A ripple in development?

Long term perspectives on the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami 2004

A joint follow-up evaluation of the links between relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD)

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The report has been written by:
Emery Brusset (team leader)
Mihir Bhatt (deputy team leader)
Karen Bjornestad
John Cosgrave
Anne Davies
Yashwant Deshmukh
Joohi Haleem
Silvia Hidalgo
Yulia Immajati
Ramani Jayasundere
Annina Mattsson
Naushan Muhaimin
Riccardo Polastro
Treena Wu

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Yulia Immajati
Ramani Jayasundere
Annina Mattsson
Naushan Muhaimin
Riccardo Polastro
Treena Wu

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Table of contents

Abbreviations and acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AFD	Agence Française de Développement
AIDMI	All India Disaster Mitigation Institute
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
BAPPENAS	Indonesian Ministry of Planning
BPK	Badan Pengawas Keuangan – Supreme Audit Board Indonesia
BRI	Bank Rakyat Indonesia
BRR	Aceh-Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency
CBO	Community Based Organisation
Dara	Development Assistance Research Associates
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IDRC	International Development Research Council (Canada)
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
ISDR	International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
JICA	Japanese International Cooperation Agency
LRRD	Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MDF	Multi Donor Fund
MIDP	Management of IDPs Department

NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
TEC	Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Programme

Executive summary

Introduction

Have the links between relief assistance, rehabilitation, and development been less significant than other issues which have affected the lives of the populations, in the recovery process after the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004? The present evaluation indicates that unless stronger synergies are made between the different interventions, they could be considered to create only a ripple in longer term structural dynamics in the region.

This evaluation was commissioned by a group of governments from the region, aid donors and other organisations to review the relevance and the effectiveness of interactions between the interventions to help the populations in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the Maldives to recover from the 2004 tsunami.

The evaluation was carried out at the end of 2008 and early 2009 by a team of independent consultants, covering separately five sets of issues: the roles of the states and civil society, livelihoods and poverty, social relations, disaster risk mitigation, and capacity building. It was composed of a review of some 600 documents and annotated bibliography, a qualitative field research process, and a quantitative survey of the affected populations. It covered the work of NGOs, UN agencies, donor and national governments, but also civil society and community initiatives.

The 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and the resulting tsunami prompted exceptional expressions of human solidarity in the coastal areas of these three countries, in which an estimated US$13 billion was donated (a good part of which given directly by individuals), predominantly in 2005–06. Over 225,000 lives had been lost in the space of a few hours. This single event interacted with extremely different conditions on the ground and provides important lessons for the future.

State and civil society

The interventions took place in a context marked in all three countries by a series of non-linear events: new government policies, shifts in the dynamics of conflict, but also improvements in macro-economic conditions. Linkages between relief and rehabilitation allowed the national authorities to reinstate their lead in the recovery process: more than 40% of respondents to our survey have pointed to either national government (in Sri Lanka) or local government (in Aceh and Nias) as the actor of reference to meet their needs, whereas in the early phase they tended to turn to international organisations.

Linkages have been most successful when the state was able to set clear policies and establish a coordinating presence in the disaster affected region (BRR in Indonesia), and where aid agencies were able to support the creation of a climate of trust (which they did more as a result of chance than by design). This was not the case where development planning has tended to consider the disaster affected areas to be recovery issues which require less structural involvement, with the consequence that even pooled funding mechanisms have retained a project focus.

Livelihoods, poverty and economic recovery

Relief assistance focused primarily on replacement of lost assets for the population, but apart from Indonesia, which has a more favourable environment, was not able to give these populations a foothold in longer term economic viability. This is because of the absence of a proper alignment to markets and to needed investments, with agencies tending to concentrate on more visible locations and programmes. Relief and rehabilitation agencies were not able to promote sustainable local initiatives, mainly due to a lack of expertise and the creation of long range programmes that could encompass many projects.

Assistance has tended to concentrate in the more accessible areas, and was not able to address income disparities in the regions. It became over the four year period more able to target the most vulnerable groups within communities, and reduce the amount of disputes that arose in the early stages of aid distribution.

Social fabric and community development

Four years after the disaster, the social fabric has been reconstituted, where conflict has not forced divisions and displacement within the population. The most significant successes here are attributable to multi-sector integrated approaches, where gender empowerment, infrastructure and community mobilisation have been combined with good information to the population, psycho-social support and economic opportunities. These approaches are not any more expensive than those that specialise by sector, but by virtue of being more comprehensive in their approach, are better linked to area community dynamics.

The rehabilitation interventions were able to move from rapid deployment in 2005 to taking more account of local government institutions, carrying out better public consultations and communication, and achieving more continuous field presence. Issues of land tenure remain a serious challenge, as well as cleavages that separate the tsunami affected groups that receive more assistance than others in some parts (particularly in the Maldives).

Reduction of risks from hazards

Risk reduction has significantly progressed over the four year period, through legislative and institutional changes. More particularly, perceptions in the public have changed since the tsunami, and risk is now decreasingly seen in development as an element of humanitarian aid, and increasingly as a cross-cutting issue. Risk reduction is now more clearly linked to livelihoods and social cohesion, as well as institutions.

Disaster preparedness still needs to be taken to the 'last mile' of disaster risk reduction, in other words to the general population in affected areas. It also needs to be broadened beyond a focus on a single hazard, be it earthquakes, floods or tidal waves (although interestingly in Indonesia there is now greater sensitivity to the types of disasters that occur in other parts). Roles still need to be clarified between different national bodies, particularly at the local level, for the risk reduction systems to be effective.

Capacity building

While capacity building is the single most important aspect of efficient linkages, it has been largely ignored. This is not so much for lack of policy statements, but rather because of concepts and guidelines of what capacity could be about. At core, there is an inability to think of resources (such as personnel) that could be shared across relief, rehabilitation and development, primarily because actors have a restricted sense of their priorities in this area, and tend to see capacity in external terms. There are significant examples of short planning timeframes that do not favour capacity building, of a service delivery approach to local partners, of poor cooperation with national academic resources.

Disasters are all too often conceived in terms of assets lost and destroyed. On the other hand the need for resilience, and the opportunity to engage in new forms of capacity building (for example 'building back safer') could become a priority of assistance to affected populations, but this has not been the case.

Overall assessment

Our observations give credit to the efforts made, which have culminated, in four years, in a process of historic proportions, due largely to the unprecedented damage and amount of support. Even if reconstruc-

tion is not complete, the achievements should not be underestimated. Budgets from all types of programming and sources (public and private) have been used in the affected areas, which have supported programmes with practically all the modalities available today in international cooperation.

Yet the results only partially met expectations. This evaluation finds that the disaster, and the hazards that lie in the future, are still treated as an exceptional category of issues by governments and agencies, rather than a mainstream concern that should trigger specific adjustments. While linkages have been beneficial mostly as regards the social fabric of communities, and in disaster risk reduction, they have not sufficiently contributed to the impact on poverty reduction, and above all local capacity building.

The main reason for the limited achievements in terms of linkages is to be found in the low priority given to long term considerations, and to lateral information. Unifying frames of reference, such as early recovery, disaster risk reduction, or poverty reduction, are still conceived and implemented separately. As a result the actors (donors, states, NGOs and UN agencies, civil society) tend to concentrate on the achievement of their own institutional programme objectives achieved through projects, which are relatively short term for the most part. They are also little inclined to analyse the cultural and governance environment in a systematic way, and, more damagingly, have few developed strategies for local capacity building.

Conclusion

The main question about relevant and effective linkages is hence not so much about "relief", versus "rehabilitation" or "development", but rather one of proper choice of partners, and scope of work. By designing long range assessments and clear planning priorities, national governments can better cooperate with international organisations, and build local capacity. Such a system-wide reappraisal of the reasons for good or weak linkages as we have carried out should then lead to a more complete assessment and planning process. This could turn the ripple of the response into a wave more equal to that of the tsunami.

Recommendations

The recommendations presented below are based on the previous conclusions, presented here organised by specific actors. The scope of the recommendations relate to post-disaster efforts in the context of fragile environments.

For affected country and host governments

Strengthen local level state effectiveness

1. *National governments* should, early in the disaster response, formulate a clear division of roles between central and local government.
2. *Governments* should document the efforts and successes of local initiatives and solutions to recovery problems during the period from the emergency response to the medium term (up to five years).
3. *Governments* should compile and share information about local development NGOs.

More long range analysis

4. *Governments* should draw lessons from the good practices of the BRR experience, in terms of its high level authority, local presence, coordination.
5. *National governments* should review the lessons drawn by others from the management of the international response to natural disasters in Asia.

Better targeted livelihoods recovery

6. *Local administration* programming should be holistic and related to household level analysis.
7. *Governments of the region* should consider identifying well aligned and well resourced response capacities as a measure of disaster preparedness.

A less restrictive understanding of risk reduction

8. Disaster risk assessments must be made a precondition for all development investment decisions in high risk areas.
9. *Governments* should promote disaster risk reduction from the central government down to the village level, and ensure policies are clearly formulated and consistently applied.

Better notions of capacity development

10. *Governments of the region* should make use of the few relevant tools available for capacity development in disasters, such as universities.
11. *Government* systems and standards for communicating to communities in disaster-prone areas should be developed.

For donor governments

Strengthen local level state effectiveness

1. *Donor agencies* should be actively pursuing a form of 'development diplomacy', including the deployment of technical assistance in the field, identification of risks and bottlenecks in delivery, supplementing pooled funding with targeted bilateral initiatives where required.

More long range analysis

2. *Donors* should consider that the timeframes for relief in a phase of natural disaster reconstruction should be multi-year.
3. *Donors and governments* should continue to review procedures for multi-donor trust funds in recovery.
4. *Donors* should require that project proposals and the functioning of multi-donor funding mechanisms include conflict sensitivity analysis.

Better targeted livelihoods recovery

5. *Donors* should direct funding to basic needs and reduce the risk of further vulnerability (preventive approaches).
6. *Donors* should create stronger policy dialogue and coordination mechanisms at the national level around the issue of support to isolated populations.

More integrated area approaches

7. *Donors* should consider that joint evaluations have been an effective mechanism to increase local and regional participation in responses.

Less restrictive risk reduction

8. *Donors* should monitor the local level implementation of risk reduction strategies, and fund targeted projects where this is weak.
9. *Donors* should conduct disaster risk assessments prior to providing development grants or loans for projects in high risk areas.

Better notions of capacity building

10. *Donors* should consider funding personnel support programmes designed to improve the skills of specialists, assist in placement, and conversion.
11. *Donors* should be sensitive to the time needed to accomplish effective and sustainable recovery programmes.

For the United Nations, Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and NGOs

Better targeted livelihoods recovery

1. Market analyses should form part of *UN and NGO* funding flows aiming to restore livelihoods.
2. *NGO* micro-credit schemes and the more sophisticated versions of micro-finance should only follow after the relief phase.

More long range analysis

3. *Operational agencies* should identify capacity in the country, and the impact of their actions on these resources.
4. *NGOs* should encourage local presence by their personnel, and monitor public perceptions and expectations.
5. Conflict sensitivity analysis should be part of all *international organisation and NGO* programming.

Strengthen local level state effectiveness

6. *NGOs* should continue to refine participatory approaches, including public consultation and grievance mechanisms.
7. *NGOs and UN agencies* should be cooperating with government to re-establish or clarify the legal rights of affected populations to land.

More integrated area approaches

8. *NGOs and UN agencies* should target need, articulated in terms of markets future investments.
9. *UN agencies* should examine how the early recovery sector leads or cluster approaches should enable a rapid transition to an area based approach.

Less restrictive risk reduction

10. UN agencies, the Red Cross Movement, and NGOs should implement their DRR projects with a multi-hazard focus.
11. All agencies, in particular the Red Cross Movement, and NGOs, should attempt to design DRR projects that bring short-term as well as long-term benefits to make participation in DRR more attractive for affected communities.

Better notions of capacity building

12. *International agencies,* which are affected by a high turnover of staff, should strengthen human resource mechanisms.
13. *NGOs and UN agencies, as well as donors* should develop operationally verifiable indicators and concepts that can guide agency programming.

14. *NGOs and UN agencies* should seek to create more linkages to academic institutions

For civil society

Less restrictive risk reduction

1. *Civil society organisations* working in national disaster risk reduction initiatives should promote a multi-hazard approach.
2. *Civil society organisations* should monitor investments to verify that disaster risks have been considered in the investment decision.

More long range analysis

3. *Academic institutions* should support a system-wide, well organised and sustained effort to develop a discipline of disaster studies.

Better notions of capacity building

4. Local civil society should develop 'anti-poaching standards' for local staff that minimise the negative impact on local human resources.
5. Some recent studies have suggested the need for a high level panel to oversee the *international humanitarian system's* progress for disaster response.

Foreword by the chairman of the joint steering committee

This report is a follow-up evaluation of linkages between immediate relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) related to the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004.

The first LRRD evaluation was one of five studies carried out by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), which was formed by around 45 bilateral donors, multilateral organisations and international NGOs early in 2005. Four of the TEC studies concentrated largely on process issues – coordination, needs assessment, capacity-building and funding – while a fifth, the LRRD part, looked at outcome issues as well: what were the consequences of successful and unsuccessful linkages between various components of the recovery?

The LRRD2 evaluation report covers experiences from the four years after the disaster in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. A number of organisations and government agencies have supported this evaluation in various ways, and we hope that it provides conclusions and lessons learned that are useful for mitigating the consequences of possible future disasters.

One major conclusion of the evaluation is that the Indian Ocean tsunami – albeit a disaster of enormous proportions – was only a temporary disturbance in development compared to conditions defined by previously existing, long-term situations. Good linkages have occurred, but the lack of planning and overall analyses mean that the return of development was weaker than it could have been.

In parallel to this main evaluation report we publish an comprehensive annotated bibliography and document review comprising over 7,000 publications on tsunami response and LRRD. Also five short versions of the main report is published in English, Bahasa Indonesia, Acehnese, Sinhalese and Tamil.

We would like to warmly thank all those who have been involved with and contributed to the evaluation.

Stefan Dahlgren
Chair, LRRD2 Joint Steering Committee
Evaluation Department, Sida, Sweden

May 2009

The following agencies and organisations (normally the evaluation departments at each organisation) were active members of the Joint Steering Committee: Sida; Norad; Danida; the Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs; CIDA; BAPPENAS, Indonesia; BRR, Indonesia; Ministry for Plan Implementation, Sri Lanka; Ministry for National Building, Sri Lanka; ISDR, Bangkok; IFRC, Bangkok; CARE International; OCHA; UNICEF.

1 Introduction

1.1 Reason for the evaluation

The 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and the resulting tsunami prompted exceptional expressions of human solidarity, and provoked an unprecedented level of international involvement in the re-building and recovery of affected coastal areas of many countries. Over 225,000 lives had been lost in the space of a few hours. This single event had a sudden and dramatic impact on the vastly different ground realities in all the affected countries in the region.

It is imperative to recognise the remarkable demonstration of solidarity shown in the aftermath of the tsunami. Although the process is far from complete, when we consider the enormous amount of damage done in a short space of time, the re-building of communities in the space of four years (a process that normally takes decades) has nevertheless been of historic proportions, due largely to the unprecedented level of support provided by private individuals, the international humanitarian community, the private sector and many others.

The aim of all the actors who have been involved with the tsunami aid effort has been to compensate the survivors, mitigate future risks, and to pursue reconstruction over and above what existed before (a position agreed at the donor conference in early 2005). According to the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, an estimated US$ 13 billion were donated from private and government sources in the space of a few months for the people and areas affected by the tsunami. At the time of the evaluation many reconstruction programmes were still ongoing. In Indonesia alone, for example, according to BRR, US$ 6.7 billion of the roughly US$ 7.2 billion in pledges made by donors has been spent[1].

Four years on, we appraise the extent to which response efforts have managed to successfully bridge the transition from relief to reha-

[1] IRIN, 29 December 2008

bilitation and development (Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development or LRRD). We shed light on this issue by asking how have the populations been impacted by the recovery efforts? And how much of that can be traced back to the manner in which the various initiatives came together in a well coordinated and cohesive manner?

The strength of the LRRD concept lies in the breadth and range of what it can cover: all those agencies and organisations which have had an influence on the lives of the affected populations are considered to be part of this evaluation. At the same time it is abstract, as the aim is not to evaluate any single action or initiative (for example a dedicated trust fund or an NGO project) but to evaluate the combined impact of the different interventions which formed the overall recovery effort. The notion of LRRD in fact forms an intrinsic part of current efforts within the international humanitarian community to improve the quality of risk reduction, emergency assistance, and development cooperation.

From October 2005 to May 2006, four independent teams worked within the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) to evaluate the LRRD dimensions of the international response to the tsunami in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. The reports were made public and contributed to the overall TEC synthesis findings, which have been widely published.

Sida (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency), jointly with resources from the Governments of Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark, and with the participation of a broader group of academics and organisations that make up the Joint Steering Committee, commissioned Channel Research and three partners: Dara, AIDMI, and TeamC Voter, to carry out this follow-up evaluation of the previous Tsunami Evaluation on the Linkages between Relief, Rehabilitation and Development activities. As a period of four years has elapsed, the link to development activities, and the quality of linkages, is much more apparent than it was in 2005, hence justifying this second phase.

The first evaluation contributed to the overall TEC conclusions about international efforts. It was designed to look at the effect of a single sudden onset disaster, a tidal wave of exceptional proportions, on the very different living conditions and recovery processes in Sri Lanka and Indonesia. The present evaluation takes place exactly three years after the first, and concerns the same two countries over the intervening period, and also the Maldives.

Our findings are intended to contribute to the development of good practices for all actors, including national authorities and local associations. Our assessment is based on previous documented analyses, as well as on our own data collection in the affected countries, throwing light on planning and operations by a multitude of agencies (government, international and non-governmental, and the commercial sector).

As described in the Terms of Reference drawn up by the Joint Steering Committee, the assessment is presented in three outputs containing:

1. The summary evaluation report intended for a large public audience
2. The main detailed technical report
3. The Document Review covering the literature currently accessible

For those wishing to refer to the mandate of the evaluation, this is contained in the Terms of Reference (ToR) in Appendix 1.

Five themes, described below, structured our review of the ability of all agencies to link their efforts and respond to needs in a coherent, efficient, effective and sustainable manner. The ToR did not include human rights or aid management, which are treated indirectly in the analysis.

The report has been written with contributions from the following team members:

Mihir Bhatt (deputy team leader)
Emery Brusset (team leader)
Karen Bjornestad
John Cosgrave
Anne Davies
Yashwant Deshmukh
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1.2 Introducing LRRD

The synthesis study on LRRD in the TEC reports (subsequently referred to as LRRD1) described LRRD not as a link between relief and development projects, but rather as "a transition whereby recovery comes to be led by the affected populations themselves", in other words a population-driven effort. It implied a link to the population (how are all interventions linked to the initiatives of the population?) as well as a link between the institutions (how does emergency aid relate to governance efforts, for example?) and the phases of the interventions (short term emergency response, reconstruction and long-term development).

For the purposes of this evaluation, we have used the notion of LRRD to mean *relevant and effective interaction between relief, longer term rehabilitation, and pro-poor development,* where relevance refers to the initiatives and needs of the population, and efficiency to synergies and avoidance of waste (through duplication or contradictory interventions).

Consequently, our study has asked: *what has changed in the situation in the disaster affected areas? And what are the changes that can be attributed to LRRD?*

The LRRD1 evaluations showed that the different degrees of satisfaction on the part of the disaster affected populations, when asked about the national and international efforts to assist them after the tsunami of December 2004[2], were grounded on broader issues than just changes in conditions on the ground:

1. Structural issues raised by the effects of the tsunami (for example those pertaining to land rights, security of tenure, existing power dynamics etc.), and
2. Governance factors (for example the weakness and lack of capacity in planning and management of mid-level public administration and national and local authorities).

Understanding the rehabilitation efforts hence both requires understanding the way in which institutions cooperated, but also how this related to local conditions. This gives the evaluation a dual focus, to encompass both the population dynamics, as well as the posture adopted by agencies in relation to that.

The framework, following the phrasing in the ToR, is structured by themes, identified in past studies as critical, to structure the information in a cross-cutting manner:

A. The return of the *state and civil society:* change in the broad governance and participation issues relating to development policy and social services, to all institutional dimensions, as well as the crucial issue of information flows.
B. *Poverty, livelihoods and economic recovery:* the evaluation reviews the interaction of all efforts with the evolution of poverty, food security and economic development, with a particular focus on the immediately affected groups.
C. Rebuilding the *social fabric and community development:* this touches on the notion of sustainable communities, and of social capital.
D. *Reduction of risks* from natural hazards and conflict: this will look at risk reduction strategies at all levels, but also effects on risk management, risk transfer, and cross-cutting issues such as gender, children and the aged. Risk also includes the notions of conflict risk.
E. *Capacity development:* the emphasis here is on the local capacity to respond better and recover faster. For international capacity it is to better support and facilitate local initiatives, and where none exist, to move in and perform, coordinate, build up the relevant capacities and then hand over.

[2] Public perceptions were particularly well captured by the TEC through the use of polling and participatory qualitative data collection techniques.

This framework, when applied to evaluation, contains in effect a double polarity: on the one hand the efficient process of association (the "linkages" that associate interventions), and on the other the effectiveness and sustainability of improvements in the conditions of the population.

The evaluation covers the broad spectrum of actors involved in the efforts in relief, rehabilitation, and development. This includes agencies such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, the United Nations, local and international NGOs, International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, but also the national authorities. The ToR stipulates that this is an evaluation of the linkages between international efforts (in the broadest possible sense), national governments, as well as local civil society, business and community capacities.

1.3 Evaluation approach

Similarly to the 2005 LRRD1 studies for Sri Lanka and Indonesia, this evaluation is based on *qualitative and quantitative information,* and uses a combination of secondary sources (written reports, evaluations, media) and primary information (collected through field work).

There was a broad sequencing of the data collection, beginning with the Document Review, followed by qualitative interviews at agency headquarters and in the region, followed by and informing the survey. The time period for carrying out both LRRD1 and the present evaluation is the same (four months). The three steps, each ending with a separate report and series of debriefings were:

1. Step one – the *document study* and field work preparation – was launched in mid September, and ended with a briefing in Jakarta in early November. This provided the field team with a mapping of the main bodies of knowledge, as well as a good idea of the gaps that remained. The annotated bibliography prepared for this first step was later expanded to include the materials identified in the field study.
2. Step two – the *field study* – included the collection of information on a qualitative and quantitative basis, and emerging findings were presented at a workshop in mid-December in Colombo.
3. Step three – the evaluation report and consultation – comprises an analysis of the findings of the individual reports on each theme, and ended with a presentation to stakeholders in Geneva.

To ensure that the subject was adequately covered within each theme, a lead writer was nominated for a particular theme, supported by other members of the team, and tasked to write a section of the report.

As the sources and nature of evidence varied in each thematic area, and because of this allocation of responsibility, there are variations in

the style of the text in the evaluative chapters 2 to 6. *More specific approaches have also been applied to each theme of investigation within the same data collection and case study framework,* as is reflected in each thematic chapter. We have preserved this variation between the chapters to preserve the inquiry within each theme, while taking care that the different chapters yielded generic findings.

Some questions cited in the ToR were not dealt with in depth. There were four dimensions for this:

- *Breadth of subject:* to discuss findings with sufficient evidence for all areas of questioning would have required an inordinate amount of time, consequently requiring that some prioritization be given to questions. We have given slightly less importance to the *shift in roles of aid agencies* from implementer to facilitator (which we do not find has taken place, or possibly do not have specific evidence on), and to *island-specific questions* described in the ToR. We recognize that it would have been of interest (although not in the ToR) to obtain figures of *funding volumes* that make a difference between relief, rehabilitation and development, but this would require addressing programming distinctions which are unique to various donors, whose own reporting does not always differentiate between donations made for reconstruction in a province from the country wide development cooperation.
- *Private sector:* the ToR alluded to the possibility of covering the private sector contribution to LRRD. This can be divided into small and medium enterprise, which is covered here, and then larger investors, which are more problematic to include, and have hence not been covered. It was found that for the interventions of larger multinational corporations, such as an oil and gas major in Aceh and an oil services company in the region, the community outreach projects after the tsunami made a strict difference between press releases and internal evaluation. In the latter case disclosure would have required considerable consultation. For the public/private partnerships and for development bank loans, such as for the German, French and Japanese interventions, it was found that the particular constraints of country indebtedness and conditionalities meant that projects were only getting under way at the end of 2008. This meant that our primary focus on the role of the private sector was placed on macroeconomic development and small and medium enterprises.
- *Capacity development:* this theme included in the evaluation is a new field for international development, which is affected by the double risk of ill-defined concepts and terminology, and of a severe lack of outcome/impact evidence. Agencies whose primary purpose is capacity building tend to report on outputs, while at the policy level there is very little guidance on the broad limits of this field (does

capacity building include technical assistance? The role of the central administration in relation to decentralization?). Our evaluation has hence preferred to diverge from the questions in the ToR (which would have required data that does not exist), and focused instead on the performance of national coordination bodies created in response to the tsunami, using primarily three case studies, and outlining gaps which could have been filled.

Apart from capacity building, *the different chapters follow the line of questioning as provided in the ToR,* and we would encourage a scanning of the ToR prior to reading the report to understand why the inquiry follows a particular path. Priority was given to issues that featured in a significant way in the interview process and when there was evidence from the literature review (for example on conflict sensitivity). This approach was taken to reflect stakeholder priorities and avoid evaluation biases, and used to inform the answer to the evaluation questions. When reading the chapters and attempting to understand the choice of evidence it will be useful to return to the terminology in the ToR, which have not been reproduced in the main text for reasons of space.

Limitations in the evaluation methodology include:

- *Lack of a normative framework* and research related to best practice regarding such a wide variety of roles in disaster prevention and recovery (spanning as we do here, government and the economy). This was in particular marked by the curious absence of other evaluations on LRRD in the response to the tsunami, while a large body of literature now exists on the tsunami (our Document Review analysed 7,775 public documents, predominantly in English);
- An *aggressive schedule* (six months at the outside) to study selected cases in depth and generalise to the entire efforts, while the literature presented severe gaps, particularly regarding social fabric and capacity building. Longitudinal data was often difficult to compare, while influences extraneous to LRRD would often come into play;
- A *diminishing interest in the tsunami response* among the affected populations and officials at the time of the evaluation, which led many to refer the team to other evaluation processes which were ongoing at the time of the present exercise (and in which some of the team members and their organisations were fortunately also involved); this is accompanied paradoxically by the slow launch of development in the areas affected by the tsunami, where the larger part of the programmes observed continue to be funded by relief and rehabilitation funds, mostly allocated in 2005.
- The withdrawal or reform of structures and agencies that were involved in the earlier phase, compounded by a high rate of personnel turnover in most humanitarian organisations.

The team, however, enjoyed privileged support and access to agency material, and lively feedback at specific debriefing workshops. We are particularly grateful to the IFRC in Sri Lanka, and UNDP in Indonesia.

The dynamics of conflict affected LRRD in the three countries: low scale communal tensions in Maldives, escalating war in Sri Lanka (which reached new heights at the time of the evaluation), and decreasing conflict in Aceh. This had implications for our methodology, particularly for the issue of access mentioned above. Given the complexity and high sensitivity of the conflict context in all the areas we covered, the evaluation was conducted using a conflict-sensitive approach at two different levels:

- Firstly, attention was paid to the interaction between the evaluation process itself and the population, and/or context: e.g. the possibility of visiting communities was assessed by the team members, trusting their judgement on the negative unintended effects the visit could have on the visited communities and persons interviewed.
- Secondly, the evaluation examined the interaction of the research process with the context setting, including policy influence, but also unintended negative and/or positive effects of the research process.

As stated in the guiding principles of IDRC's Evaluation Unit, the "evaluation should be an asset for those being evaluated. Evaluation can impose a considerable time and resource burden on partner organisations (...)"[3].We have been careful to take this into account while conducting the field visits. For consultation and restitution purposes the summary text is translated into the local languages as the evaluation is finalised.

Some of the respondents may be concerned about the confidentiality of their comments and the possibility that they might be identified as the source of critical commentary. Every effort has been made to maintain the confidentiality of the interview processes, and to explain how information has been handled.

The general nature of the evaluation referent (LRRD), and the focus by the team on efforts to rebuild after a natural disaster, ensured that the at times concurrent issues associated with the conflict in Sri Lanka and Indonesia, and the political tensions in the Maldives, did not have an overwhelming influence on the data collection process. Apart from our inability to go to northern Sri Lanka, some higher risk team movements in some insecure locations, and the obligation not to travel at night in certain areas of Sri Lanka, the conflicts have not had an effect on the nature of data collected nor on our analysis.

[3] International Development Research Council of Canada, Guiding Principles of IDRC's Evaluation Unit

The previous tsunami evaluations had been followed by a process to capture what could be learned from the TEC, and was then carried further in a paper on Joint Evaluations in the ALNAP Annual Review. Drawing on this model, here too a separate "learning from the evaluation process" report has been written in parallel. This is intended to inform the evaluation community about the lessons to be drawn from carrying out a joint evaluation, an exercise which includes the governments from the region as well as donors, and a large steering committee.

1.4 Data collection methods

1.4.1 Qualitative data collection

The first step of the evaluation was to carry out a Document Review, published separately from the present report, which consists of two parts:

1. The first part examines what documentary evidence exists on the evaluation themes.
2. The second part presents an annotated bibliography gathered by the team during the research phase.

The documents in the annotated reference set in the second part of this report are of two types.

Key documents on the tsunami impact and response in Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and the Maldives.

Methodological and context references that the team have used in their research. These form only a small part of the reference set.

Researchers in Indonesia and Sri Lanka identified key documents from the three selected countries for the evaluation through: suggestions from meetings in the field; comments by peer reviewers; documents collected through field work; and further desk research[4]. This constitutes a base of some 800 documents read and analysed for their response to the evaluation questions.

The main document set is support by a set of 7,775 documents about the Tsunami Disaster posted on ReliefWeb. This set has been used for supplementary searches and to identify key documents for the main annotated bibliography.

In the second step of qualitative field data collection, the primary method of collection of information, apart from document review, was to meet the personnel of organisations (aid organisations predominantly but not exclusively) and public administration, as well as populations involved in the disaster and the response to it.

[4] For example, a search on a particular topic might reveal a reference to a specific institution or process. Following this up to lead to finding further documents of relevance to the evaluation.

Table 1

Summary of interviews by category of person				**of which**	
Category of person interviewed	*Cat*	*No*	*as %*	♀	♀ *as %*
Government Officials	G	60	22	10	
UN Staff	U	50	18	18	36
NGO staff	N	82	29	31	38
Red Cross staff	R	54	19	18	33
Beneficiaries in individual interviews	B	5	2	4	80
Other	O	28	10	8	29
Total		**279**	**100**	**89**	**28**
Summary of interview Methods				**of which**	
Type of interview method	*Type*	*No*	*as %*	♀	♀ *as %*
General meeting	gm	3	1	2	67
Semi structured Interview (Individual interviewee)	ssi	69	25	11	16
Semi structured Interview (two or more interviewees)	ssg	160	57	59	37
Brief Discussion (less than ten minutes on one or more topics)	bd	14	5	3	21
Detailed discussion (more than ten minutes on one or more topics)	dd	31	11	13	42
Telephone interview	ti	2	1	1	50
Total		**279**	**100**	**89**	**32**
Summary by country where interview took place				**of which**	
Country	*Code*	*No*	*as %*	♀	♀ *as %*
Indonesia	ID	61	22	25	41
Sri Lanka	LK	148	53	43	29
Maldives	MV	70	25	21	30
Total		**279**	**100**	**89**	**32**
Summary for group meetings with beneficiaries				**of which**	
Numbers not counted in some meetings		*No*		♀	♀ *as %*
Number of persons		**380**		**213**	**56**

In all *279* officials and staff were interviewed in key-informant interviews, some several times by different teams. Another *380* people were interviewed in 20 group interviews, giving a total of *659 respondents for qualitative interviews.* Another *2,143 persons* from tsunami affected areas completed the *quantitative interviews* for the survey conducted by Team C Voter, which included some open questions leading to qualitative analysis.

The large number of interviews was made possible by the team of 14 members, 60% of whom are from South Asia, who spread out in teams of two or three persons in a wide variety of locations, cross-vali-

dating information. The team combines a wide range of experiences, from the academic to the operational, and comprised five men and nine women.

Visits (including methods of direct observation, individual and group qualitative interviews) were undertaken along the entire coastal belt from Trincomalee to Colombo, and from Banda Aceh to the south, Nias, and three islands in the Maldives (maps of the areas are provided in the text). Sampling was based on the degree of impact of the tsunami, geographical spread, and our ability to access villages (which has excluded populations in the north of Sri Lanka, due to the presence of war). The main method of analysis was then to detect patterns of responses to questions, which led to the identification of key findings.

To organise the information more efficiently, the evaluation resorted to Case Study methodologies. This includes in particular:

- A *causality* or theory of change, in other words a statement of cause and effect in an intervention. This "theoretical proposition" can be a visual map or causal narrative;
- A few c*ase studies,* carefully selected to test/challenge (not to vindicate) the theoretical proposition, which then allows an assessment of change (has it happened? If yes, why, if not, why not?); the number of case studies in each thematic area has been three (for capacity) to nine (for livelihoods).

We focused on those questions which the available literature partly answers, eliminating some, and used our professional judgment to make the final selections. The case studies do not assess results nor the performance of individual actors, but rather the efficiency and relevance of linkages as they lead to evolution in conditions over time.

To avoid circumstancial evidence, the qualitative sampling was purposive and based on the following criteria:

- For the economic and social themes, the criteria was maximum variation, in other words selecting case studies based on demographic variables that are likely to have an impact on populations. The evaluation team selected geographical areas on the basis of differences in extent of tsunami damage and socio-economic characteristics, particularly differences between conflict and non-conflict affected areas. By studying the same geographical areas as LRRD1, the first analytical question of what has changed and the second question of what that change can be attributed to, could be answered. Within the communities selected, multistage snowball sampling was used.
- For the state and civil society and for the capacity themes, the criteria was typical case/intensity sampling, where greatest attention was given to some of the institutions that were most involved in relief, rehabilitation and development tasks: for state and civil society this

was the local level administration and national civil society; in the case of capacity the focus is on risk reduction. These exhibited the aspects highlighted the most in the Terms of Reference.

- For the Risk Reduction section qualitative evidence was only used to analyse the quantitative (core) data, and was based on convenience sampling. The theoretical proposition itself was sharpened and used to organise the complex evidence at hand.

This sampling and triage of evidence was made possible by the Document Review, which pointed to some broad areas of investigation, with the exception of the social and capacity themes, where very little literature exists. Possible sample bias was reduced by also using systematically the survey data, which is statistically representative of the population affected by the tsunami.

1.4.2 Quantitative data collection

The purpose of the quantitative survey is to provide an empirical base to corroborate evidence drawn from each theme from the qualitative information. The choice of questions and definition of questionnaire was done during the first stages of the evaluation, but the survey chronologically followed the qualitative research. More information than below is also provided in section 9.2.

The survey was conducted in the tsunami-affected areas of Indonesia and Sri Lanka (the Maldives was not included for reasons of cost and the methodological problems linked to extreme dispersal) using a structured questionnaire, designed around the five themes. We have also used the questionnaire developed in the LRRD1, creating a longitudinal timeline. New questions according to the scope of study mentioned in the ToR were added. The questionnaire has about 50% common questions and 50% localised issues and aspects. The responses are provided separately from this report.

The survey fieldwork was done by local researchers selected and trained by professionals, using the same contractors (Channel Research and Team C Voter) that had carried out the first survey. This LRRD1 survey (on the same scale as the present one) had been conducted by carefully selected final year students who had been given training and certificates after the successful completion of the assignment. These people have since moved on into the local economy as social agents working in different capacities. It is important to note here that the process of training, and the time, energy and resources spent should be viewed as a contribution of the evaluation process in developing local capacity. At the same time it is ironic to note that due to the absence of longitudinal surveys with timeline analysis, such local capacities will not be put to good use again, thus illustrating a point made in the evaluation. The hope would be that these capacities would be used for other

development related surveys in the future, such as linked to TRIAM, for example.

The English questionnaire was translated into the local languages, Tamil, Sinhala, Bahasa Indonesia and Acehnese. The survey fieldwork was conducted from 4th to 27th December 2008, and administered to 1,210 tsunami affected people across the coastal districts of Sri Lanka and 1,560 tsunami affected people living along the coastline of Aceh.

In each country the Divisional/Kabupaten/District Secretariats were selected on the basis of the documented distribution of the tsunami beneficiaries within each district, and the subdivisions were chosen to allocate the samples. The tsunami beneficiary registrar at each selected Divisional Secretariat was used to select beneficiary settlements. The beneficiary households were selected using a systematic random sampling technique.

In order to ensure adequate representation and randomness, enumerators drew a map of their assigned divisions and marked the affected areas, areas where there were old and new housing settlements, areas where old residents are now placed (even outside the division) and new construction that took place post tsunami.

Respondents were picked according to the housing location breakdown: fully affected and living in a new location, fully affected and living in the old location, partially affected and temporary shelters. The number allocated for those who were fully affected was higher, whereas in Divisional Secretariats where there were temporary shelters, the partially affected number was higher.

The initial EDP of the survey was done in Banda Aceh, Lhokseumawe and in Colombo, followed by a final EDP in New Delhi with a 20% checking of data entry. The final data scanning and analysis was done using the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) in New Delhi. The interviews were conducted in the language that respondents are fluent in. The completed interviews were keyed into computer databases using a designed computer programme, and data analysis was carried out using SPSS. Further, senior research coordinators visited the field location and conducted a series of case studies and group discussions in order to supplement the quantitative study with in-depth insights.

2 The state and civil society

2.1 Introduction

This section sets out to (1) provide an overview of the effects of the tsunami itself and the response to the disaster on the actions and roles of the state and civil society; (2) analyse these roles in the context of their linkages toward development.

The analysis concentrates on two main questions:

1. What roles have the state and civil society played in relation to LRRD from the point of view of the population?
2. What were the favourable and the limiting factors to stronger linkages between relief, rehabilitation and development?

The evaluation questions addressed have been:

1. To what extent have state and civil society institutions regained or preserved their capacity to lead recovery?
2. What lessons can be drawn from comparisons of the three country case studies (with a focus on three related institutions) with regard to decentralisation and subsidiarity?
3. To what extent has support to the reconstruction of infrastructure been matched by attention to constraints (human and institutional)?
4. What is the relevance and impact of information flows, consultation and capacity building of the local communities?

Given the breadth of the subject, the focus has been placed on the national systems established to govern the reconstruction response, and on identifying key elements associated with state and civil society roles and governance-related processes which have either positively supported LRRD, or acted against establishing linkages with development.

In this evaluation the state is defined to include political and public sector institutions. The debated term 'civil society' is used very broadly to encompass the groups and organisations which occupy a position between the household/community, the state and the private sector. This definition of civil society comprises, among others, all non-governmental associations, including trade unions, business associations, cooperatives, employers' associations, faith groups, trade associations, recreational groups and think tanks.

For the analysis, stakeholders were divided into six categories: 1. communities and households, 2. sub national state actors, 3. national governmental actors, 4. local and national civil society organisations, 5. international aid actors, 6. other, including members of the business community. The quantitative results of the public perception survey carried out in Indonesia and Sri Lanka were incorporated into this analysis.

2.2 Perceptions of state and civil leadership in recovery

The March 2005 Asian Development Bank (ADB) conference in Manila set out the policy of rebuilding devastated areas to a standard higher than pre-existing conditions (later referred to by the Unicef US Fund as 'Build Back Better'). This implied a high degree of coordination and agreement on objectives. The assumption was that the states in the affected countries would take on the lead, and that significant contributions would be made by donors and civil society organisations[5].

Two broad convergent currents of opinion can be detected in the way in which the state and civil society have then been perceived over the four year period following the tsunami. On the one hand the official donor philosophy has been to give increasing support to modalities of cooperation and co-decision with the state. On the other, the public has increasingly come to see the state as more deserving of trust.

As interviews and planning documents show, the state is perceived by donors as the dominant actor in disaster recovery. This has been reinforced over the four year period by the emphasis given to aid harmonisation and alignment with the aim of achieving greater effectiveness. This Paris Declaration[6] philosophy of harmonisation of approaches and alignment through national ownership was anticipated by the design of a matrix of responsibilities for development agencies, in early 2005 in Sri Lanka.

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[5] One could cite the Indonesia Disaster Management Law number 24, which opens with the statement "Disaster Management is based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia" (Article 2), and then goes on to say "Disaster Management activity is carried out by making available broad opportunity to business organizations and international agencies. Operations of Disaster Management are carried out pre-disaster, during disaster, and at post-disaster phases" (Elucidation of Law, Article 1).

[6] OECD (2005). *Paris declaration on aid effectiveness: Ownership, harmonisation, alignment, results and mutual accountability.*

On the other hand, the public's perceptions are contrasted in the areas affected by the tsunami regarding the different levels of the state and civil society, as demonstrated by our survey results. Depending on the kind of problem confronting a family in the affected areas, an average of 40% of respondents in Aceh expressed a greater trust in local government than central government (which enjoyed between 5 and 10% of choices), while in Sri Lanka the proportion was exactly the reverse, with less than 5% expressing trust in local government and 26 to 60% (depending on the issues) turning to central government. This is also indicative of the roles played by each level of government in each specific context and the extent of decentralisation and devolution of power.

When grouped under the heading of attitudes to the state as a whole (local and national), this represents a significant change in levels of interest as compared to 2005, where the international agencies were distributing most of the assistance. At the time in Sri Lanka the surveys show that international organisations were considered on a par with national NGOs and governmental institutions in terms of consulting the population, while in late 2008 the surveys indicate that international organisations are rated significantly lower as source for assistance, given consistently a rating lower than 10% (with the key exception of helping in addressing inequities in the distribution of assistance, disaster relief, education, and housing).

In Indonesia the appreciation of international organisations had trumped that of national civil society and government in 2005, while in 2008 they rank significantly lower than local government as a source of aid, with the exception of support given to new housing or access to land. Even in the case of assisting in addressing inequities in the provision of assistance, the local government is seen as a better recourse than foreign organisations. This change in perception over time may be attributed to the evolving roles of the state and the humanitarian sector in the delivery of basic services, in the creation or provision of jobs etc, particularly with the withdrawal of aid agencies and the rolling back of tsunami recovery programmes.

The status of civil society in the three countries was affected by the tsunami in terms of the unprecedented role it was called upon to play in the recovery process, which then suffered in the following years. Roles shifted: while in 2005, the LRRD survey revealed that less than 10% of the Acehnese expected help primarily from NGOs and less than 5% from self-help groups (30 to 50% expected help from international organisations, although this dropped ten months after the emergency response phase), in 2008 the proportions were less than 5% for local NGOs, and less than 1% for self-help groups (international organisations have dropped to less than 20%, apart from housing). The reconstruction process can clearly be seen in terms of withdrawal of resources and in effect a handover to the state.

The questions in the two surveys were the same and the samples sufficiently related to give a longitudinal perspective to our findings. This can be represented in the graphs below, where the further away from the centre the stronger the status of an actor is in terms of its role in recovery. It is possible to see that the evolution is more marked in the case of the Maldives, and even more so in the case of Indonesia.

Figure 1

Changes in capacity and influence during the Tsunami response: Maldives



Changes in capacity and influence during the Tsunami response: Sri Lanka



Changes in capacity and influence during the Tsunami response: Indonesia



Immediate

Four years into the response

Although there is here a natural handover from emergency operators to more perennial institutions, the problem of capacity is also undoubtedly at play. Attitudes will have changed as the ability to deliver on expectations has been tested, and often proven to be wanting. The mismatch between limited civil society outreach, and the scale of the disaster, will undoubtedly have contributed to the shift towards the state. The state itself has also been highly affected by these issues of capacity.

In all three tsunami affected countries new structures were created to manage the response, showing significant constraints in capacity. In the case of Indonesia it was the Aceh-Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency – also known as BRR, the National Disaster Management Centre, or NDMC, in the Maldives, and the Reconstruction & Development Agency, or RADA, in Sri Lanka. While RADA, the earlier Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation (TAFREN) and the NDMC institutions have had national coverage, BRR's mandate was circumscribed to Aceh and Nias. Only in the Maldives will the state agency (NDMC) be maintained into the medium term. In Sri Lanka RADA and its predecessor TAFREN were dismantled. This has left a gap in institutional memory, and a weakened sense of accountability at the local level, with those affected less able to claim their rights. The closing of RADA is, according to state representatives, a sign of on the one part achievement, and on another, a desire to turn the page on the tsunami and regain a sense of normalcy.

BRR was established after the tsunami to lead and manage reconstruction activities in Aceh and Nias. It has an office in Aceh, and was tasked to coordinate all the response, handing over implementation to agencies and line ministries. Its mandate runs out in April 2009, at the time when the operations and maintenance phase for many of the projects is only beginning. The Governor and his administration acknowledge that the government is ill prepared to manage the transfer of large public assets as well as recovery projects created by BRR. These bodies have been responsible for delivering the US$300 million funds from central government for the revised Master Plan, ensuring that the Multi Donor Fund (MDF) and other development programmes, valued at more than US$ 400 million, are completed by 2012 (this includes MDF, but also Asian Development Bank (ADB), Agence Française de Développement (AFD) and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) loans). The provincial government has already been endowed with an unprecedented US$ 1 billion as a share of annual oil and gas revenues and additional Government autonomy funds.

In Sri Lanka the state is perceived as much as an employment provider as a service provider.[7] The total number of employees in state

[7] Findings from the Document Review and interviews in the field provide strong evidence in this direction.

institutions amounts to over 1 million.[8] The government recruits close to 18 per cent of the labour force in the country. Yet the dominance of the state has not led to greater coherence in terms of standard setting and definition of legal frameworks. One example is the absence of information and clear decisions regarding standards. The introduction of a 100 to 200 meter buffer zone in Sri Lanka initially meant that 50,000 families would have to move from their original locations to new land. Lack of suitable land for resettlement, problems in identifying beneficiaries, and changes in government policies, posed an array of problems including the disruption of social networks and livelihoods, difficulties in transferring the ownership of the land. Similar problems were encountered in Aceh and in especially the Maldives with the decision to resettle island communities onto 'new' islands.

Capacity issues and a difficult environment also prevail for civil society. Associations were rare in the Maldives, severely curtailed in Aceh, and only moderately developed in Sri Lanka. The massive mobilisation to respond to the tsunami helped civil society to play not only the role of facilitator of development processes, but also that of implementor. In the Maldives, the response only moderately boosted civil society. In Sri Lanka, four years into the response, the picture varies by region and some studies give more credit to the lead role of non-governmental organisations in less conflict affected areas.[9]

In Indonesia the average project size for NGOs remained small and geographically circumscribed, although NGOs were managing 80 percent of recovery projects in the first three years. In 2004 just 12 registered national and international NGOs were operating in Aceh, while the number after the tsunami immediately rose to 300 NGOs, as international efforts in Aceh focused on encouraging a role for civil society in the response.[10]

The continuing conflict in Sri Lanka and the level of mistrust limited the role of what is however a stronger civil society there. Government officials rarely view civil society organisations as an integral part of the country's institutional structure. Sri Lankan politicians express concerns over the aid agencies' weak accountability to affected communities. In the case of Sri Lanka, mistrust between the government and NGOs is high.[11]

Given the complexity of rebuilding, timelines were often unrealistic and civil society has often complained about delays in the recon-

[8] Excluding the military, there were 813,000 persons working in the state and semi governmental sector, as at 1st July 2006, according the latest survey by the Census and Statistics Department

[9] See *Marit Haug* The tsunami aid delivery system and humanitarian principles. A view from five districts in Sri Lanka NIBR Report: 2007. This study indicates survey results that show that the government was the major aid provider in war-affected communities in east while voluntary organisations dominated aid delivery in communities in the south.

[10] Channel/Cosgrave, Document Review (Crespin, 2006, page 445)

[11] This analysis does not extend to local religious groups. These were not covered in the analysis.

struction process, and unpredictability of funding. Criticism was strongest in Sri Lanka where civil society is more accustomed to international assistance, and in a better position to challenge the funding agencies. In the Maldives, civil society organisations are limited and rely on international funding and private individual support. With international support their position has grown and the acute need for human resources in all sectors of service delivery create opportunities. Beyond a certain scale, these organisations receive marginal support from private Maldivian individuals and depend on international assistance for almost all their funding, while their role has yet to be recognised by the state. Care Society is an exception to this. Their active role in the tsunami aid effort has given them considerable clout and credibility with the new Government.

At the same time, new opportunities for types of activity to assist emerged directly as a result of the tsunami, namely in terms of advocacy.[12] New civil society organisations have emerged in the three countries and networks such as the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement have increased their national capacity in Sri Lanka or established their presence as in the case of the Red Crescent in the Maldives (where it is fully recognised). Roles have changed over time. In the Maldives, agencies felt that they were initially carrying out facilitation, but later took on an implementing role at the height of community development and reconstruction projects.

2.3 Policy dimensions: focus on conflict, the harmonisation agenda

International and national responses led to new policies. Dialogue between donors, the state and civil society in particular was affected, while other forces have guided policy coherence in each country. To what extent have relief and development efforts contributed to reform of the state? What is the role of non-tsunami related factors? How have they interacted with the conflicts that prevailed in the societies affected by the disaster?

In Indonesia, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had just been elected in October 2004, two months before the tsunami. The current government's reform agenda included the decentralisation process that had started to transform the country's traditional system of governance. On the other hand the conflict in Aceh was dominated by defence policy prior to the tsunami, and there was originally no plan to increase international organisations' access to the province.

[12] The average period in which pre-tsunami CSO interviewed left aside their core mandates or beneficiaries, as explained in interviews was six months. The shortest average period was in Sri Lanka where organisations interviewed were not able to carry out their programme and only focused on the disaster response for two months.

The Aceh province and Nias Islands were among the poorest areas of Indonesia, crippled by both conflict and pervasive corruption. The Governor of Aceh had in fact been jailed prior to the tsunami on charges of corruption.[13] Since 1976 when the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) demanded independence from the Indonesian government, Aceh lived in conflict, with severe restrictions on movements.

In Sri Lanka, with one million displaced and 31,000 dead, the country was devastated by the tsunami with two thirds of its coast affected. The crippling effects of a protracted conflict between the government and the Tamil Tigers and additional differences, greatly accentuated pre-tsunami disparities between regions.

In Indonesia, the tsunami is generally perceived to have contributed to the latest peace process. The tsunami forced open access to Aceh province, which was previously off limits to aid agencies. As confirmed by the LRRD1 study[14], the presence of many internationals in Aceh then helped increase the sense of confidence, and made local actors (including the government bodies) realise that peace, security, human rights, could emerge in an internationalised framework.

The survey carried out as part of that study showed that in Aceh the main perceived opportunity offered by the tsunami (the 'Hikmah' of local cultures, or learning to be drawn in a time of great suffering), apart from a stronger relationship to God and more inner strength, was the arrival of political peace. The 2008 survey shows that this is still reflected in public opinion, where 57% of the population thinks the tsunami and reactions to it have had a positive effect on peace. The International Crisis Group also stated that the tsunami "made it politically desirable for both sides to work toward a settlement"[15]. The aid provided post-tsunami created an incentive for both the state at the national level and local government to cooperate and an opportunity for the Acehnese government to solve communities' problems.

The international linkages between the aid effort and the peace process were also strong in Aceh. An upcoming European Commission (EC) evaluation[16] concludes for example that the EC funded Aceh Peace Process Support Programme (APPS) was an appropriate response to supporting the peace process, timely after the exit of the Aceh Monitoring Mission, and relevant to the post-conflict context of Aceh. The EC assistance was well received and appreciated by communities and offi-

[13] In 2001, a year after regional autonomy, a wave of corruption cases swept across Indonesia's newly empowered regional parliaments and the trend spread from regional legislatures into the executive. In 2006, there were 265 corruption cases involving local legislative bodies with almost 1,000 suspects handled by prosecutorial offices across Indonesia. In the same year, the same offices had 46 corruption cases implicating 61 provincial Governors or District Heads. Purnomo et al (2007:1–3)

[14] "Evaluation of LRRD in Connection with the Tsunami", Channel Research, March 2006, for Sida

[15] ICG Asia Briefing N°40, 15 August 2005

[16] "Aceh Peace Process Support Programme", Matveeva and Jansen for Channel Research, 2009, Draft.

cial structures. The context for intervention was favourable as the transition from war to peace proceeded smoothly, allowing the APPS to capitalise on the political momentum.

In Sri Lanka the response to the disaster paralleled the deterioration of the negotiations between the government and Tamil Tigers and the emergence of forces opposed to peace. By August 2005 Sri Lanka's government and the Tamil Tigers had agreed to hold high-level talks but kept disagreeing on the venue. Talks with Tamil Tiger rebels had been stalled since 2003 and relations between the Tamil Tigers and the government were strained. In November 2005 the current President Mahinda Rajapakse, opposing the Norwegian-backed peace process, promised a hard line attitude to the Tamil Tigers and a re-negotiation of the ceasefires.

The political attitudes toward civil society and international organisations became markedly more suspicious. After an initial period of collaboration and reliance on the government and military for aid efforts in Tamil controlled areas mainly in the North, complaints began to emerge from advocacy groups regarding Tamil areas receiving almost no government aid. The government and Tamil Tiger rebels signed a controversial tsunami aid-sharing deal meant to ensure an equal distribution of aid to all parts of the country hit by the tsunami, including rebel-held areas.[17] President Kumaratunga backed the aid deal providing a mechanism to dispense foreign reconstruction aid in the tsunami-devastated North and East. A Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS), backed by the international community, also known as the joint mechanism was established to channel aid.[18]

The current President won the presidential elections in November 2005. A year after the tsunami, fighting flared up. The new government has favoured a military solution to the conflict and brought an end to the P-TOMS. Agencies in Sri Lanka and the UN Secretary General's report emphasise that the reconstruction process has faced "operational hurdles across a range of sectors, making it difficult or impossible for international aid partners to move or deliver assistance and supplies. Restrictions on transportation of certain construction materials, such as cement and steel, as well as difficulties in accessing certain areas have hampered recovery." [19]

There is no doubt that the large and very visible tsunami relief operations contributed in a way to these dynamics. And yet conflict is still treated as an independent external constraint on the relief and development effort, rather than a cross cutting issue. There is currently

[17] Sri Lanka Tsunami Aid Deal Signed, BBC News Online, 24 June 2005

[18] Tsunami aid deal plunges Sri Lanka into deeper political turmoil, World Socialist Web Site, 27 June 2005

[19] United Nations General Assembly Economic and Social Council Report of the Secretary-General "Strengthening emergency relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, recovery and prevention in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster" July 2008

no strategic analysis of the interaction of the relief and recovery efforts with conflict, while some upcoming research projects[20] point to the fact that, for reasons of international presence and resource handling, it became a key source of societal tension. It is striking to see how little analysis has gone into this subject. A recent OECD DAC working group study on conflict prevention and peace-building in Sri Lanka, for example, specifically excluded the tsunami response from the analysis.

A similar conclusion can be drawn (although on a much smaller scale) concerning political dynamics in the Maldives, where the tsunami created only momentary change. Some donors, such as the Agence Française de Développement (AFD), even took on a greater development presence as part of the reconstruction effort after the tsunami, while others, such as Germany's GTZ, reconsidered programme to a much greater extent around conflict than around the tsunami.

The origins of the prevailing social and communal tensions in the Maldives can be traced back to the pre-tsunami policy of "Island Consolidation" and the creation of "Population Hubs", characterised by the relocation of entire communities from ecologically unsafe islands to the larger, safer and economically more viable islands. Due to inadequate information dissemination, this policy has met with resistance from different cross-sections of the population, people who are reluctant to relocate either due to a fear of loss of status or from an unwillingness to leave ancestral lands.

The tsunami recovery effort, in an attempt to align itself with this policy, has continued with the relocation of tsunami IDPs to newly constructed housing on the designated islands. This has led in many cases to instances of ill-feeling towards the incomers by the original communities of the islands. Today new settlements exist in close proximity to the original host settlements, which are often poorly serviced and have housing which is badly in need of upgrading and rehabilitation.

In the Maldives, observers consistently claimed that political rivalry initially ceased in the two months following the tsunami. Charges against political detainees that had protested in August 2004 were dropped. Parliamentary elections scheduled for the end of December were postponed due to the tsunami but held a month later. Opposition candidates won seats in Parliament. A reform process, including the development of a new constitution, criminal justice reform and Human Rights Commission of the Maldives have since been underway, culminating in the first multi-party presidential elections in October 2008 and the election of a former political prisoner as president.

[20] Post-Tsunami Reconstruction in Contexts of War: A Grassroots Study of the Geo-Politics of Humanitarian Aid in Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka & Aceh, Indonesia [IDRC 103614], Dr de Alwis, International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Colombo. Quoted by Channel Research "Evaluation of IDRC Peace, Conflict and Development Research in Countries and Regions Affected by Conflict", Draft, January 2009, on behalf of IDRC.

In the Maldives, the level of destruction caused by the tsunami, while significant in relative terms, was less severe. The high level of centralisation in the Maldives and the fact that Male, the capital, was spared, facilitated the ensuing response. A total of 15,000 people were displaced and approximately 100,000 people affected by loss of homes, livelihoods and infrastructure. Recovery needs were estimated at US$ 393.3 million.[21] The Minister of Defence who led the establishment of the National Disaster Management Centre proved an important figure especially in the early response.

Given the need for the coast guards to be heavily involved in all operations, and given the specificities of the Maldives, the Ministry played a key role managing and coordinating a response in all scattered islands affected. In the Maldives too, in the first months after the disaster, focus shifted from internal political rivalry between the government and the opposition to the need for initial collaboration and response. Implementation of the safe islands programme has however made modest progress as the government and communities face many challenges in relocating and consolidating communities on different atolls.

The tsunami disaster however did not alter the nation's priorities of promoting economic development in key islands supported by investment in physical and social infrastructure. In this sense, respondents felt that the state was able to engage in previously planned activities such as the island atoll consolidation efforts and relocation attempts as a result of the tsunami and the resources provided.

The net effect of these changes has been to create in the three countries an interesting contrast in how international efforts could relate to the situation on the ground. While the shifting position in Aceh allowed a complex alignment to evolve around development cooperation (with BRR frameworks, the MDF and comprehensive assessments in the foreground), in Sri Lanka and to a lesser extent the Maldives development cooperation was hampered by conflict. This generated a more fragmented donor response, characterised by intense dialogue in the capital but limited presence on the ground, while humanitarian agencies took on the lead role in reconstruction.

The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness made clear in Sri Lanka the fact that effective aid is one that is aligned with countries' own policies and systems and reinforced the notion that good policies are those that are both effectively oriented towards development outcomes, and country-owned. Harmonisation involves the increased coordination and streamlining of activities of different aid agencies, with the aim of reducing the transaction costs to governments receiving aid

There are patterns of similarity between the performance of the rehabilitation activities and the development work in Sri Lanka. A

[21] Idem.

recent evaluation of the implementation of the Declaration[22] pointed to the need for better understanding by foreign field personnel of local reality, while there is resistance to donor coordination, perceived as "ganging up" on the government. On the other hand lack of confidence in partner country systems leads to the fact that donors do not give them a chance to grow.

More striking, however, in relation to the donor harmonisation agenda, is the ongoing separation of the relief and recovery effort from within the broader development aid effort. This was identified as a risk by a recent DFID evaluation[23], where support to humanitarian agencies and to the MDF was treated as "recovery", a temporary allocation with little relevance to the pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals. This is also reflected in a French Ministry of Foreign Affairs evaluation[24], which noted that humanitarian assistance and post-disaster reconstruction loans were treated quite separately in the programme portfolio.

This absence of linkage is also reflected on the partner country side. In Sri Lanka, where the state is characterised by an informal ministerial system, the tsunami response was separated from the departments managing the regular governmental programmes. It follows that, for instance, the monitoring and evaluation department within the Ministry of Planning was not involved in the tsunami aid effort and is only at the end of 2008 assimilating and incorporating the database developed to track the tsunami aid response, into its systems.

Harmonisation was exercised to a greater extent in Indonesia with the establishment of the MDF in support of primarily BRR. This did not relate well to the country programmes, and according to BRR officials however, it was the MDF that in practice proved most cumbersome to work with out of all of its donors.[25]

2.4 Decentralisation & subsidiarity

Decentralisation is designed in development policy (by the three states but also by donors) to enhance the opportunities for participation by placing more power and resources within reach of the population. In environments with little participation it is viewed as an initial step in developing opportunities for citizen-state interaction. In the three countries was the intended role of decentralisation relatively well linked to that of the agencies?

[22] Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration, Sri Lanka Case Study, July 2008, Kabell Consulting, for Danida

[23] Country Programmeme Evaluation, Chris Barnett et al. ITAD Ltd for DFID, 2007

[24] Evaluation de la cooperation française avec l'Indonésie 1988–2007, Ernst & Young and Channel Research, 2009

[25] See Masyrafah, Mckeon, the Wolfensen Center for Development, Post-tsunami aid effectiveness in Aceh, Brookings (2008)p.19

In Sri Lanka despite strong mobilisation by sub-national public governance institutions in the aftermath of the tsunami, few additional resources were allocated to them for tsunami work and their role was primarily to facilitate the work of aid agencies.

In Indonesia, the BRR, endowed with ministerial power, established its base in Banda Aceh and accelerated decentralisation. Decentralisation has clearly progressed in Indonesia since the time of the tsunami, although serious issues of local capacity remain. As consistent with the wishes of the Government of Indonesia, donor funding is increasingly via on-budget support instead of being off-budget, leading to better livelihood prevention strategies and larger national development strategies which are consistent with meeting the principles of the Paris Declaration and reinforced at the Accra High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness.

The evolution of decentralisation laws in the country continues, as can be seen in related public expenditure laws such as Law No. 25/2004 on National Development Planning and Regulation No. 21/2004 on Line Ministry and Agency Budget Work Plan.

This was well matched by the creation of the MDF. Without exception, all stakeholders interviewed by the evaluation (including government) expressed the opinion that the role of the MDF as a policy forum had an influence far wider than just funding projects. To a large extent it helped set the agenda for the BRR, particularly in terms of process (monitoring, procurement, etc) and the sequencing of priorities (housing, infrastructure)[26]. The MDF is (in practice) a consensual body, not a voting body, and there is a degree to which this is perceived to lead to lowest common denominator approaches – arguably, this happened in 2005 when construction projects with output indicators (numbers of newly built houses, for instance) outstripped the more medium term (and less visible) livelihoods projects[27].

But this was not a problem inherent to the MDF itself, as it simply reflected the kind of projects being submitted by partner agencies. By 2007, as policy-driven consensus had increased, the MDF was, for instance, taking a lead in encouraging capacity building and training projects (and components within projects) for local government.

Separate EC[28] and DFID reviews of the MDF concluded with a largely positive appraisal, in spite of serious delays in fulfilling objectives. The MDF performed considerably better in the second year, and lessons from the above evaluations (particularly on start-up, more rapid release of funds, and how to overcome bureaucratic bottlenecks) have clearly translated into more efficient decentralisation.

[26] DFID Country Programmeme Evaluation for Indonesia, ITAD, Chris Barnett et al.

[27] TEC Synthesis Report, 2005

[28] "Mid-Term Evaluation of the Multi-Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias", Particip and Channel Research for the EC, 2009.

On the other hand in both Sri Lanka and to a lesser extent in the Maldives, the tsunami response reinforced and strengthened central authority. In Sri Lanka the authority to manage the response was established at the district level through the General Administrator that represented the central government. While recovery plans were often disaggregated to District level, capacity building and strengthening tended to focus at the central levels of governance and less so at District and *Pradeshiya Sabhas*, as well as local civil society organization levels.

While a number of initiatives were taken by donors to strengthen the capacity of the Municipal Councils to deliver services, there were no effective sub-national political bodies that could function as arenas for discussing broader issues and for setting priorities for the tsunami rebuilding process in the districts.[29] The affected districts through the District Secretary subsequently reported to RADA. A number of programmes such as CADREP were initiated to address the lack of resources that hampered the effectiveness of government institutions at the sub-national level.

Apart from the involvement of the District Secretaries and the Divisional Secretaries in conducting coordination meetings, significant involvement of other public officials in the recovery process was limited. Key public officials such as the director of housing, the director of planning, the Samurdhi officers, and the social services, were often not adequately briefed on the tsunami rebuilding issues.

Analysts argue that "Clarity concerning what powers have effectively been decentralised is needed so that the provinces and districts are clear on the level of authority and the amount of resources available for their mobilisation."[30] In practice, national policies did not endow local government with sufficient capacity or authority.

Issues remain in the case of Indonesia. At the request of the Governor of Aceh and the director of the BRR, the Aceh Recovery Framework has been developed to provide inter-linkages between vital areas of Aceh's transition: ongoing peace processes and reintegration efforts, rule of law, good governance and democratic decentralization, economic development, infrastructure and housing reconstruction and basic social services – as well as cross-cutting issues, such as environment and gender.

This framework led by provincial government chairs and supported by the Agency and international partners, attempts to provide capacity-building and asset management to support the handover from the BRR Agency to the local government in April 2009. A World Bank study (2007) found that several factors limited the financial management capacity of local governments: rapid decentralisation without capacity

[29] Haug 2007, but also identified in LRRD1 for both Sri Lanka and Indonesia.

[30] National Post-Tsunami Lessons Learned and Best Practices Workshop, June 2005, United Nations and Government of Sri Lanka.

increase at the local level, the propagation of new districts (11 out of 22 in Aceh since 2000), and the conflict. According to Ghani and Lockhart (2008) a process for connecting citizens' voices to government is missing in fragile states and contexts such as Aceh. Given existing capacity constraints, local government in Aceh has not been as involved in the reconstruction effort as it could have been.

2.5 Changes in participation & issues of accountability

The level of participation is instrumental to efforts linking the relief response to development. Participation was mentioned both as an opportunity and a limitation in the context of the field study. The level of the response was cited as an opportunity in all countries for increased participation and capacity building. Effective participation however entails groups having an adequate and equal opportunity to pose questions and express preferences in decision-making.

Many limitations, such as pressure to disburse funds and complete projects rapidly, were cited, curtailing the level of effective participation in all three countries. For example the Sri Lanka Civil Society Forum in 2005 stated that "rebuilding policies were being imposed without dialogue and decisions being made by an extra-governmental body, TAFREN, composed entirely of big business leaders with vested interests in the tourist and construction industries, who are completely unable to represent the interests of the affected communities and who have no professional experience of dealing with disasters. Policies and plans developed by this body are not known by the affected people, and in many cases are not even known by the local government officials[31]."

Grievance systems have been an important innovation, replicating models established by the World Bank for the extractive industry. Those established in Indonesia were regarded as effective. In Indonesia the BRR had two grievance mechanisms, Satuan Anti Korupsi (SAK – Anti Corruption Unit) and Badan Pengawas (Supervisory Board) comprising of various NGOs, universities and other respected institutions, to provide community oversight of rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. SAK operated under the BRR Deputy for Support Services and is supported by staff, mostly detailed from the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK).[32]

Responses defined as a result of agreements rather than consultations on the ground have created a lack of flexibility in programme approaches and funding instruments. This was particularly the case for the artificial reference, at least in the first few years, to "disaster affected" as a category and central focus of relief. The response to the tsunami gave priority to those directly affected by the tsunami as opposed to following a pro-poor focus, a targeting based on vulnerability criteria and furthering development plans.

[31] Civil Society Statement, Sri Lanka Development Forum 2005.
[32] Hasan and Nicolas (2008) ETESP Complaint Mechanism

The category of tsunami affected populations has become more and more artificial over time. In the Maldives the imbalances created are very visible when four years after the tsunami, the displaced households still receive food aid and significant differences in terms of state aid divide displaced and local host communities. In Indonesia, certain donors geographically circumscribed responses to a 7 km stretch along the coastal area when much of the poorer population is located inland.

High levels of aid amplify risks of increased corruption and poor governance. In the midst of corruption there is a strong possibility that interventions may be captured by private interests. At the same time there is also an opportunity for improved governance. The evidence collected by a Swedish evaluation[33] shows that, in spite of one of the longer periods of training delivered by the Do No Harm team, the agencies neglected good practice, at the time of the tsunami response, in the interest of faster response.

In Sri Lanka, Transparency International claimed that the government had failed to account for as much as 44.3 percent of the international aid it had received following the tsunami and that over US$500 million in tsunami aid given to Sri Lanka had gone "missing".[34] Among issues raised by agencies were political interference in the allotting of housing and allegations of corruption against district level officials. Transparency International recommended that the government establish a formal complaints procedure.

The survey results indicate that both in Aceh, Indonesia and in Sri Lanka approximately 60% of the people surveyed claimed that no corruption existed in finding or building new housing, while a very high number remained silent on the issue. On an average about every tenth respondent confirmed corruption in the housing sector. In all instances of corruption, various irregularities were mentioned including claims in Sri Lanka about some families even receiving four houses while others still did not have access to water. The affected population in Sri Lanka was ambivalent about the role of the government since some public officials were regarded as corrupt.[35]

Almost all the Sri Lankan, Indonesian and Maldivian officials and aid workers recall how they worked day and night for the first three months after the tsunami, mobilizing extra resources and putting aside all other non-essential work. Many disaster affected areas in the three countries had, prior to the tsunami, remained outside most of the development programming focus, predominantly for political reasons. The resulting lack of planning on the part of the development actors, of procedures and methods for emergency recovery designed not to return

[33] Evaluation of Collaborative for Development Associates, Channel Research on Behalf of Sida, 2007

[34] Transparency International Sri Lanka, (2007) Three Years after the Tsunami

[35] Haug, NIBR (2007).

to the *status quo ante,* have limited speed of progress in terms of enhancing people's participation.

A yet to be published study of French government loans[36] describes the unusual complexity of identifying the priorities of national partners in the context of such a large disaster, using standard operating procedures. It also highlighted the blurred nature of areas of possible complementarity with other donors. The EC evaluation[37] of the MDF shows that a significant proportion of the projects funded show less than satisfactory performance, due to poor design.

For humanitarian agencies on the other hand the "need for speed" and pressure to respond, the pressure to disburse, and pressure to deliver and phase out, accentuate the risk of plans being drafted hastily, and on the basis of the planners' perception of the victims' immediate needs, rather than of needs expressed by the populations themselves, with insufficient attention attached to participation and involvement.

While it is difficult to strike a correct balance, time pressures generally acted against participation and information processes in the first phases of the response[38]. Emphasis on infrastructure and specifically housing due to existing needs, coupled with public pressure, state priorities, visibility considerations and humanitarian agency and donor timeframes, dictated that relatively less focus was placed on social issues, capacity issues, and in many instances local participation.

2.6 Conclusion

The constraints and the positive forces that affected the State's, Civil Society's and the private sector's roles in helping achieve the LRRD goals were:

(1) pre-existing conditions before the tsunami, particularly conflict and the fact that the areas were not considered priority development areas,

(2) the extent of devastation and limited prior institutional capacity in the areas,

(3) the shifting level of legitimacy,

(4) the variety of systems in place,

(5) the nature of the aid provided, being more supply-driven rather than demand or needs-driven, and

(6) the artificial separation of the newly created coordination mechanisms and bodies from mainstream development planning.

[36] Evaluation of Agence Française de Développement Post-Disaster Programme, Channel Research 2009

[37] Mid-Term Evaluation of the Multi-Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias, Particip and Channel Research for the EC, 2009.

[38] TEC Synthesis Study, 2006.

These determined the nature of the linkages between relief, rehabilitation and development. The rising role of the state and peace in some quarters offer greater possibilities that need to be captured better, earlier on.

While the first two variables do not depend on the nature of the response, the others are within the sphere of influence of state and civil society.

The donor harmonisation agenda and decentralisation policies have not, at the time of this evaluation, achieved their aim of facilitating linkages between relief and development, and, accompanied as they are by substantial capacity weaknesses, may have contributed to the reduced linkages. There remains an overly strong project focus, which limits gains made in participatory approaches, such as the deployment of grievance procedures for the general population.

An assessment of the forces strengthening the links to development shows that these are largely related to the ability of the state to take on a central role. While civil society is starting from a position of weakness, it has contributed to better linkages to the population, but certainly not to the extent foreseen by many aid interventions.

Conflict has played a strong influence on many of the programmes, while on the other hand the aid agencies, the donors and civil society have not found ways of addressing conflict sensitivity as a deliberate form of linkage to development. When peace has resulted from the interventions, it has not been linked to objectives as such.

Yet in Indonesia, while the reasoning was that several books could be written on the deficiencies and mistakes of the response to the tsunami, the fact that peace had been achieved entailed such an important gain which was so fundamental for the development for the region, that the local message given by the head of the Aceh Reintegration Authority was that "it would be a mistake to dwell on shortcomings". We would agree that conflict has been a significant enough influence in the dynamics in the affected areas for conflict mitigation to be considered a significant, if indirect, success.

3 Poverty, livelihoods and economic recovery

3.1 Introduction

This thematic section will look at the relevance and effectiveness of international and national initiatives to facilitate the economic recovery of tsunami-affected livelihoods and at the intended or unintended changes that were brought about as a result of such efforts.

The questions from the ToR are:

1. How have economic actors revived their activities after the tsunami, and what has been the role of aid?
2. What is the relative importance of external aid in economic development?
3. To what extent have livelihoods efforts recognised differing livelihoods circumstances?
4. Has recovery programming recognised the risk of chronic poverty?

The document review, as well as the survey, shows that external aid was a significant factor during the relief phase – even a key factor. This is especially so in terms of meeting basic needs such as food security, shelter, water and sanitation. This helped to alleviate the short term or transitory poverty associated with the tsunami.

While poverty has been traditionally measured in monetary terms, it has many other dimensions. Poverty is associated not only with insufficient income or consumption but also with insufficient outcomes with respect to health, nutrition, and literacy, and with weak social relations, insecurity, and low self-esteem and powerlessness.

However there are difficulties in measuring poverty reduction using non-monetary indicators. This is because it is not possible to compare the value of the non-monetary indicator for a given individual or household to a threshold, or "poverty line," under which it can be said that the individual or household is not able to meet basic needs.

Additional issues need to be considered in the context of conflict affected countries such as Sri Lanka, where there is no central government commitment to uniformly reducing poverty across all groups. This translates into the lack of monitoring of poverty. A case in point is that in the conflict areas studied, accurate "poverty line" information dating back to 2004 is not available. As such, the focus of poverty is mainly in monetary terms.

The relationship between poverty and livelihoods can be seen in terms of households having opportunities for income generating activities. The availability of such opportunities should ideally be stable and predictable, where livelihoods security is then achieved. The contribution of external aid for promoting these opportunities for income generating activities is not at all clear from the document review and generally available analyses. Many of these livelihood opportunities were primarily identified and created by the poor on their own. However there is still a large question about the extent to which small investments of external aid (through micro-credit schemes or micro-grants) have facilitated livelihoods. This evaluation limits itself to small investments, because household livelihoods are formed at the micro or small scale level of local economic activity.

Three questions structure the evaluation around this theme as follows:

- To what extent has livelihood security improved for those most directly affected by the Tsunami and if so for whom and how?
- To what extent can improvements in livelihood security be attributed to the tsunami aid effort and if so what are the possible mechanisms by which this has worked?
- What are the perspectives of the household concerning efforts made to support its livelihood recovery?

Recovery[39] and LRRD contributions to livelihoods can occur in terms of efforts to move households out from a position of transitory poverty. If the position is still systemic poverty, there may be improvements when looked at from a multidimensional perspective, improved access to housing.

The concept of livelihood security, which draws broadly from livelihoods frameworks, emphasises that what characterises the lives of most poor marginal people is a context of risk and insecurity derived from an uncertain institutional landscape (how governments and markets behave), natural hazards and the actions of others (conflict).

[39] Drawing from the social protection literature, recovery can be conceptualised in three stages: firstly households achieving protection (shelter, food, water etc to ensure survival), secondly prevention (households gaining sufficient resources to buffer themselves against risks or shocks) and thirdly promotion (household gain greater livelihood security – income, health etc.) leading ultimately, it is hoped, to greater livelihood security overall.

This evaluation has taken account of the context prior to the Tsunami (2004), asking how did governments and markets perform and work, what was the level of livelihood security of different groups, what were the risks and hazards. It assesses the ways in which the Tsunami directly or indirectly affected these various dimensions. It then assesses how households recovered their livelihood security and what this might have been due to.

The evaluation sought evidence of the extent to which such transitions (prevention of loss to promotion of livelihoods) are in process, and for whom, and if so to what it can be attributed. This part of the analysis is critical and comes down to two basic questions that must be clearly separated: what has changed? What can that change be attributed to?

The first question was addressed through evidence collection at various levels. The second question raises questions of attribution/contribution and evidence. The greater the distance from the Tsunami event and the donor response, the more difficult it is to do this. Thus rather than assume that observed changes are due to donor inputs, the more robust approach is to assume that they are not (the null hypothesis approach) and that evidence has been systematically argued to challenge the null hypothesis[40].

Fieldwork approach and data collection

Given the framework and the document review, the approach taken by the evaluation team was to study households located in the same geographical areas covered in LRRD1 (in addition to some areas such as in north-eastern Sri Lanka and in the Maldives which were not covered in the previous study) which had received external aid. Through interviews with households and key informants such as livelihood groups, CBO leaders, NGO staff and local government officials, the team could understand changes in livelihood security. The evaluation team selected geographical areas on the basis of differences in extent of tsunami damage and socio-economic characteristics, particularly differences between conflict and non-conflict affected areas. By studying the same geographical areas as LRRD1, the first analytical question of what has changed and the second question of what that change can be attributed to can be answered.

Studying geographical areas with different characteristics enabled the evaluation team to account for the contextual dimensions of drivers of change. One of the main contextual dimensions is how donor inputs

[40] It is recognised that there are contextual dimensions of drivers of change (underlying structures, markets, actors etc) on which the tsunami and the tsunami aid response has impacted. The issue to assess is the degree to which the changes that are detected in governance, the economy and in livelihood security are due, and if so in what degree, to the aid response. Aid inputs can be grouped into funding, input/ relief supply, capacity building and coordination. Money flows will have had both direct and indirect effects on institutions (e.g. markets), households and risks. They are also likely to have had effects on government.

were distributed over time. Who received aid first in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami based on government security regulations at the time? Who received aid later? Who received more aid? Who received less aid?

Household livelihood histories were collected from all the different members of a household who happened to be present at the time the interviews were conducted (380 persons interviewed as mentioned in the introduction), thereby enabling greater triangulation and cross-checking of facts and chronologies. The stories they tell recount their lives from before the tsunami and up to the present moment of the evaluation. One of the key questions asked was whether individuals in a household had inherited a specific livelihood skill from within the family. To illustrate, a household may consist of fishermen who learned their specific skills from their fathers and grandfathers. If their livelihoods were completely destroyed because of the tsunami, the evaluation team would try to understand how the fishermen adapted given the institutional arrangements at the time. Did they try to build new skills as construction workers for reconstruction projects? Or did they resort to being unskilled day labourers looking for paid work where ever available? When did they resume fishing as their main livelihood activity (if at all?)? As households were asked to tell their stories about changes over time, the evaluation team tried to understand adaptations and adjustments that they made and how external aid played a role.

If livelihood security was achieved at the later point in time of the evaluation, household histories would reflect a predictable and stable pattern of income generating activities to meet consumption needs. As most of the affected households in all three contexts were located in the agricultural and fishing sectors and subsistence economies, this pattern of income generation and consumption should be relatively predictable for each year. However this annual pattern and the volume of activity may be expected to vary depending upon any fluctuations in market demand, sudden price hikes such as those witnessed in the rise in food prices in late 2008 etc[41].

As a consequence there is a deficit of resources where consumption exceeds income; household welfare is then reduced in the given time period. The solution to address this deficit is for the household to seek out alternative income generating activities, where income can then match consumption e.g. a fisherman can complement or substitute his

[41] To illustrate, there are fixed seasonal periods for harvesting and fishing in a year. Farmers and fishermen will carry out most of their activities within this period, bring their produce to market to sell and then spread out their income for use during the rest of the year. Consumption patterns will then match with income generating patterns. This pattern of behaviour can be thought of in economic terminology as 'consumption smoothing'. If there fails to be a match within a given time period as determined by the household e.g. a calendar year, a harvesting cycle etc., this is because of the occurrence of an exogenous shock such as a natural disaster, a single event or repeated events of conflict.

income by carrying out petty trading. Graphically a predictable pattern of income and consumption can be represented as:

Figure 2



In figure 2 above, income can be generated from any number of activities and income can be drawn from savings or deferred spending. The positive rate of change for income generation matches the negative rate of change for consumption where a given household welfare level is then achieved. Time in the x-axis represents any given period as defined by the household.

Analysis

To either establish correlations, causality or attribution between donor relief efforts and household livelihoods and hence broader recovery, first an analysis of the distribution of foreign aid by geographical areas was carried out. This analysis includes where aid was first introduced and where it was gradually introduced.

The specific sector of foreign aid most closely related to livelihoods and economic recovery is economic development (or reconstruction aid). This is as defined by government financial reporting of donor aid (there is no officially recorded budget line known as livelihoods). If a given geographical area such as a district received a higher amount of aid than another district, the logical reasoning is that the households in the first district would have greater resources available to rebuild their

livelihoods. Consequently, access to these available resources by these households should result in less poverty. For example, if a district received funding under the category of credit and loans for small and medium enterprise development, households in that district could adjust their income generating activities to directly/indirectly take advantage of this new injection of resources.

As such, this analytical approach attempts to match external aid to what households report about their income generating activities. This matching approach is justified on the grounds that initially in both Aceh and Sri Lanka, humanitarian access to the conflict affected areas which also suffered damage from the tsunami was limited. Aid was specifically regulated and targeted to tsunami affected, but non-conflict affected areas only.

After trying to match aid flows by geographical areas and types and extent of livelihood activities, what cannot be directly attributed to international aid actors would then be related to (i) the affected population's own efforts (ii) market mechanisms (iii) central and local government efforts.

3.2 Targeting of aid on poverty in Aceh and Nias

Statistical evidence leads one to conclude that the effects of aid assistance on poverty levels have by and large been positive as is evident from the table below, where there are fewer poor households in 2005 (after the tsunami) compared to 2004 (before the tsunami). This data comes from the Indonesian Census Bureau (Badan Pusat Statistik) and World Bank. This is especially the case in rural areas. The positive effects of aid is based on the assumption that during the three decades of conflict, the economy in Aceh Province was close to being halted, and after the tsunami injections of financial aid contributed to poverty reduction.

Table 2

Percentage of Poor Households in Aceh Province 2004–2006

	2004	2005	2006
	%	%	%
Aceh Province	28.4	32.6	26.5
Urban	17.6	20.4	14.7
Rural	32.6	36.2	30.1
Indonesia	16.7	16.0	17.8

Source: BPS data and World Bank staff calculations.

It is not clear whether these poor households became poor temporarily because of the damage caused by the tsunami or because they were already the long term poor affected by the conflict.

The positive effects of aid assistance may be diluted when studying how aid was targeted. Based on the figure above, in 2005 funds disbursed were larger in the capital city of Banda Aceh and this was presumably because of the ease of humanitarian access. However with reference to the figure below, Banda Aceh had the lowest percentage of poor households in its local population in 2004 (we do not have figures of aid assistance per head of poor people to make the comparison clearer).

This can be seen in the following figures where the percentage of the population living below the poverty line is the lowest for Banda Aceh compared to the rest of the districts in the province. When looked at from another angle, in terms of the highest number of IDPs recorded in the immediate period after the tsunami, again it was not Banda Aceh that ranked highest.

This can be seen in Map 1 where the districts of Aceh Besar, Pidie and Aceh Barat had between 60,000–150,000 IDPs compared to Banda Aceh which recorded 30,000–60,000 IDPs. Based on either the measurement of poverty or number of IDPs, Banda Aceh was not deserving of the highest amount of aid money as compared to other administrative areas.

As such the accuracy of targeting based on poverty needs in 2005 is questionable. Looking back at the findings from LRRD1 quantitative survey, households interviewed at the time also questioned whether assistance was forthcoming from any of the rehabilitation oriented policies.

Table 3a
Aid disbursement flows for economic development (by district) 2004



Table 3b
Aid disbursement flows for economic development (by district) 2005



Table 3c
Aid disbursement flows for economic development (by district) 2006



Table 3d
Aid disbursement flows for economic development (by district) 2007



Table 3e
Aid disbursement flows for economic development (by district) 2008



Table 4
Population % living below the poverty line by district in Aceh province 2003



Source for tables 3 and 4 above: Indonesia Census Bureau of Statistics (BPS) and World Food Programme

Map 1

Source: University of Berkeley/East-West Center, 2005

With reference to the Table 4 on disbursement flows above, from 2006 to 2009 (carried forward to 2009 for funds unused presumably), Banda Aceh continues to receive a high proportion of reconstruction aid compared to other districts. Nias, which is far less developed as compared to Aceh (using the Human Development Index) is neglected throughout the period 2005–09 in terms of a lower proportion of funds disbursed. Targeting is improving as from 2005–07, Nias district received only 5% per year of total aid, which improved slightly to 8% in 2008.

Observing the statistics on aid flows in the period 2005–08 alone strongly suggests that to answer the question "To what extent has livelihood security improved for those most directly affected by the Tsunami and if so for whom and how?" those most directly affected by the Tsunami did not improve their livelihoods security via external reconstruction aid. Improvements would logically have to come from a) the affected population's own efforts b) market mechanisms and/or c) central and local government efforts

The challenge concerns the linking of development in the region to macro-economic opportunities, and not remaining concentrated on

the tsunami affected areas. The Aceh economic structure, for example, is dominated by oil and gas exports. Agriculture, in which people are currently engaged the most, apart from fisheries, contribute very little to exports. Within agriculture, coffee, which mostly is from non tsunami affected area, is the highest contributor to exports. The link to the general development of the entire region remains a challenge that still requires serious attention in the planning of bodies such as the MDF, or multilateral lending institutions.

Over 2004–09 (there was indeed aid given in 2004), there has been an improved roll out of aid with a greater geographical coverage across Aceh province. More importantly, as consistent with the wishes of the Government of Indonesia, funding is increasingly via on-budget support instead of being off-budget, leading to better livelihood prevention strategies and larger national development strategies which are consistent with meeting the principles of the Paris Declaration and reinforced at the Accra High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. On-budget support helps to create better strategies in terms of funding being tracked by BAPPENAS and BAPPEDA to improve planning and budgeting at central and local levels of government. This is especially important given the evolution of decentralization laws in the country and related public expenditure laws such as Law No. 25/2004 on National Development Planning and Regulation No. 21/2004 on Line Ministry and Agency Budget Work Plan.

3.3 Macro level support to household livelihoods in Aceh and Nias

While there is availability of foreign aid for economic development, this has not directly translated into long term job creation or income generating opportunities for households. As reiterated by BAPPENAS as it mapped out the blueprint for reconstruction in 2005, the objective of foreign aid was primarily to build new and rebuild damaged infrastructure such as roads, ports, markets etc to promote economic development. This has provided an enabling economic environment for income generating activities to take place. However there is no evidence that economic development at the macro level has created at the micro level a specific number of jobs or new businesses or trades. The lack of evidence comes from the structural nature of the formerly war ridden economy where a highly disproportionate percentage of economic activity occurs in the informal sector.

Once asset replacement has taken place and people have been able to resume their livelihoods, the government has to step in. Roads, storage facilities, fish markets and other livelihood supportive infrastructure have to be developed. Ideally the building or reconstruction of infrastructure should proceed in parallel to asset replacements, trainings, and micro-credit schemes in order to facilitate people to rehabilitate their livelihoods within a more enabling environment. As explained by

the fishermen, NGOs do not and cannot establish markets for them. These fishing groups have pre-existing and well-established supply chains or distribution channels. Because of this, fishing groups and wholesalers are in a better position to negotiate for the type of public services required from local government. Such negotiation can now be seen taking place in Aceh in the development stage of LRRD.

Table 5
Aid disbursement flows (geographical roll – out) 2004–2009 all sectors, all districts (USD nominal values)

Administrative Area	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
All Aceh province & all Nias district	165'492'045	117'471'190	41'902'346	79'188'610	29'081'645	0
Aceh Barat	154'174	130'599'366	40'803'211	29'289'936	51'247'522	561'075
Aceh Barat Daya	0	10'383'522	4'378'563	1'557'271	3'028'525	
Aceh Besar	1'186'860	186'289'699	103'674'898	74'793'765	70'751'413	1'102'921
Aceh Jaya	4'361'618	128'977'546	74'683'512	60'059'813	51'171'157	0
Aceh Selatan		6'423'527	1'037'755	1'434'993	1'230'737	
Aceh Singkil	0	8'956'064	3'470'154	1'553'890	1'911'722	
Aceh Tamiang		3'933'599	860'712	1'162'591	733'801	
Aceh Tengah		4'739'298	956'172	2'624'249	2'980'714	
Aceh Tenggara		3'490'136	677'311	792'033	621'552	
Aceh Timur		6'179'506	1'549'115	1'991'532	2'338'591	815
Aceh Utara	0	30'502'182	25'591'642	15'202'946	12'094'979	1'492'452
Bener Meriah		4'308'978	2'859'417	4'581'647	3'189'685	
Bireun	1'095	32'434'210	17'791'393	21'381'024	10'297'820	336'278
Gayo Lues		3'667'980	583'801	1'041'091	1'920'752	
Nagan Raya	0	17'359'673	19'206'766	5'018'760	8'424'028	0
Nias	0	51'740'287	18'425'300	21'286'618	30'295'093	81'449
Nias Selatan		14'600'207	9'464'072	6'707'145	2'483'625	72'228
Pidie	2'251'995	58'194'806	29'270'929	22'303'013	24'601'297	522'601
Simeulue	183	28'211'821	12'137'240	17'787'091	19'604'755	
Kota Banda Aceh (City)	531'776	204'600'793	90'631'429	130'174'109	40'675'487	101'345
Kota Langsa (City)		1'090'977	717'518	990'522	582'424	
Kota Lhokseumawe (City)	0	10'715'825	3'895'582	5'037'803	2'446'313	113'592
Kota Sabang (City)	0	9'573'378	4'586'910	4'465'690	1'397'091	3'374
Unallocated	406'519	98'041'424	42'644'660	35'093'168	63'101'383	196'498
Unspecified		34'450'231	1'838'888	3'059'291	134	
Annual Total	174'386'265	1'206'936'225	553'639'296	548'578'601	436'212'245	4'584'628

Source: BAPPENAS and BRR Recovery Aceh – Nias database

In 2005 prior to the peace agreement in August 2006, (the former) GAM stronghold districts in the east coast received little aid amounting to less than 10% of total aid. But this has improved over time where both tsunami affected and conflict affected populations are receiving aid. Still when looking at the findings from our quantitative survey, it can be noted that there is a consistent perception (both in 2005 and in 2008) that conflict affected populations are receiving less aid than tsunami affected populations. As indicated in the Tsunami Recovery Indicators for Aceh and Nias in table 6, 12 districts lag behind, many of which were not directly affected by the tsunami.

Based on full freedom of movement after the signing of the peace agreement, it could be expected that the population would move from one district to another in search of better livelihood opportunities. However our survey statistics show that communities tend not to move from their original sub-districts. Contrary to expectation, individuals from poor households were not moving from their areas which had few income generating opportunities to areas where there were better opportunities.

Non-individual movement from one sub-district to another, or one district to another, may be explained by the low level of skills that individuals have. In labour market studies carried out by the Central Bank of Indonesia and the MDF, it was found that unskilled or low skilled labour did not have any incentive to move from their places of origin as there were few jobs for unskilled workers in the areas with higher economic development. Given the labour market behaviour, it is argued that the targeted distribution of aid becomes more crucial for households in order to promote livelihoods of any description.

While foreign aid was initially mandated for tsunami recovery and reconstruction, policy arguments concerning aid for the long term poor should eventually have resulted in increased aid for Nias. While Nias did not suffer from long term conflict, it is clearly underdeveloped compared to Aceh with a primarily subsistence based economy. There is very little trade between Nias and other parts of Sumatera Utara province and its contribution to the provincial economy is very small[42].

Possible reasons as cited by BRR (2007) for this poor prioritisation in aid flows include the absence of a master plan, limited access to devastated subdistricts, limited transportation networks and slow disbursement of foreign aid (public and private). However, the National Development Planning Board of Indonesia has classified Nias as being one of the underdeveloped Outer Islands in the archipelago and as such, a separate development policy applies to Nias. Given such a policy pronouncement, and the previous statistics on targeting of aid, foreign aid donors have failed to demonstrate that they can override policy in favour of seriously addressing poverty alleviation.

[42] Asian Development Bank, 2006 and BPS Kabupaten Nias, 2005

The finding is that the donors have been unable to link disaster response with development plans when those development plans have fallen 'outside of the box', i.e., where those places suffering from chronic marginalisation receive less assistance because they are not national development priorities. There is a de facto triage, even where there is a huge amount of resources available.

As financial aid flows are recorded under the economic development sector budget line, it is extremely difficult to trace how this aid is transmitted to households for livelihoods recovery. This is because at the macro level, this sector has many indicators as defined by the national government and covers many types of interventions. Also it is difficult to make a distinction between public-private partnerships. In general, most of these interventions are categorised in terms of large scale reconstruction programmes which can be justified as providing public goods for economic activities, be it small scale or large scale. But these reconstruction interventions do not directly create outcomes that can be traced to the households met during the survey (for which sampling had been extensive).

3.4 Roles of NGOs for livelihoods in Aceh and Nias

As per the LRRD2 quantitative survey, the highest percentage of respondents, 21%, stated that they rely on friends and relatives for securing jobs. Aid agencies and their programmes were not named as being the main source of job creation. As such, it can be argued that while reconstruction programmes are conducive to job creation, it is market mechanisms and private initiatives that determine whether individuals can secure jobs This is regardless of whether these jobs can be sustained in the long term or are just related to day-to-day casual labour. This is because the labour market remains severely under-developed in terms of the number of firms available to generate demand for wage labour.

Using the livelihood group history approach, some light can be shed on the macro-micro level economic development/household livelihood relationship. The following findings are thus used to address the question "what are the perspectives of the household concerning efforts made to support its livelihood recovery?"

When collecting the household histories, attempts were made to trace patterns of household income generating activities and consumption, as well as seasonal factors that influence livelihood activities e.g. harvesting. But these attempts were by and large unsuccessful as households were not able to recall livelihood changes in a linear manner, in other words what change first happened in 2005, and then in 2006, and so forth. The household histories were consequently recorded in a non-linear manner.

In general, the main household income generation activities are fishing, agriculture (including sharecropping), micro enterprise and unorganised day labour. For the fishermen's associations, interviews show that the NGO plays an important role at the relief phase. The NGO helps these associations in terms of identifying and securing the types of equipment needed to be replaced. But the NGO always has to have the specific technical expertise to define the asset replacement needs of this livelihood group. Failure to do this accurately leads, for example, to abandoned boats on the beach. Some ill equipped NGOs that contributed fishing boats without knowledge of the type of sea conditions and the type of fish caught have ended up finding their contributions unused and abandoned. Successful NGOs (in terms of appropriate asset replacement) named in the stories from the fishermen are the German Red Cross and Church World Service.

The examples of these well targeted NGO programmes may not be so common, if we refer to the findings from the LRRD1 quantitative survey. This is primarily because of apparent scepticism about NGO capacity, and where the most useful contributions can be made.

In the survey, respondents were also asked to rank which aspect of their lives were most affected. The specific question asked was (in loose translation) "which part of your life would you rate as being most damaged today?" The highest rate of response was for delays in the education of family members. 28% of the respondents assessed this "to a great extent" while a lower 18% saw losses in terms of livelihoods. The survey shows that education of family members was rated as being a higher priority than immediate livelihoods recovery, which can however be seen as long term rehabilitation promotion.

A good grasp of distribution channels is an important element of a strong linkage of emergency aid to livelihood recovery. To illustrate with fishermen, NGOs have to gain knowledge concerning the wholesaler – fishermen relationship, and the existing debt structure. How much debt is incurred by the fishermen is related to seasonality in catching fish. This information is used by the fishermen to make decisions about the type of assets needed. From the stories told, NGOs are generally perceived to be limited in terms of technical capability and capacity over time to promote these kinds of issues. More long term actors, with access to the right expertise, have not deployed in these areas, which is a real gap in terms of LRRD.

Relief and rehabilitation NGOs in the affected areas have for the most part not been equipped to carry out micro-credit, micro-finance and skilled labour training to match firm demand, regardless of attempts to expand their mandate and to buy the technical expertise. Once asset replacement has taken place and livelihoods have recovered, the government has to step in and take over, to provide the enabling environment for trade. In other words, roads, storage facilities and fish markets

have to be developed. As explained by the fishermen, the NGO does not and cannot establish markets for them. Developing the enabling environment for the marketplace can only be seen in terms of reconstruction programmes.

Further consideration has to be given for the type of skill sets in the labour market. According to the LRRD1 quantitative survey, before the tsunami the two largest segments of the labour market consisted of small scaled or self employed workers at 30% and unorganised day labour at 31%. It can be strongly inferred that the existing labour market is unskilled. This is consistent with the Central Bank of Indonesia and World Bank labour market studies.

Over time, attempts were made by aid agencies to carry out skills training to promote income generating activities, but the results are limited. In the follow up LRRD2 quantitative survey, on the one hand 64% of respondents answered that they acquired livelihood skills from within the family or acquired them individually before the tsunami hit. On the other hand, only 3% reported that after the tsunami, they learnt a new skill from government or NGO funded training. Yet 10% of those interviewed explained that the biggest obstacle for their livelihoods is the lack of skills in their new occupation, which is high when considering that these are traditional trades.

This explanation about lack of skills is the second highest response to the question in the survey, whereas the highest concerns livelihood obstacles at 11% due to the absence of access to loans or micro credit schemes. Such feedback also came forth strongly during the household interviews (where it was even a leitmotiv).

These comparatively high responses suggest that skills training programmes and credit schemes were not able to meet the needs of the recipients and not always targeted well enough to reach the poorest and most vulnerable households. An example of how this could happen comes from Christian Aid and its revolving fund programming. The model was taken from another country, India without full adaptation to the context faced in Aceh. Christian Aid had recruited a microfinance finance expert who only specialized in India to design the program. Christian Aid failed to study the well established microfinancing models established by Bank Rakyat Indonesia. Documentation concerning model designs, pitfalls faced and legal and institutional requirements are well documented by Indonesian research groups such as the SMERU Institute. As a consequence, during the implementation of the program cases of fraud attributed to non-contextual design were identified.

A deeper issue behind this is that of NGO personnel with limited training to carry out livelihood programming. These occupy managerial positions and are often not able to provide guidance to junior staff out in the field. The senior staff tend not to have experience concerning local markets, especially within the context of a post-conflict informal econ-

omy. The Acehnese tend to have expertise in enterprise management and through their social networks are able to build and maintain specific supply and distribution chains, quite different from the rough input-output approach to livelihoods programming that prevails for NGOs.

Our evaluation for example met a group of women without any prior track record in sewing, who requested and received sewing machines, cloth and thread, to sell the religious head scarves or traditional costumes. Physical location, customer traffic, or even an established customer base, are insights that NGOs do not have naturally. There was also confusion as to whether the livelihoods project was for income generation or to empower a group of women.

This points to the key issue of when and how the government can step in to complement NGO assistance and community or individual self-help. This has been done in two ways,one related to the regulatory framework, the second related to public finance. From the LRRD1 quantitative survey, it was found that the government was most effective in terms of replacing and issuing legal documents and property titles to the people affected by the tsunami. The national identity card is a key document which people need to re-establish their lives, and this includes setting up savings accounts in the bank and receiving remittances. The identity card is also related to the issuance of other legal documents such as land title.

This function of government is crucial and is recognised by the people before and after the tsunami. But over time the second issue of public finance becomes more serious, as regards overall fiscal decentralisation in Indonesia, where districts are expected to be increasingly responsible for producing and managing their own fiscal resources. Many districts have limited revenue raising powers and limited organizational capability and capacity. This is especially true of the formerly conflict ridden Aceh province and its districts. They remain dependent on general grants (Dana Alokasi Umum) from the national government in order to provide public services.

A lesson learnt from the role of local district government in LRRD is that it does have a key role to play which evolves over time. However, now in the development phase local administrations need more resources to function well. Mechanisms such as the Multi-Donor Fund may have to increasingly provide these resources in a decentralised manner for the transition to long term livelihoods promotion to take place.

3.5 Macro-economic recovery and households in Sri Lanka and the Maldives

In this section we are discussing together the situations that occurred in the Maldives and in Sri Lanka. Although the countries have had a very different experience of the tsunami, we found in our research that the patterns concerning livelihoods and interactions with international cooperation and national authorities. These patterns afford us some useful generalisations.

In Sri Lanka, after shelter reconstruction, which accounted for 45% of the total, money allocated for livelihood restoration and recovery constituted the second largest component of donor funds. It represented for example 18% of the UK NGO Disaster Emergency Committee's total post-tsunami expenditure in 2007. The bulk of these funds was disbursed towards asset replacements. This focus is highly relevant to the needs on the ground as, apart from housing and shelter, infrastructure has been generally less affected than in other tsunami affected areas in the sub-region (mainly because of lower density), and overall economic growth was (surprisingly) little affected.

In the Maldives, total damages incurred after the tsunami were estimated to be about US$ 470 million, approximately 62% of GDP, making it one of the hardest-hit countries in overall macroeconomic terms, with the tourism, fishing, housing and transport sectors being the worst affected[43]. Nearly 5% of the population was forced to evacuate their homes and were placed in temporary shelters with their homes and property destroyed[44].

The impact on the largest sector of the Maldivian economy, namely the tourism sector (which contributes over 33% of GDP) was estimated to amount to a loss of 30% or US$55 million in industry contribution to 2005 GDP and 10,440 jobs[45]. However, the sector also proved to be remarkably resilient and was able to recover far more quickly than the other affected sectors due to easy access to a combination of insurance, government and private sector funds for recovery and reconstruction and a slow but steady rise in tourist numbers to pre-tsunami levels.

In Sri Lanka however, the severity of the impact on the economy was considerably less with overall damage from the tsunami being estimated at 7–7.3% of GDP [46]. As Mulligan and Shaw (2007) point out, "Initial predictions that the tsunami would shave more than a percentage point from GDP growth proved excessively pessimistic", and in fact GDP growth increased from 5.4% in 2004 to 6% in 2005 (Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2006), some of which may of course be the volume of assistance coming in.

[43] ADB, UNDP and World Bank, Maldives Tsunami Disaster Needs Assessment, 2005
[44] Ministry of Gender, Family Development and Social Security, 2005
[45] World Travel and Tourism Council, 2005
[46] ADB et al., 2005, p.5

"The relatively limited economic impact is due to the fact that the sectors which experienced the most extensive damage – fisheries and tourism – are relatively minor contributors to the (Sri Lankan) national economy, and losses in these sectors were offset by a post-tsunami construction boom and strong growth in the manufacturing and inland plantation agriculture sectors, which were unaffected by the tsunami"[47].

The large-scale destruction of home-based livelihood activities in the Maldives and the environmental effects of the increased salinity of cultivable land, have had negative long-term implications for the successful recovery of women's livelihoods in particular, as prevailing social customs and norms, and barriers to women's mobility severely limit the opportunities available to women on the islands for alternative livelihood activities.

However the survey shows that the biggest combined percentage (23%) of tsunami-affected households in Sri Lanka still cite the loss or insufficient replacement (13% and 9% respectively) of livelihood assets as the single biggest obstacle to the resumption of their main activity. This points to an insufficient disaggregation of need and demand by the NGOs when considered overall, and inadequate knowledge of the diversity and range of activities (and their specific needs) within each affected sector in the designing and targeting of livelihood recovery initiatives.

Put simply, one can say that the assets replaced were not always those which were the most appropriate, or the 'only' ones needed for the sustainable revival of livelihoods. We would question here the validity of livelihood damage and needs assessment studies, which informed the design and scale of the aid response, but also whether relief and rehabilitation NGOs would be the optimal agencies for this process.

Certain structural factors have admittedly impeded relief and rehabilitation efforts. There have been geographical differences in the distribution of relief assistance in both countries due to problems of access, albeit for very different reasons. In the Maldives, as shown by assessment trips conducted in February 2005 by the Ministry of Gender, Family Development and Social Security to various affected islands and atolls, and as our meetings made clear, while relief supplies did reach almost all the affected communities, the quality of relief was often found to be inadequate. This was due in large part to the absence of regular and well-established inter-island and inter-atoll transport links, and the centralisation of all operations and logistics in the capital, Male.

Due to the Government of Sri Lanka's reluctance with regards to the channelling of aid to certain districts, ostensibly on security grounds – failing to avail of the opportunity for peace offered by the ceasefire in

[47] Mulligan and Shaw, 2007

effect at the time – coupled with some initial reluctance on the part of donors and aid agencies to endanger the lives of their staff, tsunami-affected communities in the districts of Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Ampara and Jaffna could not immediately receive the levels of assistance received by people living in the south of the island.

Apart from such structural constraints, on the whole one can say that the initiatives in both countries have only partly secured livelihood security for the tsunami-affected. As Mulligan and Shawpoint out, in Sri Lanka, "livelihood interventions have focused heavily on asset replacement in the fisheries sector, while other occupations, particularly those in which women predominate, have received substantially less attention. Problems of market saturation have been compounded by poorly-planned asset replacement initiatives which have little regard for market conditions or the capacity and experience of recipients."

It should be emphasised here that, as was the case for Indonesia, the relative failure of post-tsunami livelihoods initiatives to enhance long-term livelihood security is not due as much to ineffective project implementation, as to the low understanding of the realities of the prevailing context.

In Sri Lanka for instance, the excessive replacement of one-day boats, best suited for fishing in shallow coastal waters, instead of a mix of both one-day and multi-day boats has placed undue pressures on the sustainability of the local economy and habitat.

In the Maldives, there has been an unprecedented investment by aid agencies in infrastructure (non-existent prior to the tsunami) construction for fisheries-related activities (fish markets, harbours, etc.) as well as for waste disposal and management on the islands. However, this evaluation found that in most cases, these facilities were lying abandoned and unused – the fish markets were intended to be run by fisheries cooperatives in a context where cooperatives have historically not existed, while the construction of the latter was not accompanied by any awareness-raising campaigns on hygiene and civic responsibility, or the potential economic benefits of waste recycling.

This also holds true in the case of Sri Lanka where innumerable schools, clinics, community centres, paddy storage centres etc. have been built, or rebuilt, ostensibly at the request of the relevant line ministries, without sufficient understanding of how these facilities will be staffed, run and maintained in the long term.

3.6 Comparative weight and handover among actors in Sri Lanka and the Maldives

In contrast to Aceh, where the government played a specific role in the design and coordination of the relief and rehabilitation phase, there was no such equivalent stated by the affected Sri Lankan communities. In the specific case of conflict and tsunami affected areas, a positive role

was perceived to be played by NGOs, religious groups and community groups. In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami, the highest percentage (37%) of respondents stated that they received the greatest support from NGOs. 35% reported that they received the least support from government.

Nevertheless the perceived role and functioning of government soared in subsequent years. 38% of conflict displaced communities felt that the functioning of government had improved, compared to 18% of respondents who felt that the functioning of government was better before the tsunami occurred.

A relatively more grass roots response in future emergencies could come from a new web of institutions and public service initiatives, as a wide range of institutions benefited from the large amounts of aid flowing in after the tsunami. However our evidence indicates that in the eyes of most people (surveyed in Sri Lanka), the state offers better long term guarantees as a credible development partner. This is largely, in our analysis, on account of a lack of clear notions about the potential capacity and role of civil society.

Some of the local NGOs and CBOs in Sri Lanka, which sprung up after the tsunami and which were used as the conduits for aid disbursement and for project implementation and monitoring, are now becoming less able to sustain their work with the ending of tsunami funding and the winding up of tsunami recovery programmes. They are finding it increasingly difficult to gain access to the additional funding, whether government or private, necessary for their survival, largely due to an inherent lack of knowledge of fundraising, lobbying and advocacy. These organisations have been unable to rebrand and re-orient themselves to continue their involvement with the development of their areas, because they are not embedded enough within processes at the grassroots level and lack the necessary credentials and know-how for becoming genuine and viable community-based organisations.

However there are many examples of sustainable assistance launched by international and national NGOs, particularly when the grasp of the business environment. For example many aid agencies did help set up savings groups, with high female participation, and helped to establish a budding culture of savings and loans, even in some instances to introduce these savings groups to formal micro-credit institutions and lending institutions such as banks.

Those initiatives have proved to be more viable and sustainable where the savings and micro-credit activities were accompanied by a corresponding investment in the development and improvement of market linkages, and in general product improvement[48]. Savings and

[48] For example the post-tsunami livelihoods recovery projects implemented by Practical Action South Asia, Action Aid Sri Lanka and the Christian Aid-OfFER partnership in the Eastern Province can be cited as successful examples of such initiatives

micro-credit activities arguably only provide some degree of social protection which is welfare-enhancing. This corresponding investment in a rough business plan has allowed livelihoods to be better achieved.

To take the case of the rehabilitation of the worst affected livelihoods sector in Sri Lanka, fisheries, this evaluation as well as other studies[49] found that rehabilitation revolved primarily around the provision of boats and nets, which cater to the male-dominated aspects of fisheries – at the expense of assistance being provided to post-harvest production and ancillary activities, often undertaken by some of the most marginalised groups in the sector such as women, migrant workers, older people, and other socially excluded groups.

In the case of small-scale fishermen, we see a restriction on their access rights to the sea (with the imposition of the buffer zone policy in the coastal areas of Sri Lanka), and a prevailing hostile macro-economic climate favouring more commercially viable deep-sea fishing activities – as seen in the District of Ampara (where it is supported by the ADB). This has left some of the poorest groups in the sector in a far more vulnerable state than prior to the tsunami.

Another example of the difficulties confronting NGOs in this sector can be illustrated by the efforts undertaken to rehabilitate the traditional handloom industry in the district of Ampara, Sri Lanka. The fairly considerable foreign investment has consisted largely in the replacement of looms and material, giving little attention to product improvement and diversification. This improvement could be deemed to be necessary to enable the industry to tap into an existing but previously inaccessible high-end market for these products. However it was beyond the scope of this study, and of most NGO interventions in the rehabilitation phase, to assess the real potential for growth of the handloom industry in Sri Lanka.

This points to a missing complementarity with broader economic recovery initiatives, driven by the private sector. Market research and the conversion of segments of the economy require long term involvement, and more breadth of expertise, of a kind which is simply not granted to NGOs which operate with funding of a maximum of two or three years' horizon. As a result the evaluation found during the coastal field work quite a lot of evidence of too many people being trained in the same kinds of activity, and provided with economic assets, but with no adequate assessment of market demand having been done. At the same time the claims to investment in livelihoods by NGOs may have led to unrealistic expectations on the part of donors as well as of the local communities.

[49] Fisheries-Based Livelihoods in the post-tsunami context, People's Report: India, the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Thailand; 2007

Yet the potential for change is created by the tsunami itself. As noted in the documentary review, in the Maldives a "significant number of households have changed their livelihoods after the tsunami"[50]. One of the factors that this can be attributed to is that there are still many families in the process of being relocated from transitional shelters to new houses on 'safer' islands. While their shelter and infrastructure needs are being catered to, the livelihood activities they have been pursuing for the last four years face disruption and re-adjustment during the relocation process. No organisations have emerged to support this transition in a comprehensive way.

3.7 Conclusion

The evaluation finds that underneath the renewed economic development in the three affected countries after the tsunami, the actual targeting of the poorest groups by aid efforts has not been very strong. There has been extensive evidence of rapid asset replacement by relief actors, but generally NGOs have not been well equipped to deal with a complex local economy to achieve long term opportunities. As a consequence the state has become the main provider of support, while it is itself confronted with severe resource constraints.

While many of the programmes have attempted to give fishermen the training and tools to fish, rather than just supply relief food, to coin an old adage, they have mostly failed to achieve sustainable local livelihoods. Larger industrial programmes have remained remote from the economy that is accessible to the broader population in tsunami affected areas.

Had donor projects handled by NGOs been given a longer horizon than the one to three year timeframe commonly available for humanitarian work, one can reasonably assume that the LRRD would have been more effective in improving the livelihood security of tsunami affected households. There is a clear need here for larger scale programmes to undertake more detailed poverty analysis as well as generate the missing link between local livelihoods and national development.

[50] UNDP et al., 2007, p.34

4 Social fabric and community development

4.1 Introduction

Social fabric is the social and normative infrastructure of society which, together with material and technical infrastructure (such as roads, electricity networks, schools, etc.), shapes the quality of life of individuals[51]. Social fabric encompasses a common understanding on the fulfillment of values and needs of human beings.

The theme captures the extent to which the social fabric in tsunami-affected areas may have been altered, and what part of that is a direct or indirect consequence of tsunami recovery efforts. The questions addressed are:

1. How have communities rebuilt their internal relations?
2. To what extent have housing and reconstruction programmes resulted in functional communities?
3. How have the micro-politics encouraged or hindered recovery, and to what extent have they been taken into account?
4. Has information flow improved and been used to engage with affected people?

The evaluation takes as its starting premise that 'adequate housing' (a basic human right) is a useful barometer of people's general well-being and a window on community dynamics. Based on this, we undertook critical appraisals of chains of effects of social change around shelter projects reviewed through a number of case studies. We chose the criteria of housing schemes (temporary, permanent house on new site, permanent new house on relocated site, and in some occasions non tsunami affected populations).

[51] Breton, Raymond et al. 2003. p.5

Shelter and housing have been salient aspects of relief and rehabilitation programmes in terms of volumes and perceptions: 44% of respondents to our survey in Aceh see housing as the priority item. Of all aspects of life, the tsunami was particularly damaging to habitat. In Indonesia alone, it destroyed 127,325 homes, and damaged 151,000 more[52].

At the time of writing in all three countries people remain displaced where reconstruction has not yet been completed – or in some cases, not yet started[53]. In December 2008 the Asian Development Bank Institute[54] states that 30,000 houses remained to be built.

BRR officials have praised the fact that at the time of the evaluation more than 120,000 homes, 3,500 kilometers of roads, 266 bridges, 20 ports, 12 airports, 954 health facilities, 1,450 school buildings and 979 public offices had been reconstructed. But the process clearly remains incomplete[55].

This means that the process of community reconstruction is still ongoing, or that new communities have been created. In densely-populated parts of suburban Colombo, where people migrated to seek assistance, as well as in Ampara and in most affected sites in the north, many are still in temporary shelter, with little hope of getting permanent homes soon. This combines with displacement caused by war in both Indonesia and Sri Lanka, and points to the central nature of housing.

A high number of survey respondents in Sri Lanka (31%) indicated that access to new housing was still a major problem whereas it was significantly lower (18%) in Aceh where very few people remain in temporary shelter. In some islands of the Maldives (Meemu Kolufushi and Gaaf Alif Vilinghili, Nilandhoo and Dhandhoo) people remain displaced in temporary shelters where reconstruction has not yet started[56].

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[52] BAPPENAS (2005)

[53] The end of 2008 figures are:
- Sri Lanka's total IDP caseload includes the 182,802 post-April 2006 IDPs, another 272,712 individuals displaced by conflict prior to the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), and an estimated 26,073 Tsunami IDPs for a total of 481,587. In addition, there are 21,677 Sri Lankan refugees in India including 1,240 who have arrived in India since January 2008. (Source: UN Country Humanitarian Action Plan, CHAP, August 2008, reported by IDMC, 27 August 2008).
- Aceh (conflict IDPs): As of early 2009, the number of IDPs in Aceh is unknown. In 2008, the Department of Social Affairs estimated that 1,500 households, or roughly 7,500 individuals, were still unable to return either because of insecurity or because their houses had been destroyed during the conflict. All were located in Bener Meriah regency (ICMC, 2008). Early 2009, the number of households still waiting for housing assistance, a large number of whom would be IDPs, is estimated at 6,300 households, or roughly 30,000 people (Daily Aceh, 26 January 2009).

[54] Reconstruction after a Major Disaster: Lessons from the Post-Tsunami Experience in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, 2008

[55] In Indonesia, 120,000 homes were reconstructed, which is 600,000 individuals (with an average of 5 people per household, using the CRED criteria for national disasters). Out of the roughly 1 million tsunami-related IDPs, this indicates that a further 400,000 individuals (80,000 households) still do not have houses rebuilt, ie. They remain displaced. However, the ADB report suggests that only 30,000 houses remain to be built, indicating that 150,000 people will remain displaced. Maldives: Approximately 5,000 tsumani IDPs out of 12,000 initially displaced (MIDP, Government of the Maldives, November 2008 statistics)

[56] NDMC (National Disaster Management Centre, Management of IDPs department). This was set up the day after the tsunami by MNDF – the ministry entitled Maldives National Defense Force.

4.2 Effect of integrated development on social relations

Four years after the tsunami, as will be seen below, evidence suggests that most relations are on the mend as regards events linked to the tsunami, if not entirely repaired. National and international aid efforts have mostly been instrumental in helping the process.

Social reintegration was assessed positively by respondents in the LRRD2 survey in Indonesia. They overwhelmingly state that their life is better today in comparison to before the tsunami, as regards their own relationships within the community, people's engagement in mutual help, the functioning of the government, infrastructure in the village, their own houses, future opportunities for youth, the status of women in society and the overall quality of life.

In Sri Lanka the picture is much more mixed: whereas people find that the functioning of the government, village infrastructure, the future opportunities for youth, and the status of women in society, are better today than prior to the tsunami, they consider that their own relationships with the community, engagement in mutual help, their houses, and overall quality of life were better before the tsunami than today.

Beyond contextual factors, however, certain aid practices are revealed to be more decisive when one compares results across interventions and communities. There is a direct correlation between the faster rebuilding of community relationships, and the adoption of an integrated approach to programming. By integrated we mean those cases where a housing project is complemented by a livelihoods or community support activity.

The issues which communities deal with are multidimensional and acute, including the meaning of events that are beyond human understanding. Where housing and other recovery components have been implemented in isolation of each other, community development remains fragile. This can be understood not only in terms of how interventions relate to the experiences of the population (are they dealing with a partial aspect of life only?), but also of the underlying social roles, such as gender (are they recognised and used for growth opportunities?).

At the individual level, feelings of trauma and fear continue to be important issues for many: the LRRD1study reported that 86% of respondents in Sri Lanka suffered trauma, mental health or fear to some, or great extent, immediately after the tsunami, 53% one year later and 60% in 2008; in Indonesia, a similar relapse has occurred with 67% suffering these effects immediately after the tsunami, 54% one year later and 67% today. Although the survey did not cover the Maldives, several individuals interviewed there attested to continuing psycho-social disorders such as recurring panic attacks and nightmares. Some NGOs, such as Terre des Hommes, have addressed such issues, some integrating it into the actual delivery of a broader programme, for

example in health or women's livelihoods. It is widely agreed in aid practice that such integration achieves better results, and that women, which have been identified in many programmes, play a key role.

Taken in a wider context, in Sri Lanka trauma and fear were ranked fourth in importance, out of nine issues in 2005 (after loss of property, livelihoods and day-to-day life), whereas today it is ranked fifth out of nine (after loss of property, livelihoods, day-to-day life and local infrastructure). In Indonesia trauma and fear ranked seventh most important out of eight issues immediately after the tsunami, bottom of the list at the end of 2005 and fifth out of nine issues in 2008, with the same issues considered as more important as those reported by the Sri Lankans.

The increase in women's participation in societal decision-making and involvement in recovery activities is another factor of success. In Sri Lanka, only 21% of survey respondents considered that the status of women in society is better today than before the tsunami with 43% believing there is no change. In Indonesia, 32% say it is better today than before the tsunami whereas 36% believe there is no change. National and international NGOs alike have succeeded in facilitating and encouraging women to establish and run their own group.

Interventions that do not take these dimensions into account would inevitably face difficulties when attempting community mobilisation. Over time, there has been an increase in the number of organisations which have taken this approach.

4.3 Effect of local initiative on functional communities

The primary importance of attitudes to change is also affected by the material dimensions of recovery. In areas where vital infrastructure, such as access to electricity, water and sewerage systems, roads, schools and health services, has not been assured, social relations often remain dysfunctional. This is due to people being deterred from leading lives according to their own expectations, as well as loss of former livelihoods.

Waste management programmes in the Maldives for example have not had the desired effect of providing communities with safe and sustainable waste disposal facilities. The Canadian Red Cross Society and UNDP built waste management centres on several affected islands, but these stand empty and locked, because there is no possibility of disposing of the waste beyond piling it up. Sensibly, communities have chosen to continue with their traditional methods of burning, burying or dropping waste at sea rather than having it be a nuisance and, quite possibly, public health hazard (a complaint voiced in Gaafu Alifu), in the newly provided spaces. To assume that waste becomes government responsibility once it has been gathered in the waste centres is an example of inefficient linkage: if governments had not found a way to safely dispose

of waste before the tsunami there should have been little reason to expect them to suddenly do so afterwards.

The different implementation speeds of housing and infrastructure reconstruction also raise issues of social impact. Within one year the Indonesian Government was able to spend 96% of the allocated budget for housing reconstruction, a budget which was moreover 50% higher than the budgets for the sectors of infrastructure and livelihoods. Expenditure for these latter sectors only reached 26% and 16% respectively at the end of the first year[57].

In Sri Lanka, physical infrastructure, providing new settlements with access to roads, electricity and water is still limited, as some 15% will remain without access to water and 10% will not have electricity[58]. As we saw in the previous chapter on livelihoods, it can lead to lasting imbalances for the less privileged sections of society, when marginalisation stifles long term opportunities.

Public policy has also not always been beneficial to social fabric. In Sri Lanka most new settlements are situated far from the coasts due to the ban on building new houses in the buffer zone and the shortage of state-owned land outside the buffer zone. This has resulted in 55% of the new settlements located more than 2 kilometers from the coast and 34% more than 5 kilometers away[59].

The distance is a problem where communities say that it takes longer for children to get to school, for parents, especially mothers, to attend to school functions, and to access government health services, due to lack of frequent public transport facilities to travel the extra distance. For those dependent on fishing (fisher folk who must live close to the coast, both for quick access to the sea and to protect their boats, or those who have to go to fish markets to buy and sell fish) it is not easy to continue traditional activities when their new homes are located several kilometres inland. Some people reported having to get up at 2 a.m. in order to travel to fish markets, instead of 4 a.m., when they lived by the coast.

The situation has obliged families to turn to different livelihoods activities. It has further resulted in cases of split families, where the main body of the family remains in the relocation village and the fisherman stays in temporary lodgings closer to the coast, placing a strain on traditional gender roles.

In Sri Lanka the 2006 change of policy on the buffer zone led to confusion and the inability of many housing projects to reverse direction where works had been planned or already started. Action Aid's 'People's Report' states "The policy behind the reconstruction pro-

[57] BAPPENAS 2007, quoted in Dercon 2008

[58] Survey on Post-tsunami settlements of Sri Lanka, Income Recovery Technical Assistance Programme (ITAP), SRL/05/07M/NOR, International Labour Office, Colombo, 2007

[59] ILO 2007

gramme is one of the key factors behind its successes and failures. This policy has been subject to many changes and revisions over the past 30 months, resulting in much confusion and wastage". It further reports that "the unavailability of one single document which sets out the complete policy is problematic, making it almost impossible to capture all the modifications to the policy, as many minor adjustments/additions to policy are made through government circulars, some of which are specific to certain districts".

Likewise, in the Maldives, policy reversals have led to confusion and discontent – in some cases resulting in community conflict. The population consolidation policy is not available in English and most interviewees – including government officials – had differing interpretations of it. It has not been shared with the population. Drawn up before the tsunami, its main premise is to reward whole island communities who agree to relocate to population 'hubs' – larger islands that provide safer land on which to build and develop community and economic activity. However, it failed to take into account the fact that many people in individual communities do not wish to relocate, preferring to remain on their ancestral home island despite safety drawbacks and economic non-viability. This led to split families: the younger ones (mainly) who wished to find economic, educational and health opportunities on the larger islands and the older ones (mainly) who did not want to move.

Initially, aid agencies followed the official plan in the spirit of aligning assistance with government policies. In 2007, recognizing that popular discontent was leading to social tensions that did more harm than good to the social fabric – especially in Laamu Mundhoo – consultations with the government and the islanders led to a more nuanced approach. A limited number of houses were re-constructed in the island for those families who expressed a wish to remain.

The concept of 'building back better' in terms of more solid and modern housing has caused resentments between those who received a new and modern house and those who did not, and whose houses are flimsy, unstable and – in the case of the Maldives where salt from the tsunami waves continues to erode the coral housing structures – progressively uninhabitable.

It also contradicted the social entitlements. Because the wealthier tended to live in more solid housing, their houses withstood the worst ravages of the tsunami and their compensation was in the form of repair money. The poorest, who lived in houses of poor quality, lost their dwellings completely and were entitled to the new, modern housing prescribed by government housing norms. The fact that the poor got new and improved houses and the wealthier did not has upset the social hierarchy of society and left festering resentments.

Higher rates of sustainability have been achieved where the communities could exercise initiative. This was visible from qualitative observation of the housing communities themselves, more densely inhabited, and from interviews with the participants, where they would mention the NGOs directly as benefactors, whereas the names of the NGOs were not clear when programmes were not owner driven. In Aceh the evaluation encountered many families who initially decided to stay in the relocation house but then decided to move back to their transitional shelter on the site of their former houses, not only because they wanted to be united, but also because women could resume former livelihood activities such as drying and salting fish and selling it to the market. According to those interviewed, they intend to use the new house eventually, but seemed unsure as to what factors would lead them to move there permanently.

In Aceh, the IFRC provision of transitional shelters has largely alleviated the downside of inland relocation sites. These popular houses are in evidence all along the coast in Aceh Besar and Aceh Jaya, providing basic shelter for fishermen while their families are able to live in permanent houses constructed further inland – or in some cases, move back and forth between the two. Indeed, many permanent houses stand empty as families prefer to live in the IFRC house where they can be close to the coast.

When BRR changed its buffer zone policy, most housing reconstruction agencies had already drawn up their plans and started reconstruction in relocation sites. It was too late by then to alter plans and reconstruct in sites chosen by the beneficiaries in the buffer zone. Beneficiaries interviewed in Aceh consequently took the view that housing allocation is a lottery[60]: if you are lucky, you will 'win' a good-quality permanent house with functioning infrastructure, and if not you will 'lose' with a poor-quality product far from your previous site, with neighbours you do not know, in a possibly hostile community, with only rudimentary supporting infrastructure. Our survey reveals that 60 to 70% of beneficiaries would have preferred to build their own house themselves, though this finding was not always consistent with the views of people interviewed in the qualitative study (where more acceptance of planned housing was expressed).

Respondents complained about quality (poor design, fragile roofing in particular) the most in those housing programmes where the performance of contractors has not been adequately monitored (there have been cases in all three countries of some contractors absconding with programme funds midway through the work) or where the owners have

[60] The word 'lottery' is the term people in Aceh themselves used to reflect their faith that life, death, wealth etc. are determined by God. If it is God's will that one should have a good house or not, it has to be accepted. In this way, people perceived it like a lottery in which no one knows in advance who will win or lose. In the Maldives housing allocation is determined by a real lottery which is the customary way of asset allocation and unanimously perceived as fair to everyone.

not been sufficiently guided in reconstructing their houses, in particular the women. The evaluation observed that both approaches can be equally successful or unsuccessful according to the level of monitoring and guidance.

4.4 Effect of aid on micro politics and culture

The micro-politics of local social relations[61] have encouraged as well as hindered recovery. In most cases aid efforts were slow to recognise these factors and slow to adapt their work to them. An upcoming evaluation of the research commissioned by the International Development Research Council of Canada around conflict and the tsunami[62] showed that the distribution of aid has been by far the single most important source of conflict within communities. This is played out through a number of scenarios, relating to rent seeking from distribution, the disruption of social hierarchy, lack of cultural sensitivity, and the inappropriate distinction on the ground between conflict affected and tsunami affected populations in Indonesia and Sri Lanka.

The interplay with local social structures however occurred in different ways over time. The LRRD1 studies on Indonesia and on Sri Lanka had described how the use of local structures (the Keuchik, or village head in Aceh, for example), which meant that aid intended for the more vulnerable would end up reinforcing the status of the elite groups. There appeared to be no effective mechanism to rectify the situation[63], and the Sri Lanka case study raised concerns regarding the access to housing of communities with no land titles[64].

Shifting to long term rehabilitation has in fact addressed these concerns. The Document Review showed how aid related conflicts registered by the World Bank in Aceh dropped to half of all registered conflicts after 2005[65]. The interviews carried out in the different themes of the evaluation showed a perception that the poorest had benefited most from relief assistance (which is different from the point made as regards livelihoods, and also different from geographical targeting, as here the issue is intra-community). The survey reinforces this message with an overwhelming number of respondents (some 85%) saying they were not affected by corruption.

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[61] Using the terminology proposed in the ToR

[62] "Evaluation of Peace, Conflict and Development Research in Countries Affected by Violent Conflict, South Asia Case Study", Hoffman et al. Channel Research, draft. Review of the International Centre for Ethnic Studies project "Post-Tsunami Reconstruction in Contexts of War"

[63] Evaluation of LRRD Regarding Intervention in Connection with the Tsunami, Indonesia Case Study, p34. Channel Research for Sida, 2006

[64] This study also note: "The evaluation received numerous complaints of inappropriate targeting, including reliance on social status, bribery, and lobbying capacity, amongst others, to determine beneficiaries of goods and services primarily during the post-relief period. Nearly half of respondents to the LRRD quantitative survey felt that the relief and rehabilitation activities had caused conflict. A third of the respondents felt that the activities had also caused increased conflict at district and national levels

[65] Document Review, Section 4.2.1 Risks From Conflicts.

Paradoxically micro-politics were most affected by changes in entitlements, and greater alignment to need. Social rank disruption occurred where the head of village was only entitled to the same size and types of houses as other villagers. The interviews in Aceh indicate that in a society where local values hold social ranking to be in accordance with wealth, people tend to listen less to their head of gampong (village) since he no longer displays this feature of power.

In the Maldives most social disruption occurred between 2006 and 2008 where island elites delayed the start of reconstruction for different reasons in different islands, but mostly relating to a realisation that they would lose their influence if reconstruction plans were to be followed[66]. The various factors caused a split within the communities and in some cases within individual families. After intense consultations between the government, the communities and the aid agencies lasting two to three years, a compromise has finally been reached in all of the cases except one. These problems arose partially due to failure to contextualise aid according to different community characteristics and social relations. The social fabric, highly damaged by these conflicts, will take some time to heal, according to people interviewed.

Culturally foreign initiatives also resulted in some cases with beneficiary dissatisfaction culminating in certain cases, in unsustainable results. Some houses do not meet the requirements of the community, such as in Sigli, Pidie and the Maldives, where houses were built with the bathroom inside the house, and in Sri Lanka, where houses were built with both the bathroom and the kitchen inside the house. These are seen as culturally inappropriate since according to local traditions, the bathroom should be hidden and both kitchen and bathroom should be outside the house[67]. In Sri Lanka and the Maldives houses were not left empty for reasons of design but more to do with faulty beneficiary targeting.

The stark distinctions made between the disaster and war affected and between disaster affected and poverty stricken are also apparent from the differentiated levels of aid assistance provided, which may have potentially sown the seeds of future conflict and resentment between communities and households. Just to take an example, UNDP

[66] Gaafu Alifu: elites 'hijacked' the reconstruction assessments by putting forward beneficiary lists heavily favouring themselves and their friends, leading to a halt in the plans and the aid agency pulling out; Laamu Mundhoo: elites did not want to lose influence through relocation of a major part of the island's population to Gan; Meemu Kolufushi: communities belonged under two island chiefs in the same part of the island, one of which was due to lose his influence by the merging of the two communities under the initial relocation policy. H.A. Filladhoo: island elites originally had better houses which, because of their sturdier construction, were not destroyed. They resented the prospect of the poor (ie. non-elites) receiving compensation for a reconstructed house that would end up being superior to their own.

[67] Agencies point to early beneficiary aspirations to a modern house, with kitchen and bathroom inside, only belatedly preferring these to remain outside, as per tradition. Some beneficiaries are satisfied with the model, others not.

Sri Lanka's mainstream programme targeted at conflict-affected communities was being run parallel to its tsunami recovery programme. While the average cost of a house for the former programme ranged from US$ 2,500–3,000 maximum, the average cost of a tsunami house was more than twice that at US$ 7,000–8,000.

4.5 Effect of reconstruction on social exclusion

International interventions have made an effort to relate to the context as shown in the preceding section on community conflict, but the result is uneven, while in some cases positive in unforeseen ways. For example, although in Sri Lanka the housing policy clearly states that non-titled people should become beneficiaries (including 'encroachers', 'tenants' and 'sub-families'), international agency targeting has mainly favoured those with prior land tenure and house ownership, on the grounds that it was easier and less controversial.

A major problem for many beneficiaries in Sri Lanka is that a great majority has not received land tenure for their relocation plots[68], leaving them vulnerable to predatory practices in the future, such as land seizures by elites. None of the reconstruction agencies have been informed of the reasons for the delay. Some agencies (such as IFRC and Action Aid) even made it a condition to reconstruct houses only where tenure was granted in advance of the works, but this has excluded the poorest tsunami victims who tended not to have tenure eligibility because they did not have it in their previous dwellings (they are called the 'encroachers').

In the Maldives there have also been delays in registering houses because the law states that this can only be done once a boundary wall has been constructed. Moves are underway to make a temporary exception to the law to give time to new owners to build their boundary walls.

Conversely, housing recovery has in many respects benefited the poor and been less munificent to the wealthy. In all three countries poor people who used to live in sub-standard housing (shacks, lean-to's and unsafe shelters made up of bits and pieces of assorted materials) are now the proud owners of solid, safe houses 'that they could only dream of', in the words of one community member, and with which they are extremely pleased. Former elites who owned large houses and land plots have manifestly lost out since their replacement entitlements were no greater than anyone else' s in terms of plot and house size. There is considerable qualitative and quantitative evidence of a levelling effect on society, particularly in Indonesia (although no measurement of that can be found in social indicators in relation to the sole influence of aid). The Indonesians overwhelmingly see a "Hikmah" (blessing in disguise) in the tsunami assistance, even in economic terms (64%, surpassed only by peace at 90%).

[68] People's Report, 2007

Social protection systems remain rudimentary and depend largely on family and community networks, which is something which assistance has not affected. In Sri Lanka nearly 50% of respondents and 38% in Indonesia report that local government is most likely to provide access to services such as medical assistance, food, schooling and safe water. In Aceh, friends and family are still important in helping out (16% of respondents) and in Sri Lanka it is more likely to be self-help groups (10%), attesting to the strength of civil society.

4.6 Effect of Information and participation on social fabric

In all three countries information flows, in terms of communicating transparent and clear policies down to the grass-roots level, have improved only to a moderate extent since the early phase of the response. Here it is also recognised that there may be a disconnect between community expectations and reality. That is, some communities believe that information has been withheld because it has not been communicated to them by high authorities but by local ones, signifying a lack of trust in both. Alternatively they say that information is provided by aid agencies but not by national authorities, leading to rumours of official corruption. It could be interpreted as an assumption that the issue is weak vertical information flow, when it is in fact often a matter of weak horizontal information flow between recovery actors. This underscores the need for clearer communication on programmes at the level of communities, and open interaction with the population.

Overwhelmingly positive responses on information and consultation come from communities where owner-driven as opposed to donor-driven reconstruction was implemented. Yet even here some communities remain persuaded that the beneficiary selection process was not transparent, and remain resentful about real or perceived faulty targeting, which aid agencies have not been able to respond to adequately. Governments have made little or no attempt to explain why certain people were eligible for housing reconstruction and others not, and in many cases this is purported to be due to a high degree of favouritism.

Relationships with NGOs and international organisations have been poor mainly in those cases where the aid agencies have only made sporadic visits to the community and have devolved almost all communications with beneficiaries to contractors. In a more positive light, this is clearly an improvement from the early stages of the tsunami response, where confusion and distrust were quite universal[69]. The reports from respondents during our last visit were more diverse, and clearly aligned to NGO field presence.

[69] Multiple references in LRRD1 Indonesia and Sri Lanka studies, such as page 34 for the first, and 3 of the Executive Summary for the second.

However, there are exceptions in both approaches (owner driven and close NGO involvement). For instance, in the early stages of reconstruction in the Maldives, UNDP/UN-Habitat's programme ran into problems when communities were fearful that they would not be able to rebuild their houses without assistance and the programme risked foundering on community dissatisfaction. Progressive and patient guidance, supervision of the planning and technical assistance to the communities, played a large part in assuaging dissatisfaction, and the programme was successfully completed ahead of most of those that had adopted the 'donor-driven' approach.

In Aceh and Sri Lanka, community dissatisfaction with the work of contractors is high in some locations, but they have had so little contact with the original aid agency they have no recourse for their complaints. In Sri Lanka there is more trust and faith in aid agencies that were present in communities prior to the tsunami. Criticism is levelled against aid agencies with a lack of long-term commitment, something which their local interlocutors detect rapidly from the planning timeframes of projects. The departure of relief agencies and handover to more development oriented agencies has contributed to a better relationship to the affected populations.

4.7 Conclusion

Community solidarity and the rehabilitation of social fabric should be seen as one of the most striking aspects of the reconstruction phase, especially when compared to the related issues of capacity building and livelihoods promotion. The LRRD1 study had noted that there was a risk of increased conflict between affected populations and their community leaders, due to the brokering role and privileges that the early relief phase had given the latter. Over time however there had been an adjustment to better intra-community targeting, leading instead to leaders feeling left out.

While a return to optimal conditions has undoubtedly taken place (optimal in relation to the prevalence of conflict in many of the tsunami affected areas), this evaluation has identified a significant contribution made by recovery efforts undertaken by the authorities, civil society and international actors when they were well-integrated:

- Integrated approaches are the most conducive to the restoration of social fabric, in particular when psycho-social support, infrastructure investment and consultative approaches are combined;
- Initiatives that strengthen the participation of women (such as trauma healing, changes to lifestyle for disaster risk reduction such as the buffer zones, and housing design), acknowledge local cultural norms, and take account of the resources available to the local administration, yield better results in social rehabilitation;

- Targeting of the excluded populations has been carried through successfully from the relief phase to development, where objective criteria of need and progress of implementation could be monitored through ground presence;
- Owner driven reconstruction of housing has had the most beneficial impact on facilitating the effective recovery of tsunami affected households,

Within these areas of good practice, it was also found that micro-politics were all too often a risk to implementation, and, more importantly, that the need to address the needs of the conflict affected as well as disaster affected requires continued attention. This conflict sensitive component is the only real gap in the otherwise largely positive picture in this thematic area.

5 Risk reduction

5.1 Introduction

The questions addressed in this section are:

1. How have social, economic and institutional aspects affected DRR?
2. Did the tsunami create a window of opportunity or increased attention to disaster risk reduction?
3. Has the attention to risk reduction been sustained?
4. How have regional and international initiatives impacted on national policies and institutions?

The theoretical proposition we tested was that comprehensive Disaster Risk Reduction or DRR(containing all five elements of institutions, disaster knowledge, public awareness, risk reduction measures, and preparedness at the different levels of society) limits the extent of disasters; disaster risk reduction which does not include all five elements is likely only to have a minor impact on the extent of disasters.

In interviews, the affected population indicated that changes in housing and livelihoods, rather than specific DRR interventions, had the biggest impact on their vulnerability to disaster hazards. The study was also guided by a question about the extent to which hazards were changing due to climate change or other factors.

This realisation prompted a revision of the logic model as shown below:

Figure 3 Revised logic model for the DRR component



The figure illustrates the fact that it is the combination of various dimensions of policy (drawn from the Hyogo Framework for Action, a disaster risk reduction policy framework) which reduces risk, rather than the application of a single one of them.

This figure (Figure 3) is a simplification as it does not reflect the inter-linkages between the aspects of DRR shown, but also with non DRR themes such as livelihoods, capacities, the social fabric, the state and civil society. In fact this inter-linkage between risk reduction and other areas was repeatedly emphasised by comments made by interviewees during the evaluation.

A large number of agencies are engaged in DRR work. The exact number is not known, but when asked, interviewees referred to "everybody" doing some tsunami awareness or other DRR work. However, an analysis of 7,775 postings to ReliefWeb on the tsunami suggested that a few organisations were taking a leading role, at least in flagging up the issue. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies paid particular attention to the topic.

5.2 Changes at legislative and administration level

Disaster reduction, or at least reducing the risk from tsunamis, has become a priority in the region. The tsunami led to agreement to set the formation of the Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning Centre.

Sri Lanka has new legislation on this subject, as well as new institutions. Interviewees repeatedly stressed that the attitude to disaster risk has changed completely in Sri Lanka. The new national institutions are reflected also at the district level. Some divisions have disaster management liaison officers and some communities have disaster management committees, however these structures are more likely to be found in tsunami-affected divisions and communities. It is too early to say if these new structures will be sustained, as the memory of the tsunami fades.

Indonesia also has new legislation and new institutions, but they are still not fully operational. Guidelines are still being developed and roles and responsibilities still need to be clearly defined. However, there is a clear willingness to improve and build appropriate disaster management systems, which will take time. There is a shift from focusing only on response to also include preparedness, a dimension reflected in the new laws and guidelines.

The Maldives had undertaken some training and rehearsals for small-scale disasters before the tsunami, but there was no preparation or training for large-scale disasters. The Maldives has created some of the institutions necessary for Disaster Risk Management[70] such as the NDMC, but the Disaster Management Act[71] is still in draft form. For the Maldives the biggest threat is probably climate change rather than seismic disaster events. Climate change will be experienced initially as increased frequency of disaster events such as floods and tidal surges, and possibly more frequent or destructive tropical cyclones[72].

5.3 Changes in organisational knowledge

The Document Review has highlighted the degree to which there an increasing volume of documents published on disaster risk reduction by international, governmental and NGO institutions. The aftermath of the tsunami has prompted a great deal of research on tsunamis and the extent of the tsunami hazard. As recently as 2004 a manual on community-based disaster risk management in the region barely referred to tsunamis[73]. Since the tsunami there has been a great deal of attention to at least the tsunami risk, with investigation into historic tsunamis to establish their past occurrence and likely return period[74].

In Sri Lanka there was also some evidence that attention to and knowledge of other hazards was growing. The reasons for this were

[70] Muhusin, A. (2007). Disaster Risk Reduction through people centered National Multi Multi-hazard Early Warning System in the context of Maldives Paper presented at the Fourth Technical Conference on Management of Meteorological and Hydrological Services in Asia Islamabad, 5–9 February 2007.

[71] Disaster Management Act 2006, revised on 3rd October 2007 (not yet enacted). (2007).

[72] A recent report from the World Bank notes that while the incidence of natural disasters is increasing the incidence of flooding and windstorms is increasing much more rapidly than for other types of natural disasters. Parker, R., Little, K., & Heuser, S. (2007). Development Actions and the Rising Incidence of Disasters (Evaluation Brief 4). Washington: World Bank.

[73] Abarquez, I., & Murshed, Z. (2004). Community-based disaster risk management: field practitioner's handbook. Bangkok: Asia Disaster Preparedness Center.

[74] Bondevik, S. (2008). Earth science: The sands of tsunami time. Nature, 455(7217), 1183–1184. Dahanayake, K., & Kulasena, N. (2008). Geological Evidence for Paleo-Tsunamis in Sri Lanka. Science of Tsunami Hazards, 27(2), 54–61. Ikelman, J. (2007, 03 October). There and Back Again: Old Tsunami Data Come Full Circle. Jankaew, K., Atwater, B. F., Sawai, Y., Choowong, M., Charoentitirat, T., Martin, M. E., & Prendergast, A. (2008). Medieval forewarning of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in Thailand. Nature, 455(7217), 1228–1231. Monecke, K., Finger, W., Klarer, D., Kongko, W., McAdoo, B. G., Moore, A. L., & Sudrajat, S. U. (2008). A 1,000-year sediment record of tsunami recurrence in northern Sumatra. Nature, 455(7217), 1232–1234. Wattegama, C. (2005, January). The seven tsunamis that hit the isle of Lanka. Retrieved 21 November 2008

complex, but appeared to be based in a fundamental change of attitude towards risk since the tsunami.

In Indonesia different ministries are responsible for different disasters types and the data systems differ and are not compatible. This is on the agenda for the new institutions however, and the issue is being discussed on how to standardise the early warning systems and thereby improve the monitoring of disaster risks.

In the Maldives attention has returned strongly to the greatest long term threat, that of sea level rise due to climate change. There is now an early warning system in operation in the Maldives for tsunamis and other hazards such as tropical cyclones. Previously there was no system for early warning at any level.

5.4 Changes in awareness

Awareness of risk was frequently given by those interviewed as the biggest impact of the tsunami and the tsunami response.

In Sri Lanka, many interviewees credited the tsunami itself (rather than any specific post-tsunami awareness-raising) with bringing about a profound change of attitude towards risk. The change in attitude was much stronger in Sri Lanka than in Indonesia as can be seen from the surveys carried out for the LRRD1 and for this particular evaluation.

Figure 4: Changes in the perception of risk

Question: "Which of the following future threats or risks to your household are you worried about?" with Natural Disasters as one of the potential sources of worry.



Sources: Survey of the affected population 2008 LRRD evaluations.

As natural disasters are relatively more common in Indonesia it is not surprising that nearly half of those surveyed were worried about natural disasters to at least some extent before the tsunami. In Sri Lanka, while 80% of respondents reported that they were not at all worried about natural disasters before the tsunami, only 20% reported a similar outlook after the disaster. However, by late 2008, the proportion of respondents unworried by natural disaster had risen to 30.4%.

Tsunamis present a relatively rare hazard for Sri Lanka. Floods, landslides, and cyclones present far more common hazards, although they are generally limited to specific geographical areas. As well as work with coastal communities, there has also been far more limited work with communities exposed to flood and landslide hazards.

One could argue that the shock of the tsunami led to greater willingness not only to sign up to the Hyogo Framework for Action[75], but also to implement it. The tsunami led people everywhere who lived on the coast to wonder: "Can it happen here?".[76]

Interestingly, while the percentage of respondents indicating that they were worried to an extent about natural disaster declined in Sri Lanka from 81% immediately after the tsunami to 55% four years after, in Indonesia the percentage of respondents worried about natural disasters increased from 77% to 91% over the same time period. The reasons for this are not clear. It may be due to people in Aceh now paying more attention to natural disasters occurring elsewhere in Indonesia. These would serve as a reminder of the hazards they face themselves.

During the interviews with the population in Indonesia it became apparent that the perception of risk has heightened, and it is being discussed on a regular basis between family members, friends and colleagues. This indicates that the population is now more aware of risks than before the Tsunami and also more worried. The population seems to be following the Government's initiatives on risk reducing measures more closely now.

5.5 Risk reduction

The major tsunami risk reduction measure was the banning of construction of housing in the buffer zone. The size of the buffer zone in Sri Lanka was significantly reduced after the 2005 elections. Other planning activities on risk reduction include new building regulations for housing in landslide prone areas.

In Sri Lanka there has also been some attention to river basin risks, and a there is a large project looking at river protection works for the most troublesome rivers.

The buffer zones represented a major attempt to reduce disaster risk through physical planning. In Indonesia buffer zones were identified just after the Tsunami. However, pressure from those wanting to rebuild meant that the ideal was quickly shelved. Given that the planning restrictions were set aside or moderated in response to public pressure, it is surprising that the survey found so many supported the buffer zone.

[75] ISDR. (2005). Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters: Extract from the final report of the World Conference on Disaster Reduction: 18–22 January 2005, Kobe, Hyogo, Japan. Geneva: International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. The Framework is the predominant policy framework ratified by practically all members of the UN.

[76] Ikelman, J. (2007, 03 October). There and Back Again: Old Tsunami Data Come Full Circle. Retrieved 20 November 2008

Figure 5 Support for the buffer zone only changed slightly from 2005 to 2008



Sources: Surveys of the affected population for the 2005 and 2008 LRRD evaluations.

Many NGOs, including the Indonesian Red Cross together with IFRC, have invested in mangrove planting to hopefully reduce the effects of flooding and tsunamis. However while mangrove belts have many positive aspects including erosion control, the question of whether they can contribute to tsunami risk reduction is the subject of strong debate in the literature[77].

In the Maldives the islands are too small and too flat for the concept of a buffer zone to work. The physical planning risk reduction measure proposed here was the Safe Island concept. This included planning controls, areas of high ground, and emergency evacuation buildings, but has also proved controversial.

Risk reduction is a difficult issue for the Maldives as the geography of the islands leaves them continually exposed to tropical storms and the (relatively low) risk of tsunamis. There is no natural high ground, and many inhabited islands are so small that applying a buffer zone as in Sri Lanka would lead to them having to be abandoned. The new president now talks openly of buying land away from the Maldives where the population could be resettled[78].

5.6 Preparedness and early warning

The tsunami has led to the setting up of an Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System at the international level. These are supported by national operations rooms to pass on the warning. This is one area where there has been a great deal of national effort.

[77] Dahdouh-Guebas, F., Jayatissa, L. P., Di Nitto, D., Bosire, J. O., Lo Seen, D., & Koedam, N. (2005). How effective were mangroves as a defence against the recent tsunami? Current Biology, 15(12), R443–R447. Dahdouh-Guebas, F., Koedam, N., Danielsen, F., Sorensen, M. K., Olwig, M. F., Selvam, V., Parish, F., Burgess, N. D., Topp-Jorgensen, E., Hiraishi, T., Karunagaran, V. M., Rasmussen, M. S., Hansen, L. B., Quarto, A., & Suryadiputra, N. (2006). Coastal Vegetation and the Asian Tsunami. Science, 311(5757), 37–38. Kerr, A. M., Baird, A. H., & Campbell, S. J. (2006). Comments on "Coastal mangrove forests mitigated tsunami" by K. Kathiresan and N. Rajendran [Estuar. Coast. Shelf Sci. 65 (2005) 601–606]. Estuarine, Coastal and Shelf Science, 67(3), 539–541. Vermaat, J., & Thampanya, U. (2006). Mangroves mitigate tsunami damage: A further response. Estuarine, Coastal and Shelf Science, 69(1–2), 1–3.

[78] Toomey, C. (2009, 01 February 2009). The Maldives: Trouble in paradise. Retrieved 3 February 2009

There is an issue also with the "last mile" of the warning system. Although there has been good progress in the south of Sri Lanka with the erection of tsunami warning towers, only one of the planned six towers have been erected in the east of the country. Members of the affected population there denied ever having received any tsunami alert since 2004, whereas those in the South have received three warnings. However, the National Disaster Management Centre acknowledges that progress in the East has been slow due to the previous security situation there, but that quickly progress is now expected.

As well as the formal early-warning system, there is an informal warning system in operation. Every time any earthquake is reported in Indonesia, people get phone calls from relatives and contacts overseas to warn them about the tsunami risk. People also pass on tsunami warnings to each other. This led to the situation in October where a false alert in the South quickly spread through the area and had to be officially denied with media announcements and SMS messages.

Asking people about which types disasters they feel better prepared for now illustrates this strong concentration on preparation against tsunami hazards, both for Sir Lanka and for Indonesia.

The Indonesian Red Cross has initiated a new community based risk reduction programme that seeks to increase communities' capacities to deal with disasters and reduce risk. Trained Indonesian Red Cross staff goes to the communities and offers training. If there is an interest, a village committee is established with up to 20 persons. They are trained to develop a hazard, vulnerability and capacity assessment, and a risk map. However interest in undergoing the training, as detected during the field visit for this evaluation, is very variable, probably because the two weeks needed for the training represents a huge opportunity cost for most villagers.

When one compares the preparedness of communities for different risks, it becomes clear although most of the disaster preparedness training was concentrated on tsunami risks, that people have been able to analyse this and see that some of it could also be applied to other disaster types.

5.7 Significance of impact

The lack of well-documented major disasters in the tsunami-affected zone[79] since the tsunami means that the theoretical proposition (that comprehensive DRR limits the extent of disasters) could not be tested conclusively. However, the research did highlight some points around the linkages between changes in vulnerability and development.

[79] There were serious floods in Aceh in late 2006, but these primarily affected the interior rather than the tsunami-affected coastal strip. Barron, P., Clark, S., Daud, M., Fahmi, A. Z., Hasibuan, Y., Mawardi, A., & Rusli, M. (2007). *Aceh Flood. Damage and Loss Assessment.* Banda Aceh: World Bank.

Changes in vulnerability to risk are determined by changes in:

- Livelihoods (reduced vulnerability through better shelter and better livelihoods); here our findings in the other chapters would indicate the vulnerability has remained as high.
- The social fabric (for example the way in which people 'look out for each other' and circulate any information that they have heard about threats); this has improved in connection with the disaster in the Maldives and in Indonesia.
- The role of the state civil society (for example, the new interest of the state in reducing disaster risks even for places that undergo regular flooding, or the rise of community based organisations);a more empowered state, especially at the local level as in Indonesia, would indicate lower vulnerability.
- Local capacity (for example, knowing who to call to get information about river levels upstream); this evaluation would indicate that this has remained weak.

Several officials from the disaster risk reduction institutions in each one of the three countries commented on concerns about increased levels of hazard driven by climate change. This includes the hazard posed by sea-level rise, changes in rainfall patterns and intensity, and changes to the pattern of tropical cyclones. Two types of processes that could be seen as changing vulnerability are:

1. Planned disaster risk reduction interventions.
2. Other aspects of the relief and recovery operation.

The first type of process could be seen in the work on the tsunami warning centres, and in the creation of Disaster Management Centres throughout Sri Lanka. It could also be seen in the efforts to model Sri Lanka's rivers to avoid damaging flash floods, and to develop building regulations suitable for landslide areas. One of the biggest planned changes in vulnerability may be due to the relocation of people away from the seashore where the main hazard may not be tsunamis but cyclones and storm surges.[80]

The second type of process sometimes decreased vulnerability, but occasionally increased it. Examples of increased vulnerability occurred where resettlement sites were ill chosen and people found themselves at risk of flooding, or without services such as water that increased their risk of illness, or so far from their former livelihoods that they were forced to change, losing the benefits of some of the capacities that they held.

[80] Many shelter projects had already begun before the buffer zone policy was reversed. While some of those living on the sea-shore were doing so for livelihood reasons, others did so because of the lack of other land for housing. The overall effect in Sri Lanka has been a net movement of population away from the shore.

More positively, the second type of process reduced vulnerability in many cases, by giving the poor access to good quality housing, and providing them with livelihood opportunities that they had not previously had. The evaluation was not able to find any document or study which had quantified the proportions to which this occurred.

Initially, DRR was not a priority for agencies more focused on immediate relief. However, agencies have paid more attention to DRR in their tsunami work with each passing year. Added to the slow start of DRR work is the time taken for DRR to take root. It may take decades before a risk aware approach is fully internalised, as many other factors cut across the process of improvement (such as conflict, which has increased in Sri Lanka, or democratic change, in the Maldives and Aceh). It is clear both from the survey of the affected population and interviews with them that the process of internalisation has begun, at least for the tsunami risk.

At the same time, the specialist bodies needed to support DRR are gradually coming on-stream. The Masyarakat Penganggulangan Bencana Indonesia (The Indonesian Society for Disaster Management) is a network of NGOs which all can join, which was established in 2003, designed to assist in learning from the need for better coordination and management for the disasters that occurred in Indonesia from 99 to 2002. This society initiated the drafting of the disaster management bill in Indonesia

However, it may take many years before these investments bear fruit. Finally, it should not be forgotten that vulnerability to disasters is indivisible from issues such as poverty, livelihoods, the interactions of the state and civil society, and general development. Work in these areas may reduce disaster risk without even having this as an objective. The study found, that in most cases reductions in vulnerability were by-products of other interventions (such as livelihood support), or of broader changes in the context (such as the end of the conflict in Aceh), rather than specifically as a result of DRR programmes.

Interviews in the three countries suggested that there is a broad awareness of the risk of natural disasters. However, it is an open question to what extent this awareness has been internalised to the extent that it influences everyday development decisions. It will be some time before the answer to this question is apparent.

Just before the tsunami, on December 15, 2004, the UK Secretary of State for International Development proposed that, given that evidence in support of increased investment in disaster risk reduction the UK would allocate 10% of humanitarian response funding for risk reduction[81]. However according to the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System donor commitments for disaster risk reduction were 2.7% of

[81] Benn, H. (2004). *Reform of the International Humanitarian System, ODI:* Speech by Hilary Benn, UK Secretary of State for International Development: 15 December 2004. Retrieved 28 Feb, 2009

humanitarian funding by donors in 2007, the later year for which data is available. It seems that the DRR message has not been internalised by donor administrations.

5.8 Conclusion

Disaster Risk Reduction is an area where strong linkages have been established between relief, rehabilitation and development. Progress both in terms of institutions, knowledge and practices can be observed in the region, although in many cases the roles of different bodies still need to be cristallised and coordinated.

The tsunami has clearly triggered greater awareness of the priority of disaster risk reduction, and greater sensitivity of what implications disasters elsewhere could have locally in the case of the Aceh population.

Risk reduction measures are increasingly taken, but still tentatively and piecemeal, leading to some contradictory assessments (for example the buffer zone policy in Sri Lanka, considered a hindrance, while the notion of the buffer zone is appreciated. Community levels of disaster preparedness have improved, but the final deployment of systems still needs to take place. Informal community systems however now operate, and community based networks show good results.

Overall vulnerability to natural hazards has decreased and will continue to do so, particularly thanks to greater social cohesion and the stronger role of the state, but this is still too haphazard in practice, mainly because of the need for more local capacity development, and changes in livelihoods.

6 Capacity development

6.1 Introduction

When the term "capacity" is used, we refer to the capacity to solve problems, in other words, the ability to carry out a process of disaster risk management through relief, rehabilitation and development.

For the purpose of this evaluation, Capacity Development is a process by which actors in society gain the ability to solve their problems[82]. In the disaster recovery and risk management context, relevant problems to solve include:

a. Meeting emergency needs
b. Accelerating economic recovery
c. Reviving and building social security and social networks
d. Reducing current and future social and economic risks faced by local communities
e. Cooperating with other actors to address these problems

Capacity entails not only resources, skills, knowledge and institutional resources, but also the ability to claim or establish ownership (influence and control) over decisions and actions from response to recovery. This chapter asks: to what extent has capacity building taken place?

A lot has been written about building local capacity after the tsunami. The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition reports found that it was local capacity that determined how many survived after disasters, and it was the local capacities that served as the wheels on which overall recovery

[82] The in the Community Empowerment Project of the World Bank, existing capacity is defined as "the ability to solve problems. People who have survived by trying to solve problems in difficult economic and political conditions have considerable capacity to put their experience and skills to work, once they are empowered… Once it becomes clear that local people have the power to solve problems, they will at last have the incentive to organize, assess current ills, and work out solutions..."

moved. Capacity in this sense includes not only the individual level, but also that of the organisation, and the governing or "enabling" environment[83].

The review includes analysis of capacity building efforts, with a particular attention to disaster risk reduction as a case study: one IFRC member (Indonesian Red Cross), one UN agency programme (CADREP of UNDP, Sri Lanka), and one NGO (Care Society, Maldives). Selection was made by the evaluation team and discussed with the stakeholders in the Jakarta workshop.

These programmes were chosen to represent a range (in terms of size and international organisation type) of stakeholders and approaches in disaster risk reduction, where linkages are particularly important. As there are limits in terms of comparison as the organisations have different mandates, expertise, history, documentation, disaster experience, and operate in different contexts, we have used broader evidence collected during the quantitative and qualitative research.

Evaluation visits were made to communities and organisations in Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Indonesia. In Indonesia, the experience of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) is valuable for the capacity development study, as this organisation has played a large and central role in both relief and rehabilitation phase in housing, livelihood and other key sectors. The experience of the IFRC, especially the Indonesian Red Cross (in this report as Palang Merah Indonesia is referred to as Indonesian Red Cross), is also important as it allows an investigation into a range of social movements with local, national, and regional capacities for a range of humanitarian and development-oriented links. The IFRC builds capacity and has built its own capacity in a range of disaster management issues including that of Indonesian Red Cross. IFRC efforts for tsunami recovery in Indonesia have revolved around five priorities[84]: shelter, health, water/sanitation, disaster management, and organisational development. Now that recovery is winding down, the Indonesian Red Cross is taking the opportunity to "go back to basics" and has elaborated a 2008–09 strategy that focuses on disaster management as the first among three goals[85]. These priorities are derived from needs identified and the IFRC global strategy. IFRC work on capacity development focussed on the organisational development of the Indonesian Red Cross, community capacity building, and institutional preparedness for emergency response.

The Capacity Development and Recovery Programme (CADREP) has been a key nation-wide DRM initiative launched by Government of Sri Lanka and the UNDP with support from Norway, Germany, Spain,

[83] OECD/DAC (2006)

[84] IFRC (2008)

[85] Others include: health and care, organizational development, and humanitarian values. IFRC (2008c, p2).

and Italy. The Programme's objective was "to develop the capacity of government and civil society in the planning, disaster and information coordination, management and delivery of recovery and reconstruction services on a sustainable basis."[86] This was to be undertaken through capacity development of public administration, local government, civil society, and the private sector for managing and delivering sustainable recovery services. This case provides insight into the design and implementation of a broad capacity development initiative that worked toward DRM policy development, strengthening local administrative capacity to prepare for disasters, and work with civil society in a more enabling manner[87]. CADREP ended within three years but offers insight into how district and national governments can work with a multilateral agency to implement capacity development.

Care Society in the Maldives is a rare example of a civil society organisation (CSO) that worked on local development issues before the tsunami. After the tsunami, Care Society reached out to the affected population directly and worked to influence public policy in favour of the victims.

Care Society is an NGO registered with Ministry of Home Affairs since 1998. Care Society aims at improving lives of local vulnerable people. Care Society is supported by around 300 resource members. Building capacity of NGOs and CBOs and responding in times of disasters are two of the Care Society's four aims. Before the tsunami, Care Society's main focus was on disability. After the tsunami, Care Society trained up to 250 individuals in psycho social training as well as in women's rights, counselling, and conflict resolution with Action Aid and Oxfam support.

In addition, in 14 islands, up to 700 individuals were provided support for livelihoods by Care Society. A total of 230 families were provided with agriculture support. Care Society also launched nation-wide wide network of Violence against Women including with women affected by tsunami and built five pre-schools and safe play areas for children on various affected islands to promote risk reduction. The focus of DRM in Maldives, so far, has been on tsunami risk, storm surges, fire, and climate risk. Storm surges and cyclonic winds are the main rapid onset hazards facing Maldives, particularly along atolls in the north between May and July.

[86] UNDP (2005)
[87] UNDP (2005)

6.2 Local development frameworks: whose capacity?

A salient issue in each of the areas and with many stakeholders is that many programmes are designed to build the capacity of someone else. This has been a longstanding twofold limitation of capacity building efforts following emergencies[88]. One is the supply-driven nature of capacity "building", i.e., agencies from more developed countries focusing on someone else's capacities rather than encouraging local organisations to set their own capacity development agenda, and the second that humanitarian agencies invest in (or just 'rent') local capacities in order to implement their own projects and not to contribute to these local organisations' own goals.

Few initiatives sought to improve an institutions' own capacity to manage recovery effectively, whether they were programmes of donors, national ministries, INGOs, local NGOs, or communities. Some agencies delivered services and developed their know how without prior knowledge in the sector (e.g. housing).

The Poverty section discussion, elaborated above, noted that ineffectiveness of support was often due to low levels of relevance to the context. Based on evidence in the field for the three organisations selected for our study, work is done for designing interventions at the district level either with the government or with NGOs (which tend to be international). Less is done for membership based poor people's organisations or movements (which often do not have an NGO status and are referred to as associations). Outcomes so far are essentially related to legislative tools and the assignment of responsibilities to national bodies (quite often government in Aceh).

Timeframes do not appear to have been a constraint on capacity building in relation to the tsunami. Emergency work has included capacity development, such as trainings and assets such as pre-positioned relief stocks or rescue tools, and the development and regular testing of contingency plans; the establishment of emergency funds to support response and recovery activities; reinforcing social and financial safety mechanisms and strengthening community based disaster risk management programmes, as indicated in the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015[89]. From AIDMI's own work, direct support to the poor people's own organisations can be added into this list.

There are significant examples of the development of intermediary capacities that are in a position to address recovery needs. As noted above in the section on Social Fabric and Community Development, social protection systems continue to largely rely on family and community networks. For example in Sri Lanka, one effort to mitigate tension over distributions was the People's Planning Commission. The Commission received support from local CSOs and INGOs and con-

[88] Christoplos (2005)
[89] UNISDR

sulted communities in the east to collect opinions on what people wanted in the recovery plan. This process provided a constructive channel for sometimes politicised local demands by turning them into concrete plan elements. RADA of Government of Sri Lanka made similar efforts to bring recovery closer to communities.

In Maldives on the other hand, capacity development strategies have mostly focused on the national level and so far remain highly centralised. Atoll and island leaders are selected by the centre instead of elected locally. Although a range of community organisations exist, very few have sufficient national reach to promote DRR across atolls or with the central government[90]. At the local level, a fair amount of awareness is raised and key atolls have developed preparedness plans, though yet to be made available in the public domain, but sustainable community actions for preparedness that are independent of outside funding are less common. A focus, by international actors on the capacities of local structures grew only after the initial response[91] in 2005.

In Indonesia, implementation of capacity development strategies remains in the initial stages. The Indonesian Red Cross found that implementation of activities under the banner of "capacity development" is often more focused on service delivery than long-term capacity development. Inputs of capital and training have been provided. For example, according to the Revised Plan and Budget the Indonesian Red Cross has installed emergency kits for families in 21 branches. Yet, it is not yet clear whether local capacity has been supported to determine this need and procure these kits locally. Radio equipment has been installed in each branch for early warning dissemination. The IFRC is also providing training to branch volunteers and staff but with little reference to how these capabilities will be maintained.

6.3 International alignment around capacity building priorities

The case studies found that the capacity building efforts of foreign organisations reflected the assumption that the agencies had the capacity to carry out the deed. This was often not the case in unfamiliar territory with new partners. In disaster recovery this notion of capacity is increasingly defined in sectoral terms (especially with the adoption of the so-called Cluster Approach). These sectors do not reflect the way local recovery takes place and are difficult for local partners to follow, especially for civil society as recovery is hardly ever so clearly and orderly organised. The assumptions about long term integration are often questioned by the government, NGOs, and local communities[92].

[90] Patel and Lawry-White (2006)

[91] Patel and Lawry-White (2006)

[92] In particular, see ALNAP Annual Review (2004)

Providing support to local individuals and organisations requires an approach with a flexible and long funding timeframe. Organisations that have been able to provide support successfully to local capacities are seen to be distinct from "service delivery" agents, and integrate their plans into national programmes. For example in Indonesia, IFRC efforts in supporting health and pandemic preparedness in the area are in line with the government emphasis on appropriate technology use. Health care support was identified by IFRC as one of four key goals in Indonesia. By the end of 2008, over 184 hospitals and clinics were rehabilitated and operational[93]. However, emergency medicine remains an area where more government and civil society capacity can be built. Health system recovery and epidemic prevention are priorities identified in Indonesia's Master Plan for Rehabilitation[94].

Such a harmonious relationship naturally depends on an able local coordination. The alignment between the UN, NGOs and the government has benefited from BRR work and operations and has built capacity in the sector to promote effective community participation. Alignment with development strategies was more difficult in the eastern Sri Lanka conflict areas. CADREP played an active role in aligning support with the local partner capacities. UNDP pointed out that, "CADREP acted as a bridge between the CSO and GO" to unfold recovery actions, but CADREP performance was dependent on the local administration's capacity specific to district and sector.

Some of the largest capacity support efforts of the international community, such as CADREP, have been successful at developing national policies and authorities, but have been less successful in sparking local preparedness plans and effective grassroots emphasis on risk reduction. The result can be that when care is not taken these large programmes detract from support to smaller initiatives—including those that address gender issues—at district and subsidiary levels.

Furthermore, there is not an agreed international system available for promoting capacity to respond to and recover from large-scale disasters. Most standards and quality assurance measures are aimed at delivering water, sanitation, shelter, and now livelihood and installing complaints mechanisms. Even if participation is mentioned across the Sphere standards (Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response), there are no standards for supporting local capacity to manage water, sanitation, or shelter recovery needs, especially through development stages. Donor priorities are low on this agenda, even if Principle 8 of the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative indicates that donors should "strengthen the capacity of affected countries and local communities to prevent, prepare for, mitigate and respond to humanitarian crises…" Capacity development continues to mean many

[93] IFRC (2008a)

[94] Republic of Indonesia (2005, p. IV–7)

things to many actors over time resulting into its limited or non realisation.

The project approach which characterised the early years of the tsunami response posed challenges for human resource utilisation over longer-term development. A large number of local staff is now being let go as tsunami work ends. Many young professionals with experience in highly remunerated jobs with NGOs and the UN find it difficult to settle for a "regular" NGO job in Sri Lanka. Similarly a large number of international personnel are unable to follow up with a predictable career path due to the uncertainty of funding, pushing a large number to other types of unrelated and less useful work. Their experiences and decision-making skills learnt in recent years will remain their own assets, but how and when they will continue to be used is an open question. A pool of human resource with risk reduction skills remains unutilised for development purpose. Thus the most valuable human capacity remains scattered and under applied.

6.4 Use of existing capacity

There are several indications in the countries evaluated that recovery programming has supported long-term capacities to prepare for and respond to future disasters. Yet many of these national public programmes are financed through outside grants, loans, and other technical assistance that make it difficult to assess how much the efforts are valued locally. The preceding section on risk highlighted how programming has built the capacity of national actors to allocate central roles for response more than it has built capacity among communities to identify problems, and to devise, and follow through with practical small solutions.

Some of the largest capacity building efforts of the international community have focussed their support on national authorities and apex bodies, with the interesting exception of Aceh. These efforts are still evolving in developing national policies, but have been less successful in supporting local capabilities to identify and implement risk management strategies. The decentralisation of risk reduction measures, to speak of this sector in particular, is being deferred.

Interviews carried out for this evaluation showed that the awareness, among aid management professionals, of details of existing tools on capacity development was found to be in initial stages. Projects are driven by pressure to spend and be visible, and know-how is considered by many to be a "validation" exercise. With the exception of workshops of professionals, the use or exchange of existing regional capacity between countries studied and other countries in the region is low. Yet India had the experience of a major recovery effort in Gujarat (2001). Additionally, Thailand is home to some of the key disaster preparedness centres in Asia, such as the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center. A range

of universities and institutions excelling in related fields remained under-utilised.

Evidence we collected indicate that programmes capacity development implemented in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Maldives tends to be of a technical nature, while higher end training, and links to the well developed tertiary education systems, are rare. The evaluation and monitoring capacities within various organisations were not fully used for strategy development or management of humanitarian actions. Few evaluations or activities are used to develop skills within the local partners for impact performance standards, or monitoring methods. In all three countries, there are few efforts to work with students, researchers and teachers of local universities. When it is done, it is in the rehabilitation phase, and remains a small portion of capacity building activities (we indicated how this has even affected our evaluation, whereby personnel trained for the LRRD1 survey had been lost by the time of LRRD2).

With the exception of some successful examples, existing capacities were often bypassed or taken advantage of for use at higher costs (as consultants to international agencies) for a short time. The lead evaluator of the 2006 TEC report on local capacities pointed out that this "plunder" was damaging to the humanitarian response, the sector, and also to the ongoing development process as the job market was distorted or altered.

Capacity building offers more dimension and opportunity than is often assumed. In Sri Lanka, JICA found that using local capacity required long-term step-by-step planning and wide but output specific consultation, for which its officials said there was no time for that in early phase.

It has not been easy to build on local capacities in Maldives. Local organisations had little experience working with the government. As such, the capabilities of local civil society were often unapparent to organisations arriving to provide support. Yet Care Society was able and willing to work with the government to deliver as well as join in policy dialogues in some cases by stretching their schedules and mandate.

In the absence of outside support, many enterprising individuals rebuilt their self-run businesses to sell products and services as a matter of priority. Small traders and labourers took recovery and reconstruction as an opportunity to manage a livelihood providing contracting services to NGOs and recovering families alike. As mentioned in Chapter 3 of this report, the quantitative survey indicates that affected households work with friends and family to create jobs, while aid programmes were not named as being the main sources of opportunities. Markets, both, local and social, play key role in recovery but are little understood by the humanitarian system.

The use of information plays a considerable and underestimated role in capacity building. Individuals met by our study found that making and implementing plans for their own recovery was difficult when they heard that they would receive a permanent shelter but were unsure about the type, location, or quality.

This applies to the shaping of linkages between relief and development. Many of the thousands of individuals that donate to INGOs often want to "give a house" or "deliver a boat" to an affected family. If these thousands of individuals were to want to "build local capacity to provide safe houses", the organisations would engage in that. There is no mechanism available within the spectrum of LRRD to help this latent demand for building local capacity to be articulated, either as the rights of the victims or as a form of consumer demand from the beneficiaries of humanitarian aid and development investments.

Several studies and initiatives, including the Office of the Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery's NGO Impact Initiative, have emphasised the need for local capacity building in disaster recovery[95]. Several global efforts also give the mandate for supporting local capacity, including TRIAMS' emphasis on evidence of capacity for recovery, and the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative's call for donors to "strengthen the capacity of affected countries and local communities"[96] to prepare for an manage disasters. Additionally, the World Bank's evaluations of its disaster recovery support also call for support to local institutions for ensuring sustainable recovery by increasing the organisation capacity to respond quickly to disasters[97]. Public recognition and agreement on capacity development as a priority is one step forward but far from sufficient.

6.5 Conclusion

The issue of capacity development is affected by a lack of widely shared understanding[98]. Yet getting capacity development right is essential: regardless of funding levels, relief, rehabilitation and development efforts depend on capacities, particularly at the local level, for handover between initiatives.

The tsunami responses have initiated a wide and diverse range of capacity building efforts. These have come from a wide range of agencies and communities. However little has been done to operationalise these concepts into a know-how that would allow for a proper tracking of the progress achieved, and initiatives tend to conceive of capacity as something external, that could even be conceived of as an asset to be rented for specific tasks. The personnel management aspects of capacity are completely overlooked.

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[95] For more see: American Red Cross et al. (2006)

[96] Principle #8. From GHD (2003)

[97] World Bank/IEG (2008)

[98] OECD/DAC (2006)

More effort has gone towards building the capacity of others, and into building intermediary bodies for disaster risk reduction, than has gone into assessing whether capacity building is well handled internally, and spreads to local associations and the community. In the overall scene, there is a need for more long term funding, for more local level coordination such as was carried out by BRR in Indonesia. More fundamentally, disasters should not be seen only in terms of the assets destroyed, but also in terms of the priority to be given to the opportunity they create to cultivate resilience.

7 Conclusions

The conclusions here are structured by returning first to the premises of the international and national responses to natural disasters, and weighing the influence of LRRD against other factors. The second section reviews the finding of LRRD1 in 2006 to see what changes have occurred over time in LRRD itself. The subsequent chapters draw out key findings from each one of the themes, establishing linkages that could lead to effective LRRD.

7.1 The need for linkages to be based on structural analyses

The comprehensive focus of the present evaluation on the broad spectrum of recovery efforts still only covers a relatively small part of all the contributions made to the improvement of the situation on the ground. The Document Review even concludes that despite the dramatic nature of the tsunami, it is clear that contextual issues are a bigger constraint on development than the tsunami or its aftermath.

Referring to health and education in Aceh, a World Bank study noted that "striking long-term structural problems outweigh the short-term challenges after the tsunami"[99]. Conflict and structural issues have had a larger impact than the relief effort on achieving population focused outcomes. In Chapter 2 on the state and civil society for example, we have noted that at all levels structural factors prevail, whether it be the difficulties in implementing decentralisation policies, the fragile status of national civil societies, the political dynamics of the ending of conflict, and weak accountability in the affected areas.

This confirms that it is the overall development dynamics (be they structural or from conflict), rather than the "ripple" of the tsunami response, which are the predominant forces of recovery after such a

[99] World Bank. (2006a). *Aceh Public Expenditure Analysis – Spending for Reconstruction and Poverty Reduction*. World Bank. Last viewed on 27 October 2008.

large scale disaster – no matter how large the crisis and response (and few disasters have reached the scale and complexity of the present case). This lesson of humility should also be set against the fact that disasters such as the tsunami, which affect such diverse societies, so profoundly, in such a short space of time, dwarf human efforts, and are largely unpredictable.

Yet after years of a growing focus on disasters and disaster response and risk reduction in national and international institutions, this evaluation has identified a number of areas where a stronger level of linkage could be made between interventions. These areas relate to deep dimensions of international cooperation, and will only be addressed over time. As quoted by Buchanan-Smith in her review of the notion of LRRD[100], Randolph Kent echoed this thinking in his paper on 'Humanitarian Futures'[101]:

> "In the future, we will need a humanitarian paradigm shift that understands disasters and emergencies not as unfortunate occurrences that take place at the margins of human existence, but as reflections of the ways that human beings live their 'normal lives', and hence the ways that they structure their societies and allocate their resources" (p.12).

However, as the impact of emergencies spreads globally, 'interactive across continents' as Kent puts it, so must the response be flexible and multi-dimensional and fluid. It needs above all to be made more relevant to some broad conditions, in particular those relating to livelihoods, risk reduction, and local capacity.

There have been significant adjustments in the last few years, described in the preceding chapters, in particular with a recognition of the role of public administration, better targeting of populations within a community, more integrated recovery interventions, public consultation, and a priority to risk reduction.

A more conscious approach to capacity building, and to the need for rapid but structural interventions in economic recovery, would have rendered the impact of the combination of relief, rehabilitation and development more significant.

The overall picture of the response between 2005 and 2008 is one of experimentation. Linkages within national and international interventions are multiple, in some cases increasingly strong (for example in risk reduction or in livelihoods), but in others occurring by coincidence (for example in capacity development). Some are still missing, and the most significant gap is in longer term analyses of perceptions, of drivers and structures.

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[100] Buchanan-Smith, M., & Fabbri, P. (2005). *Links between relief, rehabilitation and development in the tsunami response: A review of the debate*. London: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition.

[101] Kent, R. (2004). *Humanitarian futures: practical policy perspectives (Humanitarian Practice Network: Network Paper 46)*. London: Overseas Development Institute.

The following figure illustrates the importance of this inter-linkage applied to disaster risk reduction (DRR) action. It is not just national and international capacities that count, but also the local and global levels. The effectiveness of the whole is undermined by the absence of one of the levels of DRR, all levels are essential:

Figure 6 The "dam" of DRR



An effective LRRD would add to the ability to prevent future destruction, the isolation of specific regions from national development, or the festering of conflict. In other words, LRRD can still shift the underlying forces at play, and turn the ripple of response into an effective wave.

7.2 Analysis of the findings from the first LRRD evaluations

The previous evaluations on LRRD (LRRD1)[102], carried out at the end of 2005, had remarked how the gap between relief and rehabilitation that commonly appears in disaster response was avoided due largely to access to unearmarked funds raised in the general public, and to donor flexibility. The early phase had provided the affected populations with the security needed to start rebuilding their homes and livelihoods. It noted however how the shift to rehabilitation had been slower, particularly for housing.

It is interesting to note how the present study similarly identifies a delay of development cooperation, whereby additional funding, beyond emergency reconstruction budgets, has also been slow to arrive. This is due to complex national policies, and the tendency to think that the (albeit well resourced) response in previous years had covered the needs of the regions.

The earlier evaluation also remarked on how the time required to address land rights, linkages to services and jobs, had not been fully apprehended in LRRD plans and declarations. This remains an issue. The LRRD1 Synthesis report and particularly the country studies spoke of the perception of broken promises, and mutual ignorance between the populations and the agencies come to help them. These issues have now moved on, both because of better community consultation mecha-

[102] LRRD in the Tsunami Response, Synthesis Study, Policy Study, Sri Lanka Study and Indonesia Study, previously quoted in this report.

nisms by the more permanent NGOs (as seen in Chapter 4 on social fabric), and because of the reinstatement of the state as the primary interlocutor.

Chiming with the present study, the previous evaluations remarked on the limited understanding amongst aid agencies of what was required for sustainable livelihoods. There was all too often confusion between asset replacement and rebuilding the fishing industry. The aid community, it concluded, had not assumed a strategic stance regarding how to add value and fill gaps between these two processes. This remains the same finding in the present evaluation.

The evaluation expressed a fear that as a consequence of this lack of understanding, some rehabilitation efforts may prove ultimately ineffective and unsustainable, undermining development, for example by encouraging over-fishing. This has not been noticed by the present evaluation, and has probably not happened, which confirms the finding in the original 2006 Sri Lanka study that the markets were adjusting themselves.

The evaluations stated that LRRD requires attention on how to align programming with national planning and capacities. It noted that although there were signs that this was happening, there was poaching of staff, and inattention to policy frameworks. The issue has now divided into two, with the national development policies much more taken into account through aid harmonisation processes (with all the complexities that this is throwing up in each of the three capitals), while on the other hand local capacity is still woefully undervalued.

Most agencies had shown ignorance of the historical trends in the two countries[103], and of how aid programming could avoid repeating mistakes, and had to make difficult trade-offs between speed and quality of response and in deciding where people should be encouraged to live. An unfortunate outcome of this had been a lack of attention to issues of risk reduction. This has now clearly been overcome, although very slowly.

The evaluations concluded that there was a tendency "to worry more about how an activity would appear 'back home' (ie where donors are) than its relevance for affected populations". There was a consequent need for LRRD to improve by breaking out from the project perspective, engaging with the local and national development processes, and not allocating responsibilities to agencies that cannot muster the skills and strengths to undertake a sizable recovery engagement. This coincides with our own finding that there is a need for a new kind of actor, which is not much in evidence in the three countries studied, that can undertake rapid area recovery programmes without falling into the pitfalls of NGO implementation.

[103] In LRRD1 only Indonesia and Sri Lanka were included.

7.3 The need to give greater effectiveness to the state

The increasing stature of the state in all countries has generated more opportunities for linkages. This has been best where policies are clear and decision making is decentralised. In Sri Lanka the large flows of assistance appear to have only ruffled the surface of development of the country, because of a more complex relationship to the state, lack of capacity in the tsunami affected areas, and the conflict acting as a brake on all development. This state of affairs was also exacerbated by the establishment of coordination mechanisms for the steering of the recovery effort which remained isolated and detached from mainstream development planning and the government's 5-year development plans.

These coordination structures have since been disbanded or been absorbed into the related line ministries with no proper handover of their responsibilities and a loss of institutional memory. The interplay of state and international response generated a fragmented donor response, characterised by intense dialogue in the capital, but more limited presence on the ground, while humanitarian agencies took on the lead role in reconstruction.

This primary role of humanitarian aid in Sri Lanka, and the way in which projects were organised, led to an enduring project focus or to sector based approaches (housing, treated separately from health, or community mobilisation for example). This was detrimental to capacity building and less sustainable than a larger scale and more long term approach. The sector-focused approach also led to problems in Indonesia.

In the three countries, the state, civil society and international institutions' roles have fluctuated over the period. The influence of international organisations and of national civil society has diminished over the four years, to the benefit of the state. The relations of NGOs to communities have also improved. On the one hand, there are new mechanisms of participation in programming. On the other the international cooperation philosophy relating to the Paris Declaration[104] has given increasing emphasis to modalities of co-decision with the state. Development cooperation still struggles with how best to deal with conflict outside humanitarian aid, and also struggles to reach the point of service delivery to the population even in areas where there is no conflict (for example in Nias).

The positioning of international and national cooperation in Aceh (revolving around the institution of BRR and the MDF) allowed for good linkages to emerge toward development, and had a positive influence on tensions in the province. In Sri Lanka, and to a lesser extent the Maldives, the aid exacerbated conflict, because resources provided became an arena for struggles to gain access to assets, legitimacy and influence.

[104] This aims to increase effectiveness by harmonizing approaches, creating common mechanisms of disbursement, and reducing the so-called "transactions costs" of each intervention.

7.4 The economic effect of aid is significant but not targeted

The linkages have had a significant effect on the economic performance of relief and recovery efforts within communities, but have not occurred as the result of intention and design. In Aceh (and to a far lesser extent in Nias, due to its relative geographic isolation) the humanitarian effort resulted in an effective livelihood security protection (reconstitution of lost assets) and could ensure handover to development actors thanks to an expanding economy. However, the focus of aid flows in general has been on areas that were both affected and more accessible (Banda Aceh and not Nias), which shows partial relevance to real need.

On the other hand in Sri Lanka and the Maldives the transition from relief to livelihoods is much more tenuous, as regards aid programmes. This is due to the absence of adequate linkages within rehabilitation programmes to markets and structural programmes which has stemmed from an insufficient knowledge of contextual realities regarding the needs and vulnerabilities of different livelihood groups.

In the Maldives on the other hand, while the (worst affected) sector of tourism has been able to recover to pre-tsunami levels thanks to the availability of massive private sector resources, small-scale and often home-based livelihood activities such as agriculture, home gardening, tailoring etc. undertaken by women on the islands have found it much harder to recover. This has been largely due to the relative isolation of these island communities from the main markets in the capital, Male, as well as to repeated displacement caused by the relocation of entire communities from temporary shelters to new 'safer' islands after a period of four years.

The post-tsunami reconstruction programmes had a significant economic impact, pouring large amounts of money into the local economies. This was particularly evident in Aceh were national flows have been greater than international flows. However, impact beyond the construction boom is much harder to find.

Humanitarian aid agencies, with limited expertise and resources for long term planning, and have been hampered by poor public policies. In LRRD, there is no clear distinction for the type of poverty or vulnerability which should be targeted at a given phase, with the result that different objectives are being pursued, sometimes with contradictory results.

Linkages have had a clear effect where market conditions could be reinstated, but disparities between areas remain a challenge. Where there is little market access for the population the benefits of relief wear off over time, and development does not begin. The organisations that work at the grass roots are ill equipped for long term planning, and further hampered by poor public policies and lack of access to the populations.

Attention has not yet focused on areas with the greatest need of development in Aceh and Nias. As demonstrated earlier in this report in the discussion on financial aid flows, donors have by and large been unable to override government policy to redirect development funding towards the historically more marginalised and deprived areas. The category of "tsunami affected" is in fact becoming more a hindrance than a contribution to recovery. This relates to economic structure, dominated by oil and gas exports. Agriculture and fishing, in which many people are engaged, offers few growth opportunities, while coffee, for example, mostly found in non-tsunami affected areas, is the highest contributor to exports.

7.5 Social fabric is best restored by integrated action

Shelter, housing and habitat have dominated the reconstruction activities, and there has been a progressive integration of the aid programmes within the communities, as field presence became more continuous and work with construction contractors more limited. Housing is considered by the affected population as a priority, and receives a high rating – particularly when it is driven by community ownership, and informed by a strong knowledge of local reality and interventions address some particular needs for psychological recovery. Social fabric has by and large been reconstituted, with the exception of the areas affected by intense warfare in the east and north of Sri Lanka, and lingering community resentments in some Maldivian islands.

The most successful interventions are those that have promoted integrated approaches, touching on a broad variety of sectors, and are linked to longer term development planning. These strategies have been however difficult to formulate in all three countries, due to policy fragmentation, excessively isolated initiatives, or political confusion. Humanitarian assistance organisations have a sectoral specialisation, which reduces the ability to take responsibility for populations in an area. It also reduces access to holistic information, while the local administration is not very able to ensure or handle the handover.

Shelter, housing and habitat are a priority for the population, but should be driven by community initiative, and informed by a strong knowledge of local reality. Agencies have tended to allow immediate objectives to determine their work, to the detriment of conflict sensitivity. However it is interesting to note that whereas early on the distribution of aid led to rent seeking and elite capture (amply described in LRRD1), this has been reversed over time through rehabilitation activities, with elites now feeling occasionally threatened by the egalitarian nature of pro-poor targeting within communities. This fact points to the need for aid agencies to maintain a strong focus on cultural appropriateness.

7.6 The practice of risk reduction grows slowly

Disaster risk reduction has become a progressively greater priority over the four years in the three countries, and multiple new structures have been created, triggered by heightened perceptions of risk in the population since the tsunami, and a concerted effort by national governments at the central levels to enact legislation and institutions that can address it.

This priority still needs however to be translated to the 'last mile' of disaster preparedness in outlying areas, and in a reduction of the vulnerability of populations, both in terms of livelihoods, of local institutional capacity, and in terms of physical exposure to risk. It is often, at the local level, the lighter and less formal networks that have the greatest potential to be effective. Development and disaster risk are interwoven, but in practice this linkage still needs to be realised by the aid agencies, which need to deploy more extensively at the level of populations.

Asia will be increasingly exposed to multiple natural hazards. Risk reduction work immediately after the tsunami in Indonesia was often heavily focused on a single hazard with a long return period, whereas the population itself has become much more aware of the risk of other types of disasters. Even though disaster risk in Sri Lanka, and even more so in the Maldives, is multi-hazard, the biggest investment in DRR is still in the tsunami-affected areas. A broader multi-hazard approach could provide the affected population in Indonesia with a better return on their investment in time in DRR activities.

7.7 Capacity building: a key yet undeveloped linkage

Capacity building is a concept that is generally accepted as a priority by all actors in LRRD, but is quite ill defined and externalised: it is often equated with acquiring technical skills. While national level and regional institutions are acknowledged, there is much less attention to the institutions that come from local initiative, or interact directly with the affected populations.

More crucially however, considering the importance of institutional development in the prevention of, and recovery from, disasters, there is a notable absence of concentration on the issue of timeframes required, and of personnel management, with personnel seen from the perspective of organisations and not of the work force from which they must come. Turnover, poaching of the most capable staff, the absence of predictable career paths to capitalise on investments made over the years, are frequent.

This also extends to the few linkages to academic institutions, and to the long-term plans for civil society institutions (which provide the bulk of the response in early stages). While it is generally agreed that were capacity building a priority visible to the general public, and in particular to the donors, it would receive appropriate resources, in fact agencies tend not to report on it, contributing to its absence in practice.

7.8 Overall conclusion

The risk of poor LRRD practice which was highlighted in LRRD1 has not materialised, namely the undermining of development. The evaluation has found supportive if inconsistent linkages between relief, rehabilitation and development. The surveys carried out about the perceptions of key needs in the population show that even though most households are still preoccupied with access to key services such as education and health, and fear economic hardship such as unemployment, their situation has not deteriorated after the tsunami. Although conflicts have taken on new forms, and differences in standard of living remain largely unaddressed, positive changes, such as a greater priority on disaster risk reduction and preparedness, and better practices in community participation, are taking root.

A more thoroughly linked-up response to the tsunami would not require major institutional adjustments, but rather a better recognition of the systematic approaches that need to be established in certain key areas. Unifying frames of reference, such as early recovery, disaster risk reduction, capacity building, or poverty reduction, are still conceived and implemented separately, and need to be better linked up through assessment and area or regional planning.

As a result the actors tend to concentrate on the achievement of their institutional programme objectives, and are little inclined to analyse their own cultural and governance environment in a systematic way. More damagingly, few have developed strategies for local capacity building. This absence of operational concepts of capacity building also extend to development aid in the affected areas, which tend to be treated as separate issues ('recovery') because of the resources they are considered to have received from relief and rehabilitation.

The main factor of success has been the continuity of field presence of partners that carry out relief, rehabilitation and development work within communities. This can include state structures (and here BRR and MDF in Indonesia feature as important models for future responses), but also NGOs that work in an integrated and participatory manner in communities.

It is possible for them to be better informed by local reality, with clearer capacity building relations to local actors, and needs assessments. The main question about relevant and efficient linkages is hence not so much about "relief", versus "rehabilitation" or "development", but rather one of choice of partners and the best way to work with them, and the scope of strategy. Because relevance is key to the linkages, improvement is to be found in better understanding of the context and of future needs that the core of LRRD lies. The first step is contextual assessment, which will be followed by a virtuous cycle of LRRD, represented in Figure 7 below:

Figure 7



By carrying out informed contextual analysis, donors, UN agencies and NGOs can overcome the project based nature of interventions. And by concentrating on coordination in situ all actors are better able to understand the limitations and needs of local capacity, as well as deploy multi-faceted disaster risk reduction measures. By giving clear planning priorities, national governments can provide a better framework for economic interventions and social mobilisation interventions.

In some cases it may also be necessary to create early recovery programmes with long term horizons, in effect a third track of response, situated alongside relief and development, ensuring that key linkages are maintained by the establishment of key capacities to handle handovers. This would use a different timeline for planning than a year by year approach, while remaining very open to contingencies. This form of assistance would require not so much a palliative approach (restoring conditions to the pre-existing level) but an adaptive one (adjusting to changed circumstances) with a focus on outlying regions, and on vulnerability and the capacity of a multiple range of local actors.

8 Recommendations

The recommendations presented below are based on the previous conclusions, presented here organised by specific actors. The scope of the recommendations relate to post-disaster efforts in the context of fragile environments.

8.1 For affected country governments

Strengthen local level state effectiveness

17. *National governments* should, early in the disaster response, formulate a clear division of roles between central and local government, particularly for the authorities relating to NGOs and financial resource management.
18. *Local governments* should document the efforts and successes of local initiatives and solutions to recovery problems during the period from the emergency response to the medium term (up to five years). This will enable decisions by other actors to be based on good contextual information, and encourage emulation.
19. *Local governments* should compile and share information about local development NGOs, networks and associations that emerge in recovery: their roles, services provided, methods of management, and opportunities for support

More long range analysis

20. The *three regional governments* should draw lessons from the good practices of the BRR experience, in terms of its temporary nature but high level authority, local presence, coordination mechanisms and handover.
21. *National governments* should review the lessons drawn by others from the management of the international response to natural disasters in

Asia, for example in Iran, Pakistan, Myanmar, and China. These contain important variations on the coordination of NGOs and UN agencies, programming dialogue with donors, and certification. The review should focus on issues of presence on the ground, information flow, screening of actors, and the optimal stage of formulation of relief, rehabilitation and development policies for the affected areas.

Better targeted livelihoods recovery

22. *Local administration* programming should be holistic and related to household level analysis, ensuring that interventions are linked closely together within a single community.
23. *Governments of the region* should consider identifying well aligned and well resourced response capacities as a measure of disaster preparedness, such as universities for early response, that empower local capacities.

A less restrictive understanding of risk reduction

24. Disaster risk assessments must be made a precondition for all development investment decisions in high risk areas, whether it is an NGO building a school or a national government planning a new highway.
25. *Government* should promote disaster risk reduction at all levels of society, from the central government down to the village level, and ensure policies that are drawn up are clearly formulated and consistently applied.

Better notions of capacity development

26. *Governments of the region* should make use of, and improve, the few relevant tools available for capacity development. This could include establishing forums responsible for supporting private sector and civil society initiatives, which can then be used as a platform by UN agencies and NGOs.
27. *Government* systems and standards for communicating to communities in disaster-prone areas should be developed. During emergencies, this can include how local and international assistance works, and duties and rights in this regard. Further, the media may be engaged, supporting personnel in acquiring specialised knowledge on disaster recovery and risk management to communicate effectively in emergencies.

8.2 For donor governments

Strengthen local level state effectiveness

28. *Donor agencies* should be actively engaging central level government, regions, and also local government, during the recovery phase, and not delegate planning to humanitarian agencies or multi-donor pooled funding with a restricted mandate in economic or infrastructure issues. This calls for much more intense 'development diplomacy', including the deployment of technical assistance in the field, identification of risks and bottlenecks in delivery, monitoring of performance, and supplementing pooled funding with targeted bilateral initiatives where required.

More long range analysis

29. *Donors* should consider that the timeframes for relief in a phase of natural disaster reconstruction should be multi-year, which means that specific budget lines allowing rapid and decentralised allocations, but also long-term planning, should be either created or preserved.

30. *Donors and governments of the region* should continue to review procedures for multi-donor trust funds in recovery. Aid effectiveness analyses should consider that the Aceh multi-donor trust fund made a good linkage to relief operations, however the process of identification of projects should be streamlined and more rapid, based on explicit situation analysis.

31. *Donors* should require that project proposals and the functioning of multi-donor funding mechanisms include conflict sensitivity analysis as due diligence prior to funding decisions.

Better targeted livelihoods recovery

32. *Humanitarian aid donors* should direct funding to meet basic needs and reduce the risk of further vulnerability (preventive approaches), and not just concentrate on asset replacement over a short period (12–18 months). They should not aim to do livelihoods promotion through short-term funding.

33. *Donors* should create stronger policy dialogue and coordination mechanisms at the national level around the issue of support to isolated populations when they are affected by disasters in the midst of conflict. They could use existing in-country forums such as European Union consultations, multi-donor or pooled funds, or using lead donor entry points.

More integrated area approaches

34. *Donors* should consider that joint evaluations have been an effective mechanism to pool efforts in reviewing relief and development interventions. Increasing local and regional participation in future joint evaluations and publicising efforts in local follow-up may encourage the development of local capacities to lead reform and a more integrated approach.

Less restrictive risk reduction

35. *Donors* should monitor the local level implementation of risk reduction strategies, and fund targeted projects where this is weak.
36. *Donors* should conduct disaster risk assessments prior to providing grants or loans for projects in high risk areas.

Better notions of capacity building

37. *Donors* should consider funding targeted personnel programmes or even institutions designed to improve the skills of specialists, assist in placement, and helping to understand the mazes of national social security and opportunities as they relate to safety nets and pension plans.
38. *Donors* should be sensitive to the time needed to accomplish effective and sustainable recovery programmes, and pressure to spend by implementing agencies should be reduced by increasing reliance on monitoring and evaluation to assess whether a programme is on track.

8.3 For United Nations, Red Cross and Red Crescent, and NGOs

Better targeted livelihoods recovery

39. Market analyses should form part of *UN and NGO* funding flows aiming to restore livelihoods.
40. *NGO* micro-credit schemes and the more sophisticated versions of micro-finance should only follow after the relief phase. All savings and loan programs should be designed by national or local level bodies and not by external actors with low in-country experience.

More long range analysis

41. Stronger linkages are required from *operational agencies* in terms of their identification of general objectives. These should make a constant effort to identify other complementary interventions. They should strengthen their account of impact on capacity in the country.
42. *NGOs* should encourage local presence by their personnel, and monitor public perceptions and expectations.

43. Conflict sensitivity analysis should be part of all *international organisation and NGO* programming, based on an explicit analysis or mapping of the immediate conflict environment, and their relation with programme delivery.

Strengthen local level state effectiveness

44. *NGOs* should continue to refine participatory approaches, including public consultation and grievance mechanisms. These should lead to a programme documentation that straddles different projects and years for NGOs engaging in reconstruction work, and should lead to clear advocacy guidelines.

45. *NGOs and UN agencies* should be cooperating with government to re-establish or clarify the legal rights of affected populations, and contribute to a dialogue for the establishment of consistent policies on land use.

More integrated area approaches

46. *NGOs and UN agencies* should target need that is carefully articulated in terms of market opportunities for the beneficiaries, and the probability of future investments.

47. *UN agencies* should examine how the early recovery sector leads or cluster approaches should enable a rapid transition to an area based approach. There are such examples in the world where long term rehabilitation sectoral approaches are managed at the sub-regional level.

Less restrictive risk reduction

48. UN agencies, the Red Cross Movement, and NGOs should implement their DRR projects with a multi-hazard focus, even if taking advantage of increased interest in risk reduction after a major disaster.

49. All agencies, in particular the Red Cross Movement, and NGOs, should attempt to design DRR projects that bring short-term as well as long-term benefits to make participation in DRR more attractive for affected communities.

Better notions of capacity building

50. *International agencies,* which are affected by a high turnover of staff, should strengthen human resource mechanisms that can ensure that high quality personnel will be attracted to work in disaster reconstruction, and will be retained, possibly in an interagency context and internationally, over many years.

51. A capacity focused programming concept should be developed by *donors, NGOs and UN agencies* which seeks to invest in actors rather than anticipate outcomes and impact in highly volatile environments (capacity focused rather than results focused only).
52. *NGOs and UN agencies* should seek to create more linkages to academic institutions and to long term plans for civil society institutions (which provide the bulk of the response in early stages), allocating funds to joint studies and surveys, and creating an index of specialist resources.

8.4 For civil society agencies

Less restrictive risk reduction

53. *Civil society organisations* working in National Disaster Risk Reduction initiatives, even if benefiting from rising public concern about a single hazard, should promote a multi-hazard approach.
54. *Civil society organisations* should monitor investments by Government and donors to verify that disaster risks have been considered in the investment decision.

More long range analysis

4. *Academic institutions* should support a system-wide, well organised and sustained effort to develop a discipline of disaster studies that will lead to both more informed action as well as more informed actors.

Better notions of capacity building

5. Local civil society should develop 'anti-poaching standards' for local staff that minimise the negative impact on local human resource pools of the sudden arrival of international NGOs, including considerations of secondments of foreign staff to local organisations, and direct funding.
6. Some recent studies have suggested the need for a high level panel to oversee the *international humanitarian system's* progress for disaster response, globally but also in south Asia. Such a panel could consider the issues above, to seek greater consensus on issues and inform debates on priorities with national state authorities.

Appendix 1
Terms of reference

1 Introduction and background

This evaluation is a follow-up of the evaluation of the linkage of relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) which was part of the large, international evaluation of tsunami disaster support carried out in 2005–6 by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC).

The TEC evaluation had five parts and four parts concentrated largely on process issues – coordination, need assessment, capacity-building and funding – while the LRRD part looked at outcome issues as well: what were the consequences of successful and unsuccessful linkages between the different stages of recovery?

Already during autumn 2005, when the TEC-LRRD evaluation[1] was carried out as one of the five TEC studies, it was said that a later follow-up would be necessary in order to capture the rehabilitation/reconstruction and development aspects when the interventions had progressed further.

The tsunami disaster along the coasts of the Indian Ocean in December 2004 generated an unprecedented response from the international donor community, individuals and NGOs worldwide and private companies. Massive resources for immediate disaster relief were mobilised very fast and large amounts of money became available for recovery and reconstruction. The governments in the most affected countries mobilised extraordinary resources and in e.g. Indonesia and Sri Lanka special government agencies were created to handle the reconstruction.

The multitude of organisations involved in the aftermath of the tsunami created problems of overview, coordination, follow-up and reporting to relevant receivers of information. At the initiative of

[1] The first LRRD evaluation published five reports: a literature review, two reports from field studies in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, one report about LRRD policies and practices in international organisations, and one LRRD synthesis report.

OCHA and ALNAP [2], a number of organisations formed the TEC in order to more effectively and on a joint basis evaluate the tsunami response and the interventions carried out by the various actors.

Because of the size of the evaluation task and the number of evaluation issues related to the tsunami disaster response, and because of the problems in organising and financing a large evaluation in a short time, it was decided by the TEC members to split the evaluation into five themes. Each of these constitutes a separate evaluation of an issue that is important to investigate and is at the same time part of the overall evaluation of responses to the tsunami disaster by the international community and national and local authorities. A synthesis report of all five themes was published in July 2006[3].

1.1 Rationale for the evaluation

The evaluation carried out by the TEC was the largest humanitarian evaluation ever undertaken. The conclusions of various reports, and particularly the LRRD part, showed serious concerns that the developmental aims of the response were not likely to be achieved. However, the timeframe for the TEC evaluation, conducted less than one year after the tsunami, made it impossible to verify if this was indeed the case. This suggests a responsibility to return with further analysis in order to ask whether these concerns reflected a valid critique of the ultimate results of the response. Especially since one of the objectives of TEC evaluation was learning, it is essential that additional analysis be undertaken to see if such learning has occurred.

In the three years that have passed since the Tsunami disaster, responsibilities for and implementation of the reconstruction have largely been taken over by government agencies in the affected countries. This means that the follow-up cannot limit its interest to international organisations only but has to look at joint efforts, whether financed from abroad and implemented nationally and locally or financed as well as implemented jointly. A firm line of division between various categories of joint efforts is probably difficult to draw and the main interest for the organisations involved and the various stakeholders would anyway lie in the results achieved and the lessons to be learned from the evaluation. What is obvious, however, is that the follow-up of the LRRD evaluation has to be carried out jointly between the international organisations and relevant national and local agencies.

[2] ALNAP – Advanced Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action – is an international inter-agency forum across the humanitarian sector. (See further www.alnap.org)

[3] Full information about the TEC evaluation is available on its website, where all publications are listed and possible to download in PDF format. See: www.tsunami-evaluation.org

1.2 The LRRD concept [4]

LRRD is a multilayered concept. It means different things to different actors and the implications for programmeming fluctuate according to the levels of chronic conflict and vulnerability in which relief, rehabilitation and development are expected to be linked. Effective transitions are reliant on appropriate links within aid architecture, programmeming and methods development. LRRD is a matter relating to both internal agency procedures and external relationships. It demands creativity as each post-disaster context generates new institutional configurations and must be built on unique trajectories of development and change.

All links are not good links. Re-instating governmental authority and ownership in the midst of violent conflict is inherently problematic within the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence. In terms of the developmental principle of sustainability, the smoothest 'link' that many humanitarian actors can make is often to leave quickly to ensure that relief modalities do a minimum of damage to the development of stable institutions.

The processes in which affected populations rebuild their lives are messy and do not slot into aid programmeming structures. After experiencing a disaster people are not worried about 'humanitarian principles'. They have to deal with trade-offs between their own survival today and their livelihoods tomorrow. They have in-depth knowledge about the local factors affecting prospects for both, but are usually underinformed about the intentions of the foreigners that are suddenly in their midst.

The LRRD concept should in principle be applied in the planning and evaluation of all humanitarian and disaster relief operations. It builds on the assumptions that there is both a severe time constraint in the initial (life-saving) stage, which limits the range of possible activities, and a distinction between this initial stage and the subsequent stages. At a minimum, what is being done at the initial stage should not harm later efforts for recovery, or at least possible negative effects should be consciously diminished while still retaining the primary, operational objective of saving lives. If possible, humanitarian efforts should make a contribution to recovery and development processes and reduce the risk of future disasters.

The awareness of the importance of this linkage and how it affects the longer-term outcome of interventions is widespread but the understanding of the concept of LRRD varies considerably. It is all too easy to see the linkage between immediate relief and rehabilitation or recovery as a simple operational sequence. In practice the different stages

[4] The text in this section is partly borrowed from the LRRD1 Synthesis Report where the concept and its application in the tsunami context are examined. For a comprehensive discussion of the LRRD concept, see Buchanan-Smith & Fabbri: Links between Relief, Rehabilitation & Development – A Review of the Debate (http://www.tsunami-evaluation.org/The+TEC+Thematic+Evaluations/lrrd/LRRD+Evaluation+Sub-studies.htm)

often take place in parallel and the linkage can be rather complicated seen from either the intended beneficiaries' point of view or from the perspective of the planner or the implementation agency. The understanding and explicit or implicit use of the LRRD concept may thus become an important factor for the long-term impact of humanitarian relief interventions.

Because of its complexity a straightforward and simple definition of LRRD is not possible. The general idea is that there are linkages – positive or negative in their consequences as well as logical or accidental – between various stages of interventions after a disaster and these linkages need to be explored, both in order to explain what has happened and to learn how to do better next time.

2 Purpose and objective of the evaluation

The main purpose the evaluation is to contribute to learning from a large scale and complicated disaster, particularly about modes of planning and operation by different actors. It is desirable to have conclusions and lessons learned from the tsunami disaster that may be applied to similar situations in the future.

The possibility of reporting on the results of interventions – the accountability aspect – is also important in view of the magnitude of the disaster and the massive response it created.

The first part of the LRRD evaluation served two purposes. One was to provide information on the LRRD theme for the 'one year after' synthesis report published in 2006. The other was to collect basic information and to establish points of reference, particularly regarding the intended beneficiaries' views, to be used in the second LRRD evaluation phase. The LRRD evaluation complemented the other themes in the TEC evaluation in order to present a comprehensive assessment of essential elements of the response to the disaster.

The tsunami disaster was the last large natural catastrophe with a major international response before the so-called cluster approach was applied. As such it may serve as a basis for comparison to later international interventions and this should be kept in mind in the analysis.

The objective of the follow-up evaluation is to identify linkages, both positive and negative, between relief, recovery and development activities, investigate results and consequences of these that have taken place during the more than three years after the disaster and formulate lessons to be learned and recommendations from this. The analysis shall be carried out along the dimensions indicated below and in section 2.2. For learning purposes it may be useful to make comparisons between the three countries in the evaluation. It is important to look for intended and unintended as well as positive or negative consequences of the interventions and the ways they were implemented.

The efforts of the international aid community seem to have shifted away from leading the response to the tsunami to that of supporting national and local recovery efforts. This shift of roles shall be clearly reflected in the LRRD follow-up evaluation. Although it is the aid effort that shall be evaluated, the assessment should consider the aid response in the perspective of the domestic and international trends that have driven recovery, including household, community and government initiatives and the wider economic and market related context. The evaluation should clearly reflect the combined efforts by local, national and international actors and try to verify or falsify the TEC evaluation conclusion that external aid can only provide a supporting function to the recovery efforts of disaster affected people and countries themselves.

2.1 Scope of the evaluation

The evaluation shall cover the recovery efforts by international, national and local actors that have taken place since the tsunami disaster at the end of 2004, trace the linkages which may exist or may be missing between relief, recovery and development interventions and analyse their consequences.

The first LRRD evaluation was limited to Sri Lanka and Indonesia. This second evaluation – LRRD2 – will also include the Maldives[5]. The obvious reason for including the first two countries is both the magnitude of the impact of the disaster and the number and range of actors involved. The reasons for including the Maldives are that the damage incurred there was substantial in relation to the size of the country and that it is particularly vulnerable to natural disasters.

Because of the large number and variety of interventions and actors suitable approaches and principles for selection of cases or other limitations shall be proposed by the consultant and later elaborated further on the basis of the first part of the evaluation, the documents study (see section 3 below).

The evaluation shall not assess results and performance of individual actors but make the analysis along the themes indicated below.

The analysis shall be carried out against the following criteria: relevance, efficiency, effective, connectedness, coherence, impact and sustainability.

The analysis the LRRD1 evaluation synthesis report was largely organised around the four themes A–D below (with slightly different terminology and delimitation of the themes) and it is important to retain similar dimensions. However, in the LRRD2 a fifth theme – capacity development – shall be added.[6]

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[5] Maldives was not included in the first study largely due to time constraints in the planning of the LRRD1 evaluation.

[6] One of the five separate studies in the TEC evaluation was Impact of the Tsunami on Local and National Capacities and this issue is added in the LRRD2 evaluation since it is an essential aspect of the recovery.

The five themes are:

- The return of the state and civil society
- Poverty, livelihoods and economic recovery
- Rebuilding the social fabric and community development
- Reduction of risks from natural hazards and conflict
- Capacity development

2.1.1 Who is being evaluated?

Because linkages are the subject of this evaluation, all possible actors and their operations should in principle be included. Also, the immediately affected people are actors from the evaluation point of view and their roles both as beneficiaries and as actors – with their own 'LRRD projects' – should be given special consideration in the evaluation.

The actions of the national and local governments will be analysed in the evaluation, including their domestic, policy-related role. In the context of the tsunami disaster the bilateral and multilateral donors have multiple roles: as conventional development cooperation partners, as humanitarian actors both in the tsunami disaster and previously in connection with the internal conflicts in Sri Lanka and Indonesia, as donors to international and possibly local NGOs, and in varying degrees as responsible representatives for their own citizens hit by the wave or the earthquake. The international NGOs are important actors as well as the local NGOs or community organs, which have mixed roles as implementing agencies, beneficiaries and political lobby groups. Involvement by the national governments and by local evaluators in the planning and execution of the evaluation will be very important for this theme in order to capture this range of perspectives.

2.2 Lists of evaluation questions

The following sets of questions that are listed in order to capture the relevance and effectiveness of aid within the context of national and local response. The questions are not intended to be answered one by one but care should be taken that all the answers, in one way or another, are answered in the reports. The list is not exhaustive and should be read as a way to elaborate the theme. The consultant may include additional relevant issues provided they are within the scope of the evaluation. The themes and the questions listed cannot be covered by one kind of source only and care should be taken to support findings and conclusions by evidence from different sources ('triangulation'). Gender perspectives and other perspectives linked to social differences, e.g. age, are not explicitly focused in the questions listed but should be kept in mind when addressing the themes and questions.

2.2.1 Thematic questions

A. The return of the state and civil society

Thematic scope: This theme aims to capture the process and the outcomes of return to normally functioning government and community functions, which does not necessarily means a return to *status quo ante.* Also it shall cover the transitional nature of humanitarian agencies and NGOs and how they facilitate or disrupt return to a normal situation.

a) To what extent have state and civil society institutions regained their capacity to lead recovery, development and risk reduction?

b) Have aid agencies transformed their roles from that of implementer to one of support and facilitation? What can be learned from this experience?

c) To what extent has accurate information on reconstruction plans reached affected communities and has this provided the basis for genuine decision-making at local level? Have effective mechanisms been put into place through which households can present concerns and complaints about aid programmes?

d) What lessons can be drawn from comparison of the three very different experiences of Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Maldives with regard to decentralisation and subsidiarity?

e) To what extent have aid interventions effectively supported the restoration of public service institutions (including their human resource capacity where this was depleted)? Has assistance recognised limitations on sustainable public expenditure?

f) To what extent has support to the reconstruction of infrastructure such as schools and health facilities been matched by appropriate attention to human resource and institutional constraints?

g) How has the reconstruction effort addressed pre-tsunami deficiencies in basic services, including water and sanitation and solid waste management in particular?

h) How do national and local state and civil society actors perceive the relevance and impact of the 'capacity building' efforts so far of the aid community? What say have they had in how this has been planned and implemented?

i) Has the tsunami response become more related to the 'harmonisation and alignment' agenda agreed upon by donors in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness? How has the nature of the relationships between aid agencies and state and civil society institutions changed over time?

B. Poverty, livelihoods and economic recovery

Thematic scope: This theme will look at relevance and effectiveness of international and national initiatives to recover livelihood for the immediately affected people and what intended or unintended changes that were brought about by such efforts. It will try to find out about perceptions and knowledge by supporting organisations about existing livelihoods. including pre-tsunami poverty reduction processes and in what way chronic poverty and conditions for this was and is affected during the period after the disaster.

a) How have economic actors, from farming households to international enterprises, revived and reassessed their activities after the tsunami, and what has been the role of aid in contributing to this process?

b) What is the relative importance of external aid in livelihood support and economic development, as compared to locally generated investment resources and remittances?

c) To what extent have livelihood efforts recognised the differing livelihood circumstances and opportunities of men and women and of children and of groups with different needs and capabilities?

d) To what extent has the disaster created chronic poverty? Has recovery programmeming recognised such risks and attempted to address them?

e) To what extent has recovery programmeming been realistic and aware of the different approaches needed to address short-term transient poverty versus more chronic poverty?

f) To what extent has there been an integration of recovery efforts with national policies to promote pro-poor growth and consolidate social protection?

C. Rebuilding the social fabric and community development

Thematic scope: This theme will try to capture the recovery or changes in the social situation directly or indirectly caused by the tsunami and the RRD[7] efforts at particularly community and household levels and often related to housing and community planning. It will include questions on knowledge about the social, political and cultural context by the intervening organisations and the relevance and realism of their initiatives at various stages of the recovery period.

a) How have communities, which have been shattered by the tsunami, rebuilt their internal relations, and what role has community development assistance played in this process?

b) To what extent have housing and reconstruction programmes resulted in functional communities with access to basic infrastructure, services and livelihood?

[7] Relief, rehabilitation/reconstruction and development

c) How have the micro-politics of local social relations encouraged or hindered recovery, and to what extent have aid efforts taken such factors into account?

d) To what extent has reconstruction taken into account the varied structural nature of social and economic exclusion in the affected areas, and attempted to reverse patterns of social exclusion?

e) Has information flow improved since the early phases of the tsunami response and to what extent has this generated better ways of engaging disaster affected people and communities in the reconstruction process?

f) How have the relationships between aid agencies and local communities evolved since the initial response?

D. Reduction of risks from natural hazards and conflict

Thematic scope: This theme focuses on risk reduction efforts as part of the RRD initiatives and how such initiatives have been exercised at different levels: national, regional, local and household. Guidance regarding relevant indicators may be sought from the work related to the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action.

a) How have the preceding three sets of factors increased or reduced the risks of future natural disasters or conflicts?

b) Did the tsunami create a 'window-of-opportunity' for increased attention to risk reduction?

c) Has attention to risk reduction been sustained or has the memory of the disaster risks faded from the agenda in the face of other, competing priorities?

d) Did pressures for rapid reconstruction and disagreements over land use planning discourage attention to underlying risks of negative environmental impacts, conflict and natural hazards?

e) Which actors have 'championed' risk reduction issues over time? What lessons can be drawn regarding how to sustain risk reduction efforts?

f) How have regional and international initiatives to promote disaster risk reduction impacted on national policies and local institutions?

g) What shows experience so far about the objectives to 'build back better'?

E. Capacity Development

Thematic scope: Regardless of how much funding and how much external support is given, relief, rehabilitation and development efforts are depending on enhanced capacities at national, district and local levels.

a) To what extent have the three countries integrated capacity strengthening objectives in national development strategies?

b) How has these capacity development strategies been implemented at national, district and local levels?

c) To what extent have aid agencies aligned their support with partners' capacity development objectives and strategies?

d) How has the aid community made effective use of existing capacities and harmonised their support for capacity development?

e) How do national, district and local government as well as civil society actors perceive the relevance and impact of the 'capacity building' efforts so far of the aid community?

2.2.2 Country-specific questions

In addition to these five sets of overall questions, there are specific issues that should be addressed in the analysis of the three countries that should be part of the evaluation.

Particular issues to be reviewed in Sri Lanka

- Has the renewed conflict resulted in a more consolidated approach to reconstruction and risk reduction or are the conflict and natural disaster issues being treated separately?
- How have agencies addressed the needs of the chronically poor living in close proximity to tsunami and conflict affected populations?
- In retrospect, how did initial confusion and disagreements over buffer zones and related land issues impact on the reconstruction process?
- To what extent have newly strengthened national disaster risk reduction institutions been effectively supported and engaged in the tsunami recovery process?
- Have other emerging issues and priorities overshadowed the tsunami response, and what have been the implications of the wider socio-economic and political processes on tsunami reconstruction (especially changes and set-backs in the creation of coordination structures)?
- How have earlier concerns about politically related inequity in reconstruction priorities and a preference for easily accessible areas been addressed by the government and by the aid community?

Particular issues to be reviewed in Indonesia

- How has the decentralisation process in Indonesia affected the reconstruction effort and has reconstruction supported the consolidation of effective decentralised governmental structures?
- How have aid agencies worked to ensure synergy with emerging political change and the peace and reconciliation process in Aceh?
- To what extent have aid agencies shown evidence of a process of learning about the unique socio-cultural values in Indonesia?
- How have aid agencies encouraged and supported the increasing ownership of the reconstruction process by the Aceh and Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR) and can this be attributed to the Multi Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias?
- How have efforts reconciled demands for reconstruction of coastal communities and livelihoods with disaster risk reduction objectives that would seem to discourage activities such as fish farming?
- What lessons can be drawn from the 2006 floods in Aceh regarding the quality and appropriateness of the tsunami reconstruction and risk reduction process?
- How have aid agencies worked with the government to address challenges of land titling, support to local contractors and minimising negative environmental impacts while also responding to concerns about the slow pace of reconstruction?

Particular issues to be reviewed in the Maldives

- How have aid efforts reflected attention to the issues raised by the precipitous drop in public revenues after the tsunami?
- How have aid efforts addressed the lack of human and institutional resources on isolated individual islands in reconstruction efforts (e.g., for managing new solid waste and desalination infrastructure)?
- How have land issues been addressed during reconstruction in a country with such restricted land area and where government policy aims to concentrate the population on a limited number of islands?
- Given a context with a very rapid economic growth rate but also very high risks due to climate change, demands by the youth and other factors, have the Maldives found ways to learn from the tsunami response in design of future social protection systems?
- How have agencies developed local partnerships in light of the limited civil society present and concerns about the democratic process?
- To what extent have livelihood programmes taken into account the highly specialised nature of an economy dependent on tourism and commercial fisheries?

- To what extent have aid priorities reflected the most pressing needs of economic reconstruction (e.g., of small island port facilities)?

3 Approach and method

The evaluation shall be carried out in two steps, each ending with a separate report. Step one – the documentary study – will be an analytical compilation of existing evaluations, results reports and other relevant studies on relief, recovery and development interventions related to the tsunami disaster. Step two – the field study – will be based on interviews and observations in the three countries. Its final design will depend on the conclusions, identified gaps and need for supporting evidence from the documentary study. A final synthesis report will be produced based on the two steps of the evaluation.

3.1 The documentary study – Step one

A large number of evaluations and other studies on the progress of the rehabilitation and reconstruction after the disaster have been conducted by international organisations and domestic agencies. After the TEC evaluation synthesis report no comprehensive summary of such reports has been done. In order to both get an overview of reported results up to now and to compile experiences from particularly the recovery and reconstruction efforts, LRRD2 shall begin with a documentary study.

The consultant shall obtain, as far as possible, information on all available studies from international and domestic organisations, national and local authorities, and research institutions that provide results or analyses progress and problems regarding recovery and reconstruction efforts related to the disaster. The documents study shall concentrate on the three countries but also include other studies that are deemed relevant.

On the basis on the material collected the consultant shall prepare a report summarising results in the most appropriate way, taking into consideration whether the sources aim to report on output or outcome or even impact. The quality and coverage of the sources shall be examined according to criteria that the consultant shall propose and any reservations the consultant may have regarding quality shall be discussed in the report.

The report shall be organised so that it is possible to present country specific results and conclusions. The consultant shall analyse the reported results along the dimensions set out in section 2.2 above and discuss apparent drawbacks and achievements.

Finally the documentary study shall indicate areas and issues where the field study may be able to fill obvious voids and provide additional knowledge.

The draft report from the documentary study shall be presented and discussed on at least one workshop in the region.

In order to obtain relevant material the consultant may have to travel in the region or engage national consultants or institutions to collect and examine reports.

3.2 The field study – Step two

The purpose of the field study is to update and complement the information from the documentary study and to ascertain that the views of beneficiaries and other stakeholders – donors, implementing national or international organisations and national authorities – are sufficiently included in the follow-up evaluation.

Particular emphasis shall be put on the views of the immediately affected population and of government and local authorities in the three countries. If surveys are proposed they should be designed so comparisons are possible with the surveys conducted in LRRD1.[8]

The data collection methods for the field study will be interviews and observations. Ahead of the field study the consultant shall submit a revised Inception Report proposing a suitable approach and data collection methods in view of the findings of the first step. Care must be taken to clearly indicate principles for the selection of interview sources also when no formal samples are planned.

4 The evaluation team

The LRRD2 evaluation shall be carried out by a team of consultants, which are independent from the financing and implementing organisations as well as national authorities governing the operations. The composition of the team may differ between the two steps in the evaluation but it is essential that the team leader remains the same and that national consultants are included in both steps. It is also required that the team for each stage is comprised of both men and women.

The team leader shall have extensive, proven capacity to lead evaluations, preferably of disaster and reconstruction interventions, and to deliver reports of good quality. Additional assets will be experience from the three countries included in the evaluation and experience from evaluations in conflict areas.

The majority of the team members shall have experience from evaluations as team member or team leader. One or more team members shall have experience from documentary studies, i.e. retrieving and summarising in an analytical way vast quantities of written material, from quantitative and qualitative research, beneficiary surveys, and statistical methods.

Particularly during step two it is important that the team comprises members with good evaluation and/or research experience from each of the three countries included in the evaluation.

[8] A proper panel study, i.e. going back to people previously interviewed is not possible, but it is probably feasible to select populations which are reasonably similar to the previous samples.

5 Time plan and budget

The evaluation will take place during autumn 2008 and begin during September. It is estimated to end in January 2008 with the final, synthesis report.

The total budget should not exceed SEK 3.2 million.

6 Reporting

Each of the two steps of the follow-up evaluation shall end with a separate report. The report from Step one, the documentary study, shall be written in such a way that it may serve as a stand-alone publication, in itself an evaluation based on written sources, which can be read as a summary and analysis of previous major studies and as a source for finding the majority of reports and sources regarding relief, recovery and development efforts related to the tsunami disaster.

The second report will cover the field study and may be considered as a working paper to be used later for the final, synthesis report.

A synthesis report from the entire evaluation shall include an analysis related to both findings from the follow-up evaluation and the first LRRD evaluation. The final format for the synthesis report shall be determined in consultation with the Joint Steering Committee (JSC) and the Management Group (MG).

The documentary study report and the final report shall each have a main text in English of maximum 75 pages. Depending on the amount of material collected and deemed necessary to publish, additional volumes may be printed or distributed on electronic media. Reports shall be submitted in five hard copies and on five CDs and follow the normal format for Sida evaluation reports. The consultant may engage professional editors to ascertain good readability.

Reporting will also be done through at least one workshop in the region (South/South East Asia) after each step. The workshops will be based on the draft versions of the reports. The final report shall be presented in each of the countries included in the evaluation. Also a presentation/workshop shall be held in Europe at the end of the assignment.

In addition to the full synthesis report in the format specified in detail later the consultant shall prepare a short, comprehensive Summary Report of maximum 20 pages and a well designed PowerPoint presentation which summarises the main findings and lessons learned from the evaluation. This Summary Report shall also be translated into national languages of the three countries as specified by the Joint Steering Committee. The Summary Report will have a wider audience than the full reports and shall be written with this in mind. The PowerPoint presentation may have two versions, one aimed for a wider audience and one aimed for a professional audience.

Within two weeks prior to commencing the actual work the consultant shall produce a brief Inception Report where the approach, data collection methods and time plan are outlined sufficiently well for the Management Group to be able to judge the appropriateness of these issues and likely quality of the planned evaluation. The Inception Report shall concentrate on step one, the documentary study, but include planning for step two as well. The Inception Report shall later be updated regarding step two in view of findings and conclusions from the documentary study (see section 3.2 above).

The evaluation process and reports shall, whenever applicable, follow DAC's Evaluation Quality Standards.

7 Organisation of the Evaluation

In order to secure involvement by the relevant authorities in the three countries and the organisations sponsoring the evaluation the management of LRRD2 has the following organisation:

- a Joint Steering Committee (JSC)
- a Management Group (MG) with four members selected by the JSC
- an Advisory Group providing advice and quality assessment

The Joint Steering Group consists of the international organisations and national agencies in the three countries, which have decided to join the evaluation. Sida's Department for Evaluation is lead agency and chair of the JSC and the MG.

The tasks for the JSC are to endorse the Terms of Reference for the evaluation, give advice on criteria for the selection of consultants, decide on the final design of Step two of the evaluation, and comment on draft reports.

The Management Group will handle the on-going preparations and day-to-day management of the evaluation. It comprises four members: one member from the evaluation departments of the sponsoring agencies, two members from the concerned organisations in the region plus a member from Sida's Department for Evaluation, who is also the executive member and chair. The decisions by the Management Group are documented and shared with the members of the JSC. The MG takes the final decisions regarding approval[9] of the reports after consultation with the JSC.

A team of independent consultants will be recruited to carry out the evaluation. Since Sida is the lead agency for LRRD2 Swedish procurement rules will be adopted. This entails an open, competitive tendering procedure, where at the end all bids and the assessment of the

[9] Criteria for approval will be acceptable quality of the reports and the way findings and conclusions are substantiated.

bids are made public. The Management Group assesses the bids and, after consultation with the JSC, finally decides on the selection of consultants.

In addition to the Joint Steering Group and the Management Committee a small Advisory Group (maximum three persons) provides professional advice and quality control to the JSC and the MG. The *Advisory Group* will be selected by the MG.

Appendix 2
Details of methodology

After the selection of the household, a routine kish-grid method was used to select the respondent, listing living and present members of the household. In households where the main wage earner lost his/her life in the tsunami, the previous wage earners' occupations were recorded along with the present wage earners' occupations.

As most of the questions were applicable on the status-research of the household instead of the individual, a replacement option was given within the same household, provided the respondent was not a minor. The following table illustrates the sample distribution in the tsunami districts:

Sri Lanka: Sample Allocation Grid

Districts	Selected DSs	Sample allocation	
		DS	Total
Kalutara	Beruwala	40	100
	Panadura	60	
Galle	Balapitiya	60	165
	Habaraduwa	45	
	Ambalangoda	60	
Matara	Dikwella	60	165
	Weligama	45	
	Devinuwara	60	
Hambantota	Hambantota	60	165
	Thissamaharama	45	
	Tangalla	60	
Baticaloa	Manamunai North	60	210
	Eravur Pattu	60	
	Koralai pattu North	90	

Districts	Selected DSs	Sample allocation	
		DS	Total
Trincomalee	Kinniya	60	225
	Kuchcheweli	60	
	Town & Gravets	45	
	Muthur	60	
Ampara	Sainthamaruthu	60	180
	Alayadiwembu	60	
	Kalmuni Muslim	60	
	Total	**1210**	**1210**

Aceh: Sample Allocation Grid

District	Sub District	Samples	Total
Aceh Timur	Julok	40	115
	Darul Aman	25	
	Simpang Ulim	25	
	Nurusalam	25	
Langsa	Kota Langsa	25	25
Aceh Utara	Seunuddon	40	175
	Samudera	40	
	Syamtalira Bayu	40	
	Muara Batu	55	
Lhokseumawe	Blang Mangat	55	110
	Muara Satu	55	
Bireun	Simpang Mamplam	40	185
	Samalanga	40	
	Jeumpa	40	
	Kuala	25	
	Gandapura	40	
Pidie	Simpang Tiga	40	160
	Kota Sigli	55	
	Kembang Tanjong	40	
	Pidie	25	
Pidie Jaya	Meurah Dua	40	185
	Ulim	25	
	Jangka Buya	40	
	Meureudu	40	
	Trienggadeng	40	
Aceh Besar	Peukan Bada	70	165
	Lhok Nga	55	
	Baitussalam	40	

District	Sub District	Samples	Total
Banda Aceh	Kuta Alam	40	185
	Baiturrahman	40	
	Kutaraja	55	
	Syiah Kuala	25	
	Jaya Baru	25	
Aceh Jaya	Jaya	85	85
Aceh Barat	Meureubo	130	130
Aceh Barat Daya	Lembah Sabil	40	40
	Total samples	**1560**	**1560**

In order to maintain the quality of the fieldwork and ensure maximum dispersion of the sample within the selected micro location, the enumerators were allowed to conduct only a maximum of 10 interviews per day. Within a given macro location, the team leaders were advised to check 10% of respondents from the completed list.

The local teams used were already experienced in the field and at minimum one team leader was appointed in a team of five researchers. In all about 50 odd researchers and 10 team leaders were in the field, in addition to the presence of 2 central observers in each location.

In Sri Lanka the LRRD1 survey covered 915 samples while in LRRD2, the sample size is 965. In Aceh the last survey covered 1,227 samples while this one has 1,178 completed interviews. In both the countries a stratified random sampling strategy was used.

Country	Target Sample	Completed Interviews	Response Rate %
Sri Lanka	1210	965	80
Indonesia	1560	1178	76
Total	**2770**	**2143**	**77**

The LRRD1 and LRRD2 samples are a pooled cross-section, with individuals with the same socio-economic characteristics. But there was in this instance one significant difference in the sample profile: this time the survey has achieved a better spread of samples from the tsunami affected areas to conflict affected region.

Appendix 3
List of persons and groups met

Persons met

Surname, Forenames	Organisation and Function
Abdeen, Jaufar	UNDP Transition Programme, Ampara
Abdull, Amjad	Ministry of the Environment
Abdullah	Medic
Abeygunasekara, A.	Addl. Secretary (Development), Ministry of Plan Implementation
Abeywardena, Asanka J.S.D.M.	Additional Government Agent, Government of Sri Lanka, Ampara
Abeywickrama,Tissa	Chairman,Tsunami Task Force, Sri Lanka Red Cross Society
Adib, Ali	Journey
Ahadijat, Rachmat	NGO, Indonesian Red Cross, PMI, Deputy Secretary General
Alaidin	NGO, Indonesia Red Cross, PMI, Vice Chairman of OD (org.dev.)
Ali, Mansoor	Representative, UNICEF Maldives
Almgren, Ola	Senior Advisor Post Disaster Recovery, UNDP
Almsteier, Stephen Leopold	Government, BRR, Safety Advisor
Amarakoon, AMG	Sewalanka Foundation, District Director, Ampara
Amin, Naureen	ActionAid, Team Leader, East Programme Support Unit
Amstrong, Barry	Head of Operations, IFRC Sri Lankan Delegation
Anggraini, Rosilawati	Humanitarian Officer, Emergency Unit, UNFPA
Ardiansyah, Teuku	NGO, IMPACT, Resource Center Manager
Ariyananda, Tanuja	President, International Rainwater Catchment Systems Association
Ariyapala, Mr	CADREP, Galle, Head

Surname, Forenames	Organisation and Function
Ariyaralma, T.H.	Executive Director Organizational Development SLRCS
Ariyaratne, S. Vinya	Executive Director, Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement
Arulananthan, K	Swieovason, Project Manager
Athifa, Aminath	Former Deputy Minister for Housing and Urban Development
Augsburger, John	INGO, Oxfam, Area Programme Manager
Ayoni	UNDP, DRR Unit, University Liaison Associate
Bambang	Head of Economic Development (previousely with the UN Habitat), BRR Nias
Bandara, Wijaya	Sarvodaya, Project Manager for Resilient Villages Programme
Bawa, AA	District Director of Planning, Ampara
Benson, Raymond R. (Col, Ret.)	Technical Advisor to BRR, Banda Aceh Office
Bhanu, Niraula B.	Int. Prog. Specialist, UNFPA
Bukhary, Daoud	Government, Boupaty – District Head
Burgess, Leigh	Water and Sanitation Delegate,American Red Cross Maldives
Burnett, Alastair	Country Representative, British Red Cross Society, Maldives Delegation
Campbell, Brett	Project Coordinator, Housing and Infrastruction Recon. Unit
Caron, Cynthia	Manager,Applied Research Unit, UNOPS Sri Lanka
Chamila	Sewalanka, Field Officer, Galle
Chan, Selina	Watsan Coordinator IFRC Sri Lanka Delegation
Chandrathilaka, AAP Deepal	Sewalanka Foundation, Field Director: Ampara, Batticaloa, Monaragala, Polonnaruwa
Coeur-Bizot, Patrice	UNDP
Cooray, Duminda	Secutiy Officer
Curtiss, Dan	Country Representative, American Red Cross, Maldives Delegation
Curtiss, Daniel	Head of Office, American Red Cross
Dahlke, Dawn	Programme Development Officer, UMCOR Sri Lanka
Dalmau, Agnes	Country Coordinator, Spanish Red Cross, Sri Lanka
Dammika Bandera, EM	Savordaya, District Coordinator, Ampara
Dan	American Red Cross
Davila Hernandez, Yolanda	Development Delegate, Spanish Red Cross Sri Lanka Delegation
Dayaratna, P.	Minister of Plan Implementation
De Costa, Kala Peiris	Executive Director, Siyath Foundation
De Silva, Y.K.H.	Consultant, Disaster Relief Monitoring Unit Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka
Delo, Emma	Livelihoods Coordinator, IFRC
Demel, Suresh	Chairman of the buisiness for Peace Alliance
Dhanapala, Kapila	ActionAid, Programme Manager, Ampara

Surname, Forenames	Organisation and Function
Dilreshi	UNDP Strong Places Programme
Dirhamsyah, M	University, Tsunami and Disaster Mitigation Research Center, Director
Djalal, Faisal	Masyarakat Penganggulangan Bencana Indonesia (Indonesian Society Disaster Management), Jl. Kebon Sirih no 56 Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia – 10340
Djuli, Noor	Government, BRA Aceh Peace Reintegration Body
Doe, Samuel Gbadydee	Development & Reconciliation Advisor, UN Resident Coordinator's Office Sri Lanka
Duignan, Kevin	IFRC Maldives, Dhuvafaaru Programme Coordinator
Duska, Susanne	Duska Anema Development Associates
Egelund, John	Country Coordinator Finnish RC
Elcanyeste, R.	Programme Officer Risk Management Sri Lanka RC
Elle, Lars	Minister Counsellor; Evaluation Department
Elmes, Paul	Head of Delegation; IFRC
Fahmi, Ahmed	UNESCO
Farook, Razni	Head of organizational development programme development
Fathmath, Afiya	Chairperson, Society for Women Against Drugs
Fernando, Minari	National Project Coordinator Human Rigths Project UNDP
Fernando, Niroshini	Senior Officer Movement Coordinator
Fernando, Shanti	Coordinating Director to the President on Post Tsunami Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Affairs, President Office
Frauenfeld, Rainer	Director LKOC, UNOPS Sri Lanka
Gamage, S	Sewalanka, Credit Manager, Galle District
Ganesarajah, Rajendrakumar	UNDP, Advisor: Local Governance and Administrative Reforms
Gemma	DRM, UNDP
George, Ranjith	Disaster Risk Reduction Specialist, UNDP
Giriharan	Divisional Secretary, Vahari
Gowthaman, PB	OCAA
Graff, Guillaume	Country Coordinator French RC
Gunawardena, H.D.	Director, Prudential Holdings (PTE) Ltd.
Halder, John	Disaster Management Coordinator, IFRC
Hamaguchi, Ryo	Programme Officer, Disaster Management Unit, UNDP
Hameed, Ali Nasath	Director, Complaints Department, Human Rights Commission Maldives
Hamid, Ahmad Humam	NGO, Aceh Recovery Forum, Chairman
Haneef, Mohamed	Unicef, Maldives
Hapuarachchi, Gaya	Senior Programes Manager Amercian Red Cross
Harris, Simon	Irish Red Cross

Surname, Forenames	Organisation and Function
Haryati	Team Leader for Self Help Group, Oxfam GB Livelihoods Project, Calang Office, Desa Bahagia, Aceh Jaya – Calang, Aceh
Hasan, Hisan	MIDP Officer, National Disaster Management Centre, Maldives
Hasantha, Gunaweera	Team Leader – East, Action Aid International, Colombo
Hassan	IFRC Water Sanitation Coordinator Multilateral Implementation
Hawden, Dawn	Sewalanka Foundation, Consultant Advisor, Programme and Project Development, Ampara
Hesse, Fernando	Humanitarian Affairs Officer, OCHA
Hettiarachchi, Janath	EP, DM Sri Lanka Red Cross Society
Hettiarchchi, Maj. Gen. Gamini	Disaster Management Centre, Director General
Hidellage, Vishaka	Practical Action, Director
Hirantha, Capt.	Disaster Management Centre, Galle, Deputy Director
Husaini, Fauzi	NGO, Indonesia Red Cross, PMI, Head of DM Dept.
Ibrahim, Cowail	Journey
Imazato, Isa	JICA Expert, JICAT-CUP Project
Jamil	Medic
Jayachandra	PA to Minister
Jayasekara, Saman	Disaster Management Unit, Galle, Director
Jensnaes, Per	IFRC Maldives, Head of Delegation
Jenssen, Per Gunnar	INGO, Norwegian Red Cross
Johnston, Cory B	USAID, Project Officer
Joshan, Nayeem	UNICEF
Juli Din	NGO, Indonesia Red Cross, PMI, Progr. Ass. ICBRR (Indon Com Based RR)
Kaleyfan, Ali Moosa	National Disaster Management Centre
Kannangara, Sunil	District Secretary/Government Agent, Ampara
Kanthirvale	Admnistrative Office
Karadaghy, Wuria	UNDP, Transition Programme, Senior Programme Manager
Karunahkran	Oxfam Australia, Assistant Programme Coordinator, Tsunami Programme
Keeler, Zoé	Assistant Resident Representative, UNDP
Keicho, Toshiaki	World Bank
Kendrick	Consultant; Quality Assurance
Khan, Sarosh	Deputy for Jkaarta, Mulyi Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias, World Bank
Kibedi – Kakaire, Joshua	Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, UNICEF
Kodithuwakku, Suranjan	Green Movement Sri Lanka, Chairperson
Kolb-Hindarmanto, Ingrid	Programme & Planning Specialist, UNICEF Banda Aceh
Kottegoda, Sepali	Director, Women and Media

Surname, Forenames	Organisation and Function
Krassnitzer, Johannes	Chief Technical Advisor, ART Gold Sri Lanka Projecgt, UNDP
Krishantha, KG	Sewalanka, Information Coordinator for Southern Region
Kumar, Bijay	Country Director, Action Aid Sri Lanka
Kumari, Krishna	Daughter of recipient of Transition House, Permanent House, and ActionAid toilet
Kunneswary	Recipient of ActionAid permanent house
Lacey-Hall, Oliver	UNDP, Head Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit
Laila, Ali	WHO
Lecaniwasam, Aranda	Coordinator CRRP SLRCS
Liusha	UNFPA
Liyanagama, Pubundu	Consortium of Humitarian Agencies, District Officer, Galle
Loba	Deputy Director, Care Society, Maldives
Luna, Jorge M.	WHO Representative, Maldives
Lushan	Medic
Madan	Tricomalee District Youth Development
Magdalena	Community Development, Facilitator, WVI, Banda Aceh, Indonesia
Makoto, Nonobe	Resident Representative, Japan International Cooperation Agency
Maniku, Omar (Maizan)	President, Maldives National Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Mannan, Murushida	Coordinator,Community Mobilisation WatSan Prog, American Red Cross
Manuel, Philip	ActionAid, IDP Coordinator, Batticaloa
Marlina	NGO, Indonesian Red Cross, PMI, Resp. OD Dept.
Mazeena	Secretary, Ministry of Health
McKerrow, Bob	IFRC, Head of Delegation
Mghendi, Necephor	IFRC Maldives, Information & Reporting Delegate
Miranda, Ramona	Practical Action, Team Leader, Communications
Moektidasih, Titi	Humanitarian Affairs Officer, OCHA
Mohamed, Col. Moosa Ali	Office of the Chief of Staff, Defence Ministry
Mohamed, Noora Aishath	Manager, Community Project Psychosocial Support Program, American Red Cross
Morizzo, Karla	Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and reporting Delegate
Morizzo, Karla	Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and reporting Delegate
Mubarik	Divisional Secretary, Kinniya, Trincomalee
Mueller, Katherine	INGO, Canadian Red Cross, Information and Community Outreach Delegate
Muhsin, Abdul	Department of Meteorology, Nationaal Meteorological Centre
Muksin	Team Leader for Agriculture, Oxfam GB Livelihoods Project, Calang Office, Desa Bahagia, Aceh Jaya – Calang, Aceh
Murthala, Didi Mohamed	Director, National Disaster Management Centre

Surname, Forenames	Organisation and Function
Muthujrushna, Nishan	National Consultant; Human Rights Unit; Ministry of Disaster Mangement and Human rights
Muthumala, T.	District Programme Manager, Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
Muzain, UM	UNDP, Transition Programme, National Programme Officer
Nadarajah	Additional Government Agent, Trinco
Naeem	UNICEF Child Protection Officer
Naeem, Mohamed	UNICEF
Nanayakkara, Rukshana	Deputy Executive, Transparency International
Natarjan	Additional Government Agent, Trinco
Nawath, AGP	Government official
Nazim, Lt. Col Mohamed	Office of Chief of Staff, Maldives National Defense Force
Nidershan	DRMU
Niederayr, Michael	Security coordinator IFRC
Niimi, Reiko	Deputy to Resident Coordinator and Senior Advisor for Tsunami Recovery Office of the Humanitarian Resident Coordinator
Nilusha	Sewalanka, Coordinator of Knowledge Centre
Niranjan	PA to Government Agent, Trinco
Nishanthan	Field Coordinator, OfERR Trincomalee
Niyaaz, Hussain	Executive Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Nizam, Fathimath	CARE Society
Nurdin, Mawardy	Government, Mayor of Banda Aceh
Ondrusek, Robert	Advisor, Tsunami Impact Assessment and Monitory System IFRC
Ouvry, Adrian	Partnership Coordination Delegate, IFRC Sri Lanka Delegation
Pakras, Itha	Gender Officer, Oxfam GB Banda Aceh Office, Indonesia
Parakrama, Arjuna	TEC I
Park, Jeong	IFRC, Disaster Management Coordinator
Paterson, John	Government, BRR, Knowledge Management Advisor
Pathak, Bharat	Head of Mission, UMCOR Sri Lanka
Paul	Construction Delegate, Austrian/Swiss Red Cross, Sri Lanka
Perera, C. Rachel	Ex-RADA
Perera, Lahiru M.A.	Chief Operating Officer, The Foundation for Co-existence
Perera, M.A.L.	Board Director, Lanka Rain Water Harvesting Forum
Perera, Suretha	UNDP Disaster Risk Reduction Programme, Project Officer
Piyasene, Niroshan S.B.	Deputy Project Coordinator, CRRP, IFRC Sri Lanka
Polastro, Ricardo	DARA International, Head of the Evaluation Department
Popuri, Sri	Head of office, the UN Habitat, Banda Aceh, Indonesia
Prenatilake	Forut
Purwantu, Eddy	Government, BRR, Chief Operating Officer

Surname, Forenames	Organisation and Function
Rahman, Mofizur Md.	Livelihoods Project Manager, Oxfam GB, Calang office, Desa Bahagia, Aceh Jaya – Calang.
Rahmatillah, Syarifah	Exectuive Director, MISPI, Banda Aceh
Rahulanayak	Assistant Div. Secretary, Vahari
Rajabat, Basil	President Cabinet
Rajamoney, M	Consortium of Humitarian Agencies, District Officer, Ampara
Ranatunge, Sajani	Deputy Resident Representative, Forut
Rasheed, Arif	Chief Executive Officer, RYCO Investment Pvt. Ltd.
Rasheed, Shiyaz Ali	Administrator, Maldives National Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Rawi, Hasan Hamou	IFRC, Southern Water and Sanitation Coordinator
Razee, Shaheem	UNDP, Maldives Assistant Resident Representative (Operations)
Rembulan, Ysephine Avi	INGO, Oxfam, Partnership Programme Officer
Ridha, M	University, Tsunami and Disaster Mitigation Research Center, Vice Director
Rilwan, Ali	Executive Director, Bluepeace
Romeshun, K	Programme Officer, Swedish Embassy
Russell, Tom	Community Development Delegate, Finnish Red Cross, Sri Lanka
Ryan-Collins, Lily	Community Delegate, Belgian Red Cross/French
Safah	Bluepeace
Sajani	Deputy Coordinator, FORUT Sri Lanka
Samadhi, T Nirarta (Koni)	Head of Planning and Controlling, BRR Nias office – Jl. Pelud Binaka KM 6,6 Ds Fodo Kec. Gunungsitoli, District Nias, North Sumatra – 22815
Samithadasa, Ravi	Programme Assistant, ILO
Samithadasa, Ravi	Programme Assistant, ILO
Sansad, Mna	Project Manger Construction, IFRC
Santoso Ismail, Martha	UNFPA, Assistant Representative
Saraswathy, Selaathura	Recipient of Transition House, Permanent House, and ActionAid toilet
Sarinastiti, Nia	Communication Officer, Multi donor Fund
Sekhar, Abey	Secretary, Ministry of Plan Implementation
Senanayake, Charit	Managing director, Rainforest Rescue International
Senga-Liboro, Anna	UN Coordination Specialist, United Nations
Shah, Asharaf	IFAD
Shankar, Ram	UNDP, Maldives
Shareef, Ali	Assistant Director General, Department of Meteorology
Shareef, Shidhatha	Deputy Director, CARE Society
Sharif, Abdullah	Assistant Manager, Horizon Fisheries Ltd. Laamu Maandhoo
Shidhatha, Shareef	Deputy Director, Care Society, Maldives

Surname, Forenames	Organisation and Function
Shifaam, Ali	Island Office Secretary, Gan
Shiham, Aishath	Former Deputy Minister, Youth and Sports and Director, MIDP
Shironman, Sujith	Organizational Development Manager
Shubha	Tricomalee District Youth Development
Siddik, Jaffar	UNDP, DDR Unit, Programme Associate for DRR
Siddik, Mohammad Faisal	MDF, Operation Officer
Simanihuruk, Muba	INGO, Oxfam, Poverty Research Coordinator
Simone	Research Officer, IFRC Banda Aceh
Sivagnanasothy, V	DG deptarment of Foreign Aid and Budget Monitoring
Sobhan, Babar	Monitor and Evaluation Officer, UN Resident Coordinator, UNDP
Sobir, Raniya Aishath	National Programme Officer, UNDP
Sofyan, Safriza	MDF, Deputy for Aceh and Nias
Solih, Ahmed	Project Manager, HIRU, NDMC Maldives
Somaratne, Indika Dilhan	Sarvodaya, Senior project manager, Sarvodaya Community Disaster Management Centre
Sudiatmo, Bambang	Vice Deputy for the Housing Infrastructure Control (Wakil Deputi Operasi Bidang Penertiban – Pelaksanaan Pembangungan Perumahan) BRR, Banda Aceh Office, Jl. Ir. Muhammad Thaher No 20 Lueng Bata, Banda Aceh – 23247
Sudiro, Catur J.	Masyarakat Penganggulangan Bencana Indonesia (Indonesian Society Disaster Management), Jl. Kebon Sirih no 56 Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia – 10340
Sugathadasa, Indrani	Secretary, Ministry of Plantation Industries
Suhardjono, Pusat Pak (John)	Government, BMG, Head of Regional Centre (11 provinces)
Sujatha,	Training Coordinator, Tricomalee District Youth Development
Sunil, Lal Chander	Political Party Worker
Tabrani, Yunis	Director, Centre for Community Development and Education (CCDE)
Tagore, Ivan	World Vision, Capacity Building and Development Coordinator
Taulu, Alvin	Project Officer, UNDP Nias Office – Jl. Diponegoro No 30 Desa Fodo Gunung Sitoli – Nias
Thabarajah, Nalini	Livelihood Grant Recipient, Thirokuvil
Thabarajah, Thurayapah	Husband of livelihood grant recipient, Thirokuvil
Tham, Nalina Sobun	Transparency International
Tharmakulasingam, R.	Additional Secretary (Planning and Development) Ministry of Nationa Building and Estate Infrastructure Development
Thiruchelvam, M	Project Implementation Specialist Sri Lanka Resident Mission, Asian Development Bank
Timberman, G. David	Consultant and Analyst
Tissera, Nikita	Ex-UNDP
Tomoko, Ogura	Field Coordinator, Japan International Cooperation Agency

Surname, Forenames	Organisation and Function
Tveitnes, Ranveig	Resident Representative, Forut
Udadhayaya, Khemraj	Team Leader – Colombo PSU
Umar, Hussain	Island Chief, L. Gan Mathimararadhoo Office
Vandenbruaene, Patrick	Coordination Facilitator, The World Bank
Victor, Stella J.J.	Programme Officer, Colombo PSU, Action Aid Sri Lanka
Wafir, Ali	Department of Meteorology, Nationaal Meteorological Centre
Waheed, Zaha	Former Director, National Disaster Management Centre
Wain, John	Senior Manager Construction (TSSU) IFRC Sri Lanka Delegation
Wazeen, Asmi	ActionAid, Project Officer, Ampara and DRR Focal Point
Weeresekara, Pramodini	Programme Associate, ILO
Weiss, Gordon	UN Spokesman, Sri Lanka, UN Office of the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator
Wickramasuriya, Kumarini	Chairperson, Navajeevana
Wijethunga, Ramitha	UNDP, National Programme Officer Disaster Management
Wilmont, Mr. Fadlullah	Country Director, Muslim Aid
Yumna, Fathimath	Director, Family & Community Development Section, Min of Gender & Family, Maldives
Yuris, Tabrani	Head of CCDE, Jl. Teungku Cik Lorong E no 18, Brawe, Banda Aceh
Zaha	Tsunami Recovery, Government of Maldives
Zahid	Director, Maldives Human Rights Commission
Zahir, Farzana	Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Zahrina, Nana	Community Development, Facilitator, WVI, Banda Aceh, Indonesia
Zand, Niloo	Health Coordinator; Canadian Red Cross
Zarook, MM	Regional Coordinator, Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka
Zyath	Disaster Management Unit, Ampara, Head

Persons met as a group

Date	Attendees	No. of ♂	No. of ♀	Location	Chair	Topics
Fri 07 Nov	Villagers (Tsunami suvivors) of desa Riga, Calang	6	3		No chair	Social Fabric and Livelihood
Fri 07 Nov	Visit Household 1 from Riga Village (female headed household)		2	The villager's house	No chair	Social Fabric and Livelihood
Fri 07 Nov	Visit Household 2 from Riga Village	1	1	The villager's house	No chair	Social Fabric and Livelihood
Fri 07 Nov	Oxfam's beneficiary (Ms. Anggraini/Mak Ti and her daughter, Elly)		2	The house of Mak Ti	No chair	Social Fabric and Livelihood
Sat 08 Nov	Community at the Relocation area of Gunung Teungoh		3	The clean water point of the relocation area	No chair	Social Fabric and Livelihood
Sat 08 Nov	Oxfam's beneficiary at Lam Teungoh, Aceh Jaya	1	1	The villager's house	No chair	Social Fabric and Livelihood
Sun 09 Nov	Villagers from Pante Ketapang village (he 2nd meeting)	2	3	The house of the head of gampong	No chair	Social fabric
Sun 09 Nov	Villagers from Aloe Mie – Tsunami affected community	15	5	The village's meunasah	Head of gampong	Social Fabric, Livelihood, Risk, state and capacity
Sun 09 Nov	Villagers from Pante Ketapang village (the 1st meeting) – hosting community in conflict affected area	1	2	The house of the head of mukim	No chair	Social Fabric, Livelihood, Risk, state and capacity
Sun 09 Nov	Members of CBO in Matara	1	4	Temple	No chair	DRR and impact of Tsunami
Mon 10 Nov	Attended the workshop on 'The process of transition of the reconstruction for sustaining the development of Aceh' (Proses Transisi Rekonstruksi Menuju Keberlanjutan Pembangunan Aceh Kembali)					Social fabric
Mon 10 Nov	Group Meeting	1	6	Galle	No chair	Role of the State and capacity
Tue 11 Nov	Beneficiaries of the UN habitat community based housing at Merduati, Banda Aceh	2		The house of the target beneficiary & on the street of the village	No chair	Social fabric
Thu 13 Nov	Beneficiaries of the UN habitat community based housing at Hilombusi Village, Gunung Sitoli, Nias	1	4	The house of the target beneficiary	No chair	Social fabric, livelihood

Date	Attendees	No. of ♂	No. of ♀	Location	Chair	Topics
Thu 13 Nov	FORNIHA (Forum Peduli Tano Niha) – Jl. Diponegoro No 462 Km. 4 Miga, Gunungsitoli, Nias – Sumatera Utara 22815, Executive Director: Rev. Sarofati Gea	5	1	FORNIHA Office	FORNIHA Executive Director	Social fabric
Sun 16 Nov	Group meeting with womens of RDS		12	Nello, Trinco		
Sun 16 Nov	Met women		13	China Bay, Trinco		
Mon 17 Nov	Met 19 women and men: KPNDU	7	12	Batti		
Mon 17 Nov	Met 13 members: TCDO	6	8	Batti		
Mon 16 Nov	Beneficiaries of 'Monrovia' housing estate, Galle	27	14	The house of a beneficiary	No chair	Social Fabric
Mon 16 Nov	Beneficiaries of Spanish Red Cross housing program, Godadenikanda village, Galle	2	3	Beneficiary houses	No chair	Social Fabric
Mon 16 Nov	Sports Club Silverline – CBO assisted by SpRC, Galle	7		Community centre	No chair	Social Fabric
Mon 16 Nov	Members of Self-Help Savings Group	5	15	Kuchchaveli, Trinco	Nishanthan, OfERR Field Coordinator	Livelihoods & Economic Recovery
Tue 17 Nov	NGO Women in Need, Matara		12	Private house	No chair	Social Fabric – psychosocial aspects
Tue 17 Nov	NGO Sarvodya	17	3	Talalla Temple	No chair	Social Fabric
Wed 18 Nov	Oxfam beneficiaries		12	House of member	Mrs. Prema Gamage, Gender Consultant, OXFAM Australia	Social Fabric
Thu 19 Nov	Hambantota Rural Development Foundation – local partner of OXFAM	1	9	House of Member	Mrs. Prema	Social Fabric
Thu 19 Nov	Members of CBO, OFTAP (Organisation of Tsunami Affected Persons)	–	15	Thirukovil, Ampara	No chair	Livelihoods & Economic Recovery
Thu 26 Nov	Beneficiaries of BRCS housing program, L. Fonadhoo and Government housing programme relocates from L. Gadhoo	13	9	Beneficiary houses	No chair	Social Fabric

Date	Attendees	No. of ♂	No. of ♀	Location	Chair	Topics
Thu 26 Nov	Beneficiaries of FRC housing program, Gan	22	15	Beneficiary houses	No chair	Social Fabric
Thu 26 Nov	Womens Development Committee, L. Fonadhoo	2	12	Community Centre, L. Fonadhoo	WDC Chair	Social Fabric
Fri 27 Nov	Beneficiaries of FRC housing program, L. Mundhoo	11	7	Beneficiary houses	No chair	Social Fabric
Fri 27 Nov	Mathimaradoo Island Development Committee, L. Gan	7	2	Guest House, Gan	IDC Secretary	Social Fabric
Sat 28 Nov	Mukurumadhoo Island Development Committee, L. Gan	4	3	Guest House, Gan	IDC Secretary	Social Fabric

This report is a follow-up evaluation of linkages between immediate relief, rehabilitation (or reconstruction) and development (LRRD) related to the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. The first LRRD evaluation was carried as part of the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) set of evaluations in 2005–06.

The LRRD2 evaluation report covers experiences up to the end of 2008 in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, i.e. from the four years after the disaster. A number of organisations and government agencies have supported this evaluation in various ways, with the aim to provide conclusions and lessons learned that are useful for mitigating the consequences of possible future disasters.