.
USAID	Consolidation of Democracy	NO	INGO	Namibia	1 765 500	2000 -2002	PNAT, NGO	GOV	n.d.
USAID	Civic Organizing and Legislative Outreach	NO	n.d.	Niger	681 000	2000 - 2001	NGO, PNAT	GOV, BUD	TRA, SER
USAID	Assistance to State Legislatures	NO	PARL	Nigeria	1 000 000	1999 - 2003	PLOC	GOV, ORG	n.d.
USAID	Assistance to National Assembly	NO	PARL	Nigeria	1 150 000	2000 - 2001	PNAT	GOV	TRA, SER
USAID	Legislative Strengthening Program	NO	PARL	Nigeria	2 250 000	2001 - 2003	PNAT	GOV, HIV	TRA, SER
USAID	Legislative Strengthening Program	NO	INGO	Nigeria	6 050 000	2003 - 2008	PNAT, PCOM	GOV, LEG	TRA, SER
USAID	Technical Assistance to Rwandan National Assembly	NO	PARL	Rwanda	1 599 442	2000 - 2003	PADM	LEG, BUD	TRA
USAID	Parliamentary Orientation Program	NO	PARL	Sierra Leone	150 000	2002 - 2003	PGEN, PNAT	GOV, GEN	TRA

Donor	Project	Bask	Implem.	Country	Value	Duration	Beneficiary	Focus	Form
USAID	Legislative Strengthening	NO	PARL	Sudan	2 000 000	2004 - 2009	PCOM	BUD	n.d.
USAID	Tech. Ass. Streng. of Tanzania's Union Nat Ass	YES	PARL	Tanzania	1 875 170	2003 - 2005	PNAT, PCOM	GOV	SER
USAID	Parliamentary Strengthening in Tanzania	NO	PARL	Tanzania	3 831 167	2005 - 2007	PCOM	BUD	n.d.
USAID	Legislative Strengthening	NO	PARL	Togo	200 000	1998 - 2002	PNAT	n.d.	TRA
USAID	Uganda Parliamentary Technical Assistance Project	NO	INGO	Uganda	3 805 192	1998 - 2002	PNAT, PADM	GOV, BUD	TRA, SER
USAID	Uganda Parliamentary Support Project	NO	INGO	Uganda	2 143 644	2002 - 2006	PNAT	LEG, ORG	TRA, SER
USAID	Strengthening Democratic Linkages in Uganda	NO	INGO	Uganda	2 900 000	2007 - 2010	PNAT, PLOC	GOV	n.d.
USAID	Parliamentary Reform Project	NO	INGO	Zambia	3 819 412	2003 - 2006	PCOM, PADM	GOV	TRA, SER
USAID	Parliamentary Reform Project	NO	PARL	Zimbabwe	5 000 000	1994 - 2004	PCOM, PNAT	GOV, CSO	TRA, SER
USAID	Afghanistan Parliamentary Assistance Project	NO	INGO	Afghanistan	15 556 000	2004 - 2009	PNAT, PADM	GOV, BUD	INF, SER
USAID	Institutional Capacity Building	NO	PARL	Bahrain	125 000	2002 - 2003	PNAT	GOV, LEG	TRA
USAID	Streng. Coop. Between Political Parties in Parliament	NO	PARL	Bangladesh	220 000	1999 - 2001	NGO, PNAT	CSO	TRA
USAID	New Democracy Initiatives	NO	PARL	Bangladesh	2 800 000	1995 - 2001	PNAT, NGO	LEG	OTH

Donor	Project	Bank	Implem.	Country	Value	Duration	Beneficiary	Focus	Form
USAID	Streng. Citizens and Pol. Parties in Parl. Process	NO	PARL	Bangladesh	1 100 000	1999 - 2000	NGO, OTH	GOV	TRA
USAID	Promoting Gov., Acc., Transparency and Integrity	NO	PARL	Bangladesh	3 000 000	2007 - 2011	PNAT, PADM	BUD	TRA, SER
USAID	Decision Support Services Project	NO	PARL	Egypt	12 000 000	1993 - 2001	PNAT	GOV	SER, INF
USAID	Streng. Political Parties and Dem. Practices in Legisl.	NO	n.d.	Indonesia	635 000	2000 - 2001	PNAT, PGEN	LEG	SER
USAID	SWARA (televised sessions)	NO	PARL	Indonesia	336 000	2000 - 2001	PNAT, MED	OTH	SER, INF
USAID	Democracy and Civil Society	NO	PARL	Indonesia	51 000	2000 - 2001	PADM	RES	SER, ORG
USAID	National Legislative Strengthening Programme	NO	INGO	Indonesia	1 800 000	2005 - 2008	PNAT	RES	SER
USAID	Iraq legislative Strengthening Program	NO	PRI	Iraq	24 000 000	2008 - 2010	PNAT	BUD, GOV	INF, TRA
USAID	Legislative Support Project	NO	INGO	Jordan	13 669 000	2005 - 2010	PNAT	GOV, BUD	TRA, ORG
USAID	Assistance to Lebanese Parliament	NO	PARL	Lebanon	3 455 000	1993 - 2002	PNAT, PADM	GOV, RES	TRA, SER
USAID	Developing legislative Resource Centre	NO	PARL	Lebanon	2 800 000	2008 - 2010	PNAT	RES	INF, SER
USAID	Leg. and Party Profess. and Parliamentary Elec Obs	NO	INGO	Mongolia	660 000	2000	PNAT, PADM	LEG, GOV	TRA, SER
USAID	Strengthening Parliamentary Processes in Morocco	NO	INGO	Morocco	6 780 000	2004 - 2009	PCOM	BUD	n.d.

Donor	Project	Bask	Implem.	Country	Value	Duration	Beneficiary	Focus	Form
USAID	Strengthening Legislative Governance in Pakistan	NO	PARL	Pakistan	1 500 000	2003 - 2004	PNAT, PLOC	GOV	ORG
USAID	Pakistan	NO	PARL	Pakistan	9 000 000	2005 - 2009	PNAT, PLOC	GOV, CSO	n.d.
USAID	Strengthening the legislative Capacity of the PLC	NO	PRI	Palestine	16 000 000	1996 - 2004	PNAT, PCOM	GOV, LEG	TRA, ORG
USAID	Support to Strengthen Yemen's Parliament I	NO	INGO	Yemen	1 000 000	2000 - 2001	PNAT	BUD, LEG	SER
USAID	Support to Strengthen Yemen's Parliament II	NO	INGO	Yemen	800 000	2004 - 2006	PNAT, PCOM	GOV	TRA, SER
USAID	Legislative Strengthening Program	NO	PRI	Armenia	2 273 975	2002 - 2004	PNAT	BUD, CSO	n.d.
USAID	Legislative Strengthening Program II	NO	PRI	Armenia	2 483 853	2004 - 2006	PNAT	LEG, BUD	n.d.
USAID	Legislative Strengthening Program	NO	PRI	Azerbaijan	1 200 000	2007 - 2009	PNAT	GOV, LEG	TRA, INF
USAID	Parliamentary Oversight and Transparency	NO	PARL	Georgia	1 150 000	1997 - 2000	PCOM, PNAT	BUD, GOV	TRA, ORG
USAID	Parliamentary Strengthening Project	NO	INGO	Georgia	2 400 000	2006 - 2009	PNAT, PGEN	PEA, PAR	n.d.
USAID	Parliamentary Development/Comparative Models	NO	PARL	Kazakhstan	800 000	1992 - 2002	PNAT, PADM	GOV	n.d.
USAID	Parliamentary Strengthening	NO	INGO	Kosovo	2 000 000	2004 - 2007	PLEA	GOV	ORG
USAID	Parliamentary Assistance	NO	PARL	Kyrgyzstan	1 100 000	1992 - 2003	PNAT	GOV	n.d.

Donor	Project	Bank	Implem.	Country	Value	Duration	Beneficiary	Focus	Form
USAID	Parliamentary Strengthening Programme	NO	PRI	Kyrgyzstan	1 500 000	2006 - 2008	PNAT	GOV, LEG	SER
USAID	Improving Party Caucuses	NO	PARL	Macedonia	4 800 000	1999 - 2004	PNAT	GOV, PAR	SER
USAID	Legislative Assistance	NO	PARL	Tajikistan	350 000	2000 - 2002	PNAT	LEG	n.a.
USAID	Technical Assistance to the Bolivian Congress I	NO	PARL	Bolivia	1 862 000	2001 - 2003	PNAT, PLOC	GOV	n.a.
USAID	Technical Assistance to the Bolivian Congress II	NO	PARL	Bolivia	2 872 703	2003 - 2005	PNAT	GOV	SER, INF
USAID	Strengthening Democratic Institutions	NO	PARL	Bolivia	1 276 710	2007 - 2009	PNAT, PLOC	LEG, GEN	SER
USAID	Colombian Congress Strengthening Programme	NO	PRI	Colombia	2 100 000	2002 - 2006	PNAT	LEG	SER, INF
USAID	Strengthening Pol Parties to Deliver Const. Services	NO	PARL	Colombia	150 000	2007 - 2009	PNAT, PGEN	GOV	n.d.
USAID	Program for Citizen Particip.in Legislative Process I	NO	PARL	El Salvador	495 058	1999 - 2000	PNAT, NGO	GOV	SER
USAID	Program for Citizen Particip. in Legislative Process II	NO	PARL	El Salvador	1 400 000	2000 - 2002	PNAT, NGO	GOV, BUD	TRA, SER
USAID	Legislative Assistance Activity	NO	PARL	Guatemala	246 204	2004 - 2005	PNAT	GOV	ORG
USAID	Congressional Modernization	NO	PARL	Guatemala	3 000 000	1997 - 2000	PNAT	GOV, LEG	ORG, INF
USAID	Strengthening Democracy	NO	PARL	Guyana	3 007 000	2000 - 2004	PNAT, PCOM	GOV	TRA, INF

Donor	Project	Bank	Implem.	Country	Value	Duration	Beneficiary	Focus	Form
USAID	Re-Establishment of Transp and Eff Functioning Parl	NO	PARL	Haiti	6 840 000	2006 - 2009	PNAT	GOV	INF, TRA
USAID	National Assembly Modernization Program	NO	PARL	Nicaragua	1 314 399	2000 - 2002	PNAT, PADM	GOV	TRA, SER
USAID	Developing Skills of the Peruvian Congress	NO	PRI	Peru	1 321 998	2002 - 2004	PNAT	GOV, LEG	n.d.
USAID	Strengthening Party Caucuses	NO	PARL	Peru	150 000	2007 - 2010	PNAT, PGEN	GOV, LEG	TRA, SER
USAID	New Members Orientation Program	NO	IGO	Peru	10 000	2007	PNAT	GOV	TRA
					241 491 854				
DFID	PGA Sub-Reg Asian Parl Seminar on HIV/AIDS	NO	INGO	Asia	24 500	2004 - 2005	PINT	n.a.	TRA
DFID	Streng. the role and capacities of parl committees	NO	PARL	Bangladesh	3 635 720	2001 - 2005	PCOM	GOV	n.d.
DFID	Support to the Pub Finance and Budget Committees	NO	PARL	Bosnia Herz	89 250	2008	PNAT	GOV, BUD	SER, ORG
DFID	Strengthening Public Expenditure Management 3	NO	PARL	Bosnia Herz	1 050 000	2009 - 2011	PNAT	BUD	n.d.
DFID	Burundi Leadership Training Program	NO	n.d.	Burundi	1 939 025	2005 - 2008	PNAT, NGO	GOV	TRA
DFID	Central Asia Parliamentary and Governance Project	NO	n.d.	Central Asia	168 000	2004 - 2005	PINT	GOV	n.d.

Donor	Project	Bask	Implem.	Country	Value	Duration	Beneficiary	Focus	Form
DFID	Strengthening Democracy & Accountability in DRC	YES	IGO	Congo DRC	10 150 000	2006 - 2011	PNAT	GOV	n.d.
DFID	Democratic Institutions Programme	YES	IGO	Ethiopia	5 000 000	2007 - 2011	PNAT, PLOC	GOV	n.d.
DFID	Parliamentary Financial scrutiny Project	NO	PARL	Ghana	577 500	2007 - 2009	PCOM	BUD	n.d.
DFID	Parliamentary Strengthening Programme	NO	PARL	Kenya	16 690	2005 - 2006	PNAT, PCOM	GOV	SER
DFID	Parliamentary Strengthening Programme	YES	PARL	Kenya	1 487 500	2005 - 2009	PCOM, PADM	BUD	TRA, ORG
DFID	Streng. Parl Committees and Engagement with CS	YES	IGO	Malawi	7 700 000	2001 - 2004	PCOM, NGO	CSO	n.d.
DFID	Tikambriane	YES	IGO	Malawi	8 750 000	2003 - 2008	PNAT	GOV	ORG
DFID	Consolidating Democracy Project	YES	INGO	Mozambique	787 500	2006 - 2009	PNAT, NGO	GOV, CSO	n.d.
DFID	Strengthening the National Assembly Programme	NO	PARL	Nigeria	4 637 500	2005 - 2008	PNAT	POV	n.d.
DFID	Participatory constitution building in Nepal	YES	IGO	Nepal	2 975 000	2008 - 2010	PNAT, PADM	GOV	n.d.
DFID	Streng. voice of marg groups in the Const. Assembly	YES	PARL	Nepal	875 000	2008 - 2009	PNAT, PGEN	GOV	n.d.
DFID	Training of women members of Const. Assembly	YES	IGO	Nepal	61 250	2008 - 2009	PNAT, PGEN	GOV	n.d.

Donor	Project	Bask	Implem.	Country	Value	Duration	Beneficiary	Focus	Form
DFID	Pakistan Legislature Capacity Building Project	NO	PARL	Pakistan	1 102 500	2003 - 2006	PNAT, PLOC	GOV	n.d.
DFID	Strengthening parliamentary democracy	n.d.	PARL	Palestine	1 352 943	1998 - 2002	PNAT	GOV	n.d.
DFID	Palestinian Legislative Council Library	NO	PARL	Palestine	679 000	1999 - 2003	PADM	GOV	INF
DFID	Programme for Streng. Good Governance (PSGG)	YES	IGO	Rwanda	1 881 200	2007 - 2011	PNAT, NGO	GOV, CSO	n.d.
DFID	Parliamentary Committees Strengthening Project	NO	PARL	Sierra Leone	498 818	2004 - 2006	PCOM	GOV, BUD	n.d.
DFID	Parliamentary Strengthening Programme	YES	INGO	Sierra Leone	525 000	2007 - 2008	PNAT	GOV	TRA
DFID	Support to Transitional Federal Parliament	NO	PARL	Somalia	2 100 000	2006 - 2007	PNAT	GOV	INF
DFID	Support for parliamentary committees	YES	PARL	South Africa	1 312 500	2004 - 2007	PNAT	BUD	n.a.
DFID	Eff adm and dem gov in South. Sudan (SEADGOSS)	NO	PARL	Sudan	875 000	2008 - 2010	PNAT, PLOC	GOV	INF
DFID	Streng. the Union National Assembly (Phase II)	NO	PARL	Tanzania	3 237 500	2003 - 2006	PNAT, PADM	GOV, BUD	n.a.
DFID	Deepening Democracy Programme	YES	PARL	Tanzania	1 078 611	2007 - 2010	PNAT	GOV, LEG	n.a.
DFID	Support through a strategic fund allocation	NO	PARL	Uganda	2 100 000	2003 - 2008	PADM	GOV	ORG, SER.
DFID	Deepening Democracy Programme	YES	PARL	Uganda	468 750	2008 -2011	PNAT	GOV	n.d.

Donor	Project	Bank	Implem.	Country	Value	Duration	Beneficiary	Focus	Form
DFID	DFID-UNDP Strategic Partnership Initiative (SPI)	YES	IGO	Vietnam	1 312 500	2004 - 2009	PNAT, PLOC	GOV, BUD	n.d.
DFID	Support to the Parl Network of the World Bank	YES	INGO	World	525 000	2008 - 2010	PINT	BUD	PAP
DFID	Strengthening Human Res Dev in Southern Parl's	NO	INGO	World	8 750 000	2009 - 2012	PINT	GOV	PAP
DFID	Parliamentary Reform Programme II + III	YES	PARL	Zambia	2 546 250	2005 - 2011	PNAT	GOV	n.d.
					80 270 006				
CIDA	Parliamentary and Media Support Project	YES	IGO	Bangladesh	4 534 000	2006 - 2013	PNAT, MED	HUR	TRA, INF
CIDA	Canada Cambodia Legislative Support Project	NO	PARL	Cambodia	5 441 000	2000 - 2019	PNAT, PADM	GOV, LEG	INF, PAP
CIDA	Canada-China Legislative Cooperation Project	NO	INGO	China	4 262 000	2002 - 2015	PNAT, PLOC	GOV, POV	TRA
CIDA	Ethiopia Parliament Capacity Building	NO	PARL	Ethiopia	4 080 000	1999 - 2015	PCOM, PADM	GOV, BUD	TRA, INF
CIDA	Ghana Parliamentary Committee Support Phase II	NO	INGO	Ghana	2 993 000	2004 - 2010	PCOM	POV	n.d.
CIDA	Helping Parliaments in Post-Conflict Countries	NO	INGO	GHA, LIB,...	608 000	2007 - 2010	PINT	PEA	TRA, SER

Donor	Project	Bank	Implem.	Country	Value	Duration	Beneficiary	Focus	Form
CIDA	Support to the Haitian Parliament	NO	PARL	Haiti	4 533 000	2006 - 2012	PNAT, PCOM	GOV, LEG	TRA
CIDA	African Women Leaders Project	NO	INGO	NIG, SL, UG	358 000	2007 - 2009	PGEN	GEN, GOV	TRA, PAP
CIDA	Strengthening Sudanese Parliaments	NO	INGO	Sudan	2 901 000	2007 - 2015	PNAT, PLOC	PEA, GEN	TRA
CIDA	Conflict Prevention through Parliaments	NO	INGO	West Africa	744 000	2007 - 2010	PINT	PEA	TRA, ORG
CIDA	IPC capacity development	NO	INGO	World	543 000	2007 - 2010	PINT	CSO	TRA, ORG
CIDA	WBI Parl Performance Indicators	YES	IGO	World	90 000	2008 - 2009	OTH	RES	OTH
CIDA	GOPAC Global Programme	n.d.	INGO	World	2 810 000	2008 - 2011	PINT	COR, GOV	TRA
CIDA	Equality in Politics	YES	INGO	World	1 088 000	2008 - 2011	PGEN	GEN	TRA
					34 985 000				
Sida	UNDP Afghanistan	YES	IGO	Afghanistan	1 428 571	2005	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
Sida	AWEPA Core Funding	YES	INGO	Africa	1 285 714	2000 - 2003	PINT	n.a.	PAP
Sida	AWEPA Core Funding	YES	INGO	Africa	928 395	2006 - 2008	PINT	n.a.	PAP
Sida	Parliament via UNDP	YES	IGO	Burundi	300 000	2002 - 2005	PNAT	GOV, LEG	INF, SER
Sida	AMANI Forum	NO	IGO	East Africa	639 100	2005 - 2006	PINT	PEA	PAP
Sida	East African parliaments	NO	PARL	East Africa	140 741	2008 - 2009	PNAT	GOV	PAP
Sida	AWEPA-EALA	YES	IGO	East Africa	493 000	2008 - 2012	PINT	GOV, ENV	PAP
Sida	Democratic Institutions Programme	YES	GOV	Ethiopia	38 000	2007 - 2011	PNAT	GOV	TRA, INF
Sida	Parliament Administration	NO	PARL	Georgia	325 710	n.d.	PADM	n.a.	SER

Donor	Project	Bank	Implem.	Country	Value	Duration	Beneficiary	Focus	Form
Sida	MINUGUA Prog of Instl Ass for Legal Reform (3-5)	YES	INGO	Guatemala	1 563 571	1999 - 2005	PNAT	PEA	n.d.
Sida	Rehabilitation of Parliament Building	NO	PARL	Guinea Biss.	50 000	2000	PNAT	n.d.	INF
Sida	Engendering the Political Processes Programme	YES	NGO	Kenya	214 286	2003 - 2005	PGEN	n.d.	TRA, PAP
Sida	Trilateral Parliament SvR	NO	PARL	Moldova	55 340	2007 - 2008	PNAT	GOV	PAP
Sida	AWEPA Mozambique	YES	INGO	Mozambique	1 197 857	2005 - 2010	PNAT, NGO	n.d.	TRA, PAP
Sida	SADC PF – HIV/Aids Program	YES	IGO	Southern Afr	714 286	2007 - 2009	PINT	HIV	TRA, PAP
Sida	Engendering SADC PF	NO	IGO	Southern Afr	888 889	2006 - 2010	PINT	GEN	TRA, PAP
Sida	AWEPA - Parliamentary Capacity Building	n.d.	INGO	Tanzania	100 000	2001 - 2002	PNAT	GOV	n.d.
Sida	Parliamentary Political Parties Committee	n.d.	NGO	Tanzania	188 571	n.d.	PNAT, PGEN	PAR	n.d.
Sida	Riksdagen - Timor Leste	NO	PARL	Timor Leste	85 714	2004	PNAT	GOV	TRA, PAP
Sida	East Timor Parliament	YES	IGO	Timor Leste	285 000	2007 - 2009	PNAT	GOV	n.d.
Sida	AWEPA - Uganda	NO	INGO	Uganda	285 714	2004 - 2005	PNAT	GOV	TRA, PAP
Sida	UNDP Uganda Riksdag	NO	IGO	Uganda	428 571	2002	PNAT	n.d.	n.d.
Sida	Vietnam NASS	NO	PARL	Vietnam	2 142 857	1999 - 2001	PNAT	GOV	SER, PAP
Sida	PGA-JPO program	n.d.	INGO	West Africa	573 960	1999 - 2002	PINT	GOV	SER
Sida	PGA Core Funding	YES	INGO	World	1 928 570	2000 - 2006	PINT	n.a.	PAP

Donor	Project	Basik	Implem.	Country	Value	Duration	Beneficiary	Focus	Form
Sida	PGA Core Funding	YES	INGO	World	1 407 407	2008 - 2011	PINT	PEA, HUR	PAP
Sida	IPU Core Funding	YES	INGO	World	1 071 430	2004 - 2008	PINT	n.a.	PAP
Sida	IPU Core Funding	YES	INGO	World	488 889	2008 - 2011	PINT	n.a.	PAP
Sida	E-parliament	YES	IGO	World	185 000	2007 - 2010	PINT	POV, ENV	PAP
Sida	PACT Zambia Parliamentary Reform	YES	INGO	Zambia	928 570	2002 -2006	PNAT	GOV	n.d.
Sida	Zimbabwe Parliament	YES	IGO	Zimbabwe	114 286	2007 - 2008	PNAT	GOV	n.d.
					20 478 000				
UNDP	Supporting Pol Reforms in Both Houses of Parl	NO	PARL	Bahrain	200 000	2006 - 2008	PNAT, PGEN	GOV, LEG,	TRA, PAP
UNDP	Tokelau and Niue Young Leaders Parliaments	YES	PARL, NGO	East. Samoa	100 000	2008	PGEN	GOV, GEN	TRA
UNDP	Enhancing Knowledge Policy Analysis Female MPs	NO	PARL	Egypt	63 000	2006 - 2007	PGEN	GEN	PAP
UNDP	Strengthening the Capacity of Parliament	NO	PARL	Egypt	200 000	2006 - 2008	PNAT	BUD,	TRA
UNDP	Support to the Modern. of . National Assembly	YES	PARL	Nicaragua	100 000	2008 - 2012	PNAT	GOV, CSO	TRA, ORG
UNDP	Support to Post Conflict Gender Legislation	YES	PARL	Sierra Leone	200 000	2006	PCOM, PGEN	GEN, PEA	TRA, ORG
					863 000				

Donor	Project	Bank	Implem.	Country	Value	Duration	Beneficiary	Focus	Form
AusAID	Parliamentary Assistance Program	NO	PARL	Indonesia	750 000	2007 - 2009	PNAT	GOV	ORG, PAP
AusAID	Parl Support Facility/Institutions of Dem and Account	NO	PARL	Indonesia	225 000	2007 - 2008	PNAT, PLOC	GOV	ORG, TRA
AusAID	Solomon Islands Parl Streng. Programme I+II	YES	PARL	Solomon Isl.	1 766 250	2004 - 2012	PNAT, PCOM	GOV, LEG	TRA, SER
AusAID	Integr Prog Women in Politics and Decision-Making	YES	IGO	Timor Leste	300 000	2007 - 2009	NGO	GEN, MED	n.d.
AusAID	Streng. Parliamentary Democracy in Timor Leste	YES	IGO	Timor Leste	1 125 000	2006 - 2009	PNAT, PGEN	GEN	ORG, SER
AusAID	Women in Leadership Programme	NO	NGO	Vanuatu	32 500	2007 - 2009	PGEN	GOV, GEN	TRA, ORG
AusAID	Centre for Democratic Institutions	NO	NGO	World	3 375 000	2009 - 2011	PGEN, PINT	GOV	TRA
					7 573 750				
EuropeAid	Capacity Building Legislature and Civil Servants	n.d.	NGO	Ethiopia	110 000	2006 - 2007	PNAT	GOV, BUD	n.d.
EuropeAid	Good Gov through Capacity Building in Nat Parl	YES	IGO	Ethiopia	496 000	2003 - 2007	PNAT	GOV, BUD	TRA
EuropeAid	Promoting Democracy and Law Enforcement	NO	NGO	Indonesia	69 000	2004 - 2005	PLOC, NGO	GOV, BUD	n.d.
					675 000				
WB/IDF	Capacity Bdg Participatory Design and Const Reform	NO	GOV	Bolivia	300 000	2004 - 2007	PNAT, NGO	GOV	ORG

Donor	Project	Bask	Implem.	Country	Value	Duration	Beneficiary	Focus	Form
WB/IDF	Streng. of the Representatives Chamber of Congress	NO	PARL	Bolivia	212 000	2006 - 2009	PNAT, PCOM	BUD	INF, SER
WB/IDF	Public Financial Management and Acc Project	YES	GOV	Cambodia	500 000	2006 - 2012	PCOM	BUD	n.d.
WB/IDF	Parliamentary Economic Capacity Building	NO	PARL	Chad	320 000	2005 - 2007	PNAT	BUD	n.d.
WB/IDF	Strengthening of the El Salvador Congress	NO	PARL	El Salvador	235 000	2001 - 2004	PNAT	GOV	INF, PAP
WB/IDF	Institutional Strengthening of congress	NO	PARL	Guatemala	239 000	1998 - 2000	PNAT	GOV	INF, PAP
WB/IDF	Streng. Fiduciary Framework: Finance Committee	NO	PARL	Guinea	299 000	2004 - 2007	PCOM	BUD	n.d.
WB/IDF	Gov Financial Man and Revenue Adm Project	NO	GOV	Indonesia	5 000 000	2004 - 2009	PNAT	BUD	n.d.
WB/IDF	Institutional Strengthening of Congress	NO	PARL	Mexico	498 000	2007 - 2010	PNAT	GOV, BUD	SER, INF
WB/IDF	Support to the Federal Parl Accounts Committee	NO	PARL	Pakistan	340 000	2007 - 2010	PCOM	BUD	SER
WB/IDF	Modernization of Paraguay's Congress	NO	PARL	Paraguay	400 000	2005 - 2008	PNAT	GOV	SER, ORG
					8 343 000				

Annex 5

Norway's parliamentary strengthening projects

This dataset has been compiled with information provided by Norad (archives and project lists), the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Embassies abroad (by e-mail) and has checked against interviews and websites. Please note that the data presented in the matrix are *not exhaustive* and that the figures are *approximations* only. (For the relationship between the MFA and Norad after reorganisation, see chapter 6.1 above).

Donor	Project	Bank	Implem.	Country	Value	Duration	Beneficiary	Focus	Form
MFA/Norad	Conference of African Parliamentarians	n.d.	INGO	Africa	71 250	2002	PNAT, PINT	GOV	TRA
MFA/Norad	Women's Commission in Parliament, Argentina	n.d.	n.d.	Argentina	44 440	2008	PCOM, PGEN	GEN	n.d.
MFA/Norad	Security Sector Gov., Parliamentary Oversight	n.d.	n.d.	Balkans Yug	153 330	2008	PNAT, PADM	PEA	TRA, SER
MFA/Norad	HIV/AIDs conferences (PGA)	n.d.	IGO	Bangl Pakist	29 040	2006	PINT, PGEN	HIV	TRA
MFA/Norad	Parliament facade I	n.d.	PARL	Bosnia Herz	99 700	2003 - 2004	PNAT	n.d.	n.d.
MFA/Norad	Parliament facade reconstruction II	NO	PARL	Bosnia Herz	1 113 000	2006 - 2008	PNAT	n.a.	INF
MFA/Norad	The Parliamentary Ombudsman, HR	n.d.	n.d.	China	83 700	2006	PCOM	HUR	n.d.
MFA/Norad	EALA/AWEPA TAN-02/304, 07/106, 07/101	n.d.	IGO	East Africa	1 034 519	2003 - 2008	PINT	GOV	TRA
MFA/Norad	Democratisation in Parliament (FUNDASPAD)	YES	INGO	El Salvador	318 370	2002 - 2003	PADM	n.d.	SER
MFA/Norad	Capacity building Parliament	YES	PARL, IGO	Ethiopia	120 000	2002 - 2004	PNAT, PADM	GOV, GEN	TRA, INF
MFA/Norad	Democratic Institutions Programme	YES	PARL, IGO	Ethiopia	962 000	2008 - 2009	PNAT	GOV	TRA, INF
MFA/Norad	Seminar parliamentarians	YES	INGO	Haiti	275 200	2006	PNAT	n.d.	TRA
MFA/Norad	Support to the commission on Education	NO	IGO	Haiti	201 600	2007 - 2008	PNAT, PCOM	OTH, LEG	TRA, INF
MFA/Norad	Capacity Building Parliament	YES	IGO	Haiti	133 000	2008	PNAT	n.d.	n.d.

Donor	Project	Bank	Implem.	Country	Value	Duration	Beneficiary	Focus	Form
MFA/Norad	Gender and Governance Programme	YES	IGO	Kenya	200 000	2006 – 2009	PGEN	GEN	n.d.
MFA/Norad	Amani Forum: Eng. Members of Parl in Confl Manag	n.d.	INGO	Kenya	307 692	2008 – 2009	PNAT	PEA	n.d.
MFA/Norad	Lebanese Parliamentary Monitor	n.d.	n.d.	Lebanon	90 815	2008	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
MFA/Norad	Democratic Consolidation programme Phase II	YES	IGO	Malawi	5 076 923	2002 - 2008	PNAT, NGO	GOV	n.d.
MFA/Norad	Democratic Consolidation programme Phase III	NO	IGO	Malawi	2 461 538	2008 - 2011	PNAT, OTH	GOV	n.d.
MFA/Norad	Support for strategic plan legislative assembly	YES	PARL	Malawi	1 153 846	2008 - 2011	PNAT	GOV, LEG	ORG
MFA/Norad	Parliamentary strengthening in Mongolia	YES	IGO	Mongolia	1 629 628	2001 - 2008	PNAT	GOV	TRA, ORG
MFA/Norad	Support to Parliament	NO	PARL	Mozambique	1 123 077	1998 - 2006	PNAT, PADM	GOV, BUD	TRA, SER
MFA/Norad	Network of Parliamentarians	n.d.	n.d.	Myanmar	133 330	2000	PGEN	n.d.	TRA
MFA/Norad	Program Support to UNDP in Nicaragua	YES	IGO	Nicaragua	185 185	2007 - 2008	PGEN, NGO	GOV, HIV	n.d.
MFA/Norad	PLC Reform II + III	YES	PARL	Palestine	960 000	2005 - 2007	PNAT	GOV	TRA, ORG
MFA/Norad	Good Gov for Poverty Reduction in Rwanda, Ph II	YES	IGO	Rwanda	215 000	2004	n.d.	PEA	n.d.
MFA/Norad	Training petroleum legisl for parl and gov. officials	NO	n.d.	Sao T & Prin	59 000	2006 - 2008	n.d.	ENV	TRA

Donor	Project	Bank	Implem.	Country	Value	Duration	Beneficiary	Focus	Form
MFA/Norad	Provincial Parliamentarians - Addend	n.d.	n.d.	South Africa	407 400	1999	PLOC	GOV	n.d.
MFA/Norad	Parliamentary Monitoring Group	NO	INGO	South Africa	74 000	2003 - 2004	PINT	HUR	TRA
MFA/Norad	SADC-AWEPA Phase I + Add. 2 + Add. 3	n.d.	INGO	Southern Afr	711 111	1999 - 2001	PINT	n.d.	n.d.
MFA/Norad	SADC Parliamentary Forum/Election observation	NO	IGO	Southern Afr	1 103 704	2003 - 2005	PINT	GOV	PAP
MFA/Norad	Parliamentary delegation to Norway	NO	PARL	Sri Lanka	94 963	2001	PNAT	n.d.	TRA
MFA/Norad	Infrastructure support Parliament Southern Sudan	YES	IGO	Sudan	177 778	2006 - 2007	PLOC, PADM	n.a.	INF
MFA/Norad	AWEPA Leg Capacity Building Prog support SSLA	YES	INGO	Sudan	348 148	2007 - 2009	PNAT	GOV, LEG	TRA, PAP
MFA/Norad	Deepening Democracy Programme TAN-05/087	n.d.	n.d.	Tanzania	281 000	2007 - 2008	PNAT	n.d.	n.d.
MFA/Norad	Parliamentarians visit	NO	GOV	Timor Leste	37 037	2003 - 2004	PNAT	GOV	TRA
MFA/Norad	Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy I	YES	IGO	Timor Leste	376 923	2004 - 2005	PNAT, PADM	GOV, LEG	TRA, SER
MFA/Norad	Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy II	YES	IGO	Timor Leste	2 258 461	2006 - 2009	PNAT, PADM	GOV, BUD	TRA, SER
MFA/Norad	Women in Politics and in Decision-making	n.d.	n.d.	Timor Leste	296 000	2007	PGEN	GEN	TRA
MFA/Norad	AWEPA addendum	NO	INGO	Uganda	148 148	2002	PINT	OTH	TRA
MFA/Norad	Parliamentary Strategic Investment and Dev. Plan	n.d.	PARL	Uganda	148 148	2005	PNAT	GOV	ORG

Donor	Project	Bank	Implem.	Country	Value	Duration	Beneficiary	Focus	Form
MFA/Norad	Financial Management and Accountability Progr.	YES	GOV	Uganda	1 000 000	2006 - 2011	PCOM	BUD	TRA, INF
MFA/Norad	Deepening Democracy Programme	YES	PARL	Uganda	2 240 000	2008 - 2011	PCOM, PGEN	GOV, BUD	TRA, PAP
MFA/Norad	Capacity building in Parliament (PAPST) I	n.d.	n.d.	Zimbabwe	385 185	2000 - 2003	PNAT	n.d.	n.d.
MFA/Norad	Capacity building in Parliament (PAPST) II	n.d.	INGO	Zimbabwe	1 032 667	2005 - 2007	PNAT, NGO	CSO.	n.d.
MFA/Norad	Capacity building in Parliament (PAPST) III	n.d.	INGO	Zimbabwe	296 296	2008 - 2010	PNAT	GOV	n.d.
					29 652 153				

Annex 6 Questionnaire

This questionnaire was sent to a number of donor agencies and Norwegian Embassies in developing countries.

Questionnaire	
Background information	
1.	When did your agency start supporting legislatures (parliaments) in partner countries (approximately)
2.	What is the (approximate) total volume of funding that your organisation has provided in support of legislatures, cumulatively since 2000?
3.	Which countries have mainly received legislative support from your agency (country/regional focus)?
4.	Is there a list (available) of legislature/parliament support projects (and/or programmes) with information on project title, type, amounts, periods, partners, focus, etc?
5.	Are there any evaluations available (internal and external) on some/all of the projects?
6.	Are there any position papers, guidelines, background notes, cumulative evaluations, or other relevant material on parliament support for your organisation?
Project information	
Please provide a list of legislative/parliamentary strengthening projects (programmes) for your organisation. A project information form (Typology Sheet) is provided, showing the information required for each project or programme with explanations of values and coding:	
Donor	
Project	<i>Project title, shortened if necessary.</i>
Basket	<i>Does it include funding from other donors? YES/NO</i>
Implementer	<i>Who is the contract partner (implementing organisation)? PARL, IGO, INGO, NGO/CSO, GOV, PRI, OTH</i>
Country/region	<i>Three-letter country code</i>
Value	<i>Committed by your organisation</i>
Duration	<i>Start and end year</i>
Group	<i>Who is to have an improved capacity? Parliament: PNAT, PLEA, PCOM, PGEN, PLOC, PADM, PINT Other: INGO, NGO, MED, OTH</i>

Focus	<i>Thematic focus (priorities)</i> GOV, BUD, LEG, POV, ENV, HIV, COR, GEN, CSO, ELE, RES, PEA, PAR, HUR, OTH
Form	<i>What form (or type) of intervention or activity?</i> TRA, INF, SER; ORG; PAP, OTH
Partner	<i>Partners involved?</i>
Project website	<i>(if existing)</i>

Annex 7

Typology sheet

Type	Explanation	Values	Abbr.
1 Basket funding	This typifies projects/ programmes financed by one individual donor vs. projects/programmes financed by several (bilateral and/or multilateral) agencies (basked funding).	Individual	No
		Basket	Yes
2 Implementer	This typifies projects and programmes according to the implementing organisation (contract partner) of the donor agency	National parliament or sub-unit	PARL
		Intergovernmental org. and int. parliamentary org. and networks	IGO
		International non-government. org.	INGO
		National NGO or Civil society org. (CSO)	NGO
		National governm. institution	GOV
		Private company, consultancy (for-profit)	PRI
		Other	OTH

Type	Explanation	Values	Abbr.
3 Beneficiary	This typifies the groups benefiting from the project (asking who, within the parliament in question, is to have an improved capacity? (And, in stead of or in addition to the direct parliamentary counterpart/ beneficiary, who else?)	National parliament, (plenary), all MPs	PNAT
		Parliament leadership, speakers' office	PLEA
		Committees and Commissions	PCOM
		Subgroups like women, minorities, young people, opposition, parties	PGEN
		Local (sub-national) elected assemblies	PLOC
		Parliamentary administration, support staff, experts	PADM
		International and regional (supra-national) parliaments and org.	PINT
		Not elected international beneficiaries like international NGOs, think tanks, researchers	INGO
		Not elected national beneficiaries like NGOs, CSOs, churches, women	NGO
		Not elected national beneficiaries like the media, media org., etc.	MED
Other not elected national beneficiaries	OTH		

Type	Explanation	Values	Abbr.	
4	Policy focus	This typifies the thematic focus (priorities) of the support project or programme. In other words, what parliamentary policies, sector issue capacities or functions are to be improved?	Good governance, democratisation, accountability, rule of law, representation	GOV
			Budget, public finances, income and expenditures, trade	BUD
			Legislation, drafting and passing of bills, legal capacity	LEG
			Poverty alleviation, MDGs	POV
			Environment, climate, nat. res.	ENV
			HIV/AIDS, STD, health	HIV
			Corruption, transparency, crime, terrorism	COR
			Gender, women, minorities, and participation	GEN
			CSO and NGO oversight of parliament and policy areas	CSO
			Elections, monitoring elections, election system reform	ELE
			Research, evaluations, methodology, indicators	RES
			Peace, reconciliation, conflict settlement	PEA
			Political parties, opposition, political constituencies	PAR
			Human Rights, political and social rights and freedoms	HUR
Other	OTH			

Type	Explanation	Values	Abbr.
5. Means of support	This typifies the form or method of parliamentary support project/ programmes, including the means of intervention or activity that is taking place.	Transfer of knowledge/ skills/ experiences/ expertise through training, seminars, conferences; knowledge management	TRA
		Infrastructure improvement and acquisitions, improved physical structures, books, library, IT	INF
		Human support services like library, legal and economic expertise, investigation and research, technical advisors	SER
		Organisational reform and dev., including codes of ethics and internal regulations	ORG
		Partnership programmes, exchanges, parliamentary networking and twinning	PAP
	Other activities	OTH	

Annex 8

List of persons consulted

Araldsen, Hege, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo
Balch, Jeff, AWEPA, Amsterdam
Bjuremalm, Helena, Sida, Stockholm
De Vrieze, Franklin, UNDP, Brussels
Emanuel, Anders, Sida, Stockholm
Emmerink, Ruth G.M., Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague
Espeland, Knut, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo
Figuera, Elin, International IDEA, Stockholm
Habets, Ingrid, NDI, Brussels
Heyghebaert, Thomas, European Parliament, Brussels
Hubli, Scott, NDI, Washington D.C. (by telephone)
Imlack, Andrew, CPA secretariat, London
Kossoff, Stephan, DFID, London
Løvbræk, Asbjørn, Norad, Oslo
Meijenfeldt, Roel von, NIMD, The Hague
Moen, Eli, Norad, Oslo
Murphy, Jonathan, Howe Murphy Consulting, UK
Pierre-Louveaux, Olivier, UNDP, Brussels
Ramslien, Alf Arne, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo
Teigland, Kristin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo
Tuit, Jan, NIMD, The Hague
Sørbø, Gunnar M., Chr. Michelsens Institutt, Bergen

Annex 9

Terms of Reference: Study of experiences with support to legislatures⁷³

1 Background for the Study

Support to legislative assemblies is of relative new date on the international development policy arena. The democratic governance agenda came into prominence in the beginning of the 1990s, and is today seen as a key element in the international efforts to help fight poverty and corruption in development countries. Support to legislative assemblies is seen as central for the work to enhance effectiveness of development aid. It is assumed that ownership of national development strategies is increased if parliaments and citizens are more fully engaged in the planning and assessment of such policies and programmes.⁷⁴

The necessity for recipient countries to develop their own oversight capacities, including those of the parliament, is further underlined by the increased use of budget support as an aid modality.

Contributions to state-building in fragile states are another arena where institution-building and capacity building often tend to involve legislatures and their role in the government set-up.

A study conducted in 2006 found that legislative assemblies are often overlooked by donors in the formulation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)⁷⁵, which is a key decision-making or negotiation process with recipient governments.

There is relatively little systematic knowledge of what works and what does not work with regard to support to legislatures, and what factors to be considered when entering into new agreements. It is therefore a need for more information about what environments, strategies and approaches are conducive in terms of bringing about positive results, as it is expected that support to legislative assemblies will continue to grow, according to a recent ODI briefing paper.⁷⁶

2 Purpose, Use and Objectives for the Study

The main purpose of this study is to review international experiences, accumulated to date, regarding what works and not in development support to legislative assemblies in partner countries, and how and why it works. A secondary purpose is to

⁷³ In the ToR we will use the concepts 'legislatures', 'legislative assemblies', and 'parliaments' inter-changeably, as referring to institutions with elected representatives, having the mandate to initiate, review, pass and adopt laws, oversee the executive, and represent the people and parties that have elected them.

⁷⁴ This came out strongly in the 2006 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration.

⁷⁵ Selbervik, H og Wang, V (2006): "In Pursuit of Poverty Reduction: What have Parliaments got to do with it?", CMI, R 2006:13

⁷⁶ ODI Briefing Paper, April 2007

provide a systematic overview of Norwegian assistance in this field since mid-1990s, as there is no such overview as of today.

The primary target groups for this evaluation are relevant staff in Norad, the Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, involved Norwegian embassies, and non-governmental organisations.

2.1 Objectives

1. Summarise achievements (at output and outcome level), intended and unintended, in the field of support to legislatures.
2. Summarise main findings, and external and internal factors that might have affected the implementation and results of the legislative strengthening programmes.
3. Provide an overview of the nature and scope of Norwegian support to legislatures to date.
4. Provide recommendations to the Norwegian development aid administration regarding future programmes, policies, and possible strategies in the field of support to legislative assemblies.

3 The Evaluation Object

Many legislatures in low income countries are characterised as being weak at best and dysfunctional at worst. In some African countries, legislative assemblies are characterised by patron-client relations and personal power struggles that has little to do with the formal political agendas on which the members of parliament or the political parties were elected into the assemblies. Moreover, many legislatures are dominated by the executive branch, and consequently do not duly exercise the oversight functions they are entrusted. Corruption, ineffectiveness and high wages often weakens the legitimacy of assemblies, and also adds to the challenge of providing support to these institutions.

There is a need for knowledge about what issues can be addressed in order to help improve the legislative's representative and oversight role of parliaments in partner countries. There is a need for more knowledge about which approaches yield which outcomes. Strengthening the capacity of parliaments is believed to contribute to one of the defining principles of constitutional democracy: the "checks and balances". But does the support yield the desired results? Do we have a realistic picture about what we can achieve in the various contexts that we are involved in?

3.1 International support to Legislative Assemblies

There are several large donors and actors in the field of support to legislative assemblies. The major actors are assumed to be UNDP, Dfid, Sida, USAID, the World Bank Institute and various parliamentary networks that provide support to legislative assemblies in developing countries.⁷⁷ Some, but not all, are listed below:

⁷⁷ Westminster foundation for Democracy, Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, Parliamentary Centre (Canadian), AWEPA (European), National Democratic Institute (USA), Institute of International Relations (Netherlands), and the Inter-Parliamentary Union. In addition, political party foundations, INGOs (IDEA), and various NGOs are specialised in this field.

- UNDP is one of the most important actors with programmes for support to parliaments in more than 60 countries. Parliamentary development is one of UNDP's seven practice areas/knowledge networks in the field of democratic governance.⁷⁸
- National Democratic Institute (NDI) is another organisation that has provided support to national and regional-level legislatures in more than 60 countries. NDI helps legislatures, according to its own words, "...to better represent citizens and groups in society, more effectively carry out their law and budget-making roles, and better oversee government finances and programs."⁷⁹
- The Westminster Foundation receives £ 4.1 millions from the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office to work with strengthening institutions of democracy, including parliaments. It was founded in 1992.
- The Canadian Parliamentary Centre was founded in 1968, devoted to "... improving the effectiveness of representative assemblies around the world."⁸⁰
- The Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA) is an international non-governmental organisation that supports parliaments in Africa. It has some 1500 current and former parliamentarians as members from the European Parliament, almost all European Member States and Norway and Switzerland. It receives funding from a variety of donors, including from UNDP.

The amount of money that goes through the various organisations to this type of work, and to what degree the work is coordinated globally or at the country level, is not known and will be further explored in this study.

3.2 Norwegian support to Legislative Assemblies

In terms of the Norwegian policy context, support to legislative assemblies is seen as a means to strengthen governance functions: "Norway shall contribute to strengthening mechanisms that can function as guardians/watchdogs, and that can hold authorities and governments accountable. This entails support to the development of functioning justice systems, to parliaments and political parties, to independent media and an active civil society."⁸¹

Systems for entering data about Norwegian support to legislatures leave room for gaps, as there is not a specific OECD DAC or chapter post category for this support and support to legislatures often constitute one of several components of larger programmes or multi-donor basket funds, but the support is spread over several countries over a long period of years.

Some of the agreements support by Norway has only been concerned with short term physical rehabilitation, or a one-off support. Other agreements are part of more comprehensive long term support programmes aiming to enhance the representative, oversight and legislative capacity of parliaments. Support to legislatures is provided in fragile state contexts, as well as in non-fragile states.

78 For more, see <http://www.undp.org/governance/sl-parliaments.htm>

79 http://www.ndi.org/democratic_governance?page=0%2C1#LegislativeStrengthening

80 http://www.parlcent.ca/aboutus_e.php

81 Norad Evaluation Department's translation. The Proposition No 1 to the Storting (2007-2008) page 33.

Norwegian support to legislative assemblies is often carried out in cooperation with one or more donors, multilateral organisations (such as UNDP) or parliamentary networks or organisations.

There are no aggregate figures for this type of support from Norway. For comparison, a review of Swedish support to parliaments, in 2005,⁸² revealed that a total of 165 million Swedish kroner was allocated to parliamentary support programmes, over a period of 8 years; 1998 – 2005 (Out of these 31 % was allocated to UN or UNDP – implemented programmes, and 30 % was allocated through International parliamentary networks).

4 Scope

The study shall comprise the following four components:

1. The consultant shall identify the most relevant evaluations, studies, research and reports available internationally regarding experiences from support provided to parliaments since mid-1990s to date by various actors and donors.⁸³ The review of these shall shed light on what works and not, what are the most common approaches and strategies used; what are the main challenges; what are the achievements made or not made and why; what is the level of coherence and coordination with other interventions in the field of governance; what are the most common failures in terms of approaches chosen and what are the best practices to be learnt from? Distinctions shall be made between support that takes place in “non-fragile states” (or so-called development contexts) or in fragile states and countries affected by conflict.
2. The consultant shall synthesize the findings, reflections, recommendations and lessons learned based on the (international) experiences reviewed. Based on this the consultants’ shall present his/her own conclusions and recommendations for future programming.
3. In addition, the consultant shall provide a description of the most important international actors (multilateral organisations as well as bilateral donors, INGOs, parliamentary networks, etc.) that work with technical assistance to parliaments, their track records / how they work, as well as comparative advantages that they might have. This, in order for the Norwegian programme officers to have an idea of which potential cooperation partners and channels are available in this field, and how they operate, for future strategy and programming needs.
4. The consultant shall identify the nature and scope of the Norwegian support provided to elected assemblies since the mid-1990s to date, including, as much as possible, the total amount of funds allocated. All types of support to legislative assemblies shall be included, but distinctions shall be made between small, discrete one-year projects, physical infrastructure projects, and more comprehensive multi-year programmes; types of channels; and whether support takes place in “normal” development countries or countries affected by conflict (pre-, during, post). Inter-linkages, or lack thereof to other types of governance/ civil society programmes shall be highlighted.

82 “Approaches to Parliamentary Strengthening. A review of Sida’s Support to Parliaments”, Sida Evaluation 05/27, Department for Democracy and Social Development.

83 OECD DAC’s network on governance: GOVNET could be one of several resources in this regard.

4.1 Limitations

The study shall not cover support to political parties or elections. The study shall be carried out as a desk study with interviews with task managers, experts and policy-makers to supplement written documents. No field visits shall be undertaken.

5 Methods and Data-collection

Collection of data will be based primarily on document reviews, but shall not exclude interviews. Interviews can be helpful in gathering information throughout all phases of the study; both in the selection of international studies and evaluations to be reviewed, and in the identification of organisations that work in this field, such as the UNDP, other donors, INGOs and various parliamentary networks. Interviews can also be carried out with recipient parliaments if relevant to deepen the knowledge of what works and not in terms of parliamentary support.

Selection of international actors can also be based on articles, and notes from the recent Wilton Park conference on: *Enhancing the effectiveness of parliaments: challenges and opportunities* (27-30 October 2008) as well as from other documentary sources and interviews with resource persons and experts in relevant organisations.

Collection of data for the overview of Norwegian support to legislative assemblies shall be conducted by the consultant through a search in the MFA/Norad Archives, data bases and interviews of resource persons and key stakeholders.

6 The Report

6.1 Main Evaluation Questions answered by Conclusions

The report should answer the main questions and information needs detailed in the scope of the study. Where this is not possible, reasons and explanations shall be provided.

6.2 Clarity of Analysis

The analysis shall be structured with a logical flow. Data and information shall be presented, analysed and interpreted systematically. Findings and conclusions shall be clearly identified and flow logically from the analysis of the data and information. Underlying assumptions shall be made explicit and taken into account.

6.3 Distinction between Conclusions, Recommendations and Lessons Learned

The report must distinguish clearly between findings, conclusions and recommendations. The report shall present conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned separately and with a clear logical distinction between them. Conclusions shall be substantiated by findings and analysis. Recommendations and lessons learned shall follow logically from the conclusions.⁸⁴

6.4 Methods

Strengths and weaknesses of the studies and their findings and conclusions shall be described in a transparent manner.

⁸⁴ Section 6 is based on DAC Evaluation Quality Standards, paragraph 10 on "Completeness".

6.5 Presentation

Where possible and relevant, visual figures, charts and tables and photos to communicate findings shall be used.

7 Team Qualifications

The team shall comprise members with the following key qualifications:

- Experience with and knowledge of support to democratic governance
- Experience with and knowledge of support to legislative assemblies. Practical experience and theoretical knowledge is desirable.
- Experience in carrying out similar evaluations, reviews and/or research, using social science theories and methods.
- Relevant higher degrees (MPhil/ PhD or equivalent).
- Relevant academic backgrounds (political science/sociology, social anthropology, history).
- Knowledge of evaluation standards and practice.
- Familiarity with international and Norwegian development cooperation policies and instruments.
- Fluency in English, written and spoken
- Fluency in Norwegian, written and spoken

Quality assurance shall be provided by the company delivering the consultancy services. This shall be done by a person that is external to the evaluation team.

8 Time Schedule

Activity	Date
Announcement of bid	13 March
Deadline for submitting proposals	22 April
Notice of award	29 April
Contract signature	11 May
Inception report	15 June
Draft report	15 September
Final Report	15 October
Seminar	10 November

Budget: 16 consultant weeks shall be allocated to this synthesis study.

The report produced shall be no more than 18 000 words (ca 35 pages), excluding appendixes.

List of possible synthesis study questions for consideration:

The list below should be viewed as guidance to the team, not as mandatory questions.

- 1 Based on the review of existing evaluations, studies, reports and research: what are the main achievements of support to legislative assemblies in terms of outputs and outcomes (Effectiveness)? Was the support relevant? Was it based on the right understanding of the context in which it was operating? Which activities did it comprise? And did these lead to sustainable outcomes?
- 2 To what degree have various factors affected negatively or positively the implementation and results of programmes to support legislative assemblies, and where these factored into the programmes? A suggested, but not exclusive list of issues for consideration is as follows:
 - High turnover of project staff/parliament staff
 - Quality of risk-assessments made
 - Quality of political analysis made
 - Funding levels
 - Programme formulation process (stakeholder involvement)
 - Programme theories/design/implementation models based on correct or false assumptions
 - Coordination or lack thereof with other key partners
 - Coherence with other initiatives or lack thereof
 - Political events /political environment (majority/minority parliament)
 - Institutional environment
 - Political system (authoritative, presidential, parliamentarian)
 - Constitutional set up
 - Political practice and culture (MPs “crossing the floor”, the difficult role of being in opposition)
 - Lack of independence versus other branches of government
 - Corruption
 - Elections
 - Political parties
 - Armed conflict or threats of it
 - Emergencies
 - Other
- 3a Which are the most important of the international actors (multilateral organisations as well as bilateral donors, INGOs, parliamentary networks, etc.) that works with technical assistance to parliaments?
- 3b What are their respective areas of work, or do they all work in the same areas? Do they tend to operate in different geographic areas? Do they tend to coordi-

nate their initiatives with other actors and donors? How do they learn? What are their track records?

- 3c Are there some organisations that are more specialised in working with towards non-fragile state development countries or towards fragile states, such as countries affected by conflict (pre-, during, post)? Are there other trends/distinctions/ comparative advantages that distinguish some organizations from others?
- 4a What is the scope, spectre and nature of Norwegian support to legislative assemblies since the mid-nineties, in terms of funding, time period, cooperation, channel and main components (average size, etc.)?
- 4b What was the basis for the decisions to provide this type of support? Was it part of a comprehensive strategy to strengthen democracy or was it a balancing item (salderingspost)? Was it motivated by political events? Is there a geographic focus? Do we base our support on certain political requirements being in place- such as minimum requirements concerning democracy and corruption levels? How were channels chosen? How were partners chosen?
- 4c Is there a bias in the Norwegian allocation of resources towards non-fragile state development countries or towards fragile states, such as countries affected by conflict (pre-, during, post)?
- 5 Provide recommendations and inputs to decision makers and advisers in the Norwegian aid administration that can guide future support to legislative assemblies, considering the following factors:
 - Which internal and external factors should be given special attention when considering support?
 - Which programming approaches and processes are most likely to yield lasting results?
 - How to best manage for results? Are there any special requirements for M&E, or good practices to adopt in this regard?
 - Which implementation models seem to be most effective?
 - Which implementing partners or channels (bilateral, NGO, INGO or multilateral) have had most success or most failure?
 - Which timing, scope and components should be considered when considering future support in this area?
 - Under what circumstances should support to parliaments not be given or discontinued? If possible, provide concrete examples.

EVALUATION REPORTS

- 5.97 Aid to Basic Education in Africa – Opportunities and Constraints
- 6.97 Norwegian Church Aid's Humanitarian and Peace-Making Work in Mali
- 7.97 Aid as a Tool for Promotion of Human Rights and Democracy: What can Norway do?
- 8.97 Evaluation of the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala
- 9.97 Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Worldview International Foundation
- 10.97 Review of Norwegian Assistance to IPS
- 11.97 Evaluation of Norwegian Humanitarian Assistance to the Sudan
- 12.97 Cooperation for Health Development WHO's Support to Programmes at Country Level
- 1.98 "Twinning for Development". Institutional Cooperation between Public Institutions in Norway and the South
- 2.98 Institutional Cooperation between Sokoine and Norwegian Agricultural Universities
- 3.98 Development through Institutions? Institutional Development Promoted by Norwegian Private Companies and Consulting Firms
- 4.98 Development through Institutions? Institutional Development Promoted by Norwegian Non-Governmental Organisations
- 5.98 Development through Institutions? Institutional Development in Norwegian Bilateral Assistance. Synthesis Report
- 6.98 Managing Good Fortune – Macroeconomic Management and the Role of Aid in Botswana
- 7.98 The World Bank and Poverty in Africa
- 8.98 Evaluation of the Norwegian Program for Indigenous Peoples
- 9.98 Evaluering av Informasjons støtten til RORGene
- 10.98 Strategy for Assistance to Children in Norwegian Development Cooperation
- 11.98 Norwegian Assistance to Countries in Conflict
- 12.98 Evaluation of the Development Cooperation between Norway and Nicaragua
- 13.98 UNICEF-komiteen i Norge
- 14.98 Relief Work in Complex Emergencies
- 1.99 WID/Gender Units and the Experience of Gender Mainstreaming in Multilateral Organisations
- 2.99 International Planned Parenthood Federation – Policy and Effectiveness at Country and Regional Levels
- 3.99 Evaluation of Norwegian Support to Psycho-Social Projects in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Caucasus
- 4.99 Evaluation of the Tanzania-Norway Development Cooperation 1994–1997
- 5.99 Building African Consulting Capacity
- 6.99 Aid and Conditionality
- 7.99 Policies and Strategies for Poverty Reduction in Norwegian Development Aid
- 8.99 Aid Coordination and Aid Effectiveness
- 9.99 Evaluation of the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF)
- 10.99 Evaluation of AWEPA, The Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa, and AEI, The African European Institute
- 1.00 Review of Norwegian Health-related Development Cooperation 1988–1997
- 2.00 Norwegian Support to the Education Sector. Overview of Policies and Trends 1988–1998
- 3.00 The Project "Training for Peace in Southern Africa"
- 4.00 En kartlegging av erfaringer med norsk bistand gjennom frivillige organisasjoner 1987–1999
- 5.00 Evaluation of the NUFU programme
- 6.00 Making Government Smaller and More Efficient. The Botswana Case
- 7.00 Evaluation of the Norwegian Plan of Action for Nuclear Safety Priorities, Organisation, Implementation
- 8.00 Evaluation of the Norwegian Mixed Credits Programme
- 9.00 "Norwegians? Who needs Norwegians?" Explaining the Oslo Back Channel: Norway's Political Past in the Middle East
- 10.00 Taken for Granted? An Evaluation of Norway's Special Grant for the Environment
- 1.01 Evaluation of the Norwegian Human Rights Fund
- 2.01 Economic Impacts on the Least Developed Countries of the Elimination of Import Tariffs on their Products
- 3.01 Evaluation of the Public Support to the Norwegian NGOs Working in Nicaragua 1994–1999
- 3A.01 Evaluación del Apoyo Público a las ONGs Noruegas que Trabajan en Nicaragua 1994–1999
- 4.01 The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Cooperation on Poverty Reduction
- 5.01 Evaluation of Development Co-operation between Bangladesh and Norway, 1995–2000
- 6.01 Can democratisation prevent conflicts? Lessons from sub-Saharan Africa
- 7.01 Reconciliation Among Young People in the Balkans An Evaluation of the Post Pessimist Network
- 1.02 Evaluation of the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM)
- 2.02 Evaluation of the International Humanitarian Assistance of the Norwegian Red Cross
- 3.02 Evaluation of ACOPAMA ILO program for "Cooperative and Organizational Support to Grassroots Initiatives" in Western Africa 1978 – 1999
- 3A.02 Évaluation du programme ACOPAMA un programme du BIT sur l'« Appui associatif et coopératif aux initiatives de Développement à la Base » en Afrique de l'Ouest de 1978 à 1999
- 4.02 Legal Aid Against the Odds Evaluation of the Civil Rights Project (CRP) of the Norwegian Refugee Council in former Yugoslavia
- 1.03 Evaluation of the Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries (Norfund)
- 2.03 Evaluation of the Norwegian Education Trust Fund for Africa in the World Bank
- 3.03 Evaluering av Bistandstorgets Evalueringsnettverk
- 1.04 Towards Strategic Framework for Peace-building: Getting Their Act Together. Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study of the Peace-building.
- 2.04 Norwegian Peace-building policies: Lessons Learnt and Challenges Ahead
- 3.04 Evaluation of CESAR's activities in the Middle East Funded by Norway
- 4.04 Evaluering av ordningen med støtte gjennom paraplyorganisasjoner. Eksemplifisert ved støtte til Norsk Misjons Bistandsnemda og Atlas-alliansen
- 5.04 Study of the impact of the work of FORUT in Sri Lanka: Building Civil Society
- 6.04 Study of the impact of the work of Save the Children Norway in Ethiopia: Building Civil Society
- 1.05 – Study: Study of the impact of the work of FORUT in Sri Lanka and Save the Children Norway in Ethiopia: Building Civil Society
- 1.05 – Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norad Fellowship Programme
- 2.05 – Evaluation: Women Can Do It – an evaluation of the WCDI programme in the Western Balkans
- 3.05 Gender and Development – a review of evaluation report 1997–2004
- 4.05 Evaluation of the Framework Agreement between the Government of Norway and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
- 5.05 Evaluation of the "Strategy for Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation (1997–2005)"
- 1.06 Inter-Ministerial Cooperation. An Effective Model for Capacity Development?
- 2.06 Evaluation of Fredskorpset
- 1.06 – Synthesis Report: Lessons from Evaluations of Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation
- 1.07 Evaluation of the Norwegian Petroleum-Related Assistance
- 1.07 – Synteserapport: Humanitær innsats ved naturkatastrofer: En syntese av evalueringsfunn
- 1.07 – Study: The Norwegian International Effort against Female Genital Mutilation
- 2.07 Evaluation of Norwegian Power-related Assistance
- 2.07 – Study Development Cooperation through Norwegian NGOs in South America
- 3.07 Evaluation of the Effects of the using M-621 Cargo Trucks in Humanitarian Transport Operations
- 4.07 Evaluation of Norwegian Development Support to Zambia (1991 - 2005)
- 5.07 Evaluation of the Development Cooperation to Norwegian NGOs in Guatemala
- 1.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS)
- 1.08 Study: The challenge of Assessing Aid Impact: A review of Norwegian Evaluation Practice
- 1.08 Synthesis Study: On Best Practice and Innovative Approaches to Capacity Development in Low Income African Countries
- 2.08 Evaluation: Joint Evaluation of the Trust Fund for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development (TFESSD)
- 2.08 Synthesis Study: Cash Transfers Contributing to Social Protection: A Synthesis of Evaluation Findings
- 2.08 Study: Anti-Corruption Approaches. A Literature Review
- 3.08 Evaluation: Mid-term Evaluation of the EEA Grants
- 4.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian HIV/AIDS Responses
- 5.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Research and Development Activities in Conflict Prevention and Peace-building
- 6.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation in the Fisheries Sector
- 1.09 Evaluation: Joint Evaluation of Nepal's Education for All 2004-2009 Sector Programme
- 1.09 Study Report: Global Aid Architecture and the Health Millennium Development Goals
- 2.09 Evaluation: Mid-Term Evaluation of the Joint Donor Team in Juba, Sudan
- 2.09 Study Report: A synthesis of Evaluations of Environment Assistance by Multilateral Organisations
- 3.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation through Norwegian Non-Governmental Organisations in Northern Uganda (2003-2007)
- 3.09 Study Report: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance Sri Lanka Case Study
- 4.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Support to the Protection of Cultural Heritage
- 4.09 Study Report: Norwegian Environmental Action Plan
- 5.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Support to Peacebuilding in Haiti 1998–2008
- 6.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Humanitarian Mine Action Activities of Norwegian People's Aid
- 7.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Programme for Development, Research and Education (NUFU) and of Norad's Programme for Master Studies (NOMA)
- 1.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support 2002–2009

Norad

Norwegian Agency for
Development Cooperation

Postal address

P.O. Box 8034 Dep. NO-0030 OSLO

Visiting address

Ruseløkkveien 26, Oslo, Norway

Tel: +47 22 24 20 30

Fax: +47 22 24 20 31

No. of Copies: 250

postmottak@norad.no

www.norad.no

