



Implementing United Nations Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations

A report on findings and recommendations

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Table of Contents

Foreword by Jonas Gahr Støre, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs.....	6
Executive Summary	8
Preface.....	11
1. Introduction	12
1.1 Purpose and structure	13
2. Integrated Missions and the UN Reform Agenda.....	14
2.1 The call for change	15
2.2 Managing the UN peacebuilding architecture.....	15
3. UN Integration in Practice: Experience to Date	17
3.1 Framing integration – an evolving concept	18
3.1.1 Integration as a management tool.....	18
3.1.2 Integration to improve quality.....	19
3.2 Integration is not a magic cure	20
3.3 Integration in practice	21
3.4 No one model.....	21
3.5 Degrees of integration	22
3.6 The integrated mission planning process	22
3.7 Administrative constraints to integration.....	25
4. Policy and Doctrinal Coherence on Integrated Missions.....	26
4.1 UN policy coherence on integration.....	27
4.2 Strategic coherence in responding to country situations.....	28
4.3 Strategic coherence at the intergovernmental level.....	29
4.4 UN multidimensional mandates	30
5. Addressing Development and Humanitarian Dilemmas in UN Integrated Peace Operations and Peacebuilding Efforts	31
5.1 The security-recovery-development nexus	31
5.2 Bridging conflicting paradigms: preserving humanitarian and human rights principles	33
5.2.1 Human rights and the protection of civilians	34
6. Aligning Mandates and Resources.....	34
7. UN Governance Structures and Collective Accountability	37
8. Leadership and Management in Integrated Missions	38
8.1 Strengthening civilian capabilities	41
8.2 Integrated training systems.....	41
9. Partnerships	42
10. Concluding Comments	44
Endnotes.....	49

Foreword by Jonas Gahr Støre, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs

There has been a dramatic surge in the number of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations deployed around the world, and their endeavours are increasingly multidimensional and complex in nature. Although the UN has taken important steps and adopted new and innovative policies, significant challenges remain in the quest for increased cohesiveness of multilateral efforts in countries affected by or emerging from conflict. In 2006, the Norwegian Government launched a project to take stock of, and further enhance, issues relating to the implementation of multidimensional and integrated peace operations. Through a series of regional seminars and consultations, the project aimed to map out some of the most crucial principles and recommendations for improving the effectiveness and accountability of UN peacekeeping operations. The project culminated in this final synthesis, which encompasses the most important findings concerning coherence and integration of peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts.

The task of grappling with these challenges should not be left just to the UN Secretariat, agencies, funds, programmes or other multilateral actors. One of the most important lessons from the project is that no single actor can resolve the challenges on their own. The project concluded that, given the complex range of approaches and instruments that are employed in peace operations, some form of integration is necessary in order to adequately address the realities on the ground and secure lasting peace. The degree to which integration should take place should be determined by the situation in

question and the desired impact of the international engagement. The report also reflects the view that integration is not an end in itself, but rather a means to an end. Neither is there a fixed template for how to integrate, and actors are encouraged to take *context* as their starting point. The report also underlines that integration is not a panacea for systemic dysfunctions and the absence of political engagement or solutions. However, it urges us to improve the way we marshal the necessary resources, including political, financial and human resources, and the way these are then used.


There is also a strong call to bring politics back into the equation for, without a deep understanding of the political nature of contemporary challenges and an informed and committed membership, we run the risk of only addressing the symptoms and not the root causes of the conflicts in question.

In supporting and promoting these processes, my Government is keenly aware of the need to accommodate the many different mandates with which the UN has been tasked, and ensure that efforts to promote better coherence and integration in countries in, emerging from or affected by conflict, are reconciled with respect for the overarching humanitarian principles. We are deeply concerned that if these challenges are left unattended, they can easily undermine confidence in the UN as a whole, because the success of UN peacekeeping is one of the key parameters by which the UN is judged. Member States interested in reform should be aware of the key findings reflected in

this report, based as they are on actual operational experience. The findings point to reforms that are likely to increase the success of peace operations, provided that they are sufficiently supported by Member States.

I would personally like to take this opportunity to thank our partners in this project, extending a special thank-you to the Governments of China and South Africa, for co-hosting two of the events, and last but not least I would like to thank all the participants for taking part, and for sharing their experiences and providing invaluable contributions and insights.

Minister of Foreign Affairs



Jonas Gahr Støre

Executive Summary

Integration in multidimensional peace operations should not be considered a magic cure for the endemic problems of the UN system and country-specific challenges, but rather as a strategic management tool to achieve greater coherence, effectiveness and efficiency in UN interventions. As such, it should form the basis of management and administrative reforms in the relevant UN departments, funds, programmes and specialized agencies. The nature and degree of integration required for a mission should be determined by country-specific realities and needs (rather than a bureaucratic framework), desired outcomes and impact, and the requirements for effective engagement with partners.

The lessons of the past have shown the “international community” the high cost of focusing too narrowly on the “architecture” of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, instead of taking broader measures to ensure the sustainability of the transition from war to peace.

Comprehensively addressing conflict and creating conditions for lasting peace requires an understanding of the contexts and complexities of both peacemaking and peacebuilding and the linkage between the two, and real structural change in the institutions and processes governing the planning and implementation of international post-conflict interventions. In the UN, reforms to bring about greater coherence, collaboration and integration of efforts in multidimensional peace operations have promise, but at present they are being

implemented in a policy vacuum, and are beset by problems caused by a fragmented and unwieldy system. Working together is not simply a question of “signing up” to promising ideas. It requires leadership and commitment within the UN, as well as a willingness by Member States to re-evaluate governing arrangements and procedures for the funding of post-conflict interventions, both within the General Assembly and in the international donor community.

Changing organizational structures and setting targets are actions that on their own do not guarantee useful change or coherence. There is a risk of such structures or targets being remote from the reality of day-to-day practice. Sharing different functions can lead to a diffusion of ownership and accountability. The process of integration will not automatically lead to increased coherence. The perspective emerging from the project is that revisiting the integrated missions concept could enable the broader UN reform agenda to demonstrate specific successes and build on them, thus bolstering both its appeal and impact.

Addressing these challenges will require commitment, concerted engagement and action on the part of a number of actors, including; the UN governing bodies, the UN secretariat and relevant agencies, funds and programmes, other multilateral actors and Member States. Revisions to the overall implementation systems governing UN bodies as a whole will also be required. While many of the current challenges are deep-rooted

and structural in nature, a commitment to progressively address priority issues would significantly improve the effectiveness of the UN and the response of the “international community” in the short and medium term, and ensure that the failures of past interventions are not repeated.

The project concluded that for integration to really be successful, the UN Security Council (UNSC), the General Assembly and other intergovernmental bodies have to be more closely involved and held accountable. It is therefore necessary to examine the priorities for implementing reforms to improve the coherence and effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts, including the necessary structural and operational changes. Similarly, UN agencies and their respective governing bodies should be encouraged to be as flexible and supportive as possible in the management of field operations, seeking to reduce bureaucratic inertia and regulatory and procedural blockages. Greater efforts should be made to establish and formalize collaboration between UN bodies and other multilateral actors at UNSC level, as well as in the strategy and planning work at country level.

Moreover, a UN-system-wide strategy needs to be formulated to assist the host country in its transition from war to peace, and which takes proper account of the different, overlapping and simultaneous pathways that need to be followed. Furthermore, a robust leadership team with the appropriate authority and resources (political, financial, and administrative) needs to be established to

implement this strategy in line with a set of agreed priorities.

Reform of administrative, budgetary, and procedural practices within and between each UN agency is essential for the implementation and overall effectiveness of integrated peace operations and will provide an incentive for greater inter-agency mobility and understanding. The current budget processes and cycles for peace operations have to be reformed as they have proven inadequate for the comprehensive, integrated planning of interventions and operations that necessitate in-depth collaboration with the UN and other partners, or which require longer and more comprehensive processes of assessment and programme development. Priority should be given to ensuring seamless transitions between different stages of UN engagement (at all levels) and the overall sustainability of UN efforts for the entire duration of a mission and in connection with the development of exit strategies. Greater efforts should thus be made by relevant UN entities to identify areas where procedures and systems could or should be harmonized and/or standardized, including in the areas of staffing, information technology, decision-making procedures, reporting lines, accountability, and the provision of logistics and other support services.

Preface

Following the 2005 Oslo Conference on Integrated Missions, the Norwegian Government launched an initiative in 2006 to take stock of the current debate on multidimensional and integrated peace operations. The project was a follow-up to the work of the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) on the integrated missions concept, and aimed to map the degree of progress made towards greater coherence and integration, and the remaining challenges and dilemmas.

To this end, the Norwegian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence organized a series of regional consultations and seminars between March and October 2007 in Beijing (co-hosted by China), Addis Ababa, Geneva, New York, Johannesburg (co-hosted by South Africa) and Brussels.¹ In addition to the main seminar series, a number of additional consultations, field visits and meetings have taken place. The aim was to gather the experience, views and lessons learned of practitioners and decision-makers from a wide range of operational and institutional settings. The conferences and seminars drew heavily on the operational experiences of participants, including senior management both at United Nations headquarters and in the field, decision-makers from capitals, regional organizations, representatives from the NGO communities, and independent researchers.

The final conference on multidimensional and integrated peace operations in Oslo in October 2007 concluded the project in a mood of cautious optimism about how the integrated mission concept

has developed, bearing in mind the considerable amount of work involved and the obstacles that remain to be overcome. Participants across all seminars and sectors discussed a multitude of normative and practical issues for integration and for multidimensional peace operations, and recognized the need to be better informed by realities on the ground. Additionally, they promoted a renewed faith in and recognition of the UN's comparative advantage in integrating the different goals of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development, despite a number of challenges. They agreed that building on this momentum is vital to further strengthen UN performance and better assist countries emerging from conflict.

Despite the diversity of experience drawn upon, several common themes emerged through the series of seminars, conferences and independent assessments. Some of these themes are reflected below, others have been elaborated upon in more detail in the individual seminar and conference proceedings.

1. Introduction

The basic question that has been asked during the course of the project on multidimensional and integrated peace operations² has been this: is the United Nations (UN) able to provide coherent, concerted and integrated action in countries in conflict, or emerging from conflict, and prevent fragile situations and incipient conflicts from escalating? A mixed picture has arisen. While there is general agreement on the rationale for UN system reform in the area of conflict management, its translation into practice has proven to be a highly complex and challenging undertaking. It was stressed that there is new momentum. There is also renewed faith in and recognition of the UN's comparative advantage in integrating peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development efforts. The assertion that the UN system³ and UN peace operations need to be more coherent, and better coordinated and integrated in terms of structures, strategies, planning and implementation is therefore generally accepted.⁴ However, the implications of these demands on the system remain unresolved. What seems clear however is the fear that UN peace operations will face both political and operational overstretch in the time ahead, if the demands continue to grow but the system continues to resist change.

It is important to underline at the outset that a degree of progress has been achieved in integrated UN system efforts and capacities, particularly at the field level. However, this has not been accompanied by the necessary reforms within, and in the interaction between, institutions and structures at headquarters level. Thus, a significant divide still exists between integration as a policy ideal⁵ and integration as a reality on the ground.

The policy ideal is that there should be an integrated response within, across and outside the system to complex (and sometimes competing)

demands and realities. At the same time, integration at operational level is vital to ensure that peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts are effective on the ground. To close the gap, it is necessary to strengthen strategic coordination,⁶ system-wide incentives and accountability, so that effective collaboration between the various entities is not only encouraged, but made possible. This has been described as a “wicked problem”, because the tasks covered by a multidimensional mandate are highly dynamic and constantly evolving.⁷ A wicked problem is one where any attempt to create a solution changes the understanding of the problem. Because the definition of the problem evolves as new solutions are considered and/or implemented, it cannot be solved in a traditional, linear fashion.⁸ Constant alertness and willingness to adapt strategies and tactics mid-stream will be necessary. No single solution will be sufficient. It requires a completely new and open-minded approach.

Shifting realities on the ground and the growing complexity and scale of peace operations mean that multidimensional peace operations are working with a “moving target”. The project found that in many instances, the barriers to effective reform are administrative rather than conceptual or political. Contradictory accounting, human resources and regulation systems make it difficult to move funds and personnel between UN agencies, to use a single auditing system or to establish common standards for financial and performance reporting. Unless administrative changes are introduced, the UN could find itself presiding over more failures of collective security in the future. The implementation of these reforms will require the political commitment and engagement of all actors within the UN system, as well as the wider international community.

However, it is not simply the complexity of the situation that makes integration difficult to achieve. The way in which the integration agenda has been implemented thus far is exacerbating the problem. The approach has been to regard the tasks of peacekeeping/peacebuilding as sequential and separable activities, rather than a dynamic whole. The sequential approach is problematic. The current debate on multidimensional and integrated peace operations needs to be set in the context of a wider set of reform efforts to increase multilateral coherence in responding to conflict and crisis situations. This debate also highlights the need for improved assessments, communication and

responses to developments at the local level that are informed by the political, economic and social realities of the host country in question.

Prescribing multidisciplinary solutions within a system made up of silo-type structures may not be beneficial. When integration is implemented in a piecemeal and half-hearted way, impaired by resistance to reform, bureaucratic inertia or overstretch, and a administrative, financial, political and operational barriers to achieving the political and operational goals, there is a risk that both the reform process itself and the underlying philosophy will be undermined.

The project found that the following factors are key for the implementation of a coherent and integrated approach to assisting countries affected by or emerging from war to build lasting peace:

- *conceptual factors*, including the understanding of key concepts (such as “integration”), and the wording of mandates;
- *contextual factors*, such as the geopolitical

climate, political and financial uncertainty and the UN reform agenda in general; and

- *organizational factors*, such as leadership, roles and responsibilities, programming and financial cycles, aims and objectives, professional ideologies, joint training and teambuilding, communication and resources, bureaucratic inertia, and undue enforcement of outdated policies and procedures.

1.1 Purpose and structure

The purpose of the report is to provide participants and stakeholders with a brief final synthesis of the overall findings from the project on multidimensional and integrated peace operations. It also gives an overview of independent research work that was undertaken during the project. The UN has instituted a series of reforms intended to engage “its different [post-conflict] capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner”.⁹ This report should be read in the broader context of these reform efforts, with particular focus on the coherence and integration reforms.

This report seeks to identify some key principles for more coherent and effective peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, and considers how the system is currently working against this goal. It raises questions about what an effective system should look like and what the key barriers and enablers to achieving this are, and presents some forward-looking thoughts and ideas. For a more detailed, thematic account, including specific recommendations, see the individual conference and seminar proceedings and the synthesis of findings, all of which can be downloaded from the project website: www.regjeringen.no/integratedmissions.

This report attempts to reflect, as faithfully as possible, a large number of intense discussions and exchanges, and is fabricated from many diverse and often conflicting views and perceptions. It is intended to present the policy side of the discussion, to give a glimpse of what is at stake, and to

relay the perceptions, experiences, and perspectives of some of the key stakeholders in complex multidimensional mandates in countries affected by or emerging from war.

2. Integrated Missions and the UN Reform Agenda

The current debate on UN system integration in multidimensional peacekeeping operations¹⁰ must be seen in the context of the UN system's general reforms, the international community's evolving engagement in peacebuilding, and changes in the global peacekeeping architecture.¹¹ As an increasing number of UN and non-UN actors have become involved in crisis and conflict management, the lines between conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, early recovery and peacebuilding and development activities have become increasingly blurred.

Peacebuilding is now commonly understood as a broad framework of interventions that address short-, medium- and long-term priorities for preventing further conflict, and addressing the consequences and root causes of conflict. The old concept of sequential transitions from war to peace, involving clearly demarcated phases of peacemaking, peacekeeping and long-term development, has given way to a newer, more complex model, where different interventions frequently take place simultaneously and interlink. This perspective enables a more accurate evaluation of the progress achieved to date, and of the challenges currently being confronted, both of which should guide policy development and future interventions.

According to the recently established Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), peacebuilding includes any activity that "is needed to help a country move from war to peace".¹² The recently adopted

UN Capstone Doctrine on peacekeeping states that modern peacekeeping is "action undertaken to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers",¹³ but it also acknowledges the role of missions in supporting longer-term peacebuilding processes.

The strategic aims¹⁴ of UN peace operations have changed as a result, both in design and purpose. According to the UN Security Council (UNSC), the UN peacekeeping agenda, "should be part of an overall strategy to consolidate and sustain peace".¹⁵ The evolving consensus on peacebuilding, the ongoing efforts to improve UN system coherence, and the lessons learned from previous peace operations all point towards a multidisciplinary approach. According to the *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine)*, "The United Nations has developed the concept of 'integrated missions' to maximize the overall impact of its support to countries emerging from conflict"¹⁶. The *Capstone Doctrine* goes on to state that "...Multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations generally lack the programme funding and technical expertise required to comprehensively implement effective peacebuilding programmes." Nonetheless, the peacekeeping arm of the UN is increasingly, and mandated by the Security Council, "to play a catalytic role" in implementing a number of critical peacebuilding activities.¹⁷ In the UN system as a whole, there is a thus a growing recognition of

the complex nexus between political, security and development interventions, and between the various roles of individual UN agencies involved in multidimensional peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, and of the fact that greater systemic reform and coherence is needed in order to address these challenges. There is also a growing recognition that in addressing these challenges, it requires revisions to implementing arrangements governing UN bodies as a whole, including current intergovernmental processes.

2.1 The call for change

The UN's peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts have developed over time, with a basis both in the long-standing UN reform process and in the broader international efforts to implement "comprehensive" and "joined-up" efforts.¹⁸ The UN Secretary-General (SG) has identified "the integration of all parts of the UN system in the planning and delivery of field operations" as the "essence – and the challenge – of complex peace operations".¹⁹ Here the SG is pointing to one of the paradoxes of integration: much of the progress toward policy coherence and inter-agency integration has occurred in spite of, not as a result of, the UN's policies and procedures.²⁰ However, it is important to stress that coordination and integration cannot be fully achieved without a common strategy and the necessary political, financial and administrative backing.

There are significant barriers to implementing a comprehensive approach to peacebuilding at the international level. As was stated in the 2006 Inventory of UN capacity in peacebuilding, "Some actors [still] associate peacebuilding with 'security' and therefore differentiate it from 'development' activities. Others regard peacebuilding as a 'transitional' set of activities and distinguish it from the 'security' field. Crisis response (combining natural disaster and conflict-related situations), humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping,

and development remain the dominant conceptual frameworks and funding channels, in large part as a result of existing organizational mandates and interests. This lack of a common understanding on the meaning of peacebuilding has operational consequences, as donors and UN entities hold differing views as to how it should be approached and funded. In the absence of a well-articulated paradigm, the tendency [...] is also to adopt a supply view of what is needed, thereby overlooking critical areas for effective peacebuilding which to date may be weakly conceptualized or ignored by the international community."²¹

In other words, the planning and funding of political, security, development and humanitarian efforts need to be harmonized. This will require broad political will and engagement at the international level and a continued effort by individual Member States to pursue a "whole of government" approach to crisis and conflict interventions. It will also require the completion of two ongoing reform processes aimed at improving UN coherence, namely the implementation of the high-level report on system-wide coherence addressing development, humanitarian and environmental issues,²² and the continuous efforts (described in this report) to ensure a more coherent and integrated approach to UN operations in countries affected by or emerging from war. The very fact that these two processes were split in the first place demonstrates the fragmentation of the system. The greatest obstacles to both are the organizational frameworks, procedures and practices, including at the intergovernmental level, which are not sufficiently relevant or adapted to what is essentially a field-based organization.

2.2 Managing the UN peacebuilding architecture

The current system for forging the political and financial links necessary for effective and integrated peacebuilding efforts remains fragile at best and non-functional at worst. The current

system for financing multidimensional peace operations does not allow for adequate resourcing. While acknowledging the security focus of missions authorized by the UNSC, more efforts should be made to explore how other sources of funding could complement the resources provided by the UN General Assembly. This will entail a much closer dialogue between the UNSC, other multilateral organizations, in particular the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), and donors.

The role of the PBC should be considered in this context. A recent stock-taking exercise revealed a somewhat mixed picture its performance, showing that while the PBC and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) had made a great deal of progress over the last year, they have not contributed to renewed efforts to ensure effective coordination within the UN or with other partners in agreed strategies.²³ The PBC and PBSO have also failed to deliver “quick dividends” as envisioned, leading to calls for a review of the current peacebuilding architecture and raising the question of whether the creation of a new entity was simply the wrong answer to the right question. It was suggested that the peacebuilding competencies of the UN should be consolidated. This would involve merging the relevant units in the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), the UN Development Programme’s (UNDP)’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) and the PBSO, and establishing a dedicated peacebuilding section within the Secretariat, with clear terms of reference specifying the form of its collaboration with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Department of Field Support (DFS), the IFIs, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the DESA and other stakeholders.

It was assumed that the PBSO with its advantage of reporting directly to the SG and the PBC, would act an “internal clearing house” for good practices

and lessons learned on peacebuilding for the benefit of the system at large, which the various agencies, especially those charged with planning and programming, could tap into when needed. This function is still lacking. One suggestion that has been raised is the option of reviving the Security Council Peacekeeping Working Group, to act as an outreach for the PBC, and enable it to deal more effectively with issues relating to the integrated aspects of multidimensional peace operations and to engage on a frequent basis with the broader UN family to address issues that are important to successfully implement UNSC multidimensional mandates. This could also be a good way of highlighting that peacebuilding is not a sequence of activities, but a comprehensive whole (albeit one that needs continuous support).

It is also critical that the SG takes on a stronger role in pushing forward current reform efforts and creating system-wide incentives to promote integration. In this connection, the SG’s authority and responsibility to hold the UN system, the IFIs, donors and Member States accountable when they fall short of their commitments and responsibilities should be strengthened. The SG should also make active use of the Chief Executives Board (CEB) structure to promote inter-agency collaboration and draw up directives for the heads of funds and programmes in the field, whether operating within a UN Country Team (UNCT)²⁴ or in connection with a multidimensional peace operation.

Funds, programmes and specialized agencies are not accountable to the UNSC, even though their active engagement is required to successfully implement UNSC mandates. There is therefore a need to develop a common understanding of what is at stake that is shared by the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), to which the majority of the various entities report, and their respective governing boards. Closer collaboration between the UNSC, the governing bodies of the relevant UN entities, and other

multilateral institutions and donors (including the World Bank) is also needed. This collaboration needs to be codified at both at the policy level (in the UNSC mandate) and in the strategy development and planning work at country level. The current aid architecture is highly fragmented. Funds tend to be ear-marked, and it is thus difficult to create a flexible structure. The situation is further complicated by the fact that Member States and donors do not speak with a single voice. Indeed they may even take contradictory positions at different venues.

Moreover, the integration taking place at field level has not been adequately acknowledged by

the political and administrative bodies in New York, Geneva and Rome. As a result, the various headquarters are sending contradictory directives to their representatives in the field, which are not sufficiently aligned with the developments within the country concerned. This prevents progress and the integration of lessons learned into the system as a whole. If directives are to be applied effectively, they must be more relevant to the flexible, country-driven approaches that are based on the realities on the ground. There is also a need for greater decentralization and delegation of authority to the field level. Needless to say, this will require strengthening the mission leadership on the ground (see section 8).

The following are some key points for action that need to be addressed in the near future by the UN and its Member States:

- The UNSC, the General Assembly and other intergovernmental bodies should be encouraged to further examine how political, security, development and humanitarian efforts can be better integrated, and recommend concrete and practical ways in which a more coherent approach can be adopted in international responses to specific situations.

- UN entities and their respective systems of governance (including the UNSC and the General Assembly) should examine the priorities for implementing reforms to improve the coherence and effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts, including the necessary structural and operational changes.
- Agencies, their respective governing bodies and the Chief Executive Board should be encouraged to be as flexible and supportive as possible in the management of field operations, seeking to reduce bureaucratic inertia and regulatory and procedural blockages.

3. UN Integration in Practice: Experience to Date

The call for a more integrated approach to conflict management first appeared on the UN reform agenda in connection with the 1997 Programme for Reform, and was reiterated in the Brahimi report released in 2000: “The impulse to integrate grew out of a conviction that the peacekeeping failures of the 1990s were at least partly attributable to various parts of the UN acting separately, and

occasionally at cross purposes; and in the wake of increasingly complex and multidimensional mission mandates the proclaimed need to integrated became every more pressing.”²⁵ The SG’s 1997 report aimed to redress this disparity, stating that the key factors “that are now most demanded by the UN external context in some respects are in shortest supply: strategic deployment of resources,

unity of purpose, coherence of efforts, agility and flexibility”.²⁶ The factors highlighted by the SG, are if anything more important than ever.

At the outset, reforms at mission level focused on increasing the authority and responsibility of the Special Representative of the SG (SRSG) and giving the Deputy Special Representatives to the SG (DSRSGs) a “multi-hatted” role as both Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator of the UN Country Team²⁷. Other early reforms, such as the establishment of Integrated Mission Task Forces, one of the key recommendations of the Brahimi Panel, focused on integrating planning at the headquarters level. Internal efforts were also launched in individual UN departments, agencies and programmes. In 2005, a first attempt to take stock of the progress made was the report commissioned in 2005 by the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) entitled *Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations*.²⁸ The report emphasized the absence of adequate definitions of “integration” and “coherence”, the different interpretations of these concepts across the UN system, and the implications. The report also asserted that “only that which needs to be integrated should be integrated”. The “form follows function” maxim was to guide future integration efforts, and was later enshrined in the *Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP)* guidelines endorsed by the SG in 2006, and in his *Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions (2005)*. It underlined that the concept of integration should not be overstretched or uniformly imposed.

3.1 Framing integration – an evolving concept

While there is broad agreement on the need for integrated approaches, the form and function of integrated missions continue to evolve. Despite the absence of an authoritative definition of “integration” and of “integrated missions”, a consensus is emerging on the usefulness of the working definitions²⁹ adopted by the UN system.

Integration generally refers to organizational and management processes that, if sufficiently targeted, supported and managed, lead to greater systemic, policy and systemic coherence and impact, while integrated missions are understood as complex peace operations, whose guiding principle is to link different organizations and their respective capacities into coherent support structures and strategies. The Capstone Doctrine offers the following definition of integrated missions: “An integrated mission is one in which there is a shared vision among all United Nations actors as to the strategic objectives of the United Nations presence at the country-level. This strategy should reflect a shared understanding of the operating environment and agreement on how to maximize the effectiveness, efficiency, and impact of the United Nations overall response.”³⁰

The integrated mission concept should not be seen as an end in itself but rather as a process for enhancing the performance, impact, effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of UN peace operations. Integration, if managed well, can enable coherent allocation of resources towards common strategic ends.³¹ The integrated mission concept – understood as a process – is intended to serve two principal purposes: i) to serve as a management tool that reduces waste (such as duplication and contradiction of efforts); and ii) to improve the quality (i.e. appropriateness and effectiveness) of the response.³²

3.1.1 Integration as a management tool

This twofold purpose is problematic owing to the current organizational structure of the UN system, which is diversified and fragmented. Reduction of waste calls for a clear delineation of responsibilities, strong leadership from the top, and well regulated and professional execution. It should be noted that hierarchical organizations are most efficient at delivering a defined set of services.³³ In relation to the organizational units currently

participating in UN peacebuilding efforts, the following changes need to be made:

- a UN-system-wide strategy needs to be drawn up for assisting the host country in its transition from war to peace, which takes proper account of the different, overlapping and simultaneous pathways that need to be followed;
- a robust leadership team with the appropriate authority and resources (political, financial, and administrative) needs to be established to implement this strategy in line with a set of agreed priorities;
- each organizational unit needs to be assigned (a) separate part(s) in the execution of the strategy according to its specific competency and role; and
- each organizational unit should be held accountable for implementing the strategy based on common benchmarks and assessment criteria.

This would necessitate a complete overhaul of the UN system. As it stands, the UN structure is highly fragmented. Its various entities, separate governance structures, administrative procedures and organizational cultures and practices often

make effective integrated efforts to manage modern conflicts very difficult. Another complicating factor is the highly fluid nature of peacebuilding, and the question of how to measure success.³⁴ The transition from war to peace is not a linear one, and a long-term strategy or blueprint will not remain relevant.

3.1.2 Integration to improve quality

The integrated missions concept, when properly implemented and supported in accordance with a set of agreed priorities, will enable the UN to sequentially and simultaneously adapt and link its conflict (and possibly crisis) management capacities into a coherent support strategy so that, despite the limitations alluded to above, the overall impact is greater than the sum of the impact of its disparate parts.

In sum, whereas efficiency calls for some form of hierarchy, effectiveness calls for vertical collaboration within and among the various organizations involved. Where and how to strike the balance remains an open question. The findings set out in this report suggest that a compromise should be sought in each situation that best addresses the most glaring common obstacles.

Lessons and best practices so far highlight the following:

- Decision-making authority should be pushed as far downwards as possible. In the case of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, this would entail delegating more responsibility, authority and accountability to the field level. This would enable organizational units to quickly adapt to changing circumstances without having to wait for orders from above (or being constrained by conflicting orders or a lack of orders);
- Systematic real-time evaluations of actions and programmes should be used as the basis for recommending adjustments; and each unit should be accountable for the impact it achieves.

3.2 Integration is not a magic cure

Enthusiasm for integration must also be tempered with caution, and an acknowledgement of the inherent trade-offs and limitations. This is particularly important at a time when the demand for UN peacekeepers is at a record high and overall capacity is strained. Integration must not be considered as an end in itself. Its benefits should be weighed against the coordination and capacity requirements, which can be onerous and may detract from the main purpose of the UN presence in a country. In other words, “coordination among actors and integrated institutional responses do not themselves comprise (or guarantee) coherence, but rather are tools to achieve it.”³⁵

The integrated mission concept in its current form is still constrained by systemic and institutional factors. Integration alone cannot ensure system-wide responsibility, authority or accountability. It is difficult for the UNSC to devise mandates for integrated missions that adequately reflect the challenges involved, and ensure the system-wide support and resources needed to implement them. Integration is not a magic cure for the continuing obstacles that prevent proper alignment between security and development concerns at both international and local level. Neither will integration reforms alone be able to promote better system-wide coherence in the current complex, uncertain and fast-changing environment where focus remains on execution rather than innovation, conformity is valued, mistakes are not tolerated, and system-wide accountability in terms of outcome is lacking. Neither can it compensate for the absence of viable political processes, commitment and will on the part of local, regional and international

actors (particularly in cases where there is no clear consent to a UN presence).³⁶ Moreover, the risk of operating in a “strategic hubris” should also be addressed, in order to ensure that the entities designated to perform tasks at the strategic level actually have the capacity to deliver.

However, integration can play an important part in identifying and harnessing the comparative advantages, functions and competencies of participating actors so that they are able to pull together towards common objectives. Integration should not be regarded simply as a bureaucratic exercise to align structures, but rather as a *process* to develop greater coherence in the use of resources and the achievement of deliverables. Thus, integration needs to be tailored to the requirements and realities of specific missions, and take into account common barriers and enablers that need to be addressed in a systematic fashion. The multilayered nature of the UN system makes it extremely difficult to gauge overall efficiency, and raises critical questions regarding who is responsible for improving efficiency and effectiveness. A clear finding from the project is that the vast range of reforms initiated over the last decade may have improved individual components of the system, but its overall architecture is still inherently fragmented and inefficient. However, it is not clear whether integration as an operational imperative will improve coherence and impact. Yet, there are clear indications that the integrated mission concept should be revisited, as early evidence shows that with proper management and political, financial and administrative support, integration does in fact improve the overall delivery rate of the UN.

To summarize:

- Integration in multidimensional peace operations should not be considered a magic cure for the endemic problems of the UN system and country-specific challenges, but rather as a strategic management tool to

achieve greater complementarity, effectiveness and efficiency in UN interventions. As such, it should form the basis of management and administrative reforms in the relevant UN departments, funds, programmes and specialized agencies.

3.3 Integration in practice

The promotion of an ideal end-state of full integration or full coherence has often obscured the necessity of taking a more realistic and practical approach involving varying degrees or levels of coherence or integration. The attempt to implement integration reforms in an environment that is not favourable for undertaking radical changes has proven to undermine the reforms themselves and the agenda behind them.

Fortunately, there is early evidence of a more practical and realistic approach to integration. The experience in a number of countries reveals that integration can and has been achieved through the application of various structural modalities and management styles that have provided us with a number of best practices. The most important lesson is the importance of adopting a flexible approach to integration that is founded on: i) a realistic appraisal of the specific context and needs; ii) an understanding of the existing constraints, opportunities and capacities (political, systematic and operational); and iii) a common vision of the desired impact.

3.4 No one model

Experience from the field has shown that integration must promote coherence at different levels and in varying degrees, ranging from loose networking and coordination to close partnerships and full integration of efforts and capacities, according to the circumstances of the mission in

question. Integration as it is applied today can best be described as a mix between collaboration and partnering arrangements, including, in certain cases, the establishment of common financial and administrative arrangements, and reinforcement of integrated mission decision-making and management mechanisms.³⁷ Current practice differs significantly from “ideal integration architecture”, and reflects the need to adapt to a mix of systemic and political barriers, as well as the general tendency of the system towards fragmentation. A flexible approach to integration should be characterized by a gradual adaptation to the situation on the ground, fully recognizing that there is no one-size-fits-all solution.

While crisis management and post-conflict interventions require a multi-pronged approach, the organizational model itself and the way this is implemented should be guided by the intended impact and what is realistically achievable. As Alan Doss points out in a recent article, “Just as conflicts are never identical in their origin, evolution or duration, the institutional responses to them can never be exactly replicated.”³⁸ Thus, the nature and degree of integration required for specific situations cannot be prescribed, but must be determined on the basis of country-specific realities and needs, and any requirements necessary for effective engagement with partners. UN structures should also be adapted to various requirements during the different phases of a peace process, the evolving needs and capacities of the host country and the role being played by the international community.

Even if it cannot provide the perfect model of integration, the growing repository of lessons learned and best practices should provide useful guidance on how to better tailor UN responses and enhance overall performance.

3.5 Degrees of integration

In current multidimensional missions, integration is being implemented at three levels of organizational response,³⁹ and to different degrees within each of these, depending on the requirements for achieving common outcomes and objectives in a coherent and effective manner. At the strategic level, the principal focus of integration is on the development of a common UN system strategy and set of objectives, underpinned by a shared assessment of the situation and priorities. At the operational and programmatic level, integration is focused on identifying ways to improve the coordination of UN programmes and operations, rationalize the use of institutional capacities, resources and funds, and facilitate monitoring and evaluation. Finally, at the organizational and administrative level, integration manifests itself as

joint decision-making and overseeing procedures (for example with regard to policy, operations and funding), the provision of core functions and services to the UN system as a whole, and the establishment, where necessary, of integrated organizational structures.

In order to determine the appropriate degree of integration in countries affected by or emerging from conflict, it is important, as mentioned previously, for all the actors involved to gain an in-depth understanding of the context. All conflict-sensitive approaches⁴⁰ or programmes, whether framed as peacemaking, peacekeeping or peacebuilding interventions, depend on the identification of the full range of political and socio-economic factors, and the appropriate strategies for managing them. It is important to remember that durable peace is built in incremental steps; it is not a “finished product” that becomes available with the signing of a peace agreement. The integrated mission concept can unlock resources that can provide vital continuity once the initial political and media “spotlight” fades, and can thus address the *long-term* structural and conflict-generated issues and needs.

To summarize, the degree to which integration should be applied ought to be governed by this principle:

- The nature and degree of integration required for a mission should be determined by country-specific realities and needs (rather than a bureaucratic framework), desired outcomes and impact, and the requirements for effective engagement with partners and ability to adapt.

3.6 The integrated mission planning process

The broad acknowledgement that the unique characteristics of peace operations must be addressed at the outset of the planning phase was reflected in the formal endorsement of the revised Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) guidelines by the SG in 2006. The IMPP is intended as “an inclusive framework” to facilitate the planning of

multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping; help the United Nations system arrive at a common understanding of its strategic objectives in a particular country by engaging all relevant parts of the United Nations system; ensure that the right people are at the planning table; that the right issues are being discussed, and that the appropriate

authorities; and accountabilities are in place to motivate integrated thinking and planning.⁴¹

It is often assumed that a coherent strategy exists or will be developed during an integrated planning process. However, there do not seem to be grounds for this.⁴² Indeed, the detailed operationalisation of attempts to integrate at the strategic level may bring to the fore the strategy’s inherent divisiveness. This has been seen in some mission planning processes where any illusion of a shared outlook and plan was quickly shattered as the Integrated Mission Task Force grew larger, not in authority or ability to act, but in sheer numbers.

The IMPP has since been further expanded to include a series of operational guidance notes reflecting the lessons learned in the planning and development of current integrated missions, including the flexible approach to integration explained above.⁴³ This is an encouraging development, and it should be followed up with new policy guidelines on integration within the UN system, which should be implemented in all current and new integrated missions

A key lesson learned has been the need for flexibility in defining appropriate organizational structures and operational strategies. The size and complexity of UN interventions, together with the need to respond rapidly, necessitates a degree of standardization in the planning and deployment of operations. However this standardization should allow for appropriate and realistic calibration to the specific needs on the ground, and the application of rigid organizational templates should be avoided at all costs.

Greater flexibility in the design of integrated missions requires periodic monitoring and assessment of performance, timely response to contingencies and emergencies, and periodic revision of priorities, strategies and operational plans as necessary. The responsibility for ensuring that a mission

remains appropriately configured so that it is able to attain the overall strategic objectives should lie with both the UN senior management and the UNSC, as mandates may need to be adjusted.

Another lesson learned is the importance of early devolution of decision-making authority regarding planning to country level. This should ensure that planning is realistic and attuned to local requirements. While the involvement of headquarters in planning, particularly at the early stages, remains critical, a degree of delegation of authority to country level and the early deployment of key staff will ensure a far more grounded approach.

Finally, experience has shown how important it is to ensure seamless transitions and overall sustainability of UN efforts in the long-term. While the development of mission exit strategies is clearly important in terms of the objectives and expected outcomes of UN operations, and in terms of measuring performance, the exit should be designed to ensure a seamless transition from emergency, crisis-oriented deployments to support for the peace agreement, long-term development and security-assistance programmes for weak states.

The existing challenges to effective integrated planning of peace operations – notably the UN’s inadequate planning capacities at headquarters and country level and the short planning time frames imposed by the UN General Assembly budgetary cycle – require urgent attention if the revised IMPP guidelines are to be effectively implemented. More focus must be given to streamlining the various planning and assessment processes undertaken by different parts of the UN system, the broader donor community and the IFIs. At present, the IMPP is regarded as an internal UN process, rather than being used for broader coordination with other international actors. The involvement of other actors (at this stage) would enable the UN to more accurately define its role in relation to the broader international effort, and

would enable more effective coordination and collaboration with other actors.

Moreover, while the IMPP is designed to facilitate a more integrated UN approach to peacekeeping and peacebuilding, it cannot replace other UN planning processes such as the humanitarian Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) and the development Transition Plans. The entry point for the IMPP should therefore be determined with cross-reference to existing planning processes under the Inter-Agency CAP, the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), the World Bank's Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and transitional programming and funding (such as transitional CAPs and the World Bank's Post-Conflict Fund and Transitional Support Strategy (PCNA/TRF)). Most of these have already been adapted to support immediate "peace dividends" (such as the short-term employment generation, restoration of basic services, and various other

quick impact projects). Duplication of these short-term deliveries is unnecessary, but more efforts should be invested in ensuring that they are better aligned to bilateral whole-of-government planning processes, so that the international community can avoid operating at cross purposes.

Addressing these challenges requires a broader engagement from the various parts of the UN system, the IFIs, the donor community (including OECD/DAC) and the Chief Executives Board (CEB), currently the only "mechanism" in the UN with the mandate and responsibility to foster real inter-agency coordination. Traditionally the CEB has not focused on issues relating to security, but as the peacekeeping machinery has been challenged to look beyond narrow security objectives, so should the CEB (chaired by the UNSG) and its governing partners expand their view of what counts as sustainable development.

In order to achieve the above, it is important that:

- In implementing the IMPP, efforts should be made to achieve the right balance between addressing the need for a standardized approach and taking local factors into account. The planning phase of integrated missions should be given adequate time and resources so that realistic assessments can be made and capacities can be tailored to the specific situation.
- The decision to initiate an IMPP for new missions should be accompanied by a commitment to establish an early field presence to allow for context-based assessments and planning, and an accurate assessment of the operational and organizational resources that already exist or could be rapidly deployed to ensure the sustainability of the UN's engagement.

- The planning of integrated peace operations should not be considered solely as an internal exercise, but should include other international and regional actors (with links to their respective planning processes) as appropriate. This is critical for defining the appropriate role for the UN in relation to other efforts. The current IMPP guidelines should be revised with a view to clarifying procedures for ensuring proper coordination with, and input from, external actors (both governmental and non-governmental).
- The IMPP should also be applied in all peacebuilding and political missions, which will require a re-configuration of the current working methods of DPA.
- Flexibility in the planning, design and implementation of integrated missions is essential in order to be able to adapt and respond to changing circumstances in volatile

situations, and achieve objectives in a sustainable manner. In this regard, the UN system should consider developing integrated monitoring and evaluation systems that can be used to improve deliveries, and the UNSC and General Assembly should consider how the necessary capacity within a mission can be established or strengthened.

- DPKO and DFS, together with DPA, PBSO, ECHA, the UN Development Group (UNDG) and the World Bank, supported by the CEB, and driven by the UNSG, should develop specific procedures for ensuring proper alignment and links between the various UN planning processes, and with other partners that are instrumental to IMPP implementation in a multidimensional and integrated peace operation. The planning guidelines and doctrine should be revised, adapted and implemented accordingly.
- The current budget cycles for peace operations have proven inadequate for the

comprehensive, integrated planning of interventions and operations that necessitate in-depth collaboration with the UN and other partners, or which require longer and more comprehensive processes of assessment and programme development. The relevant bodies of the General Assembly should initiate dialogue with the UNSC and the UN Secretariat to consider options for addressing these challenges, including the possibility of a "two-stage" budgetary process for peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions.

- Priority should be given to ensuring seamless transitions between different stages of UN engagement and the overall sustainability of UN efforts for the entire duration of a mission and in connection with the development of exit strategies. Guidance on this issue should be included in the IMPP.

3.7 Administrative constraints to integration

A major obstacle to enhancing coherence in integrated UN missions is the current administrative, procedural and legal constraints that effectively limit interoperability and integration at both administrative and operational level. Limited success has been achieved in establishing "integrated" units, which involves the secondment of agency staff to missions, the development of system-wide integrated security, decision-making and management arrangements. But integration in other areas – notably establishing common logistics services and sharing resources and services in more general terms – has been constrained by major differences between administrative systems, legal restrictions, and restrictions on the use of mission funds to support activities implemented by non-mission entities. Other barriers to interoperability

are: cumbersome and different human resources systems, procurement and budgetary policies, and IT systems, and insufficient or poorly directed information flows.

Overcoming these constraints will necessitate administrative and legal changes within the relevant UN entities, as well as the harmonization of procedures and standards. In the short and medium term, greater efforts should be made by the UN to identify areas of harmonization that do not require structural change, building on experiences to date, while the General Assembly's Administrative and Budgetary Committee (as well as the Fifth Committee itself) should examine how UN entities directly involved in the implementation of mandates could obtain access to the necessary mission support services. This will require a shift

in the Fifth Committee's view of how mission resources should be administered. At present, agencies are often asked to pay for the use of resources, even when the usage is directly linked to the implementation of a UNSC mandate. It is therefore

important to institute a new practice whereby agencies pay only for resources that are to be used for objectives that are beyond the integrated mission mandate.

The main points for action are:

- Reform of administrative, budgetary, and procedural practices within and between each UN agency is essential for the implementation and overall effectiveness of integrated peace operations and will act as an incentive for greater inter-agency mobility and understanding. Greater efforts should thus be made by relevant UN entities to identify areas where procedures and systems can or should be harmonized and/or standardized, including in the areas of staffing, information technology, decision-making procedures, reporting lines, accountability, and the provision of logistics and other support services.
- In the light of the fact that a number of UN entities are increasingly assuming important operational roles in the implementation of UNSC-authorized mandates, but do

not have the organizational set-up or funding sources required to effectively and efficiently achieve objectives, the General Assembly should consider how mission support services funded via the assessed budget could be made available for the purpose of implementing UNSC mandates.

- It is advisable to revise current financial procedures with a view to a) ensuring that all missions include integrated administration management and finance teams to oversee the allocation and management of resources (assessed and voluntary) for purposes directly linked to the implementation of multidimensional mandates and b) establishing self-evaluation systems for missions to monitor the use of funds in relation to the comprehensive mission strategy and implementation plan, and thus increase accountability across organizations.

4. Policy and Doctrinal Coherence on Integrated Missions

To date, progress in achieving greater coherence through an integrated approach at country level has largely been attained despite the absence of clear and authoritative policy guidance from headquarters, and has rather been due to the initiative and goodwill of senior managers at country level. The current lack of a formal policy and doctrinal framework on integration at headquarters level threatens both the effectiveness and long-term sustainability of the integrated approach, and ultimately

the ability of the international community to help particular countries.

Ensuring an integrated UN system-wide approach to the planning and implementation of multidimensional peace operations requires improved policy coherence at four different levels. Firstly, an evaluation is needed of the current inter-governmental structures at international and regional level, and of how policies should be adapted to support strategic and operational integration of

efforts in the field. Secondly, the internal UN policy on improving system-wide efficiency and effectiveness in peace operations needs to be further developed, and the factors necessary to implement the policy need to be identified. Thirdly, system-wide planning mechanisms need to be institutionalized to better respond and adapt to specific situations. Fourthly, collective accountability, and a procedure to ensure that this is established and maintained, is essential.

It should be noted that developing a clear consensus on policy in each of these areas is a prerequisite, and must be achieved before even considering the additional challenges of translating policy into operational reality.

4.1 UN policy coherence on integration

There is an emerging consensus that efforts in the UN to promote effective policy decision-making and integrated planning, management and implementation of UN peace operations often fail due to a lack of guiding policies with a unified purpose, a lack of systemic incentives and collective accountability, and an excessive focus on coherence and integration as a structural framework rather than as a strategic tool to optimize impact. The UN's acceptance of integration as a desirable has not led to a formal system-wide agreement on needs to be achieved and how, and neither has it led to a coherent plan of action and benchmarks that are sufficiently backed up by political will and resources to ensure successful implementation.

Despite the SG's *Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions* and the *2006 IMPP Policy Guidelines*, the UN still does not have an authoritative policy and doctrine to guide the system's approach to implementing integration in peacekeeping. While the IMPP has been partially tested and applied in selected missions (usually at country level), significant progress in the general implementation of the IMPP in new missions has not been achieved.

The current lack of policy coherence and system-wide engagement with regard to integration stems from a number of obstacles and inconsistencies. These include an institutional environment that tends towards: fragmented, mandate-based and interest-driven policy-making; the diffusion of accountability in relation to policy decisions due to "stove-piped" governance arrangements (whereby each UN entity has its own governing bodies and reporting lines); shifting political commitments due to different inter-governmental and donor interests and alignments; a tendency to layer political considerations and trade-offs until overload or overstretch occurs; and the lack of institutional capacity and expertise at both headquarters and field level to drive complex processes of inter-agency policy development.

In addition there are at times conflicting or incompatible policy goals between different organizations, resulting in a need for substantial bargaining and the imposition of authority from the top UN management, including the intergovernmental bodies, in order to make the various entities of the system perform and be held accountable for their tasks.

Improving coherence at this level of policy-making is a complex undertaking given the current institutional set-up of the UN. However, promoting effective leadership and management, fostering institutional incentives and accountability, and developing a more formalized way of addressing these policy issues, could prove an effective way of avoiding the trap of developing additional organizational templates and structures, while at the same time ensuring that lessons learned and best practices are applied in a manner sensitive to the desired impact and conditions on the ground. It should be noted that the UN already has mechanisms that are geared towards better coordination of efforts. But, for reasons ranging from bureaucratic inertia to lack of incentives and political and organizational will, all these mechanisms have

been unable to provide a coherent, overarching strategy, either in the field or at headquarters. Some UN system partners systematically reflect on their

experience from their conflict-related activities in order to identify good practices, whereas others review their work only in an ad-hoc fashion.

It is therefore worth highlighting two significant areas where initiative is needed:

- The development of authoritative and commonly agreed UN policies and doctrine on integration is vital, as is the development of system-wide decision-making on policy issues in this area. Despite the various guidelines endorsed by the SG on integrated missions and the IMPP, further formal codification and endorsement of these documents is still required by relevant UN entities. The

SG should initiate a process for developing a formal policy and doctrinal framework on integration that is binding for relevant entities within the UN system.

- To overcome the fragmented and incomplete institutional memory of the UN, it is advisable to establish a comprehensive repository, under the guidance of the SG and the PBC, for the knowledge, best practices and lessons learned on pertinent issues relating to the implementation of system-wide coherence and multidimensional and integrated peace operations.

4.2 Strategic coherence in responding to country situations

The ability of the UN system to respond to specific crisis and post-conflict situations is currently hampered by the lack of system-wide policy and decision-making processes and the current stove-piping of political, security, development and humanitarian responses. While a certain degree of information-sharing and discussion does take place at headquarters level (notably through the Executive Committee for Peace and Security and the Framework Team, and within the UNDG and ECHA frameworks), agency-specific and sector-wide processes and responses remain of prime importance. These include the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) and Transitional Planning (TP) processes for the development agencies, and the Common Action Plan/IASC/cluster system for the humanitarian agencies.

The responsibilities and importance of each institutional process are not brought into doubt, but the lack of system-wide priorities, alignment and strategy development at policy level in the initial

stages of the UN system's response undermines the coherence and overall effectiveness of the UN engagement in a given country. The recently developed UN "strategic assessment" for Somalia – a system-wide assessment and strategy for UN engagement – should be examined as a possible mechanism for engendering greater UN-system coherence in policy and strategy development in specific field situations. Coherence and integration at country level is more often achieved in spite of, not as a result of, guidance by headquarters. There was a strong consensus throughout the series of seminars and conferences that integration in the field needs be supported by a truly integrated structure at strategic level and appropriately adapted reporting arrangements if it is to be effective.

However, a number of developments within the UN system provide grounds for hope. The increasingly pro-active role of the SG's Policy Committee, a platform for senior-level discussion and decision-making on country-specific policies, is leading to a more strategic orientation of UN efforts. Another innovation is the undertaking of

"strategic assessments" prior to UN engagement, which focus on the development of a shared system-wide analysis of the given situation and the priorities for UN support, as well as on policy recommendations for system-wide UN engagement (which could include, but are not limited to, options for a multidimensional or integrated peacekeeping operation). While the use strategic assessments is still under discussion, the initial application in Somalia⁴⁴ illustrates their potential as a platform for improving the coherence of policy decision-making and priority-setting, improving UNSC deliberations, and developing a comprehensive strategy for UN engagement and intervention in post-conflict situations.

At country level, the experience of recent years underscores the important role of the SRSG, along with the DSRSG/RC/HC, in facilitating and ensuring a more integrated and coordinated approach within the UN system to country policies, strategy development and operations. The *Capstone Doctrine* goes as far as defining an integrated mission as a strategic partnership between a multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation and the UNCT, under the leadership of the SRSG and the DSRSG/RC/HC", and underlines the critical roles played by the mission management team in the implementation of a multidimensional mandate. Thus, there is an urgent need to strengthen the role and

To summarize:

- The UN needs to overcome its currently stove-piped response to country situations. The role of the SG's Policy Committee in

authority of the SRSG, and find ways of complementing integrated decision-making at headquarters level. More reflection is also needed on the role of the DSRSG/RC/HC and how to extend her/his "reach" in countries where UN agencies and NGOs operate more frequently.⁴⁵

Finally, increasing recognition of the need for a more comprehensive peacebuilding approach, supported by the lessons learned from peacekeeping operations since the 1990s, underlines the importance of broader coordination and dialogue with all relevant UN bodies and international actors, including the IFIs, donors and key regional actors and institutions, to ensure the overall coherence of the international community's engagement.

It is also important that the pace of reform corresponds to the absorptive capacity of societies emerging from conflict. There is a need for flexibility to deal with fluid situations on the ground, responsiveness to absorb unpredictability, and better risk management strategies to respond to the volatility (including inevitable reversals) that is inevitable in countries affected by or emerging from conflict. It is also critical to establish an integrated security system, which requires closer collaboration between DPKO and the Department of Security and Safety in order to ensure better support security policies at the field level.

strategy and policy development on UN response priorities should be strengthened by increasing the authority of its decisions within the UN system.

4.3 Strategic coherence at the inter-governmental level

The debate on integrated peace operations extends far beyond changes within the UN system;

it also touches on the way in which UN Member States and related institutions work together to develop and implement policy. Within the UN system, the UNSC is responsible for policy

decisions affecting the engagement of the international community in post-conflict situations, and for mandating the establishment of UN multidimensional and integrated peacekeeping operations. UNSC members should be encouraged to consult widely with other UN and non-UN bodies in the development of mandates, to ensure that objectives are realistic, founded on solid analysis, and in line with the overarching international consensus on priorities for achieving and sustaining lasting peace. The peacekeeping working group should be revived so that it can take a lead alongside the PBC in dialogue with other parts of the UN intergovernmental system and with other partners to ensure the successful implementation of increasingly complex UNSC mandates.

4.4 UN multidimensional mandates

UNSC mandates define the core functions and responsibilities of a mission, and should be evaluated and adapted throughout the life-span of the mission, to ensure that available resources are at all times optimally geared towards achieving the conditions for sustainable peace. It should be born in mind that these mandates are primarily political documents that are the product of negotiations between Member States, and often prepared under extreme time pressure and close public scrutiny.

They therefore tend to be heavily influenced by the interests of Member States and the current

geopolitical climate, and may not fully take into account country-specific requirements for peace. UNSC mandates are also limited in their scope, and do not sufficiently address the range of actors and efforts involved or required for effective consolidation of peace. A UNSC mandate is not the only benchmark of peace.

Broad coordination is needed at inter-governmental policy-making level between a wide range of international actors and stakeholders, including the donor community. Closer dialogue is also needed between the UNSC and other actors, for example in the development field, which is critical for ensuring sustainable results. The PBC, with its dual reporting lines to the UNSC and General Assembly, could achieve the necessary policy coordination and coherence. This would mean that, while UNSC mandates would still focus on the political and security aspects, they would be framed by a broader overarching intergovernmental consensus on priorities for achieving and sustaining peace, and the various roles of the UN and other international actors in these efforts.

Enhanced coordination at the policy level could usefully inform the development of UNSC mandates for multidimensional operations, allowing in particular for clearer delineation of roles, comparative advantages, and areas of strategic and operational collaboration.

5. Addressing Development and Humanitarian Dilemmas in UN Integrated Peace Operations and Peacebuilding Efforts

The need for a comprehensive and multi-faceted approach to setting peacebuilding priorities in post-conflict situations underlines the importance of integrating the previously separate areas of political, security, development and humanitarian response on the part of the UN.

Traditionally, the UN's development efforts have focussed on addressing long-term factors that are vital for sustainable growth and development. Since the late 1990s, development agencies have increasingly applied a "conflict lens" in their programmes, in recognition of the important part development can play in preventing and addressing the root causes and consequences of conflict. As a result, some development agencies now play a key role in post-conflict interventions, through strengthening national institutions, promoting security sector reform and the rule of law, reintegrating ex-combatants, and supporting economic recovery and reconstruction. However, there are a number of barriers to integrating these efforts within multidimensional peace operations. These include the unwieldy and fragmented system of voluntary funding for development activities, and differences in planning cycles, which often lead to a serious lack of synchronization between peacekeeping and development-oriented interventions. This can result in a failure to intervene during critical "windows of opportunity" (see section 6, below). Equally important, there are often significant differences in the organizational priorities and time-frames for peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The underlying fundamental lack of coherence among donors and governing boards, whose separate strategies drive and enable separate agency action, also forms a barrier to integration and coordination.

Reconciling the short-term political and security imperatives of a peace operation with the long-term and development-oriented objectives of development agencies requires a common understanding, continued focus on the UN's role throughout the entirety of a peacebuilding process, a far more careful evaluation of the role and comparative advantages of each entity involved, and the sequencing of their respective interventions. Peace operations also need to place more strategic and operational importance on national ownership and capacity development. Conversely, development agencies need to focus more on addressing specific short-term priorities and requirements, and scaling up the necessary capacities in a timely manner.

5.1 The security-recovery-development nexus

Experience from the field demonstrates a need to demystify the "early recovery" concept, which in practice encompasses a specific set of recovery and reconstruction interventions that are implemented shortly after the end of conflict, alongside political, security and humanitarian actions, in order to create conditions for longer-term measures. Early recovery efforts in countries emerging from conflict may include interventions that relate to aspects of a UN multidimensional peace operation mandate (for example security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, transitional governance, rule of law, human rights, etc.), as well as "traditional" recovery interventions in areas such as infrastructure reconstruction, rapid employment generation, and the provision of basic services. Recent experience has also demonstrated the importance of the economic and community-based dimension of early recovery for peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts, including the provision

of emergency livelihoods and income generation, resettlement of the displaced and war-affected, the restoration of essential services, and the rebuilding of community capacities to manage social and economic issues. These activities play a critical role in a multidimensional and integrated peace operation, insofar as they address socioeconomic conflict factors (such as massive unemployment or the socio-economic dislocation of war-affected populations) and provide tangible peace dividends.

Operationalising integrated missions that incorporate a focus on post-conflict recovery will necessitate much closer collaboration between the UNSC, the governing bodies of the relevant UN entities, and other multilateral institutions and donors engaged in this area (including the World Bank), in order to avoid the present serious lack of coordination in the timing of peacekeeping and recovery interventions. Moreover, the UNSC needs to recognize the critical

importance of post-conflict recovery interventions (with recovery defined broadly to encompass the range of sectors relevant to peacebuilding, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), governance, rule of law, and economic and social recovery). These interventions are vital if peace agreements and other political settlements are to be sustainable, and they complement short-term political, security and humanitarian interventions designed to help to stabilize countries and avoid relapse into conflict in the short-term.

Severe delays have arisen in programme implementation due to overlapping responsibilities and divergent rules, regulations and procedures. In some cases, this has resulted in an inability to respond to narrow windows of opportunity for consolidating security and peace dividends in highly volatile environments.

To summarize, the important points for action regarding the security-recovery-development nexus are:

- The importance and role of certain post-conflict recovery interventions in peacebuilding should be discussed in the UNSC in general thematic and expert-level meetings, and should be addressed in country-specific terms in order to gain a better understanding of how these interventions can best be supported in the field and how they relate to UNSC mandated operations. In both cases, the PBC and the PBSO should be sufficiently empowered to provide support.
- Planning and programming for recovery and reconstruction interventions in support of peacekeeping and stabilization efforts must be well-adapted, timely and relevant to the country situation. Priorities should be set on the basis of realistic funding opportunities, rather than on all-inclusive needs assessments.

- Funding gaps must be addressed, as too much funding is currently earmarked for specific purposes and/or administered in too bureaucratic a way.
- Greater efforts should be made to establish and formalize collaboration between UN bodies and other multilateral actors at UNSC level, as well as in the strategy and planning work at country level.
- The UN system as a whole needs to focus more attention on specific issues, including national ownership and capacity development, the commitment to address short-term requirements, and the scaling up of capacities to complement the activities of peace operations. Formal discussion of these issues should be encouraged at the level of the SG's Policy Committee and the Executive and Governing Boards of relevant UN entities.

5.2 Bridging conflicting paradigms: preserving humanitarian and human rights principles

Bridging security and humanitarian paradigms poses a different set of challenges. These are two very different areas of endeavour, yet clearly these two types of response are mutually dependent. The delivery of humanitarian assistance tends to be delayed by a lack of security, whereas the manipulation of humanitarian aid has been known to feed the cycle of conflict. It is therefore important that the development of an integrated UN strategy takes due consideration of humanitarian efforts, in order to ensure that decisions are informed by the reality on the ground and the local humanitarian needs.

The importance of safeguarding humanitarian principles in multidimensional peace operations is no longer a disputed principle. However, the question of how to strike the correct balance, strategically and operationally, between respect for this principle and the need for an integrated and coherent UN approach in post-conflict situations has not yet been answered. An important step in the right direction would be to clarify the implications of integration for humanitarian action, and gain a clearer view of the range of humanitarian needs and the link to the overall political and developmental situation.

The *Capstone Doctrine* states that: “the primary role of United Nations peacekeeping operations with regard to the provision of humanitarian assistance is to provide a secure and stable environment within which humanitarian actors may carry out their activities.”⁴⁶ The *Capstone Doctrine* further states that a key development in this regard is that: “In situations where there is little or no peace to keep, integration may create difficulties for humanitarian and development partners, particularly if they are perceived to be too closely linked to the political and security objectives of the peacekeeping mission.”⁴⁷ Identifying when there is “no peace to keep” is a complex question, for which

there is no clear roadmap. The point made in the ECHA report of 2005 still rings true, namely that integration should be planned from the outset, clarifying roles and responsibilities, constantly adapting to shifting realities, and that it should be carefully implemented with respect for humanitarian principles and imperatives, especially at the peak of a crisis. As stated in a recent article by Lakhdar Brahimi and Salman Ahmed an integrated UN strategy that includes due consideration of humanitarian efforts, assistance and principles should ensure that life-saving humanitarian assistance is “delivered on the basis of need and not as a reward for participation in the political process or punishment for lack thereof”,⁴⁸ This should continue to serve as the basis for decision-making at senior management level.

As such, there is a clear consensus among all stakeholders in this project that it is important to retain the function of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) in the integrated mission senior leadership structure in order to ensure that critical humanitarian tasks and dilemmas at the policy and strategic levels can be addressed. At the organizational and operational levels, however, it is now recognized that there is a need to maintain a certain distance from the UN operation when providing life-saving humanitarian assistance. This often leads to the decision to create a separate OCHA presence, that is physically located outside the mission, to oversee the humanitarian coordination pillar and advocacy role in the field. There is general acceptance that for humanitarian assistance to be effective, the entities concerned should be given the latitude to operate autonomously when required, within the framework of the integrated UN strategy, in order to avoid a gap between short-term humanitarian assistance and long-term recovery and development. In this respect, further clarification is needed of the position of a number of critical actors in the field who take on a political role that is not provided for by their formal statutes. This applies to humanitarian organizations as well as the World Bank.

5.2.1 Human rights and the protection of civilians

In other areas, such as human rights and the protection of civilians, considerable progress has been made in integrating human rights efforts and the protection of civilians in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Among the “noteworthy milestones in human rights mainstreaming efforts” highlighted by the High Commissioner for Human Rights is “the decision of the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee in 2005 to integrate human rights into peace operations according to an agreed set of principles”.⁴⁹ However, the human rights agenda, she stated, is still too often merely “crossed off and cut out”. Part of the problem is insufficient understanding of what human rights includes. But where the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) field offices are integrated into the mission structure at strategic, organizational and operational levels, this has led to considerable progress on human rights-related issues, both inside and outside the mission, and has ensured appropriate prioritization

of human rights concerns in the implementation of the mandate implementation, and the continuation of human rights efforts following the draw-down of a peace operation.

Most recent mission mandates incorporate a strong emphasis on civilian protection, and dedicate significant resources to this end, while at the same time strengthening the coordination and integration of efforts with other UN agencies. According to a senior UN official charged with overseeing integration in one of the UN’s most complex missions, “The issue of protection can exemplify the potential of UN reform if we get it right.”⁵⁰ At the same time, there is a need to strengthen the integration of development-oriented efforts in the area of security sector reform (SSR) and related issues to provide the foundations for a long-term capacity-building focus on the protection of civilians. Humanitarian assistance is a critical yet temporary measure, pending a lasting solution.

countries. While significant structural constraints exist in the form of fragmented funding and institutional and policy gaps between security and development interventions, a number of priorities can be identified for immediate action.

To begin with, the development of UNSC mandates could be improved to allow for a more in-depth analysis of needs and possible responses, and a more realistic appraisal of the role and constraints of a multidimensional operation. This could be linked to a broader dialogue and assessment of system capacities within the Secretariat, as well as with other UN bodies (including the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), the Committee of Programmes and Coordination (CPC), the CEB, the PBC, the IFIs and the governing boards of the relevant funds, programmes and specialized agencies). The dialogue should also include international actors and stakeholders (within the framework of the OECD/DAC guidelines on assistance to countries affected by or emerging from war) to ensure strategic coherence between UNSC mandated interventions and other activities aimed at medium and long-term peacebuilding and development priorities. A “deeper and broader” process for the development of UNSC mandates thus constitutes a critical first step towards ensuring that multidimensional missions are provided with achievable goals.

A realistic appraisal of the resources required is another priority. There are two distinct considerations in this respect.

The first is the need for a re-evaluation of the current process for developing peacekeeping budgets, which many consider to be inadequate for determining the resource requirements for missions. Major problems include the extremely short time-frames available to mission planners and the over-reliance on templates to determine staffing

requirements. These problems are particularly salient in the development of budgets for mission functions and activities that require comprehensive assessments and in-depth consultations, such as DDR, SSR and rule of law.

The second relates to situations where the budget available from the General Assembly is insufficient to cover the peacebuilding aspects of a mandate. Here, it is important to ensure early identification of the outstanding requirements and to initiate a dialogue with Member States and the donor community in order to secure the resources needed.

A major problem in current multidimensional missions is the need to secure reliable and up-front funding to address immediate challenges to peace which, in some cases, may involve activities that fall outside the scope of the General Assembly’s funding parameters, such as urgent, large-scale job creation, reintegration support for ex-combatants, and intensive capacity development of governance institutions. Such interventions are usually funded through voluntary contributions, and these funds are unlikely to be disbursed quickly. The lack of resources can prevent missions from seizing windows of opportunity for stabilizing the situation, and as a result security requirements and costs can increase. The establishment of rapid funding facilities such as the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) provide a partial, short-term solution to the problem, but are not a substitute for direct consideration of these issues, which could lead to policy changes in the General Assembly funding procedures and alterations to agency regulations for the implementation of UNSC-mandated activities. The same applies to a number of the existing trust funds that are aimed at providing “quick” funding for “quick” dividends, yet are unable to disburse funds in a timely way.

A broader issue is the need to align assessed funding with voluntary funding. In this connection, the

The main points in this connection are:

- The progress made so far in integrating humanitarian, human rights and civilian protection priorities within integrated missions should be consolidated and further promoted, together with continued efforts to appropriately balance political strategies with

short-term humanitarian needs that require a degree of autonomy in order to safeguard the humanitarian principles.

- The policy confusion concerning the political status and utility of humanitarian assistance and the practices leading to “aid-induced peacebuilding” needs to be clarified.

ensure proper alignment between mandates, programmes and resources. Discrepancies impair the ability of the UN to achieve results in a credible and timely manner, and undermine the role of the international community in supporting particular

6. Aligning Mandates and Resources

The expanding scope of multidimensional peacekeeping operations, together with the need for enhanced UN system-wide coherence in addressing complex peacekeeping and peacebuilding challenges, highlights more than ever the need to

UN needs to develop a comprehensive funding strategy that clearly identifies the resource requirements of the UN system as a whole for a given integrated mission, regardless of whether these would normally be funded by assessed funds or voluntary funds. Moreover, appropriate accountability, monitoring and reporting on the use of funds, irrespective of source, needs to be ensured. Commitment from the General Assembly and the broader donor community is needed to ensure that resources are provided in a timely and adequate manner, or at very least to ensure that broader funding for post-conflict recovery and reconstruction is aligned and harmonized with UNSC mandates.

This will mean that the governing structures of the various UN funds, programmes and specialized agencies, and the IFIs will have to identify new and better ways to adapt current programming and funding cycles to ensure a smooth transition from short-term activities covered by assessed budgets, and activities that require a long-term approach. The Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP)⁵¹ has been highlighted as an model that, if adapted to the needs of a multidimensional mandate, could provide a useful tool for securing cross-sectoral funding both from the outset of the mission and during critical transitional phases. A mission-specific common fund to support key functions of the mission from the outset could help to establish strategic plans – based on regional priorities – to better target resources, increase flexibility and improve the response-time for meeting urgent needs. This

The important points for action regarding funding issues are:

- The SG and the General Assembly should consider undertaking an evaluation of the budgeting process including an examination of budgeting categories and the budget timeframe.

would require Member States to take the commitments outlined in the good donorship and other initiatives seriously, and to manage bilateral funds in such a way that they support the overall goal of a coherent UN response on the ground (rather than focusing on projects that “look good” at home). This would also require an overhaul of current financing and budgeting structures in general, examining ways of channelling both assessed and voluntary funding into an operation-specific fund, with a more long-term perspective than the usual peacekeeping budget framework, geared towards long-term peacebuilding efforts.

There is a need for more realistic timeframes, mandates and funding to support countries affected by or emerging from war in areas such as SSR, capacity-building, reform of public income and expenditure management, infrastructure and employment, elections. However, it is important that funding for peace operations in the short to medium-term is not tied specifically to sectors and geographical areas, so that it can respond, under the guidance of the SRSRG, in a much more flexible way than the majority of existing mechanisms and bilateral donors. A compact or consolidated strategy, developed in collaboration with the national government and all other stakeholders, would be preferred as the long-term option. All planning and fundraising should take these considerations into account, and should be systematically revised as the situation improves and the country becomes ready for long-term investments guided by national priorities and needs.

- A review should also be undertaken of the aspects of current multidimensional peace operations that cannot be funded, either in whole or in part, through the Assessed Budget, and for which dialogue will be needed with the international donor community to secure the required resources. Such a review should be undertaken by the

General Assembly and relevant UN and international stakeholders, including the IFIs.

- While recognizing the security-oriented nature of missions authorized by the UNSC, an effort should be made to include longer-term goals pertinent to reconstruction and recovery and identify appropriate ways to ensure timely and comprehensive funding.
- The UNSC and General Assembly should undertake consultations with relevant members of the international donor community, the IFIs, and the administrators of rapid

emergency funding facilities (such as the PBF and the Central Emergency Response Fund) to identify (or establish) appropriate sources of funding for critical interventions, in situations where funding cannot be provided by assessed contributions.

- Once the UN adopts an explicit strategy of using international development and recovery assistance funds for achieving quick peace dividends, the full political apparatus should be employed in support of this strategy

7. UN Governance Structures and Collective Accountability

A major challenge to the integration of UN efforts in multidimensional peacekeeping operations is the “stove-piped” system of governance in the UN system (as explained above in section 4.1). This system is a barrier to achieving policy coherence on post-conflict response; it has serious implications for the ability of the SG to ensure proper alignment and coordination between the various components of the UN; and it prevents collective accountability for the achievement of shared objectives. Besides, although multidimensional operations are accountable to the UNSC, the latter does not have formal oversight or authority over the UN entities that are involved in, and indeed essential to, the implementation of mandates. While the long-term solution will entail evaluation and reform of governing arrangements within the UN system, efforts in the short- to medium-term should focus – at the intergovernmental level – on establishing closer coordination between the UNSC and the governing bodies of key UN entities, and on ensuring that these bodies are in a position to provide policy direction downwards to senior management.

At country level, the limited authority of the SRSRG has led to the establishment of innovative, albeit

cumbersome, arrangements designed to address current systemic constraints and ensure a degree of strategic and operational coherence. These include the “triple-hatting” of the DSRSG to include the functions of Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator, and the establishment of senior management teams consisting of the mission leadership and local heads of UN agencies, funds and programmes. These arrangements have improved coherence in policy-making at country level. It should be recognized, however, that administering this system entails additional costs. At headquarters level, attempts are being made to streamline decision-making between relevant UN entities. These include encouraging greater reliance on the SG’s Policy Committee for collective decision-making on policy and strategic issues, and the proposed establishment of robust planning capacities in the IMPP.

Additional measures designed to improve accountability in integrated missions are also being applied in different contexts. These include efforts to align the country-level authorization of individual agencies with mission plans or an integrated strategy. Efforts are also being made to improve alignment

in inter-agency planning, as exemplified by the humanitarian CAP and UNDAF/UN Transition Plans. While these developments are encouraging, further measures need to be implemented to ensure accountability in integrated missions (for example the use of centralized fund-management

The main points for action are:

- The current fragmented system of governance within the UN system needs to be addressed, primarily through greater involvement and accountability of UN governing bodies in UNSC deliberations and vice versa, in the development of mission mandates, as well as through the development of common strategies and the implementation of work plans across relevant UN entities to foster system-wide accountability from the outset.
- Further consideration should be given at senior levels in the UN to how appropriate incentives can be created within each agency to encourage integration and foster greater institutional accountability both at field and headquarters level.
- Close attention should be directed to examining procedures for increasing alignment

arrangements), to establish robust monitoring and evaluation systems, and reporting requirements, and to measure the performance of all UN system actors involved in the implementation of a given UNSC mandate.

between agencies, funding systems and integrated mission planning, as well as the development of common accountability systems.

- The UN system should seek to develop common performance evaluation standards in integrated missions in order to accurately assess the impact of the overall efforts of the UN system in any given country. The UNSC and the General Assembly should consider ways in which resources can be provided for the establishment of relevant system-wide monitoring and evaluation functions and capacities in this regard.
- A management system and culture that rewards organizational development policies that promote achievement over effort, and management information over data, should *be encouraged*.

8. Leadership and Management in Integrated Missions

Due to the need to operate with – and in some cases surmount – systemic constraints, and the high demands placed on senior managers in integrated missions, effective leadership and management is difficult. While individual leaders will undoubtedly continue to have a significant impact on integration, it is crucial to build a solid mission leadership *team*, not only to ensure sound management but also to build trust among the constituencies

with which the leadership team will engage. It is thus important to look beyond the issue of personalities, and focus on how to develop strong mission leadership teams that encompass the full set of desired leadership skills and competencies. These considerations should be taken more fully into account in mission recruitment, which should involve careful profiling during the selection process and be followed up by appropriate training.

Central decision-making responsibilities should be transferred from headquarters to the field. This would facilitate greater integration of the various actors, and enable them to focus on the collective impact. Providing the SRSRG with more political and financial leverage to ensure coordination and integration is also recommended, as well as gaining credibility vis-à-vis local and international partners is critical.

In the light of the multiple roles and wide range of functions performed by the DSRSG/RC/HC, the creation of a dedicated support team or office that reflects the tasks outlined in the mandate should be considered. According to Ross Mountain, who is currently serving as a multi-hatted DSRSG, “there is notionally a cost saving dimension of this quadruple-hatting (quintuple if one includes the security function) but, beyond the workload, this combination of roles can permit the development of synergies between different peacekeeping, humanitarian and recovery actors and can considerably improve the impact and effectiveness of our efforts to assist the people of the countries we serve.”⁵² The immense pressure posed by such a quadrupling or quintupling of tasks for one person in the position as the mission DSRSG/RC/RR clearly underlines the urgent need to improve planning and support capacities and structures for management in the field. This would also reduce the dependence on individual personalities for the successful functioning of a mission.

The establishment of a dedicated office to oversee all the various interlinked issues, and coordinate activities with the rest of the UN system would be a very positive step.

The increasingly complex relationship between the SRSRG, the multi-hatted DSRSG and the Director of Administration/Chief Administrative Officer (DOA/CAO) needs to be clarified. In theory the DOA/CAO reports to the SRSRG, but in practice, he/she reports directly to the recently

established Department of Field Support on general support and financial issues, and to the Department of Management on procurement issues. The relationship between the DOA/CAO and the UNCT, especially on issues regarding the use of mission assets to perform functions directly provided for in the SC mandate also needs to be clarified. The latter also requires the attention of the Fifth Committee.

There will be a need for constant forging of alliances and gathering of support for the large number of changes that will be necessary during the process. It is important that the senior leadership, supported by the respective headquarters structures, communicates a clear vision and strategy to the UN presence on the ground. It has been maintained that integration can be implemented by command (backed by authority), consensus (where leadership is a function of the capacity to orchestrate a coherent response and mobilize key actors with no direct assertion of authority), or default (in the absence of a formal entity, rudimentary exchange of information and division of labour among actors with under no direction leadership),⁵³ depending on the degree of integration and the authority provided for in the Security Council mandate, and backed by the General Assembly and the SG. Authority can be formal, financial, personal, or can relate to the organizational dimension (interagency cooperation).⁵⁴

In most cases, the SG and the SRSRG have to mix and match the different levels of authority as they go along. What is most important is that the SRSRG has all options open in order to successfully oversee the implementation of the UNSC mandate.

Moreover, it is important to emphasize that any form of integration may have financial and political costs that need to be taken into account in further developing the concept of integrated missions. It is also essential that the senior leadership of a UN operation, both in the field and at headquarters, shows

visible commitment, backed with financial and administrative authority, throughout the integration process (not just at the beginning). Greater involvement from the SG is required both to provide the mission leadership team with necessary institutional weight and to overcome institutional barriers to integration. The SG should reform, revamp and examine how to make better use of the CEB function, and continue to strengthen the role of his Policy Committee in creating a basis for stronger decision-making and accountability within the system on issues related to integrated missions. In cases where lack of cooperation impedes the SG or the UNSC, the SG needs to use his overall authority and vested responsibilities more explicitly than in the past to secure the necessary support from the UN system as a whole.

The main points for action on leadership are:

- The role of and the authority of the SRSG in facilitating the integration of country-level UN decision-making on policy and strategic issues needs to be strengthened and supported by all stakeholders.
- The selection procedures for senior mission leadership, particularly the SRSG, need to be reviewed and revised to take account of both the nature of integrated missions and the leadership skills required. It is also critical to shift from appointing senior leaders on a case-by-case basis to building strong mission leadership teams.
- The authority of the SRSG over the relevant UN-system actors in integrated missions should be enhanced through the creation of complimentary leadership teams and support functions, clear terms of reference agreed by all stakeholders (both UN and non-UN), greater delegation of authority from headquarters, greater influence over

It is important to equip the SRSG and his or her leadership team with the means to secure both short- and long-term peace dividends in countries emerging from conflict, to enable implementation of projects of high visibility and urgency at critical junctures of the mission life span, and to create incentives for integration. The possibility of establishing country-specific or mission-specific trust funds at the disposal of the SRSG, from which funds can be disbursed in a flexible and timely manner, should be further explored. Such funds could enable the SRSG to secure peace dividends and balance the formal, financial, personal and organizational dimensions of authority.

the use of the mission's assets, and sufficient political support from both the UNSC and the General Assembly.

- Stronger involvement of the SG than in the past is required to secure necessary support from the UN system as a whole, to support and guide the mission leadership team and overcome organizational and political barriers to integration.
- The role of the CEB should be developed to form a tool to provide support for and guide the implementation of the integrated mission concept.
- It is also important to further clarify the roles and responsibilities of the SRSG and the DOA/CAO, to ensure that the resources available to the mission are used in the interest of the system as a whole and on the basis of a commonly agreed plan. Discussions on this issue should be encouraged in the General Assembly, as well as in DPKO and DFS, as a decision on the use of mission assets to support the overall implementation of the mission mandates requires a change

in current practice.

- Where applicable, specific agencies could and should also be given the authority to act on behalf of the SRSG, within their agreed sector and cluster of competency, in connection with integration of UN system efforts aimed at long-term peacebuilding.
- The General Assembly should consider the establishment of an integrated office to

support the DSRSG/RC/HC in all integrated missions. Such an office should draw from the full range of UN system competencies and resources available at the country level (including the current joint analysis function), and seek to ensure proper integration and alignment of UN and other relevant capacities in support of the implementation of mandates.

8.1 Strengthening civilian capabilities

The UN recruitment processes needs to be improved and speeded up to ensure the timely deployment of qualified leadership teams and staff. The deficit of qualified and readily deployable civilian capabilities for highly complex multidimensional peace operations should be addressed more thoroughly. Recent efforts to establish a civilian

cadre, to be deployed at short notice to new areas of operations, failed due to disagreement among Member States of the exact purpose and costs of such a cadre. There has been a tendency for the recruitment of civilians to be a supply-driven exercise rather than based on merits and actual demand. There has to be a collective effort to appoint, train and retain good staff.

Important points in this connection are:

- The General Assembly and other UN governing bodies should address how to better streamline existing civilian deployment capabilities to fit the needs and requirements in the field. This will involve reform of recruitment processes, facilitation of inter-agency mobility, and harmonization of common services and business practices.
- The possibility of establishing a civilian cadre or roster of qualified staff should be revisited. This should draw on both national resources and existing cadres managed by the various entities of the UN system. Selection procedures and training systems should be adapted and aligned accordingly.

8.2 Integrated training systems

Likewise, it is vital to establish training systems that will properly prepare staff for taking part in multidimensional and integrated missions. There are efforts underway to revamp the current UN training programmes, but there is still work to be done with regard to aligning and harmonizing current training standards and systems. Generic

training programmes on integrated missions are necessary, as well specialized training to ensure that senior management, and other relevant staff have the necessary skills. In this respect, adapting and aligning current training programmes represents one of the most important factors for improving mission integration and system-wide coherence.

Important points for action are:

- Building and strengthening civilian capability needs to be backstopped by an integrated training system. This would promote the development of system-wide training standards and inter-agency collaboration and ensure that current and future mission staff have greater knowledge of the UN system.
- Common and/or aligned training systems should be provided for all personnel serving in the theatre of operations. These should be used as a baseline and a complement to existing and more specialized training systems for both pre-deployment and in-situ training on issues of common concern.

9. Partnerships

The UN-system efforts in a multidimensional peace operation must also be aligned with the efforts of other actors in order to ensure the overall effectiveness and coherence of the international community. Partnerships and coordination between the UN and other multilateral actors such as the IFIs, the EU and NATO, regional organizations, as well as with national stakeholders, are all essential in this regard. According to the *Capstone Doctrine*, “Successful integration and coordination requires a high degree of sensitivity to the interests and operating cultures of three broad sets of actors: mission components, UNCT members and external partners.”⁵⁵

Partnerships with multilateral and bilateral actors at the policy and strategic level are just beginning to mature. However, in some countries such as the DRC, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Haiti, partnerships between the UN, bilateral donors and IFIs such as the World Bank, are considerably enhancing strategic coherence, and facilitating far more effective and focused operational efforts to support transitions from war to peace. In other countries, cooperation on military and security issues with the EU and NATO has led to the development of innovative coordination (yet in most cases insufficient) arrangements. More systematic interaction

between the UN and these organizations and actors, particularly during the development of strategic and operational plans, should be encouraged and should build on the lessons learned to date.

On issues relating to inter-organizational integration, recent examples of collaboration between the UN, the EU, NATO and the AU attest to a growing convergence of efforts. But more can and should be done to improve the overall effectiveness of international engagement. Securing broader inter-governmental policy coherence in UN missions needs to be complemented by closer strategic coordination with the EU, NATO, and the AU, all of which are currently in the process of developing their own concepts for multidimensional peace operations.

At the national level, the UN – and the international community as a whole – is still seeking to strike an appropriate balance between the frequently conflicting imperatives of speed and national ownership, both of which have very different implications for partnerships with national actors. In fragile post-conflict situations, the UN often transfers its roles to the state or other actors in order to achieve short-term political and stabilization objectives. However, in order to achieve sustainable peace, the

UN needs to engage with and support national actors from the start of its intervention. The promotion of earlier and closer engagement with national actors – for example through the development of compacts – can help to clarify the UN’s role, and provide the foundation for successful strategic partnerships for peacebuilding. Compacts and similar frameworks are increasingly seen as potentially important instruments for supporting peacebuilding initiatives.⁵⁶ They seek to provide a framework for engagement with a post-conflict country on the basis of mutual accountability and joint commitment. The timing, scope, and the mechanism for effective monitoring and follow-up are critical, which again underlines the importance of avoiding a one size-fits-all approach.

Effective peacebuilding and integration calls for an overhaul of the management of the general ODA funds in countries affected by or emerging from war.

These countries will have fragile and disjointed structures that are unable to manage funds in accordance with ODA regulations. UN operations should therefore be given more authority to guide ODA donors, so as to ensure that bilateral aid-based initiatives support the overall objectives of the SC mandate and the goal to build sustainable peace.

It was also emphasized that all peace and mediation efforts need to be carefully managed to avoid a gap between what is expected from the peace agreement and what the UN is actually equipped to do. For this reason, mediators charged with assisting in the implementation of the peace agreement need to have thorough knowledge of the system, in order to avoid unnecessary disappointment due to unrealistic expectations. The current system is not sufficiently geared towards this, and the UN and its partners are still working too much in isolation from each other.

The main action points with regard to international, regional and national partnerships are:

- Ways to improve coordination and partnerships between the UN and other international and regional organizations in integrated missions should be examined, including procedures to improve overall interoperability between organizations. More systemic interaction between the UN and other actors, particularly during the development of strategic and operational plans, should be encouraged and should build on the experience and the lessons learned to date.
- The cooperation between integrated missions and national actors should seek to build effective partnerships on the basis of a real-time assessment of national capacities and requirements with a view to forging effective national ownership.
- System-wide, national and regional commitment needs to be fostered, and should be supported through the further development of common and consolidated strategies between the UN and national and regional actors to foster mutual accountability.
- Bilateral actors should provide expertise and support to UN-driven integrated planning processes to enhance capacity and the knowledge base and ensure coherence in the implementation of agreed strategies and plans.
- International actors should explore procedures for achieving integrated approaches across ministries and departments at inter-governmental and headquarters level as well as at country level.
- Member States should also be expected to speak with a coherent voice to all relevant stakeholders, including the UN and the IFIs, and any regional organizations they participate in.

10. Concluding Comments

Comprehensively addressing conflict and creating conditions for lasting peace requires both an understanding of the complexities of peacebuilding (including peacemaking), as well as *real structural change* in the institutions, policies and rules governing the planning and implementation of international post-conflict interventions. In the UN, reforms to bring about greater coherence, collaboration and integration of effort in multidimensional peace operations have promise. However, at present they are being implemented in a policy vacuum, and are beset by problems caused by a fragmented and unwieldy system. Working together is not simply a question of “signing up” to promising ideas, but requires leadership and commitment within the UN. It also requires Member States to be willing to re-evaluate governing arrangements and procedures for the funding of post-conflict interventions, both within the General Assembly and in the international donor community.

1. Planning should be based on an approach that is sensitive to the context, using a comprehensive knowledge of local dynamics.

It is essential that the UN leadership (including the Security Council) develops and agrees on a full and timely understanding of the dynamics of the country and conflict in question, including state and non-state actors, demographics, and the political, humanitarian, military, economic, legal, social and development aspects. Based on this understanding, a strategic response should be developed in consultation with other international actors. This must be tailored to needs specific to the country, the nature of the conflict, and the particular peace

agreement. Clear plans are needed for implementing the strategy in an integrated manner, clearly indicating to whom the delivery and impact should be accountable. This whole process should guide the decision whether or not to integrate, and the degree of integration that is appropriate. The role of the SG, the SG’s policy committee and the CEB in driving system-wide coherence and management should be further elaborated.

It is important to note that changing organizational structures and setting targets on their own do not guarantee useful change or coherence. Such structures and targets risk being removed from the reality of day-to-day practice. Sharing different functions can, if not managed well, also lead to a diffusion of ownership and accountability. Integration will not automatically lead to increased coherence.

The perspective emerging from the project is that revisiting the integrated missions concept could enable the broader UN reform agenda to demonstrate specific successes and build on them, thus bolstering both its appeal and impact. The project has identified a number of challenges that need to be acted upon if the UN is to meet increasing demands in the short and long term. Below follows a short summary of the principles that can be adopted in the most critical areas where action needs to be taken to improve the system.

2. **Better alignment of political processes, mandates and resources for multidimensional peace operations are required.** Political decisions on mandates and resources should be based

on the strategic assessment process and should clearly indicate how UN capacity is to be aligned with other interventions and how to avoid political and operational overstretch. When there are elements of international input absent, or there are contradictory signals given, political decisions and allocation of resources by partners can unintentionally undermine the role and effectiveness of the UN. Furthermore, the UN Security Council should seek input from and collaboration with other parts of the system on a more systematic basis before issuing and/or reconfiguring multidimensional mandates. Additionally, the PBC/PBSO should in turn seek to fulfil its original “clearing house” function for system-wide peacebuilding best practices, to ensure continued and realistic mandating and resourcing of peace operations.

3. Better and more effective mechanisms should be developed for improving the inter-governmental dialogue and coordination.

The current barriers within the international system seriously undermine comprehensive approaches to peacebuilding and result in duplication, inefficiency and delays in the commencement of operations, as well as causing unnecessary costs. Better relations and coordination between the UN Security Council, the General Assembly, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and other relevant UN governing bodies and multilateral actors are essential.

4. The role, authority and accountability of the SG needs to be strengthened.

The role of the SG to more closely manage and oversee integration processes, alongside the equivalent empowerment of his special representatives on the ground will be a critical step towards better coherence. It is also important that Member States undertake an in-depth review of how to adapt current intergovernmental processes and the current support system to ensure sufficient support and conditions for a viable integrated approach to conflict management. Moreover, the authority and tools available (political, financial and administrative) to the SRSRG and country-level senior leadership teams need to be strengthened. The HQ should focus on the provision of strategic level policy development and advisory services, leaving greater flexibility, delegation of authority and accountability for operational planning and implementation to those on the ground. A field-based organizational and management structure is desirable because, in practice, integration is best built bottom-up, around an agreed set of strategic priorities, with a collaborative ideology to guide the process. The practice of establishing a field-based integrated support office to support the DSRSG in implementing her or his many activities tasks should be regularized.

5. UN capabilities must be aligned to national priorities and objectives.

From the outset there should be much greater emphasis by the UN governing bodies and the broader UN system on securing input from local stakeholders (the

host government and society), ensuring their ownership and harnessing their capacities. This should extend down to the operational level of planning. Here too, a clear plan will be required from the outset that indicates who is responsible for delivering what and to whom. This will help to clarify the role, capacities and accountability of both the host government and the UN and other actors from the beginning. The SRSG, with the necessary backing from the relevant UN governing bodies and institutions, will need to play a leading role. Non-UN and bilateral actors will also need to carefully consider their involvement, to ensure that they do not unintentionally undermine the collective process and relations with the host government.

6. Better incentives and support for integrated planning need to be ensured.

The UN system and relevant partners should seek to improve impact assessments, training systems and communication strategies, and should enhance alignment and inter-agency collaboration with the efforts of other UN and external actors, with a view to common planning. The SG needs to take on a more visible role in outlining the planning assumptions from the outset, to guide the integrated planning process, and ensure that the necessary resources are made available to translate assumptions to operational roadmaps. The roadmap that will be shared with all the relevant intergovernmental bodies, the governing boards as well as other partners, such as the World Bank and OECD/DAC, will ensure that the intergovernmental discussions are

informed by and take into account the context-specific needs and operational requirements of the mission to operate in an integrated manner.

7. Provision for greater flexibility in adapting priorities and reconfiguring mandates during the implementation process.

It must be possible to adapt operations to deal with unexpected developments, and to ensure correspondence between the priorities set and the resources actually mobilized. Mechanisms are therefore needed for real-time reviews and adaptation that can secure common or closely-linked decision-making by those responsible for mandates, those responsible for assessed funding, and those who control the bridge to voluntary funding.

8. The current funding and administrative arrangements for UN multidimensional and integrated peace operations need to be overhauled.

A serious review of the current funding and administrative arrangements is essential to the successful implementation of an integrated mandate. This will need to involve the General Assembly, the PBC, the governance bodies of UN funds, programmes and specialized agencies, and the international donor community. It will need to examine how current structural constraints, human resources policies, administrative and budgetary practices, allocation procedures, programming and reporting tools and requirements etc. can be addressed in order to bridge funding gaps and align resources in line with a common strategy at country level. This

means that the current regime for determining the usage of the mission budget needs to incorporate programmatic activities performed by all UN agencies directly related to the mission mandate.

9. The UN's strategic management and planning capacities need to be strengthened.

Strong collective engagement and commitment on the part of the SG and the heads of relevant UN entities and other senior managers – including insistence on the development and implementation of a clear policy and doctrine on integration and that subordinates are held accountable – is essential. This may mean that new mechanisms for joint country-specific decision-making and collective

accountability at both headquarters and country level are needed.

10. Human resources, recruitment policies and regulations need to be adapted to facilitate systematized inter-agency mobility.

Current human resources policies and practices constitute unnecessary barriers and do not allow the UN as a whole to optimize the collective insights and resources of the various stakeholders. This requires full engagement of the member states, the SG and the CEB to ensure that related policies and practices are adapted to allow for a mobile, responsive and streamlined UN-wide use of human resources, implemented expediently and by all.

Addressing these challenges and recommendations for further action will require commitment and concerted engagement on the part of a number of actors, including the UN governing bodies, the UN secretariat and relevant agencies, funds and programmes, other multilateral actors and Member States. Some of the points addressed above are neither novel nor groundbreaking. They clearly illustrate however, as participants in this project on Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations have identified, that while there is general agreement on the rationale for UN system reform to make the UN more effective and efficient in the area of conflict management, implementation has proven to be a highly fluid, complex, political and challenging undertaking. A significant divide still exists between integration as a policy ideal and the reality of multidimensional peace operations. Shifting realities on the ground, the growing complexity and scale of peace operations, the

geopolitical realities in which they operate, and fragmented aid architecture have made the full realization of a more coherent UN in countries emerging from or affected by conflicts a “moving target”. The core insight from the project is that if the UN is truly to become more coherent, effective and efficient, serious revisions to the overall implementation systems governing current conflict response mechanisms and UN bodies as a whole will be required. While many of the current challenges are deep-rooted and structural in nature, a commitment to progressively address priority issues, however, would significantly improve the effectiveness of the UN and the international community’s response in the short and medium term. The establishment of an informal Contact Group on Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations could thus prove a useful venue for translating some of the challenges and suggestions described above into detailed practical guidelines

outlining the responsibilities of the different governing bodies and mechanisms in supporting better system-wide coherence and integration. These guidelines should in turn be presented to the formal bodies of the UN providing clear and manageable suggestions on how to move this agenda forward.

Endnotes

1. This final synthesis has been prepared by Anja Therese Kaspersen with Spyros Demetriou. The author would like to thank the vast number of individuals who have given of their time and given extremely valuable comments and insights at various stages. The author would like to thank the following in particular for their invaluable contributions: Espen Barth Eide, Colin Keating, Bruce Jones, Salman Ahmed, Susanna P. Campbell, Jostein Leiro, Michael Moller, Laura Londen, Halvor Sætre, Erin Weir, Anna Herrhausen, Barry Kavanagh, Kristina L. Revheim and Caroline Bond. The author would also like to underline that this report builds on the respective seminar proceedings that can be downloaded from www.regjeringen.no/integratedmissions.

The text may not be printed in part or in full without the permission of the author. The views expressed throughout this report, and in all the seminar proceedings, should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of, or being endorsed by, the Norwegian Government, the United Nations or other institutions with which contributors and commentators are associated.
2. According to the recently adopted *Principles and Guidelines for UN Peacekeeping Operations*, commonly referred to as the *Capstone Doctrine*, published by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support (2008:23), “the core functions of a multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation are to:
 - a) Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State’s ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights;
 - b) Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance;
 - c) Provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner” (emphasis added).
3. UN System is used to refer to the UN as a whole, and refers to all UN departments, programmes, funds, and specialized agencies, as well as all UN *intergovernmental bodies and mechanisms*.
4. Confirmed at an SG Policy Committee meeting of 19 July 2005, stating that on responding to a complex post-conflict situation there is a need to design a UN operation that links the different dimensional of peacekeeping and peacebuilding (political, developmental, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security) into a coherent support strategy.
5. For the purposes of this report, the term “policy” refers to a set of decisions that are oriented towards a long-term purpose or to resolving a particular problem.
6. The term “strategic coordination” is commonly used to refer to a situation where a single strategy is supported by a set of operations, each one managed within the framework of an integrated management hierarchy.
7. Salman Ahmed highlighted this important concept.

8. Rittel, H. and Webber, M. (1973): *Dilemmas in general theory of planning*, Policy Science, 4, pages 155–69.
9. 10 Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions: *Clarifying the Role, Responsibility and Authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/ Humanitarian Coordinator*, 17 January 2006, paragraph 4.
10. According to the *Capstone Doctrine* (2008:97), multidimensional peacekeeping operations comprise “a mix of military, police and civilian components working together to lay the foundations for sustainable peace.”
11. The use of “architecture” here refers to the various agencies, institutions and systems worldwide for managing conflict and transitions to peace.
12. See website of the Peacebuilding Commission www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/questions.htm
13. *Capstone Doctrine* (2008:97).
14. “Strategy” may generally be defined as “a plan of action designed in order to have some end” (J.C. Wylie quoted in John Baylis et al., *The Contemporary World: An introduction to Strategic Studies*, Oxford University Press, 2002, page 4). Strategic integration is usually concerned with the vertical connections between a single over-arching strategy and its subsidiary tactical operations. Thus, strategic integration depends on an agreement of the objectives to be achieved to ensure that the tactics support the overall strategy. Operational integration on the other hand, concerns the actual management of the horizontal linkages. A complicating factor when applying this definition to the implementation of multidimensional and integrated peace operations, however, is the tendency by both UN agencies and member states to pursue multiple and stove-piped strategies, subscribing to nationally or institutionally defined objectives and only subscribing to the Security Council mandate in so far as it addresses particular sectors of concern.
15. S/PRST/2004/16 of 17 May 2004.
16. See Secretary-General’s *Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, clarifying the Role, Responsibility and Authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/ Humanitarian Coordinator*, 17 January 2006.
17. *Capstone Doctrine* (2008:16).
18. Background paper on multilateral initiatives on integrated planning prepared for OECD-DAC thematic (expert) meeting in Oslo, 11–12 February, 2008 on “Diplomacy, development and integrated planning in fragile states and situations”. Available at http://www.norad.no/default.asp?V_ITEM_ID=10661
19. UN Document A/60/640 of 29 December 2005, paragraph 25.
20. Campbell, S.P. and Kaspersen, A.T., *Confronting Integration: The UN’s integration reforms and their barriers*, Journal of International Peacekeeping, Special Edition on Integrated Missions Revisited (forthcoming, autumn 2008).
21. Executive Office of the Secretary-General, September 2006, *Inventory: United Nations Capacity in Peacebuilding*, page 6.

22. The UN Secretary-General commissioned the High Level Panel on System-wide Coherence to produce a set of recommendations for UN reform aimed at improving the coherence and effectiveness of the UN system at country level, looking specifically at development, humanitarian and environmental issues. The report *Delivering as One*, published in November 2006, highlights that the UN system as it is, is not equipped to respond to the challenge posted by the Millennium Development Goals, due to fragmentation, duplication, high overhead costs, and lack of strategic and operational focus. It should be noted, that in spite of the strong emphasis on the nexus between security and development and the need to move towards multidisciplinary and integrated approaches, neither the terms of reference for the panel nor, and as a consequence, the final report, made any reference to the UN response mechanisms in countries on the verge of, affected by or emerging from conflict. As a result parallel tracks have developed in the efforts to address system-wide coherence.
23. Bruce Jones and Jenna Slotin, *Taking Stock, Looking Forward: A Strategic Review of the Peacebuilding Commission*, NYU Center on International Cooperation and the International Peace Institute (April 2008:4).
24. The UN Country Team is composed of the resident heads of the funds, programmes and specialised agencies of the UN in the country in question. In non-integrated operations, the Resident Coordinator is the UN Secretary-General’s designated representative for development cooperation at country level and serves as the head of the UNCT. However, in an integrated mission, it has become increasingly common for the SRSRG, as the UN designed official charged with all the coordination tasks in the country, to play a more active role vis-à-vis the UNCT.
25. Jennings, K.M and Kaspersen, A.T., *Integration Going Forward*, Journal of International Peacekeeping, Special Edition *Integrated Missions Revisited* (forthcoming, autumn 2008).
26. UN SG Reform Agenda 1997, paragraph 23.
27. The development of the “multi-hatted DSRSG” role grew out of precedents set in Sierra Leone and Liberia, where one of the deputies to the SRSRG was concurrently appointed as the Humanitarian Coordinator (reporting to OCHA with close linkages to the IASC) and Resident Coordinator (and UNDP representative with close links to the UNDG–UNDGO structure). Additional responsibilities may include areas such as civil affairs, child protection, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, human rights, gender, HIV/Aids. The multi-hatted DSRSG is often the security focal point as well as serving as a key component in the mission senior management team.
28. Espen Barth Eide, Anja Therese Kaspersen, Randolph Kent and Karen von Hippel, *Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations. Independent Study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group* (2005).
29. “Integration is the guiding principle for the design and implementation of complex UN operations in post-conflict situations and for linking the different dimensions of peacebuilding (political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security aspects) into a coherent support strategy.” *SG’s Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions*, paragraph 4.

30. *Capstone Doctrine* (2008:53)
31. Campbell, S.P., Kaspersen, A.T. and Weir, E., *Synthesis: Integration Revisited*, background paper for the Oslo Conference on Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Trends and Challenges (October 2007: 3).
32. Anna Herrhausen, *A Discussion Paper on Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding – A Theory-Guided Approach*, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, 2007.
33. Anna Herrhausen highlighted this important point.
34. Campbell, S.P. and Kaspersen, A.T., *Confronting Integration: The UN's integration reforms and their barriers*, Journal of International Peacekeeping, Special Edition on Integrated Missions Revisited (forthcoming, autumn 2008).
35. Alan Doss, *Crisis, contention and coherence – some reflections*, Journal of International Peacekeeping Special Edition Integrated Missions Revisited (forthcoming, autumn 2008)
36. Lakhdar Brahimi and Salman Ahmed, *In pursuit of Sustainable Peace: The Seven Deadly Sins of Mediation*, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations (2008:9-19).
37. See *Capstone Doctrine* for an interesting discussion on “no size fits all” (2008:39).
38. Alan Doss, *Crisis, contention and coherence – some reflections*, Journal of International Peacekeeping, Special Edition, Integrated Missions Revisited (forthcoming, autumn 2008).
39. Lise Grande and Ross Mountain highlighted this point.
40. See *Resource Pack on Conflict Sensitivity* for an analysis of terminology and methods to foster conflict sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding: http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/resource_pack.html n-depth explanation of terminology.
41. *Capstone Doctrine* (2008:53)
42. Susanna P. Campbell, *Integration's challenge: incoherence and (dis)integration in UN Post-Conflict Intervention*, Journal of Peacekeeping Operations, Special Edition on Integrated Missions Revisited (forthcoming autumn 2008).
43. The SGs Note of Guidance on the IMPP defines integration as the “guiding principle for the design and implementation of complex UN operations in post-conflict situations” and sets out two basic criteria for integrated missions: they must be based on a strategic plan; and they must contain a “shared understanding of priorities, programmatic interventions, and basic sequencing”. The IMPP operational guidelines currently under development are slightly more detailed and specify, for example, that integration calls upon all actors to maximise the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN presence at country level, including through minimising duplication and optimising the available logistical, human and financial resources to meet the combined mandates of the various components of the UN presence. These documents draw explicit links between improvements to the UN system improved impact and outcomes in host society.
44. The UN strategic assessment of Somalia was prepared by an inter-agency task force

- led by DPA during the latter part of 2007. It provides a comprehensive assessment of the current situation and dynamics of conflict in Somalia, identifies priorities for UN engagement, and recommends a series of short- to medium-term actions intended to re-orient, strengthen and integrate UN efforts. The strategic assessment report and recommendations were presented to the UN Secretary-General and subsequently informed his report and proposals to the UNSC (S/2008/178).
45. An argument raised several times by a number of representatives from non-governmental and voluntary based organisations during the series of seminars and conferences.
46. *Capstone Doctrine* (2008:18)
47. *Capstone Doctrine* (2008:54)
48. Lakhdar Brahimi and Salman Ahmed, *In pursuit of Sustainable Peace: The Seven Deadly Sins of Mediation*, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations (2008:9-19).
49. Written submission by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to the SG's high-level panel on system-wide coherence, May 2006.
50. Ross Mountain, *Humanitarian Reform: saving and protecting lives in DRC*, Force Migration Review (2007-29:29).
51. The Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP) was first launched in 2006 to replace the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) that was seen by many as a solely UN-driven document. The HAP defines the overall framework for humanitarian action. The identification of project priorities within the HAP framework is the task of the respective clusters overseeing the implementation of humanitarian activities. At the provincial level, special inter-agency committees are responsible for translating priorities into context specific and provincial needs based packages.
52. Ross Mountain, *ibid.*
53. Donini, A., *The Politics of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Rwanda*, Occasional paper 22, Brown University.
54. Rich Hooper and Mark Taylor, *Command from the Saddle*, FAFO publication 1999.
55. *Capstone Doctrine* (2008:38)
56. Peacebuilding Commission Working Group on Lessons Learned: Compacts, Summary of discussions, 17 April 2007.



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