

# EVALUATION DEPARTMENT

REPORT 3/2018 COUNTRY EVALUATION BRIEF




Norad

# Haiti

## Evaluation Portrait

UPDATED NOVEMBER 2018



# 1 Haiti – Evaluation Portrait

## 1.1 2018

### 1.1.1 Final performance evaluation of the “LIMIYE AK ÒGANIZASYON POU KOLEKTIVITE YO ALE LWEN (LOKAL+)”

<i>Evaluation</i>	<i>Final performance evaluation of the LIMIYE AK ÒGANIZASYON POU KOLEKTIVITE YO ALE LWEN (LOKAL+)</i>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2018
<b>Author/Agency</b>	Haiti Evaluation and Survey Services of Social Impact, Inc.
<b>Commissioned by</b>	USAID
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Final project evaluation
<b>Project period</b>	2013 - 2018
<b>Keywords</b>	Governance, transparency, accountability, service delivery
<b>Abstract</b>	<p>USAID/Haiti’s Limiyé ak Òganizasyon pou Kolektivite yo ale Lwen (LOKAL+) project was designed to improve Government of Haiti’s service delivery at the local level. From 2013 to 2018, the project sought to increase legitimacy through improved governance and deconcentrated public service in nine selected communes. This evaluation assessed the project’s relevance, effectiveness in improving accountability, transparency, and service delivery; and sustainability of transparent governance in target communes. The evaluation aimed also to inform future USAID/Haiti programming and communal government strengthening, identify strengths and weaknesses and assess the validity of the development hypothesis.</p> <p>While most stakeholders found the project to be somewhat effective in improving three focus domains (accountability, transparency, and service delivery), communes do not have capacity to independently sustain such improvements. Nonetheless, three important findings include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) It is possible for communes to be financially sound and administratively autonomous;</li> <li>2) the notion of transparency to municipal citizens has been introduced;</li> <li>3) there is improved understanding of critical administrative systems (i.e., tax collection administration, housing census).</li> </ol> <p>LOKAL+ engaged closely with main GoH local partners and was integrated in the Ministère de l’Intérieur et des Collectivités Territoriales (MICT) Communal Action Plan, but had challenges connecting with Parliament. The project was not effective in improving the legal framework for decentralisation and actions will likely not be sustained due to tensions between communal officials and committees. Revenue increases have generally not improved service delivery; key examples are the incomplete CIVITAX software system, the built property census, lack of internet connectivity and tools—tablets, global positioning system devices, etc., and poor collaboration between communes and stakeholders.</p> <p>While LOKAL+ staff engaged a gender specialist to develop an inclusion plan, women’s participation in communal government remains elusive (communes have not met the 30% quota and there are reports of violence against women street vendors, etc). Women were not sufficiently included in design; communal governments did not appoint a Gender Affairs contact, and no local governance partner was aware of the LOKAL+ gender inclusion plan.</p>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	Gender

<b>Evaluation</b>	<i>Final performance evaluation of the LIMYE AK ÒGANIZASYON POU KOLEKTIVITE YO ALE LWEN (LOKAL+)</i>
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00T9NZ.pdf">https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00T9NZ.pdf</a>

### 1.1.2 Support to the Electoral Process in Haiti Project - Final Evaluation

<b>Evaluation</b>	<i>Support to the Electoral Process in Haiti Project - Final Evaluation</i>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2018
<b>Author/Agency</b>	UNDP
<b>Commissioned by</b>	UNDP
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Final project evaluation
<b>Project period</b>	2013 - 2018
<b>Keywords</b>	Electoral processes
<b>Abstract</b>	<p>The international community has supported the electoral processes in Haiti since 1987, the earliest technical assistance was provided through the different peacekeeping missions or bilaterally by donors. UNDP started its support in 2004 through a series of projects that provided basket funding to support a process to strengthen the electoral process in Haiti. The project notably aimed to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strengthen capacity of the Electoral Council (Output 1)</li> <li>• Strengthen capacity of the National Office of Identification for the distribution of national identity cards required for voting, through an agreement with the Organization of American States (Output 2);</li> <li>• Supporting holding of the elections (Output 3, main); and</li> <li>• Increase participation of women, youth and vulnerable groups (additional Output 4 and 5 added through a 2015 amendment but not funded).</li> </ul> <p>Implemented through a Direct Implementation mechanism (DIM), the effort was originally designed to strengthen the Electoral Council and the 2013 – 2014 electoral process in Haiti. It was extended to September 2017 because of political crises which interrupted the electoral processes. The cycle of direct elections was eventually completed in early 2017.</p> <p>GOH and UNDP supported the mechanisms needed for the administration of elections. It used a relevant electoral cycle and capacity building approach. Relevance was lower in 2017 as the project was not long enough to help consolidate gains made by the Provisional/Permanent Electoral Council (CEP) or to support the reform discussions which were just getting underway.</p> <p>Sustainability remains a key concern. The project did not address the issue of reforms needed in the context to stabilize and solidify Haiti's political and electoral processes and institutions. A permanent CEP is still not in place and the cost of the election requires analysis at the policy and technical levels in the near term for Haiti to be able to develop an electoral system and process that it can afford and sustain.</p>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	Participation of women, youth and vulnerable groups
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/download/11717">https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/download/11717</a>

### 1.1.3 Éducation juridique à l'intention des acteurs de la chaîne de protection des droits humains (Strengthening Human Rights Protection Through Legal Education in Haiti)

<b>Evaluation</b>	<i>Éducation juridique à l'intention des acteurs de la chaîne de protection des droits humains (Strengthening Human Rights Protection Through Legal Education in Haiti)</i>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2018
<b>Author/Agency</b>	Isabelle Fortin (independent consultant)
<b>Commissioned by</b>	UNDEF
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Final evaluation
<b>Project period</b>	2014-2016
<b>Keywords</b>	Human rights, legal education
<b>Abstract</b>	<p>Implemented by the 'Plateforme des organisations haïennes des droits humains' (POHDH) from April 2014 to March 2016, the overall objective of this evaluation (two years after the completion of the project) was to analyse the performance of the UNDEF funded project entitled: "Éducation juridique à l'intention des acteurs de la chaîne de protection des droits humains" (Strengthening Human Rights Protection through civil education) in Haiti.</p> <p>The project aimed to address the low level of knowledge of community actors (such as farmers' organizations, youth organizations and women's organizations), vulnerable groups and local authorities on human rights as well as State authorities' obligations in respect of human rights, through capacity development activities. Civic education on the chain of protection of human rights in Haiti, the mobilization of local actors on this thematic and the establishment of legal clinics were the main project elements.</p> <p>The evaluation found that while the overall aims of the project were relevant, the project largely failed to achieve intended results. The sustained existence of the platform--27 years--is proof of its capacity to establish and maintain relationships with grassroots organizations even though often irregular. The few trainings and meetings that brought together locally elected authorities, justice system representatives and members of grassroots organizations facilitated a dialogue that is still ongoing after the projects' closure and continue to contribute to civic education. Though the participation of women was limited, the platform developed strong relationships with women's rights organizations in Haiti that could help it better reach some of the marginalized target groups.</p> <p>However, the platform's lack of transparency and limited monitoring system are major impediments to measuring and achieving targeted results. The effort was neither effective nor efficient and facilitators/animators were unable to create or reinforce networks of human rights observers in the targeted communities. Human rights violations failed to be systematically documented. Observation reports were based on too few and poorly documented cases and legal aid was not provided as intended.</p> <p>A wide range of challenges limited evaluation outputs: the POHDH was not effectively forthcoming, key stakeholders not available, key beneficiaries no longer in office, unclear baseline, internal monitoring reports/tools and financial supporting documents not shared with the evaluator.</p>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	Farmers, youth and women's organizations
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="https://www.undeflessonslearned.org/projects/strengthening-human-rights-protection-legal-education-haiti/">https://www.undeflessonslearned.org/projects/strengthening-human-rights-protection-legal-education-haiti/</a>

#### 1.1.4 Technology Transfer to Small Farmers Program in Haiti (PTTA) IMPLEMENTATION, EVALUATION AND LESSONS LEARNED

<i>Evaluation</i>	<i>Technology Transfer to Small Farmers Program in Haiti (PTTA) IMPLEMENTATION, EVALUATION AND LESSONS LEARNED</i>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2018
<b>Author/Agency</b>	Karen Macours, Dan Stein, Lina Salazar, Sébastien Gachot, Bruno Jacquet, Jossie Fahsbender, Jery Rambao, Jérémie Gignoux and Kelsey Wright
<b>Commissioned by</b>	Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Lessons learned report
<b>Project period</b>	2011 - 2017
<b>Keywords</b>	Agriculture, technology
<b>Abstract</b>	<p>While most Haitians live below the poverty line, the impact of poverty is far more severe in rural areas (UNDP, 2014). Haitian agriculture has a high potential for growth and income generation, with an increasing demand for agricultural products in the local market and clear opportunities for export. Lack of competitiveness in the international market prevents economic benefits due to a range of challenges depicted briefly in the report.</p> <p>Smart subsidy programs have been advocated in many developing countries to encourage adoption of modern inputs and increase agricultural productivity. Between 2010 and 2013, the Ministry of Agriculture (MARNDR) introduced smart subsidies through a gradually introduced set of four large-scale projects. Among these, the Technology Transfer to Small Farmers Program (PTTA), the largest one implemented between 2011 and 2017 had three objectives: increasing agricultural production, increasing farmers' revenues and preserving natural resources. The PTTA provided vouchers to subsidize agricultural inputs, such as certain labour tasks, seedlings, fertilizer, pesticides, and other inputs.</p> <p>A series of evaluations deployed a variety of methods to test the program's effectiveness using agricultural and socio-economic variables. The present report's goal was to provide a clear, yet concise overview of this multi-year Program, illustrating a selection of the lessons learned from the evaluations, divided into policy and operations, presenting improvements for replication of similar efforts and more generally, for agricultural subsidy schemes in Haiti.</p> <p>Agroforestry incentives attracted up to two-thirds of the program's budget, whereas the remaining third was devoted to annual crops. Main findings show that agroforestry subsidies were effective in increasing the total value of crops and agricultural incomes derived from their sale. Findings provide a strong justification for agroforestry (including a potential follow-on program, the Agriculture and Agroforestry Technological Innovation Program, or PITAG).</p>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	Vulnerable groups, rural areas, poverty
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/9048">https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/9048</a>

## 1.2 2017

### 1.2.1 Evaluation approfondie des impacts de l'ouragan sur la sécurité alimentaire suivant l'approche HEA dans les huit (8) zones de moyens d'existence du pays

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b><i>Evaluation approfondie des impacts de l'ouragan sur la sécurité alimentaire suivant l'approche HEA dans les huit (8) zones de moyens d'existence du pays</i></b>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2017
<b>Author/Agency</b>	ACF, Oxfam and Concern Worldwide
<b>Commissioned by</b>	ECHO
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Thematic evaluation
<b>Project period</b>	2017
<b>Keywords</b>	Food security, nutrition
<b>Abstract</b>	<p>Haiti remains a country very exposed to natural hazards, environmental degradation and the persistence of poverty. This report describes a scenario analysis based on a Households Economic Approach (HEA) conducted in the eight rural livelihood zones following Hurricane Matthew. It aimed to assess the impact of the storm on zones both directly affected and unaffected, as well as the lingering effects of the prolonged 2015 drought, reinforced by the el Niño phenomenon.</p> <p>The report aims to build an evidence base to describe the evolution of food and nutrition security and to identify major risks for affected households, in order to inform emergency response and improve the overall strategic framework for livelihood rehabilitation and resilience building.</p> <p>The results of this analysis revealed that all livelihood zones have survival deficits up to 47% in areas directly affected by Matthew and 21% in areas not directly affected, as well as a livelihoods protection deficit. It concludes that the hurricane was the most harmful hazard, but the high degree of poverty has led households to cultivate marginal lands and live in high-risk areas. While Matthew's passage has exacerbated needs in affected communities, the rest of the country is not immune, as demonstrated by the analysis of the different livelihood zones. Very poor households also exist in the livelihood zones far from Matthew; they did not fully recover from the aftermath of the 2014 and 2015 droughts.</p> <p>A series of targeted and well-coordinated food security restorative actions are recommended in the report in order to reverse the identified deficits.</p>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	vulnerable groups, disaster risk reduction
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	Link not available anymore

### 1.2.2 Reducing stunting in children under five years of age: a comprehensive evaluation of UNICEF's strategies and programme performance - Haiti country case study

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b><i>Reducing stunting in children under five years of age: a comprehensive evaluation of UNICEF's strategies and programme performance - Haiti country case study</i></b>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2017
<b>Author/Agency</b>	Pepe Monroy and Rachel Kagel from ICF, team of independent consultants
<b>Commissioned by</b>	UNICEF
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Case study report
<b>Project period</b>	2014-2017

<b>Keywords</b>	Nutrition, stunting, short-term childhood development
<b>Abstract</b>	<p>This report constitutes part of a global evaluation titled “Reducing Stunting in Children Under Five Years of Age: A Comprehensive Evaluation of UNICEF’s Strategies and Programme Performance” which includes six country case studies of which Haiti is one. In recent years, the global nutrition community has increased its focus on stunting and has recognised lessons and models to support multi-sectoral approaches to improvements in nutrition.</p> <p>The case study addresses three UNICEF objectives:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Assess the relevance, appropriateness, and coherence of UNICEF’s country strategies and plans to address stunting in young children.</li> <li>2. Assess the effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of UNICEF’s country programmes in addressing stunting in young children, with particular attention to less-reached, disadvantaged, and vulnerable groups, and draw lessons on equitable progress in reducing stunting in various programme contexts, and</li> <li>3. Assess UNICEF’s leadership, guidance, and technical support, as well as the adequacy of UNICEF staffing and institutional capacity to respond to the lead role the organisation is expected to play at the field level in contributing to the sustainable and equitable reduction of stunting.</li> </ol> <p>Overall, the Haiti program included a number of relevant nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive approaches, mostly aligned with the context, national strategies, and global guidance. Progress in addressing stunting has been made.</p> <p>However, the first conclusion highlights that longer-term preventive approaches were excluded, and strategies and interventions were often poorly managed (no theory of change to address stunting and relevant outcomes related to complementary feeding and severe acute malnutrition, limited programmes implementation documentation, etc.).</p> <p>A second conclusion is that levels of funding and staff were insufficient to adequately address stunting. The third conclusion focuses on gaps in multi-sectoral approaches. While there is evidence that nutrition-sensitive approaches have been implemented, most were limited to water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) and higher-level policy discussions not operationalised on the ground. Other gaps in multi-sectoral approaches included lack of coordination and partnership activities with the UN, actors operating in agriculture and other nutrition-sensitive sectors. The final conclusion states that UNICEF Haiti implemented relevant data collection and dissemination activities using innovative technologies (e.g., commune surveys), but data and knowledge gaps remain.</p>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="https://www.unicef.org/evaldatabase/index_100691.html">https://www.unicef.org/evaldatabase/index_100691.html</a>

### 1.2.3 Learning from a Mid-Term Evaluation of FONHDAD in Haiti

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b>Learning from a Mid-Term Evaluation of FONHDAD in Haiti</b>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2017
<b>Author/Agency</b>	Kelsey E. Hopkins
<b>Commissioned by</b>	Clark University
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Mid-Term project evaluation
<b>Project period</b>	2015-2017
<b>Keywords</b>	Agriculture, food security, capacity development
<b>Abstract</b>	The Haitian Foundation for Sustainable Agricultural Development, FONHDAD, is a non-profit organization in Haiti which aims to modernize

	<p>Haiti's agriculture by introducing new techniques, fertilizers, seeds, and equipment. FONHDAD implemented the USAID funded REFERANS (Project to strengthen the agricultural production in the communes of Ganthier and Croix-des-Bouquets) project which provided agricultural support to farmers in two communes both located less than 30 kilometres from Port-au-Prince. During the first year of the project, REFERANS established baseline data, conducted agricultural interventions and trainings, and impacted over 1,000 rural households.</p> <p>Evaluation data was primarily based on the production of corn and sorghum. Data was not available for analysis of beans. A pest management strategy was also utilized which included a targeted pest control campaign. Nonetheless, pests negatively influenced the yield of sorghum. Data was not available to truly understand the extent of the pest control campaign and if it targeted sorghum or not. The project evaluation noted that one major area for improvement would be data management strategies to reduce inconsistencies and gaps in the available data.</p> <p>Available gender data was included throughout the evaluation to highlight progress towards FONHDAD's goal to include female farmers in available programs. The performance indicator data showed varying levels of female inclusion, with rates for female training higher than for other activities. This included short-term agricultural productivity or food security and global climate change training.</p>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	Gender, training
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="http://commons.clarku.edu/idce_masters_papers/111">http://commons.clarku.edu/idce_masters_papers/111</a>

#### 1.2.4 Évaluation en temps réel: Réponse à l'ouragan Mattieu en Haïti

<i>Evaluation</i>	<i>Évaluation en temps réel: Réponse à l'ouragan Mattieu en Haïti</i>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2017
<b>Author/Agency</b>	URD/HERE- Geneva
<b>Commissioned by</b>	DFID/URD
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Thematic: RTE of disaster event
<b>Project period</b>	Nov-Dec 2016
<b>Keywords</b>	Preparedness, communication, logistics, clusters
<b>Abstract</b>	<p>On 3 and 4 October 2016, a category 4 hurricane, known as Matthew, struck the Grand'Anse and Sud Departments in southwestern Haiti affecting an estimated 2.1 million people. As the first major disaster since the May 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) held in Istanbul, the international response took place in a particular context. The report focussed on several issues that reflected the commitments listed in the Grand Bargain such as: disaster preparedness, mobilisation of international actors, telecommunications; data management and needs assessments, logistics and related challenges.</p> <p>While providing detailed evidence on these areas, the evaluation's main overall finding was that there had been significant improvement in the international response to the humanitarian consequences of hurricane Matthew compared to earlier disasters in Haiti, even though the improvement has been uneven. Among donors and operational humanitarian agencies, there were major differences in terms of how they understood the scale and complexity of this disaster. They responded at different speeds, with different levels of investment from headquarters, and have done well in some sectors, but far less well in others.</p>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	None described



<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="http://www.urd.org/Rapport-de-l-evaluation-en-temps">http://www.urd.org/Rapport-de-l-evaluation-en-temps</a>
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### 1.3 2016

#### 1.3.1 British Red Cross' Haiti Urban Regeneration and Reconstruction Programme (URRP) Final Evaluation

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b><i>British Red Cross' Haiti Urban Regeneration and Reconstruction Programme (URRP) Final Evaluation</i></b>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2016
<b>Author/Agency</b>	Advisem Services, Inc.
<b>Commissioned by</b>	BRC British Red Cross
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Thematic: urban regeneration
<b>Project period</b>	June-Sep 2015
<b>Keywords</b>	Urban, reconstruction, livelihoods
<b>Abstract</b>	<p>The British Red Cross (BRC) commissioned a final evaluation of the programme to reflect on and learn from its experience in Haiti. The specific objectives of the evaluation were to review the extent to which BRC's engagement in Haiti achieved its objectives across different interventions. The British Red Cross generally accepted all (7) recommendations presented by the evaluators. The evaluation team believed that, even though the results appeared to be mixed, the Urban Regeneration and Reconstruction Programme (URRP) still represented a major achievement, considering the conditions that prevailed in Delmas 19 and the significant constraints within which the BRC had to work.</p> <p>On the whole, the housing and infrastructure component achieved fairly good results, especially in public infrastructure. The livelihoods component achieved modest results and could have done more, had it not been for the lack of time and the high turnover in programme staff. Of all three components, governance was the most severely affected by the programme's tight implementation deadlines. Some progress was made in building the skills and capacities of local stakeholders; however, in the absence of any meaningful follow-up, this progress is unlikely to be sustainable. The evaluation highlights that the canal and other drainage and paving infrastructure works "had the greatest and most positive impact upon the community".</p>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	Marginalized groups
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="http://www.urban-response.org/resource/23685">http://www.urban-response.org/resource/23685</a>

#### 1.3.2 Haiti: What did we learn? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haiti Earthquake

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b><i>Haiti: What did we learn? The Shelter Response and Housing Recovery in the First Two Years after the 2010 Haiti Earthquake</i></b>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2016
<b>Author/Agency</b>	The World Bank
<b>Commissioned by</b>	Habitat for Humanity, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, UN Human Settlements Program, Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR)
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Thematic: Shelter
<b>Project period</b>	2010-2016

<b>Keywords</b>	Shelter, Reconstruction, humanitarian response
<b>Abstract</b>	<p>The report was intended to help housing and shelter practitioners improve future post-disaster shelter responses and housing recovery programs and the integration between them. The report covered the shelter and housing responses in Haiti, and looked especially at how early decisions about sheltering affected the housing response. The analysis also covered other interrelated topics that heavily affected work on shelter and housing: disaster risk management (DRM), the urban context, and recovery financing. The report served as an input to work of the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) to improve disaster recovery, in particular, the development of the Guide to Developing Disaster Recovery Frameworks (DFR Guide).</p> <p>Soon after the initial emergency phase was completed, it was evident that Haitians and international actors were not working in concert. There was lack of familiarity with the cluster system by Haitian actors, a failure to adapt it to Haitian requirements, and friction from language and cultural differences. Government was not successful at coordinating the international actors and there was turnover and instability in the cluster system. A further difficulty was maintaining continuity during the nearly yearlong election and early post-election period. Ultimately, the shelter response consisted almost exclusively of camp support and a massive T-shelter program. The T-shelters supported property owners more than renters, by committing disproportionate funding to T-shelters, which required access to land, and alternatives, such as rental subsidies and hosting arrangements, were underfunded.</p>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	Protection
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="https://www.gfdr.org/what-did-we-learn-the-shelter-response-and-housing-recovery-in-the-first-two-years-after-the-2010-haiti-earthquake">https://www.gfdr.org/what-did-we-learn-the-shelter-response-and-housing-recovery-in-the-first-two-years-after-the-2010-haiti-earthquake</a>

### 1.3.3 Evaluación del Programa de País Haití 2011-2015

<i>Evaluation</i>	<i>Evaluación del Programa de País Haití 2011-2015</i>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2016
<b>Author/Agency</b>	IADP
<b>Commissioned by</b>	Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Country
<b>Project period</b>	2011-2015
<b>Keywords</b>	General development, transportation, WASH, education
<b>Abstract</b>	<p>The country strategy with Haiti for the 2011-2015 period was the Inter-American Development Bank's (IDB) first post-earthquake strategy and coincided with the start of the mandate of the Ninth General Increase in the Resources of the IDB (IDB-9). The IDB-9 commitments for Haiti included debt forgiveness and expanded the IDB Grant Facility with a view to providing Haiti with US\$200 million per year over a period of 10 years (2011-2020), subject to annual approval by the Governors. The IDB-9 commitments modified the Bank's relationship with Haiti by converting the Bank's entire portfolio to a grant portfolio. Adjustment to the IDB-9 requirements also included to create in the Vice Presidency for Countries (VPC) a Haiti Department (CDH), to ensure the efficient and effective management of the unprecedented amount of resources allocated by IDB-9 (document AB-2764) to the Haiti program.</p> <p>The country strategy achieved limited results in relation to the initial targets, with significant challenges in terms of the operational and financial sustainability of investments. The investment portfolio made progress on</p>

	<p>infrastructure works, albeit with differences from sector to sector, but the coverage and expansion targets initially proposed under the country strategy were not met. Sector specifics follow:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transportation: the results fell short of the targets in terms of road network quality (kilometers rehabilitated) and maintenance.</li> <li>• Energy: rehabilitation programs for the Péligre hydroelectric plant and the distribution system experienced significant delays and cost overruns (close to US\$110 million).</li> <li>• Agriculture: the sector portfolio was positive in terms of the construction of flood protection infrastructure and the expansion of irrigable area, but limited in terms of raising crop yields.</li> <li>• WASH: increase in coverage and financial performance of the operators, were limited for Port-au-Prince but showed improvements in mid-sized city programs. The rural water program, despite achieving the beneficiary targets, did not meet the coverage and sanitation targets.</li> <li>• Education: improvements in access, through the construction of schools, were limited, while the tuition waiver program yielded better outcomes. In terms of quality of education, progress was confined to teacher training and the provision of materials. Progress on the governance pillar was significant.</li> </ul>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	None described
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/8057?locale-attribute=es&amp;locale-attribute=en">https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/8057?locale-attribute=es&amp;locale-attribute=en</a>

#### 1.3.4 Rapport de la Commission Indépendante d'Évaluation et de Vérification Electorale Elections de 2015

<i>Evaluation</i>	<i>Rapport de la Commission Indépendante d'Évaluation et de Vérification Electorale Elections de 2015</i>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2016
<b>Author/Agency</b>	Commission Indépendante d'Évaluation et de Vérification Electorale (CIEVE)
<b>Commissioned by</b>	Commission Indépendante d'Évaluation et de Vérification Electorale (CIEVE)
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Process
<b>Project period</b>	2015
<b>Keywords</b>	Electoral system, voting transparency
<b>Abstract</b>	<p>The number of complete files expected (3,235) compared to those found (294) shows the weakness of the documentary surveillance chain whose mission was to protect chronological documentation or any documentary trace related to the seizure, detention, control, transfer, analysis, and storage of physical and / or electronic evidence of electoral ballots.</p> <p>The proportion of non-retractable votes (29%) applied to the total of valid votes (1,560,631) means that the Voting Bureaux would have authorized 448,000 citizens to vote without confirming and certifying inadequacy, as stipulated in the electoral decree. The second critical element is the proportion of the number of correct National Identity Cards (CINs) compared to signatures and or fingerprints. The percentage of false CINs found is 16.2%. For the 1,112,600 registered votes (valid votes reported on minutes minus the number of hand-inscribed CINs) 180,250 would then be false CINs for a total of 628,000 irreducible votes.</p> <p>The number of unreliable votes (628,000 votes, or 40% of valid votes) is higher than the number of votes obtained by the candidate placed at the top of the list according to the results of the evaluation, higher than the</p>

	<p>sum of votes obtained by the second and third candidates, and higher than the difference between the first and fifth candidates. Moreover, by applying certain criteria defined by the CIEVE according to article 171.1 of the electoral decree, the situation becomes even more serious because the percentage of valid votes is reduced to 9% of the total votes.</p> <p>In line with the CIEVE's mandate to essentially purify the process in order to restore the confidence of the political actors, it recommends the resumption of the process, while taking the necessary steps to ensure and respect the right to vote of citizens and the right of candidates (to be fairly elected).</p>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	None described
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Rapport_CIEVE.pdf">http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Rapport_CIEVE.pdf</a>

### 1.3.5 Comparative Assessment of Livelihood Approaches Across Humanitarian Organizations in Post-Earthquake Haiti Camp Resettlement

<i>Evaluation</i>	<i>Comparative Assessment of Livelihood Approaches Across Humanitarian Organizations in Post-Earthquake Haiti Camp Resettlement</i>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2016
<b>Author/Agency</b>	Concern Worldwide
<b>Commissioned by</b>	Concern Worldwide
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Impact: shelter
<b>Project period</b>	2013-2016
<b>Keywords</b>	Resettlement, gender, livelihoods
<b>Abstract</b>	<p>This report focused on an evaluation of Income Generating Activities (IGA) that accompanied rental subsidy programs in Haiti between 2013 and 2016. The original objectives were to evaluate the impact of supplemental support on the economic situation of house-holds, the livelihoods approaches from a quality/ cost/ effectiveness point of view and to feed into current reflection process of parties concerned with sustainable livelihood approaches.</p> <p>The consultants reviewed reports for humanitarian organisations that provided rental subsidies, conducted 10 focus groups with beneficiaries and aid workers, and surveyed a sample of 1,399 rental subsidy beneficiaries. The study found:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) A relationship between aid money received and those who remained in rental subsidy housing. Those who received the greatest amount of money—over 25,000 HT--were most likely to have left the house for economic reasons. The relationship is likely related to the fact most vulnerable beneficiaries received the most aid, i.e., they were also the most likely to have to seek lower income housing.</li> <li>2) The most statistically significant indications of a relationship between training and any response variable were a relationship between professional training and still being in the rental subsidy house or having left it for non-economic reasons. Specifically, the evaluators found that 73% of those who had professional training had either remained in the house or left for non-economic reasons vs. 60% for the overall sample population.</li> <li>3) A relationship between Breadwinner Status and having Received Tools or Materials. Eleven percent of those who had received tools progressed from being a non-breadwinner or a less than primary breadwinner to being a second or the primary household breadwinner.</li> <li>4) The evaluators found a statistically significant (<math>p=.05</math>) higher proportion of beneficiaries who had received training remained in the rental subsidy home or left for non-economic reasons. Specifically, only 41 percent for</li> </ol>

	those who had received no training remained or left the rental unit for non-economic reasons vs. 55 percent for the nearest humanitarian aid agency, that of Goal.
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	Gender
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IGA_Report_FINAL_10_07_2016.pdf">http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IGA_Report_FINAL_10_07_2016.pdf</a>

## 1.4 2015

### 1.4.1 Evaluation of Canada-Haiti Cooperation 2006-2013 - Synthesis Report

<i>Evaluation</i>	<i>Evaluation of Canada-Haiti Cooperation 2006-2013 - Synthesis Report</i>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2015
<b>Author/Agency</b>	Development Evaluation Division
<b>Commissioned by</b>	Government of Canada
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Country evaluation
<b>Project period</b>	2006-2013
<b>Keywords</b>	General development, cooperation, health, education
<b>Abstract</b>	<p>This report presented the findings, conclusions, lessons and recommendations stemming from the evaluation of Canada-Haiti development cooperation for the 2006-2013 period. The evaluation, conducted from May 2013 to March 2014, assessed a sample of 47 out of the 170 projects implemented during the review period, 17 of which were visited in the field. Sectors included health, education, sustainable economic development, food security, governance, environmental sustainability. Gender equality was also addressed through improved access to health and education.</p> <p>Based on the sample, the evaluation concluded that overall, the initiatives Canada supported were relevant and effective. Canadian cooperation helped in the following sectors:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Health sector: established a national health policy, reduced maternal and child mortality, and improved coordination between national and international actors.</li> <li>• In the education sector: improved school attendance and student retention rates among both boys and girls, although it could not be determined whether this contribution had an impact on passing and graduation rates.</li> <li>• Sustainable economic development: helped build infrastructure in Haiti, which should generate future economic benefits. The program introduced innovations, particularly as part of the municipal integrated planning approach and sustainable agriculture in target areas. A key achievement was implementation of an agricultural insurance and credit system. However, the evaluation found a need for greater focus on agricultural reform, marketing, and support for value chains.</li> <li>• Food security sector: helped introduce micro-credit to encourage small-scale food production with potential for replication on a wider scale. Several civil society organizations were supported in improving management of rural agriculture.</li> <li>• Governance sector and human rights: a tangible contribution increased universal suffrage and created a space for exercising civic and fundamental rights. Canadian support helped Haiti to</li> </ul>

	<p>produce its first reports on the human rights situation, in accordance with UN conventions.</p> <p>The evaluation found that Canada-Haiti cooperation has been contributing to progress in the area of gender equality (GE), including the decrease in maternal and child mortality since 2006, and improvement of the attendance and retention rates of both boys and girls at the elementary school level. Canadian cooperation also helped strengthen women's roles in rural organizations in the targeted areas. The most successful projects were implemented by large Canadian NGOs.</p>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	Gender, environment
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="http://www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc/publications/evaluation/2015/dev-eval-canada-haiti01.aspx?lang=eng">http://www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc/publications/evaluation/2015/dev-eval-canada-haiti01.aspx?lang=eng</a>

#### 1.4.2 Évaluation finale : Plans d'implémentation de programmes (pip) livelihoods et gestion des risques/préparation humanitaire (2011-2014)

<b>Evaluation</b>	<i>Évaluation finale : Plans d'implémentation de programmes (pip) livelihoods et gestion des risques/préparation humanitaire (2011-2014)</i>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2015
<b>Author/Agency</b>	Oxfam
<b>Commissioned by</b>	Oxfam
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Programmes (2)
<b>Project period</b>	2011-2014
<b>Keywords</b>	Livelihood, DRR, gender
<b>Abstract</b>	<p>This was a joint evaluation of two Program Implementation Plans (PIP)—a) Livelihoods and b) DRR/Humanitarian Preparedness—implemented by OXFAM USA (OUS) with the support of several actors over the 2011-2014 period in the departments of Artibonite, Nippes, and Ouest, Haiti. Each PIP was built around a number of projects/actions, most of which were implemented by local partners, such as community-based organizations (CBO), civil society organizations (CSO) in collaboration with local authorities, and sectoral state institutions. The evaluation findings were obtained through a participatory methodology used with the different stakeholders involved in both PIPs. These included state actors and sector regulatory institutions, implementation partners, local authorities, and direct beneficiaries/primary change agents. The data collected was complemented with data from secondary sources (e.g. project reports, sector planning document, evaluation reports, sector statistics). The Livelihoods PIP's implementation brought about a number of changes in the lives of primary change agents (at the individual, community, and organizational levels). The DRR/Humanitarian PIP actions brought about changes at the individual, community, and organizational levels in target areas.</p>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	Gender
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="https://policy-practice.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/files/Haiti_Program_Evaluation_2_011-2014_-_French_Report.pdf">https://policy-practice.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/files/Haiti_Program_Evaluation_2_011-2014_-_French_Report.pdf</a>

### 1.4.3 The Listen and Learn Project - Improving Aid Accountability in Haiti 2014

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b><i>The Listen and Learn Project - Improving Aid Accountability in Haiti 2014</i></b>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2015
<b>Author/Agency</b>	Dara/Keystone Accountability
<b>Commissioned by</b>	Conrad N. Hilton Foundation
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Programme
<b>Project period</b>	2013-2015
<b>Keywords</b>	Accountability mechanisms, donor accountability
<b>Abstract</b>	<p>The purpose of the Listen and Learn project, a joint DARA/Keystone initiative funded by the Conrad N. Hilton Foundation, was to improve the accountability of aid efforts in Haiti and to provide a model for greater beneficiary accountability in relief and recovery efforts for this context and others.</p> <p>The first component implemented by DARA, was based on face-to-face interviews with aid organizations in Haiti and representatives of governments, international organizations, NGO networks, foundations and private contractors in Washington DC, New York, London and Rome. The second component tested a new way to gauge the perceptions of disaster-affected people and to assist organizations to incorporate that perspective into program design and implementation. The goal was to make affected people the unit of account in aid-related decision-making by asking a representative sample of beneficiaries a few questions continuously, and then using the answers to guide improved performance.</p> <p>The field research confirmed the preliminary findings of the previous desk analysis of dozens of evaluations and reports: very few of the UN agencies, NGOs, charities or private contractors operating aid programs in Haiti have a functional beneficiary accountability framework or guidelines in place beyond informal accountability tools (e.g. surveys, quality control procedures to track satisfaction among beneficiaries, etc.). The lack of formal procedures in implementing accountability mechanisms made the organization dependent on the initiative of those leading the projects on the ground, at times jeopardizing the long term sustainability as staff rotation is often high. Accountability to beneficiaries simply was not a priority in programming for many organizations.</p>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	None described
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="http://daraint.org/2015/01/12/5271/listen-learn-project-improving-aid-accountability-haiti/?utm_source=feedburner&amp;utm_medium=feed&amp;utm_campaign=Feed%3A+daraint%2FobwK+%28dara%29">http://daraint.org/2015/01/12/5271/listen-learn-project-improving-aid-accountability-haiti/?utm_source=feedburner&amp;utm_medium=feed&amp;utm_campaign=Feed%3A+daraint%2FobwK+%28dara%29</a>

### 1.4.4 Evaluation of Norwegian Multilateral Support to Basic Education: Synthesis Report

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b><i>Evaluation of Norwegian Multilateral Support to Basic Education: Synthesis Report</i></b>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2015
<b>Author/Agency</b>	University of Southern California
<b>Commissioned by</b>	Norad
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Outcomes, output, value added
<b>Project period</b>	2009-2013
<b>Keywords</b>	Education, fragile states, gender

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b><i>Evaluation of Norwegian Multilateral Support to Basic Education: Synthesis Report</i></b>
<b>Abstract</b>	<p>Norway places education on top of the development agenda with much funding for basic education channelled mainly through then multilateral actors United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and Global Partnership for Education (GPE). UNICEF and GPE received 74% and 24% respectively, of Norway's multilateral aid to basic education during the period of 2009-2013.</p> <p>A recent white paper explicitly stated that better results reporting and delivery is expected. This was the main rationale for the current assessment; to understand the effectiveness and value added of this modality of development cooperation. The evaluation synthesized results of a desk study of 10 countries that included Haiti. The main evaluation questions focused on the intended and unintended outputs and outcomes of the basic education initiatives that Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs funded through GPE and UNICEF, and the value-added to Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs of using GPE and UNICEF as conduits for investments (aid management).</p> <p>The findings of this report were that both UNICEF and GPE lack transparent and easy access to their key documents pertaining to upstream work on the program cycle on their websites by county and operation. The second basic question that this evaluation was expected to answer was the value-added to Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs of using GPE and UNICEF as conduits for its investments in basic education. The findings indicate that while both UNICEF and GPE added value, neither added as much value as it could, especially UNICEF.</p> <p>For the GPE programs in Haiti during the evaluation period (2010-2015), the evaluation team found little or no change in the percentage of children enrolled in participating schools for more than one year reading at grade level in grade 3. Gender equality was not addressed in the GPE project. However, the number of children in disadvantaged or marginalized areas enrolled through provision of tuition waivers is seen to be partly positive or fulfilled. In Haiti, the UNICEF Country Programmes did not have learning outcomes on their agendas. UNICEF also failed to put forward any expected results for gender equality. However, the evaluation team found improved access to quality early learning and basic education for low income and rural area children and equality for marginalized groups.</p>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	Fragile states, gender
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="https://www.norad.no/en/toolspublications/publications/2015/evaluation-of-norwegian-multilateral-support-to-basic-education/">https://www.norad.no/en/toolspublications/publications/2015/evaluation-of-norwegian-multilateral-support-to-basic-education/</a>

#### 1.4.5 Independent Evaluation of SDC's Performance in Basic Education 2007 – 2014

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b><i>Independent Evaluation of SDC's Performance in Basic Education 2007 – 2014</i></b>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2015
<b>Author/Agency</b>	Columbia University
<b>Commissioned by</b>	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Independent/outcomes SDC's performance in basic education
<b>Project period</b>	2007-2014
<b>Keywords</b>	Education, fragile states, marginalised children
<b>Abstract</b>	Basic education (BE) and vocational skills development help to ensure access to resources and services for all. The evaluation of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) in the fields of education



<i>Evaluation</i>	<i>Independent Evaluation of SDC's Performance in Basic Education 2007 – 2014</i>
	<p>included case studies and desk studies (Haiti). The efforts of the SDC were best articulated along three main axes:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Promoting a holistic vision of education based on the right to education in the framework of the political dialogue on the post-2015 agenda.</li> <li>2) Strengthening the quality and relevance of education by better matching supply with educational demand.</li> <li>3) Access to basic education / training for excluded populations (children, out-of-school and out-of-school youth, illiterate adults, girls and women, rural populations, etc.).</li> </ol> <p>Six features of SDC programmes/projects in Haiti were noticeable and relevant for consideration in the Independent Evaluation of SDC's BE programmes:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) The comprehensive approach that integrates humanitarian and development assistance both in terms of programming as well as organisational structure in the Swiss Cooperation Office.</li> <li>2) The combination of infrastructure/rehabilitation support and quality improvement in education as reflected in the vocational-skills development of construction workers.</li> <li>3) SDC's dual role as an implementer and a funder of programmes carried out in one and the same country.</li> <li>4) The implementation of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States to overcome fragility, establish peace and stability, and to ensure equitably access to resources and services.</li> <li>5) The close collaboration with government institutions from the onset of the project ensured a successful scaling-up and institutionalization of the programmes.</li> <li>6) The success with scaling-up and institutionalizing standards and training programmes nationwide that were first funded as innovations or pilot programmes.</li> </ol>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	Low income, marginalised children (homeless)
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="http://www.oecd.org/derec/switzerland/Evaluation%20of%20SDC%E2%80%99s%20Performance%20in%20Basic%20Education%202007%20%E2%80%93%202014.pdf">http://www.oecd.org/derec/switzerland/Evaluation%20of%20SDC%E2%80%99s%20Performance%20in%20Basic%20Education%202007%20%E2%80%93%202014.pdf</a>

#### 1.4.6 Evaluation of Norway's Support to Haiti after the 2010 Earthquake

<i>Evaluation</i>	<i>Evaluation of Norway's Support to Haiti after the 2010 Earthquake</i>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2015
<b>Author/Agency</b>	Particip GmbH
<b>Commissioned by</b>	Norad
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Hum / Dev Action
<b>Project period</b>	2010-2015
<b>Keywords</b>	Earthquake, capacity building, human rights
<b>Abstract</b>	<p>Soon after the earthquake hit Haiti on 12 January 2010, Norway joined the massive international response to the appeals for humanitarian aid. Norway was among the first countries to also pledge support to medium and long-term reconstruction and development needs. A major challenge was knowing how to utilize funds optimally. Adding to a humanitarian crisis of enormous magnitude and the loss of infrastructure, the combination of an inflow of international actors often poorly coordinated and the destruction of</p>

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b>Evaluation of Norway's Support to Haiti after the 2010 Earthquake</b>
	<p>already weak state institutions, created challenges of unprecedented magnitude for the national and international efforts to help rebuild Haiti.</p> <p>This evaluation looked at the Norwegian assistance to Haiti after the earthquake. First, it looked at the effectiveness of Norwegian assistance to Haiti. At the time of the report, it was too early to conclude on effects from the Norwegian support, since most of it was aimed at long-term development efforts. However, the report presented and discussed findings that can tell us whether it is likely that the Norwegian support will lead to achievement of intended objectives in the future. Second, the evaluation sought to improve future Norwegian development assistance in comparable situations elsewhere. It did so by extracting lessons on the ability of the Norwegian aid delivery system to manage knowledge and to navigate in complex political and institutional dynamics, making the best possible strategic and practical decisions.</p> <p>The effects of Norwegian support on the Haitian population were moderate. Norwegian assistance actively supported the four priority themes with differing twists. Natural Resource Management (NRM) efforts were appreciated by all stakeholders interviewed but show little tangible results to date. Norwegian efforts in dialogue/governance seem to be most effective at the central level. Beyond the humanitarian phase (when Norway managed to insert it on the international agenda), protection of vulnerable groups was not effectively made a focus of support. Working mainly from the central level, valuable efforts, such as in protecting women victims of SGBV often laboured in isolation. Explicit Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) was the weakest portion of the Norwegian portfolio, also with scattered efforts not adding up to an effective programme. While it was, in fact, unreasonable to expect visible results at this early stage, it is uncertain to which degree they are likely in the future.</p> <p>Overall, Norwegian development assistance is unlikely to produce tangible improvement directly for poor people in Haiti, except in very focused settings, such as in supported fishing cooperatives in the Département du Sud, but, even there, the sustainability of the effects can still be questioned. Although more likely, evidence is lacking to link indirect support to tangible improvements for the poor.</p> <p>Accepting the strengths of Norway as the quintessential flexible donor and partner, it is important to recognise the benefits of a country strategy. Although they should include logical frameworks and more carefully chosen goals and indicators, strategy documents can and must remain moving targets, incorporating genuine on-going learning as a rule. To capitalise on this learning, Norway will need to put into place and enforce more structured learning systems, such as informal opportunities for learning ("brown bag lunches") and a system for better sharing and archiving of trip reports.</p>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	Capacity building, human rights
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="https://www.norad.no/en/toolspublications/publications/2015/evaluation-of-norways-support-to-haiti-after-the-2010-earthquake/">https://www.norad.no/en/toolspublications/publications/2015/evaluation-of-norways-support-to-haiti-after-the-2010-earthquake/</a>

## 1.5 2014

### 1.5.1 'We are here' - IFRC's experience with communication and feedback channels for affected populations in Haiti

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b>'We are here' - IFRC's experience with communication and feedback channels for affected populations in Haiti</b>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2014
<b>Author/Agency</b>	ALNAP/ CDA

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b>'We are here' - IFRC's experience with communication and feedback channels for affected populations in Haiti</b>
<b>Commissioned by</b>	ALNAP, German Foreign Ministry, IFRC
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Process
<b>Project period</b>	November 2012 - May 2013
<b>Keywords</b>	Accountability, relocation, internally displaced persons
<b>Abstract</b>	<p>The objective of this joint research initiative was to produce evidence-informed guidance for operational agencies on strengthening the effectiveness of feedback mechanisms for affected populations in humanitarian context. This case study on Haiti primarily focused on two-way communication and feedback processes in IFRC's Return and Relocation Programme, which supported people displaced by the earthquake to move out from the crowded camps and informal settlements into safe housing. A distinctive feature in the Haiti case study was the use of technology to enhance and expand communication and feedback loops. The humanitarian response to the Haiti earthquake was characterised by an unprecedented degree and scale of application of new and innovative crowd mapping platforms, mobile technology and call-in radio shows that provided information in real time.</p> <p>The IFRC's impressive investments in multiple and complementary two-way communication channels produced important lessons for its global affected population communications and accountability work. IFRC Haiti operations greatly benefited from the expertise available through (its global network of experienced delegates and local experts during the testing and design of the TERA and IVR systems. The increased attention on information and communication technology (ICT) application during the Haiti Earthquake response allowed for the testing of new communication channels and previously untested organisational structures. The evolving role of the IFRC's Beneficiaries Communication Team (BCT) during the various phases of the response was another important area for consideration in future responses. While in the immediate post-disaster response information provision and mass communication approaches are most helpful, in subsequent phases the BCT has the potential to support programmes in a much closer way by targeting questions to improve programme relevance and quality and to help with data analysis.</p>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	None described
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="http://www.alnap.org/resource/12815">http://www.alnap.org/resource/12815</a>

### 1.5.2 How law and regulation supports disaster risk reduction: Haiti case - study report

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b>How law and regulation supports disaster risk reduction: Haiti case - study report</b>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2014
<b>Author/Agency</b>	Croix-Rouge Haïtienne; Canadian Red Cross (CRC)
<b>Commissioned by</b>	Croix-Rouge Haïtienne; Canadian Red Cross (CRC)
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	DRR landscape
<b>Project period</b>	2010-2014
<b>Keywords</b>	Law, regulation, DRR
<b>Abstract</b>	<p>This study analysed the extent to which legal frameworks in Haiti support national and local efforts towards disaster-risk reduction (DRR). The study covered a broad scope of law and regulation relevant to DRR for natural hazards, including issues such as the integration of DRR into disaster risk management laws and institutional arrangements, responsibility and liability</p>

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b>How law and regulation supports disaster risk reduction: Haiti case - study report</b>
	<p>for DRR, early warning systems, infrastructure, building codes, land use planning, environmental management, and awareness-raising and education. Its methodology of speaking with stakeholders at national, sub-national and local levels was also designed to identify gaps, challenges and good practices in the way the legal framework was implemented.</p> <p>The good practices identified in this report are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) National DRM system and the creation of DRM committees at departmental, municipal and local levels.</li> <li>2) Haiti has a working national Early Warning System in place for hurricanes as well as a flooding EWS tht is technical in nature and covers the highest risk areas in the country.</li> <li>3) The existence and nascent implementation of the National Building Code is a clear example of good practice in this sector.</li> <li>4) Proposed legal framework for environmental impact assessments: Haiti already possesses a brief but important legal framework for the environmental impact assessment process, and some limited capacity at national level to enforce it.</li> <li>5) Forest protection under law: a large body of law relates to protection of forests in Haiti, and whilst enforcement and capacity in the sector is severely lacking, a legal framework exists that seeks to limit human impact on Haiti's depleted forests, and to prevent risks such as forest fires.</li> <li>6) DRR has yet to be included as part of the national education curriculum however, a significant amount of good practice exists elsewhere.</li> </ol> <p>Gaps that exist in law and practice identified in the evaluation include: 1) A lack of a legal framework for DRR and the national system for DRM; 2) Responsibility and accountability for DRR; 3) Lack of coordination in the early warning systems and risk mapping; and 4) Lack of legislation that regulates and informal and precarious settlements.</p>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	Environment
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/IDRL/country%20studies/HAITI%20ODRR%20Report.pdf">http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/IDRL/country%20studies/HAITI%20ODRR%20Report.pdf</a>

### 1.5.3 Evaluation de la coopération de l'UE avec la République d'Haïti

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b>Evaluation de la coopération de l'UE avec la République d'Haïti</b>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2014
<b>Author/Agency</b>	Particip GmbH
<b>Commissioned by</b>	EC Development and Cooperation EuropeAid
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Outcome
<b>Project period</b>	2008-2012
<b>Keywords</b>	Road infrastructure, economic governance, democratic governance, education, risk and disaster management, food security
<b>Abstract</b>	The main objectives of the evaluation were to provide an independent and comprehensive evaluation of the EU's past and present cooperation and partnership relations with the Government of Haiti and to identify key lessons and formulate recommendations to improve the EU's current and future strategies, programs, and activities. The scope of the study covers all cooperation strategies, agreements and other official commitments between the EU and the Republic of Haiti, as well as their implementation, during the 2008-2012 period.

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b>Evaluation de la coopération de l'UE avec la République d'Haïti</b>
	<p>The challenges encountered during this evaluation are mainly related to the impact of the 2010 earthquake on the cooperation context (loss of life, change of personnel, physical loss of data, changes in the focus of development / cooperation strategies, etc.). Measuring the long-term effects of support was made difficult by many factors specific to fragility contexts. Findings include:</p> <p>1) EU support was focused on main fragility issues at two levels of intervention: a) the strengthening of the State and the economic reconstruction of the country (budgetary support and rehabilitation of large infrastructures); b) support in high-priority social areas (education) and support for the most vulnerable populations (food security and local development).</p> <p>2) The EU support strategy was adapted to the context of fragility and the framework was correctly adjusted following the successive shocks (cyclones, soaring commodity prices, earthquakes, etc.). In particular, it proved wise to emphasize the strengthening of the State and the consolidation of the structuring processes initiated in the previous period without neglecting certain "social" issues of high priority (including security food security, education, and risk prevention and management).</p> <p>3) Significant effects were achieved in the macroeconomic area and the legitimization of the State with budget support. But budgetary support played a limited role in terms of strengthening public financial management, and did not contribute to targeting allocations and strengthening sectoral policies. In particular, the use of this modality of support was based on weak policy dialogue and political dialogue.</p> <p>4) The EU provided support both at the level of the central state and that of civil society. However, the EU did not aim for genuine synergies between the two forms of support. While it had positive effects at the local level, support to non-state actors has not been included in processes for strengthening strategies and public institutions at the sectoral level.</p> <p>5) Finally, EU visibility at the policy level was good but below what was feasible, especially given the financial weight of its support and the level of financial and political risk associated with budgetary support.</p>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	Fragility
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/strategic-evaluation-eu-cooperation-republic-haiti-2008-2012_en">https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/strategic-evaluation-eu-cooperation-republic-haiti-2008-2012_en</a>

## 1.6 2013

### 1.6.1 Review of Three Programmes for Natural Resource Management and Disaster Risk Reduction in Departement du Sud, Haiti

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b>Review of Three Programmes for Natural Resource Management and Disaster Risk Reduction in Departement du Sud, Haiti</b>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2013
<b>Author/Agency</b>	International Law and Policy Institute
<b>Commissioned by</b>	Gov. of Norway, ILPL
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Programme
<b>Project period</b>	2010-2012
<b>Keywords</b>	Law, natural resource management, DRR
<b>Abstract</b>	This report presented a review of three programmes that were set up to address natural resource management and disaster risk reduction in the aftermath of the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The Government of

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b>Review of Three Programmes for Natural Resource Management and Disaster Risk Reduction in Departement du Sud, Haiti</b>
	<p>Norway funded the programmes through the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF). The programmes are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Haiti South West Sustainable Development Programme (SWSD), executed by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS);</li> <li>• Vulnerability Reduction in Watersheds/Agriculture, executed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO);</li> <li>• Natural Disaster Mitigation in the Southern Department, executed by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (MARNDR).</li> </ul> <p>As a forward-looking review, it recommended improvements and adjustments to the three programmes and the coordination between them with a view to strengthen local ownership. The overarching recommendation was for Norway to continue funding programmes in the Southern Department. The first phase of programming put in place a valuable base for continued programming. The UNDP project should be considered the core initiative, with UNEP providing support in a limited number of focus areas, such as the energy programme. The review team supports the decision to redirect the funding of the IADB programme funding to the on-going, co-financed project to protect Parc Macaya and a renewable energy programme. Norway should commit funding for a minimum of three years. Predictability of funding is necessary to enable long-term planning. The transaction cost of the present phased funding approach has been high, and there is now a need to shift attention fully to programming. Decisions on the distribution of funding should be based on an informed assessment of the capacity of the implementing partners to use the funds efficiently. Fragmentation of activities should as far as possible be avoided, and the division of responsibilities between partners should be as clear as possible.</p>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	Gender
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="https://www.norad.no/en/toolspublications/publications/2013/review-of-three-programmes-for-natural-resource-management-and-disaster-risk-reduction-in-haiti/">https://www.norad.no/en/toolspublications/publications/2013/review-of-three-programmes-for-natural-resource-management-and-disaster-risk-reduction-in-haiti/</a>

### 1.6.2 Mid-term Evaluation of IDB-9 Commitments

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b>Mid-term Evaluation of IDB-9 Commitments</b>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2013
<b>Author/Agency</b>	Office of Evaluation and Oversight /IADB
<b>Commissioned by</b>	Office of Evaluation and Oversight /IADB
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Evaluation of effective implementation of support
<b>Project period</b>	2010
<b>Keywords</b>	Debt forgiveness; financial commitments, Government of Haiti
<b>Abstract</b>	The objective of this report was to assess the full and effective implementation of the Bank's support to Haiti in the wake of the 2010 earthquake, in fulfilment of the mandates of IDB-9, which included full debt forgiveness, delivery of concessional resources in 2010, and expansion of the Bank's Grant Facility to provide Haiti US\$200 million per year for a period of 10 years (2011-2020), subject to annual approval by the Governors.

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b>Mid-term Evaluation of IDB-9 Commitments</b>
	<p>The evaluation confirmed that the financial mandates included in IDB-9 were fulfilled. The Bank wrote off Haiti's debt and transferred resources to the Grant Facility to approve grants to the country over the amount previously established, for US\$231.6 million in 2010. In 2011 and 2012, the Bank transferred US\$200 million per year in Ordinary Capital resources to the Grant Facility. The Bank financed a programme for an amount that exceeded the transfers made, totalling US\$231.0 million in 2011 and US\$228.0 million in 2012.</p> <p>The intervention strategy adopted by the Bank emphasized long-term efforts in the sectors where it had been operating, rather than reconstruction, and had very ambitious targets given the limited management capacities of the Government of Haiti. Execution problems, such as poor designs and pre-investment studies, combined with low execution and supervision capacity in executing units, limited the results of these programmes. New programmes for development in the northern hub, along with institutional support at the sectoral level, involve risks that need to be addressed in a timely manner to ensure results in the long term. Meanwhile, the urgent need for approval and disbursement of US\$200 million each year for 10 years does open up new opportunities for establishing a long-term country strategy, but is hindered by the slow, complex process of institution building. The result is pressure on specialists from the Bank and in the country, and this does not necessarily lead to disbursements or to effective efforts to overcome the problems of Haitian society.</p>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	None described
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="http://www.iadb.org/en/office-of-evaluation-and-oversight/mid-term-evaluation-of-idb-9-commitments,7990.html">http://www.iadb.org/en/office-of-evaluation-and-oversight/mid-term-evaluation-of-idb-9-commitments,7990.html</a>

## 1.7 2012

### 1.7.1 Haiti Humanitarian Assistance Evaluation - From a Resilience Perspective

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b>Haiti Humanitarian Assistance Evaluation - From a Resilience Perspective</b>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2012
<b>Author/Agency</b>	Disaster Resilience Leadership Academy, Tulane University
<b>Commissioned by</b>	Tulane University
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Recovery programming
<b>Project period</b>	2010-2012
<b>Keywords</b>	Resilience, DRR, protection
<b>Abstract</b>	<p>In an effort to advance effective humanitarian assistance, the Tulane University's Disaster Resilience Leadership Academy (DRLA) in partnership with the State University of Haiti (UEH), conducted the Haiti Humanitarian Assistance Evaluation. The evaluation attempted to build a framework for analysing resilience and the effects of humanitarian assistance on resilience outcomes.</p> <p>The research process was dynamic, allowing the evaluation team to explore the theme of resilience and humanitarian assistance led by and between Haitians in stakeholder workshops in impacted communities. Guided by these discussions, the evaluation team developed a resilience framework based upon seven dimensions of resilience (wealth, debt and credit, coping behaviours, human capital, community networks, protection and security, and psychosocial) and used primary data collected through a national household and community key informant surveys, to measure</p>

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b><i>Haiti Humanitarian Assistance Evaluation - From a Resilience Perspective</i></b>
	<p>the relationship between the earthquake, Haitian resilience, and exposure to humanitarian assistance and resilience outcomes. Resilience outcomes were measured at the household and individual levels.</p> <p>This evaluation found that humanitarian assistance provided did not make a detectable contribution as defined by the seven dimensions of resilience and in some instances, may have been associated with undesirable outcomes. It demonstrated the importance of engaging the impacted community from the on-set of the disaster to lead strategy, policy, and implementation based upon a thorough understanding of resilience and coping mechanisms that should be integrated into humanitarian programming starting at the beginning and continuing through the recovery process.</p> <p>The framework for measuring resilience defined and used in this evaluation can serve as a catalyst for future discussions related to Haitian resilience and to support and refine the monitoring and evaluation strategy for Haiti's recovery. However, more resources are needed to strengthen Haitian capacity to further develop evaluation methods and metrics (particularly metrics that track resources through the value chains to Haitian end user organisations and beneficiaries) that will allow for a deeper understanding of resilience and provide evidence to support data driven programming.</p>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	Protection
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="http://www2.tulane.edu/drla/upload/UEH-Tulane-DRLA-Haiti-Humanitarian-Aid-Evaluation-ENGLISH-May-2012.pdf">http://www2.tulane.edu/drla/upload/UEH-Tulane-DRLA-Haiti-Humanitarian-Aid-Evaluation-ENGLISH-May-2012.pdf</a>

### 1.7.2 Review of Norwegian Support to Strengthening Citizens' Political Influence in Haiti through the National Democratic Institute (NDI)

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b><i>Review of Norwegian Support to Strengthening Citizens' Political Influence in Haiti through the National Democratic Institute (NDI)</i></b>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2012
<b>Author/Agency</b>	International Law and Policy Institute (ILPI)
<b>Commissioned by</b>	Norad
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Final evaluation programme
<b>Project period</b>	2010-2011
<b>Keywords</b>	Political voice, civil society, Initiative Committee
<b>Abstract</b>	<p>This report on "Norwegian Support to Strengthening Citizens' Political Influence in Haiti through the National Democratic Institute (NDI)" was delivered to Norad under the contract with the International Law and Policy Institute to review a civil society democracy building programme in Haiti implemented by the National Democratic Institute (NDI). The programme has been funded by Norway since August of 2010.</p> <p>The review was based on a study of available literature, programme documentation and field work which included eight sites covered by the programme, as well as interviews with NDI staff and a wide range of stakeholders.</p> <p>The core element in NDI's civil society programming in Haiti is the Initiative Committee (IC), a democratically elected eleven-member group. NDI encouraged the formation of hierarchically nested ICs. Village level "section" ICs coalesce into municipal level "communal" ICs, which in turn coalesce into Department level ICs. The principal objective of the programme was to encourage citizen participation and advocacy around reconstruction and development issues via these ICs. An additional</p>



<b>Evaluation</b>	<b><i>Review of Norwegian Support to Strengthening Citizens' Political Influence in Haiti through the National Democratic Institute (NDI)</i></b>
	<p>objective was to create broader municipal or departmental units called platforms and advocacy coalitions that organize around specific issues.</p> <p>NDI's contribution to ICs was to organize them through intensive training in a village or urban neighbourhood and to support them logistically through event financing at the communal and departmental levels. This entailed use of Norwegian funds to rent a meeting space, to pay for food and drink at meetings. The programme successfully met the quantitative goals of forming more ICs and of activating platforms and coalitions, yet several problems are identified within the programme (e.g., managerial, budgetary, and conceptual).</p> <p>Despite problems, the report concluded that NDI had effectively fulfilled its part of the agreement at least in terms of activities, if not of results. The evaluation recommended that MFA and NDI deal with the conceptual, budgetary and managerial issues raised in the report and continue in partnership. The recommendation was also made for the creation, in the next phase, of local action funds (LAF) that will permit at least some local level of concrete action for mature ICs that have yet to receive resources from the State. The IC will not be sustainable unless years of dialog are transformed into some form of visible action.</p>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	Gender
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="https://www.norad.no/om-bistand/publikasjon/2012/review-of-norwegian-support-to-strengthening-citizens-political-influence-in-haiti-through-the-national-democratic-institute-ndi/">https://www.norad.no/om-bistand/publikasjon/2012/review-of-norwegian-support-to-strengthening-citizens-political-influence-in-haiti-through-the-national-democratic-institute-ndi/</a>

### 1.7.3 Giving with one hand: Evaluation of Post-Earthquake Physical Rehabilitation Response in Haiti, 2010 – a systems analysis

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b><i>Giving with one hand: Evaluation of Post-Earthquake Physical Rehabilitation Response in Haiti, 2010 – a systems analysis</i></b>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2012
<b>Author/Agency</b>	International Centre for Evidence in Disability/ London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine
<b>Commissioned by</b>	Christian Blind Mission/International Centre for Evidence in Disability
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Impact
<b>Project period</b>	2011
<b>Keywords</b>	Early response, coordination, people with disabilities
<b>Abstract</b>	<p>CBM supported an evaluation of the post-emergency rehabilitation response in order to assess the impact of the emergency response on the rehabilitation sector following the 2010 earthquake; what had been achieved, learn from good and not-so-good practice, and promote the development of an effective rehabilitation sector in the future.</p> <p>The evaluation provided evidence to inform CBM and other humanitarian organisations about what must be done in a post-disaster situation so that people with disabilities have access to relief and protection on an equal basis with others, and what is required in the long-term to develop a good rehabilitation service.</p> <p>Coordination and relationships with national authorities are aspects considered in the evaluation. The main findings are:</p> <p>1) The rehabilitation sector in Haiti after the earthquake was composed of a variety of actors with sometimes conflicting approaches. Full participation</p>

	<p>of national authorities was challenged by personnel turnover, political instability and unclear division of responsibilities.</p> <p>2) The coordination mechanism focused on day-to-day activities, neglecting the building of a common vision for the future. The creation of the Injury, Rehabilitation and Disability Group within the Health Cluster had a positive impact on emergency response coordination.</p> <p>3) The range of services offered to people with disabilities in Haiti was greater after the emergency response thanks to the introduction of new services.</p>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	Vulnerable groups
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="https://www.cbm.org/article/downloads/84419/Evaluation_of_Post-Earthquake_Physical_Rehabilitation_Response_in_Haiti_2010_-_a_systems_analysis.pdf">https://www.cbm.org/article/downloads/84419/Evaluation_of_Post-Earthquake_Physical_Rehabilitation_Response_in_Haiti_2010_-_a_systems_analysis.pdf</a>

## 1.8 2011

### 1.8.1 "Die deutsche humanitäre Hilfe im Ausland Länderstudie Haiti" EN: German humanitarian aid abroad: a country study on Haiti

<b>Evaluation</b>	<i>"Die deutsche humanitäre Hilfe im Ausland Länderstudie Haiti" EN: German humanitarian aid abroad: a country study on Haiti</i>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2011
<b>Author/Agency</b>	Ralf Otto und Lioba Weingärtner with contributions from Kelcie Joseph Dumorné and Gladys Berrouët / Channel Research, AGE G Consultants eG
<b>Commissioned by</b>	BMZ: Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung EN: Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Program outcome, field management/internal coherence
<b>Project period</b>	2010
<b>Keywords</b>	LRRD, development aid, gender
<b>Abstract</b>	<p>This evaluation of German humanitarian aid abroad, which began as early as in the beginning of 2009 (during the previous legislative term), was the first inter-ministerial, independent and comprehensive analysis and assessment of Germany's humanitarian assistance abroad. It focused on the humanitarian aid provided by the Federal Foreign Office (AA) and on the development-oriented emergency and transitional aid provided by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) in the period 2005-2009. The evaluation's main purpose was to gather insights to help the two ministries govern these fields of activity and to serve accountability purposes.</p> <p>The evaluation found that, Germany's humanitarian aid in Haiti was relevant and broadly appropriate. In terms of effectiveness and coverage, technical implementation of most projects examined appeared to be good, however innovative was often lacking. It was noted that smaller and shorter projects could generally be considered less efficient than larger and longer ones due to higher start-up costs distributed over a shorter timeframe. The overarching impacts of the measures were difficult to establish given a lack of information. It could be noted that interventions and organisations financed by Germany had played a part in improving the lives of the victims of the earthquake. Without further adaptation, however, it is questionable if longer-term effects can be achieved.</p> <p>The context of Haiti did not allow for the application of the LRRD approach in its ideal-typical, linear and phased way. State funding from Germany</p>

	<p>alone is insufficient to reach the rehabilitation phase of 'LRRD'. Long-term and development oriented engagement by Germany depends largely on the resources organisations already have, which do not stem from the ministries (own resources and financing from other donors). A coordination system for humanitarian aid was established after about half a year and was largely functional. Regarding cluster coordination, there was rarely coordination beyond information exchange and coordination in geographic targeting. Coordination with existing local coordination mechanisms and the participation of local capacities was found to have been insufficient. On the one hand, coordination management between the two ministries (AA and BMZ) took place in Berlin quickly in multiple meetings of the crisis unit in the AA with BMZ participating. On the other hand, the usual procedures for reciprocal information and consultations in connection with project approvals were applied between and within the ministries. The informational and coordination needs of participants were not always properly covered. In Haiti, no specific coordination measures could be observed for interventions financed by AA and BMZ.</p>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	Gender
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="https://www.oecd.org/derec/49865501.pdf">https://www.oecd.org/derec/49865501.pdf</a>

### 1.8.2 Haiti External Evaluation of the Emergency Relief & Response Fund (ERRF), 2008-2011

<i>Evaluation</i>	<i>Haiti External Evaluation of the Emergency Relief &amp; Response Fund (ERRF), 2008-2011</i>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2011
<b>Author/Agency</b>	OCHA/Moriniere
<b>Commissioned by</b>	OCHA/Moriniere
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Programme
<b>Project period</b>	2010-2011
<b>Keywords</b>	Funding for earthquake response
<b>Abstract</b>	<p>The Haiti Emergency Relief &amp; Response Fund (ERRF) was activated in 2008 (start-up funding by Sweden) with the goal of enabling the international community to better support local authorities by providing rapid and flexible funding to meet unforeseen needs in the event of disasters of natural origin.</p> <p>The aim of this evaluation was to explore how the mechanism contributed to a more timely, predictable, effective and accountable humanitarian response. The evaluation compiled evidence from in-depth key informant interviews, focus group discussions, grant registry analysis, an e-survey and site visits to six projects.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Despite analysis indicating slower than ideal (and even expected) proposal and grant processing, ERRF/Haiti is still considered a rapid response mechanism and evidence indicates that the mechanism was rapid when speed was most important—at the onset of crises. Evaluation findings align to conclude that ERRF/Haiti was more effective than efficient.</li> <li>2) Based on evidence compiled from key informants, the Haiti/ERRF team appears to have been effective under heavy constraints.</li> <li>3) Although relatively effective despite all constraints, ERRF/Haiti did not function efficiently.</li> <li>4) ERRF is connected to other funding mechanisms (through jointly funded efforts—the majority of the portfolio).</li> <li>5) Vulnerable target groups were routinely addressed by ERRF/Haiti projects. This quality of ERRF was one of the most commonly recognized</li> </ol>

	among E-survey Respondents. Gender equity elements and marginalized groups were systematically targeted by the portfolio. Despite all of its weaknesses, voices converge to say that ERRF was, and should remain, a pertinent pillar in the humanitarian architecture in Haiti.
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	Gender, vulnerable groups
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="http://www.alnap.org/resource/11680">http://www.alnap.org/resource/11680</a>

### 1.8.3 Assisting Earthquake Victims: Evaluation of Dutch Cooperating Aid Agencies (SHO) Support to Haiti in 2010

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b><i>Assisting Earthquake Victims: Evaluation of Dutch Cooperating Aid Agencies (SHO) Support to Haiti in 2010</i></b>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2011
<b>Author/Agency</b>	Dutch Cooperating Aid Agencies
<b>Commissioned by</b>	OECD/Min FA Netherlands
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Programme
<b>Project period</b>	2010-2011
<b>Keywords</b>	Donor response, children, protection
<b>Abstract</b>	<p>The evaluation undertaken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' independent Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) covers "Stichting Samenwerkende Hulporganisaties" (Foundation of Cooperating Aid Agencies or SHO) organisations' emergency relief and recovery activities.. It assessed SHO-funded activities of SHO organisations and their implementing partners in the following sectors: Shelter (and non-food items); WASH; Food security; Livelihoods; Healthcare; Education; Protection; and DRR.</p> <p>Some of the main findings include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) The approach followed by the SHO organisations and their partners has been consistent with internationally accepted humanitarian practices.</li> <li>2) The organisations involved in the SHO Haiti campaign were sufficiently able to provide the required support.</li> <li>3) The SHO organisations and their affiliates conducted rapid needs assessments in the first days and weeks immediately following the earthquake.</li> <li>4) The involvement of the Haitian government, NGOs and representatives of the population in the initial needs assessments and shaping the emergency operation was very limited.</li> <li>5) Interventions supported with SHO funding were undertaken largely without the benefit of national plans and strategies.</li> <li>6) The activities supported by SHO were appropriate.</li> <li>7) In general, linking relief, rehabilitation and development was a major methodological and operational issue.</li> <li>8) The evaluation was unable to ascertain compliance to all standards.</li> <li>9) It proved difficult to assess effectiveness by comparing achievements with plans, because of the weakness of proposals (which differed in quality and detail), the weak link between achievements reported and objectives in the proposals, and inconsistencies in reporting.</li> <li>10) Activities undertaken with SHO funds in 2010 did address the immediate needs of those affected by the earthquake; other longer-term needs were also gradually addressed.</li> <li>11) Very few rigorous investigations have been done on the outcomes of the humanitarian support provided in 2010. A number of evaluations covering the response as a whole have been critical about the results</li> </ol>

	achieved in terms of outcome. The present evaluation obtained only illustrative information on beneficiary satisfaction about a number of SHO-funded interventions.
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	Children, protection, gender-based violence
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2011/11/15/iob-evaluation-assisting-earthquake-victims-evaluation-of-dutch-cooperating-aid-agencies-sho-support-to-haiti-in-2010">https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2011/11/15/iob-evaluation-assisting-earthquake-victims-evaluation-of-dutch-cooperating-aid-agencies-sho-support-to-haiti-in-2010</a>

#### 1.8.4 Real-time evaluation of humanitarian action supported by DG ECHO in Haiti

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b><i>Real-time evaluation of humanitarian action supported by DG ECHO in Haiti</i></b>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2011
<b>Author/Agency</b>	Groupe URD
<b>Commissioned by</b>	ECHO
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Outcome
<b>Project period</b>	2010-2011
<b>Keywords</b>	LRRD, rehabilitation, development, cholera
<b>Abstract</b>	<p>The evaluation, which included a field visit and covered the work of the Disaster Preparedness ECHO (DIPECHO) programme, the Global Plan and presents the general conclusions about DG ECHO's strategy and operations as well as the evaluation recommendations. The full report describes the results for the main operational sectors funded by DG ECHO (Nutrition and Food Security, WASH, Health, Shelter- Housing, Coordination) and for the secondary sectors of Protection and Security.</p> <p>The main findings presented include that the programmes supported and strategies adopted were relevant on the whole; effectiveness is limited by institutional constraints; aid into urban areas present major challenges yet to be overcome; funds allocated for political reasons to the detriment of programme quality; difficulties linking relief, rehabilitation and development despite the shared will to do so; cross cutting issues not sufficiently taken into account and; the country context remains volatile.</p>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	Gender, protection
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2011/Groupe-URD_evaluation_Haiti_en.pdf">http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2011/Groupe-URD_evaluation_Haiti_en.pdf</a>

### 1.9 2010

#### 1.9.1 Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment a Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment (REA) of the response to January 12th earthquake for USAID through a grant provided by CHF

<b>Evaluation</b>	<b><i>Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment a Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment (REA) of the response to January 12th earthquake for USAID through a grant provided by CHF</i></b>
<b>Published (year)</b>	2010
<b>Author/Agency</b>	CHF International-Sun Mountain Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment (REA)
<b>Commissioned by</b>	USAID
<b>Type of evaluation</b>	Impact
<b>Project period</b>	2010

<b>Keywords</b>	Environment, rural and urban disasters
<b>Abstract</b>	<p>USAID commissioned a Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment (USAID REA) and involved the collection and synthesis of information on relief and recovery operations, and from disaster survivors in Port au Prince, rural earthquake-affected areas and destination areas for earthquake affected.</p> <p>The assessment identified the following critical earthquake-related environmental issues and provided recommendations where appropriate: Coordination, Management and Information, Geophysical and Hydro-Meteorological Hazards Monitoring, Sewage and Solid Waste, Sanitation Access, Hazardous Waste, Biohazards, Health-Related Issues, Shelter Sites, Emergency and Transitional Shelter, Debris Management, Livelihood Security, Food Security, and Medium to Long Term Issues that includes asset distribution, land tenure, governance of relief effort, environmental resilience, deforestation.</p> <p>The assessment also found that to implement the shift from immediate relief operations to sustainable recovery, the assessment recommended the following in the clusters of coordination, management and information.</p> <p>A wide range of USG organizations, including the US military, USAID, Department of Health and Human Services and others have responded to the Haiti earthquake. Specific and dedicated environmental management capacity has been incorporated into some elements of this response (e.g., SouthCom) but not others (e.g., USAID). There is, at the time of this report, no cross-organizational coordination on environmental issues or on how to manage potential negative environmental impacts related to USG assistance. Further, there is uneven dissemination and sharing of information on the USG response, making the monitoring and assessment of environmental issues difficult and the likelihood of negative environmental impacts high.</p> <p>USAID/Haiti staff, normally responsible for environmental issues, are overworked and unable to dedicate sufficient time to the more than full time requirements of overseeing a multi-million-dollar emergency program. The Government of Haiti also does not appear to have had time to establish a coordinating capacity on environmental issues and impact. UNEP, charged to coordinate the environment as a cross-cutting issue through the InterAgency Standing Committee (IASC) Cluster coordination system is underfunded, and no Cluster has yet dedicated internal environmental support.</p>
<b>Cross-cutting issues</b>	Environment
<b>Link to evaluation</b>	<a href="http://www.alnap.org/node/6541.aspx">http://www.alnap.org/node/6541.aspx</a>

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*Haitians set up impromptu tent cities throughout  
the capital after an earthquake measuring  
7 plus on the Richter scale rocked  
Port-au-Prince, Haiti, January 12, 2010.*

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