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
**THE EFFECTIVENESS  
OF TECHNICAL  
ASSISTANCE PERSONNEL**

Financed by the Nordic Countries

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A study commissioned by the Danish International Development Authority, DANIDA, the Finnish International Development Agency, FINNIDA, the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Development Co-operation, MCD/NORAD and the Swedish International Development Authority, SIDA.

*March 1988*



EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PERSONNEL

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REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE REFORMS OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM

CHAPTER II THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM

A study of the judicial system

The judicial system is a complex one, and it is one which has been the subject of much study and discussion. The Commission has been asked to study the system and to report on its findings. The Commission has done so, and its report is set out in this chapter.

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## SUMMARY

The four Nordic aid agencies have a considerable technical assistance personnel component in their development cooperation programmes. This component is expected to play an important role in the realization of the programmes' objectives. The aim of technical assistance personnel (TAP) has been defined as;

"To assist host countries achieve the desired development of indigenous manpower resources, the sustained development of their institutions, and to contribute to the achievement of other project goals."

None of the Nordic countries had made any evaluation of this component of their aid programmes and so the present study was initiated. The objectives were:

- (1) To evaluate the extent to which the aim of providing technical assistance personnel has been achieved, and to assess other effects, positive and negative.
- (2) To assess the relevance of the Nordic countries technical assistance personnel in relation to the needs expressed by the host countries.
- (3) To identify the main factors determining success or failure in achieving the aim of providing technical assistance personnel.
- (4) To compare the effectiveness of different categories of technical assistance personnel in achieving the aims, and to consider alternatives.
- (5) To make recommendations regarding factors to be noted and steps to be taken by the Nordic agencies in order to better fulfill the aim of providing technical assistance personnel.

It should be noted that the evaluation is concerned with personnel, it is thus not evaluating projects. The total impact of an aid project may well be positive even if the personnel component did not function well - and vice versa.

The evaluation was undertaken by a team of five consultants, representing four Nordic countries. The study was geographically confined to Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia. The empirical data came from studies of 55 assistance projects/programmes. Studies of the national manpower development policies were undertaken by researchers in Zambia, Kenya and Tanzania. The evaluation took place during 1987. This is a summary of the major results in respect of each of the evaluation's objectives.

(1) There were some 900 TAP in the three countries during 1987 at a total cost of 900 million SEK - an average of 1 million per manyear (based on the costs of consultants and aid agency employed TAP). Salary is only a small part of the total cost: administration, logistics, etc constitute the major part. The technical assistance personnel are most effective in contributing to the achievement of operational project goals. The achievement ratio is high in these respects. Job descriptions put an emphasis on these functions, but are vague and general concerning institutional development and training. As a consequence such objectives are seldom met. In fact, many aid projects have a negative impact on institutional development, for example by creating oversized organizations that are not sustainable without assistance.

Looking at the 900 manyears of assistance we must conclude that the institutional framework that should lead to a transfer of knowledge was non-existent or crippled. In several positions there was no need for foreign personnel. A limited number of persons did not have the necessary competence and training for working on aid programmes. In sum, the impact does not stand in any favourable relation to the cost.

(2) The manpower development in African countries has made rapid progress since Independence. The shortages of skilled personnel has been reduced, and in several areas there is a surplus of well qualified persons. The assistance programmes of the Nordic countries have not recognized these changes in the availability of local manpower. Very often TAP is suggested before the local manpower situation has been investigated. We found that in more than half of our case studies there was indeed local manpower available, but perhaps not on the terms and conditions prevalent in the governmental sector.

The need for TAP was identified by the Nordic aid agencies, their consultants and by technical assistance personnel on the projects in 56% of the cases. Even though requests for TAP are channelled through the official system, it is not the recipient countries that are the dynamic element in expressing the need for TAP. In 64% of the cases TAP were placed in new organizations set up by the donor for the sake of project implementation, or in special arrangements within existing organizations to secure donor control.

We estimated that 65% of TAP in our cases were implementors, 17% were controllers on behalf of the aid agencies, and only 11% and 7% were trainers and institution builders, respectively. This is far from the real and expressed needs of the recipient countries.

- (3) Personal characteristics, preparatory training, language skills, back-stopping, etc. are important for individual experts - but as long as the need for TAP has not been correctly identified they have no basis for being effective. In fact, effectiveness may then be detrimental to national development objectives.

Given that TAP are needed, the most important factor determining success or failure is the personnel development of local staff. In less than one third of our cases were such systems functioning well. Recruitment of qualified local staff, personnel development through on-the-job training and scholarships, combined with plans for out-phasing TAP and career opportunities for local staff, should be priority areas to increase the effectiveness of aid.

- (4) Different projects require different types of technical assistance, there is no standard recipe concerning "modes" of assistance. There are also several categories of TAP. One common distinction is between agency employed TAP and consultants.

Consultant TAP often had a good record of reaching operational goals but were not effective in training and institutional development - this was more marked than with agency employed TAP. However some of the "best" cases in all respects were consultant employed TAP, so there is no general rule. There is a need for the aid agencies to strengthen their capacity to monitor and evaluate project performance whichever means of implementation they choose.

(5) Our recommendations for an improved process of technical assistance follow three main lines of argument;

(i) a critical assessments of the needs, which will lead to a more extensive utilization of local personnel, and a significant reduction in the numbers of foreign assistance personnel.

(ii) improvements of a detailed nature in the process of cooperation to make those experts that are still sent out more effective, particularly important is to increase the resource base through international recruitment of experts and consulting firms, continuous training on local culture and administration, emphasising personnel development, and promoting organizational learning in the aid agencies.

(iii) an analysis of the process of technical assistance, that is, of different ways of delivering "aid". The present approach in aid agencies, as well as in consulting firms, does not allow for sufficient consideration of the environment, the purpose, or the internal consistency of the process of assistance.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. Technical Assistance from the Nordic countries

It is estimated that some 80.000 resident non-nationals are working on technical assistance programmes in the public and parastatal sectors of the 40 countries in sub-Sahara Africa. The personnel cost alone amounts to some USD 4 billion annually - which is a large sum by any standards. If we look at technical assistance in a global perspective, it is likely that the figure should be quadrupled. Furthermore, even larger numbers work for international companies in the developing countries. The effectiveness of expatriates is thus a question of general concern, and their effectiveness on aid programmes in particular as the latter group of expatriates are engaged in development cooperation.

Technical assistance from the Nordic countries has been growing continuously since the first years of development assistance. In 1986 Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, jointly had slightly less than 1100 aid agency employed personnel working under technical assistance programmes. Furthermore, external organizations that implement aid programmes financed by the agencies also employ technical assistance personnel. There are no statistics for this category of personnel, but we assume that they are at least equally many. This means that the Nordic countries employ somewhere around 2.200 personnel on their aid programmes in developing countries. The total cost for this ended up around 2.200 million SEK in 1987.

This evaluation is concerned with the effectiveness of technical assistance personnel in three African countries; Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia. In January 1987 there were 568 agency employed expatriates and 316 employed by external organizations in these countries. This is a relatively small share of the total 30.000 technical assistance personnel (of all nationalities) present in the countries, but it is nevertheless a sizeable presence. As the Nordic technical assistance is concentrated to a few key sectors, and as personnel usually means senior technical and managerial professionals, their potential impact is large.

In a historical perspective assistance from Sweden and Denmark started somewhat earlier than from Norway - and Finland is a relative newcomer. But assistance from Finland has increased very rapidly in recent years, whereas it has stagnated from Sweden. The 1950s were the formative years of development assistance; patterns were set that are still with us today, eg the "project" idea as a combination of financial flows, personnel and training programmes. The first years' experience also led to revised organizational forms, DANIDA was formed in 1962 and SIDA in 1965. NORAD and FINNIDA were born later but of the same spiritual parentage.

Let us see to what extent ideas about development assistance born in those early days are still with us. First and foremost are the arguments for the legitimacy of aid. Modern communication shrank the world and brought the daily lives of other people into the living rooms of Scandinavia. Faced with different material standards of living, fed with the threat of overpopulation of the earth, meeting the rhetoric of independence leaders in Asia and Africa - it is not difficult to see a concern for international development emerging. The Nordic countries would not accept any "colonial" responsibility for the state of the globe, but they did accept an obligation to share some of their wealth. Aid is motivated by a sense of moral duty and international solidarity; it was an expression of the recognition that peace, freedom and welfare are not exclusive national concerns, but rather something increasingly universal and indivisible.

The second legacy concerns the objective of aid. The notion that growth equals development is as old as aid, the conviction that all the poor countries have to do in order to develop is to emulate the patterns and processes of the industrialized countries, is pervasive. We have perhaps come to see that reality is more complex and we have learnt respect for other cultures, but the attitudinal change is not complete, and when it comes to practical delivery of assistance it is even more difficult to find alternatives.

A continuous discussion on the meaning of development is important because everything starts with an objective. All other activities in the sphere of aid depend on the notion of what constitutes development; right from the policy statements of the aid organizations, to the design of the vehicle which is to deliver aid (the organizations, the programmes and projects) and onwards to the evaluation activities. This particular evaluation study can of course not

present any new ideas in this field, but as we are to discuss policies and as we observe widespread problems in the delivery of aid, it is natural to go back to the beginnings and point to some problems at the source.

The concept of what constitutes development has been qualified over time, even though there is repeatedly a tendency to return to economic growth as development. In Sweden aid has officially been given to support four policy objectives;

1. Economic growth
2. Equal distribution of resources
3. National independence
4. Democracy

These cornerstones have been consistent since 1962, but in practice the emphasis has varied. It is easier to define projects that generate growth than promote democracy. There is less controversy over growth than distribution.

Norway, Denmark, Finland and Sweden have in common an emphasis on reaching the poorest people with assistance. They concentrate assistance to the least developed among developing countries and try to define projects that will benefit the poor. The policy opens the agencies to endless criticism as there can of course not be any consensus on who are the poorest, and what will benefit them, or how that could be combined with other objectives. Reaching the poorest may mean that you sacrifice growth and western concepts of democracy.

From time to time other objectives are introduced, gain prominence, and if they do not fade away they are institutionalized at some level. Environmental considerations, energy issues, and the role of women in development are some such issues. At times they have an impact on policy making throughout the organizations - and at other times not. To be seriously and effectively pursued they should of course influence all policy areas. How could an organization keep its respectability if it on the one hand demands that its clients give equal opportunities for men and women, and on the other hand mostly employs men? An emphasis on women in development must have consequences for internal personnel policies - just to take one example.

The third legacy from the beginnings of aid concerns the way we help. The very first piece of development assistance was people to do a job - perform a service - that nobody in the recipient country could do. Next the public debate, at least in Sweden, came to focus on large scale training programmes for people from the Third World in Scandinavia (to teach them how we have done). But of course funds for investment, in infrastructure, in productive resources were also necessary. And that is where we remain, these are the building blocks of aid. Emphasis on one or the other has shifted over the decades, there was a tilt towards training in the 1960s, next decade investment funds were relatively more important, then personnel have again gained ground. It seems as if the present trend is towards a relative increase of training in different forms.

The development project is also an invention of the 1950s. Projects are a concept for organizing and channeling resource flows. A project organizes productive activities and creates the physical and social infrastructure necessary to link markets and organizations. But projects are usually also fairly small units and they require, as well as facilitate, management. At times the project as a framework for management and control has been favoured. At other times the project mode of assistance has come under attack. The project form has a tendency to isolate activities, to impede coordination and to demand much of scarce managerial resources (Lecomte, 1986).

In the early 1970s there was instead a tendency to provide assistance with as few ties as possible - on the conditions of the recipient. Projects were substituted by sector programmes and general import support became a feature of cooperation in several countries. But the request for visible results lead to a swing back, a project can have objectives of a scale that can be assessed - and thus projects were again favoured by the aid agencies. But the pendulum has not swung all the way back, and there are differences among the Nordic donor agencies. DANIDA, NORAD and FINNIDA are providing more aid in project form than SIDA.

After this very brief sketch of why we give aid, for what purpose and in which forms - let us return to the beginning and see if this legacy from the past has changed and how it influences aid today. First of all aid has grown to be a big industry and it has not been possible to keep it insulated from other foreign policy objectives - or domestic policy objectives for that matter.

Commercial interests and employment considerations interfere with development objectives. Aid money is often tied to purchases in the donor country, to support investments from the donor country, to employ personnel from the donor country, and to provide business for consultants. Aid money brings students for training programmes in the donor country; at universities, in industry and on professional courses. Education is also business.

The link between aid and commercial interests has its advantages, eg. by introducing an element of competition and by enabling aid organizations to purchase the services they do not build up internally. It is also natural that a country provides assistance in areas where there is a domestic resource base, as Finnish assistance in forestry, Norwegian assistance in fishing and Danish in agricultural development. But everyone must realize that there is a fundamental difference of interest between those selling their services for the purpose of aid (be they private or public firms, institutions, trade unions or cooperative movements) and the development objectives. That realization must form the base for contractual arrangements between the "selling and buying parties". That is where the aid organizations should have policies for how they intend to handle the differences and turn them into a complementary whole.

But not only organizations have objectives different from aid objectives - so do the people that are employed in the aid business, irrespective of whether they are technical assistance personnel, consultants or programme officers in the aid organizations. People are rarely motivated by some single goal, but they pursue several causes simultaneously. It is even more complex as some motives are open and others are hidden, some are even hidden in the subjects subconscious mind. This must also be realized and must lead to policies in respect of recruitment, personnel administration and retention.

But where exactly is the area of choice when it comes to policy in respect of technical assistance personnel? In which dimensions are such policies formulated? What type of activities and objectives are of concern to such policies? What function should such policies perform? In theory, policies in respect of personnel assistance should have been derived from an idea of why aid is given and what it should achieve, taking into consideration other means of assistance. The policies should serve as a guideline for solving daily problems and for elaborating procedures of work in the aid organizations.

The policies should be the link between strategies and operations; ie. they should interpret how the strategy of the aid organizations should be transformed into action, in this case in respect of technical assistance personnel. If the strategy is confusing and contradictory, it is to be expected that lower level policies exhibit the same characteristics.

## 1.2. Evaluations of technical assistance

As we have seen above technical assistance is an industry in its own right. Considering the size of the industry, and considering the importance of the problem "expatriate effectiveness", one would assume that it has been studied intensely - and indeed so is also the case. The present review is a brief indication of the different approaches to the problem. We would like to indicate where previous research has led to more or less conclusive results, where there is a need for further research, and which areas remain to be explored. It might be useful to distinguish between the following four approaches:

- (1) the "personal characteristics" approach,
- (2) the national development approach
- (3) the institutional approach
- (4) the project evaluation approach.

### 1.2.1. The "personal characteristics" approach

A hypothesis widely entertained concerning aid, is that it matters very little what organization and projects you have. It is the people that count. Consequently, a number of studies have tried to find what type of people should be employed and how these people could be found. The first studies in this field were made by Harris (1973, 1975) and Tucker (1973, 1974), who in a series of empirical studies of Peace Corps volunteers and U.S. Navy personnel identified 20 dimensions that were related to success on foreign assignments.

The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) built on this research and undertook a major evaluation in 1979. The objective was to analyse the concept "overseas effectiveness" and to arrive at a profile of individuals who were effective on overseas assignments. The concept itself was found to

consist of three component parts; intercultural interaction and training, professional effectiveness, and personal/family adjustment and satisfaction. The first, intercultural interaction and training may be described as "adaptation" in the sense of mixing with local people and learning about local culture. The second, professional effectiveness refers to the performance of daily tasks, duties and responsibilities on the job. The third component is related to the capacity for basic satisfaction while living overseas, as an individual and as a family unit.

The CIDA study also gave characteristics of individuals who were effective on overseas assignments. In summary the effective person was above all effective in interpersonal relationships. This was demonstrated through six behaviour patterns: flexibility towards ideas and beliefs of others; respect towards, attentiveness and acknowledgement of others; listening skill and accurate perception of the needs of others; trust, friendliness and cooperation with others; calm and self-control when confronted by obstacles; and sensitivity to cultural differences.

The effective individual was also capable of self-expression, including demonstrated initiative, self confidence with respect to goals, and genuine frankness or honesty. The effective individual had doubts and concerns before departure overseas, but nevertheless expected a rewarding experience.

The CIDA study had a large impact, not least in the Nordic countries. The three components of overseas effectiveness and the indicators have been accepted as the principal criteria for the evaluation of technical assistance personnel. Furthermore, preparatory training courses have been designed to strengthen those areas where Nordic personnel are seen to be weak in respect of the criteria. There are of course modifications, but soon after the appearance of the CIDA report there was even a time when the same questionnaires were used to evaluate Nordic assistance personnel. If nothing else, this could be seen as an indicator of rapid learning in the aid agencies.

The thrust of the report is built on the fact that individuals who tend to fill in the questionnaire in a certain manner, also tend to have a positive view of their own effectiveness. This should raise a number of serious questions about the validity and the reliability of the study - but that will have to be done somewhere else. The consequence for this study is that we will

not take for granted that any general personal characteristics predicting success really exist. We will not try to assess new characteristics either, by and large we will not focus on the individual but rather on the circumstances under which individuals work.

Recently the monthly journal "Look Japan" had a series of articles under the heading "Learning from the West" portraying the individuals who took part in Japan's modernization towards the end of the 19th century. Each article described the men, their jobs and their personalities. From the point of view of the Japanese, they were often described as "pushy", hard-working, obnoxious, insensitive to Japanese culture and values, etc. Nevertheless, some 100 years later they are identified as the ones that made significant contributions to the country's modernization. Of course the situation was entirely different from Africa today so we do not want to draw any conclusions that expatriates should be in this way or that - but the Japanese articles confirm that the problem is complex. Even though tolerance, sensitivity, etc. are nice characteristics, they are perhaps not always essential for the performance of technical assistance personnel.

#### 1.2.2. The national development approach

In the "host" countries, expatriates are accepted because they provide some service connected to national development objectives. However, there are no studies of the impact of the 80.000 expatriates working in sub-Saharan Africa - but that does not mean that there is no debate.

African media, African intellectuals and politicians often voice their concern over the negative effects of the presence of large numbers of technical assistance personnel. Alien life styles and destructive consumption patterns are brought to the countries and diffused among the people. The expatriates do not spend money in the country but contribute to an outflow of foreign exchange. They take jobs from qualified nationals, contribute to inflated wage levels and in general create dependencies and maintain neo-colonial linkages.

Most countries, at least in English speaking Africa, coordinate their manpower development policies through some central ministry. But the policies and procedures in this field are difficult to coordinate, particularly as sectoral ministries often negotiate project support directly with foreign aid

organizations. Raphaeli, Roumani and MacKellar (1984) have made one of the few existing studies of how national policies of manpower development influence the use of expatriates. Their report builds on an assessment of Botswana's experience. Since Independence, Botswana has had a clear strategy for the recruitment and deployment of expatriates. The Government identifies sectors where foreign personnel are needed, and employs such personnel directly. The point is that the need for assistance is defined in terms of the overall manpower needs of the country, rather than on a sectoral approach - or even on a project by project approach.

Botswana rapidly had local managers take over all the highest policy-making posts. Expatriates are used on the levels below, and they usually are deployed in line positions, rather than as advisers. As the expatriates are employed by the local authorities, they do not have their loyalties divided between an aid agency and national authorities. They are placed in the service structure of the country, and even if their salaries are topped up, they follow local practices.

We suppose that similar studies have been made in other places, but as they are written for local readers they are not easily found in research data banks. It would appear as if comparative studies of national manpower development policies could be a fruitful approach to understanding the effectiveness of expatriates. The same applies to the attitudes of the general population. The climate for acceptance - or rejection - of expatriates would vary with the colonial heritage, the policies and the experience of development since Independence. Such attitudes and policies reinforce each other and develop over time. The consequences for our study are that we will incorporate a comparative study of attitudes, procedures and policies, in respect of utilizing technical assistance personnel in the three countries we are concerned with. It is an area that needs to be explored from the recipient countries' point of view.

### 1.2.3. The institutional approach

The third approach can be exemplified by Lethem and Coopers report "Managing Project Related Technical Assistance; The Lessons of Success" (1983), and the Storrar missions report on technical assistance (1982). These studies have looked at the institutional factors surrounding an expatriate assignment, such

as the conception and birth of a project, the negotiation process leading to expatriate recruitment, setting terms of reference, etc, up to the end of an assignment. Lethem and Cooper suggest that the success of an assignment depends on three factors in particular:

- (a) The commitment of all parties concerned; that there is an agreement on the need for technical assistance personnel, that the objectives are clear and understood, that the assignment is economically and technically feasible.
- (b) Careful design of the project. Special attention must be given to various modes of delivery, the role of the recipient country staff and technical assistance personnel, and the administrative arrangements.
- (c) The handling of technical assistance as a process and not as a blueprint. The aid agency must interact closely with the technical assistance personnel and should be prepared to change the projects, and in general act as catalysts to ensure that the cooperation between all the stakeholders is maintained.

It should be noted that Coopers and Lethems report is based on a study of successful cooperation. They identify factors that are correlated with success. If we turn to the Storrar mission report instead we find a description of the situation as it appears on many assistance programmes. Let us sum up the major problems:

- (a) Poor coordination of programmes both by donors and recipient countries.
- (b) Inadequate job descriptions.
- (c) Inadequate briefing before starting on a job.
- (d) Lack of career prospects for field staff.
- (e) Poor selection and availability of counterpart staff.
- (h) Inadequacy of local funding.
- (i) Insufficient emphasis on training.
- (j) Poor continuity of technical assistance services.

The general problems outlined in these studies have also been noted in other recent reports such as Cassen (1986). As for the Nordic countries, Rudengren (1976) made a comprehensive study of the results of personnel in aid - a study which also contained a bibliography of previous studies of relevance for East Africa. There is no doubt that previous research in this field has given a full picture of the nature and extent of the problems of technical assistance in general, and particularly of the institutional shortcomings that often surround an expatriate assignment. Some other studies have also focussed on part of the problem, as for example Jacobsen (1985) on the role of expatriates in training programmes for local staff and the qualitative elements of this transfer of knowledge process.

This approach is characterized by its "donor perspective". The studies are primarily concerned with what the aid agencies as institutions can do differently in order to reach the objectives of assistance. As such, we would like to note two main reservations. First, many of the studies are descriptive - they list problems. But the aid agencies learn and during the last five to ten years the policies and procedures that govern technical assistance have changed. It is necessary and interesting to incorporate recent changes in a study of technical assistance. Secondly, some of the reports are normative, but their lessons for success may well be biased. The approach is to call for more active involvement of all parties, more and better planning, more frequent and better monitoring and evaluation, etc. This seem to lead in the direction of more blue-print oriented management and more bureaucratized structures. But rational, scientific management has over the last few decades been severely criticized by Simon (1956), Lindblom (1959) and Morgan (1987)- to mention but a few in the long line of critical organization researchers.

Little of this debate has been applied to the organization of development cooperation. Some studies, for example Forss (1985), suggest that there might be a need to look more closely at the circumstances of decision-making, particularly at the environmental constraints affecting project implementation. There is a balance to strike between effective assistance and sophisticated institutional arrangements beyond which more complicated policies and procedures tend to decrease the effectiveness of assistance.

#### 1.2.4. The project evaluation approach

There is indeed a terrifying amount of project evaluations. We have the whole range of monitoring reports, quarterly-, biannual- and annual project reports, special evaluations, terminal reports, debriefing reports, mass media coverage, research studies, theses, etc. Most contain statements about expatriates working on a project. Personnel is usually such a vital factor that it would be difficult to ignore. But some project evaluations focus more narrowly on personnel, for example Cracknell (1986), but others treat the problem more casually. The latter is most common, and in general does not lead to any deeper understanding of why expatriates are effective, or why not.

It is also likely that the problem is perceived differently within the framework of one project or programme. When a pattern applying to several projects becomes visible, the magnitude of the constraints becomes visible- and the approach to solutions will look different. The more simplistic complaints and solutions would probably be avoided. But it is rare that such cross-project evaluations are undertaken. If they are, it is usually in the form referred to under the sections above.

If we now look at the implications for the present study we would conclude, (1) that there is a need to concentrate on the institutional factors surrounding technical assistance, in particular national manpower development policies and aid agency management, (2) that the main factors that inhibit the effectiveness of expatriates are well known and that there is a need to concentrate on aspects of cooperation that can be changed by the parties concerned, that is, we have a normative ambition, and (3) that it is important to have a holistic approach, that is, look at the framework of cooperation rather than people and their personal characteristics. Let us now turn to a brief review of why this evaluation was done.

#### 1.3. Objectives of the evaluation

As we have seen all four Nordic countries have a considerable technical assistance personnel component in their development cooperation programmes. None of the countries has so far made a comprehensive evaluation of this component which is, however, considered to play an important role in the realization of their development cooperation objectives.

In order to pool experience and economize with resources the aid agencies decided to undertake a joint evaluation of the technical assistance component of their bilateral development programmes. The aim of technical assistance personnel was defined as follows:

"To assist host countries achieve the desired development of indigenous manpower resources, the sustained development of their institutions, and to contribute to the achievement of other project goals."

Against this background, the main objectives of the evaluation were;

- (1) To evaluate the extent to which the aim of providing technical assistance personnel has been achieved, and to assess other effects, positive and negative.
- (2) To assess the relevance of the Nordic countries technical assistance personnel in relation to the needs as expressed by the host countries.
- (3) To identify the main factors determining success or failure in achieving the aim of providing technical assistance personnel.
- (4) To compare the effectiveness of different categories of technical assistance personnel in achieving the aims, and to consider alternatives.
- (5) To make recommendations regarding factors to be noted and steps to be taken by the Nordic agencies in order to better fulfill the aim of providing technical assistance personnel.

The full elaboration of the terms of reference for the evaluation is found in Annex 1. Let us now turn to a brief account of how the task of evaluating technical assistance personnel was solved.

#### 1.4. Research method

The basic building blocks of the study were two; (1) studies of the national manpower development policies in Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia, and (2) case studies of technical assistance personnel from the Nordic countries in the

same African countries. The studies of national manpower development were carried out to complement the experience of a country like Botswana (cf, above) and find out to what extent the experience from Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia differs, and what could be learnt from each country. We also realize that the effectiveness of expatriates to a large degree depends on the attitudes of the recipient country, and its role in identifying the need for assistance and in ascertaining that the expected transfer of skills will take place.

The case studies form the empirical base of the study. Whether technical assistance personnel are effective or not can only be seen by reference to the purpose of their stay in the country, and that means looking at the whole project, or programme, of assistance. That does not mean that the individuals performance is the same as achievement of project objectives - far from it. But it is only with reference to these objectives that it is possible to start a discussion about the constraints and opportunities for some professional performance. Basically, we do not think it is meaningful to ask persons whether they think they do a good job or not, such statements have a limited reliability.

Each of our case studies has built on four sources of information. First, we have gone through previous evaluation reports, monitoring reports, agreements, and other written information in the aid agencies' files. Second, we have interviewed a sample of the technical assistance personnel working on the projects. The number of interviews depended on the size of the project and the presence of personnel. We tried to include at least one representative from each personnel category (that is, general management, finance and accounting, technical personnel, etc.).

Third, we interviewed the local staff, that is counterparts to the expatriates, local management, as well as representatives from higher organizational levels (ministries, regional authorities, etc). In some case studies we included interviews with representatives from target groups, such as womens' groups, harambee groups, or simply individuals affected by the development activities. Our fourth source of information was the aid agencies themselves, or rather the programme officers in charge of the activities.

We selected the following "projects" for our case studies:

1. Tanzania

Telecommunications	SIDA
Tanzania Bureau of Standards	
Tanzania Food and Nutrition Centre	
Sector Support - General Education	
Health through Sanitation and Water (HESAWA)	
Water Resources Institute	
Personnel and Consultancies Fund	
Tanga Cement Factory	DANIDA
TRC Marine	
Ministry of Education - project implementation section	
Water development in the southern highlands	
Sao Hill saw mill	NORAD
Rural roads maintenance	
Petroleum sector programme	
Mbegani Fisheries Development Centre	
Water Supply to Rukwa and Kigoma Regions	
Personnel Fund	
Mtwara and Lindi Rural Water Development Project	FINNIDA
Fibreboard Africa Ltd	
Stamico	
Kibaha Educational Centre	NORDIC

2. Kenya

Soil Conservation	SIDA
Integrated Rural Health - Hospital Maintenance School	
Kenya Water Institute	
Headquarter Support	
Kwahe Area Programme	
Eastern Province Area Programme	
Kenya Water and Health Organization	
Personnel and Consultancies Fund	
Aguthi Water Development	DANIDA
Mutomi Soil and Water Conservation Programme	
Taita Taveta District Development Programme	
Industrial Training Programme	
Family Life Training Programme	
Public Telephones Project	
Minor Urban Water Development Programme	NORAD
Kenya Industrial Estates	
University of Nairobi - Veterinary Science College	
Kenya Finland Rural Water Development Programme	FINNIDA
Rural Dairy Development Programme	
Industrial Minerals	
Kenya Finland Primary Health Care Programme	
Nordic Cooperative Project	NORDIC
Rural Development Programme	

### 3. Zambia

Nurse Tutor Programme  
Agricultural Sector Support Programme, AASP.  
Cooperative Development  
Ministry of General Education - Planning Unit

SIDA

Integrated Rural Development Programme  
Zambia Cold Storage Cooperation

DANIDA

Village Agricultural Programme

NORAD

Practical Subjects Education Project  
Support Programme for Luapula Province  
Technical Assistance to ZESCO  
Forestry Education and Training Project

FINNIDA

We have thus chosen to investigate 55 projects, including 3 "Personnel and Consultancies Fund". The following notes are meant to give an indication of how representative the sample might be from a few different points of view.

#### Projects according to aid agency and country.

	SIDA	DANIDA	NORAD	FINNIDA	NORDIC	TOTAL
Tanzania	7	4	6	3	1	21
Kenya	8	6	3	4	2	23
Zambia	4	2	1	4	-	11
Total	19	12	10	11	3	55

#### Projects according to sector and country.

	Tanzania	Kenya	Zambia	TOTAL
Industry and Mining	5	3	1	9
Water Development	5	8	-	13
Health	1	3	1	5
Education	3	3	3	9
Agriculture and Fishery	1	2	2	5
Infrastructure	4	2	2	8
Integrated Rural Development	-	1	2	3
Personnel Funds	2	1	-	3
TOTAL	21	23	11	55

The aim has been to let the agencies' relative involvement in the three countries be reflected in the selection of projects for case analysis. The same applies concerning the choice of sectors - with due regard to the fact that few projects are easily classified according to a few single categories.

Projects according to size and country:

	Tanzania	Kenya	Zambia	TOTAL
Large (more than 15 TAP at the time)	8	6	3	17
Medium (between 2 and 15 TAP at the time)	9	5	8	22
Small (1 or 2 TAP)	4	8	1	13

Projects according to starting date and country:

	Tanzania	Kenya	Zambia	TOTAL
Started before 1977	8	6	4	18
Started 1977-1983	10	10	6	26
Started later than 1983	3	3	2	8

As our selection procedure could best be described as a "judgement sample" we have made use of as much knowledge as we have to ascertain that the projects selected are representative of the total population. We have treated the case studies confidentially, they are thus not presented in this report. There are several reasons for this. We do not want to mark projects, persons or aid agencies as good or bad. The interviews often uncovered difficulties in relations between agencies, personnel and national staff. Needless to say, we cannot present confidential information. We are concerned with a summary of the overall patterns concerning technical assistance, and we do not want that pattern to be clouded by details.

In order to supplement the information from the case studies, we designed a written questionnaire which covered the expatriate assignment from the beginning to the end. This questionnaire was mailed to 365 persons who had been employed as technical assistance personnel. We regret to say that the

response rate was very low, only 37 %. The information is therefore difficult to use as we have no background data on the respondents, and we do not know how they relate to the total sample. We do not use this material here, except at a few occasions when the answers do express an unanimous opinion - either confirming or contradicting one of our arguments.

The evaluation team consisted of:

Kim Forss, Team leader, PhD in Business Administration,  
FIDE AB, Sweden.

John Carlsen, Lecturer in Development Economics,  
The University of Ålborg, Denmark.

Egil Frøyland, Educationist,  
Statens yrkespedagogiske høgskole, Norway.

Taimi Sitari, Social Geographer, Researcher at the Institute of  
Development Studies at the University of Helsinki, Finland.

Knud Vilby, Development Journalist, Denmark.

The study of national manpower development policies was subcontracted to:

Professor Mwesiga Baregu, the University of Dar-es-Salaam,  
Professor Oliver Saasa, the University of Zambia,  
Mr. Mukhisa Kituyi, M.Sc., the Chr. Michelsen Institute in Bergen.

Our work started in January 1987 with an outline of the method, drafting terms of reference for subcontracted research, establishing a framework for interviews and selecting case studies. In February we held a workshop in Nairobi with a selected number of Nordic assistance personnel for the purpose of generating ideas on the problem, and get the opinions of field personnel at an early stage. We also conducted four case studies in Kenya as a pilot study to assess our interview framework and to develop a joint approach to the interview situation.

Between March and August we did the remaining case studies, each of which took between one and two weeks depending on the circumstances. The team met in September for a joint analysis of the cases, and for a review of the subcontracted research tasks. During the September meetings we decided on the structure and content of the final report which was then written during October. A draft report was submitted to the aid agencies in November, and the final report was completed in January 1988. The process of the study has thus been quite intense. The data material encompasses more than 800 interviews in connection to the 55 cases, plus an extensive list of reading on each case, as well as wider reference material.

### 1.5 Structure of the report

The results of the evaluation are presented in chapters 2 to 9, and chapter 10 contains our recommendations to the Nordic donor agencies. The reader will find our answers to the objectives in these chapters which constitute the main body of the report. In addition we present studies of national manpower development policies, host country attitudes, and the experience of Nordic TAP in a number of specific sectors of interest. These sections are presented in Annex 2, 3, and 4. The differences between agency employed TAP and consultant TAP are the subject of Annex 5.

The structure of the main text of the report (chapters 2 to 10) follows the terms of reference (Annex 1). We start by discussing the need for technical assistance in chapter 2. This exposition largely builds on the special studies in annex 2, 3, and 4. The reader who wishes to pursue any of the problems regarding manpower development from the nations point of view should read these annexes in direct connection to chapter 2. In the main text follows sections on the dimensions of effectiveness of TAP and the TAP component of projects (chapters 3 and 4). These sections treat the identification of TAP components, the integration between different elements of assistance, and the achievements in terms of the different objectives of assistance.

Having studied the TAP component of projects and the achievements, we return to the host country point of view. This is presented in chapter 5. The subject is treated more comprehensively in Annex 2, 3, and 4 - where the differences between Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia are also clearly visible. Chapter 6 introduces a discussion of consultant versus agency TAP. The subject is also

treated in annex 5. The reader who is particularly interested in the subject could proceed directly to the annex as all points are elaborated there.

Chapter 7 is a review of all the factors concerning administration that affect TAP. The exposition follows a normal project cycle; from recruitment, preparatory training, arriving in the field, backstopping to debriefing and returning home. It briefly touches on problems such as language skills, job situation for spouse and the modes of operation of aid agencies. Chapter 8 discusses the alternatives to TAP. These alternatives are mainly seen as training, short-term consultancies and local project implementation (with a number of different ways of implementing each). Chapter 9 contains a discussion of the cost and effectiveness of TAP and alternatives. We can present information on the cost of alternatives, but the discussion of effectiveness only concerns TAP.

Chapter 10 finally contains conclusions and recommendations. We have grouped 30 recommendations that are particularly important around our observation of 8 different problem areas.

There are some special features concerning the structure of the report:

- (1) In general the chapters follow a pattern of observation, analysis, conclusion and recommendations. This is present in all chapters, but in chapters 2, 5 and 9 this organizes the whole chapters, but in the others it is a framework for discussion at the level of different sections in the chapters.
- (2) Each chapter has a summary towards the end which contains the most important observations and the major recommendations (except chapter 7, where the summaries are found after each section).
- (3) It is difficult to do justice to the empirical material. We often quote case studies to illustrate a point. We never have a complete review of a case. This may mean that a project only is cited for what is negative, but there is no mention of positive aspects or of problems overcome. Many readers could feel offended by the presentation of their activities. But that would be a misdirected reaction. Our concern is not to evaluate projects but a phenomenon which is larger and more complex. Our references to projects should be seen in this context.

## 2. THE NEED FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

### 2.1 Observations

#### 2.1.1. Generalities

1. The need for foreign specialist will always be there in any society at any time.

It differs in magnitude as well as in skill composition between countries as well as between sectors in the individual country. It changes over time depending among other things upon development politics and priorities as well as the time perspective itself involved in the development planning and priority setting process.

2. Manpower planning and manpower development policies as well as educational policies in general are key policy instruments determining a society's availability of the human resources required for its development.

The manpower plan based upon a manpower survey identifies the need for training and the manpower development plan implements the necessary training programmes.

3. However, the need for additional trained manpower is itself partly a reflection of past policies and partly a consequence of national and sectoral development plans and policies.
4. These factors determine the demand and supply of various categories of skilled manpower in the different sectors of society.
5. But in addition development policies and administrative traditions and practices determine to what extent local manpower is required and is available for development projects/programmes in the public sector.

On the one hand, the governments of developing countries tend to get involved (and often exclude private companies from participation) in economic sectors and activities, which in the Nordic countries are performed by private companies. Thereby, the demand for highly skilled and qualified government personnel increases.

On the other hand, the governments in Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia pursue employment policies that make it very difficult to attract, utilize, develop and retain talented trained young people.

Salaries and fringe benefits are important elements of government employment policies. Equally important however, are personnel policies and personnel management in government offices and public sector undertakings.

6. Also the development policies and practices of the Nordic donor agencies influence the supply of as well as the demand for skilled manpower and consequently the need for TAP.

Whenever a group of donors identify a priority sector of assistance such as for example water in Kenya and Tanzania or agriculture in Zambia, it means that more projects will be initiated and more skilled manpower of various categories will be required.

To the extent that donors are project rather than programme/sector oriented in their development approach - as is often the case with relatively small donors - projects tend to be planned and implemented without due consideration to the present and future availability and need for trained people to implement, operate and maintain all the projects in the sector. This often results in the creation of a demand for future TAP.

7. More directly, donor practices may create a demand for TAP. This is the case when the specific requirements of donor agencies and its personnel, such as:

- . the pursuance of specific development objectives
- . successful project implementation in accordance with project plan of operations,
- . and the accountability of the donor agency vis a vis financial authorities in the donor country,

lead to the posting of TAP in positions as controllers in order to see that objectives are being pursued, projects are being implemented in time and funds properly accounted for.

Some of these TAP are posted because donor agencies feel that the Government system in the recipient country is less efficient or simply cannot be trusted. In order to implement projects many donor agencies have developed their own organizations staffed with TAP, parallel to existing government institutions simply because it was felt that project implementation and project funds could not be trusted with existing government institutions.

### 2.1.2. Country Specific Factors

#### 2.1.2.1. Availability of trained local manpower - Common features in Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia

The manpower situation in Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia are thoroughly discussed in Annex II-IV of this report.

Immediately after Independence the African governments engaged themselves in a rapid expansion of primary and secondary schools, as well as technical education and vocational training. By the 1980's all three countries had seen a significant quantitative growth in education. Secondary schools certificates ceased to provide a secure access to jobs and/or further education in the 70'es and in the 80'es the problem of finding useful jobs for all university graduates slowly emerged.

At present there are unemployed/underemployed university graduates in Kenya as well as in Tanzania and Zambia, but the manpower situation in general as well as in different sectors and professional categories differs between the three countries. From our country studies as well as our TAP project case studies we may conclude that the three countries have trained a sufficient number of people in such areas as general administration and accounting, as well as lower level technicians (certificate and diploma holders) for construction work, water development and agricultural development, most infrastructure jobs such as road construction, telecommunication and transport services. For most social services i.e. school teachers and nurses a high number of people have been trained but due to the rapid population growth the need can hardly be said to be fully covered although few established positions remain vacant and it is difficult to find jobs in the exact priority areas of job seekers. In the case of the manufacturing sector the need for specialised skills at the

level of technicians is still by and large uncovered although there are differences between Kenya on the one hand and Tanzania and Zambia on the other.

However, at managerial level as well as higher level technicians and professionals the three countries alike are short of skilled and in particular of skilled and experienced manpower required for strategic management, institution building and creative planning and development. Kenya, probably has a higher supply of these categories of people than Tanzania and Zambia. However, in Kenya this talent is attracted by the much better paid and much more challenging job opportunities offered by private sector companies among which multinational companies offer very interesting carrier options for young Kenyan professionals.

In general we may therefore conclude that there is still a shortage of skills and experienced manpower in these categories for these particular - but very crucial jobs - in Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia.

#### 2.1.2.2. The need for TAP - the case of Kenya

##### a. The present manpower situation

The Directorate of Personnel Management in the Office of the President, which is in charge of hiring qualified personnel as well as coordination and facilitation of pre-service and in service training, has undertaken manpower surveys in order to establish the need for training and manpower development. The basic survey undertaken in 1979 is continuously being updated as the basis for decision making.

Theoretically the manpower surveys form the basis for the identification of the need for TAP in Kenya and the Directorate of Personnel Management is supposed to approve request for TAP from ministries before such requests are forwarded to the donors.

In practice, however, the planning and coordination from the Directorate of Personnel Management has been very weak and it is the Sectoral Ministries such as Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health, etc., which should be credited with the rapid increase in the number of trained people at certificate and diploma level in Kenya.

Even if the last basic manpower survey was undertaken in 1979 a simple projection of the data in the survey underlines that Kenya has become or is soon becoming self-sufficient in most areas at certificate, diploma and even in some categories at post graduate levels. (See chapter 2 in the Kenya Country case study table 1, table 2 and table 3). At these levels there seems to be no further need for TAP as gap-fillers.

The future challenge is one of quality more than quantity. There is a need for upgrading of skills (certificate holders to become diploma holders, etc.) and not the least for providing relevant job experience for young professionals in the form of practical exercises as part of the training as well as suitable on the job training programmes as part of coherent staff development policies.

#### b. Availability of skilled manpower for the public sector

The Government in Kenya finds it increasingly difficult, however, to attract skilled people to public sector jobs and to retain the talented people once they have received some experience and perhaps some further training.

The private sector in Kenya continues to grow relatively fast and they can often offer better paid jobs, better career prospects and more job satisfaction.

Many ministries and public undertakings suffer from very weak personnel management.

Young university graduates are not properly introduced to their jobs, there is little delegation of authority, promotion is not always granted on the basis of merit and since there will be no or very slow growth in the public sector for many years due to the budget constraint, well educated young people see little prospects for utilizing their abilities in the Government sector.

With a few exceptions the management style in the Civil Service is one of Crisis Management through command and control. This management style is unsuitable for solving the structural problems of the Kenyan Economy in the 90's and it will make it difficult to attract and retain educated, talented young people.

In our opinion it is the poor personnel management rather than the lack of qualified people or the relatively low salary which explains that some ministries continue to have vacant positions in their establishment.

### c. Kenyan motives for requesting TAP

From a Kenyan point of view, a number of departments, especially in the Ministry of Agriculture, the Manpower Development policies appear to have attained a relatively high level of success. This is seen as a background to the President's announcement early 1987 that no more TAP would be recruited onto development projects in agriculture.

If non-availability of local manpower for public sector jobs was the only reason a Kenyan Departmental Head could have for requesting TAP, the present number of TAP in implementing jobs would seem illogical.

Naturally this is not the case. A Departmental Head can have several reasons to request for TAP assistance even when local manpower is available. The following is just a few examples mentioned by Kenyan Civil Servants:

- . Shortage of established post. The TAP enables him to expand his professional staff beyond the limits of Government Budget constraints.
- . The TAP brings development projects (The TAP is seen as an integrated part of Development Assistance).
- . The TAP is often more experienced and can therefore do the job faster.

### 2.1.2.3. The need for TAP - the case of Tanzania

#### a. The present manpower situation

As part of the First Five Year Plan (1965) Tanzania announced its "Policy on employment of Non-citizens" confining the recruitment of expatriates to those areas where there was a proved absence of a local candidate.

But from the beginning of the economic crisis in 1978, long term manpower planning gave way to short term crisis management, focusing on partial problems and solutions. The issue of expatriate manpower faded into the background in Tanzania and there are no longer any official policy setting dates when foreign manpower will no longer be needed.

The present manpower situation is less well documented in Tanzania than is the case in Kenya and Zambia. The evaluation mission is not aware of any recent overall manpower survey documenting the annual output and requirements for various categories of skilled manpower. Some sectoral surveys have been undertaken by individual donors, but no coordination has taken place neither with the Ministry of Labour and Manpower Development nor between donors.

However, local manpower has been trained and is available for a number of the jobs that are today filled by TAP in various sectors such as agriculture, water development and road transport, just to mention a few.

Thus, in 1983/84 more than 2.000 students were enrolled in certificate and diploma training courses in Business administration, accountancy and stores management and 439 were enrolled at the same level as water and road construction technicians, sectors where a high number of Nordic TAP are concentrated.

At undergraduate level at the university of Dar es Salaam 630 engineering students and 423 students of Agriculture, Veterinary, Forestry and Geology were enrolled in the same year.

#### b. Availability of skilled manpower for the public sector

The problems of attracting, utilizing and retaining skilled manpower in the public sector is far more serious in Tanzania than in Kenya and Zambia.

The reason for this, however, is not the higher pay offered by the private sector since this alternative is non-existent in Tanzania in many of the skill categories concerned. It is the very low purchasing power of the present government salaries, that makes it impossible even for a University professor to cover the cost of living for his family from his salary, which is the main problem.

This means that skilled manpower only seeks public sector employment when there is no alternative, when fringe benefits are substantial or/as a supplement to private or informal sector income generating activities. Consequently, the highly skilled people in the public sector are very inefficient partly because they have very little recurrent funds to work with, and partly because they spend part of their working day generating additional income.

### c. Tanzania motives for requesting TAP

The issue of having the sectoral ministry requesting the Donors for TAP through the Ministry of Labour and Manpower Planning has become a futile formality in Tanzania. TAP is no longer requested by the recipient because there is no local manpower available, but simply because TAP brings "all those things needed to continue business as usual" i.e. vehicles, equipment and funds for recurrent cost and maintenance.

### 2.1.2.4. The need for TAP - the case of Zambia

#### a. The present manpower situation

The Manpower Planning and Research Division (MPRD) of the National Commission of Development Planning is at the centre of manpower development in Zambia. The main objective of MPRD is to undertake comprehensive national manpower planning, which includes labour market analysis and manpower supply and demand projections. It is also responsible for the coordination of the country's training institutions.

Several constraints affect performance of MPRD. Paradoxically it lacks sufficient and appropriate manpower to effect its planning and coordinating functions. In June, 1987 6 out of 7 senior strategic positions were vacant. Many of the staff were also reported to be junior, with no relevant background related to manpower analysis (Segerström, 1986). The net product is that the government's policy is still quite confused, and that manpower development and employment still lack coordination.

But there is also a second institution directly responsible for national manpower development; the Directorate of Manpower Development and Training (DMDT) which is under the Cabinet Office. Its role is to establish a cadre of manpower development officers seconded to ministries and provinces, to administrate training awards, establish a policy on training of civil servants, and to allocate funds for manpower development. It is thus complementary to the MPRD, but in practice their tasks overlap, particularly in the absence of national policy. DMDT also face the same constraints regarding its own manpower development as MPRD does.

The present availability and need for various categories of skilled manpower is well documented through a study undertaken by UNDP complemented by the Zambia Country Case study of this Evaluation (see Annex 4).<sup>1</sup>

Like in Kenya and Tanzania there has been a rapid expansion at all levels in the education sector since Independence. Zambia differs, however, in the sense that the severe economic crisis and the needed attempts at restructuring have led to a decrease in spending in the education sector since 1974 by approximately 40% (in current prices). Consequently, the capacity as well as the quality of the educational sector have been negatively effected. As an example the enrollment for technical colleges and technical training institutions as well as at secondary school teachers' colleges declined between 1979 and 1986.

In general terms, therefore, the availability of local manpower as an alternative to TAP looks less promising in Zambia than in Kenya and Tanzania.

In the agricultural sector, however, which has high priority with the Government of Zambia and the Nordic Donor Development Assistance Programmes alike, the situation continues to improve. A manpower survey undertaken by a SIDA TAP in the manpower section in the Department of Agriculture, Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development shows that Zambia will soon be self-sufficient in professional manpower in this sector at medium level i.e. certificate and diploma level.

#### b. Availability of skilled manpower for the public sector

From our case studies and interviews with senior civil servants it appears that the public sector is seriously affected by a low working morale.

In brief this means that officers are not very efficient, but it also means that like in Tanzania it is difficult to attract and retain qualified Zambians to public sector employment. To illustrate this point it suffices to mention that Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Limited - a parastatal which is responsible for over 90% of the country's export receipts in 1984/85 had 331 vacant positions including such as accountants and technicians that are in surplus in the local market.

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<sup>1</sup>) UNDP, Restructuring and Development in Zambia Roles for Technical Cooperation, New York 1986.

The reasons for the difficulties of attracting and retaining qualified people are basically the same as in Kenya and Zambia:

- . The scheme of service (salaries, fringe benefits and promotion possibilities).
- . The lack of funds for recurrent cost in the public sector.
- . The more remunerative and challenging opportunities in the private sector (or abroad).

But in addition the public debate about the need to reduce the salary cost in the public sector by reducing the numbers of government employees as part of the new economic reforms have created uncertainty and a low working morale.

### c. Zambian motives for requesting TAP

Many TAPs in Zambia are working as gap fillers in established vacant positions to which it has not been possible to attract qualified Zambian professionals for the reasons mentioned above.

To the Zambian Heads of Departments interviewed, though, the significance of the Nordic TAP was not primarily their manpower and skill but the "things" they bring i.e. funds for recurrent costs, equipment and first and foremost vehicles.

#### 2.1.3. Donor motives

For the purpose of this evaluation the four Nordic Development Assistance agencies have defined the overall aim of TAP as follows:

to assist host countries achieve

- the desired development of indigenous manpower resources
- the sustained development of their institutions and
- to contribute to the achievement of other project goals.

Thus, according to this definition, the provision of TAP may be seen as a reflection of a need - felt by recipients and donors - for added knowledge, management capability and dynamics in the development process.

There is no doubt that this is seen as the main aim of Development Assistance by Policy makers in the four Nordic Countries. However, the implementation of policies will always be affected by more pragmatic motives and constraints as seen by the administrators at the various levels in the Aid organizations.

#### 2.1.3.1 The Project Approach - Consequences for TAP

Firstly, somewhat poor results in terms of physical achievements experienced by most donors in development programmes in many African countries in the 1970's have resulted in a change of the approach to Development Assistance from sector/programme support to project support. The donors want to know, where their money goes, and to see that "their" project becomes a success.

This means that among the three main aims for providing Development Assistance in the form of TAP, the role as implementors has been given priority vis a vis the long term aims of training and institution building.

But it also means that partial solutions are sought rather than comprehensive ones. The result has been that more projects are initiated in a sector such as for example water development in Kenya, than the local implementation capacity can justify (without attempting to develop this capacity) that more TAP is required and that the operational and maintenance requirements of the projects create a demand for additional TAP. A number of project cases presented in chapter 4 below illustrate this point.

#### 2.1.3.2. Accountability and the Need for Control

As a consequence of the project approach to Development Assistance donors have felt that it was necessary to establish special procedures and sometimes even special institutional set ups in order to secure efficient implementation.

The appropriation in aid systems by which the donor takes over the functions of the recipient as far as procurement of material and cost accounting and control are concerned, has become the rule rather than the exception in Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia in the early 80's.

In its extreme version the donor has taken over the full responsibility of implementation and set up its own organization parallel to and not integrated into the local government system.

In such projects TAP's become not just implementors, they also become controllers and they perform administrative and support functions as procurement officers, store keepers, accountants, copy typists, automobile mechanics and even drivers for which there is ample supply of local manpower.

The donor motives for the TAP controller is a combination of a need to show results in the form of efficient project implementation and a distrust in the ability of the local system and its people.

Examples of projects implemented in this fashion and the impact upon training is given below in chapter 3.4 and 7.

But also some sector support Development Assistance Programmes have TAP, whose basic task is to monitor/control that funds, equipment and manpower are utilized according to the development cooperation agreement between donor and recipient. In cases such as the SIDA and NORAD assistance to Zambia's agricultural sector with emphasis on rural women it became quite clear that the female TAP's were seen by the Zambian Heads of Departments as a donor conditionality. TAP, who are not requested and not wanted by the recipient organization, have little scope for contributing to positive institutional development.

#### 2.1.3.3. TAP as the secure, easy option

Development projects are risky projects by nature. They are often attempts to start new activities or to expand activities into new environments. The only method existing is that of "trial and error" and success ratios of more than 30% must be considered very satisfactory.

From a development point of view the important aspects of all development work is the ability to learn from ones mistakes and therefore to set up institutional frame works that facilitate institutional learning.

From an administrative point of view, however, things often look quite different. The administrator in the development organization may see a "good" project as one which does not create too many problems.

There are a number of cases in our sample of Nordic assisted development projects designed by development consultants with few TAP or without any, which end up with a substantial TAP component due to the attitude of risk avoidance which is prevalent among most development assistance administrators in the Nordic donor organizations.

#### 2.1.3.4. Practice of Individual Donors

The above mentioned factors have influenced the Nordic Donor Agencies' views regarding the availability of qualified local manpower and the need for TAP in general. But in the absence of a systematic approach to assessing the need for TAP, the judgement of individual aid administrators has often been decisive in determining the actual TAP component in specific aid projects/programmes. This "individual element" should not be underestimated.

The four Nordic Donor Agencies do have different approaches that bear upon the identification of the need for TAP. A few of our observations are listed below.

##### 2.1.3.4.1 DANIDA

The DANIDA budget for TAP is included neither in the country programming nor in the budgeting for single development projects of the recipient country. This means that TAP is "free" to the recipient.

This fact has been used as an argument by DANIDA programme officers aiming at fast implementation and control in cases, where for example Kenyan Officials have pointed out that local manpower was available and that there was no need for TAP.

To DANIDA Zambia is not considered a priority aid recipient. The DANIDA TAP are working either in Zambia Government Institutions, on projects financed by other donors or in parastatals assisted with Danish equipment financed by Danish State Loans.

For the last three years this system has functioned remarkably well. The identification of the need for TAP has always been done by the Zambian Authorities, and the TAP are placed in positions where the Zambians felt a real need.

#### 2.1.3.4.2 FINNIDA

Compared to other Nordic Aid Agencies FINNIDA has a relatively small staff. The FINNIDA missions in Dar es Salaam, Nairobi and Lusaka do not have the capacity to identify the need for TAP on specific projects. Consequently, this is left to appraisal missions undertaken by private companies or institutions. Often the implementation of the projects identified has been left to the same company/institution. This has resulted in some projects implemented outside the local government institutions, with relatively many TAP with functions for which local manpower is readily available. (One example is the Rural Water Supply Development Project in the Western Province-Kenya). The fee received by Finnish companies/institutions for administration of Development Assistance Projects are often related to the number of the TAP component, which they have no incentive to reduce.

#### 2.1.3.4.3. NORAD

Judging from our case studies NORAD is in the process of changing policy/practice regarding the TAP component of projects.

In the first half of the 80's NORAD seems to have been dominated by implementation oriented efficiency seekers (many NORAD desk officers are engineers). In this period NORAD moved from programme/sector support to project orientation and NORAD TAP became implementors and controllers. (Examples are Minor Urban Water Project in Kenya and Rural Roads maintenance project in Tanzania). It should also be mentioned that administrative weaknesses led to severe implementation problems, which, from the point of view of NORAD, necessitated a closer financial control of the projects.

Since 1985 the budget systems and the financial control systems have been improved, particularly in Kenya. As a consequence NORAD has been prepared to let the recipient countries increase their control of funds, particularly in Kenya. NORAD's attitude towards TAP seems to have changed. "The recipient organization/country have to prove that they really need the TAP". This is the way, it was stated by a NORAD desk officer in Lusaka. In line with this change in attitude the TAP component on several projects in Kenya and Zambia was cut drastically during 1987. (On Minor Urban Water Project - Kenya from 14 to 4 TAP in 6 months).

#### 2.1.3.4.4. SIDA

SIDA has maintained a strong sector approach to development in its development assistance programme as exemplified by the support for water development (including the institutionalized training of water technicians) in Kenya and Tanzania, the agricultural sector support programme in Zambia as well as the regional soil conservation programme covering five East African countries. In the areas of water and agriculture TAP has been and continues to be involved in implementation and control as well as training and institution building - a comprehensive approach has been attempted.

In the soil conservation programme the emphasis has been on institution building and as we shall argue later the result has been very impressive.

#### 2.1.3.4.5. Joint Nordic (Scandinavian Projects)

Those joint projects were included in our sample - The Rural Development Fund and the Nordic Cooperative Project (both in Kenya) and the Kibaha Education Centre in Tanzania.

TAP in the Rural Development Fund are basically involved in institution building as part of the decentralization reform for rural development.

The Nordic Cooperative Project is the largest ever TAP project in which the Nordic countries have been involved. The Nordic Cooperative Project has since the inception in 1967 consumed 600 manyears making it the largest Nordic programme ever. Our mission has benefitted from an independent evaluation of the technical assistance personnel to the programme from 1986 by Dr. P.O. Alila and Dr. B.E. Cracknell.

The most successful feature of the programme has been institution building through standardization of accounting procedures, the expansion of cooperative credit and banking and the establishment of training system including the cooperative college.

The joint Nordic programme has created continuity and consistency in a sector where competing donors could easily encourage divergent approaches.

A problem area in the programme was a widespread malpractice and self-seeking, often linked to political manipulation. Areas for needed improvements would be better sector planning and statistics and improved monitoring, evaluating measures.

According to Alila and Cracknell the programme now has reached a watershed where the programme should shift from general support to concentration on assistance by highly qualified professionals in specialized fields; training of trainees being one identified area of priority. Furthermore, the researchers argued that financial assistance will count more than technical assistance in the future.

The TAP component in the cooperative programme in Kenya has been reduced to eight professionals in 1987. The recruitment of experienced TAP to the programme has been notably good. Since 1983 only one out of eighteen TAP has been recruited without previous experience in developing countries - many had worked in the programme. The large recruitment base demonstrates one benefit accruing from massive sector support on a joint Nordic basis.

The cooperative programme has been a Government-to-Government cooperation. In May, 1987 a review mission recommended to strengthen the Movement-to-Movement component of the programme. This should be taken as an indication of successful institution building of the cooperative movement in Kenya.

#### 2.1.4. Presentation of the Case Studies

The evaluation mission has studied the actual posting of TAP in the case studies undertaken in Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia in order to assess to what extent they reflected real and perceived needs.

As shown in the next section local manpower could have been made available for some of the posts filled by TAP and concrete cases are discussed in the sector case studies of water, agriculture and education in the country reports in the annexes to this report as well as in chapters below.

The donor agencies have started to realize this and during 1987 a lot of effort and innovative thinking was going on resulting in recruitment and deployment of local manpower in previous TAP positions - particularly in Kenya and to lesser degree Zambia. Examples of this recent development are given in the last paragraph of this section.

#### 2.1.4.1. Summary of case studies

The results regarding the identification of the need for TAP and the availability of local manpower are summarized in the table 3.1 below.

A total of 324 TAP - of which 13 women - were employed on the five case studies of ongoing projects undertaken by this evaluation mission in the period May - August, 1987. (For a discussion of methodology see chapter 1.

As can be seen from line 3 in table 2.1 only in 45% of the cases did the donor agency undertake an investigation of the availability of local manpower for the positions later filled by TAP as part of the project - appraisal/preparation.

In 56% of the cases, the need for TAP were identified not by the recipient country, but by the donor. In 64% of the cases the TAP were placed either in new organizations set up by the donors for the sake of project implementation (13%), or in special institutional arrangements (for example A-in-A procedures) within existing organizations in order to secure donor control.

65% of TAP in the projects were implementors, 17% were controllers on behalf of the donor agencies and only 11% and 7% were trainers and institution builders, respectively.

For each of the positions occupied by TAP on the 58 projects the availability of local manpower was investigated by the evaluation team. The results are shown in line 7 in table 2.1.

For 59% of the TAP positions there were a shortage of skill in the local labour market, although for 63% of the positions local manpower would be available at the market rate of the private sector. However, at the terms offered in the public sector only 48% of the positions could have been filled by local candidates. In other words for almost 50% of the jobs occupied by TAP suitable local candidates could have been made available. This would require that the donor expectations for efficiency, control and certainty of proper implementation could have been solved by reforming the managerial, administrative and accounting systems of the recipient organizations/countries.

**Table 2.1** Evaluation of Local Manpower in relation to TAP positions in Nordic Development Assistance Project

	Total	Kenya	Tanzania	Zambia
1. <u>Number of project cases</u>	55	23	21	11
2. <u>Number of TAP</u>	324	90	172	62
Of which female	13	4	7	2
3. <u>Investigation of availability of local manpower</u>				
YES	25	9	9	7
NO	30	14	12	4
4. <u>Who identified need for TAP?</u>				
Donor	31	16	11	4
Recipient	5	0	3	2
Jointly	19	7	7	5
5. <u>Organization of TAP assistance:</u>				
a) Existing institution	21	9	6	6
b) New arrangement in Existing set-up	28	13	12	3
c) Donor organization	7	2	3	2
6. <u>Nature of Job of TAP</u>				
a) Implementation	210	42	130	38
b) Institution building	23.5	14	4.5	5
c) Training	34.5	14	19	1.5
d) Control	56	20	18.5	17.5
7. <u>Availability of local manpower</u>				
a) Labour market situation				
(i) surplus	133	32	64	37
(ii) deficit	191	58	108	25
b) General availability				
(i) YES	204	59	101	44
(ii) NO	120	31	71	18
c) Availability for public sector				
(i) YES	155	49	91	15
(ii) NO	169	41	81	47

#### 2.1.4.2 Examples of "best practice"

The evaluation mission has been searching for elements in the existing 55 project cases pointing at ways and means of solving the apparent conflict between the need to employ local personnel whenever available instead of TAP and the donor requirements in terms of accountability and successful project implementation.

A few examples are given below:

Example No. 1: SIDA TAP assistance to manpower planning in the agricultural sector in Zambia has made it possible to identify bottlenecks where additional training efforts and institutional development is required.

Example No. 2: SIDA TAP assistance to the Soil Conservation Branch of the Ministry of Agriculture in Kenya since 1976 has made it possible to develop the institutional capacity of Kenya in this area by long term planning involving staff development and institutional development with a very modest TAP component extremely well supported by long staying professional desk officers in the SIDA mission, Nairobi.

Example No. 3: SIDA TAP assistance to Kenya Water Institute is gradually making Kenya self-sufficient in water technicians. The present TAP are concentrating on institution building in order to make the curriculum more oriented towards practical experience by including a six months traineeship period for Kenyan trainees to get acquainted with practical work attached to water projects under implementation. The TAP component is giving an important contribution to the development of the local manpower resource base.

Example No. 4: A SIDA TAP assistance programme to Tanzania Bureau of Standards implemented and administered by the similar institution in Sweden - Swedish International Standards is an example of the establishment of an institutional framework, that has facilitated a gradual, flexible transfer of

know-how within a professional environment of mutual understanding and trust - with a very modest combination of TAP and short term consultants.

Example No. 5: The FINNIDA assisted Rural Dairy Development Programme has been very innovative in finding ways of retaining qualified locals trained by the programme. The Kenya Veterinary Officer studied on scholarship in Finland for a number of years. He came back as a Veterinary Officer in the project area of the Rural Dairy Development Programme, but since he became heavily involved in general administration he could not substitute the Finnish TAP. FINNIDA then - in agreement with the Kenyan Authorities - employed the Kenyan Officer. He stayed in the same office, received better pay, better access to transport and recurrent funds, was relieved of his administrative duties and could concentrate on the professional job for which he was trained.

Example No. 6: In cases when authorities have not agreed to have civil servants paid by donors on special schemes of services it has been possible to attract qualified locals on a topping up arrangement or by employing local professionals as consultants. In the last case the local professional is employed by the donor agency outside the local government system.

There are many such examples. In Kenya: DANIDA's Mutomo Soil and Water conservation, FINNIDA's Rural Water Supply Development Project in Western Kenya. In Zambia: DANIDA's IRDP and NORAD's VAP in Kasama. In such cases where local professionals substitute TAP's not working in established posts in Government it must of course be made clear that such positions are temporary in the same manner as TAP positions would be.

## 2.2. Analysis of country studies and project cases

### 2.2.1. Availability of local manpower and the need for TAP

From the observations above and in particular from table 2.1 it became evident that TAP were posted to jobs for which local manpower is available. There are several reasons for this:

- Neither donor agencies nor recipient country authorities have a clear picture of the availability of local manpower in the various professional categories. The situation seems to be worse in Tanzania than in Zambia, where the UNDP study has provided a good general review, and in Kenya, where the sectoral ministries appear to have a fair view of the situation.
- Only in 25 out of the 55 project cases examined by the evaluation team did the appraisal report/project preparation include any examination of the availability of local manpower. But even in those cases, the analysis was often superficial.
- Professional manpower may be available in a particular category, but only if salaries, scheme of service and job satisfaction in the particular job is comparable to the conditions in the private sector.

While local manpower would be available for as many as 204 of the 324 TAP jobs at conditions prevailing in the market, the number is reduced to 155 on the terms and conditions that are offered at present for the particular job in the public sector.

- Donors have their own motives for employing TAP which has nothing to do with the availability of local manpower. In 31 out of 55 cases the need for TAP was identified by the donor who wanted efficient implementation under his full control and accountability of his "own staff". Consequently, donors have set up their own organizations (in 7 cases) or have imposed special procedures upon recipient government organizations, which put TAP in charge of procurement and accounts (in 28 cases). As a result TAP are performing jobs as implementors, administrators and accountants for which there is a surplus of trained local people (133 out of 234 TAP jobs where in areas with ample local supply of manpower).

- Many unnecessary TAP "were also found on projects implemented by private companies/institutions whose administration fee (overhead cost factor) was related to number of TAP rather than the fulfillment of overall project objectives.

### 2.2.2. The role of TAP

We saw in section 2.1.2. above that Kenya, Zambia and Tanzania are particularly short of trained and experienced engineers, experienced trainers and innovative managers with experience in staff development and institution building.

However, most of the TAP provided by the Nordic Donor Agencies are implementors (technicians and engineers at diploma level). They do have very relevant theoretical as well as practical experience as implementors.

The second most important category of TAP are controllers. They may be trained as administrators and accountants but most of them are highly skilled professionals, who, however, in their TAP positions spend part of their time as messengers, drivers, typists, accountants and administrators. The TAP often have title of project team leaders or project coordinators. An analysis of how they spend their time shows that they are in fact project administrators tied up in routine work with little time for strategic thinking and institutional development.

Only 58 of 324 TAP were full time involved in training, staff development and institutional development - the sort of jobs which - if conducted successfully - can expect to satisfy the objectives of TAP as defined by the Nordic Aid Agencies themselves.

But why then are these TAP accepted by the recipient governments? The answer is quite simple: Firstly, they are not always accepted. In a few cases donors have used their discretion and good contacts to have TAP positions and TAP candidates approved by "short cutting" the government procedures.

Secondly, they may be accepted by the project organization simply because otherwise there would be no project. This is the case of the TAP as controller. He is a conditionality.

Thirdly, TAP are always welcome because of what they bring. Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia are alike going through difficult financial periods. The public sector is short of funds for recurrent cost and maintenance.

In such a situation, a TAP, who brings equipment such as photocopying facilities, type writers, personal computers and vehicles, is always welcome—provided he is willing to share.

Finally, African Heads of Department are mostly well educated, open minded, hospitable people. When donor agency personnel argue that TAP are necessary in order to secure "safe" implementation of a project at no extra cost to the project itself, why should he object. After all Nordic professionals are generally more experienced than their African colleagues and can function as catalysts. Some transfer of know-how may occur and some young civil servants may learn from watching and being exposed to "the expert".

### 2.2.3. Conclusions and recommendations

From the analysis above we must conclude that the aim of TAP as defined by the Nordic Agencies in the ToR for this evaluation has not been fulfilled to a satisfactory degree. But we have also seen that the situation is not static and that elements of existing TAP projects and new donor procedures are pointing forward.

The analysis leads to the following recommendations:

#### 2.2.3.1. Regarding manpower planning and availability of local manpower

The recipient countries need to strengthen their manpower planning in order to improve their knowledge about the availability of various categories of skilled manpower.

Manpower surveys will form the basis for identifying priority areas for development of the local manpower resource base and for identifying the role of TAP in the long term development plans of the countries in question. The evaluation mission recommends that the Nordic donors react positively, should the governments of Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia request for assistance in this field.

### 2.2.3.2. Regarding the availability of skilled local manpower for public sector jobs

In order to attract, develop and retain skilled manpower in the public sector Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia need to reform the Civil Service.

It is not simply a question of paying higher salaries and fringe benefits. For young local professionals job satisfaction is probably equally important particularly in Kenya, where one can exist reasonably well on a government salary.

The evaluation mission recommends that Nordic Development Agencies bring up the need for reforms in relation to the discussion of the need for TAP during the annual development assistance consultations with the three recipient countries.

### 2.2.3.3. Regarding project identification and appraisals

The desk officers of the Nordic donor agencies in Nairobi, Dar es Salaam and Lusaka cannot be expected to have a thorough knowledge of the local availability of various skill categories.

In order to improve the information upon which the institutional framework and personnel component of new development assistance projects/programmes are based, the evaluation mission recommends that:

- The Nordic agencies cooperate for example by employing a local consultant to develop an information system on the availability of various professional skill categories and the various ways in which they can be attached to donor development programmes as a substitute for TAP.
- The Nordic agencies incorporate institution building and manpower/staff development in their project appraisal/project planning manuals to be used by appraisal missions. And that long term institutional and staff development becomes an integrated part of all project planning documents.

- The Nordic agencies incorporate qualified professionals with relevant experience in institution building and staff development in all project appraisal/project planning teams.

#### 2.2.3.4. Regarding donor motives

- Desk officers in Nordic agency missions are still to some extent administrators rather than professional development workers. TAP are offered pre-posting training regarding the recipient country socio-economic environment. Young inexperienced desk officers are often posted without such prior preparation for the job.

The evaluation mission recommends that desk officers are well prepared for development work through relevant pre-posting training courses. These courses should include an introduction to the recipient country administrative and political system and its traditions and procedures.

The aim of these courses should be to avoid that narrow short term implementation considerations lead to administrative decisions regarding project designs and functions of TAP at the cost of long term manpower development and institution building.

- The distrust in the ability of the government of recipient countries to implement projects efficiently and to account properly for equipment and funds must be overcome by working within the local system in cooperation with the local government officers. The development of parallel institutions staffed by TAP only leads to underdevelopment of local capabilities.

Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia alike have administrative systems and state auditing systems. They do not function as well as the similar systems in the Nordic countries, but they can be streamlined through proper monitoring and evaluation. If the recipient countries request assistance in this area, the evaluation mission recommends that the Nordic agencies respond positively.

### 3. DIMENSIONS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT OF TAP (ToR 3.4)

This chapter should be seen in association with the following chapter on the aim and relevance of the TAP-component of projects (ToR 3.3). This chapter deals with the general impact, strength and weaknesses of TAP in projects. The individual performance of TAP and different factors influencing individual TAP from recruitment to debriefing are dealt with in chapter 8 (ToR 3.6 and 3.7).

Impact is reflected by the TAP-components effectiveness in:

- 1) achievement of specific operational project-goals, different for different projects.
- 2) development of indigenous manpower (counterpart systems, on-the-job training, formal training, training of trainers, development of training systems and manpower development systems etc).
- 3) sustained development of institutions (integration in the national system, strengthening of national institutions at national and local level etc).

Important in this respect is whether TAP are working as gap-fillers or primarily as advisors and trainers, whether they are implementors of project objectives themselves or are strengthening and participating in development of local systems and institutions designed for a takeover.

The degree of utilization of the capacities of TAP is of course crucial for the overall performance.

#### Observations:

##### 3.1 Control functions

The role of TAP as controller is never or very seldom mentioned in project documents, and only very few job descriptions mention this role, which seems to be of increasing importance, although it is seldom specified or brought out into the open.

It is our evaluation that about 20 % of Nordic TAP have some sort of control as their primary function. The function is to control proper use of funds to avoid misappropriations and to be a sort of guarantee for donor agencies. But

a second part of the role should not be underestimated. Very often it is a part of the task to be responsible for procurement of equipment, spare-parts etc, and more often than not from the donor countries.

Interviews give us the impression that tasks of procurement and (especially) control have been increasing over the years.

It is tasks which are often carried out very efficiently, but if those tasks do not imply training or institution-building (in the same areas: control and procurement) it can be discussed whether it is in reality technical assistance, or purely Nordic auditor-, accountant- and sales-functions. A rigid donor-imposed system of TAP administration of procurement and accounting functions can in some cases be counter-productive, and make integration impossible.

Other evaluations have recommended donor agencies to state openly, when the main purpose of expatriate personnel is control of donor funds, and we want to make this recommendation ours. Openness around these functions is also the only road to discussions on how to solve the mentioned contradictions in the TAP-assistance.

It is our observation, that representatives of recipient countries understand and even sometimes appreciate control, but such TAP positions must be given correct labels, and the functions be mentioned in project documents. Project plans shall also include plans for transfer and integration of such control (and procurement) into the national systems.

### 3.2 Operational achievements

Most TAP are professionals. They want to do a job in their own trade and profession, and thereby to demonstrate that a given objective can be reached and how.

Although training is seen as a very important element of the job by most TAP, it is still secondary to what is seen as the primary job functions: to provide water in water projects, to maintain roads in a road maintenance project, to provide planning figures for provincial planning, to plan effective marine operations at Lake Victoria, or to teach at a training centre. Teaching is in

this last example also seen as doing the job as a sort of gap-filler in contradiction to training of to-be-trainers at a training centre or development of training systems in cooperation with local trainers.

Almost all TAP are to some degree effective as professionals in their normal professions. There are a number of negative exceptions, and as it shall be shown later, it has in some areas been a problem to recruit qualified personnel (and/or qualified companies) but the general picture is nevertheless that lack of normal professional qualifications is not a main problem, and there are many hard working, skilled professionals doing a good job.

The fact, that recipient countries need technical assistance can also justify some gap-filling in various positions, and even where the main task is training or institution building, gap-filling is still seen to be an important part of the job.

Gap-filling, understood as TAP doing a job for which local professionals are (for a number of reasons) not available at the moment, has been an important element of the functions of TAP in almost all 58 cases evaluated.

The fact, that more local professionals could sometimes have been made available and the need for gap-filling therefore made less through better planning, does not change these observations, but point primarily at other weaknesses in the TAP- and project-system. And at weaknesses in many TAP's ability to do more than their normal professional job as trainers and institution builders.

Gap-filling at management level and/or as organizers is a special and important area. It is reflected in many interviews with TAP, that lack of experience in management, and lack of skills or tradition for organizational work is seen as main weakness in many institutions in Africa. Basically these problems can only be solved over time, and in donor assisted projects only in connection with strong training elements and institution building elements in the assistance. The value of short term gap-filling in management and organization should however not be underestimated.

Danish assistance to the Marine Service of Tanzania Railway Corporation can serve as example: Supported by Danish financial and TAP assistance since 1981, the service has been reorganized and rehabilitated. The passenger traffic has quadrupled, the number of tours increased rapidly and the staff very significantly reduced. The achievement is better economy and a significant contribution to the economic and social development in the lake region.

The success has undoubtedly a certain institution strengthening effect in itself, but our evaluation shows that training and institution building have apart from this been weak project components until recently. The project, which was to end in 1985, has been extended and a further extension until 1991 is likely. At the moment the results achieved are impressive, but not sustainable.

### 3.3 Training (The counterpart-system)

It is difficult to find a project without some elements of training, and all TAP will normally see it as one of their tasks to train or transfer know-how. But the training component is nevertheless one of the weakest in many projects.

In one third of the projects there was no formal training plan or element, or the training was introduced very late, often after several years of project life. In another third, training was primarily or only on-the-job training, possibly including a few scholarships, but without any concrete manpower development plan. And only in one third of the projects was training made a more systematic, integrated and planned part of work plans for TAP and for projects.

Training plans are no guarantee against problems. It is not possible to make a perfect training system in a difficult environment, but high and timely priority given to training is the first condition.

These observations should be seen together with our observations of the counterpart system. It is an old tradition in development assistance to have national counterparts working together with expatriates, and thereby learning from the TAP experience. The system has often been criticised, but is still the dominant system for training at many projects. It is our observation that

the counterpart situation is a problem in around two third of the projects, and about half of the TAP, who were supposed to have counterparts, did not have any.

One conclusion is, that the old combination of on-the-job training and counterparts is not working, and not solving the training problems.

In the following some of the reasons are given.

First as seen by recipients:

It has been donor thinking, that professionals in the recipient system get new possibilities in their personal development and new career opportunities by being counterparts at a project with funding and technical assistance from outside.

But the reality is much more complex. As expressed by a provincial permanent secretary in Zambia: "Counterpart positions are not popular or attractive. They are subordinate and low paid, and it is often very unclear, which career possibilities, they give".

This statement has, with variations, been repeated in all three countries. In some ministries and sectors it seems obvious, that national authorities are not ready to post their best people as counterparts. Counterpart positions can be dead ends for more senior people.

Very many of the counterparts interviewed have criticised that their positions are very unclear. They do not know if or when they are going to take over responsibility or how long they have to be in a subordinate position.

TAP and the donor agencies often criticise lack of continuity because of frequent changes of counterparts, and local authorities are often blamed for project failures due to such reasons. The criticism is sometimes valid, but we have met a great number of counterparts, who have described how they have had to receive, support and start several inexperienced expatriates, without ever being given a plan for their own future.

Reasons for lack of counterpart promotion can be both in the donor and in the recipient system. If lack of counterparts leads to appointment of very junior people, it is very likely that they will not be accepted as experienced enough to take over a TAP function. But the reason for counterpart frustration is very often lack of planning for their future inside projects.

In Kenya it is often possible for talented young professionals to find better opportunities outside the government sector, and this is also sometimes the case in Tanzania and Zambia. Other ways of "solving" frustrations can be to do less than necessary in the counterpart job. "We are not given responsibility, we do not know if we are ever promoted, and we are paid a fraction of the salary TAP gets. Why should we then be very dedicated ?"

Some counterparts have criticized the TAP's lack of skills or experience in training. Or as one counterpart expressed it: "This is not learning-by-doing but learning-by-looking."

It often adds to frustration, that the TAP in a workshop or a plant is the only person with access to funds for procurement of spare-parts etc. Sometimes with "a direct line" to the Nordic exporter, and it makes it impossible for counterparts to think, that they will ever be able to take over. Often TAP seems to be of the same opinion.

It is not uncommon that the counterpart has been with the job already for many years, and/or is much older than the advisor.

TAP at projects will often see the counterpart problem as a proof of lack of priority given to the projects by national authorities. They are not given the counterparts they have been promised, or they are given too young inexperienced people. Sometimes they have to accept that good counterparts are transferred to other positions. If scholarships are included in counterpart training, they are without their counterparts for long periods, without any guarantee, that they will ever get them back.

A number of factors lead to situations, where TAP feel they have to do the job themselves, because they cannot rely on the counterpart system. A weak training and counterpart system is further weakened by this process, but it has to be added, that quite many TAP - though worried over the situation - in reality like to do the job alone. They feel that training is difficult and often not the best of their qualifications. If a project is without formal manpower development plan and/or time schedule for out-phasing of TAP, they are not trying to change this situation, they often tend to defer the problem to a later unknown moment.

Companies from donor countries may not have an interest in replacement of TAP with local personnel, due to the way overheads are calculated.

One of the conclusions is, that counterpart systems are seldom effective. A minimum condition is that such systems are parts of more formal and systematic manpower development plans included in project plans from the beginning, based on time planning, career development plans for nationals working as counterparts or studying and on more systematic training plans.

Training at training institutions is a specific problem. There is no doubt here, that training is the main task, but problems from other projects are nevertheless repeated. TAP train students, but have great difficulties when it comes to training of teachers and trainers or to the development of training systems, curriculum development etc.

SIDA support to Rwegalulira Water Institute and partly to the Telecommunication Training Centre, both in Tanzania, are illustrative examples. In both cases the assistance has included relatively sophisticated equipment, and transfer of knowledge to local staff has in both cases been a problem. And local staff fear they are left with equipment they do not know how to use.

At the Water Resource Institute one of the problems seems to have been that both parties (donor and recipient) were stuck with the idea of counterparts, without being able to keep this system working. Lack of manpower has made it difficult to assign two people ( TAP plus counterpart) to one position, and experienced local staff do not like to be made counterparts especially to younger and less experienced TAPs.

But professional exchange of knowledge and transfer could and should be structured in a different way. At an educational institution it should be possible to establish a formal planned tutor-teacher relationship.

It is not possible to propose a perfect recipe for training workable in all projects and all environments, but much more open-minded timely thinking is needed. Staff development is one of the key words.

### 3.4 Institution building

Some problems in institution building have been mentioned already. The experiences in the water sector show both the tendency to create independent parallel institutions, and to make existing institutions oversized through assistance.

In Tanzania and Zambia this risk is obvious for all bigger projects. The economic problems are so severe, that all bigger projects are more or less creating their own structures, not sustainable without future support. Systems like the appropriation-in-aid (A-in-A) in Kenya, where funds are channelled outside the national systems, and the payment of Danish TAP outside normal project budgets, are negative from an institution building viewpoint. The problems in training systems, and many TAP's preference for doing the job themselves, are also making it more difficult to strengthen local institutions.

Institution building has to be a sort of a compromise because it can be impossible to develop totally independently sustained institutions. When a country like Tanzania has become more and more dependent on foreign assistance, it is a part of the problem that many national institutions are - at the moment - only sustainable with support from outside.

#### Positive examples

In this situation it is realistic to consider institution building a success, if a project has been integrated in the national system to such a degree, that it is possible to maintain and run it with a limited continued financial support, and possibly also a limited technical follow-up assistance of short-term nature.

Two examples, one from Tanzania and one from Zambia, illustrate positive possibilities:

Tanzania Bureau of Standard and Nurse Tutor programme in Zambia.

Tanzania Bureau of Standard has been given Swedish assistance since 1979, financed by SIDA, but channelled by the Swedish "sister" standards institution. TBS moved to new premises in 1982 and is today a new, relatively well working, institution. Economy and a certain "brain drain" constitute problems, but they are manageable. TBS receives no long-term personnel assistance anymore, but the former Swedish project manager is still assisting short-term. In the mid 1980's an average of 3 TAP were employed by TBS.

A number of factors have been important for the success:

- TBS has had the same director since 1977, and he was the person who contacted SIDA for support. The idea was Tanzanian, and there has been continuity at Tanzanian management level.
- The Swedish support made it possible to construct a new modern institution with good working conditions for the staff, some fringe benefits (e.g. housing). The institutional development of TBS took place in a positive environment and with unusual continuity in the staff.
- There has also been continuity in the TAP system with most TAP coming from the same Swedish institution and all working in the same field. But it is maybe more important, that TAP have never been "a part" of the organization, they have been advisors from the beginning, and they have normally not taken over positions even when there have been staff shortages. In the words of the director: "It is not a problem to phase out, when expatriates have given back-up services only, whereas it is a very tricky thing if the organization from the start is based on expatriates." There has in this situation not been a counterpart problem.
- Through forward planning it has been possible to offer a flexible TAP assistance, with a combination of long- and short-term expatriate assistance, and often with former long-term TAP coming back on short-term missions.

In conclusion: A success through a combination of a strong national base for the project, and a flexible adjustable advisory technical assistance from a sister institution in the donor country. Therefore also a cooperation between equals or almost equals.

The marked contrast are projects "created" by donors or by recipients, but without a national base, and therefore with TAP as managers and implementors from the beginning, and with nationals in subordinate positions. The weaker the national base is seen, the stronger the TAP component, and as a result a much more difficult transfer situation.

The Nurse Tutor Programme in Zambia supported by SIDA gives a less clear picture, but is still an example of successful out-phasing of TAP. Swedish personnel assistance for training of nurses started in 1973. Over the years 45 nursing and midwifery tutors have served on an average three years. Support was given to nurses' schools and later for a post basic school of nursing. Swedish tutors were both engaged in teaching directly, and in training of Zambian teaching staff. From 1978 SIDA and the Zambian Government began to plan for out-phasing of TAP. A formal plan was agreed upon in 1981, and the last tutor left in 1985. A certain staff development training has been given since then, but that is also being phased out now.

During the 12 years of TAP assistance there have been conflicts about priorities in the programme and differences in donor- and recipient-views, e. g. between the more pragmatic Nordic educational standards and the inherited British system.

Another serious problem was the fact, that it was impossible to find Zambian tutors for distant provincial schools, even when enough Zambian graduates were trained.

SIDA insisted that the personnel assistance could not go on, and TAP not be posted at these vacancies, when Zambian tutors were available in the country.

There were also problems in the TAP group. Evaluations show that a few TAP were unqualified and some had only a minimum of qualifications for their positions. It is possible that the same achievements could have been made

cheaper with less TAP or with a combination of Swedes and third country nationals (it was tried to recruit third country nationals, but without success or much efforts).

As can be seen, the project was in no way ideal, but nevertheless a relative success due to emphasis on training of trainers and institution building from the start. The planning for out-phasing of TAP was - with some flexibility - made at the right time, and SIDA insisted on out-phasing, when the local base had been strengthened enough to make it realistic for the country to take over.

In conclusion: When training and institution building elements are built into a project from the beginning, and when the forward planning (also for out-phasing of TAP) are made early, it is possible to absorb a number of conflicts and problems without ruining a project. It is essential, that the recipients are closely involved in the out-phasing plan and its consequences.

### 3.5 The number of expatriate TAP

In other sections we deal with the need of identifying and finding better systems of employing national professionals instead of expatriate TAP. It is not possible in any exact way to measure how many of the present TAP functions local professionals could take over, but our evaluations lead us to believe, that available manpower exists for 204 out of 324 of the functions if problems such as lack of funds etc. are solved. More TAP-functions can be taken over by locals in Kenya, than in Tanzania and Zambia.

A reduction in the number of TAP could release funds for a number of other manpower development purposes.

It is our conclusion, which should also be seen in the light of findings in other chapters, that the number of expatriate TAP could be reduced substantially, through A) more efforts to employ local personnel possibly on contract, B) faster out-phasing of long-term TAP in combination with well-planned staff development programmes, and C) follow-up assistance in the form of experienced short-term TAP, possibly plus one or two TAP in bigger projects.

### Summary of findings and recommendations

Main conclusions and more specified recommendations are included in different sections of the chapter.

The overall conclusion is 1) that control functions are seen by the donor agencies to be still more important, but are very seldom mentioned in project documents. Such positions are not always technical assistance, but there is an understanding in recipient countries for some such positions; 2) that TAP have their main problems in training and institution building; 3) that the traditional system of training with a combination of on-the-job training and counterpart positions is not effective; 4) that it is easier to absorb problems and conflicts in projects where manpower development and institution building have been included from the beginning, but such projects are few; 5) that more systematic efforts to employ local personnel are lacking and 6) that a faster and well planned out-phasing of long term TAP followed up by short-term assistance could sometimes be a cheaper and more effective solution.

### Recommendations

Control and procurement functions must be specified in project documents, and plans for integration of such functions in national systems included.

Systematic manpower development plans must be included in projects plans from the beginning and based on time-planning career development plans for nationals and more systematic training plans.

Priority should be given to projects with a strong national base, making twinning arrangements and "cooperation between equals" one of the possibilities and making institution building and well-planned out-phasing of TAP a process which involves the recipient closely.

These recommendations should especially be seen in connection with findings and recommendations in chapter 4 and 7.

#### 4. THE TAP COMPONENT OF PROJECTS (ToR 3.3)

The intention of this chapter is in accordance with ToR 3.3 to present a broader examination of the TAP component of projects, and not least to compare the actual development with the intentions as perceived at the planning stage.

##### Observations

There is a very strong TAP component in most Nordic projects in Africa. It is the judgement of the donor agencies, that the size of the TAP component in an average project in India is less than 50 % of the average in Tanzania, for projects with the same level of financial funding.

As it has been shown, the situation is not the same in the three African countries covered by this evaluation, but the general picture has been one of a need for technical assistance personnel in many different sectors due to a number of different problems within the countries.

The broad aim of the strong TAP component in the assistance has since the birth of development aid been to provide the countries with much needed technical expertise as a supplement to financial assistance. In specific projects, objectives for TAP varies, but the general long term aim has in most cases been to make certain, that development assistance to projects or programmes lead to viable, sustainable and therefore lasting improvements in the relevant sectors or areas.

Measured on the basis of the intentions of the TAP component as perceived at the planning stage, this aim can not in general be seen to have been met.

Many projects have failed to meet their objectives. They have for a number of reasons not been sustainable.

It is difficult or impossible to evaluate the TAP component of projects without taking other factors into account. And the evaluation of the TAP component of Nordic projects in Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia has not been an overall evaluation of all factors leading to success or failure. It is obvious that the economic crisis, which hit Tanzania first, and later also Zambia, has had a detrimental effect on the development, and also on the work of technical assistance personnel.

There are cases, where objectives of projects and technical assistance seemed relevant at the planning stage, but where the general development may have made the task of TAP almost impossible.

But it is at the same time important to stress, that where a strong TAP component in projects should make it easier to be flexible and to adjust to a changing environment, the situation has sometimes been the opposite.

Such flexibility and ability to realistic adjustment is not always seen.

#### 4.1 TAP does not lead to sustainable projects

One way of measuring discrepancies between the original aim of the TAP component and the factual situation today, is to look at the number of projects, which have had both a longer lasting and a bigger TAP component than originally anticipated.

30-35 of the projects are so mature, that it is relevant to make this comparison, and in one third to half of the projects, the TAP component has developed very differently from what was originally planned. In some cases specifications at the planning stage were not detailed enough so it is possible to make an exact comparison, but the general picture is clear. And in a number of cases it is possible to specify.

Tanzania is the country, where the difference between the perceptions at the planning stage and the actual TAP situation in projects, is the biggest. In more than half of the evaluated Tanzania projects, and in many of those with the biggest TAP component, the development of the TAP situation over the years had very little resemblance to the anticipation of the planners.

Zambia comes close to the same situation but with fewer and less marked cases.

The picture is more varied in Kenya.

Some examples document the problems:

Sao Hill Saw mill in Tanzania. A NORAD supported project, administered by a Norwegian consultant company, established in 1974, and since then with an average of 6 TAP working for the project (with a maximum of 10 at one time). According to the original feasibility study, the last expatriate should have left the project in 1977. An evaluation in 1977 recommended plans for

counterpart training and transfer of management positions to local staff. According to the new plan TAP should be out-phased in 1981. At the time of this evaluation there were still 5 TAP at the project. Part of the management is still expatriate. The newest plan speaks about out-phasing of long-term TAP in 1989, but continued short term consultancies. After around 80 TAP manyears the saw mill is not evaluated as sustainable without expatriates.

Project implementation section, a DANIDA-supported section in Tanzania's Ministry of Education. The project was established under a different name in 1969. In 1983 after the input of 140 TAP manyears, the staff was still predominantly expatriate. The development of realistic building standards (one of the main aims) has not been a success, and in 1987 (after 15 additional TAP manyears) the TAP assistance is being out-phased. Emphasis is instead put on assistance to maintenance in the school sector. The original aims of the PIS projects were never reached.

Practical Subjects project in Zambian upper primary school. Supported by FINNIDA since 1974, and with the Finnish assistance, since 1985 channelled through a Finnish university institution. An evaluation in 1984 recommended that technical assistance should be phased out during the spring 1986, with the exception of one TAP, who should continue until 1987. A new project document made on the basis of the evaluation planned out-phasing in 1988, but a preliminary revised plan prepared by the Finnish director of the project envisaged that the 5 TAP present in 1987 should continue until 1990, and that 4-5 new posts should be created.

To further illustrate the problem a number of other projects with similar problems are mentioned briefly:

The Finnish assistance to Tanzania's State Mining Corporation since 1969. The first evaluation took place in 1985 and showed that advisors worked without specific objectives and were too dispersed to be effective in their activities. The number of TAP grew from one to four and the corporations dependence on TAP increased, while the decrease in production, which started in the sixties, continued.

The Danish assistance to the cement industry in Tanzania (primarily Tanga Cement), where dependency on TAP increased and continued much longer than anticipated, where project objectives were never reached, and where a number of sudden ad hoc solutions had to be imposed to avoid total failure.

The Norwegian support to Mbegany Fisheries Development Centre, a more than 20 year old project, which has absorbed more than hundred TAP manyears, but had to be redesigned and redirected after failure. The actual cost of 15 TAP in 1987 is close to four times the total recurrent budget for the centre, and the NORAD involvement has become much deeper than ever anticipated. A joint Tanzanian Norwegian Evaluation Report from 1986 anticipated need for TAP for another 4 years.

The Norwegian support to the Rural Roads Maintenance Programme in Tanzania, where a project with 17 TAP today, and with its start 15 years back, is still an expatriate managed project, with none or very little Tanzanian involvement at managerial level. Efforts are made to change the situation, but decisions on changes were taken very late.

The Swedish support (through a semi-public institution) to the training centre of Tanzania's telecommunication sector, where the centre after years of TAP assistance (6 TAP in 1987) is without institutional capability to take over, and where the TAP component is now increased and strengthened further.

#### 4.2 A vicious circle

The list could be continued with more projects or elements of projects.

Though the reasons for problems and deviations from planned developments are many and different, some are very frequently observed.

In Tanzania, and increasingly also in Zambia, recruitment and retention of dedicated local personnel constitutes a problem, which is often seen to be insoluble. The counterpart system does not work or works very unsatisfactorily, where such systems formally exist, and TAPs become managers and implementors to a degree which was never intended. In a number of cases relatively qualified nationals are present in the society and the problem is how to recruit and retain them. In other cases they are even present within the projects, but they are for a number of (primarily economic) reasons not able

or prepared to perform to standards required to meet project objectives. Government officers in Tanzania "cannot" devote all their working hours to their formal work. They need to do other things as well to be able to "survive" on government salaries. It is the normal judgement, that one months government salary can only cover one weeks expenses for an average civil servant.

The economic problems in many institutions are at the same time so severe, that they make it impossible to continue operations without funds (and funds in foreign currency) from outside and TAP is normally seen as one of the conditions for financial support.

These problems are dealt with elsewhere. Here, where one of the questions is to evaluate, to which extent TAP have succeeded in adapting to the situation, we will deal with the effects these problems have had on the thinking and planning by technical assistance personnel and in the TAP system as such.

Some of the biggest problems have been experienced in projects of a substantial size and with a big TAP component. In some cases the TAP component has been increasing, even when evaluations or original project plans have recommended the opposite.

It is not possible to give a totally objective answer to why this has happened, but interviews and project documents give some rather precise pointers:

In many of the cases referred to, it has been seen as the task for the TAP group as such or for the TAP coordinator in cooperation with local agency missions (and often but not always with the national authorities) to make certain, that the given project is working and operational in spite of all difficulties. "That the job is being done."

Adding more TAP is often the easiest way of solving complicated implementation problems, where alternative (local) solutions require decisionmaking in the local bureaucracy (which may be politically sensitive or very time-consuming.

This has lead to the creation of additional TAP posts, often generated within the TAP community, and often with job descriptions formulated by TAP colleagues.

Though it (as will be discussed in chapter 7) quite often has been a problem to find enough qualified TAP candidates in the donor countries it has been the first solution to recruit additional expatriates to the projects in an effort to solve problems. Finding ways of solving the problems from within the recipient country has not been given the same priority.

In some cases, projects have developed their own internal expatriate life, where all key positions are manned with TAP, and where procurement and the use of all funds are controlled by expatriate staff.

Sometimes a vicious circle has developed. Difficulties in recruiting and retaining local manpower and lack of local involvement leads to additional TAP posts. Additional TAP posts lead to an expatriate community less integrated and still more with its own social and working life and norms, but with the ability to manage and implement all project elements. This situation leads to even less local involvement and enthusiasm, and in some cases even to deliberate (but seldom open) decisions giving less priority to the national or local manpower support to such projects. In a situation, where the recipient has a manpower scarcity and lacks funds, local top priority will seldom be given to support for projects, where the whole management and implementation formally or in reality are in the hands of the donors.

The NATCAP report on technical assistance to Zambia in 1986, speaks about the danger of technical cooperation creating unsustainable "islands of efficiency". Our evaluation does not in all respects confirm that "islands" created by Nordic technical assistance are efficient, but it confirms that it is very difficult to reach sustainability.

#### 4.3 Country differences

As mentioned, Kenyan projects differ to some degree from this general picture. Similar cases can be found, but they are less typical, and there are less "old" Nordic assisted projects, which still have a big TAP component. An obvious exception to this general picture is the Nordic Cooperative Development Programme in Kenya, which has "swallowed" more than 600 TAP manyears during its 20 years. The programme seems, in spite of many problems, to have benefitted the Kenyan society in a number of ways, but the TAP input

and costs have been enormous. After 20 years the latest review (Cracknell) shows, that insufficient planning, monitoring and evaluation, and unrealistic targets still create problems.

It is somewhat easier to recruit and retain local personnel in Kenya, and the problems with lack of local funds are not so dominant. The same problems as in Tanzania and Zambia are there and they are very visible, but they do not reach the same level. That is one of the reasons for the different Kenyan picture. The Kenyan economy is more developed, and bigger and more experienced, higher education systems in some sectors are other parts of the explanation.

But it is also obvious, that donor proposals for TAP are more often challenged by national or local authorities in Kenya. In Tanzania and Zambia, governments are more ready to accept donor proposals and to see TAP as a non-negotiable necessary part of a total aid package.

Lack of sufficient resources have led to Tanzanian and Zambian near-non-involvement in some "TAP-heavy" projects. Some projects have been allowed to develop on their own to such a degree, that authorities are skeptical, when it is proposed to redirect projects and work for much closer integration and for out-phasing of TAP. As e.g. in the case of the Rural Road maintenance in Tanzania some representatives of the recipient country see it as a new burden and a possible threat towards the objective of the assistance, that they cannot rely on a continuance of a free expatriate road maintenance system.

In this environment it is often the easiest (but also most expensive) just to go on. To revise and postpone plans for out-phasing of TAP continuously, so that the difficult decisions are always to be taken two or three years later. The difficulties in projects can (almost) always justify to put more emphasis on "doing-the-job" in a TAP effort to avoid break downs and failure.

As we have seen in chapter 3 there is a lack of manpower coordination in the recipient countries, and the weak economic situation leads to relatively passive acceptance of donor proposals also for TAP.

When donors insist on TAP

In Kenya the evaluations of the TAP component in Nordic projects have sometimes shown other reasons for lack of national or local support or integration. Projects in the water sector, and special problems in some projects administered by consultant companies are dealt with later. Here we will only mention two projects, where too high donor priority to TAP for different project tasks may have led to lack of Kenyan involvement.

Family Life Training programme. A DANIDA supported programme since 1979, and earlier supported by Red Cross and Oxfam. At the moment supported with two TAP and 7 Danish volunteers. Government funds for the programme have been decreasing over the years and the programme does not seem to have a high status within the relevant ministry. It is the feeling of TAP, that the Kenyan staff is not very interested or motivated. TAP feel, that the programme would come to a standstill without them.

Public Telephone project. A DANIDA supported project, where TAP on grant basis is supplementary to a project based on a state loan. The project involves DANIDA-TAP and Consultant-TAP. Consultant-TAP were at first included in the loan agreement, but Kenyan government claimed they were not needed. They were then made a part of a Danish grant and accepted by Kenya. But the consultants (technicians) have had difficulties. Lack of qualifications have been a problem, but also Kenya Post and Telecommunication's lack of allocation of qualified personnel to the relevant tasks. The evaluation gives the indication, that KPTC - with limited resources - did not find it necessary to give high priority to an area, where a donor insisted on providing "free labour". (The problem is not unusual. There have been other cases where TAP as a part of a Danish State loan were first rejected by the recipient country, but later accepted, when it was made part of a supplementary grant assistance).

Reasons for project problems or inability to reach the planned objectives are almost always complicated, but examples from all three countries show, that if a whole project or the TAP component of a project is the result of donor insistence more than of a request from the recipient, integration becomes difficult or impossible, and working conditions for TAP are often negatively influenced by the lack of priority attached to the project or task by the local system.

If neither the donors, nor recipients in such cases are prepared to take strong actions redefining or renegotiating the projects to reach a positive understanding, they can go on and on, possibly with operational benefits, but at a high cost and without any institutional development.

In some cases local authorities will be forced to take over a task, they should maybe have been given from the start of the project. In other and more serious cases the lack of local involvement from the start, and the donor agencies use of too many TAPs can make it practically impossible to out-phase assistance at a later stage.

Frequent revisions and postponements of out-phasing plans for many projects document this problem.

#### 4.4 Water projects

Particular high priority has for many years been given to Nordic assistance to the water sector in Kenya and Tanzania. All four Nordic donor agencies are involved and a number of consultant companies are working for the agencies as administrators of funds and construction companies. The input of TAP is very substantial, and the good and bad experiences gathered are numerous. Early and very costly Swedish involvement in technologically sophisticated piped diesel engine pumped water supply in Tanzania has been one of the "old" negative experiences. Many schemes did not become operational or did not stay in operation.

"Historical" experiences exist in this area, and new trends in development and thinking are to a certain degree communicated to new projects, but TAP working at different projects in the water sector in Kenya in 1987, had very little knowledge about the development in "each others" projects. They had seldom met, had normally not seen the other projects, and had no professional exchange of experiences, although many of them would have liked to. A coordination unit for water development plans exists, but with limited impact. (More limited TAP evaluations in other sectors e.g. provincial planning units in Zambia with involvement of more Nordic countries showed a similar lack of cooperation).

TAP often felt, that they could benefit from professional discussions with other expatriates in a similar situation, but vague intentions about "doing something to improve the situation" did not seem to materialise.

One of the striking surprises in an evaluation of the TAP component in projects in the water sector in Kenya and Tanzania today is the lack of exchange of experiences.

#### 4.5 Changing priorities over time

As in other sectors the evaluation in the water sector does not include the overall performance in the sector, the TAP component can on the other hand not be seen isolated from other components.

The task for TAP has been complicated, and the thinking by planners have changed over time, not making the job easier.

The development has not been quite the same in both countries, and not all project or programmes are similar. SIDA's assistance to Kenya's rural water supply programme can however illustrate different problems and different thinking. And show, how the role and aim of TAP have changed within ten years.

In the 1970's the emphasis was on institution building at central and high level. TAP were posted in established positions at ministerial level, as gap-fillers in the bureaucracy supposed to implement and train counterparts. But implementation of water schemes was very slow and counterpart training failed because of lack of qualified Kenyans. The absorptive capacity of the ministry was lower than anticipated.

As a result the task of TAP was redefined from institution building and training at the ministerial level, towards implementation of water schemes. Donor designed "construction companies" were established, and the implementation of water schemes was speeded up from 1980-85. But with little local involvement and little involvement of Ministry of Water Development. Many schemes ran into problems of operation and maintenance.

In 1985 the strategy was again changed for operation and maintenance reasons, but also as a result of the new national district focus policy. Local involvement is given much higher priority in the new participatory approach.

#### 4.6 Project documents tell a different story

Change in strategies and thinking are not always clearly reflected in project documents written in an earlier phase and still official. The DANIDA water project in Tanzania is in this respect an interesting case of special relevance for the evaluation.

In the terms of reference of the evaluation it is stated, that main tasks of TAP are institution building, training of indigenous personnel and gap-filling. During the evaluation, the Danish TAP at this project stated, that this was not the case here. The purpose is to supply water to villages, and whilst training and gap-filling maybe secondary benefits they are clearly not main tasks. The TAP therefore felt that an evaluation on the basis of ToR would be misleading and "possibly unfairly reflect the projects performance". While the situation of individual TAP is in general dealt with in chapter 8 (the project cycle), it is relevant to mention in this connection, that according to our interviews not all TAP are aware of their job descriptions, that some had not been given briefings about the development aims, that records were unsatisfactory, and that there was not yet any comprehensive plan or policy for training. (Training is nevertheless given priority, and Tanzanian staff are in one of two regions encouraged to take more responsibility).

Changes of strategies in the SIDA programme in Kenya, and unclear communication of an overall strategy to TAP in DANIDA's programme in Tanzania show among other things, that failure or less satisfactory performance of TAP in projects or programmes does not necessarily have to do with the qualifications of the individual TAP. This is in a way obvious, but deserves nevertheless to be mentioned. Success or failure is a much more complex question.

#### 4.7 Examples from water and health

The TAP evaluation includes more than ten projects in water, and in the somehow similar health sector in Kenya and Tanzania, and the material is sufficient to study differences and similarities in the problems TAP have experienced.

These are sectors, where more and more emphasis has been put on local mobilization, participation and involvement, and all projects have been moving in this direction, but with different complications.

In many of the projects the main objective has been to provide water (or "health"), and almost all projects experience a permanent conflict between this objective, (which gives priority to construction) and the need for long-term integration, which will hopefully make the achievements sustainable in the future.

A choice between a higher integrated but slower (and by many TAP seen as less efficient) development of the project on the one hand, and a more construction and short-term result oriented, but less integrated project on the other.

As we will see later, most TAP have their best qualifications in implementation, they are achievement oriented and want results within their own period at a given project. The conflict is therefore felt very much by the TAP.

Less clear, but just as important is another obvious conflict. The conflict between integration and participation with the local community on the one hand, and integration with the national system at ministerial level and with local representatives for the government system on the other. In a number of projects TAP have done impressive work in an effort to integrate the work in the local community, and thereby also strengthening the local maintenance, fund raising for operational costs etc. There is no doubt that TAP have been able to support the development of more viable water-schemes than those constructed in the 1970's.

The conflict, which is more objective than political, can be described by taking the NORAD support to water supply and sanitation in Rukwa and Kigoma in Western Tanzania. The project is again a reflection of changing priorities, and the increasing emphasis on training and institution building. It started in 1979, but in the beginning with very little integration into the national Ministry of Water Development system, and without any training plans. It was in 1986 (phase IV) decided to integrate the project in the ministry and also to strengthen systematic training. Today it is the aim of TAP to transfer responsibility to Tanzanians and to out-phase TAP, but the main obstacle for real institution building is now, that the project is of such a scale that it goes far above the capacity of the existing government institution in the region.

As a consequence of the project and the efforts to integrate it in the national system it is the likely result, that the local ministry institution becomes oversized compared to normal operations in the region and will collapse without the continuance of extra budgetary funds.

It is important to distinguish between the cost of construction and the cost of operation and maintenance. Such costs should possibly be covered by users fees, but managed by the ministry. The maintenance organization must continue after the termination of construction, and only simple projects such as shallow wells and protected springs can be maintained solely with locally trained people.

Similar problems are seen in a number of projects. Parallel institutions with budgets much bigger than corresponding national institutions have been created. Relations to local communities have been developed, but often late in the process. Integration with the government system is attempted, but difficulties arise, among other things, because of the size of the projects.

In some cases it can also be the feeling of the national system, that scarce national resources should not be used in regions given such a substantial support from outside donors. The development of integrated decentralized maintenance programmes with government backing are important conditions for sustainability in such projects.

The experience, which is similar in Kenya and Tanzania, demonstrates how continued support will be needed in those sectors to make the results sustainable. One major future challenge is to develop systems for donor support to water supply and maintenance less dependant on TAP. It will be necessary to channel financial resources into the system for a long time to come but hopefully with a very limited use of "controlling" TAP and possibly also with some short term technical assistance.

The problems involved are also treated elsewhere, but a number of factors making this coming task more difficult than should have been necessary, are obvious:

- Although a number of problems are unavoidable, it is clear, that the development of systematic training systems and the early planning of integration of projects in the national systems have often been given much too low priority. Consequences have been that out-phasing of expensive TAP has become even more difficult, but also that parallel donor systems have sometimes developed in unsustainable ways.
- Although many (Nordic and other) donor agencies have worked in similar projects with similar problems, almost nothing have been done to coordinate or exchange professional experiences between different projects.

#### 4.8 TAP from different sources

The projects involve many TAP from different sources, donor-agency-TAP, TAP from consultant companies, and (in a Norwegian project), TAP from NGO's. This underlines the need for cooperation and professional exchange of experiences. Many new people and many new (sometimes inexperienced) companies are involved in the work together with different donor agencies.

In some cases there is even lack of cooperation between projects assisted by the same country and working with same background in the same region, as where two Finnish companies work in the Water and Health sectors in Western Kenya. The two projects were designed in ways which made real cooperation impossible, and a coordination committee was for the same reason not very successful.

The Primary Health Care programme in Western Kenya, supported by FINNIDA through a consultant company can illustrate some problems.

The structure of the project organization is only for the project, and without any aims to develop it into a lasting institution. Training is an essential part of the project, but training for nationals to replace TAP has not been developed. Training is only mentioned in two of four job descriptions.

Transfer of methods for development of health material was not originally built into the system. The number of TAP is higher than necessary partly because of lack of integration.

The performance of private companies are in general dealt with in chapter 6, but the example illustrates how a project can develop its own structure, outside national and local institutions. And how lack of cooperation even within the National donor system can make integration in the recipient system very difficult.

The example is not exceptional. Swedish support to Rural Water supply, Environmental Sanitation and Health Education (HESAWA) in Tanzania shows very complicated and sometimes poor communication and conflicts between the many partners in the project, involving both consultant companies and the donor agencies with offices both in Tanzania and Sweden - plus the whole Tanzanian system.

Our evaluation shows, that it is an obvious risk that private companies as project implementors put more emphasis on visible short-term results, sometimes with the consequence that long-term sustainability, training and institution building suffer. When private companies are used, it is very important for the recipients and donor agencies to draw up agreements which take this risk into account, and to create systems for cooperation and monitoring from donor agencies, which make it possible to correct a wrong development.

Tendencies and problems identified, in the "old" Nordic projects - Where TAP assistance has been going on longer than anticipated, and in projects in water and health sectors, where conflicts between integration and quick results are very obvious - are seen repeatedly in several other Nordic projects.

TAP in more or less all sectors in Tanzania and Zambia experience how projects and institutions sometimes become more and more dependent on the assistance, which ideally should make them less dependent, and it is seen as a bigger and bigger challenge and need to develop systems that in a responsible way make it possible to continue financial assistance without tying it to expatriate personnel. The countries foreign currency situation makes it unlikely that many established projects or institutions can continue without some assistance from outside for procurement and often for the payment of part of recurrent costs. But if this assistance has to include TAP to the same degree as now, the donor programmes will gradually be reduced to a number of "project islands", dependent on donors but to a certain degree independent and isolated from the surrounding society.

#### 4.9 A-in-A and TAP as a free gift

Though the economy of TAP is also dealt with later (in chapter 9 ToR 3.5), two economic considerations deserve to be mentioned in this more general chapter on the TAP-component. a) The disbursement of funds directly to projects without going through Government budgeting, procurement, payment and accounting system, and b) the payment of TAP outside project budgets or country allocations.

##### a) Funding of projects outside the government financial system.

There are different ways of paying assistance directly to projects without using the normal channels in the government structure. Sometimes (as at provincial level in Zambia) government authorities participate in priority discussions at provincial level, but the funds are not included in their budgets. In other cases governments accept that the government system is totally bypassed by the donors.

A well known system is the so called A-in-A system (appropriation in aid) in Kenya, used by all four Nordic agencies, but with Norad as the agency, which has taken the firmest decision gradually to replace this system by integration in the government system, and channelling of funds to projects through this system in spite of delays as a likely consequence.

The A-in-A system cuts bureaucracy, is a certain guarantee against delays, makes certain that funds are channeled to the projects they have been provided for. But the roles of TAP (often the TAP coordinator) as accountants and controllers are also strengthened, and the combination of this role, and the frequent TAP role as the responsible procurement officer with links to Nordic exporters makes real integration impossible.

- If integration and institution building are real wishes, some delays have to be accepted through the use of the government system, and another less TAP dependent control system has to be developed.

#### b) Payment of TAP outside the country allocations

This is primarily a Danish problem. The cost of TAP from the three other countries is normally a visible part of the total allocation for a recipient country. This means - at least in theory - that the recipient country during negotiations can argue for TAP costs to be reduced and funds transferred to other purposes. The recipient has an interest in replacing TAP with national personnel, and thereby releasing funds for other purposes.

In the Danish cases costs of TAP are kept away from budgets and negotiations. The idea being, that the recipient country should not carry the burden of costly TAP, but with the consequence that priority discussions become more difficult, and that recipients have nothing to gain by replacement of TAP with own staff members.

In practice the difference between Nordic countries is less. As mentioned by the DAC report on World Bank Technical Assistance activities (DAC(87)30), technical assistance is often "supply driven" or imposed as a price for financial assistance more than as a response to local demand. This goes also for Nordic assistance, and all Nordic countries are quite insistent on the TAP component of projects.

Just as TAP can be seen as a "free gift" for recipients, this can also be the donors view. Additional TAP in projects are not proposed on the basis of economic calculations or considerations on relations between TAP input and project output. It is very easy for donor representatives to propose additional TAP in all key functions.

As long as it is still argued, that development assistance is a response to requests from developing countries it is nevertheless a way of hiding costs and economic implications of TAP to argue, that TAP is an extra free gift. In Denmark, as in other Nordic countries, TAP is a very substantial share of development assistance and a costly one. If this fact is kept away from recipient countries and from national project managers, they have no incentive to work for the necessary out-phasing of TAP. And the replacement of TAP by local professionals becomes uneconomical.

The cost of TAP should always be visible and specified in all project budgets and in country allocations to make it possible to base negotiations between donor and recipient on the real cost of TAP, known by all parties.

#### 4.10 Summary of findings and recommendations

One main observation in this chapter is, that a substantial TAP assistance in projects continues much longer than anticipated at planning stages. Especially when the TAP component is strong and substantial in relation to the national base and/or priority given to the projects. In a number of cases projects are not sustainable after several hundreds of manyears of TAP.

Systematic training components has often been introduced very late in such projects, and projects often rely on "own" institutions not integrated in the national system. The overall observation is, that TAP are often forced in to ad hoc solutions of problems. Implementation of specific project objectives becomes the main occupation. Additional TAP positions are often created on the basis of proposals from within the TAP systems in an effort to solve problems, whereas systematic efforts to try to identify local personnel resources are seldom observed.

There is a special risk that private companies (consultant TAP) administering technical assistance on behalf of donor countries give priority to implementation, measurable short-term results, and donor agencies do not always have sufficient resources to follow and monitor such projects.

Some more specific conclusions and recommendations are included in the different sections:

### Main recommendations

Donors should in cooperation with recipient governments develop methods and systems for identifying and employing national professionals in projects, replacing TAP wherever possible.

To avoid TAP-heavy unsustainable projects much more emphasis should be put on integration in the national system already at the planning stage. Manpower development plans and realistic plans for the out-phasing of TAP should be included from the projects start (see also chapter 4) where donors assist in the same sectors information and experience should be developed.

Monitoring systems for projects administered by private companies should be developed, and donor agencies be given sufficient resources to make the task possible (See chapter 7).

The recipient governments financial systems should be used when projects are funded by donors.

The cost of TAP should be visible and specified in all project documents to make the TAP component more negotiable.

## 5. HOST COUNTRY ATTITUDES TO TAP.

### 5.1 Observations.

The fact that TAP are usually on contract with the donor agency or an implementing foreign company or institution makes their position somewhat unclear to the local officers. They feel that they cannot control and discipline the TAP, and if a TAP is found unsuitable there is very little they can do. Only in extreme cases has action been taken by the recipient country to send an unsuitable person home. Two cases can be cited, one when the TAP had refused to lend a project vehicle to a visiting Minister of State, and one when a TAP had been carrying a pistol around without even having a licence for it.

The local officers were often not informed sufficiently about e.g. the holidays of their subordinate TAP. It was felt that TAP do not always respect the working hours of the institution in which they work and they take their holidays when it suits them disregarding the suitability for the local institution.

It is generally accepted that TAP are very efficient in the implementation of their projects. The reason for this is seen to be the good facilities they have, not their personal or professional qualities. Many officers claim that they could achieve the same given the access to the same equipment and other facilities.

Some officers mentioned that in their opinion the projects had actually too good equipment because that level was not sustainable within the government system. It also seemed to them that TAP, who control the money, sometimes procure equipment which is not at all needed for the operations and thus waste foreign exchange which would be needed more urgently for other purposes in the local institutions.

The local officers are especially critical of the fact that they are not given an equal excess to the project vehicles with TAP. They are aware that they are suspected of misusing the vehicles but as they see it also TAP misuse the vehicles by using them for private driving and holiday trips. Generally it was stated that misuse of equipment and dishonesty are not confined only to local personnel but exist also among TAP.

The role of TAP as trainers is not viewed favourably by the government officials in any of the three countries. The exception are those TAP whose primary job is to train and who work in training institutions. The counterpart system has not given expected results. Cases in which a counterpart has actually succeeded a TAP are very rare. Counterparts are often frustrated because when one TAP leaves another one comes in her/his place. Being a counterpart is not an attractive position to a local officer because they see it as inferior to a position where they are fully in charge. A counterpart is also often away from the line positions in the ministry and consequently misses the promotions. In addition the local officers are well aware that nomination for a counterpart may be given with the very purpose of moving them aside. One case was documented in which the government officer had gone as far as resigning when he heard that he was made a counterpart.

The people who are not employed by government but who are employed by the implementing agency see the role of TAP in training more favourably than the people employed by the government. Many of those employed by the projects felt that they had been given a chance to be instructed on the job and that the skills they had previously, had been challenged by the work in the project. A significant number of TAP have put attention into discussing the project activities with the direct employees of the project.

Some factors which inhibit the effectiveness of TAP as trainers were e.g. a fundamentally negative attitude to TAP, the lack of required academic qualifications of TAP in an environment where these are highly valued, insufficient language skills of TAP, poor knowledge of the country, the skills of TAP are not sought in the country and the TAP or the whole project has been only reluctantly accepted.

The local people usually estimate the cost of TAP much lower than it actually is but even so they think that these are far too well paid. It is often assumed that TAP would not get equally well paid jobs in their home countries. Good salary and easy life are commonly considered as the main motivation why TAP like to work in the recipient country.

Although it is accepted that some TAP is needed in the recipient countries because of lack of manpower especially at management level it is obvious that in the view of the local officers there is far too much TAP in the three countries. This has raised criticism especially in Kenya and even the Government of Kenya itself has said that all TAP should go home. However, no measures have really been taken to this effect and the government has not even explained why they still continue requesting and accepting TAP. In Zambia a decision has been made that TAP should be accepted only when the manpower is needed, not because of the facilities associated with TAP.

TAP is actually perceived by the local officers especially at district level as an unavoidable component of aid which they have to live with. Gate-keepers are not considered necessary but they are accepted as part of reality. To the group of TAP whose need is only seen by the donors belong e.g. the sociological advisers and community development officers. The governments are only gradually coming to see their role as important in hardware projects. This is mainly through a demonstrated importance emphasized by donors.

The large salary differentials between the nationals and TAP are viewed negatively by the local, especially government, staff. This is one reason for the poor social contact between the local staff and TAP because the local staff feels that they cannot invite the TAP to their more modest homes. It also creates an atmosphere of inequality which does not facilitate transfer of knowledge and skills effectively.

The people of the target groups of the projects have more confidence in the projects than in the work of the ministries. It has also been mentioned that they trust TAP's willingness to help them more than their local officers. Since TAP are outsiders they are also outside the negative aspects of the local systems.

## 5.2. Analysis

All the three countries have a stated intention of localizing all the posts held presently by TAP. However, none of them has pursued any consistent policy in order to achieve this. In Kenya there has been some public discussion concerning the necessity of TAP in the country and its effects but no real debate has developed.

In interviews with the local officers and counterparts of TAP it becomes clear that the relation between TAP and the local people is in most cases strained in one way or another. The main reasons for this are:

1. The local officers feel that they are not given an equal opportunity to do their job well and they are considered professionally inferior to TAP even when the difference in performance is due to different facilities.
2. TAP may have lower academic qualifications than their local colleagues whom they are supposed to train. In an environment in which academic qualifications are highly valued this inhibits effective training even if the TAP could be very experienced in his field.
3. TAP may have been imposed on the local institution and only reluctantly accepted as an unavoidable consequence of foreign assistance. In such cases they are perceived as controllers disregarding what their job descriptions say. This adds to the negative atmosphere of distrust between the local officers and TAP.
4. The decisions to accept TAP are often made in the central government offices and the officers in the districts are not involved even if they are the ones who are supposed to work together with the TAP. This means that these officers did not always agree in the first place that TAP are needed for the tasks and are unsure what exactly their relation with is TAP supposed to be.
5. From the point of view of the local officers TAP seem personally extremely rich and having inexhaustible resources for their work. The fact that TAP usually also controls these resources and makes the executive decisions for their use frustrates the local officers.
6. TAP are often unable to analyse their own position in such a way that they would be aware how they are perceived by the local officers and institutions. The local officers are reluctant to make their views explicit due to cultural reasons and to the fear that this would decrease the amount of assistance.

7. The local officers feel that TAP has established double standards in the use of the project facilities. In particular this is the case in the use of project vehicles for private purposes.

There is a difference in the attitudes of TAP towards the local people employed directly by the project and the government employees. There is also a difference how these perceive the TAP. Generally the relations between TAP and the directly employed local people are better than the relations between TAP and the government employees.

One of the main constraints which the interviewed TAP mentioned for their effectiveness, is lack of power. TAP naturally commands more power over directly employed people than over government employed people and therefore feel more secure with the former than with the latter. This creates a more relaxed working atmosphere in the former case. Further, the direct employees may look at the TAP more favourably because these have given them jobs of which there is usually a shortage. It is natural that the good facilities which the project provides gives them also the possibility to get satisfaction of the work. In such areas where the local officers do not enjoy the full confidence and trust of the people TAP is viewed rather positively, not by the people they work with but by the people they work for. They are known to be hardworking and outside the local politics and patron - client systems.

### 5.3 Conclusions and recommendation;

The most fundamental condition for a good working atmosphere between TAP and local staff is that there is real and articulated need for TAP. This issue is elaborated in Chapter 3 and therefore only mentioned here.

Sharing and control of the facilities which a project acquires causes a lot of harmful friction between the local staff and TAP. Having facilities which are exclusively for TAP use cannot be justified with any arguments. It is worst when the arguments are based on double standards which have been established between the local staff and TAP. Proper use and control of facilities is one of the skills in which TAP is supposed to train their local colleagues and this cannot be done if the facilities are not available to everyone on equal terms.

Recommendation. When the purchase and building of facilities is planned, it should be done in full consideration of the whole staff of the project and the needs of the local institution within which the project is supposed to be implemented. The donors have to see the full context in which the project is implemented not "our project" only.

There is a lot of doubt among the local officers concerning the qualifications of TAP. This is because there have been cases in which TAP have not been sufficiently qualified. It has to be accepted by the donors that in the recipient countries formal qualifications are more respected than in the Nordic countries. Consequently a more qualified person cannot be subordinate to a less qualified or a less qualified teach a more qualified. Similarly a younger person cannot effectively teach an older one.

Recommendation. No TAP which is formally not fully qualified should be recruited. Whenever it is possible to know the age of the local people with whom TAP will be working closest this should be considered when TAP is recruited. TAP recruited for managerial or senior positions should not usually be under 40 years.

3.3. Conclusions and Recommendations

The most fundamental conclusion for a project is that there is a need for TAP. This issue is elaborated in Chapter 3 and therefore only mentioned here.

Starting and control of the facilities which a project requires involves a lot of attention to be paid between the local staff and TAP. It is a task which is not exclusively for TAP use cannot be justified with any argument. It is wrong when the arguments are based on donor's standards. The local staff is one between the local staff and TAP. TAP is not a superior staff. The local staff at the skills in which TAP is required to help the local staff. This cannot be done if the facilities are not available to everyone on equal terms.

## 6. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES OF CONSULTANTS (PART OF TOR 3.7)

An increasing share of technical assistance from the Nordic countries is channelled through private companies working under contract to the donor agencies. The development with its complications and difficulties are described more in depth in the annex . The main trends are dealt with here and described through some projects with TAP from private companies.

There is a marked difference between the development in the four Nordic countries, as can be seen by a comparison of the situation January 1, 1987. TAP employed by a company or institution working on contract for one of the donor agencies are in the following called consultant TAP, whereas other TAP are called agency TAP.

Number of TAP January 1, 1987 in Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia:

	Agency TAP	Consultant TAP	Total
Finland	31	118	149
Sweden	120	162	282
Denmark	175	24	199
Norway	185	27	212

As can be seen consultant TAP have an absolute dominance in Finland, and they are a majority in the Swedish assistance, whereas they only constitute a minority in Norway and Denmark. The trend is however, that consultant TAP have been growing also in these two countries, and a further growth is expected.

All four donor agencies explain, that lack of manpower at donor agencies is one important reason for this development. The increase in development assistance has not led to a similar increase in agency staff, and the agencies have been forced to use "private contractors" in the assistance.

The first basic consideration does not seem to have anything to do with a wish to improve the assistance. It was done by necessity.

All donor agencies however emphasize, that they are without the necessary expertise in a number of areas, and that close cooperation with companies add expertise to their programmes.

In some of the donor agencies (most explicitly FINNIDA) it is worrying staff members, that staff shortage is so acute, that it is not possible for the agency to follow projects close enough and when necessary correct and adjust them.

### 6.1 Different types of consultant companies

The consultants and companies used are of very different nature. In the annex four basic types are mentioned.

- private consultant companies with independent consultant services
- export-oriented firms offering technical assistance as a part of their export of equipment.
- institutions involved in twinning arrangements based on cooperation between professionals in the same field (like TBS, chapter 4.5)
- subsidiaries of public institutions or public institutions as such.

A variety becoming more and more common in the Nordic countries.

Some of these companies are very experienced and with years of background in Africa, others are new or have just been created for the purpose. Some have short-term profit oriented approach, while others are development oriented and have a long-term strategy. And one of the basic observations is that the quality and background of consultant companies varies very much and makes a uniform description of their impact and effectiveness almost impossible.

It follows from this, that it is important that agencies have sufficient resources to monitor consultant TAP, and that agencies should not almost automatically rely on consultants and consultant TAP in the administration of their assistance, as it is sometimes the case in Finland and to an increasing degree in Sweden.

It is very important for donor agencies to take into consideration whether a company can be seen as an independent adviser or not. Sometimes a consultant makes the appraisal which later involves the same consultant in the administration and "execution" of the proposed project. In other cases a consultant (as in the Zambian case 5.1) has proposed additional TAP immediately after an evaluation recommending out-phasing of TAP.

Where consultant TAP is supplementary to tied grants or tied state loans it can be natural to use TAP from the exporting corporation, but it is at the same time very important to obtain independent advice.

It is an interesting observation, that whereas Nordic consultant engineering companies running commercial subsidiaries in Africa are able to do this with relatively few expatriates and many national professionals, this is not the case when consultant companies are involved in the administration of agency assistance. One reason can be traditional donor thinking, another, that agreements between companies and agencies are often based on overhead calculations, which makes it more favourable for the company to use expensive Nordic TAP instead of cheaper local professionals.

## 6.2 Recruitment, qualifications and job descriptions

Many of the problems are the same as will later be described for agency TAP. But again the variation is bigger. Some of the most experienced TAP in the Nordic countries are working for consultants, but we have also met totally inexperienced people, with lack of knowledge about countries, languages and the training task. Some were posted with very short notice, sometimes only a few days.

Many companies try to recruit from inside or from a professional pool, but in a number of cases it has been difficult to find enough qualified people, and unqualified have been recruited. The problem has been mentioned in a few Finnish projects and may have to do with the fact, that such a large share of TAP is consultant TAP.

There have also been at least one case, where a person, which failed to meet the standards of DANIDA, were later employed as consultant TAP (and paid by DANIDA at a higher price).

These are not common cases, but when such recruitments take place, when there is a lack of training, and when projects are administered by inexperienced consultants, results can only be weak.

### 6.3 Training of consultant TAP

Training for consultant TAP has been and still is a problem, but in all four countries a strengthening of this component is considered. Whereas agency TAP have always been given some basic preparation and (when needed) language training, consultant TAP have often been posted without any preparation at all.

Some consultant TAP are so experienced, that they possibly can do without the normal preparatory course and obviously without language training. But quite many consultant TAP have complained that they were not given the opportunity to get the training they needed, and many could have benefitted. Language is a problem for many, and language problems can spoil training components of projects. Lack of basic knowledge about the African country has caused problems for others.

### 6.4 The impact

Interviews with consultant TAP and with representatives from agencies and companies give the impression, that consultant TAP are basically "production- and implementation-oriented". Contracts are often favouring measurable targets, and this is in line with the most typical consultant TAP qualifications.

Projects based on consultant TAP and with good training and institution building components exist, but it is obvious that many consultant companies have a tendency to form a sort of independent organization for the purpose of reaching the specific project objectives stated in the agreement. Training and institution building will often suffer in such cases.

A special problem can be that a consultant company want to keep executive power to be able to reach agreed production targets. In such cases training at management level and institution building becomes almost impossible.

The best consultant companies may have "better memories" than agencies normally have, and they are sometimes through their utilization of experiences gathered able to "guarantee" a better continuity in a project.

Where the cooperation is based on a twinning arrangement between Nordic and African institutions in the same fields, this becomes even more obvious and we have (as in the case with TBS in Tanzania) seen some of the best results.

#### 6.5 Organizational problems

Organizational problems are especially important in relation to consultant TAP. Project organizations are often complicated with many parties involved, and with consultants they tend to become even more complicated:

The idea is, of course, to make the burden easier for the donor agencies, who do not have to deal with recruitment, administration etc.

But six different parties will often be involved in necessary negotiations involving all groups: Local and headquarter representatives of consultants, local and headquarter representatives of donor agencies and local and central representatives of the recipient.

Representatives of donor agencies at headquarters do not always have the same opinions as the local missions, local consultant TAP can have problems with communications to their Nordic headquarters, and communications between consultants and agencies can create problems. Communication problems and difficulties within the donor system can also make it almost impossible for the recipient to become involved. (A few illustrative cases are referred in the end of this chapter).

If a consultant company is inexperienced and back-stopping weak, and if agreements drawn up with the consultant have not taken into account how conflicts and problems are to be solved, projects involving consultant TAP can become very complicated and burdensome also for the agencies.

Where consultant TAP have been working for experienced responsible consultant companies some of the benefits for the projects have been:

- specialist knowledge
- continuity in operations
- less administrative work for agencies
- cooperation between professionals from similar institutions
- well composed teams with similar background and good management.

Where experiences have been less positive, the consultant companies have sometimes been nothing but a company for construction and implementation (including export), sometimes over-staffed with TAP, with far too little integration in the local system and with more loyalty towards the delivering company than towards the donor agency or recipient country.

In some cases "corrective measures" taken by donor agencies, have involved the agencies much more than anticipated.

#### 6.6 Typical problems

A great number of cases already referred to have involved consultant TAP and it has been mentioned in each case. To illustrate typical problems three very different projects involving consultant TAP are described in the following:

##### Tanga Cement

in Tanzania, assisted by DANIDA through a consultant company which is a specialist in the cement field and responsible for the construction of the plant (and other cement plants). The project is complicated and problems have been many. Only two problems of principle are dealt with here:

- Technical assistance is based on an agreement between DANIDA and the Danish consultant company, but only indirectly with the Tanzanian company. Another Tanzanian cement plant owned by the same Tanzanian parastatal receives Swedish assistance through a Swedish consultant company, but based on a contract built on different principles and

involving the Tanzanian company much more directly. For this and other reasons a big and expensive Danish team (12 TAP in spring 1987) and a Swedish team have worked without coordination or cooperation at two Tanzanian cement plants owned by the same parastatal and with similar problems.

- The agreement between DANIDA and the Danish consultant company has stated specific production targets for the plant, and the consultant TAP team feared that those targets could only be reached, if and when all management positions were in hands of expatriates. Production targets were in contradiction with training and institution building efforts. The situation was changed through long and complicated negotiations.

#### Rural Dairy Development Programme

in Kenya supported by FINNIDA through private consultants. The project is an example of a project started without an evaluation of a prior pilot phase or a comprehensive appraisal report. A consultant, who proposed the set-up of a milk processing plant, was also responsible for the feasibility study on the plant.

The strongest input in the project is the plant (as a grant to a cooperative) plus trucks and milk-coolers also delivered as grants. 5 consultant TAP are working for the project.

The project was evaluated by an independent international consultant on FINNIDA contract in December 1986 and the criticism was penetrating. The most serious criticism is, that the need was not rightly assessed. That the idea of competition with existing dairies (KCC) had not been sorted out, and that the project has created a number of problems threatening to weaken the cooperative movement in the area.

There are interesting training elements in the project, (and information in 8.1.2 tells about other positive aspects), but the evaluation shows how a turn-key export operation and including technical assistance can be dangerous for a local society if the need and the economy is not assessed with sufficient care. The evaluation shows also, that there have been no cooperation with other donors in the sector.

Support programme for Luapula province

in Zambia. The programme consists of several components assisted by FINNIDA through a university institution. Here it is basically mentioned for two reasons:

- it illustrates how an inexperienced and weak consultant organization can have administrative problems. TAP criticised lack of backstopping, poor communication with headquarter etc. and it seems that FINNIDA should have done more to support the university institutions "head-quarters", when the institution was made responsible for the implementation. The TAP were not from the university but recruited from outside.
- in one of the components trucks were delivered to a cooperative workshop, and a consultant TAP was transport and workshop manager. He had only little time for training. Transport planning, and procurement of trucks and spare-parts in Finland were important parts of his work. The broken transport fleet of the cooperative union showed, how different donors over the years had granted different trucks, and how maintenance and spare-part problems had increased simultaneously. A counterpart had worked at the workshop for nine years, but saw no possibility for taking over in this system.

The examples, from the cement plant (as a giant investment) over the dairy processing plant to the trucks for a Zambian cooperative union, show, that it is very difficult to combine assistance based on export of plant or equipment (on grant basis) with integration and institution building. Minimum conditions are independent appraisals and monitoring plus sufficient strength at agency level to take and keep overall responsibility for the projects. And it is contracts and agreements, which make certain that external companies are answerable to the local organizations, they work with. Many differences should be sorted out at this level, and the partners should here have equal bargaining strength.

SIDA has tried to develop new types of consultant agreements focusing on needs for institution building and training, and offering bonuses to consultant companies for performances which through planning and training lead to less use of TAP and to a sooner handing over of responsibilities to nationals. Such efforts should be strengthened. SIDA has also, especially when contracts are between a Swedish and a recipient company, provided the local company or institution with legal advice, in an effort to give the African partner bargaining strength.

### Summary of findings and recommendations

The basic recommendations in the annex study on consultants are based on the fact that consultant TAP are there to stay, but that the almost automatic development towards more use of consultants (partly due to manpower shortages at donor agencies) cannot be justified. Each possible project has to be assessed and the best technical assistance solution selected.

In a number of projects, consultants have a better professional background, and positive twinning and "sister" arrangements can be developed, but in many cases consultants are very concerned with measurable short-term objectives, and not concentrating on integration, institution building and out-phasing of TAP through replacement by nationals.

It is our recommendation, that minimum requirement for the use of consultant TAP are

- that agencies have enough staff to make a real choice between agency TAP and consultant TAP, taking all factors into consideration.
- that agreements with consultants strengthen training and institution building elements, and make it a specified part of plans to out-phase TAP and hand over projects. Models should be developed, which make company profit less dependent on the number of TAP employed.
- that agreements are based on independent assessments and appraisals.
- that the recruitment base is widened to cover more than the donor country. And more emphasis put on recruitment and training of consultant TAP.
- agencies must have enough strength and manpower to retain the overall responsibility of project performance.

Other recommendations (e.g. on the greater use of local professionals) which are relevant for all types of projects are made in the chapter 8 and in the general recommendations.

The cost and cost effectiveness of consultant TAP versus agency TAP are dealt with in the annex study and in chapter 9. (ToR 3.5). The normal consultant TAP is - as an individual - normally considerably more expensive than agency TAP. The extra cost covers both the company profit, and back-up services. It is not easy to compare extra costs with possible savings in the donor-agency system, but the study shows that it in a number of cases is a problem, that the administrative backstopping is insufficient, and that agencies relying on consultant companies have not enough strength to monitor and adjust projects. The real cost of consultant TAP can in such cases be more expensive, than revealed by official figures.

cases consultants are very concerned with maintaining their reputation and not concentrating on information, maintaining working and out-purchasing of TAP through replacement by individuals.

It is our recommendation that agencies require a lot of use of consultant TAP.

- that agencies have enough staff to run a real office between agency TAP and consultant TAP, taking all factors into consideration.

- that agencies with consultants strengthen training and monitoring building elements, and make it a specified part of the out-purchase TAP and hand over projects. Models should be developed, which show company profit less dependent on the number of TAP employed.

- that agreements are based on independent assessments and materials.

- that the recruitment base is widened to cover more than the donor country. And more emphasis put on recruitment and training of consultant TAP.

- agencies must have enough strength and capacity to handle the overall responsibility of project performance.

Other recommendations (e.g. on the greater use of local professionals) which are relevant for all types of projects are made in the chapter 8 and in the general recommendations.

## 7. THE PROJECT CYCLE (ToR, part of 3.7 + 3.6)

### 7.1 Job identification and sources of TAP

#### 7.1.1 Donor countries

The Nordic donor agencies see Technical Assistance as a natural part of assistance. There is a natural specialization in types of projects according to differences in donor countries. Sweden do more in industry, Finland in forestry, Norway in fishery and Denmark in dairy to mention a few obvious examples.

The composition of country programmes reflect much broader interests, but it is still realized that different donor countries have different backgrounds, and the different ways of tying assistance to procurement in donor countries can at least to some degree be justified by the existence of a special expertise in certain areas in the countries.

The technical assistance have followed the same pattern. The Nordic countries have to a certain degree specialized in areas, where expertise and a national resource base exists. And projects have been designed accordingly.

#### 7.1.2 Recipient countries involvement

Recipient countries are formally involved in the project design and the identification of the need for TAP. But they have very often to rely on the donors knowledge about technical needs of a new project and the relevance of the available expertise from outside.

When the size and composition of a TAP component is decided the strongest involvement from the recipient country is seen, where:

a) the project is the result of clearly defined recipient needs in a project or a sector, where the country has some strength and expertise already, in contradiction to "new" sectors or areas, where a need is realised and the local expertise weak or non-existing.

b) it is obvious, that a professional (possibly temporary) function in a project should be staffed with local personnel if at all possible (community participation officers e.g. in water projects have been such examples).

In general the involvement has been greater in Kenya, where it is a general political view-point, that the number of TAP has to be reduced, than in Tanzania and Zambia.

With very few exceptions TAP positions are only identified in the government sectors or in parastatals. The important question when a project is identified is therefore, whether it is possible to man a post with a national government employed person, or whether a TAP is needed.

Missions identifying new projects and preparing project documents include representatives of the recipient, but the strength and majority is normally expatriate "experts", and they have the mission as their main task at that moment, whereas local participants are often attending other duties at the same time.

And because TAP is seen as a free extra gift in connection with financial support it is normally easy for donor and recipient to agree, on what the donor thinks is a sufficient number of TAP to make certain, that a new project will not become a failure due to mismanagement, lack of expertise, vacancies at key positions etc. The recipients have the same short-term interest, and lack funds.

### 7.1.3 The possible local resource base

The local resource base has, as reflected in chapter 3, been growing as a consequence of the strengthening of higher education and also as a reflection of the economic development. Local expertise is to be found inside and outside the government system, at research institutions, in private or public companies, some specialising in consultancies.

But when projects are designed and positions identified, the choice is normally still between TAP from the donor country, and government employees. A few exceptions exists, and new attitudes are emerging towards a more systematic search for alternative local personnel. But we have seen very few projects involving TAP, where systematic work had been done in an effort to try to identify all available local personnel resources.

Nordic and European TAP are in some cases 100 times more expensive than local professionals, and always several times as expensive. In a situation, where unemployment is and will become a growing problem for many africans with higher education (because governments lack funds), it is extremely important that TAP are not just recruited for positions, where local manpower is available, but where the problem is the government systems inability to employ local professionals.

It can create difficulties to employ nationals on temporary contract and possibly on different terms from the permanent employed national staff, and that is one reason for the situation.

But the few rather unsystematic attempts show, that possibilities exists.

The Finnish supported Rural Dairy Development Programme in Kenya is interesting in this respect. In addition to Finnish TAP, the Finnish consultant has employed a Kenyan professional (M.Sc. in agriculture dairy development) who was trained on scholarship in Finland during phase I of the project. When he returned, he was posted in the area as a livestock development officer, but the many bureaucratic and administrative routines did not allow him to utilize his expertise fully. The Finnish consultant proposed to employ him as Kenyan consultant, and this was accepted by Kenyan authorities. He is now doing the job with higher salary, more autonomy and better motivation.

This and a few other examples show, that it is possible to make untraditional local arrangements. They will sometimes lead to conflicts, and a perfect way to manage this has not yet been developed. But the greater use of local professionals in foreign owned commercial companies, the fact that the resource base is growing, and the few unsystematic attempts donor agencies have made, show that TAP can sometimes be replaced by local professionals at a much lower price.

### Recommendation

Much more systematic efforts should be made on development of systems for identifying and employing local professionals and replace TAP with nationals where possible.

#### 7.1.4. Third world TAP

What has been said about the local resource base can also be said about TAP from Third World countries, including neighbouring countries. No systematic attempts have been made to replace Nordic TAP with cheaper TAP from Third world countries.

Where Third world professionals work at projects, it is seldom the result of a donor policy.

In Zambia Cold Storage Corporation (ZCSC), assisted by DANIDA, a TAP position as production manager was taken over by a Tanzanian expatriate working on local contract with a foreign exchange topping-up of the salary. But his presence at ZCSC was not the result of Danish assistance. The local contract was made in continuance of a UN engagement.

Tanzania Bureau of Standards, assisted by SIDA, employs an experienced Asian TAP, who has been with the institution before, and is back after some years of UN employment. But he is financed by NORAD's personnel fund for recruitment from Third World countries, and SIDA had not been ready to finance.

We have not been able to make any systematic evaluation of NORAD's fund or of the quality and performance of the few Third world professionals, we have met. But it is obvious, that no serious attempts have been made to find qualified Third world professionals for posts now manned with Nordic TAP within our selected projects.

#### 7.1.5 The Nordic resource base for TAP

The Nordic aid agencies look for qualified personnel in their home countries. Posts are advertised in journals of "vacant positions" and sometimes in daily papers and professional journals. Consultant companies look first for personnel inside their own organization, but they have often to recruit from the open market as well.

The national resource base in the Nordic countries is normally big enough to attract a number of applicants. Half of the posts registered had 10 applicants or more, and only a handful did not attract any applicants.

Differences are however big. FINNIDA can tell about consultant TAP being more expensive in some fields, where a few companies have something like a monopoly situation, and all donor agencies have experienced situations, where they have difficulties in finding suitable candidates. In some evaluation reports and interviews, this is mentioned as a sort of "excuse" thereby reflecting, that candidates are often posted without all wanted qualifications. A candidate without theoretical qualifications if he has a good professional record or vice versa.

The aid agency and consultants are often forced to accept someone with qualifications other than they have originally looked for. In a case we have seen how a person who had been refused was later accepted, when another candidate withdrew. Later it was realised, that he should not have been posted. In other cases ( but very few) TAP have been dismissed and repatriated.

It is our conclusion, that the domestic resource base should be enlarged to provide the employer with a more qualified choice of candidates.

Experience from other developing countries, for example Papua New Guinea and Botswana (Raphaeli, Roumani and Mackellar) indicate, that the best solution is to provide a country with funds and make it possible for the country to recruit internationally for the purpose it wants.

This is drastic medicine, but it is a reason for alarm when Nordic TAP without sufficient qualifications are sometimes recruited, without any prior attempt to identify local professionals.

Where expatriate TAP from industrial countries are needed, the recruitment should be much more open.

As a start it should be possible to enlarge the resource base by recruitment in all Nordic countries.

### Recommendation

We propose that the agencies journals on vacant positions are printed together and contain vacant posts in all aid agencies.

The long-term objective must be to widen the recruitment base further internationally.

This goes also for consultant companies. There are sectors, where some companies in donor countries have a virtual monopoly in development assistance. Even if such assistance implies delivery of equipment from the donor country, it should be possible to create competition and widen the resource base for TAP internationally. Or to give the recipient country a much wider and freer choice.

### 7.2 Recruitment of personnel

The Nordic donor agencies all have a personnel section, which is responsible for finding and recruiting project personnel. Recruitment is generally initiated by field offices and personnel sections and programme sections involved in the final stage.

The responsibility for identifying, recruiting and sending out agency TAP rests with the personnel section. This section also handles the administration of personnel, salary payments, allowances, travelling, leave etc.

The size of the personnel sections vary. FINNIDA has the smallest with 18 persons altogether, as there are relatively few agency recruited persons. The other personnel sections comprise 20-40 persons.

The purpose of the recruitment process is to ascertain that the personnel that are sent out are qualified to do a good job. Predictors of performance are: professional qualifications, educational background, personal characteristics, language proficiency, health and family situation.

Many of these factors can be judged on a routine basis. But it is widely recognized, that other factors are also important, and recruiters see also a need to screen personal aptitudes for the jobs.

Some sort of psychological tests are used. FINNIDA uses an institute for occupational psychology for a one-day test, and SIDA, NORAD and DANIDA occasionally consult psychologists. SIDA has developed a selection system with the help of psychologists, and DANIDA uses a tool called the PAPI system, which is supposed to match job descriptions with personal qualifications.

The tests intend to provide some insight in the applicants personality, including adaptability, flexibility, dedication, patience, resourcefulness, tact, skills in cross-cultural communication etc.

But such qualities are not easily identifiable even through tests, and different TAP positions have different needs. A senior advisor needs another profile than technical gap-filler, and the profile of a trainer is again very different.

The nature of projects differ, and one project can have different needs at different times. As an example, the first marine officer, who played an important role in institutional development of one Tanzanian project in the transport sector, was a rather stubborn person, who would probably not have made it through a psychological test, but who was the right person for the project during its first years.

Tests can be of use, but with uncertainty concerning general selection criteria, we think that it is more important to base selection on persons who have a good experience in working abroad.

The chances that the personnel sections staff will recruit the right candidate increases the more they know about the actual project, its local staff, and the other expatriates. It is very important, that the personnel sections develop their own knowledge of the local scene, and that they have a high status within the agency system. Project personnel should be closely involved in recruitment, but it is also important, that programme officers in the personnel sections have field experience.

#### Recommendation

Programme officers in the personnel sections should be given opportunities to visit project sites regularly and follow up how their candidates are doing.

Some consultant companies recruit personnel without any formal screening at all, and in some cases without any involvement of donor agencies. In most contracts, the donor agencies have a formal say, and can refuse to accept candidates. In some cases more than one candidate are presented, but often it is a very formal right of vetoing.

Cases exist, where persons without formal qualifications (e.g. in English language) have been posted without any special prior training, and where instructions, as in the case of Finnish support to Fibreboard Africa Ltd. in Tanzania, had to be given via an interpreter. An ineffective solution criticised by Tanzanians.

Some of the projects, where consultant TAP were posted without any screening, had a high turnover of personnel. Several expatriates have been sent home because they failed, and the experiences point at the need to monitor the quality of consultant TAP more closely.

At the same time it is important to realize that both consultants and agencies find it natural to protect staff and hide problems. Nobody likes to admit failures. And if TAP have been posted, problems have to be serious before action is taken.

#### 7.2.1 Few Women among TAP

Women are a minority in the group of TAP. We have only interviewed few female TAP during our field visits, most of them but not all working with the software components of projects. Although cultural differences and different management traditions can in some cases create specific problems for women, so can they for men. We have not observed any major problems, which can discourage wider recruitment of women. When job descriptions and TAP posts are formulated, it should be taken into account that men and women have different opportunities for reaching the different sexes in the recipient country and to involve them in development activities. But we have not been able to make an more thorough evaluation.

### 7.2.2 Spouses' job situation

In recent years the demand for jobs for the accompanying spouse has been put on the agenda of the TAP associations repeatedly. Most of the spouses are female. Some figures from Norway are presumably indicative for the other Nordic countries as well. 1985 NORAD employed 254 experts, 92 % male and 8 % female. 89 % of the men were married whereas only 55 % of the women were married. Few men (outside liberal professions) are inclined to accompany their wives without any prospects of employment. This aggravates the skewed sex recruitment and consequently most likely the negligence of the role of African women in technical assistance programmes.

Traditionally the spouses have been involved in philanthropic work on a part time basis. In recent years NORAD, DANIDA and SIDA have introduced the concept "mini projects" for small philanthropic projects financed at the discretion of the field officers.

In Tanzania an "interest group" of spouses has forwarded proposals for improving the situation:

- More positions on local contracts
- hiring spouses for odd jobs and small consultancies
- widening the possibilities for part time jobs
- provide salary grants when the spouse succeed in getting non-paid jobs in the local economy when the type of employment at hand is within donor's priority areas
- contributing with salary grants for the spouse within the project or programme of the husband/wife.

The evaluation mission has not had opportunity to look specifically into this area of concern. The value of healthy family situations is appreciated and the increasing significance of the question of job opportunities for the spouses is acknowledged.

The evaluation mission is not in a position to make any recommendations regarding this issue. The needs and wishes of the accompanying spouses of contracted technical assistance personnel must be weighed against the needs for employment of locals.

A major aim is to reduce the need for expatriate personnel. Provision of jobs for spouses may easily become counter productive to this aim. Still the problem should not be dismissed as being non-essential.

The spouses must not be given false expectations about the employment prospects by the recruitment officers.

### 7.2.3 The role of recipient countries

The recipient countries seldom have any say in the screening and selection of candidates. They do normally have a chance to veto the agencies choice, but the right is only exercised in extreme cases.

In some projects recipient organizations have however received a short-list of candidates. The response was positive and basis for cooperation better through the local involvement in recruitment.

In a few cases seen to be of special importance representatives of recipients have participated in interviews in the Nordic countries. In the case of Rural Development Fund in Kenya a representative of the recipient went in one case to Norway and to Denmark to take part in interviews, but not to Sweden, because SIDA did not see it necessary.

Compared to the total cost of a TAP (close to two millions NoK for a two year period), it is not very costly, but other constraints may exist, and it is not usable in all cases. A closer and earlier cooperation with representatives of the recipient will however often make easier to discuss needs and later problems.

At Tanga Cement we experienced one situation, where the recipient had objected to a TAP candidate. But partly because the management agreement, which was the basis for TAP, was an agreement between the Danish consultant and DANIDA, he was recruited and posted in spite of protests. He was later replaced.

Recipient countries knowledge about their own needs and their judgement of candidates should not be disregarded.

### 7.3 Preparatory training

#### 7.3.1 The purpose of training

The training sections of the Nordic agencies have cooperated for many years. In 1969 a programme for training of field personnel was drafted in Uppsala: "the Uppsala statement". This gave a platform to develop the training sections within the aid agencies and to further Nordic cooperation in this field. It is the attitudes of the technical assistance personnel that are the prime concern and the purpose of the training is:

"...strengthen and develop attitudes and skills that facilitate social contacts and adaptation to and performance of tasks in the host country. Attitudes and skills are more important than academic goals. Academic knowledge may be a subsidiary goal but serves in the first place as a support of attitudes and skills."

The Uppsala statement is indeed a child of its times. It represents the late 1960s in its disregard of academic learning. But it contains a number of salient insights. We find that attitudes are given a very general interpretation; "...awareness of problems of development and of the fact that development means a mutual transfer of knowledge" and "awareness of the fact that the host country will as soon as possible replace the field worker with its own personnel."

Among the objectives of the training we would particularly like to mention the following: "(1) Awareness of one's own role as an agent of social change. Knowledge of processes of social change, of oneself in relation to other people, of general development problems, of the host country's particular development problems, and of the project and its place in the development plan of the host country, and of the development of one's own country. (2) Transfer of knowledge. Elementary knowledge of adult education with special emphasis on learning as a process of change. (3) Social contact and cooperation. Knowledge of customs and traditions in the host country. Knowledge of group processes and leadership, especially with regard to the preparation and carrying out of decisions. Self knowledge and knowledge of oneself in regard to other people."

The words were those of the Uppsala statement, we made the selection of 3 out of its 10 objectives. Let us see how the preparatory training has been organized.

All the Nordic aid agencies now offer preparatory courses lasting around two weeks. DANIDA and SIDA have their own training centres with permanent staff, in Hornbaek and Uppsala. NORAD has a semi-permanent centre, the courses are conducted by personnel from its training section. In FINNIDA training has had a weak position - a small unit of 1 programme officer and 2 secretaries have run the courses.

### The training programmes

The preparatory courses are mandatory for agency recruited personnel, and several of the external organizations also send their personnel to these courses. The courses are conducted by a coordinator who also gives some presentations. The participants will participate in around twenty lectures and will meet equally many resource persons during the two weeks. Typical topics are:

- international cooperation, aid agency policies,
- social and cultural aspects of developing countries,
- specific information on the country they will go to,
- hygiene and health risks,
- the social situation for the expatriate family,
- intercultural communication.

The themes are presented through lectures, but there is usually ample time for discussions. The training centres also have collections of tapes and video films, as well as libraries. The participants should also have time to browse around and look for information on their own. Some sessions are also more self directive and require an active part in preparing the sessions.

The outcome of the training depends very much on the coordinator. Some sessions are of an academic character and others are very personal. The impression is that the intellectual aspects play a larger role and that the development of attitudes and behaviour (and feed back on these from the coordinator) is sporadic and cautious. Fierce discussions on cultural patterns and value systems do not necessarily enhance a deeper self knowledge.

By and large the participants were positive to the preparatory courses. Some would have liked to have more information about living conditions, others wanted more discussions of the politics and economics of development - but all thought that two weeks were an appropriate duration. During the course there would often be a meeting with former technical assistance personnel. These meetings were highly appreciated and usually led to lively discussions on all aspects of living and working in a developing country. Sometimes attitudes clash as the "idealism" of newly recruited persons is confronted with a more seasoned experience of development work.

SIDA and DANIDA provide extensive project documentation in the libraries of the course centers. It is also possible to find debriefing reports of former technical assistance personnel. Used in a systematic way, this could represent a shortcut on the tricky road of institutional learning. SIDA also invites former expatriates to write case studies from their field work.

#### Potential future developments

Even though the preparatory training has found a suitable form, we would like to give some critical comments on the following aspects; "training of trainees", training of agency personnel, job-related training, and cultural understanding.

The development of skills in training and institution development is hardly approached, let alone cultivated, in the preparatory courses. The focus is on the individual and societal levels, the organizational level receives little attention. One of the most significant handicaps of expatriates is their weak theoretical and practical base on institutional development. The assistance personnel mostly have their professional experience within one specialization in a well structured organization operating within a stable political system and an infrastructure providing personal safety. It is a formidable task to suddenly become an "expert" in an alien culture, where the organization fights financial bankruptcy as well as other social struggles. The easy way out is often to establish a parallel system operating efficiently on a Nordic model and on a sound financial basis.

The point is that technical assistance personnel have a tendency to practice their knowledge and skills regardless of the local environment. They should to a larger extent analyse training needs, plan and implement training programmes - but their ability to do so is limited. Here the preparatory courses have a mission to fill. For the course centers this is not only a question of attitudes but also of learning the relevant skills.

The staff of the aid agencies field offices play a crucial role in drafting and monitoring projects. They are also backstopping, supervising and debriefing personnel - tasks that have a general impact on the effectiveness of technical assistance, and on the aid agencies ability to learn from mistakes (and successes). To work effectively, the programme officers need to be familiar with rules and procedures in bureaucratic systems - and they need to be good at interpersonal communication. They should see themselves as members of a service organization. But most programme officers have little experience of these tasks. All the agencies need to pay more attention to their own staff development through recurrent courses.

We have noted that many technical assistance personnel are recruited because they possess some technical skill. In the developing country they have to attend to a wide variety of tasks and they have to handle problems they have no experience with. As an example, people generally have a fairly vague understanding of labour legislation in their home countries, but they often find themselves engaged in complex problems of a legal nature in their new jobs. Another example, few know anything of the logic behind decision-making in political administrative systems, let alone in African political administrative systems. Nevertheless, they have to operate effectively within such systems.

As for the cross-cultural communication, we would like to point out that information in this field is sporadic. The information appears to be ad hoc - and we have found examples of mistaken images of the developing countries presented to the participants. But the subject is difficult and the fact is that there does not exist any good text on the problem of bridging a cultural gap. The course centers do have access to information on traditional African culture but this is material of an anthropological character. This is valuable in its own right, particularly for those working in a rural environment. But many expatriates will work in the modern sector, and here we do not have much information on culture.

Do we find it necessary to extend the preparatory training several weeks? No, even if we suggest that more topics should be included, we would not propose that the preparatory training is prolonged. However, we think it is a mistake to limit the training to one occasion only. The preparatory course should not be the beginning of training, neither should it be the end. Project and country information should start intensively from the very first day of recruitment, and it should continue throughout the assignment. Some of the aid agencies have started short courses or seminars on the duty station. This appears to be a very valuable instrument to exchange information and to reflect on one's experience. Such courses could be of a few days duration each time, and could by preference be arranged on a Nordic basis.

Almost all interviews with TAP have reflected, that they liked the preparatory training given. There have been critical remarks about outdated information or less relevant parts, but a much more outspoken criticism have been given by TAP, who felt, they were not given enough or any preparatory training (especially consultant TAP). Some felt, they were not able to understand relations in the society and that they could have avoided some problems through better training.

Training is a lot of things. For health workers the ten weeks course in tropical medicine, including cultural information, is more important than the official preparatory training. And job related training is - as mentioned - generally very important.

The proof of the importance of training and preparatory courses is in a way a negative one. It is not possible to guarantee a good TAP or project performance just because TAP have had the normal training. But it is clear that a number of individual TAP problems have been related to lack of training, and that lack of training has been one of the problems in a number of projects characterized by lack of integration, by TAP isolation and by unsustainable structures.

Some consultant TAP have felt, they were experienced enough to do without any specific training, but others have complained, that they were not given the same opportunity of doing a good job as agency TAP. Ironically, some of the consultant TAP involved in twinning arrangements with a good continuous backstopping have been given better training than consultant TAP in some projects working much more in isolation.

### 7.3.2. Language training

So far we have spoken about the preparatory courses, but the aid agencies also provide language training. The English courses seem to be highly effective. Former participants are very positive and it seems as if the language upgrading works well. There are of course several cases of expatriates who are not fluent enough to perform their task - and quite often the local authorities complained about the poor English of Nordic personnel. This does not reflect negatively on the courses but rather on the assessment of the skills and needs of individuals. In general, the aid agencies are not critical enough in their demand of language proficiency.

Insufficient knowledge of English is one problem, a much more serious problem (in Tanzania and to some extent in Kenya) is the neglect of Kiswahili. The personnel in local organizations are unanimous in requesting that expatriates learn Kiswahili - it is needed and it would make the expatriates' presence much more valuable. Technical assistance personnel must make every effort to learn the local language, and the aid agencies should encourage them, even if it means adding several weeks of preparation for the job. It is arrogant and insensitive to continue insisting that Kiswahili is not needed when almost 100% of local personnel think it is indeed necessary.

### 7.3.3 Conclusion and recommendation

The ability to adjust to a new situation, to be flexible and open minded, has a lot to do with a natural self confidence.

A combination of superficial recruitment and none or unsatisfactory preparatory training can lead to situations, where a TAP as a result of a certain cultural shock and professional difficulties, closes the mind, reacts without flexibility, hides himself from the local society and becomes a burden to himself and the project.

#### Recommendation

Preparatory training in job related subjects and in general development themes plus necessary language training should be made compulsory for all TAP, but as far as possible adjusted to different needs for different groups.

#### 7.4 Starting on the assignment

The first few days on the new job are very important for the entire contribution of technical assistance personnel.

The donor agencies often take the responsibility for meeting people, particularly when it is agency recruited personnel. During the first days they will take the new expatriate to the relevant ministries and the new duty station, they will give the latest information about the project and practical information about housing, customs procedures etc.

##### 7.4.1 Role of field offices, role of consultants

Approximately half of our case studies show, that the agencies were appreciated for their role upon arrival. Most consultant TAP was found in the other half, and this reflects to a certain degree lack of clarity about what can be expected by agency field offices from consultant TAP.

The consultant company is normally paid for such practical support services, but in cases where consultant companies are small or inexperienced, a number of problems arise, and fields offices of the agencies are expected to solve them.

In the case of FINNIDA it is clear, that the companies take care of the arriving staff. The system is established and works well. But where the experience with consultant TAP is a new one, frictions can occur.

As an example it can be mentioned that personnel at the DANIDA mission in Dar es Salaam felt, that they had to do work for some arriving consultant TAP, which the consultant companies had been paid for. It could be argued that field offices should be paid by the consultant for such services, but conflicts about such responsibilities should of course not harm TAP.

In some cases a rather cool relations have developed between TAP at a project and the responsible programme officer at the field office, and this can influence relations to new TAP. We have also seen a case, where a field office by many TAP is seen more as a controlling than supporting function. Our

picture is not clear enough to place responsibility and we do not want to identify the office, but the problem is mentioned, because it is important for headquarters to follow and monitor the atmosphere in and around the crucially important field offices.

Different offices have of course different opportunities. FINNIDA has less field staff than the other agencies, and most agencies have smaller offices in Zambia. Such differences can of course influence the service given, but not the general attitude. And our experience is that the size of the staff at field offices is not the main problem in this respect. It has more to do with attitudes and quality, and of course with the expectations of the arriving TAP.

When conflicts have to do with individual TAP, it can be difficult to pinpoint the problem. Some expatriates ask for more assistance than reasonable and small misunderstandings grow. Such problems are not major problems.

It is worse when a "new" TAP explains, that he or she was treated correctly but did not feel welcome.

#### 7.4.2 Overlapping or...

Both agency TAP and consultant TAP normally get the most useful assistance from their new TAP colleagues. There is normally a good exchange of information. And it is easier to be newcomer at a project with other TAP, than to be the first.

Problems arise however often, when there has been "a gap" between the coming and the outgoing TAP. It is very often the idea that there should be overlapping between two TAP doing the same job, and it works sometimes. But in close to one third of the cases overlapping did not take place. In some cases TAP posts were vacant for months between two postings, and the project idea of TAP positions was lost.

The value and cost of overlapping can be discussed. In projects with more TAPs the new TAP can get general information about the project from other colleagues, TAP as well as national project staff. Only a short period of handing over may then be required, provided the outgoing TAP has prepared an operational handing over report. Such reports should be made a condition before a TAP can leave a job.

However, in more complex projects where institution building has been the main task of the outgoing TAP, who has been the only TAP in the project or programme, a longer period of maybe 2-3 months could be beneficial in order to secure continuity in the work.

When the idea of overlapping is a part of a project, but does not take place, it makes both the start and the whole task for a new TAP difficult.

#### 7.4.3 The local organization

As we have seen the newly arrived expatriate normally meets the most important personnel last, that is the local personnel. And he meets them through the mediation of another expatriate. He is likely to inherit attitudes and opinions from other expatriates, and his own assessment of the situation will be biased. The local staff will place him in the same category as other expatriates, which often means as "one of them" rather than "one of us".

It is important that new expatriates are received and introduced also by other expatriates, but basically we think, that the local organization, where the expatriate will work, should meet him/her, help him/her to settle and introduce him or her to work.

#### 7.4.4 Timing of arrival

Overlapping and lack of overlapping has been mentioned, other serious problems in timing can occur.

It happens that project personnel arrive before other necessary inputs to a project are ready, and while it can be very important for a project or TAP coordinator to arrive "before the project", it is very costly and frustrating, if a number of TAP just have to wait, without being able to do meaningful work.

Often the real cost is higher than the salary they earn during this period. It can leave them inactive and they may have lost their spirit and initiative.

Other timing problems relate to housing. In general we have heard very few complaints about quality of housing, and none seemed substantive. But a real problem can be that TAP families have a long wait for a place to live. The general impression is that it is better to move to the "permanent" house or flat as soon as possible (even if it is not ready), than to live for a long time at hotel.

Some TAP seem to be able to start at their assignment and work relatively effectively already after a few weeks. Others evaluate that it takes them three to six months to adjust to the new environment and to become efficient workers when they are posted abroad for the first time.

An average saying that the "normal TAP" posted for the first time can not do much effective advisory work until after 4-5 months seems to be the best judgement, if it is added that "the delay" is less for TAP specifically working with concrete operational tasks.

A good start can reduce the long period of introduction and adjustment. A wrong start can lead to a situation, where the TAP never get settled and adjust.

#### 7.5 Role and performance of technical assistance personnel

Most of the TAP we have interviewed find they are doing a job of importance. A few have been without meaningful assignments, but the great majority are busy and many find it difficult to get sufficient time to do everything needed. But what is needed, as they see it now, is not always what they expected before they arrived.

And one of the most common observations is that the priorities in the work are very often set by immediate day-to-day problems, and not by job descriptions or formal work plans.

Some are not aware that they have job descriptions at all, and quite a lot have outdated descriptions, or descriptions based on assumptions about the job, often far from reality.

Lack of scheduled work plans (including things other than pure operational objectives) and lack of operational manpower development plans often lead to disorganized day to day crisis management priorities.

#### 7.5.1 The most common problems experienced by TAP

When interviewed TAP describe problems which make it difficult for them to perform their tasks or have changed their tasks in relation to what they expected.

The most common problems raised concentrate on:

- the counterpart situation (see also 4.3), including the problem, that persons, who TAP are supposed to work together with, are away on scholarships.
- the fact that TAP for these and other reasons have to fill positions and do the job, where they had expected to have training or advisory functions only.

It is surprising how often TAP feel they are working in something like a transition period. "Just now, the project has some specific and temporary problems, which makes it necessary to find ad hoc solutions."

Common reasons are that

- counterparts are away on scholarships
- counterparts have not yet been appointed or have just been transferred
- time gap between a leaving and coming TAP increases the workload for the remaining TAP
- all sorts of practical problems: break downs, procurement problems, negotiations, paper work etc take time away from other more long-term tasks.

Problems are of course very different for different types of TAP. In positions defined as gap-filler functions it is easier and less complicated just to do the work, whereas project coordinators are often so occupied with negotiations, paperwork and practical management operations, that they have little time to share experiences with local staff and to work with long-term integration.

Some examples can illustrate the character of some the problems:

In The State Mining Corporation in Tanzania the Finnish team of TAP were preoccupied with running one of the mines during the evaluation, because its Tanzanian managers were on training abroad at the time. (Stamico has received Finnish assistance since 1969).

In Mbegani Fisheries Development Centre in Tanzania (Norwegian support since 1974) a report from 1983 tells about Tanzanians coming home from scholarship studies, and feeling alienation. They were suddenly unknown persons to the expatriate team that had arrived during their studies overseas. The experts had established working relations with the remaining staff, and some returning fellows felt like intruders or outsiders.

At Zambia Cold Storage Corporation in Lusaka a Danida-TAP working as chief and development engineer since 1982 was given his first counterpart five years later. In 1987 this counterpart was on scholarship outside Zambia, and the TAP still performing all duties. There are not any elements of planning for out-phasing of TAP in job descriptions and no overall strategy for training.

At a Provincial Planning Unit in Zambia a Finnish TAP working as government officer (provincial planner) described his work as "ad hoc work, gap-filling and control of funds." He estimated, that he used one third of his working hours on Zambian administration, one third on Finnish administration (FINNIDA plus consultant company) and one third on ad hoc tasks. A work plan exists but was difficult to stick to.

The very competent TAP worked in principle together with Zambian staff, but at the time of the interview one highly qualified Zambian was on scholarship in London, one was in Lusaka for shorter studies, and one was only employed on temporary basis. Only one experienced Zambian planner worked in the unit; he was complaining over his subordinate position, but was not seen as a qualified

counterpart by the TAP or the Zambian system. The TAP feared on the other hand, that the qualified planner on scholarship would never be appointed to take over because he was too young, and because Zambian authorities did not want to promote him "two steps at one time".

The whole Finnish support programme for the development of the province should according to project documents have 6 TAP in three different areas. But due to recruitment difficulties and delays only 3-4 have been posted for long periods. This has also changed the TAP task considerably.

While the programme could have been designed differently with less TAP, it was now often felt by the present TAP, that they have to do two functions at a time, and the burden of administration, control of funds etc, created problems.

At the Industrial Training Programme in Kenya (supported by DANIDA since 1970) TAP felt a pressure to participate in instruction of classes, while their prime objective should be to update and improve training programmes. There are competent instructors available in Kenya, but also a problem of understaffing. TAP understands the pressure, and feel that it can create negative working relations if they refuse to give instructions, but they feel at the same time, that their time could be used better. Some have "solved" the dilemma by refusing to give instructions officially, but do so unofficially.

#### 7.5.2 TAP as trainers

In chapter 4 a number of weaknesses in the training system are outlined. Many TAP find themselves inexperienced and poorly prepared to organise training of local personnel. Very often the unprecise term "on-the-job-training" covers little more than sitting together in the same office or the same department. The most visible token of concern for training is seen in the recommendations for scholarships. However a well thought out plan to integrate the scholarship studies with institution building in the projects is rarely observed.

This is an area, where many TAP could benefit from much more support. Many TAP will be able to work with training systems, but not to develop them.

Recommendation

Systems or schemes for transfer of knowledge interchange are very often lacking and should be developed.

At an old and big TAP project like Rural Road Maintenance in Tanzania with 17 NORAD-TAP all in executive functions, and with support since 1972 the first senior training officer arrived about a year before this evaluation. This does not mean, that the project has been totally without training, but that no systematic effort has been made, and that interested and dedicated TAP have not been given sufficient support. More and earlier training could possibly have reduced the number of TAP many years ago.

In 1985 SIDA assigned a seasoned officer in the agency to become an adviser in the design of programmes for training and institutional learning. The officer travels extensively to be able to participate in the development of training programmes on the project site. His experiences amply demonstrate the need for such services.

NORAD's office of education and fellowships has made knowledge transfer a prime objective for its efforts.

Another problem in the field of training is lack of sufficient knowledge about different formal training opportunities in the country or in neighbouring countries. There have been cases where trainees have been sent to Europe on scholarships, but where the same course could have been given in a neighbouring country. And none of the field offices in Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia have any comprehensive review over most relevant training institutions and possibilities in East and Central Africa.

Recommendation

It is recommended to create and regularly update a review of training opportunities through cooperation between donors (the Nordic) and recipient countries.

It could become a valuable support for training activities.

### 7.5.3 Conflict between flexibility and lack of planning

Many young TAP have a good professional background, but lack management experience and experience in more formal training.

They have an open and positive attitude. They are prepared to learn by experience, to be flexible in their new job positions and to adjust.

But the combination of poor forward planning and lack of training and manpower development plans on the one hand, and understaffing and acute problems on the other hand can lead to situations, where ad hoc solutions become the main priority, and where TAP never get the time to be challenged by real training and institution building functions.

Some of the observations and recommendations in this area are to be found in 4 and 5. Again it has to be stressed, that there is no perfect recipe for success, but it is obvious that it is much easier to be flexible, if the flexibility can be seen within a comprehensive adjustable work plan including manpower development and gradually out-phasing of TAP.

And with the increase in the number of highly educated nationals it becomes still more important to make certain, that TAP are not just placed as gap-fillers in functions, for which Nationals are available, but where (costly) TAP becomes the alternative to cheap National professionals, because of lack of funds or poor government salaries.

#### Recommendation

It should always be the first choice to try to find ways of employing nationals, where they are available. TAP is often seen as the first solution to a problem. It should be the last.

### 7.5.4 Executive versus advisory functions

We have found problems both when TAP "takes over", as in the cases of Tanga Cement, Mbegany Fisheries Development Centre and many others. How should low paid nationals be able to influence decisions and to integrate, when they are without any formal responsibility. They become "onlookers".

But purely advisory functions are on the other hand difficult and dangerous. In the case we saw how an advisor after 8 months felt, that he had learnt much more than he had contributed (which can be positive), but also that he still had no operational role, had conducted no training programmes and had performed practically no other functions.

#### Recommendation

Where functions are purely advisory, they still need to be based on concrete tasks specifying the institutional set up, the decision making procedures and the distribution of powers and responsibilities between the TAP and National executives.

It can often be necessary to place TAP for a period as gap-fillers in the system or as executives in managerial positions, but in such cases we have very often seen that neither the donor system nor the recipient system have any clear picture showing when and especially how the positions are being "nationalized".

#### Recommendation

TAP should never be placed in executive positions without a simultaneous plan for the transfer of the positions to the local staff.

#### 7.5.5. Duration of assignment

Two years is a very short period for a TAP working in a foreign country and culture for the first time. And a majority of TAP extend their contract for another period.

It is our observation, that a lot of time is wasted or used on social and cultural adjustment during the first two year period, making the cost of effective working time even much higher than the salaries and total costs of donor agencies show.

It is not unusual to use 3-4 months to get started on the new job and 2-3 months to wind up, leaving 18 months (including normal leave) in a two year period.

In some projects (e.g. DANIDA supported Taita-Taweta district development programme) the time perspective of the first project period (three years) contradicted the TAP's two years assignments.

It is our conclusion that two years assignment should not be considered the norm.

#### Recommendation

For each project and each position the objectives and needs should form the background for the assignment period and TAP contracts should be made accordingly.

Whereas the first assignment should often be longer than two years, it is broadly recommended by TAP to have a formal short-term follow up technical assistance at projects after out-phasing of long-term TAP. The short-term TAP has to be experienced personnel with a good concrete background and prior knowledge of projects. Such short-term assistance as supplementary to continued financial assistance could often make it possible to plan for earlier out-phasing of TAP.

#### Recommendation

Donor agencies should develop systems for use of experienced former TAP on short-term TAP assignments as a part of a systematic follow up on long-term TAP, making it easier to continue with advisory functions after formal out-phasing of TAP, and thereby also easier to withdraw long-term TAP.

#### 7.5.6 Integration between local and foreign staff

The working atmosphere between expatriates and local staff is an important element in the transfer of knowledge. It is obvious that an atmosphere of hostility, envy and misunderstanding is not conducive to a transfer of skills, nor even to an effective job performance.

Very few project settings could be described in such negative words, but that does not mean, that there is a sense of common purpose, mutual respect and fine collaboration. Relationship between local and foreign staff is often friendly enough, but usually each part goes about his own business. If we conclude, that around 20 % of the expatriates in our cases have a good and close professional working relationship with the local staff, we have not exaggerated.

Seemingly trivial issues play a role for the organizational climate.

Expatriates have usually much better access to equipment. Vehicles are a particular problem. The use and abuse causes frequent problems and mistrust. It is common that both sides perceive the other as using the cars for illegitimate purposes: expatriates by using it for vacations and locking it, when they go on home-leave, local staff for private transport and family purposes. Often, it seems, that both groups have valid reasons for complaint, but basically the problem arises from the fact, that in countries where access to transport is a privilege, the expatriate have always much easier access. There are cases, where cars included in TAP assistance may be more important than the TAP.

Office equipment and office space is a similar but less frequent observed problem. It is still possible to find projects, where all TAP have both chairs and desks, but where it "unfortunately due to lack of space" has not been possible to find room for local partners, who have to move around and find a chair here and there.

There are also differences in standard of equipment. Personal computers are a useful new tool for many TAP in their work, but if this new tool is not going to be in use, when the TAP has left it can be a wrong standard of equipment, indirectly "telling" local personnel, that they cannot be expected to perform without a PC.

It is also problems like these, which make the "counterparts" weak, and gives the word counterpart a negative connotation in Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia.

#### 7.5.7 TAP in the social environment

The presence of a great number of well paid expatriates have of course an influence on the social life of recipient countries. TAP are a sort of luxury guest workers, with a living standard and consumption patterns very different from the average population.

This is unavoidable, but the overall impact of TAP in the societies is substantial, and not always positive. It should therefore be taken into consideration. The life style of TAP becomes a special problem in countries with a negative economic growth, like Tanzania and Zambia. The average citizen experiences increasing hardship, and TAP are at the same time given more "fringe benefits" to be able to work. More protection and more special treatment. It is important that TAP are prepared for such experiences and prepared to handle situations in a responsible way.

Another factor affecting the status of expatriates pertain to their relation to the secondary economy, the parallel or black market. These problems are most frequent in Tanzania. There is a number of ways in which TAP can utilise the difference between the official and the black market. The most obvious way is through the sale of cars and household goods, but there are numerous others. Some legal, others illegal.

In job situations, where informal and sometimes illegal activities in the recipient system, can be one of the reasons for project failures, it is of course a problem, when/if TAP are involved in different black market activities. Obviously it is not possible to measure exactly the level of such activities, but in the donor society as such, they are clearly visible and well known.

One factor more in relations between expatriate and local staff is important, and that is the size of the TAP community in different projects. It is often important for a new TAP to work in relation to other TAP at a project. It is difficult to be alone in a different environment. But it is dangerous to be too many.

When big projects with a large TAP component becomes "islands of plenty in countries of scarcity" new barriers are created: Between projects and the surrounding society, and inside projects between the big expatriate group, and the local staff.

It is not healthy, if the TAP group is so dominant, that the working language becomes one of the Nordic languages. In such cases the whole Nordic culture follows easy, and Kenyans, Tanzanians or Zambians become strangers in their own countries.

These tendencies have been seen in some of the big projects mentioned in chapter 4, which are also some of the projects, where out-phasing of TAP have been most delayed.

There is no doubt a correlation between too big TAP teams developing or maintaining their own culture, and problems with integration and out-phasing in many projects.

## 7.6 Role of the aid agency

### 7.6.1 The need for a differentiated view of roles.

In the chapters above we have occasionally commented on the role of the aid agency in connection with identifying projects, recruitment, preparatory training, arriving in the country. It is quite clear that activities of the aid agency, or the absence of activities, play a significant role for the effectiveness of technical assistance personnel. This applies equally much for agency implemented projects as for projects implemented by external organizations. As a first step in the discussion we would propose to make a distinction between situations where the agency is actively involved and situations where it is passive.

Some projects are characterized by very frequent contacts between aid agency staff (field office and/or headquarters) and project staff. The extent of contacts can be "measured"; perhaps there are daily meetings of either formal or informal character. The correspondence can also be frequent, letters, telex and telephone conversations several times a week.

One example of a project with close contacts between the aid agency and the project was Norwegian assistance to a saw mill in Tanzania. The programme officer was closely involved in all stages of project implementation, he knew the personnel and their families, and he knew the local management. He was thoroughly familiar with the substantial nature of the project.

Danish assistance to shipping on the Tanzanian lakes was similar. The programme officer took active part in a large number of decisions of an operational nature, not only at the strategic level. The reporting system of that project was also rather tight and it had been subjected to a number of

in-depth evaluations. In both of these cases the aid agency had an in depth knowledge of the projects and managed their development.

Often such tightly managed projects are agency implemented, but not always. Some projects implemented by external organizations are also closely integrated with the aid agency (the Norwegian saw mill project, for example). This could be so for two reasons - one being that the external organization fails to organize the cooperation. But the other reason has to do with the form of the contract, the division of labour between the partners and the reporting system. If the contract requires continuous negotiation and consultation the agency will be involved. If shipments, customs clearances, training programmes, etc. are still channeled through the agency they will also need continuous consultations.

In general the close contacts between aid agency and projects seem to be a precondition for an effective management of technical assistance personnel. It is through a close integration of all aspects of the work that aid agency personnel have a chance to assess how well different experts are doing and what problems they have - and the same regarding local personnel. It is also through a close involvement with the project that they will have a chance to strengthen the performance of weak personnel, and if need be, terminate contracts and send home the expatriates. In general, the various monitoring reports that are used will not be of any help unless the quality of the agencies' integration with the project is good. Furthermore, if the quality of the integration is close and good, the reports are not needed anyway.

#### 7.6.2 "Scanning" as a mode of operation.

But we also have several examples of technical assistance where the aid agencies role is much less intense. Some project personnel do not meet aid agency staff at all, or perhaps only some few times every year. The programme officers may not even be informed about how many expatriates work on a project and what they are supposed to do. Perhaps the agency staff have no real knowledge about the nature of project activities - and are not familiar with the management and staff of the local organization. The programme officer's role is to assess the value of the project from a distance, often by relying on secondary information. This role could be called "scanning" as it implies getting information without being closely involved and without direct super

vision. It implies having a "feeling" for how things are going. But it is expected that if something (or someone) fails, the programme officer should not only detect this but should also take action to have the problem solved. Scanning thus means supervision from a distance while being prepared to interfere if the need arises - and that is an extremely difficult role.

"Scanning" is more characteristic of the aid agencies' role in respect of projects implemented by external organizations, but it is also found on some agency implemented projects. Each mode of operation has its problems. We have seen examples where the aid agencies active involvement and tight management has caused major problems for technical assistance personnel and has reduced the value of their jobs significantly. Clumsy and undiplomatic interference in activities that were not understood by agency personnel have in some cases led to disintegration of projects. But it is also possible to enumerate examples of failure to "scan" effectively. Such a failure is seen when projects and personnel continue with serious problems that are never addressed or solved, and when there is no evidence that they were detected by agency personnel.

In one case an expatriate family had several problems with housing, childrens' education and general health - which all reflected that they did not adjust to the situation in the developing country. This was clearly brought to the attention of the agency through the written reports of the family, who requested assistance in different forms. There were also direct contacts. But the agency in question did not react. It seems as if it was paralysed and did not know what to do. Their preparation to act and help the family with their further adjustment was basically non-existent. Even though such examples are rare, they do occur. In our opinion the aid agencies should pay more attention to how they could intervene and help solve problems at an early stage. This is more important than formal reporting systems. As long as nobody acts on the information in reports these are but an exercise in futility.

In a simplified way we have now distinguished four "modalities" of agency-project relations; those of active involvement on agency implemented and external organization implemented projects, and those of "scanning" agency implemented and external organization implemented projects. There is of course no general pattern of success or failure in these four modalities. The potential for a meaningful and constructive cooperation is usually there, but

so is the potential for a dysfunctional relationship. But each "modality" seems to be associated with a trap. Active agency involvement presupposes a high quality and professional competence on behalf of the agency personnel, plus matching personalities. Another precondition is relatively stable personnel, when new programme officers arrive without sufficient knowledge of a project, and when programme officers positions are vacant for long periods-then active involvement becomes an impossibility.

"Scanning" is subject to another trap. It can easily be an excuse for doing nothing and for knowing nothing. It is also difficult to assess whether what is presented as "scanning" is really an activity of high quality or not. It will of course be revealed if signals arrive that require some form of action, then it becomes visible if the aid agency had a real grasp of the events that were "scanned". The activity as such becomes most problematic on external agency implemented projects. If a firm in charge of a project has very few contacts with the agency, and if the local authorities do not cooperate with the agency, it might well be impossible to follow events. It is also possible that the project personnel have a vested interest in keeping the agency ignorant- and there are examples of situations where they were relatively successful in doing so.

### 7.6.3 Backstopping services.

The role of the aid agency could also be to provide backstopping services to technical assistance personnel. Backstopping could mean a number of things, for example all the services that have to do with the employment contract (paying salaries, insurances, arranging housing, leave, travelling), project services such as purchasing equipment, arranging scholarships and training programmes. But it also includes professional consultations. It might be very important for technical assistance personnel to discuss their job with someone of the same profession - to get inspiration and ideas, to check whether your approach is right or wrong, etc. One of the advantages of external organizations implementing projects are that this aspect is said to be taken care of quite well. But the aid agencies are not as disadvantaged as is commonly believed, very often the programme officers do a very good job in this respect. In fact, our case studies do not indicate any major difference between agency implemented and other projects in this respect!

As our evaluation is not really concerned with the effectiveness of aid agencies as such, we will not pursue the problem any further. The aid agencies, particularly the field offices, have a significant impact on the effectiveness of technical assistance personnel. To exaggerate a little bit we could say that expatriate personnel are instruments in the hands of the programme officers for the service of the recipient countries. If the instrument is handled clumsily it will do harm, but if it is handled with care and precision it will have chances of doing good. But the requirements will vary from project to project, and it will also change over time. Active agency involvement might be useful in preparatory phases, and perhaps in concluding phases of assistance. On the other hand "scanning" could be an appropriate mode during consolidation and diversification of activities.

#### 7.7 The end of an assignment.

When an expatriate has completed a number of years on a project he will return home. By that time he will have gained considerable experience of the project, the country and the process of assistance. The danger is that this knowledge is lost to everyone but himself, and as he or she goes back to the ordinary activities at home even that memory will fade away. The problem for the aid agencies, and also for external organizations, is to document learning, to store the information and to retrieve and make use of it - for new projects, for the same project, for newly recruited technical assistance personnel and for its own personnel.

##### 7.7.1 Written debriefing.

The Nordic aid agencies all have some form of debriefing procedures whereby the departing expatriate should tell the programme officers (in the field office and at headquarters) of his experience. Usually they also write some form of report which is stored in the archives of the agencies. At times these reports are made available to new personnel - but most often they are simply forgotten. Why? Well, usually because they are not very good. The information they contain is trivial and if it should happen to be interesting in itself it is presented in a boring and haphazard manner.

When an expatriate leaves the whole family is usually preoccupied with moving, returning to the home country, finding new jobs or returning to the old ones. All these practical problems make it difficult to sit down and make a proper account of years of experience. This experience is perhaps also partly subconscious and it is not easy to put in words. It is hard to account for all the difficulties and problems at work, and in adjusting to a foreign culture in general. Some will also be concerned about presenting themselves in a favourable light so they get new jobs. Thus there are many reasons why the written debriefing - "terminal reports" - are not very interesting and thus are not widely used. But when they are good they have a great potential, as we saw on the Swedish nurse tutor programme in Zambia. The terminal reports on this project held a high quality and were used by the successors.

#### 7.7.2 Debriefing sessions.

There are also debriefing interviews, but they seem to be equally difficult to make interesting. These sessions may well be pleasant for the moment, both for the programme officers and the expatriates. But neither partner learns anything they did not know before - the value of the process lies more on the ceremonial side. It is not to be expected that an hour or so could yield any significant new insights.

The only instances where returning expatriates experience seem to be effectively used are at the course centers (see section 4C above) and in some of the external organizations - particularly those involved in twinning arrangements. One of the chief characteristics of the twinning arrangements is that people go back to the same employer and they continue with the cooperation from there. Often former expatriates will return to the field as short-term consultants. They will receive trainees from the developing country in their own organization. They will have opportunities to meet their successors at work and speak at leisure about their job in Africa. This creates an environment of institutional learning which is very difficult to duplicate.

The aid agencies all try to make use of former technical assistance personnel for various tasks. To some extent they also help returning expatriate with shorter jobs if they are unemployed when returning home, but those are exceptions. But they can be called in for evaluations, for preparation of new

phases on a project etc. The agencies also try to keep updated rosters on the whereabouts of former technical assistance personnel - but the overall impression is that such data banks are not utilized very much.

The sad fact seems to be that the potential for learning from the experience of individuals is seldom realized. Here the project cycle coincides with the individuals assignment, when projects come to an end they are forgotten and it is difficult to find any visible indicators of learning.

#### Summary of findings and recommendation

It has been most relevant to include recommendations after the different relevant sections of the project cycle in this chapter. General findings and recommendations especially relating to section 8.5 should be seen together with findings, observations and recommendations in chapters 4 and 5.

The only... where... experience... in some... particularly... in training... that people... cooperation... short-term... in their... successors... creates an... duplicates.

The aid agencies... for various... shorter jobs... expectations...

## 8. ALTERNATIVES TO TAP

The alternative ways to achieve the goals of development aid can be looked into at two different levels; the alternative ways to give development aid in general and the alternatives for the TAP in the present general set-up of development cooperation. The former level goes beyond the scope of this evaluation and therefore only the latter level is discussed here.

In the case studies the following alternatives for TAP were identified:

1. Local professionals
2. Seconded staff from the local institutions
3. Volunteers
4. Short-term consultants
5. Implementation by a local institution
6. Twinning arrangement
7. Intensive training locally and abroad

### 8.1 Local consultants

#### Observations

Among the case studies there were some cases in which local consultants were used in the projects. Local consultants were used for instance as community participation and training officers in some rural water projects. These officers seemed to be very capable in their work and their contribution was highly valued by the TAP. However, it was obvious that there was some friction between them and the ministerial staff. The rather large salary differences must be a strain on the relations between the government employees and local consultants. In addition to this, the implementing foreign agencies have a tendency to give a local consultant better facilities to do the work than to a staff member who has been seconded to the project by the government.

#### Analysis

The use of local consultants in the projects is rather new and therefore the cases so far are few and kind of experimental. When skills and knowledge is transferred to a local consultant it is not transferred to the public sector of the country but to the private sector. Previously it has been seen as the function of the development assistance to develop the public institutions of

the recipient country. However, more recently the governments of the recipient countries have become more aware of the need to develop also the private sector. In Kenya there is already a rather well developed private sector but also in Tanzania the fast development of the private sector is presently the most noticeable feature of the economy.

The fact that there is a considerable difference in the salaries of government employees and local consultants causes problems especially in such projects in which both are represented. It is only human that the government employees would feel bitter when they receive less than a third of the salary of a local consultant who has the same training and is doing a similar job. Altogether the question of salaries for local consultants is a difficult one. Some bilateral donors follow the scales of UN organizations others negotiate each case separately. Some local consultants want to follow the international prices. This is an issue in which cooperation between the donors would be an advantage in order, not to save money, but to make the system as fair to all as possible.

#### Conclusion and recommendation

It is the view of the mission that local consultants could be used more often in all the three countries, but especially in Kenya where there is more local trained manpower available than in the other two countries. This has to be done in agreement and full cooperation with the government of the recipient country in order to avoid the problems mentioned above.

#### 8.2 Seconded staff from the local institutions

##### Observations

Almost all the projects which are implemented more or less independently from the local institutions have some staff which has been seconded to the project by the sectoral ministry. It became evident during the case studies and in the country studies that such assignments are generally not liked by the local officers. An officer who spends several years in a project is away from a line position and consequently from the scheme of service and therefore does not get promotions. Because this is not compensated in the salary they are losing economically while in a project. Projects also require a full time contribution from its employees, which means that the officers working in the

projects do not have as much time for their private business as they would in their regular office. It should be emphasized that the government salaries are insufficient for living and therefore it is a necessity for the government officers to have additional income.

In the Kenya-Finland Primary Health Care Programme the Project Manager has been a local Provincial Public Health Officer during the second phase. This certainly seems to be a good solution since in this kind of programme it is of vital importance that the Project Manager is familiar with the health problems and with the social and cultural environment of the programme area. He also knows the local institutional structure and the administrative procedures which are often the worst stumbling blocks to expatriate project managers. It is worth mentioning that at the beginning of the second phase he arranged a two day workshop for the staff of the project, both expatriate and local, to discuss the contents of the project document. The purpose was to make sure that the whole staff had a common understanding of what they were supposed to try to achieve.

#### Analysis

It is important for any project that it has also local staff which can advise the TAP of the local culture, procedures and practices. If this idea is properly understood and implemented it can save the project from many unnecessary problems. However, the cases in which locally seconded staff is genuinely integrated into the project are rather rare. Also, the seconded staff members often have other duties in addition to the project and they can be called by their superiors in the ministries to meetings and for occasional tasks.

The government officers are used to following the government procedures and intend to continue this while seconded to aid projects. However, especially company implemented projects are often run with a mentality which is typical at private companies which means that procedures are streamlined and decisions made quickly bypassing as much bureaucratic red tape as possible. The ways of the project may thus seem improper to the government officers and this brings tension between them and TAP.

If TAP are not fully aware that in most cases the government officers have been seconded to the projects against their own will, they cannot understand their sometimes negative attitude towards TAP. These feelings can be reduced e.g. by allowing an equal excess for them to the project facilities.

### Conclusions and recommendations

Before a project requests for more government staff it should fully analyse the problems involved and assess its own ability and willingness to deal with them. The Mission thinks that when government officers are seconded to projects, their loss of promotion opportunities should be compensated by possibilities to get scholarships so that they could acquire higher degrees and thus return to higher positions. Also ways to compensate for the loss of income should be found.

### 8.3 Volunteers

#### Observations

The organization of the volunteer service varies between the Nordic countries, however, the principles and aims are practically the same.

In Denmark, Finland and Sweden the volunteer service has been organized under an NGO arrangement whereas in Norway it is a part of Norad. The Nordic countries have a total of some 600 volunteers in the field at present.

Usually volunteers work individually in gap-filling positions but occasionally they are placed into development projects although this is not the actual policy of the volunteer agencies. In our case studies there were some volunteers. The volunteers were mainly Nordic but there was also one American volunteer. Quite a few of TAP had previously worked as volunteers. The same was the case with the officers in the missions of the donor agencies. Therefore it seems that volunteer service has been important in creating a resource base for TAP recruitment.

### Analysis

The volunteers were in positions which could easily have been filled by local professionals provided that funding would have been available for that purpose. The situation is, however, different between the countries and sectors. E.g. in Zambia there may still be a need for expatriates in gap-filling positions in lower professional categories but this is certainly not the case in Kenya.

### Conclusions and recommendations

It is the view of the Mission that the basic assumption of volunteer service that there is a shortage of skilled manpower at all levels is not valid any more. Also the other aim of volunteer service, to inform people in the home country of the developing countries and their problems through the returning volunteers, is somewhat outdated. Nowadays there are many other ways to acquire information from all over the world. However, the original idea of which the volunteer service has evolved, namely that the youth from different countries meet and work together for some practical project, is always valid. It would be time to create new ideas how this could best be achieved in the present day situation. One such idea might be to organize exchange programmes for young professionals from developed and developing countries, in which two young people would exchange jobs for a year or two.

#### 8.4 Short-term consultants

##### Observations

Short-term consultants are used more in projects implemented by companies than in agency implemented projects. It is simpler for a company than for an aid agency, to send a short-term consultant out for a specific small task. Short-term consultants are commonly used for such jobs as installations, studies, special investigations, training etc. There are also cases in which the same consultant comes regularly, e.g. twice a year, to advise in the work. Such a case was e.g. a consultant who came every six months to supervise the water laboratory in Sumbawanga, Tanzania, in connection with the Norad Rural Water Development Project. Unfortunately in this case, however, the laboratory only received new chemicals when the consultant came and therefore it was difficult to get an assessment of the system as a way to give advisory support.

Within the cooperation between Tanzania and Norway in the petroleum sector there have been several short-term consultants. Besides the Norwegian short-term consultants recruited by Statoil, the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC) has used many other short-term consultants from different countries and companies. Both parties in the cooperation were satisfied that in this case short-term consultants have been a good solution. Since the technical assistance from Norway is given as a part of a twinning arrangement between the companies it has been easy for the consultants to adjust to the working situation quickly.

### Analysis

Short-term consultants are used successfully in giving specific technical support for a local institution. The usefulness of such technical assistance depends on the strength of the local institution. Like in the case of the petroleum sector in Tanzania, TPDC is assessed to be one of the best functioning companies in the country and therefore what it needs is not so much assistance in institution building than in actual technical knowledge.

In other cases short-term consultants are used in large projects which have a large TAP component. In such cases the short-term consultants can be seen more as a support to the TAP team than to the local institution. This support may be needed especially at a time when the number of TAP is being reduced.

### Conclusions and recommendations

The Mission saw short-term consultants as a viable alternative in quite a few of the case studies, however, usually in combination with long-term TAP involvement and use of local consultants. Especially at the time of handing over or reducing TAP in a project, a follow-up by short-term consultants was seen as a practical way to reduce the abruptness of the change. This would also give to the donor agency sufficient confidence on the continuity of the work and thus facilitate an earlier withdrawal of TAP than would otherwise be the case, and, if problems develop, they could be detected at an early stage.

Short-term consultants are the more suitable option the more developed the local institution is.

## 8.5 Implementation by a local institution

### Observations

Nearly all the development projects are under one ministry or another which is in principal in charge of the implementation. However most projects are implemented rather independently, parallel with related government activities. It could be observed that when a project gets older it has a tendency to become more and more independent. This tendency is counteractive to the aim to hand the project smoothly over to the local institutions.

Among the case studies there were none in which there had not been any TAP component at all at any time. However there were cases in which the TAP component was very small or which had actually been handed over. Such cases were e.g. the Nordic Kibaha Educational Centre and the SIDA Tanzania Food and Nutrition Centre in Tanzania, the SIDA Nurse Tutor Programme in Zambia and the FINNIDA Industrial Minerals Project in Kenya.

It is obvious from these cases that local institutions are capable of implementing projects, however, the time schedules have been adjusted to a slower pace and scale of operation has been reduced .

### Analysis

What the development projects do is usually not qualitatively different from what the local institutions do. The difference is more in the quantity of work achieved in a unit of time. When the level of activity in a project goes down after the handing over this does not have to be taken as a sign of failure either from the part of the project TAP or the local institution. It is more commonly a sign of unrealistic expectations. In the case of the old projects it can be said that they function at least at the same level of efficiency as local institutions in that country on average. It can be expected that a project which has represented Nordic efficiency level will settle, after handing over, at somewhere near to the average efficiency level in the recipient country.

When old projects are assessed they should not be compared with how they were while they received a lot of assistance and had a lot of TAP but with the institutions of the same environment either in the same country or in the neighbouring countries. This goes also for possible projects which are implemented by the local institutions. When evaluated they should not be compared with projects with TAP but with other similar projects implemented by similar institutions.

### Conclusions and recommendations

Development assistance could be much more channelled through the local institutions. As a consequence, because of the limited absorption capacity of a local institution, the size of the projects would need to be reduced. This means that aid would be distributed more broadly and it would be difficult for the donor agencies to assess the effects of their aid.

### 8.6 Twinning arrangement

#### Observations

Twinning arrangement is not only an alternative way to give technical assistance, it is also an alternative for the whole project set-up. In a twinning arrangement two similar institutions, one from the developed country and the other from a developing country, cooperate on a long-term basis. This provides a framework for two way exchange of knowledge, staff and experience as well as for effective institutional learning.

Unfortunately this mode is rather rare and therefore only few cases were in the sample of projects which were studied. Such projects were e.g. the SIDA aid to the Bureau of Standards in Tanzania and the FinnIDA Industrial Minerals Project in Kenya and the NORAD assistance to the petroleum sector in Tanzania.

Of all the institutional set-ups for implementing development projects which were surveyed during the case studies the twinning arrangement seems to provide the best possibilities for achieving the institution building and training targets. In all the cases the relations of TAP and the local staff had been very good and both parties felt that they had professionally and personally gained of the cooperation. In none of these cases had TAP been in executive positions, they had been strictly advisers. TAP was recruited from

within the institution and therefore they had a good long-term knowledge of the programme. TAP and the local staff felt equals and their social relations were good as well.

A special case of twinning is assistance from movement to movement as in a SIDA sponsored project in Zambia, in which the Swedish Cooperative Centre assists the local cooperative movement.

### Analysis

Two similar institutions, although operating in different environments, have similar objectives in their respective societies and these objectives have been internalized by the people working in them. There is a good opportunity for accumulation of knowledge and experience since the TAP is drawn from the staff in the institution and they usually return to the institution after their service in the developing country. Profitable long-term training and visiting programmes are easy to plan and implement. People working in similar institutions often have similar professional interests and this makes professional as well as social communication easier.

### Conclusions and recommendations

Whenever possible the project implementation should be organized as a twinning arrangement. Within the case studies there were several other projects which would have profited if they had had a twinning arrangement rather than a regular project set up. This was especially the case with projects supporting training institutes.

## 8.7 Intensive training locally and abroad

### Observations

The possibilities to use training as an alternative for TAP have been approached in two ways in the studied cases. There are projects which give support to local training institutes and thus build up the capacity of local manpower in a certain sector but without being related to a certain project. Secondly practically in all projects training is mentioned as one of the tasks of the project. Further, in quite many projects there are possibilities to arrange scholarships for the local staff.

It could be expected that less TAP would be used in projects in such sectors, which have received substantial assistance for training. However, this is not the case. E.g. in the water sector in Tanzania and Kenya, most of the Nordic projects have a rather strong TAP component even if the training institutes of water sector have been supported as well and substantial scholarship programmes have been run for many years especially by SIDA. The Department of Geology of the University of Dar es Salaam receives development assistance from FINNIDA which includes also scholarships for studies both locally and abroad. However, at the same time the same donor has provided TAP for the State Mining Corporation for many years and there is no indication that the number of TAP is getting any less.

One of the cases, namely the Nurse Tutor Programme in Zambia gave an example of a project in which intensive training is given to a specific group and TAP is effectively replaced by local staff.

#### Analysis

Unless it is identified as a specific purpose of a training programme to reduce the number of a specified group of TAP, a training programme does not have this effect. This is not because the shortage of manpower would be greater than can be satisfied. E.g. the output of water engineers from the University of Nairobi has been about 40 annually since 1970's. This means that a new water engineer could be placed in almost every district every year. However, there are several TAP water engineers in the country working for development projects.

The reason for the fact that support to training does not reflect in the numbers of TAP is that TAP is placed into the projects on other grounds than an identified manpower need in the recipient country. If the training programmes are to reduce the need for TAP these have to be linked to each other either by designing the training programme specifically to help to replace a certain group of TAP by nationals or by basing the recruitment of TAP on a careful assessment of the manpower situation in the recipient country.

### Conclusions and recommendations

There is no doubt whether intensive training programmes are beneficial to the recipient country, however, they do not help to reduce the number of TAP unless they are specially designed and consistently implemented to that effect.

Intensive training programmes are most useful in cases in which a new kind of activity or new technology is introduced into the country. In other words, when qualitatively something new is started. When it is a question only of expanding the manpower base in some field, support to local training institutes should be given.

### 8.8 Other alternatives

Expatriates on local contracts, expatriates from other developing countries and topping up of local salaries can be mentioned as other alternatives.

If an expatriate is on local contract the local institution should have a better control over her/him and s/he would be, without question, answerable to her/his local superiors. In these cases the donor agency would pay her/him the difference between the local salary and the regular TAP incomes. Therefore this is not a cheaper solution but somewhat more acceptable to the local officers.

Expatriates from other developing countries, especially from India, are sometimes recruited as TAP instead of TAP from industrialized countries. Their main advantage is that they are cheaper than e.g. Nordic TAP. It is also sometimes assumed that they can be more effective than Nordic TAP because they are used to developing country conditions. We are not convinced that this is the case. In addition Indians are certainly not more accepted by the African population of Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia than the Nordic citizens.

Recruiting expatriates from other countries within the region would, however, provide the local professionals broader possibilities to be exposed to different ideas and opportunities for professional advancement.

Topping up of local salaries and thus motivating the local government officers to be more efficient is a procedure which, if applied, has to be used cautiously in order to avoid creating tensions between the government officials. However, it would seem fair to us, to compensate them for the increased demand on their time and possible loss of promotions while working in an aid project.

#### 8.9 Financial assistance for recruitment of expatriate personnel (consultancy/personnel funds).

NORAD and SIDA have established so-called personnel funds for financial assistance for recruitment of expatriate personnel in most of the main partner countries. SIDA was the first Nordic donor to launch personnel funds from the mid 1970s.

The conditions for assistance have varied to some extent among the donors and in the individual countries. The experts have been hired on local contracts. The donor has covered expenses incurred in the recruitment procedures, travel costs of the expert and his family, house allowance and gratuities after the completion of their contracts. NORAD has specifically targeted the personnel funds to TAP from other Third World countries.

The donors inputs regarding salaries vary; in some cases the donor has fully paid the (local) salaries or topped-up the local salaries or solely reimbursed part of the salary in foreign currency. NORAD's experience in Tanzania may illustrate this way of utilizing the funds. NORAD pays 1/3 of the beneficiaries' salary in foreign currency after the local employer had paid the equivalent amount of money in TSH to the Treasury. The administrative procedure proved to be rather cumbersome and caused delays and frustrations. In 1986 some amendments were made in order to simplify operation. Nevertheless, the agreement was terminated in 1987. Due to the devaluation of the TSH in 1986 much of the incentive effect of the system was lost.

The personnel funds have been criticized for many reasons:

- the funds have not been utilized for hiring new experts. Instead the funds to a large extent have been used to cover salaries of expatriates with a long record of service in the country.

- the funds have not stimulated in-service training through counterpart system as intended.
- the requests have not been forthcoming as expected. The accounts and auditing system have not been provided as agreed upon.
- the administrative work on the part of donors has been high compared to the amount of financial assistance involved.

#### Recommendation

The idea behind establishing the Personnel and Consultancies fund was good. The funds have many interesting elements. To our mind it is a pity that the funds are not utilized in line with initial intentions. We recognize that the problems are large and it seems to be necessary to evaluate the organizational structure and the procedures of operation in their own right, if the funds are to be given a chance to function well.

#### 8.10 General conclusion

Most projects have, besides TAP, a combination of these alternatives. However, it is the view of the Mission that the use of alternatives could be substantially increased. In Kenya especially, local consultants could be used much more, and in Zambia, where there is a more severe shortage of manpower than in the other two countries training programmes should be organized. In Tanzania, where the government has faced most serious economic problems, implementation through local institutions should be increased in order to give them additional resources.

## 9. COST AND EFFICIENCY OF TAP.

### 9.1. The cost of TAP as compared with alternatives

#### 9.1.1 The cost of agency employed TAP

The Nordic agencies have standard figures for the cost of one manyear's work for technical assistance personnel. The figure varies from one country to the other, but hovers around 650.000 SEK. This includes the gross salary to the employee, insurances, travelling, family allowances, housing, etc.

Let us look at one of the figures that go into the average costs for an expatriate manyear. NORAD has calculated the cost for one manyear in Kenya in 1987 to 632 000 NOK. This sum consists of two main components;

1. Salary plus social expenses: NOK 332.000
2. "Distributed costs": NOK 300.000

If we look at the second component, these distributed costs consist of the following;

1. Preparatory courses: NOK 70.000
2. Recruitment: NOK 35.000
3. Travel and freight: NOK 65.000
4. Insurance: NOK 22.000
5. Employers' tax: NOK 35.000
6. School fees: NOK 29.000

There are also a number of minor costs, such as security guards, 3.000 NOK per year. There will be a large difference between an expert with a family compared to an unmarried person. (The cost for having one child in the International School in Nairobi is 100.000 DKR). Also, the longer the persons stay out, the more the costs for recruitment, etc. can be spread.

The average cost for a SIDA expert is slightly more than 600.000 SEK. This cost is calculated as follows:

Basic salary: 7.000 SEK per month in taxable income

Social security: 39 % of the taxable income

Allowances: 18.000 to 20.000 SEK per month

Distributed costs (c.f. NORAD): 300.000 per year

DANIDA calculates that the total cost for an expert (in 1986) was 520.000 DKR, out of which the salary was 260.000 per year. FINNIDA uses a standard figure of 58.000 FMP per manmonth, or 699.000 FMK per year. We can thus see that there is a fairly large discrepancy between the Nordic aid agencies. NORAD and SIDA experts being around 20 % more expensive than the DANIDA experts, and a FINNIDA expert being almost twice as expensive.

The differences are on the one hand illusive, and on the other real. From the recipient countries point of view they are real. The cost represents how much of the total budget for development assistance that goes to payment of experts. For them, a Danish TAP would be cheaper than other Nordic TAP. But the costs are illusive in the sense that the real expenditure on personnel are quite similar. The question is how the costs are treated in the domestic accounts. The taxable income of a SIDA expert is artificially low, but the non-taxable income elements are much higher. In Finland, the experts salary is taxed as for any other Finnish government employee. The cost to the donor community is about the same, but in the case of Denmark the home country bears a larger share of the cost in the form of bypassed earnings (tax).

When calculating the cost for a man year, none of the agencies include its own administrative cost. The standard costs of all the four agencies are thus too low to reflect the real cost. To assess the cost correctly we should also add the salary and office expenditures for the aid agency personnel that administrate technical assistance. If the total 18 manyears of work in NORAD's personnel section are distributed, we should add another 35.000 NOK to the TAP cost in Kenya. But it is not only the personnel section that is involved in backstopping and administrating technical assistance personnel, but also other programme officers . We estimate tha on the average 20 % of the time in a programme officers work (both at headquarters and in the field office) is concerned with personnel matters, which should mean adding another 85.000 NOK to the cost. We thus arrive at a total cost of 747.000 NOK per manyear.

On the average TAP stay 33 months at their jobs. But they do not work effectively all the time. During this period the average persons takes 3 months holiday. It is also generally said that it takes some time to get started on a new job. The personnel officer at Kenya Industrial Estates said he did not expect expatriate staff to be able to work effectively during the first year. This is exaggerated, but there will be a reduced efficiency during the first year of work - it seems to us that the magnitude would be around 4 to 6 months. There will be large variations according to the different personal backgrounds. Furthermore, before returning home the TAP and his family have a lot of practical matters to attend to. It is likely that another 3 to 2 months are taken from the actual job. As we can see, 33 months in the field leads to 24 months of effective work. The cost per man month of effective work is thus in NORAD's case 72.400 (without including administrative overheads). If we include overheads of 115.000 NOK per year, we arrive at an estimated cost of 85.600 NOK per month of effective work.

#### 9.1.2. Costs for consultant TAP

Consulting firms are generally more expensive than agency employed TAP. DANIDA uses average figures for consultant man years of 900.000 per year. But the remuneration of consultants vary even more than of agency TAP. The most expensive consultant TAP cost 1.500.000 NOK per year in 1987. The cheapest were paid approximately the same as agency TAP. The cost for consultants are however also supposed to cover backstopping and administration. The cost should therefore be compared to the agency standard cost plus all the distributed costs for administration and backstopping.

But we should also remember that several consultants do not send their personnel for training. When they employ personnel in their own organization the costs for recruitment are also nil. Thus the costs for the consultant tend to include less services, while at the same time it is more expensive. One of the significant advantages with consultants is that they bring a total package, that is, the agency cost for backstopping and administration would be low. However, that is far from true. Several inexperienced consulting firms need a lot of assistance from the aid agency field offices.

In the initial phases of the SIDA project Tanzania Bureau of Standards there were close contacts between SIDA, TBS and the consultants. As the project has matured, it runs on its own. DANIDA is heavily engaged in backstopping the TANGA cement plant (partly because of contractual relations). On the other hand FINNIDA assistance to Fibreboards Africa runs on its own with hardly any contacts with FINNIDA in Dar-es-Salaam.

In sum, to assess the cost of consultant manyears correctly, we propose to add another 100.000 SEK per year for the services of aid agencies. We thus arrive at a total of 1.000.000 SEK per year. On the whole, consultants do not stay as long in the field as agency personnel. They tend to have a more rapid turnover of personnel. But they are generally more production oriented, and start with production oriented tasks. They lose less time at the beginning and end of projects. on the whole, this is a problem. But it means that they work more manmonths out of their total stay in the countries. If we estimate the average duration of consultants field work to be 24 months, and that 4 months are lost on arrival and departure, and 2 on vacation, we arrive at a total cost of 111.000 SEK per active working month.

## 9.2. Cost of alternatives to TAP

### 9.2.1 Cost of short-term consultants

The cost of short-term consultants in Sweden is usually around 15.000 SEK per week. The costs for travelling, hotels and allowances should then be added. We estimate the cost for one manmonth to 60.000 (salary) plus 30.000 (allowances) plus 20.000 (travel), that is 110.000 SEK. Short-term consultants also require backstopping. They will need more time from local authorities, but usually they do not take so much time from the aid agencies. Nevertheless, the amount above should be adjusted for the backstopping time of the agencies, but we cannot say how much it should be.

### 9.2.2 Cost of training of local manpower

The cost of training will depend on subject, length of the programme and country of studies. A scholarship for one year in Norway amounts to 120.000 NOK. That is one year's academic studies. If the education was in the U.S., the cost would be the double if the student went to an elite university, but

otherwise approximately equal. If the training took place in India, it would be reduced by half. There are good opportunities for advanced studies in other developing countries as well, primarily in Asia but also in the Middle East. For portuguese and Spanish speaking Africans, Latin American universities provide cheaper (and often very good) programmes. Cost of scholarship on academic programmes usually only reflect living allowances and travel. Many institutions are now changing their policies and charge tuition fees. This will raise the general cost of education for scholarship students.

Further studies on academic programmes are one alternative to TAP, but often various types of shorter programmes are suggested as alternatives - or supplements. Training abroad is always expensive. Industrial training in Sweden costs around 35.000 SEK per manmonth (in-plant technical and managerial training of 6 - 8 months duration). Technical training at schools, e.g. on BITS financed programmes costs 47.000 SEK per participant and month. The international aid organization estimate the cost of scholarships at 2.200 USD (1985), but in Western Europe, USA and Japan, they estimate the average cost to be around 5.000 USD per month. But the costs for different programmes could vary. UNIDO's in plant training programmes on "industrial goods manufacturing" cost 7.700 USD in 1983. A similar course on "diesel engines' maintenance" cost 2.900 USD the same year - per month and participant.

Training in the country is often a viable alternative to training abroad. But this implies bringing short term consultants for training. Considering the cost for travelling, instructors, local support, etc. the average cost per manmonth in such courses have been estimated to be around 25.000 SEK (Forss, 1985).

Naturally, further training at national educational institutions in accordance with personnel planning would be a much cheaper alternative. As an example, Sao Hill saw mill project sends personnel for further training at Tanzanian institutions. Management takes part in shorter course at the Institute of Finance and Management in Dar-es-Salaam, at the Institute of Development Management, at the East and central African Management Institute. The cost for these course are paid in TSH and they are low.

### 9.2.3. Cost of volunteers

The cost of volunteers is now around 300.000 SEK per year, which is approximately half of the cost of the agency standard figure for TAP. 40 % of the cost reflects salary and 60 % distributed costs. But the cost of volunteers should also include the cost of backstopping and administration. This cost is lower than the agency cost for TAP services, but it is nevertheless significant. The average effective working time of volunteers is expected to be the same as for agency TAP. We thus arrive at an average cost of 34.000 SEK per month (not including administrative costs).

### 9.2.4. Cost of third country TAP

It is often suggested that third country nationals would be a cheaper alternative to TAP from the Nordic countries. We do not find any discrepancy between Scandinavian personnel and other Europeans. When we look at the remuneration within the UN system, we find that all its international experts have Nordic wage levels. It can thus be assumed that highly qualified expertise in some professions has a market at Nordic salary levels, irrespective of whether the person is of European, Asian or African background.

The question still remains whether a number of the Nordic TAP could not have been substituted by TAP from other countries. Even though the remuneration of Nordic TAP is similar to the UN system, that does not mean that all would be qualified in an international competition. If we look at the bilateral assistance from the People's Republic of China, the cost of a Chinese expert is equal to the daily allowance of a Swedish expert. Indian TAP on bilateral assistance programmes also cost less than Nordic TAP. All the African countries also recruit manpower directly in Asia, at costs that around a fifth to a tenth of the cost of agency TAP.

### 9.2.5. Cost of local project implementation

It has been discussed whether local project implementation is sometimes an alternative to implementation of a project through TAP. Let us first of all assume that a project can be implemented by the local organizations. The manpower needed would then be paid according to the local salary scales, with

the appropriate overheads. That means that a manager in Tanzania, or a senior technician, would cost around TSH 10.000 per month. Zambian salary levels would be close, and the Kenyan salaries would be the same in KSH, which means they are 5 times higher in foreign currency.

But it has also been argued that it is difficult to attract qualified persons to the public sector with its present salary structure. The projects that have successfully recruited local personnel have also found ways to circumvent such Government policies. Some projects were simply able to pay higher salaries to their employees because they were set up outside the parastatal structure. Others managed to provide fringe-benefits and other types of incentives that could compensate for the lower salaries.

If we are to give an estimate of the cost for implementing projects with local personnel, we would probably have to quadruple the monthly salaries of senior civil servants. We arrive at a total cost of 4.000 SEK per month in Tanzania, 2.000 SEK in Zambia and 12 to 15.000 SEK in Kenya. This would apply to private companies, government institutions and special contracts for local professionals, etc.

#### 9.2.6. Conclusion

We will now put the estimated cost of the different alternatives beside each other for the sake of comparison. The reader should bear in mind that one type of assistance cannot be a real alternative to a manmonth of the other type. But the balance between the different types could be sensed in terms of their total prospects for success.

One manmonth effective work:

Agency TAP: SEK 85.000

Consultant TAP: SEK 111.000

Short-term consultants: SEK 110.000

Scholarship for academic programme: SEK 10.000

" technical course: SEK 50.000

" in-plant training: SEK 35.000

Technical courses in the recipient country: SEK 25.000

Volunteers: SEK 34.000

Third-country experts: SEK 10.000 - 135.000

Local project management: SEK 4.000 - 20.000

### 9.2.7. Cost to the recipient

If we now look at the cost from the recipient country's point of view the first aspect relates to the direct costs that expatriates necessitate. They need offices, secretarial assistance, etc. to do their jobs. In many cases the government provides housing. Whereas the accounted cost for this is low, the opportunity cost will often be very high. More important is probably the indirect cost in terms of high level manpower time needed to introduce expatriates to their jobs, and in other ways administrate expatriate presence. This takes scarce manpower resources away from other urgent tasks, but as long as the expatriates are wanted and needed there is nothing to say about that. However, we have also seen that many expatriate positions are initiated by the foreign partners, and some expatriates are not wanted. But the costs still have to be borne by the "recipient".

It is difficult to isolate the costs associated with the presence of expatriates from the other costs that are incurred by technical assistance. There is always a local government contribution to the project, and the investments have to be sustained from the current budgets of the governments. The technical assistance personnel are closely associated with the pattern of creating institutions that cannot be maintained without further assistance because they have gone beyond the carrying capacity of the local economies. This has an influence on local spending patterns and the grand result of the priorities cannot even be estimated, nor can of course the opportunity cost be guessed. But they are likely to be large. There are also costs to the recipient country in the form of changing consumption patterns and the influence of foreign life styles. The governments have a political cost to carry because of the presence of technical assistance personnel.

### 9.3 Efficiency and effectiveness of different categories of TAP

In total, the Nordic countries finance the presence of slightly more than 900 technical assistance personnel in Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia (1987). If we assume that the total cost per manyear is around 1 million SEK, we thus arrive at a total figure of 900 million. The cost per manyear is higher than the standard figures, but considering that these do not include total personnel costs, and considering that many of external organizations incur higher costs, we think it is a reasonable approximation.

If we take the opportunity cost to mean the difference between the real cost of expatriate assistance and the cheapest possible way of achieving the same effect, we would probably arrive at a fairly large share of the above mentioned sum for Nordic technical assistance personnel (900 million SEK). But it is also very clear that such a figure will be extremely uncertain - to the point of being ridiculous even. But let us nevertheless attempt an introductory discussion.

If we first of all base the discussion on our case studies, which represent all sectors of assistance and covered interviews with around 250 expatriates, 350 representatives from the recipient country, and some 50 programme officers in the aid agencies, we have some ground to stand on. In addition, the 50 case studies represent the accumulated activities of around 800 technical assistance personnel.

If we put a name and a price tag on the different problems we find that: (1) on the average 5 % fail radically on their assignment and have to be sent home, (2) another 5 % do not have their contracts extended for the same reason, (3) around a quarter have their working capacity reduced because they do not speak English well enough, (4) around another quarter were in fact not really needed, the posts were identified by aid agencies or other expatriates, (5) the full effectiveness of almost 75 % was hampered because of a lack of other inputs, and the counterpart system failed to lead to a transfer of knowledge. Now, these categories overlap to a large degree. However, they still indicate a fairly low general "achievement ratio". But it hides the excellent performance of several expatriates that bring huge monetary benefits to the organizations they work in, as well as the failures that incur large costs both to the aid agencies, the recipient governments and to the expatriates themselves (not least the social costs).

Before proceeding to a discussion of efficiency and effectiveness we would like to note what is commonly meant by these two concepts. An account of efficiency presupposes knowledge of costs and knowledge of the benefit from an activity. Furthermore, it presupposes that both can be measured on a scale. As a consequence, efficiency is generally treated as a short-term measure of the value of some activity. It is generally agreed that a measure of efficiency needs to be supplemented with other information. That brings us to the concept

"effectiveness". Effectiveness is also as a measure of the value of an activity, the difference is that it is often a discussion in more general terms. Assessing effectiveness means that several objectives are brought into the picture and compared to the costs of an activity. It also means that various side effects are considered. The comments that follow below are concerned with the effectiveness of TAP.

The overall achievement of the objectives of TAP were discussed in section 4 above, but that discussion was not quantified, nor were the relations between non-quantifiable inputs and outputs made explicit.

Our overall conclusion was that the institution building and training objectives are generally not met, but TAP are more effective when it comes to operational objectives. There should not be any need for a more extensive debate concerning this conclusion. The fact that assistance projects continue for several years and that one plan for out-phasing expatriates follows another, is ample evidence of the overall failure to build up local competence and subsequently withdraw. A large number of the technical assistance personnel are also competent and hard-working professionals. Most of them will be at an advantage in getting things done, and in achieving production oriented objectives.

Many technical assistance personnel are advisers at lower organizational levels, and we have seen that they come to take operational responsibilities. If we were to assess the total worth of the expatriates' "gap-filling" and "implementing" activities, where would the results point? As an example, we have an already completed project; SIDA's nurse tutor programme in Zambia. Its objective was to train nurse tutors to increase Zambia's capacity to train its own nurses, and remove the need for expatriate personnel in that sector. By 1985, when the programme was completed, the objective had been reached. Zambia had the number of nurse tutors it needed. SIDA had financed a large number of Swedish tutors in Zambia between 1973 and 1985, to a total cost of around 28 million SEK. Was it worth the cost? Obviously the question cannot be answered. Could it have been done at a lower cost? Obviously, as some of the expatriates were not very effective (even if most were), but that presupposes an organization that makes no mistakes, and that is again an impossibility.

If we look at another example, assistance to the mining industry in Tanzania, we find that another problem. The mining activities have declined considerably, the production of gold went from 500 kgs per year in the late 1960s to between 0 and 15 kgs per year in the mid 1980s. The expatriate team, costing close to 4 million SEK in 1987, have for a number of years concentrated their activities on gold mining. It would seem that the benefits have few chances of outweighing the costs, but on the other hand mining is an activity with long range commitments, and even if there is no evidence of benefits today, there could perhaps be an impact on policies that in turn lead to production in the future.

Danish assistance to the public telephones in Kenya is an example where the cost-benefit ratio appears high. The cost of expatriate personnel is a very minor share of the total project, but has been necessary for the rapid installation of telephone booths. The investments costs were returned before installation was completed. There is a common agreement that the project can now be taken over by the Kenyan organization, so the institutional development and training has also been completed.

These cases cannot be compared, and thus it is not possible to say something general about cost effectiveness - apart from what has already been said. The achievement of project objectives in sectors as different as agriculture, health and industry cannot be compared in monetary terms (neither can failure). Our general observation remains that we think the same impact could have been reached with less TAP, but whether the money could have been more wisely spent on other projects, with other personnel remains open to doubt.

It is a very interesting question if the same effect could have been reached by some other combination of inputs or with other personnel. In general we do not think that TAP from any other country would have done a better job than Nordic TAP. They would have been cheaper (in several cases), but as the problem very often is one of foreign presence by and large, it does not matter much where these foreigners come from. However, if the presence of cheap TAP had meant that more money was allocated for training of indigenous personnel, it is quite possible that the overall impact had been better. If less funds were spent on TAP, resources could also have been used for equipment, short-term consultancies etc. to a higher degree. That would also have led to a better achievement of objectives.

#### 9.4. Towards a framework for technical assistance

If we follow a project from the beginning to the end, we find that from the managerial point of view a number of things can be done differently. The same applies to technical assistance personnel, from recruitment and through the assignment to debriefing, things can be done differently.

Take the example of identifying the need for assistance; that can be done by the recipient organization, by consultants, by the aid agency, by other expatriates. Each way of doing has its cost and benefits. The aid agency and the expatriates will probably act rapidly if they have made the decision. A consultant can bring other opinions, but will work slower. The recipient organization is most likely to be correct in its assessment of the need. Now, if speed happens to be a major criteria for success, and if the need is relatively clear, and if mistakes are not expensive - or could be corrected; we should perhaps argue for the first way of identifying the need for expatriates.

Another example could be training. If the personnel going out already have considerable exposure to the developing country, and to the place they are to work in, they might not need to take part in preparatory training. An effective institutional set-up that emphasizes learning from senior personnel and that is closely integrated with the recipient organization could well compensate for such courses. This type of learning could take place on twinning arrangements, for instance.

We also discussed the various roles of aid agencies in relation to projects, and the distinction could be brought further by separating headquarters and field offices and the roles they might play in relation to personnel. The point we want to make is that there are a very large number of variables that could be handled differently.

Let us call these different solutions design variables. The term indicates that each such solution is chosen from a set of solutions, and another solution could also have been appropriate (perhaps, and depending on the circumstances). The number of design variables will vary, but probably are between 20 and 40 on an ordinary project. The number of possible design alternatives is, for practical reasons, usually limited to a handful. As we

can see, the combinations are very many; if each of the 20 design variables could be designed in 5 alternative ways, we end up with 3.200.000 combinations. The point is purely theoretical, many combinations will be non-sensical.

But the exercise also has practical implications. There is no one correct way of "delivering" assistance. If we think of the project as a process involving several design variables, our minds will perhaps be less constrained by preconceived ideas of correct solutions. The review of our case studies show some "typical" project designs. Some of them seem to work well, others do not. There are also instances where a way of delivering assistance works well in one case, but in other cases not. If we call the way of delivering assistance for a "mode", we have a term that encapsulates the whole process and that includes specific solutions in respect of the design variables.

The prospect for such a mode of reaching the objective of assistance will depend on a number of factors. The first is that different objectives will call for different modes of assistance. An integrated rural development project will usually require another mode of assistance than an industrial project. If training is essential another mode would be appropriate than if gap-filling is the primary target, or if we speak of a senior adviser.

The second is that the project's environment should influence the mode of assistance. National policies and national concerns (even if only reflected in political rhetoric) affect the prospects for a certain mode of assistance to be successful. In Kenya, it would be much more common to seek modes of assistance building on local personnel than in the other countries. In Tanzania, preparatory training that includes political science and Kiswahili would be much more important than in the other countries. In Zambia, long term continuity on senior advisory positions would be a more common "value" of a design variable in a mode of assistance than in the other countries.

The third point we want to raise is that the different design elements need to be consistent with each other. The "values" on the design variables should be in harmony. As an example, a tightly managed industrial development project that operates according to a fixed schedule needs rapid recruitment, strong backstopping and a tight monitoring system. Standardized procedures and a "well-oiled machine" for implementation are essential for cost-effectiveness.

But an institution building project in the public sector needs a more integrative nature of implementation to transfer the "software" - tight planning, bureaucratized routines and strict monitoring might destroy the "spirit" of work.

The Nordic aid agencies are for many reasons rapidly moving away from the traditional approaches to development assistance whereby the aid agency was in charge of all aspects of implementation, from the beginning to the end. Whereas the agencies procedures were to a large degree standardized, we now find a number of external organization that represent different "modes" of delivering assistance. The agencies are also being diversified as the nature of health, agriculture, industry, etc, in fact put different demands on the operations of the sections. As the developing countries progress, they also push the agencies and they necessitate a diversified approach to implementation.

The patterns of implementation that we observe today are the result of ad hoc solutions to the problems of "delivery". But if the aid agencies are to be in control of development cooperation, they need to make rational choices between modes of assistance, and they need a conceptual framework to distinguish between such modes - as well as to discuss when a specific mode of assistance is applicable or not. It goes beyond the present report to develop such a framework, but our case studies have provided the grounds for identifying the need and we would propose that the organization of development assistance - over a broad range of projects - is investigated further.

## 10. RECOMMENDATIONS

### Introduction

The chapters above have indicated a number of problems that are associated with the employment of technical assistance personnel. When we now arrive at our recommendations the reader should bear in mind the following assumptions:

1. In spite of the short-comings we think there is still a basic need for technical assistance personnel on development programs. Our recommendations focus on an improvement of the existing systems of cooperation, even if the changes we propose are sometimes drastic.
2. The recommendations are based on our review of projects in Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia. The problems that were identified and that we list here were common to all countries and for all Nordic aid agencies. If the recommendations are discussed in a wider context - which we still believe is possible - it is necessary to take into account the new environment. The general applicability must be qualified.
3. When we list our recommendations we start by a brief observation concerning the problem. For the purpose of the presentation we keep this very brief, but refer the reader to the relevant section of the evaluation. In that section the reader will find a discussion of the magnitude of the problem, its manifestations and, in some cases, the diversity of solutions.

Let us now turn to the recommendations.

### Recommendations

Observation. Development assistance is often designed without sufficient knowledge of the local manpower situation. Technical assistance personnel are found to be a solution before the nature of the problem is really identified.

The recipient countries are seldom fully involved in the decisions on technical assistance personnel - for a number of reasons; the coordinating capacity in respect of manpower and aid is low, the aid agencies follow procedures that do not disclose vital information, particularly on costs, that are a prerequisite for decisions. Chapters 2, 3, 4)

Recommendations.

(1) The recipient countries need to strengthen their manpower planning in order to improve their knowledge about the availability of various categories of skilled manpower.

(2) Manpower surveys will form the basis for identifying priority areas for development of the local manpower resource base and for identifying the role of TAP in the long-term development plans of the countries in question. The evaluation mission recommends that the Nordic donors react positively should the Governments request assistance in this field.

(3) In order to attract, develop and retain skilled manpower in the public sector Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia need to reform the Civil Service. It is not simply a question of paying higher salaries and fringe benefits. For young professionals job satisfaction is probably equally important, particularly in Kenya where one can exist reasonably well on a government salary. We recommend that the Nordic aid agencies bring up the need for reforms in relation to the discussion of the need for TAP during the annual development assistance consultations with the 3 recipient countries.

(4) Development assistance should take into account the availability of local manpower. The aid agencies should make sure that every attempt to employ local personnel has been exhausted before they resort to technical assistance personnel. To do so it is necessary to develop real knowledge of local manpower constraints and to identify ways of employing (and keeping) qualified local personnel on development projects.

(5) The desk officers of the Nordic donor agencies cannot be expected to have a thorough knowledge of the local availability of various skill categories. In order to improve the information upon which the institutional framework and personnel component of new development assistance are based, we recommend that the Nordic agencies cooperate by employing a local consultant to develop an information system on the availability of various professional skill categories and the various ways in which they can be attached to donor development programmes as a substitute for TAP.

(6) The Nordic agencies incorporate institution building and manpower/staff development in their project appraisal/project planning manuals to be used by appraisal missions. And that long-term institutional and staff development becomes an integrated part of all project planning documents.

(7) The Nordic agencies incorporate qualified professionals with relevant experience in institution building and staff development in all project appraisal/project planning teams.

(8) Technical assistance personnel should not necessarily be coupled to other forms of assistance, to a project. Financial assistance should not necessarily be linked to personnel assistance. Funds should be given in a long time perspective even if personnel may be needed for shorter time periods.

(9) The Nordic aid agencies should in every way facilitate the work of local authorities and they should respond favourably to initiatives that strengthen the ministries of manpower development, in particular.

(10) The aid agencies should inform the recipient countries on the full cost of technical assistance and should contribute to having decisions regarding foreign personnel taken at the instances where the alternatives in terms of cost-effectiveness are fully appreciated. The local authorities must be responsive to cost signals and by implication should be able to receive, interpret and act on such signals.

Observation. Personnel policies in the aid agencies are one of the main reasons for the choice of a particular form of aid, for example whether it should be implemented by an external organization or by the aid agency. The final choice has not taken the requirements of the activity as a starting point and this has led to poor performance. (Chapters 6 and 7)

Recommendation

(11) Obviously it is the actual needs of the project setting that should govern the choice of how to implement it. Personnel constraints within the aid agencies should not be an excuse for counterproductive means of implementation. When there is a real need to expand the capacity of the aid organizations, it should be expanded?. When it is better to select an external organization this should be done. In neither case should vested interests or fiscal policies be allowed to impede the effectiveness of development cooperation.

(12) If it is not possible to choose the best means of implementation in a particular sector, then the aid agencies should avoid such sectors rather than choose an ineffective means of implementation.

Observation. Few of the technical assistance personnel from the Nordic countries have relevant knowledge and skills in designing and implementing programs for on-the-job training and institution building, even if they are otherwise professionally well qualified. (Chapters 4 and 7)

Recommendation

(13) It is important to give priority to experience and skills in training and institution building when personnel are recruited, and for the recruiters to discern when such experience is relevant.

(14) The preparatory courses should introduce personnel to training methods and models for institution building. The training should include practical exercises.

(15) The relevant skills often develop over time and we recommend the aid agencies to couple the contracts of personnel to the needs of a project. The first contract should normally not be less than three years, and there is no need for an upper limit on the years of service.

Observation. The recognition and appreciation of the local environment is frequently superficial and inadequate. This is particularly so regarding culture in a wider meaning, including political systems, administrative practices, etc. (Chapter 7)

### Recommendation

(16) The preparatory training centers in the Nordic countries should further their cooperation - including country and sector specialization. The centers should develop task specific training programs that include information on legal systems, public administration and management in specific countries.

(17) The training of personnel should continue with shorter courses in the country, focussing on the local environment. These could also be undertaken on a Nordic basis. In Kenya and Tanzania Kiswahili is much more important than most foreigners realize. Competence in Kiswahili should be emphasized.

Observation. In connection with the above observations we must conclude that the recruitment base for technical assistance personnel is too narrow. The aim of funds for technical assistance should be to let recipient countries recruit abroad qualified manpower that is not available domestically. Even more serious, the same applies to the availability of competent external organizations. Given the present trend of rapidly increasing numbers of projects implemented by such organizations, this is a great threat to the effectiveness of aid.

(Chapter 7)

### Recommendation

(18) To the largest extent possible the donor agencies should advertise jobs internationally and should encourage applicants of all nationalities. As a minimum, the Nordic area should be seen as one recruitment base.

(19) We recommend that the aid agencies' journals on employment opportunities are merged into one as rapidly as possible, and that consultants also advertise vacant positions there.

(20) When firms, consultants or public institutions are selected on a national basis competition is in effect limited. We recommend the aid agencies; first, to introduce an element of competition by inviting tenders on an international basis, second, to have independent, unbiased external organizations assess the feasibility of the project - and the capacity of the tendering organization to implement it effectively.

Observation. Monitoring and evaluation of technical assistance personnel concentrate on quantifiable, production oriented targets. The training and institution building objectives are neglected. This is more common when external organizations implement projects, but occurs in all assistance.

(Chapter 7)

#### Recommendations

(21) The aid agencies need to educate their staff at all levels in qualitative assessment of project performance. The aid agencies should emphasize such skills (including personnel management) when they recruit new programme officers.

(21) The contracts between aid agencies and external organization must be very specific on training and institution development. These words must not become standard phrases but should be filled with content.

(22) The aid agencies should develop bonus systems that encourage the external organizations to perform well regarding such objectives.

(23) It should be recognized that a number of powerful forces will pull project activities away from institution development and training. These forces must be checked and evaluations should start from the assumption that the problems exist and should proceed to an account of their magnitude and what solutions, if any, that are available.

Observation. The integration between local staff and foreign staff on development projects is often poor. Foreign personnel have divided loyalties. Foreign and local staff have not similar access to office equipment, project facilities etc. There is frequently a considerable amount of distrust between the aid agencies, local authorities and project personnel. (Chapters 5 and 7)

#### Recommendations

(24) The terms of reference should make technical assistance personnel first and foremost answerable to the local authorities.

(25) In consequence of this the local organization should be fully involved in recruitment and should also set job priorities and engage in active personnel management.

(26) Local and foreign staff should have equal access to services, and these should be determined by the projects' requirements.

(27) There must be a commitment to personnel development which should be physically visible on every site, meaning that foreign and national staff should be working together.

Observation. The life cycle of a project is often characterized by discontinuities. The same mistakes are repeated by personnel, aid agencies and local authorities. (Chapters 3, 4, 6, 7)

#### Recommendations

(28) It is important to plan the arrival and departure of foreign personnel so that their experience is captured and utilized. The local authorities must assume the first responsibility for this, but the aid agencies also need to learn - both for the project at hand and because they represent the link to other projects, in other countries.

(29) External organizations have an even greater need to learn and to make sure that personnel have an opportunity to overlap. By definition, they are not part of the same learning system the aid agencies participate in (they are usually not specialists on development assistance). Instead, they could often act faster and avoid bureaucracy when it comes to recruitment and fielding. But there is still little evidence that this opportunity is used, and their learning is often weak.

(30) Formal debriefing procedures are good but should not be overestimated. It is important that the aid agency personnel policies allow for continuity and on-the-job learning. The programme officers represent the live intelligence and information concerning project implementation, and from the point of view of the Nordic countries, are the keys to successful, dynamic, cooperation. The same should apply to the external organizations that to an increasing degree account for project implementation.

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