




# Evaluation of the Norwegian Tax Administration's Capacity Building Program

Final report

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# Acknowledgements

This report has been prepared by KPMG Norway International Development Advisory Services for the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad). The team comprised of Thomas Fugelsnes, Team Leader; Lars Engen, Evaluation Expert; and Jana Tomaškovičová, Data Analyst.

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The report is the product of KPMG AS and the findings, interpretation, and conclusions presented in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of Norad nor NTA.

# Acronyms

Acronym	Explanation
AAAA	The Addis Ababa Action Agenda
ATAF	African Tax Administration Forum
ATI	Addis Tax Initiative
CB	Capacity Building
CBP	Capacity Building Program
CRS	Common Reporting Standard
FI	Finance Institution
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KRA	Kenya Revenue Authority
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
LTD	Large Taxpayers Department
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NTA	Norwegian Tax Administration
OECD	The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
RRA	Rwanda Revenue Authority
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SUNAT	Superintendencia Nacional de Aduanas y de Administración Tributaria
TA	Technical Assistance
TAK	Tax Administration of Kosovo
TIWB	Tax Inspectors Without Borders
TRA	Tanzania Revenue Authority
URA	Uganda Revenue Authority
WB	World Bank
ZRA	Zanzibar Revenue Authority

# Executive Summary

## Background

The Capacity Building Program (CBP) is a development program targeting domestic resource mobilization funded by Norad and implemented by the Norwegian Tax Administration (NTA). The program provides peer-to-peer capacity building support from a roster of 'regular NTA staff' to counterpart tax administrations in developing countries, with the ultimate objective of contributing to improved tax collection. The program has been operational since 2018 and is currently in its second phase, providing long term support to four partner administrations through four country projects, in Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Zanzibar.

The objective of this evaluation is to review the overall results of CBP for the period 2018-2024 and assess the program's performance. The performance of the program is assessed in line with the OECD DAC Evaluation criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and coordination and sustainability. The scope of the evaluation includes all activities undertaken under the Program in Phase I from 2018 to 2023 and the first year of activities in Phase II up to December 2024. Based on the findings, the evaluation highlights recommendations for improving CBP going forward, and lessons learned to help guide future implementation of similar interventions.

## Findings

The overall finding of the evaluation is that while technical implementation of the capacity building appears to have been effective, management and oversight of the program could be improved. On the *country project level*, within partner administrations, NTA expertise is perceived as valuable and helpful, and there are few major challenges reported in the day-to-day implementation of projects. While difficult to prove systematically, there is anecdotal evidence from partner administrations that capacity has indeed improved, and even that this has had positive effects on the administrations' efforts at collecting taxes. However, as a *program*, CBP lacks certain formal structures and processes that are expected from a development cooperation program: the overarching strategic management of the program has been largely person-driven and needs formalization; some of the underlying models of program approach could be revisited, and structures such as a comprehensive results framework and reporting procedures, and a fully developed theory of change need to be developed. Without these, it is difficult for the program to justify the actions it has taken, monitor whether the program has achieved or is on track to achieve its objectives and whether this can be attributed to the program's actions, and explain why the program is set up in certain ways and not differently. Put starkly, because of the low quality of reporting it is not clear what has been achieved after seven years of program implementation and NOK 100 million of spending. By the time the program completes in 2028, it will not be clear whether the program has achieved its objectives unless reporting improves.

Fundamentally, many of the weaknesses of CBP are caused by the program structure being designed with the solution/approach being given as a starting point (*expertise provided by 'regular NTA staff'*), instead of starting from the problem (*how to improve tax collection in developing countries*). While the program has gradually improved since its inception, this evaluation provides a good opportunity to re-think some of the building blocks of the program that NTA has taken for granted while it has slowly adjusted the program in the right direction.

The most important strengths of the program are:



**The program has been demand-driven in both the formulation and implementation of country projects.** During the inception and design phase of country projects, NTA made sure that country projects are (i) designed based on diagnostics of the challenges facing the partner organization, (ii) aligned with partner organizations' plans and strategies, and (iii) developed in collaboration with the partner agencies. During implementation, NTA has been flexible to revise plans, change priorities and adapt to new working modalities as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic.



**Country projects have experienced anecdotal successes**, including in improving capacity and performance among partner administrations, especially under the ICT and taxpayer services components. Partner administrations generally have positive views on the NTA support, from technical staff to managerial levels.



The most important challenges of the program are:

## 1. Strategy and approach

- 1.a **The structure for management of country projects and their components is insufficiently designed and likely over-emphasizes a bottom-up approach.** Country projects follow a decentralized approach where NTA technical teams for specific components work directly with counterpart teams in partner administrations. While guided by project plans, teams are relatively free to make adjustments to priorities during implementation. While this is good for flexibility and ensures that activities are demand-driven, this risks losing track of the overarching objectives of country partnerships. The degree to which this is a challenge varies between countries and components, as there is no formal structure imposed, but instead has been interpreted differently by for example the ICT team in NTA from the audit team in NTA. This challenge is related to and reinforced by the large number of NTA experts employed by the program (see below).

**Recommendation 1:** NTA should establish more formalized structures around country project and component management, in order to ensure that there is sufficient oversight of all components.

- 1.b **CBP's approach of using a large roster of NTA experts with limited individual involvement across country projects is inefficient.** CBP makes use of over 100 'regular NTA staff' as experts, each with very limited involvement in specific country projects. NTA experts' limited involvement means there are frequent onboarding costs for new experts, there is limited learning across projects, and NTA resources are not always available for CBP.

**Recommendation 2:** NTA should consider whether they could provide the same support with a smaller roster of more involved experts explicitly devoted to CBP, instead of the current model.

- 1.c **CBP involves capacity building in areas where it is not obvious that NTA staff is the best value-for-money option.** NTA supports partner administrations across a variety of areas, ranging from tax/revenue-specific areas requiring specialized knowledge and skills such as audits and taxpayer services to more generic areas like network infrastructure, call center etiquette, change management or agile development. With generic areas like these, it is not clear that Norwegian experts are most cost efficient option to provide capacity-building. NTA experts on, for example, network infrastructure do not have specialized knowledge that applies specifically to tax administrations, and offer 'generic' (as in broadly applicable) solutions, that likely could have been provided more cheaply by other providers (including local ones).

**Recommendation 3:** NTA should ensure capacity building support provided by NTA experts makes use of the unique skills and experiences found in NTA as a peer tax administration. Where support in generic areas is required, NTA could consider outsourcing activities to make the program more cost efficient.

## 2. Implementation

- 2.a **CBP's results monitoring and reporting is insufficient.** The most critical challenge of the program is that it lacks monitoring of and reporting on what has been achieved, and to what extent the program's activities have contributed towards reaching the program's objectives. Existing reporting on both the program level and for individual country projects includes mostly narrative text on what was carried out during the last reporting period and does not report on what was achieved in terms of the ultimate objectives. In Phase I, the intermediary objectives (outcomes) that are measured are not clearly linked to the desired impact objectives. In Phase II, objectives in the results framework (log-frame) are more clearly linked to the overall objectives, but they lack indicators for measurement. Owing to the lack of monitoring and reporting, there is little oversight over what the program has achieved, and a lack of monitoring of results means the Program is not able to make adjustments based on progress or lack thereof.

**Recommendation 4:** NTA should develop a proper results framework with baseline and target values for indicators and should use this results framework for reporting in the Program's annual reports.

**Recommendation 5:** NTA should consider using partner administrations' internal results framework or at least aligning project plans to these, which could help improve monitoring of results and increase ownership of objectives and results at the partner administrations.



**2.b The program's theory of change could be more explicitly formulated.** Individual country project documents to some extent outline how the outcomes targeted under the projects contribute towards the program's overall objective of increasing domestic revenue mobilization. However, the explicit justifications for pathways between activities and desired outcomes are limited. The lack of a clearly formulated theory of change could have negative implications on program management, as risks and assumptions are not clearly stated, and when coupled with the lack of reporting, this makes tracking successes and challenges of the program more difficult. Further, the roles of partner administrations and to what extent actions by counterparts affect projects are rarely explained. When project activities are updated or changed, projects rely on tacit knowledge among team members rather than documents, which means implementing teams could lose track of broader goals or how individual components fit into larger country projects.

**Recommendation 6:** NTA should develop a formal theory of change for the Program as a whole and for individual country projects. This should include root cause analyses (problem trees) and linkages between outputs, outcomes and impacts, and describe assumptions and risks.

## Lessons learned

**Lessons learned from the CBP evaluation are intended to provide a basis of knowledge for future similar programming, especially related to capacity building, Knowledge Bank programming and/or revenue mobilization.** The lessons are intended to go beyond the specific recommendations for adjusting CBP presented above and are mainly targeted at Norad. The lessons include:

- 1. Knowledge bank programs could benefit from more guidance from Norad and more peer learning between programs.** The knowledge bank programs span a variety of thematic areas, but at their core include similar elements such as capacity building through the 'shoulder-to-shoulder' approach, requirements to monitoring and reporting, and the set-up of a supporting 'organization' within respective Norwegian agencies. Challenges within the non-thematic areas (e.g. not related to tax, or statistics, or audits) are (i) typically shared among all the agencies, and (ii) represent areas where Norad as a development agency has more expertise than the sectoral agencies. There is therefore an opportunity for increased learning among Norad and the agencies as well as among the agencies. As an example, the 2015 evaluation of Norwegian capacity building program includes relevant findings and recommendations that do not to a large extent appear to have been systematically applied across knowledge bank programs. This 2025 evaluation of CBP illustrates that NTA has started from a low level of capacity on running a development program and gradually improved through trial and error, which could perhaps have been accomplished faster with increased support from Norad.
- 2. More specifically, Norad should provide more concrete recommendations for improving results reporting.** As this evaluation has illustrated, CBP suffers from a lack of monitoring and reporting. While both parties report that Norad has requested improvements in reporting, this appears to not have materialized, suggesting that Norad should be more forceful in its request and that they could be providing more concrete recommendations for *how* results reporting could be improved.
- 3. The political status of CBP means Norad is not able to oversee it as it does other programs in the Tax for Development portfolio.** CBP is in a unique position among Tax for Development programs in that it is mandated by parliament and therefore not subject to the same scrutiny and 'exit option' as other grantees, at least in practice. While not proven, it is likely that this relaxed oversight role by Norad has meant NTA has not been mandated to improve results reporting and other aspects in line with Norad's request.
- 4. Norad's funding has allowed for the establishment of long-term partnerships.** The long-term and predictable funding from Norad has allowed NTA to take a phased approach and put explicit effort into building long-lasting relationships. This is likely an important benefit for a program like CBP. However, it should be noted that there is an crucial balance between patient funding and expecting results (see above).

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# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Background

In 2011, Norway established the Tax for Development program, a political initiative to prioritize tax-related efforts. Since 2015, the program has constituted the main efforts of Norway's commitments to of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the Addis Tax Initiative, particularly the commitment to double efforts towards strengthening domestic revenue mobilization<sup>1</sup>. The Tax for Development program is in practice a portfolio of projects and programs, funding multilateral organizations, civil society, and research centers, while also engaging in bilateral cooperation between government institutions focused on tax policy and administration.

One of the programs under the Tax for Development portfolio is the Norwegian Tax Administration's (NTA) Capacity Building Program (CBP)<sup>2</sup>. NTA has participated in capacity-building projects funded under Tax for Development and Oil for Development since 2010, providing expertise in tax administrations to counterpart administrations in developing countries (including in Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia). These capacity building initiatives belong under the umbrella of Norad's *Knowledge Bank* (see Box 1). In 2018, Norad reorganized its financial support to NTA's activities into a single program, the *Capacity Building Program (CBP)*. The program is funded through the Tax for Development portfolio, and its objective is to contribute to improved tax collection to finance the SDGs.

### Box 1: Norad's Knowledge Bank

Norad's *Knowledge Bank* is an umbrella of programs where Norwegian public administration entities provide technical assistance and capacity building to counterpart entities in developing countries in areas where Norway has relevant and in-demand expertise. The *Knowledge Bank* brings together several aid programs<sup>3</sup>:

Agriculture for Development	Contributes to the implementation of the Government's strategy for food security in the development policy 'Combining forces against hunger – a policy to improve food self-sufficiency'.
Digitalization for Development	Facilitating digital public goods and digital public infrastructure contributes to more efficient and inclusive service delivery, as well as increased innovation in public and private sectors.
Energy for Development	Aims to strengthen the authorities' competence and capacity to develop the renewable energy sector and ensure public access to clean energy.
Fish for Development	Supports partner countries with development of sustainable fisheries and ecosystems, as well as increase in sustainable production of fish and seafood.
Gender equality for Development	Supports partner countries with design and implementation of policies that promote women's rights and participation in working and social life.
Oceans for Development	Contributes to a sustainable and inclusive ocean economy.
Oil for Development	Assistance to developing countries with oil and gas industries in managing their resources in a way that contributes to sustainable economic growth and welfare. This program was discontinued in 2024.
Statistics and registry Cooperation	Strengthens the ability of national statistical systems to produce and use official statistics of high quality.
Tax for Development	Strengthens developing countries' efforts to improve the financing of national development priorities and the SDGs through increased tax revenues and a strengthened social contract. Serves as follow-up of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the Addis Tax Initiative.
Anti-corruption ("other specialist collaboration")	Aims to strengthen the public sector in partner countries through increased competence, knowledge, and capacity to prevent and follow up corruption.

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.norad.no/publikasjoner/2020/tax-for-development/>

<sup>2</sup> Up to 2021, NTA has used different names for the CBP. During project period 2018-2024, the name 'Capacity building in developing countries' was used, and during new period 2024-2028, name 'Institutional capacity building of tax administrations' was used. For the purposes of this evaluation, 'Capacity Building Program' (CBP) will be used.

<sup>3</sup> Norad. Programs of the Knowledge Bank. 2024. <https://www.norad.no/en/norwegian-aid/the-knowledge-bank/the-knowledge-bank/programs-of-the-knowledge-bank-in-2024>



### 1.1.1 NTA's Capacity Building Program: Phase I (2018-2024)

Phase I of NTA's Capacity Building Program (2018–2024) aimed 'to contribute to improved tax collection in developing countries to support SDG financing' by establishing a structured cooperation portfolio with tax administrations and strengthening NTA's capacity-building framework. Phase I of NTA's Capacity Building Program initially spanned from 2018 to 2022 but was later extended until February 2024. The objective of improved tax collection was pursued through the establishment of a portfolio of cooperation with tax administrations in multiple developing countries. To achieve this, NTA recognized the need to expand and strengthen its approach to capacity building, creating a more robust and structured framework compared to what was in place before 2018. As a result, the program established three main outputs along with corresponding sub-outputs to contribute to a systematic and targeted approach to capacity-building efforts.

Table 1. Overview of Capacity building program's results framework and co-relating indicators

Capacity building program 2018-2024		Indicators	
Impact	Contribute to improved tax collection in developing countries to finance the SDGs.	A.	Average cumulative increase tax-to-GDP ratio in partner countries
Outcome	Portfolio of cooperation with tax administrations in developing countries.	0.1	Number of partners with institutional cooperation
		0.2	Number of targeted TA partners
Output	<b>1. Robust NTA-framework for CB</b>		
Sub-output	1.1 Cooperation and coordination with relevant CB players 1.2 In-house CB routines and practices 1.3 Rosters of CB experts 1.4 Participation in missions implemented by other CB players 1.5 Quality assurance 1.6 Various analyses 1.7 Promotion of CB cooperation with NTA 1.8 Program organization and administration		1.1 Number of meetings with CB players 1.2 NTA in-house routines & practices established 1.3 Roster of NTA experts established 1.4 Number of IO missions with NTA participation 1.5 NTA CB Brochure produced
Output	<b>2. Institutional cooperation projects</b>		
Sub-output	2.1 Country pre-selection 2.2 Scoping missions 2.3 Selection Targeted CB activities of countries for cooperation 2.4 Inception activities 2.5 Project documents 2.6 Implementation and administration		2.1 Number of pre-selected countries 2.2 Number of scoping missions 2.3 Number of inception activities approved 2.4 Number of 'program documents' approved 2.5 Number of institutional cooperation programs started
Output	<b>3. Targeted CB activities</b>		
Sub-output	3.1 Requests are evaluated 3.2 Necessary event documents 3.3 Implementation		3.1 Number of requests evaluated 3.2 Number of targeted TA missions implemented

The total combined budget for the period 2018 to 2024 was NOK 94.7m. The original program budget was NOK 50m for the initial period of 5 years and was increased by NOK 36.7m in an addendum signed in 2022, and by additional NOK 8m in an addendum signed in 2023. The implementation and spending plans have been adjusted, reportedly due to the pandemic. Its implications are evaluated in the report.

During Phase I of the program, NTA engaged with counterparts across various regions and operated through two main approaches:

1. Comprehensive long-term country projects<sup>4</sup>, focusing on specific needs of the partner institutions which are analyzed throughout an inception Phase before an agreement is signed;
2. Short- to long-term *targeted capacity building* activities, delivered based on a specific request from the administrations or after assessing that institutional cooperation is not the most optimal option.

<sup>4</sup> For clarity, this evaluation refers to the long-term cooperation agreements as country projects, to make them distinguishable from other projects. We note that Zanzibar is not a country. NTA documents occasionally refer to these as projects, long-term cooperations, or institutional cooperation.

Table 2 summarizes the partner countries and their respective counterparts categorized based on the type of cooperation they were involved in.

*Table 2. Overview of partner countries and their counterparts*

Cooperation type	Country/ geography	Counterpart	Phase	Period
<b>Institutional cooperation</b>	Rwanda	Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA)	Long-term cooperation	2022 - 2026
	Kenya	Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA)	Long-term cooperation	2024 - 2027
	Tanzania	Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA)	Long-term cooperation	2024 - 2028
	Zanzibar	Zanzibar Revenue Authority (ZRA)	Long-term cooperation	2022 - 2026
<b>Targeted CB</b>	Lebanon	Lebanese Tax Administration	In cooperation with Tax Inspectors Without Borders.	
	Peru	Superintendencia Nacional de Aduanas y de Administración Tributaria (SUNAT)	Delayed	
	Uganda	Uganda Revenue Authority (URA)	As part of Oil for Development program (although reported on to Norad under CBP, it was not part of the program's budget).	
	Kosovo	Tax Administration of Kosovo (TAK)	In cooperation with the Tax Inspectors Without Borders and the Swedish Tax Agency	
<b>Partnership did not materialize</b>	Ethiopia	Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority (ERCA)	NTA has been in discussions with respective countries; however, these discussions did not result in any formal cooperation.	
	Indonesia	Directorate General of Taxes (DJP)		
	Ghana	Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA)		
	Nepal	Inland Revenue Department Nepal (IRD)		
	Myanmar	Internal Revenue Department Myanmar (IRD)		
	Pakistan	Federal Board of Revenue in Pakistan		

**Capacity building through both approaches has been delivered by a roster of 100+ NTA experts.** CBP uses regular NTA employees to occasionally provide capacity building and technical assistance to the partner administrations in areas they directly work with, as and when needed. The NTA experts are assigned to specific activities at limited capacity, alongside their regular full-time job.

### 1.1.2 NTA's Capacity Building Program: Phase II (2024-2028)

**Phase II of CBP focuses on strengthening long-term partnerships to improve capacity of tax administrations in developing countries.** This Phase builds on the foundations established in Phase I, focusing on five partner administrations in Zanzibar, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Peru and sustained capacity development. Within each of these partnerships, NTA has already established:

1. Institutional agreements or Memoranda of Understandings (MoUs)
2. Project plans with results-based frameworks
3. Annual work plans and reports.

**The overarching impact goal remains improving tax collection in developing countries.** However, compared to Phase I, Phase II includes more explicit targets for the *outcomes* of the country partnerships. The results framework is structured around six country-specific outcomes, with no overarching program outcome. The approved budget of Phase II (2024-2028) is NOK 200m.

*Table 3. Overview of CBP's 2024-2028 results framework and co-relating indicators*

Capacity building program 2024-2028		Output Indicators
<b>Impact</b>	<b>Improved tax collection in developing countries.</b>	Average cumulative increase of tax-to-GDP ratio in partner countries within institutional cooperation (% points, latest available data)
<b>Outcome 1</b>	<b>Increased capacity in Zanzibar Revenue Authority (ZRA) for improved compliance and revenue mobilization</b>	
<b>Outputs</b>	1.1 Improved auditing and control	1.1 Improved risk assessment and audit processes
	1.2 Improved ICT capacity and systems	1.2 Improve IT security, capacity of infrastructure and related management
	1.3 Improved awareness and compliance of taxpayers	1.3 Improved interaction and communication with taxpayers
<b>Outcome 2</b>	<b>Increased capacity in Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) for improved taxpayer awareness, compliance and revenue mobilization</b>	
<b>Outputs</b>	2.1 Improved capacity in IT and digitalization	2.1 Improved enterprise architecture function. Carried out assistance to build competence in support in KRA's efforts to modernize tax solutions
	2.2 Improved capacity in customer interaction	2.2 Improved competence on methods for user insight. Improved customer interaction
	2.3 Improved capacity in tax audit and processes within Large Taxpayers Officer	2.3 Improved audit processes

Capacity building program 2024-2028		Output Indicators
<b>Outcome 3 Increased capacity in Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA) for improved taxpayer compliance and revenue mobilization</b>		
Outputs	3.1 Improved capacity in taxpayer services (TPS)	3.1.1 Call Centre service and management improved 3.1.2 Better accessibility of information and services through RRA website 3.1.3 In-house capacity for user journeys developed 3.1.4 Social media guidelines and skills in relevant tools developed
	3.2 Improved capacity in ICT and digitalization	3.2.1 Improvements in infrastructure, security, monitoring, documentation 3.2.2 RRA Digital Transformation Strategy developed and implemented 3.2.3 RRA staff are applying 'agile methodology' where relevant
	3.3 Improved capacity within selected areas of taxpayer audit	3.3 Improved capacity in auditing taxpayers in selected business sectors
<b>Outcome 4 Increased capacity in Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) for improved compliance and revenue mobilization</b>		
Outputs	4.1 Improved capacity in tax audit and processes within Large Taxpayers Department (LTD)	4.1 Continue the collaboration with TRA to find suitable areas and topics for capacity building within LTD in a future Project Plan
	4.2 Improved compliance within digital economy	4.2 Continue the collaboration with TRA to find suitable areas and topics for capacity building within the digital economy section in a future Project Plan
<b>Outcome 5 Increased capacity in SUNAT (Peru) for improved taxpayer compliance on Common Reporting Standard (CRS) information</b>		
Outputs	5.1 Improved compliance of domestic reporting Finance Institutions (FI)	5.1 SUNAT's follow up on FI's obligations is improved
	5.2 Creating value from use of CRS information	5.2.1 SUNAT's understanding of different financial products and use of compliance activities relevant to CRS data is improved 5.2.2 The Interface on the tax return and information on taxpayers reporting obligations on CRS data is improved
	5.3 Improved use of CRS data and enhances taxpayer compliance	5.3 Improved taxpayer compliance in areas covered by CRS-reporting
<b>Outcome 6 Increased capacity for partners through collaboration and cooperation with international stakeholders</b>		
Outputs	6.1 Improved partner capacity through regional initiatives	6.1 Contribute to increased capacity for partners through 2 regional initiatives
	6.2 Cooperate with Ios to improve partner cooperation and CB standards	6.2 As a proactive international partner contribute to better understanding, design and implementation of CB programs
	6.3 Collaborate with IOs/countries to improve partners' capacity	6.3 Improved capacity with partners through collaboration with IOs/countries

## 1.2 Evaluation objectives and methods

**The objective of this evaluation is to conduct an end of program evaluation of NTA's Capacity Building Program's for period 2018-2024.** The performance of the program was assessed in line with the OECD DAC Evaluation criteria<sup>5</sup>. The guiding questions are divided into relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and coordination and sustainability. The guiding questions for each can be found at the beginning of each chapter. The evaluation considers Phase I and the first year of Phase II and will consider the two program Phases together, except for where differences between approaches are worth highlighting. However, some aspects are more relevant for Phase I (e.g. did the program meet its objectives?), as Phase II has only recently begun. The scope of the evaluation includes all activities undertaken under the Capacity Building Program in (1) Phase I from 2018 to 2023 and (2) the first year of activities in Phase II up to December 2024.

**The evaluation deploys a mixed-methods approach, utilizing a framework of three levels of analysis** – program level, project level and activity level (case studies) – to systemically assess the evaluation questions, progressing from the highest level to the ground level. Data collection was done through desk-based research, key stakeholder interviews, and two surveys (of NTA experts from the roster, and of government counterparts from each partner administration). Two field visits were conducted, in Rwanda and Zanzibar. **For full methodology see Annex I.**

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/development-co-operation-evaluation-and-effectiveness/evaluation-criteria.html>

# 2. Findings

## 2.1 Relevance

### Evaluation framework

Two elements are used to evaluate relevance. The extent to which:

1. NTA's approach is in line with Norway's priorities for tax and development
2. Capacity building is demand-driven from tax authorities in developing countries

### Key findings



**The Program's approach is aligned with Norwegian development priorities**, which explicitly highlights peer-to-peer learning and capacity building within tax administration, reflecting Norway's commitments under the Addis Ababa Action Agenda.



**Country projects are demand-driven** and are (i) designed based on diagnostics of the challenges facing the partner organization, (ii) aligned with partner organizations' plans and strategies, and (iii) developed in collaboration with the partner agencies.



**Country projects have remained demand-driven during implementation**, and have been flexible to make adjustments along the way.



**The bottom-up approach of country projects risks losing track of larger project objectives**, due to a lack of structured oversight on the project level.



**The Program lacks a formal Theory of Change** to justify which activities are carried out under country projects, how these can plausibly contribute towards the ultimate objectives, and under which assumptions.



**Technical capacity among tax administration is just one of many potential limitations to revenue collection**. The Program's approach to achieving its objectives (increased revenue) is heavily affected by other factors, which implies large external risks.



= Positive finding



= Negative finding



= Relevant finding not directly answering an evaluation question but worth noting

### 2.1.1 Relevance to Norwegian development priorities

**The Capacity Building Program is highly in line with Norwegian development priorities.** The overarching objective of the program, increasing domestic revenue mobilization, is a stated priority area in Norwegian development policy, is aligned with Norway's international commitments, and is aligned with Norad's strategies. Additionally, the modality of the program, the use of Norwegian public sector expertise to support capacity building in developing countries, is an explicitly stated goal of Norwegian policy.

1. **Norwegian development policy:** While there is no single document outlining Norway's development policy priorities, the importance of domestic revenues is highlighted in multiple strategic documents outlining Norwegian development policy, including white papers such as *Dele for å skape Demokrati, rettferdig fordeling og vekst i utviklingspolitikken* ([Meld St. 25 2012-2013](#)), and Felles ansvar for felles fremtid, Bærekraftsmålene og norsk utviklingspolitikk ([Meld St. 24 2016-2017](#)), and the priorities were recently restated in a [National statement at the Financing for Development Forum, 18 April 2023](#). The documents highlight the role of domestic revenue as both a source for revenue, and a key ingredient in the social contract between citizens and the government.

2. **International commitments:** Norway is committed to the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) and The Addis Tax Initiative (ATI) declaration<sup>6</sup>, in which development partners commit to “double [their] support for technical cooperation in the area of taxation/domestic revenue mobilization”, initially by 2020. Domestic revenue mobilization is also covered under SDG 17.1 (improve domestic capacity for tax and other revenue collection).
3. **Norad strategies:** Tax for Development<sup>7</sup> is the umbrella program/portfolio for Norway’s response to the ATI declaration and represents Norad’s official strategy towards promoting domestic revenue mobilization. The approach to TfD has evolved over time, from a program to a portfolio, previously hosted under the Knowledge Bank and now being a sectoral program in Norad, but the content has remained stable. TfD builds on three strategic pillars: ecosystem of accountability, knowledge based development, and capacity building – the latter of which aligns completely with CBP, which amounts to the flagship program under the portfolio and the largest recipient.
4. **Knowledge bank modality:** Norwegian development policy explicitly asks for a twinning approach between public administration and agencies in Norway and their counterparts in partner countries, which is operationalized under the Knowledge Bank umbrella<sup>8</sup>. Until recently, the ‘Prop 1’ included language that the goal for Knowledge Bank spending included *“Offentlig forvaltning i samarbeidsland er styrket på områder der norske offentlige institusjoner og andre partnere har bidratt med relevant og etterspurt kompetanse”*, but this was removed as of 2024/25 when the Knowledge Bank was removed as a separate budget post<sup>9</sup>. CBP fits within this model, and NTAs capacity building efforts in the 2010’s even served as a model for the Knowledge Bank concept.

**The country selection in the Program is to some extent aligned with Norwegian official policy.** The list of priority countries under Norwegian development cooperation has changed throughout the period of the Program. The most recent update to the list of priority countries in 2017-18<sup>10</sup>, right before inception Phase of the program, included<sup>11</sup> Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Nepal, **Tanzania**, Uganda, Ghana, Myanmar, Indonesia and Colombia, of which only one country was eventually selected in CBP<sup>12</sup>. The other countries selected for long-term cooperation, Rwanda and Kenya, are not too dissimilar to the types of countries selected in the white paper (lower income, mostly Africa), but the country selection of the short-term CBP activities in Peru, Kosovo and Lebanon appear to be less in line with Norwegian government policy (and possibly NTA’s capacity, in particular in terms of language, see Effectiveness).

## 2.1.2 Relevance to partner organizations

### 2.1.2.1 Basis for cooperation

**The overarching objective of the program, increasing domestic revenue mobilization, is in line with the needs of the programs’ targeted recipients (developing countries), including the participating countries.** Most developing countries face low levels of government revenues, resulting in inadequate public spending on critical public infrastructure, education or healthcare. According to the OECD’s Revenue Statistics, in 2022, developing countries’ tax-to-GDP ratio far below the levels in OECD countries (Figure 1).<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, for a large segment of countries, these low levels have persisted over time, with little improvement (Figure 2). While the program never specified the targeted recipient countries formally, this is understood to include all developing countries, selected based on a country selection process (see more on partner selection below).

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.addistaxinitiative.net/resource/ati-declaration>

<sup>7</sup> <https://kudos.dfo.no/documents/15694/files/15892.pdf>

<sup>8</sup> <https://www.norad.no/publikasjoner/2020/the-knowledge-bank-in-brief/>

<sup>9</sup> It is unclear whether the removal of the explicit goal as stated in previous ‘Prop 1’s reflects a change in political priorities, or whether it simply reflects changes to internal accounting in Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>10</sup> <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/meld.-st.-17-20172018/id2604526/>

<sup>11</sup> List is limited to the partner countries for “long-term development”

<sup>12</sup> Note that *selected* here does not imply a top-down process of NTA picking among potential partners but reflects the scope of the Program and which partners NTA ended up collaborating with. More details under section 2.1.2.1.

<sup>13</sup> OECD. Revenue Statistics in Africa. Facilitation and trust as drivers of voluntary tax compliance in selected African tax administrations, 1990-2022. 2024.



Figure 1: Total tax revenues, including and excluding social security contributions, as a % of GDP, 2022<sup>14</sup>





Figure 2: Average tax-to-GDP ratios for Africa, Asia-Pacific, LAC, and OECD, 2000-2022<sup>15</sup>



The overall modality of the program, providing capacity building to tax administrations, responds directly to one of many factors causing low revenue mobilization. Research on resource mobilization has identified multiple complex underlying reasons for low taxation in developing countries, including both political and capacity issues (Table 4). CBP is designed on the assumption that removing bottlenecks in tax administrations' capacity leads to higher revenue mobilization. On a global scale, this approach is sensible, as this bottleneck does exist in many countries<sup>16</sup>. However, it should be noted that (i) technical capacity is often, if not always, only one of multiple factors limiting resource mobilization, and (ii) the exact nature of bottlenecks varies from country to country. The extent to which CBP interventions are relevant on a country level depends on the relative importance of other factors inhibiting resource mobilization in a country (see 2.1.2).

<sup>14</sup> OECD. Revenue Statistics in Africa. Facilitation and trust as drivers of voluntary tax compliance in selected African tax administrations, 1990-2022. 2024.

<sup>15</sup> OECD. Revenue Statistics in Africa. Facilitation and trust as drivers of voluntary tax compliance in selected African tax administrations, 1990-2022. 2024.

<sup>16</sup> Benitez, Juan Carlos, Mansour, Mario, and others (2023). Building Tax Capacity in Developing Countries. Staff Discussion Note SDN/2023/006. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.

Table 4. Possible reasons for low taxation in developing countries<sup>17,18</sup>

<b>Culture, Norms, and Identity</b>		Weaker tax-paying norms in low-income countries limit compliance and revenue. National identity can strengthen tax adherence, while ethnic divisions and tensions undermine it.
<b>Political Institutions</b>	<b>Low Contestability of Power</b>	Low taxation in developing countries often stems from low contestability of power that are highly restricted with limits on who can vote, as well who can run for office. As elite-controlled governments prioritize policies benefiting the wealthy, reinforced by hereditary rule, military regimes, or party dominance.
	<b>Weak Checks and Balances</b>	Weak checks and balances in low-income countries undermine scrutiny of public spending and auditing, allowing corruption to thrive and limiting effective taxation.
<b>Economic structure</b>	<b>Informal and Small-Scale Firms</b>	Large informal sectors in poor economies are inherently difficult to tax, making broad-based taxation nearly impossible. Imposing higher taxes may also lead to a decline in reported taxable income.
	<b>Aid and Resource Dependence</b>	Countries with substantial aid inflows or easily taxable natural resources, like those using royalties, often have weaker incentives to develop domestic taxation.
	<b>Failure to Take Government Action</b>	Low taxation in developing countries often stems from government inaction, as effective tax systems require policy reforms and strong enforcement, shaped by political institutions.
<b>Tax administration capacity</b>		Tax administrations lack the technical capacity to implement tax policies that have been adopted.

**Partner selection strikes a balance between needs and feasibility.** The partner selection for CBP country projects is based on a combination of practical feasibility, demand, the extent to which capacity is a bottleneck, and Norwegian development priorities. Table 5 shows that the countries/geographies selected are all relatively low performers in terms of tax collection, and thus have a need. Further, based on internationally harmonized diagnostics of tax administrations (i.e. TADAT), the tax administrations selected have large challenges with capacity (TADAT ZRA 2017; TADAT RRA 2019). NTA explicitly selects partners with at least a minimum level of capacity, based on an idea that capacity building works best if there is a certain base to begin from. This is a justified reason for not targeting the very lowest-capacity partners, considering a 2015 evaluation of Norwegian capacity building support found that the most successful projects exhibit high ownership, commitment and capacity from partners: *“Where partners were able to invest the time, resources and commitment to engaging in a capacity development process, the results are positive.”*<sup>19</sup>

Table 5: Tax to GDP ratios, NTA partner countries

	Kenya	Rwanda	Tanzania	Zanzibar	Peru	Kosovo	Lebanon
Tax to GDP ratio (2018)	14.3%	14.2%	11.7%	9.07% <sup>20</sup>	14.3%		15.3%

[Source](#)

**Country projects are demand-driven and are (i) designed based on diagnostics of the challenges facing the partner organization, (ii) aligned with partner organizations’ plans and strategies, and (iii) developed in collaboration with the partner agencies.** Emphasis on demand starts already in the country selection Phase, where projects were actively requested by partner agencies. The objectives of each country project are outlined in their respective country project documents. These were developed after relatively long inception Phases (disrupted to some extent by COVID; see 2.2.2.1) that involved comprehensive dialogue with the partner agencies, often in the form of visits. Diagnosing issues relied on both NTA experts’ analyses of challenges, the partner agencies’ analyses of their own challenges (typically in the form of a strategy document), and other external analyses such as TADAT. In the two case study partner administrations, Rwanda and Zanzibar, the objectives of the NTA cooperation align closely with internal strategic documents, respectively RRA Strategic Plan 2019-2024 and ZRA Fourth Corporate Plan 2020/2021-2024/2025 (see table 6). Stakeholders in NTA report that partner agencies were to a large degree involved in designing project objectives, and that capacity building is demand-driven (Figure 3). However, the survey of NTA experts reports slightly

<sup>17</sup> Besley, T., Persson, T. Why Do Developing Countries Tax So Little? Journal of Economic Perspectives – Volume 28, Number 4 – Fall 2014, p. 99-120.

<sup>18</sup> Fjeldstad, O. (2014) ‘Tax and Development: Donor Support to Strengthen Systems in Developing Countries’, Public Administration and Development 34: 182–93

<sup>19</sup> Norad. 2015. Evaluation of Norwegian support to capacity development, p. 69.

<sup>20</sup> ZRA Fourth Corporate Plan 2020/21-2024/25

more negative views of the demand-driven nature of the projects in Tanzania and Kenya compared to Zanzibar and Rwanda (Figure 3), likely related to the fact that political changes in Tanzania and Kenya changed the original plans considerably. Owing to the comparatively low capacity in ZRA, the involvement of stakeholders in ZRA in project design is reported to be relatively low compared to in other agencies. However, stakeholders in most partner administrations report that they have been highly involved in setting the agenda for the cooperation (Figure 4).

Table 6: Partner administration priorities vs NTA project plan

	Strategy document main priorities	NTA project plan
Rwanda	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Improved customer service</li> <li>2. Enhanced tax compliance</li> <li>3. Improved employee engagement and development</li> <li>4. Strengthened organizational capacity</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i) Improved taxpayer services capacity</li> <li>ii) Improved capacity in ICT and digitalisation</li> <li>iii) Improved capacity within selected areas of taxpayer audit</li> </ol>
Zanzibar	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Optimise Revenue Collection</li> <li>2. Improve Quality of Service and Compliance</li> <li>3. Innovate in Digitalization and Technology Harness</li> <li>4. Improve Staff Performance.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i) Improved Auditing and control</li> <li>ii) Improved ICT Capacity and systems</li> <li>iii) Development of ZRB as an Organization</li> <li>iv) Improved awareness and compliance of taxpayers</li> </ol>

Figure 3: NTA expert survey – Country project ownership





Figure 4: Government partner survey – Country project ownership



**The implicit theories of change for country projects for the most part provide a plausible story for how NTA's interventions could support the program's objectives.** Individual country project documents outline how the outcomes targeted under the projects contribute towards the program's overall objective of increasing domestic revenue mobilization. This implicitly amounts to a theory of change, although it is not presented as such. The pathways, for instance that improving the ICT system facilitates tax payments and thus improves revenue collection, are plausible and aligned with research, suggesting the activities that are implemented under country projects are relevant to achieve the stated objectives (which in all cases is improved tax collection).

**However, these implicit theories of change, and thus project plan design, have weaknesses:**

1. **The explicit justifications for pathways between activities and desired outcomes are limited.** While interviews with NTA and partner stakeholders revealed substantiated reasoning behind these implicit pathways, including the 'tax compliance pyramid', they are not described or justified in sufficient detail in project plans. This could have implications on program management when project activities are updated or changed (see 2.1.2.2 below), as the project relies on tacit knowledge among team members rather than documents (which is a concern with the program in multiple areas).
2. **There are examples of support that is less clearly linked to outcomes.** From the case studies, some areas are perhaps less clearly linked to the program objective, for example the research component in Zanzibar, which also appears less in line with the ZRA strategy. This research appears to be a continuation of previous Norwegian-supported research on tax compliance, and has been placed under the CBP umbrella for administrative reasons as opposed to being an integral part of the support provided towards building capacity in ZRA. From interviews, it appears that the research and policy division that is supported through this component would be better served with more applied training on data management, data analysis and statistics that could be used in day-to-day operation of the tax administration (ZRA Strategic Plan goals (viii) *Develop and Monitor Strategic Planning* and (ix) *Develop, Implement and Monitor Statistics Strategic Plan*, and NTA-ZRA Project Plan output 1.5. *Data Analysis and Management*), than with the broader research agenda currently implemented.
3. **There are many areas not covered in the theories of change or project plans that are likely to inhibit improvements.** There are inevitably factors outside the scope of projects that affect the success of projects, for example corruption, tax policy, or transparency. These are identified as 'risks' in the project plans. But a more explicitly stated theory of change in the project plans, with stated assumptions and pre-conditions would likely have resulted in a clearer view of how projects are supposed to work, and thus help guide management of projects.

**NTA is well placed to respond to demands from counterparts, but there have been requests for support that NTA has been unable or unwilling to meet.** As a tax administration, NTA has access internally to experts related to most of the areas a counterpart revenue administration in partner countries could need. However, there are some areas of relevance where NTA is not a peer, most notably in tax policy, which falls outside of NTAs remit in Norway. In addition, there have been cases where NTA has not been willing or able to provide support, for example: specific knowledge of hotel management software for audits in Zanzibar (specific knowledge not in NTA), cyber security in Rwanda, and media production in Rwanda. In Zanzibar, NTA initially deliberately wanted the engagement to be manageable and small, and thus limited the scope of the project. This is likely a prudent approach, considering the limited capacity in ZRA, both in terms of finances and staff time.

#### 2.1.2.2 Implementation


**Country projects have been demand-driven during implementation, and remain flexible to make adjustments along the way.** Country projects follow a decentralized approach where NTA technical teams work directly with counterpart teams in partner administrations. While guided by project plans, teams are relatively free to make adjustments to priorities during implementation. In theory this should happen formally through annual project meetings, and tracked through reporting, but in practice it appears it is even more flexible than this for many teams (see below). A notable example is the provision of hardware infrastructure for ZRA; the hardware component was not included in the original plan, but was added at a later stage when NTA experts realized it was impossible to continue supporting on the ICT component without the requisite infrastructure in place. NTA's flexibility has been highlighted by counterparts as a particular strength of NTA as a partner compared to other providers of capacity building. Similar flexibility, including from other Norwegian capacity building providers, is also highlighted in the 2015 evaluation of Norwegian capacity building programs as a unique strength.<sup>21</sup> Updating and adapting country projects during implementation ensures that projects stay relevant, even when circumstances change, which they are reported to do often in the contexts of CBP country projects (in terms of staff changes, management priorities, leadership, etc).

<sup>21</sup> Norad. 2015. Evaluation of Norwegian support to capacity development, p. 69.


**At the same time, however, the bottom-up approach of country projects risks losing track of larger project objectives.** A potential risk with the decentralized approach is that individual NTA expert teams working on a lower level lose track of the larger objectives of the country projects (or CBP as a program). This is a challenge also noted in similar capacity building efforts in the 2015 evaluation.<sup>22</sup> In CBP, this risk is reinforced by the lack of formalized structures around country projects; within the various components and country projects, the degree of decentralized management by expert teams varies considerably. Under the ICT components, management structures are relatively similar across country projects, with designated mid-level management at NTA that oversee activities on the ground *across* the country projects. In these cases, the middle layer of management ensures that issues, challenges and any potential updates to activities are flagged in the correct fora (such as annual project meetings). Meanwhile, other components, such as audit and taxpayer services are to a larger degree decentralized or bottom-up, and individual experts in NTA work directly with counterparts in partner agencies, without much oversight<sup>23</sup>. Here the risk is that technical teams get ‘carried away’ by immediate needs and lose track of the larger project. The lack of centralized management of components is also reflected in the lack of reporting beyond outputs/activities (discussed in further detail in Section Effectiveness), which *further* increases the risk that country project objectives are underprioritized vis-à-vis more immediate needs. Notably, precisely due to this lack of reporting within CBP, it has not been possible for the evaluation team to assess whether country projects in fact have veered off-course, or if current activities are still relevant to the original project plans. As an example, under the audit component of the RRA project, the project plan outlines five output targets related to audits, but by the 24/25 workplan, activities are only planned for one of these (“Increase capacity regarding auditing of taxpayers within certain business sectors”). Instead, focus appears to have shifted to emphasize the modality of eAudits, on request from RRA. From interviews with stakeholders on both sides, it is not clear exactly who is responsible for making sure the activities carried out reflect the ambitions under the project plan.

**In terms of implementation, the capacity building support is relevant for counterparts.** To a large extent, the hands-on, ‘shoulder-to-shoulder’ approach adopted by NTA is well received by partner agencies. In interviews, counterparts report that capacity building support is relevant, that NTA as a peer administration understands their particular challenges, and that despite the contextual differences between Norway and the respective countries NTA experts’ inputs are highly relevant in light of their agencies’ challenges. NTA experts report that the support they provide is broadly in line with the capacity of counterpart agencies (Figure 5), but perhaps less so with regards to budgets (i.e. the counterparts’ budgets available for their own internal costs), which is discussed in further detail in Section Sustainability). Similar sentiments are reported by the counterpart agencies (Figure 6).

*Figure 5: NTA expert survey – To what extent did the support you are giving match the capacity/budget/technological capacity of the counterpart administration?*



*Figure 6: Government partner survey – To what extent does the support you are receiving match the capacity/budget/technological capacity of your administration?*



<sup>22</sup> Norad. 2015. Evaluation of Norwegian support to capacity development, p. 69.

<sup>23</sup> Formally, each country visit is followed by a visit report written by the NTA experts involved, and to the extent possible resident advisors are intended to attend workshops and meetings during visits. However, it is not clear that this information is then used in a formalized manner to inform management of country projects.



## 2.2 Effectiveness

### Evaluation framework

Three elements are used to evaluate effectiveness:

1. The extent to which the program meet its objectives
2. Challenges in project implementation and achieving results
3. Effectiveness of risk assessments to identify and propose mitigating measures

### Key findings



**The outcome objective of Phase 1 (establishing cooperations) has been achieved**, with four long-term cooperation agreements going into Phase 2



**Country projects have experienced anecdotal successes**, including in improving capacity and performance among partner administrations, especially under the ICT and taxpayer services components



**Under Phase I CBP lacked a proper results framework and theory of change** justifying how activities were meant to achieve the program's objective of improving tax collection.



**Under both phases results reporting is insufficient**, which makes it impossible to assess the extent to which the program or individual country projects have achieved their objectives.



**The program risk assessments mainly focus on external risks**, not taking into consideration internal risks within NTA



**The program and its country projects have faced challenged with implementation**, including: the COVID-19 pandemic, lack of management buy-in, slow relationship-building leading to delays, too many NTA experts being used too little, and adjustment challenges.



= Positive finding



= Negative finding



= Relevant finding not directly answering an evaluation question but worth noting

### 2.2.1 Results achievement

#### 2.2.1.1 Program level

**The results achievement assessment is challenging due to multiple factors connected to set-up of the program.** Internally, the program does not have sufficiently detailed processes for monitoring achievements. Three particular factors make it difficult to *assess how the program's activities have resulted in the program's targeted objectives*:

1. **In Phase I, the implicit theory of change (ToC) on program level does not sufficiently justify the links between impact, outcomes and outputs.** The theory of change of Phase I<sup>24</sup> assumes that by establishing a robust framework for cooperation with tax administrations and implementing targeted capacity-building activities, the program can improve tax collection in developing countries, ultimately supporting the financing of SDGs (Figure 7). The causal link between establishing structures within NTA (target output) to facilitate formation of partnerships (target outcome) is reasonable, but the causal link on how forming these partnerships results in increasing tax collection (target impact) does not appear plausible. There are intermediary outcomes, such as improving capacity in the partner administration, that are not included in the theory of change, and thus not monitored in the results framework. This misalignment between internal NTA-focused activities and the ambitious impact objectives creates a challenge in linking the program's interventions to broader improvements in tax collection – even if NTA reaches its outcome objectives this does not suggest the program is leading to improvements in tax collection. A theory of change should include all the steps required, and the results framework should measure as many of those steps as possible.


<sup>24</sup> Since the program documents did not contain an explicit Theory of Change, the overview below illustrates a reconstructed and implicit ToC.

Figure 7: CBP's reconstructed Theory of Change for Phase I



In Phase II, the theory of change is improved and provides more reasonable link between outcomes and impact. For Phase II, the program level objectives are the aggregate objectives of individual projects, and this is reflected in the results frameworks. In the theory of change in Phase II, causal linkages between outputs (such as improved ICT and improved taxpayer compliance) and impact of improved tax collection in developing countries, are more logical (see Figure 8). This is because the emphasis is on strengthening the capacities of partner administrations, rather than solely focusing on NTA.

Figure 8: CBP's reconstructed Theory of Change for Phase II



2. In Phase II, poorly defined results frameworks mean that objectives are not measured. In both periods, the results frameworks share the same impact statement, which is the improvement of tax collection in developing countries, as measured by an increase in the tax-to-GDP ratio. However, on the outcome level, there are no indicators to measure the objectives of Phase II. Outcome objectives are defined as aggregations of country projects' outcomes, which allows for adjusting results frameworks to individual country objectives, which is good. However, the lack of indicators means that there is no way to compare results against objectives or baselines (country project results frameworks are discussed in section 2.2.1.2). Where indicators are established, they remain overly broad and high-level, lacking specific metrics that would enable the assessment of the intervention's impact and primarily emphasize 'improving' key areas without detailing how such improvements will be measured (see Table 7).

Table 7: Overview of output, outcome and impact indicators established in Phase I and Phase II

	Output	Outcome	Impact
Phase I	Indicators established	Indicators established	Indicators established
Phase II	Indicators established	No indicators established	Indicators established

3. In both phases, progress reporting does not report on the established result frameworks. The annual program reports to Norad do not report against the indicators and targets, even where these exist in the result frameworks (see Table 8). Instead, the annual reports contain mostly narrative updates on activities implemented, mainly focused on the output level, with little information on what this means in terms of the target objectives of the program or country projects.

Table 8: Overview of indicators reported on during Phase I and Phase II

	Output	Reported on	Outcome	Reported on	Impact	Reported on
Phase I	Indicators established	No	Indicators established	No	Indicators established	No
Phase II	Indicators established	No	No indicators established	-	No indicators established	-

In terms of **impact**, program progress reports have not included data on the tax-to-GDP ratio, except for one. The impact indicator, *average cumulative increase in tax-to-GDP ratio in partner countries*, has not been measured by NTA for the whole duration of the program. There is also no clear indication of how the ratio is to be measured. The only mention of the indicator was in the progress report for 2024, indicating a 2% increase of tax-to-GDP ratio from 2023 to 2024 for Zanzibar Revenue Authority (ZRA), surpassing Phase II target of 0% of average cumulative increase in partner countries. The 2024 result of 0.5 is based on the average reported increase in tax-to-GDP in four partner countries.

Table 9: Reporting on impact indicator tax-to-GDP in Phase I of CBP

Impact indicator	Baseline	Targets						
		Phase 1						Phase2
		2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Average cumulative increase tax-GDP ratio in partner countries (% points)	-	0	0	0.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	0
		Results (reported)						
		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.5 <sup>25</sup>

In terms of **outcomes**, the main outcome objective of Phase I, establishing a portfolio of cooperations with tax administrations, was achieved to a certain extent. The primary outcome objective of the program's Phase I was to build a portfolio of collaboration with tax administrations in developing countries, aiming to have 4 partners engaged in institutional cooperation and 6 partners receiving targeted technical assistance by the program's conclusion. By the originally intended conclusion of the program in 2022, this target had not been met. The program was subsequently extended until early 2024, during which Phase I led to the establishment of partnerships with 3 institutions and the provision of targeted technical assistance to 4 countries, slightly missing the initial goals. The fourth institutional partnership was established in March 2024, after Phase I of CBP has concluded. Overview of the partnerships can be found in the Background chapter.

Table 10: Outcome indicators results for Phase I of CBP

Outcome indicators	Baseline	Target	Result		Result achieved in Phase I
		2022	2022 (initial end of Phase 1)	2024 (Phase 1 end after extension)	
0.1 Number of partners with institutional cooperation	-	4	2	3	No
0.2 Number of targeted TA partners	-	6	3	4	No

In terms of **outputs**, the program's outputs have been achieved to some extent, but they were not tracked nor reported on in Phase I. The results framework outlined in the 2018 program document, which includes baselines and targets, has not been applied in the annual progress reporting, complicating the assessment of output achievements. The primary quantitative data reported consisted of number of visits to tax administrations. While this data can indicate whether the implementation and activity plan has been executed, it does not adequately reflect the accomplishments or confirm the targets have or have not been met. Moreover, the final report for the entire program period of Phase I has not been submitted despite it being a requirement in the agreement between NTA and Norad<sup>26</sup>.

Norad has consistently requested improved results reporting from NTA with limited success and some resistance throughout the program's duration. Interviews with Norad stakeholders have shown dissatisfaction with the quality of reporting since the program's inception. Norad has repeatedly urged NTA to improve their results reporting and provided assistance from within its results unit and the Knowledge Bank. Despite this support, NTA has shown minimal improvement in the reports. While Phase II introduced a more suitable results framework (see Figure 8 above), the reporting so far (Annual Report 2024) has not used this framework for reporting (see Table 8 above – overview of reporting on indicators) and no measurement of results against targets was done. It would be beneficial for Norad, particularly the Knowledge Bank, to leverage its oversight role of the Knowledge programs to facilitate experience sharing or training sessions, as other programs might encounter similar issues.

#### 2.2.1.2 Project level

**Results frameworks for institutional partnership projects lack ways to measure change, and reporting is insufficient.** Most project outcome and output objectives focus on 'improving' or 'upgrading' of the tax administrations themselves, with the overarching intended impact being improved taxpayer compliance or revenue mobilization (See Figure 8 – theory of change for Phase II). No indicators were established apart from output level indicators for RRA project. The indicators measure activities but do not reflect and assess actual change and improvement within the

<sup>25</sup> As the calculation method for the impact indicator is not provided by NTA; the average cumulative increase in tax-GDP ratio in partner countries has been done using the data from the 2024 progress report - 2% increase from 2023 to 2024 for ZRA, divided by the number of partner countries at the time - 4.

<sup>26</sup> Phase I concluded in February 2024, with the requirement to submit final report within six months following the conclusion of the support period

partner organization with some projects not including indicators at all (ZRA). Furthermore, the results frameworks are not reported on in progress reports. Similarly, as at the program level, the primary quantitative data provided is the number of trips made to partner institutions, which fails to adequately reflect the accomplishment of the project's objectives.

*Table 11: Overview of indicators established and reported on in country projects*

	Output	Reported on	Outcome	Reported on	Impact	Reported on
<b>RRA</b>	Indicators established	No	No indicators established	No	No indicators established	No
<b>ZRA</b>	No indicators established	-	No indicators established	-	No indicators established	-

**Both RRA and ZRA have their own internal corporate plans which could be used for reported in CBP.** The internal corporate plans, along with their monitoring and evaluation frameworks and targets, such as those related to outputs, outcomes and revenue collection, could be integrated into CBP. This integration may enhance the ownership of objectives and results (see Table 12).

*Table 12: Examples of outcomes and indicators from RRA and ZRA Corporate plans' Monitoring and Evaluation frameworks*

<b>RRA</b>	<b>Strategic goal, outcomes and outputs</b>	<b>Performance indicator</b>
	<b>Strategic goal/Impact</b>	Total tax revenues as % of GDP
	<b>Optimized revenue collection</b>	% contribution of tax revenue collection to national budget
		Year-on-Year percentage increase in district revenue collections
	<b>Outcome 1: Improved customer service</b>	Customer satisfaction rate
	<b>Output 1.1: Customer Services Simplified</b>	% of customer reporting that it was easy to access the information and guidance required to manage their tax affairs
		Number of key RRA services whose number of customer touch points reduced
		Number of manual processes (external services) shifted to online
	<b>Output 1.2: Customer engagement improved</b>	Number of consultations, dialogues and tax education sessions
		Level of implementation of the annual action plans of tax education and awareness strategy
<b>ZRA</b>	<b>ZRA Corporate objectives</b>	Optimize revenue
	<b>ZRA Strategic Direction</b>	Increase revenue collection
	<b>Main Initiatives to Achieve Corporate Objectives:</b>	
	<b>Collect revenue pursuant to set target and regulatory framework</b>	Revenue collected against estimated target
	<b>Measure revenue collected against annual GDP</b>	% of revenue to GDP
	<b>Conduct a Tax Gap study and implement interventions to reduce the revenue gap</b>	% of overall tax GAP to GDP
	<b>Measure revenue collected against targets and monitor revenue enhancing plans</b>	% of estimated target (Bill TZS)
	<b>Carry-out a Tax Expenditure Analysis and implement policy interventions</b>	% of Tax expenditure to revenue collection
	<b>Develop and implement action plan to write-off unrecoverable debt</b>	% of unrecoverable debt written-off


**Partner institutions have experienced successes.** Case studies in Rwanda and Zanzibar reveal that both tax administrations have seen improvements (see Table 13). Tax administrations survey respondents indicated that Taxpayer services and ICT are viewed as areas where the program has been most successful. Despite the positive perception of ICT, it appears that some administrations still see opportunities for improvement in the area. Organizational development and CRS compliance have achieved success in certain countries yet appear to require further effort in others (see Figure 9).

Table 13: Examples of CBP achievements in ZRA and RRA

Zanzibar Revenue Authority (ZRA)	Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Increased tax-to-GDP ratio from 9% in 2018/19 to 12% in 2023/24.</li> <li>The total revenue collected in 2024 was USD 718,760, while in 2018 it was only USD 360,300. This represents an increase of 142% since 2018.</li> <li>Improved audit capacity.</li> <li>Increased ability to conduct business process reviews on its own.</li> <li>Hotel audits have become digital, more frequent and of better quality.</li> <li>Increased taxpayer compliance, but still relatively low.</li> <li>Improved capacity of ICT staff and increased availability of systems (less downtime).</li> <li>Research division's skills have improved.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Tax-to-GDP ratio has remained stable at around 14% since 2018.</li> <li>Taxpayer satisfaction has increased (based on taxpayer surveys, 75% satisfaction rate in 2020).</li> <li>RRA drafted 5 updated audit sector notes under guidance from NTA (Hospitality, Financial sector, Telecommunication, Mining, Manufacturing).</li> <li>Developed Digital transformation strategy together with NTA.</li> <li>Agile development is used in all processes.</li> <li>Increased Call Centre performance.</li> <li>Improved cross-departmental cooperation within RRA.</li> </ul>


However, the contribution of NTA to these successes of the partner tax administrations is unclear and undocumented. NTA has established four institutional partnerships, offering support to each partner in various areas through trainings by NTA experts. Interviews with partner administrations reveal generally positive views on the role of NTA. However, in terms of attribution, it is uncertain to what extent successes have been achieved due to NTA's support, as there is no available data to substantiate this, largely due to CBP's limited results reporting.

Figure 9: To what extent has the program achieved or is on track to achieve its objectives within your agency? Partner agencies, N=6.



NTA experts have mixed perceptions regarding the impact of their support on improvements, highlighting the need for more robust measurement of results. In the survey, approximately 40% of NTA expert respondents indicated that the tax administrations they supported experienced capacity improvements to a large or very large extent. Meanwhile, 35% reported limited or moderate improvements, and around 20% were unsure of the extent of improvement (see Figure 10). This indicates that the effectiveness of support differs across various administrations and contexts, and the uncertainty among some experts about the extent of improvement underscores a gap in tracking and measuring outcomes.

Figure 10: To what extent was the capacity of counterparts improved as a result of your support? NTA Experts, N=59.





## 2.2.2 Challenges in implementation and results achievement

### 2.2.2.1 Challenges in achieving results

**Stronger monitoring of goal achievement would make it easier to evaluate why certain approaches are more effective than others.** As it is difficult to point out which components or country projects were successful and which were not, assessing what affects success is challenging. NTA should enhance the results measuring and reporting of CBP, then invest more time and resources into evaluating which projects and components are successful and which are not, and finally identify the potential causes behind this.

**The CBP has faced challenges common to many capacity-building initiatives, as well as some specific to the program.** The 2015 Evaluation of Norwegian support to capacity development highlights several broad challenges typically encountered in Norwegian capacity-building initiatives. The CBP has experienced some, but not all, of these challenges. For instance, challenges such as mistrust between parties, limited flexibility from the Norwegian partner, performing gap-filling instead of capacity building, or lacking the necessary skills for capacity building were not issues encountered within CBP. In fact, the opposite was true. The NTA expert and partner administration surveys indicated that NTA ensures experts focus solely on providing support rather than gap-filling and has demonstrated significant flexibility within the program, which has been appreciated by the partner administrations.

**Table 15 presents a combination of common challenges faced by capacity-building programs alongside specific issues encountered by the CBP.** More detailed explanation of the CBP-specific challenges are:

**Overall:**

1. **Covid-19 pandemic** – The onset of the pandemic in early 2020 has affected the whole program and caused delays in implementation and also led to loss of contact with Tanzania Revenue Authority, where NTA has been trying to establish relationship. Rwanda Revenue Authority has been the most stable partner throughout the pandemic as they had better technical infrastructure for working online than others, which is also one of the reasons why they were the first partner that has signed institutional partnership agreement with NTA.

**Relating to context and/or partner administration:**

2. **Lack of management buy-in** – Management buy-in is a key success factor and a key challenge in implementation of the program. This is also connected to ruling political parties and elites within the countries who might not have interest in the initiative. A point in case is with Kenya Revenue Authority, where a change in the ruling political party resulted in a shift in the top management of the tax administration, causing the loss of previous efforts to secure management buy-in and disrupting established contacts. Importance of this can be seen with Zanzibar Revenue Authority and Rwanda Revenue Authority, whose management is very engaged, hence the projects are progressing. Lack of management buy-in and weak ownership is also seen as an obstacle by the NTA experts (see Figure 11).
3. **Relationship-building takes longer than expected** – The CBP program has experienced delays in implementation mainly due to the lengthy processes which were required to build relationships prior to starting cooperation. The initial program plan was very optimistic, anticipating a swift establishment of relationships at the project's onset, taking into consideration that scoping missions needed to be conducted too. The program plan aimed, by the second year, to secure institutional cooperation with two partners and provide targeted assistance to four partners. However, the first five years of the project were primarily used for inception activities and setting ground for delivering support. As illustrated in Table 14, initial inception phases did not commence until the project's second year, with durations ranging from two to five years. Consequently, the first institutional partnerships were not formalized until 2022, four years into the project, and by end of phase I, targeted technical assistance was provided to three partners. NTA should have planned more realistically, as challenges such as delays in communication, lack of responsiveness, and slow decision-making due to insufficient buy-in were known and evident from NTA's earlier capacity-building effort prior to 2018<sup>27</sup>. Pandemic and lack of physical presence needs to be taken into consideration, however, it does not justify all of the delays.

<sup>27</sup> As is mentioned in the brochure on CBP 'Building Capacity in Tax Administrations – A Norwegian Approach'.

Table 14: Timeline of the CBP and its institutional partnerships


Counterpart	Project implementation period					Extension	New program period				
	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028
Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA)		Inception Phase			Institutional Cooperation Agreement						
Zanzibar Revenue Authority (ZRA)		Inception Phase			Institutional Cooperation Agreement						
Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA)		Inception Phase					Memorandum of Understanding				
Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA)					Inception Phase		Institutional Cooperation Agreement				

4. **Staff turnover** – Since tax administrations in partner countries typically do not offer competitive salaries, staff turnover is a concern. For CBP to be successful, it is crucial that skilled employees stay with the organization over the long term to ensure lasting changes. This challenge is present among most partner organizations and has been pointed out as a challenge in the NTA expert survey as well.
5. **Limited technical capacity and infrastructure issues** – In the case of the Zanzibar Revenue Authority, CBP was unable to initiate capacity building in the ICT area due to the absence of technical infrastructure at ZRA. This led to delays that might have been anticipated during the three-year inception phase, potentially preventing the setbacks. Consequently, the program had to redirect funds to acquire infrastructure, which does not fully align with capacity building objectives. However, this situation highlights the CBP program's flexibility, which was valued by partner administrations.
6. **Resistance to change** – Even after capacity building has been provided by NTA, some of the tax administrations do not adapt quickly enough to new systems established.
7. **Cultural differences** – The program sees cultural differences as challenge, mainly due to not showing up in meetings on time or not showing up at all, the need to conduct physical visits, especially at the beginning of a relationship to ensure interest and demand and sometimes also being inadequately prepared for visits from NTA. This challenge has partly been solved by having resident advisors from NTA sit in the partner institutions whose primary value lies in their ability to facilitate and coordinate relationship between NTA and partners. The resident advisor plays a role in preparing missions, planning and report writing, serving as a bridge between the institutions and NTA.

#### Relating to NTA:

8. **Lack of onboarding process for adaptation among Norwegian partner experts** – Based on stakeholder interviews, it seems that the preparation that NTA experts receive prior to travel to partner agencies varies, as there is not one fixed onboarding process for all. This could lead to a lack of contextual understanding of the partner and thus providing training that does not fit the partner either.
9. **Too many NTA experts are involved at limited capacity** – The use of NTA experts on an occasional basis to deliver capacity building with sometimes little onboarding or familiarization creates gaps in contextual understanding and long-term direction of the support provided. Nearly half of the NTA expert survey respondents marked the impact of political change and the state of the sector in the recipient country as a possible challenge as 'I don't know', which indicates limited understanding of the recipient administration's context (see Figure 11). Frequent rotation of NTA experts at reduced capacity means that experts are not as involved in country projects, outside their occasional activities, reducing contextual familiarity. This also correlates to challenge number 11 – Time spent on issue comprehension despite prior scoping missions. The lack of contextual understanding of NTA experts hinders the timeliness of the whole project and does not prove to be cost-effective. There are also multiple team leaders involved, who do not necessarily communicate to each other (reflecting point 10 below). The position of resident advisor is valuable; however, the position does not have enough strategic competencies.

Figure 11: NTA expert survey - To what extent have these factors posed obstacles in achieving the project's objectives? N=59.



**10. Lack of cross-departmental communication to find synergies** – As NTA supports different divisions within the partner agencies, it utilizes staff from different departments within NTA to provide capacity building. From interviews with team leads for the different departments, it appears they do not frequently communicate nor share learnings, which might potentially lead to overlaps in some areas or also missed opportunities in case of synergies between some areas.

**11. Excessive time spent on issue comprehension despite prior scoping missions** – Due to the large number of experts and frequent rotations, NTA experts typically need one to two travels to the partner administration to understand what issues they are dealing with, despite prior scoping missions and lengthy inception Phases. The program incorporates hybrid working, yet physical visits remain a core component.

#### Relating to NTA and Norad:

**12. Lack of alignment on strategic direction and long-term planning** –NTA and Norad appear to be misaligned regarding the strategic long-term direction of the CBP program, with each expecting the other to provide guidance. For example, Norad would like CBP to go into more challenging country contexts and not only rely on demand, but NTA feels it makes more sense to provide more capacity building within the countries they are already established in. It is essential for all parties to establish and agree on a strategic direction to achieve effective results.

**13. Reluctance to change at NTA despite requests from Norad** – Over the eight years since the program's inception, NTA has been slow to make changes, despite Norad's ongoing efforts and requests for improvement. Most visibly this relates to reporting and results measurement.

#### Relating to Norad:

**14. Lack of Knowledge Bank network utilization and knowledge-sharing** – CBP is under the Knowledge Bank umbrella and some collaborations and knowledge-sharing seminars do take place, however, increased interaction and more focus on strategic collaboration with other Knowledge Bank programs would be beneficial. Norad could leverage the Knowledge Bank's network to offer training, share insights, and guide Norwegian capacity building efforts, in order to benefit both NTA and Norad, as well as other capacity building programs. Many programs may encounter similar challenges as CBP or have achieved successes and developed effective practices that could be advantageous for CBP to learn from and enhance its operations.

Table 15: Overview of challenges experiences by CBP

Category	Potential challenge	Observed in CBP	Source
<b>Context / Partner administration</b>	Weak ownership from partner administration	Yes	Norad (2015)
	Partner administration has weak capacity to engage / Institutional weakness	Yes	Norad (2015)
	Partner administration lacks financial sustainability	Yes	Norad (2015)
	Staff turnover in partner administration	Yes	Norad (2015); Interviews, surveys, document review
	Partner administration/sector is undergoing significant reform	Yes	Norad (2015)
	Political interests are not conducive to the capacity efforts being supported	Yes	Norad (2015)
	Lack of management buy-in	Yes	Interviews, surveys, document review
	Relationship building takes longer than expected	Yes	Interviews, surveys, document review
	Limited technical capacity and infrastructure issues	Yes	Interviews, surveys, document review
	Resistance to change	Yes	Interviews, surveys, document review
	Cultural differences	Yes	Interviews, surveys, document review
<b>Implementation / NTA</b>	Poor measurement/tracking of results and impact	Yes	INTRAC – Rising to the Challenges: Assessing the Impacts of Organisational Capacity Building Norad (2015)
	Lack of onboarding process for adaptation among Norwegian partner experts	Yes	Interviews, surveys, document review
	Too many NTA experts are involved at limited capacity	Yes	Interviews, surveys, document review
	Lack of cross-departmental communication to find synergies	Yes	Interviews, surveys, document review
	Excessive time spent on issue comprehension despite prior scoping missions	Yes	Interviews, surveys, document review
	Lack of alignment on strategic direction and long-term planning	Yes	Interviews, surveys, document review
	Reluctance to change at NTA despite requests from Norad	Yes	Interviews, surveys, document review
	Lack of trust between partners (due to short term partnerships)	No	Norad (2015)
	Low flexibility in Norwegian partner to adapt to changing circumstances	No	Norad (2015)
	Norwegian partner does gap-filling instead of building capacity	No	Norad (2015)
	Twinning advisers do not have the skills and expertise to effectively diagnose and support capacity development	No	Norad (2015)
<b>Norad</b>	Lack of alignment on strategic direction and long-term planning	Yes	Interviews, surveys, document review
	Lack of Knowledge Bank network utilization and knowledge-sharing	Yes	Interviews, surveys, document review
<b>Overall</b>	Covid-19 pandemic	Yes	Interviews, surveys, document review

## 2.2.3 Risk assessment quality

### 2.2.3.1 Identification of risks

The program risk assessments mainly focus on external risks, not taking into consideration internal risks within NTA. Risk assessments and mitigation measures are included in both program documents from 2018 and 2024. Although risk assessments are present, they are missing a description of a consequence/situation after a mitigating measure was implemented. They list external risks pertaining the partner administration, with only one addressing internal risk within NTA – CB resources unavailable within NTA.

The risk assessment of Phase II has not taken Phase I experiences effectively into consideration. If the risk assessments of both Phases were compared with the Table 15 above, the program has experienced more than the risks

included in the initial risk assessment.. Despite encountering several challenges during Phase I, the program has not significantly expanded its risk assessments in Phase II, largely relying on those from Phase I with the addition of a focus on global crises and epidemics. It might have been beneficial for NTA to broaden the risk assessment to encompass more internal risks beyond just 'CB resources unavailable within NTA,' such as 'lack of adaptation among NTA experts,' 'lack of cross-departmental communication,' or 'insufficient results measurement', especially considering Norad's frequent recommendations for improvement. Furthermore, additional risks like staff turnover in partner administrations, cultural differences, or resistance to change could have been considered for inclusion.

### 2.2.3.2 Mitigation of risks

**Risk assessment reporting was limited and has room for improvement.** While most progress reports contained a chapter on program risks updates, they typically contained text copied from the program document, often lacking adequate information on whether the risks had materialized or been mitigated. Based on the evaluation, out of 9 identified risks (one added in 2020 and one in 2024), all 9 have materialized out of which 6 were successfully mitigated and 3 were not, as they did not have sufficient mitigating measures and resulted in delays in implementation (see Table 16). Institutional partnership agreements with RRA and ZRA include risk assessment, however they lack risks such as political instability or need for top management buy-in, which NTA knew were potential risks in most partner countries. RRA has reported on their risk assessments in progress reports, ZRA has not.

*Table 16: Overview of identified, materialized and mitigated risks*

Identified risk factor	Materialized	Mitigated	Comment
Lack of good CB partners	✓	✓	This posed a risk primarily at the beginning of the program, when NTA was searching for partners to start a cooperation with, which has proven challenging due to multiple factors (see 2.2.2). Mitigating measure proposed was to discuss the cooperation with enough diversified potential partners and the risk was mitigated after the institutional partnerships were established.
CB resources unavailable within NTA	✓	✓	The right NTA experts on audit to support RRA on sector-specific audits were unavailable when needed. Having a large pool of NTA experts mitigated the risk.
Management support missing in partner institution, changes in senior management	✓	No	More thorough mitigation measures missing, as the ones proposed in the project document in 2018 were not sufficient.
Uptake capacity in partner organization	✓	✓	Although capacities of the partner agencies differ, the CB efforts have been absorbed to some level in all. Zanzibar Revenue Authority is the smallest in size, therefore a lot of adaptation needs to be done.
Inadequate infrastructure for CB project implementation	✓	✓	Zanzibar Revenue authority was lacking a lot of infrastructure needed for effective capacity building, resulting in CBP shifting the use of funds towards it and adjusting program activities.
Political turmoil, natural disasters	✓	No	Changes in KRA's top management due to a new ruling political party led to a halt in contact with NTA. Additionally, ongoing conflict in the region, pandemic and explosion in Beirut disrupted communication with the Lebanese Tax Administration. At that time, CBP lacked a sufficiently large portfolio of partnerships to prevent these issues from impacting the program overall.
Suboptimal selection of cooperation areas	✓	✓	During inception Phases, projects laid groundwork to identify areas for support. Later, some of these areas had to be re-assessed as ,for example, infrastructure was not in place, making the selection of cooperation areas suboptimal. NTA has mitigated this by modifying projects.
Pandemic and other health issues (added in 2020)	✓	No	The impact of the pandemic was felt throughout the program, with most of the activities not being implemented. Online communication was introduced; however, it has not mitigated the situation sufficiently as also the program was still building relationships with partners, which requires some level of physical presence.
Global crisis / epidemics (new in Phase II)	✓	✓	In 2024, Rwanda experienced outbreaks of Mpox and Marburg virus, prompting NTA to conduct assessments of health-related guidance prior to facilitating physical visits.



## 2.3 Efficiency

### Evaluation framework

Two elements are used to evaluate efficiency. The extent to which

1. NTA's approach to development cooperation and capacity building makes efficient use of resources
2. The budget is reviewed as reasonable and delivering "value-for-money"

### Key findings



**Resident advisors is a cost efficient solution**, but they should be assigned for longer periods, and they could be utilized more efficiently beyond mere facilitation and coordination



**CBP's approach of using a roster of NTA experts with limited involvement across country projects is inefficient.** NTA experts' limited involvement means there are frequent onboarding costs for new experts, there is limited learning across projects, and NTA resources are not always available for CBP.



**NTA provides capacity building in areas where it is not obvious that NTA staff is the best value-for-money option**, such as generic areas like network infrastructure, call center etiquette, change management or agile development.



= Positive finding



= Negative finding



= Relevant finding not directly answering an evaluation question but worth noting

### 2.3.1 Budget review

**The total combined budget for the period 2018 to 2024 (Phase I) was NOK 94.7m.** The program budget was NOK 50m for the initial period of 5 years and was increased by NOK 36.7m in an addendum signed in 2022, and by additional NOK 8m in an addendum signed in 2023. The budget increases resulted from a shift in the initial funding plan. Instead of channeling funds through Norwegian embassies to support established institutional partnerships, all funding is now managed directly by Norad.

**The total expenditure from 2018 to 2024 amounted to NOK 98.7m, which represents a 4% overspend relative to the revised budget.** In the initial years, spending aligned with the original budget. However, in the last two years, annual expenditure significantly increased after the signing of the first institutional partnership agreements with RRA and ZRA. This rise is attributed to the funding for these partnerships being directed through Norad rather than through the Norwegian embassies in the respective countries, as initially planned, which also contributed to the substantial budget increase.


Table 17: Overview of budget and expending in CBP for period 2018-2023<sup>28</sup>

Year	Original budget (in mil. NOK)	Amended budget (in mil. NOK) <sup>29</sup>	Actual expenditure (in mil. NOK)	% Variance (Original vs. Actual)	% Variance (Amended vs. Actual)
2018	8.0	8.1	6.8	85 %	84 %
2019	12.0	18.3	11.9	99 %	65 %
2020	12.0	12.6	11.9	99 %	94 %
2021	10.0	9.9	9.3	93 %	94 %
2022	8.0	32.2	26.6	333 %	83 %
2023	-	43.3	32.2	N/A	74 %
<b>Total</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>124.4</b>	<b>98.7</b>	<b>197 %</b>	<b>79 %</b>
<b>Approved contribution by Norad</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>94.7</b>	<b>98.7</b>		<b>104 %</b>

<sup>28</sup> As the final financial report for the entire duration of Phase I (up to February 2024) has not been submitted, spending information for Phase I is only available up to the end of 2023. The 2024 annual progress report presents cumulative spending for 2024, without distinguishing costs between Phase I and II.

<sup>29</sup> All amounts are taken from progress reports provided by NTA. The total of the amended budget (NOK 124.4m) does not align with the actual approved contribution by Norad (NOK 94.7m), hence a line for the approved contribution by Norad is added on the bottom.

Figure 12: Overview of budgets and actual expenditure for period 2018-2023 of CBP



**Inception phase used up a significant portion of funds with limited results reported, particularly given the low activity levels.** Between 2018 and 2021, spending was largely in line with the original budget, despite annual amendments and reduced activity levels due to the pandemic. Table 18 presents a comparison between spending during inception phase and implementation phase. For calculation purposes, inception phase is considered from 2018 to 2021, while implementation phase is counted from 2022 onwards, marked by the signing of the first institutional partnership agreements. Inception phase utilized 40% of the revised budget, whereas implementation phase accounted for 60% of the spending. The inception phase led to signing of the first institutional partnerships, however, as no reporting against targets was done in progress reports, it is challenging to capture what has been achieved during inception phase apart from this. This indicates that inception phase expended a significant portion of funds with limited results reported in the progress reports (see Table 8 in section 2.2.1).

Table 18: Comparison of spending between inception Phase and implementation Phase of CBP

Total expenditure for period in	Inception Phase (2018-2021)	Implementation Phase (2022-2024)	Total
In mil. NOK	39.9	58.8	98.7
In % of total	40%	60%	100%

**The program's financial reports lack a detailed breakdown of costs necessary to evaluate value-for-money.** Over the years, the reporting has been inconsistent, with some years presenting output-based expenditure, others dividing costs into broad categories such as expenses and staff compensation without providing information on how many staff were involved nor what specific costs belong under the general expenses category. Some improvements are noted, for example in the years 2021 to 2023, reports included a country-based breakdown of costs. In the planning Phase of the program, 58% of the budget was expected to be spent on output 2 – institutional cooperation, 29% on output 3 – targeted CB, and 13% on output 1 – robust NTA framework. With the inconsistent financial reporting, the division of spending among the three outputs is not available for all years (see Table 19).

Table 19: Overview of actual expenditure per output for period 2018 to 2023 of CBP

Year	Budget line	Original budget (in mil. NOK)	Amended budget (in mil. NOK) <sup>30</sup>	Actual expenditure (in mil. NOK)	% Variance (Original vs. Actual)	% Variance (Amended vs. Actual)
2018	Output 1 - robust NTA framework	4.0	7.1	6.4	160 %	90 %
	Output 2 - institutional cooperation	3.0	0.8	0.4	13 %	50 %
	Output 3 - targeted CB	1.0	0.2	-	0 %	0 %
	<b>Total 2018</b>	<b>8.0</b>	<b>8.1</b>	<b>6.8</b>	<b>85 %</b>	<b>84 %</b>
2019	Output 1 - robust NTA framework	1.0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Output 2 - institutional cooperation	8.0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Output 3 - targeted CB	3.0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	<b>Total 2019</b>	<b>12.0</b>	<b>18.3</b>	<b>11.9</b>	<b>99 %</b>	<b>65 %</b>
2020	Output 1 - robust NTA framework	0.5	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Output 2 - institutional cooperation	8.0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Output 3 - targeted CB	3.5	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	<b>Total 2020</b>	<b>12.0</b>	<b>12.6</b>	<b>11.9</b>	<b>99 %</b>	<b>94 %</b>

<sup>30</sup> All amounts are taken from progress reports provided by NTA. The total of the amended budget (NOK 124.4m) does not align with the actual approved contribution by Norad (NOK 94.7m), hence a line for the approved contribution by Norad is added on the bottom.

2021	Output 1 - robust NTA framework	0.5	4.2	4.5	900 %	107 %
	Output 2 - institutional cooperation	6.0	4.6	4.5	75 %	98 %
	Output 3 - targeted CB	3.5	1.1	0.3	9 %	27 %
	<b>Total 2021</b>	<b>10.0</b>	<b>9.9</b>	<b>9.3</b>	<b>93 %</b>	<b>94 %</b>
2022	Output 1 - robust NTA framework	0.5	6.0	5.4	1080 %	90 %
	Output 2 - institutional cooperation	4.0	24.5	20.7	518 %	84 %
	Output 3 - targeted CB	3.5	1.7	0.5	14 %	29 %
	<b>Total 2022</b>	<b>8.0</b>	<b>32.2</b>	<b>26.6</b>	<b>333 %</b>	<b>83 %</b>
2023	Output 1 - robust NTA framework	-	9,4	6,5	N/A	69 %
	Output 2 - institutional cooperation	-	32,0	25,1	N/A	78 %
	Output 3 - targeted CB	-	1,8	0,6	N/A	33 %
	<b>Total 2023</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>43,3</b>	<b>32,2</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>74 %</b>
<b>Total all years</b>		<b>50.0</b>	<b>124.4</b>	<b>98.7</b>	<b>197 %</b>	<b>79 %</b>
<b>Approved contribution by Norad</b>		<b>50.0</b>	<b>94.7</b>	<b>98.7</b>		<b>104 %</b>

**The absence of result measurement throughout the program hinders the ability to assess the budget in terms of value-for-money.** Although majority of expenditures are related to staff costs and travel expenses, which are justifiable for a capacity-building initiative, the absence of consistent result measurement since 2018 and lack of any cost breakdowns provides limited evidence of accomplishments. This makes it challenging to evaluate the expenditure across various countries against their achievements, complicating the assessment of value for money. In some tax-related programs, calculating support for revenue collection can be straightforward, as demonstrated by NTA in previous capacity-building programs, which have used calculations like 'achieved USD X in revenue based on USD Y in inputs'<sup>31</sup>. This was, however, not possible in the case of CBP, owing also partly to its more complex objectives.

### 2.3.2 Use of resources

**NTA's approach of using a large roster of 100+ NTA experts is costly.** CBP utilizes a roster of over 100 NTA staff serving as ad hoc experts, each occasionally contributing to specific activities where needed, while retaining their full-time positions at NTA. This poses risk of inefficient implementation, stemming from factors such as lack of coordination among NTA departments, resulting in duplicated efforts, and the frequent need for experts to start "from scratch", requiring additional trips for familiarization, despite NTA as an organization having spent years in the inception phase identifying partner needs. It also risks using more resources at partner administration than necessary, as staff time is required to build relations over again each time a counterpart in NTA is replaced, although interviews found no evidence of this having happened. This 'pool of regular staff as experts'-model is integral to the Norwegian capacity building model, but it is contrary to many other development assistance models where for example expert staff is hired specifically for use in capacity building efforts. In practice, for NTA the roster means that CBP work is secondary to the experts' main responsibilities, which means their available time for CBP is limited. At the same time, NTA sees participation in CBP as an HR perk for its staff, which offers interesting opportunities and travel. However, this approach is seen as inefficient. NTA should focus on engaging a smaller number of experts at higher capacity to deliver more strategic and effective capacity building.

**Despite the adoption of hybrid working methods introduced during the pandemic, physical travel remains high.** Although partner administrations struggled at the onset of the pandemic, they have now more successfully adapted to online working, partly thanks to NTA's support. This and the fact that institutional partnership agreements are in place should ideally lower the number of travels, as the relationship with the partners is more stable (physical visits are likely more important when relations are less firm, in the beginning of projects). However, the number of physical travels remains high<sup>32</sup>, and NTA still characterizes physical visits as 'pivotal' to the success of projects. NTA should consider making a more formalized strategy on when travels are needed and when online meetings could replace physical visits.

**Resident advisors are essential in partner administrations, but should be assigned for extended periods, as they could be utilized more efficiently beyond mere facilitation and coordination.** The resident advisor position is essential for facilitating efficient and successful relationship between NTA and the partner administration. While this is true, it appears that their full potential is not being utilized. Given that the resident advisors often have offices within the tax administration, they should ideally be entrusted with more project management and long-term strategic

<sup>31</sup> Skatteetaten, 2018. *Skattebistand virker, derfor økes innsatsen i flere utviklingsland*. Available at: <https://www.skatteetaten.no/presse/nyhetsrommet/skattebistand-virker/>

<sup>32</sup> Financial data available does not include a breakdown of travel expenses. The only reporting detailing costs on travel is for 2020, which saw exceptionally little travel. The best data point for indicating the costs of travel is that in Q1 of 2020, travel expenses amounted to NOK 1.1 million, compared to NOK 5.1 million in staff time costs. In 2023, "expenses" (which includes but is not limited to travel costs) amounted to NOK 11.7 million, compared to NOK 31.6 million staff time costs.

responsibilities. Case studies indicate that resident advisors typically spend their first year familiarizing themselves with the partner institution and establishing relationships. This suggests that their posting should ideally extend beyond 1-2 years, allowing them to contribute more strategically, follow up on reporting outcomes, and ensure that the program remains on track, as this can be more easily done from the partner institution, rather than from NTA in Oslo.

**Regional peer-to-peer learning could be used more to enhance capacity-building initiative and increase efficiency.** Relying solely on training and capacity-building efforts from Norwegian experts at NTA who need to travel to partner institutions multiple times a year is considered inefficient, and a greater emphasis on South-South learning approaches is recommended. This approach has already been used to an extent, such as when participants from RRA, ZRA, TRA and KRA convened in Nairobi to collaborate and exchange experiences on digitalization and agile development. Case studies also show that the partner institutions want to learn from their peers. However, it appears that such collaboration is not consistently applied across all areas supported by NTA.

**NTA provides capacity building in areas where it is not obvious that NTA staff is the best value-for-money option.** NTA supports partner institutions across a variety of areas, ranging from tax/revenue-specific areas requiring specialized knowledge and skills such as audits and taxpayer services to more generic areas like network infrastructure, call center etiquette, change management or agile development. With generic areas like these, it is not clear that high-paid Norwegian experts are the best option to provide capacity-building. NTA experts on, for example, network infrastructure do not have specialized knowledge that applies specifically to tax administrations, and offer 'generic' (as in broadly applicable) solutions. It is likely that other experts on network infrastructure, including cheaper local vendors, could have provided the same expertise, including a long-term partnership with shoulder-to-shoulder learning and a gradual handover. While partner administrations appreciate the support, that might be because it comes for free and that they already have relations with the NTA teams.

## 2.4 Coherence and coordination

### Evaluation framework

Coherence is evaluated in terms of:

1. Ways in which NTA ensures coherence and promotes coordination and collaboration with other development partners

### Key findings



**Long-term support activities appear well coordinated with other development support,** largely thanks to formal donor coordination structures at the partner administrations.



**The short-term support is highly coherent with other development efforts** reflecting its demand-driven nature by explicit coordination mechanisms (such as TIWB).



= Positive finding



= Negative finding



= Relevant finding not directly answering an evaluation question but worth noting

**Most of the partner administrations have experience managing development support and have explicit structures for managing coordination.** For three out of four country partnerships (KRA, TRA, RRA), the partner agencies have a number of development partners supporting them, including multilaterals like IMF, World Bank, UNDP, AfDB and bilateral support such as FCDO/HMRC, GIZ, KOICA, and EU. In TRA and KRA, donor support is formally coordinated in donor coordination mechanisms, and NTA is to some extent involved in these. In Tanzania, the Norwegian Embassy is also involved in such process, as well as broader political dialogue. In RRA, donor coordination is managed by a unit in the revenue authority (program implementation unit). ZRA is the only partner not currently receiving any other external support.

**NTA long-term support is relatively well aligned with other development cooperation support, most importantly through aligning support with partner strategies.** In RRA, NTA has little explicit communication directly with other development partners, but coordination is managed by the RRA coordination unit. The most important role NTA plays is to align its support with RRA's long-term strategies, and let RRA coordinate which donor supports which aspect of the RRA strategy. This approach, as currently taken by RRA, promotes ownership of processes and ensures relevance of support for the partner. As described in section 2.1, this has to a large extent happened. However, this approach can only work if there is sufficient capacity at the partner level, and might not be suitable for all partnerships now or in the future.

**The short-term support is highly coherent with other development efforts reflecting its demand-driven nature.** Short-term support provided by NTA through TIWB is highly demand-driven by the partnership, and NTA plays specific roles in larger support programs, coordinated by TIWB.

## 2.5 Sustainability

### Evaluation framework

Under sustainability we measure the extent to which:

1. NTA's approach and activities promote sustainability of results and investments

### Key findings



**The approach of the Program incorporates sustainability at its core**, insofar as it aims to build capacity that is meant to last and supporting organizational changes



**The CBP model involves large risks to long-term sustainability**, including government reprioritization, staff turnover, and the financial capacity of partner agencies.



= Positive finding



= Negative finding




= Relevant finding not directly answering an evaluation question but worth noting

**The approach of the Program incorporates sustainability at its core, insofar as it aims to build capacity that is meant to last and supporting organizational changes.** In a general sense, capacity building is inherently conducive to sustainability, in that the goal is to build capacity in an organization, as opposed to supporting the carrying out of a specific one-off activity. NTA experts are explicitly not providing 'gap-filling' for counterparts, which is in line with the model. As seen in section 2.2.2, most of the experts involved respond that they see capacity has improved in the partner agencies (Figure 10).

**At the same time, the CBP model involves large risks to long-term sustainability, including government reprioritization, staff turnover, and the financial capacity of partner agencies.** As country projects started implementation only in 2022, it is too early to say anything about the actual long-term effects of the program. But there are certain risks inherent to the approach taken, and suggestive evidence available highlighting what this entails in practice. First, any external assistance received is at the mercy of partner agency priorities. In the case of taxes, political priorities outside of the administrations are especially pertinent, as tax policy is a highly politicized area (compared to other areas of Norwegian capacity building support). As an illustration, KRA already saw a large reprioritization during CBP implementation as a result of government elections. As it happened during implementation, NTA could re-organize the support to continue the efforts. But if large changes like this happen after completion of programs, it risks jeopardizing the improvements achieved. Second, training of individual staff is particularly susceptible to staff turnover – government officials capacitated through development efforts are regularly poached by private sector, not helped by low government salaries. During interviews, both ZRA and RRA reported that staff turnover is generally an issue in their agencies, but they are wary to say it affects the sustainability of capacity building support. Staff turnover is not explicitly highlighted as a risk in CBP documents, and no mitigation for it is mentioned. Third, the financial capacity of partner administrations can be a limit on the sustainability of improvements, as some of the changes requires a financial commitment, such as hiring more staff, running ICT systems or websites, and others. In surveys, NTA experts report that there are relatively large challenges to sustainability, especially in the form of reprioritizations and staff turnover (Figure 13). Government counterparts are less concerned, with the exception of financial capacity.

Figure 13: NTA expert/Government partner survey – To what extent do these factors pose risk to the long-term sustainability of the impacts





# Annex I: Methodology

## Purpose and scope

The objective of this evaluation was to conduct an end of program evaluation of NTA's Capacity Building Program's for period 2018-2024. The evaluation considered Phase I and the first year of Phase II and treated the two program Phases together, except for where differences between approaches are worth highlighting. However, some aspects were more relevant for the Phase I (e.g. did the program meet its objectives?), as the Phase II has only recently begun. The scope of the evaluation included all activities undertaken under the Capacity Building Program in (1) Phase I from 2018 to 2023 and (2) the first year of activities in the Phase II up to December 2024.

The evaluation reviewed the overall results of NTA's Capacity Building Program. The performance of the program was assessed in line with the OECD DAC Evaluation criteria. The guiding questions are divided into relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and coordination and sustainability. The guiding questions for each can be found at the beginning of each chapter.

In addition, the evaluation highlighted lessons learned based on these findings, which will help guide future implementation of the program:

1. What has worked well, and what can be done better next time?
2. What, if anything, has not worked well/as planned and what can be learned from this?

## Data collection

The evaluation deployed a mixed-methods approach, utilizing a framework of three levels of analysis – program level, project level and activity level (case studies) – to systemically assess the evaluation questions, progressing from the highest level to the ground level. The triangulation of evidence from these three distinct levels provided a comprehensive and varied basis for analysis, enhancing the credibility and validity of the evaluation findings. Data collection was done through desk-based research, key stakeholder interviews, and surveys. Two field visits were conducted, in Rwanda and Zanzibar.

**Program level:** The evaluation started at the program/strategic level, which referred to the NTA's Capacity Building Program. Data collection was mainly through a document review of key documentation, such as strategies, Theory of Change, M&E framework, annual reports, previous evaluations, and reviews (including of similar projects implemented under the Knowledge Bank) and other relevant documentation. Interviews were also conducted with NTA management and Norad.

**Project level:** Project analysis of the portfolio of activities was conducted. Project level represented all activities focusing on institutional cooperation and targeted capacity building with different country authorities. This included a review of any existing results database(s) and portfolio documentation, such as progress reports. An online survey was distributed among NTA and counterpart stakeholders for each of the activities.

**Activity level (Case study):** Activities refer to individual agreements with respective countries' authorities. For Zanzibar and Rwanda, deeper dives (case studies) were conducted. This involved conducting field visits with key informant interviews with a broader set of stakeholders, including NTA staff and staff from the partner organization.

In this evaluation, desk-based research, data analysis, key stakeholder interviews, assessments and surveys were employed. The desk-review was a foundation for the review and was the first step of the evaluation process. The desk-based research encompassed both qualitative (document and literature reviews) as well as quantitative (statistical analysis of data) analysis. The desk-based research informed the succeeding steps in the review by identifying issues and contentious topics early, which were then followed-up on with more focused approaches later in the evaluation.

## Document review

Relevant documents reviewed:

Relevant documents	
1. <b>Agreements and project documents between NTA and Norad</b>	Agreement and project document for period 2018 – 2022 and relevant amendments
	Agreement and project document for period 2024 – 2028
2. <b>Agreement and workplans between NTA and cooperating institutions</b>	Cooperation agreement with Zanzibar Revenue Authority (ZRA)
	Cooperation agreement with Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA)
	Cooperation agreement with Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA)
	Memorandum of Understanding with Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA)
3. <b>Implementation Plans and Budget 2018 - 2024</b>	
4. <b>Annual progress reports from NTA (narrative and financial) from 2018 to 2024</b>	
5. <b>Annual Work Plans and Progress Reports for country projects (for case studies)</b>	
6. <b>Parter administration documentation (for case studies)</b>	RRA Strategic Plan 2019/20 – 2023/24
	ZRA Fourth Corporate Plan 2020/2021 – 2024/2025
	ZRA TADAT 2017
	RRA TADAT 2019
7. <b>Norad's strategy for Tax for Development</b>	
8. <b>Strategy of the Knowledge Bank 2020-2025</b>	
9. <b>Other evaluations</b>	Evaluation of African Tax Administration Forum Programmes, 2009-2019
	The Annual Evaluation Assessment of The ATAF 2021-2025 Strategic Plan (African Tax Administration Forum)
	Evaluation of Norwegian support to capacity development (Norad, 2015)
	Joint Scandinavian evaluation of support to capacity development (Evaluation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2016)
	Evaluation of the support to the SAI of Somalia (Finance Performance Oversight, 2021)
	Mid-term Review of Support to SAI, South Sudan: NAC Strategic Change Project 2020-2025 (Oslo Economics, 2022)
	NAC Strategic Change Project 2020-2025 – Project report 2023

## Key informant interviews

**Key informant interviews were conducted with various stakeholders.** Interviews were semi-structured and followed a rough guide, allowing for flexibility to probe deeper into issues as and when they emerged. Interviews were conducted in-person and virtually. Field visits were conducted for deeper dives on the Rwanda and Zanzibar partnerships. The below table presents list of interviews conducted.

Table 20. Key informant interviews conducted (Names redacted)

Level	Category	Sub-category	Position
Program level	NTA	International relations unit	Ag. Program manager
			Program manager
			International Director
			Other IRU staff
			Other IRU staff
		Other units	NTA IT
			NTA Large Taxpayers Office
			NTA Customers Interaction
	Norad	Norad Section for Governance	Senior adviser
			Head of section
			Senior adviser
		Knowledge Bank	Head of Knowledge Bank
	Other capacity building programs in Norway	SSB	Head of Division for International Development Cooperation
Portfolio level	NTA	Other units	Experts that have been involved with providing CB to counterpart agencies
Project level (case study) (Zanzibar)	NTA	International relations unit	Resident advisor
			Project manager/former resident advisor/current resident advisor Nairobi
			Team lead ICT
	Government counterparts	ZRA	Program manager
			Project coordinator
			Acting commissioner general ZRA
			Director of ICT
			Commissioner domestic
	Other development partners	Norwegian embassy Dar Es Salaam	Country Economist
		International relations unit	Resident advisor
Project level (case study) (Rwanda)	NTA	Other units	Team lead ICT
			Coordinator or DTD & Support program Manager Single Project Implementation Unit
	Government counterparts	RRA	Commissioner general RRA
			Assistant Commissioner in charge of Taxpayer Services (TPS) and Communication
			Acting Assistant Commissioner in charge of Taxpayer Audit Division or Director in charge of Sector and General Audits Unit
			Commissioner for IT and Digital Transformation (IT & DT)

## Surveys

Two online surveys were distributed to stakeholders, one to NTA experts involved in the program and one to partner administration counterparts. Table 21 shows the participation rate for each survey.

Table 21: Survey responses overview

Survey	Invited	Participated	Response rate
NTA experts	99	59	60 %
Administration counterparts	7	6	86 %



## Contact us

### **Thomas Fugelsnes**

*Executive Director*

T: +47 415 70 368

E: [thomas.fugelsnes@kpmg.no](mailto:thomas.fugelsnes@kpmg.no)

### **Lars Engen**

*Senior Manager*

T: +47 454 16 165

E: [lars.engen@kpmg.no](mailto:lars.engen@kpmg.no)



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