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“Twinning for Development”
Institutional Cooperation between
Public Institutions in Norway and the South

Development through Institutions?
Sub-study 1

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A report submitted to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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The Ministry does not accept any responsibility for the information
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Executive Summary

INTRODUCTION

Institutions are increasingly seen as a key factor in the development process, and institutional development has been an important element in Norwegian development aid since the beginning of the 1990s. The issue came to the forefront of policy debates with the publication of NORAD's «Strategy for the 1990s» and White Paper No.51 (1991–92) and No. 19 (1995–1996). Parallel with the increasing emphasis on institutional development, Norwegian institutions have been given a central role as partners in development with the introduction of the «Norway Axis». According to policy statements NORAD's responsibility is primarily to fund and coordinate projects, with the cooperating institutions in the South and Norway being responsible for planning, implementation and reporting.

The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is carrying out a comprehensive assessment of institutional development efforts in Norwegian bilateral assistance through four different channels. These are public institutions, universities, private companies and private consulting firms, and non-government organizations. The present sub-study (Study 1) examines the experiences with institutional cooperation between public and semi-public institutions in Norway and the South. Altogether 35 Norwegian public institutions are involved in over 100 institutional development projects. 55 percent of these are larger public institutions (directorates and authorities), while 45 percent are semi-public institutions of research and higher learning.

The report is based on information and data from surveys of the Norwegian institutions and their partner institutions in the South, case studies of institutional development projects in Namibia, Mozambique and Tanzania in the sectors oil, fish and research, and interviews with staff from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the NORAD Head Office in Oslo and Norwegian embassies. The stated objectives of the study are: i) To examine institutional development strategies, experiences and outcomes in institutional cooperation between public institutions; ii) to analyze the preparation, processes and outcomes of collaboration, and in particular assess how these are perceived by Southern partners; iii) to contribute towards improving policies and practices in the area of technical cooperation and institution building.

THE CONCEPTS OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND TWINNING.

The focus of this study is on institutional performance and how public institutions relate to the political and economic context they are a part of. More specifically, the analysis distinguishes between three levels of institutional development: i) One is transfer and use of knowledge on the individual level («human resource development»). ii) The second is changes in formal structures, management, administrative routines and technology in individual organizations («organizational development»). iii) And the third is changes in the relation between individual organizations and networks, sectors and overall context («systemic development»). This level basically concerns the legitimacy and usefulness of organizations as institutions vis á vis their public and private stakeholders.

Institutional cooperation between institutions in Norway and the South («Twinning») is one of several alternative strategies to promote institutional development in international aid programs. Institutional cooperation is seen to provide the recipient with a broad range of competence and services through a sister institution with a comparable institutional mandate. However, the experiences with institutional cooperation through twinning arrangements are not solely positive. The most common criticism include the supply-driven nature of institutional reform, resistance to change of status quo in many Southern institutions, and the cultural and communication barriers between foreign advisers and consultants and local management and staff.

TWINNING IN NORWEGIAN DEVELOPMENT AID

The Role of NORAD

Institutional support has been part of Norwegian development aid for many years. The most important new developments following the policy shift has been the increased emphasis on institutional development as an objective in its own right, and the equally strong emphasis on the responsibility of the Southern and Norwegian institutions themselves for planning, implementation and reporting of institutional development projects.

While general policy statements have been effectively disseminated within NORAD, there has only been limited attempts to formulate more specific objectives and guidelines. As a consequence, there is a conceptual confusion particularly as regards the difference between

organizational and institutional development, and uncertainty regarding the division of roles and responsibilities between NORAD and the institutions in Norway and the South. At the same time, institutional development projects are planned and implemented within existing NORAD structures and project cycle principles. This makes it difficult to accommodate the roles and responsibilities of the institutions themselves in the planning and implementation process.

Having said this, a number of initiatives have been taken to clarify policy implications. Advisers in the Technical Department have been assigned a special responsibility for institutional development issues. Special courses in institutional development have been established at the Foreign Service Institute. NORAD supports and takes part in two networks between public institutions involved in development aid. Framework agreements have been established with a number of public and semi-public institutions. A guide for evaluation of the sustainability of institutional development projects is currently being produced. And there is a formalized internal debate in NORAD on experiences and how to clarify objectives and processes. NORAD's current perception of the role of Norwegian public institutions in development aid is relatively positive, even though their ability to combine transfer of professional competence with the need to take development issues into account remains a concern.

Public Institutions as Agents of Aid

Norwegian public institutions differ in experience, competence and capacity for development work. Some have considerable experience, are involved in a large number of projects and have separate units working with development issues. Others have limited experience and only a few individuals involved in development work without an adequate institutional basis. The individuals working with development issues have a range of incentives for doing so, but the institutional commitment is not equally strong. Public institutions give precedence to their responsibilities in Norway. While most of the institutions possess considerable professional competence, they are not equally strong in pursuing Norwegian development goals and the broader objectives of institutional development. At the same time, they argue that NORAD represents the main bottleneck for successful implementation of projects and that more responsibility should be left to the institutions themselves.

The public institutions in the South are generally posi-

tive to the cooperation with Norwegian organizations, but are only to a limited extent familiar with the implications of the policy shift for development focus and their own role and responsibilities. They also have problems separating NORAD and the Norwegian institutions as agents of Norwegian development aid. The capacity of the Southern institutions to absorb and use the human and technical resources accessible through the twinning agreements vary. Some are skeptical towards including higher level concerns such as organizational change, management and relations with external stakeholders in projects.

Institutional Development Projects

Despite the conceptual confusion and the unclear distribution of roles and responsibilities, the institutions themselves are generally positive towards the institutional development projects they are involved in. The Southern institutions are normally more positive than their Norwegian partners. The majority of the projects have been established the last 1–4 years, they are primarily but not solely funded by NORAD, they have budgets of around 10 million NOK and are projected for periods of between two and five years. The project periods are significantly lower than what is recommended for this type of projects. The projects involve a relatively large number of people from both institutions, and thus adhere to the idea of institutional cooperation projects being something more than individually based technical assistance.

However, our data also reveal that the projects largely relate to lower level concerns of human resource and organizational development, and to a much smaller extent to higher level concerns of strategic management and systems development. Technical competence, improved technology and equipment, and improved administrative routines are most commonly targeted, while the impact on the development of an effective and accountable leadership, stronger linkages with other organizations and improved and relevant services to stakeholders is more modest. Even though transfer of professional competence and organizational efficiency is the most important part of institutional development projects, this is not sufficient to develop institutional legitimacy and long term sustainability.

INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SECTORS OIL, FISH AND RESEARCH

The case studies from Namibia, Mozambique and Tan-

zania largely confirm the findings from the general surveys of Norwegian and Southern institutions. The relation with NORAD is seen as problematic particularly by the Norwegian institutions, but the relations established between the partner institutions are seen as positive and constructive. The Southern institutions have a relatively strong influence on the identification of objectives and project activities, while the Norwegian institutions normally carry the professional aspects of the twinning arrangements. Again, however, the projects mainly relate to lower level concerns even though some of them do have implications for the broader political and economic context.

The cases also make it possible to assess the importance of the political and economic context. More developed and stable environments (like Namibia) are most conducive for institutional development efforts. At the same time, however, the options for making substantial contributions to development is also evident in less developed and stable contexts like Mozambique even though the risk element is larger. Having said this, context is not decisive. In Tanzania the cooperation between Agder College and IDM has fulfilled many of the objectives of institutional development by relating actively to the external context, while the relation between the Agricultural University of Norway and Sokoine University of Agriculture has enhanced research capacity but without making the research sufficiently relevant for the agricultural sector and Tanzanian society.

INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION AS A DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

With reference to a set of key questions and hypotheses developed jointly for the four sub-studies on institutional development cooperation, the following main conclusions are drawn for this study:

Concepts and intentions

Norwegian public institutions are increasingly engaged in institutional development, and there has been a shift of emphasis from operational interventions and physical outputs to development of human and social capital. While there is confusion at the conceptual level particularly related to the differences between organizational and institutional development, the stated objectives in individual projects are consistent and clear. However, these tend to target lower level rather than higher level concerns. Both NORAD and the public institutions need to sharpen their conceptual tools and their understand-

ing of institutional development. Even though the policy of institutional development and twinning has been donor-driven, there is no evidence that the institutional development objectives of the Norwegian institutions dominate those of the partner in the South.

Strategies and actions

There are few operational objectives that allow organizations to effectively target institutional development. Interventions tend to concentrate on competence building and introduction of improved technologies, less on improved administrative routines and accountable leadership, and least on linkages between the institution and the larger political and economic context. Development of organizational capacity contribute to institutional development, but only when the interventions are done with reference to their relevance for external stakeholders and society at large. Much of what is done is «gap-filling» in the production of tangible outputs. Also this contributes to institutional development, but only when the recipient institution is closely involved in the process. To develop a constructive relation between Norwegian and Southern institutions, it is necessary to find a balance between short-term consultants and longer-term resident advisers. Public institutions are not development institutions. NORAD should make a closer assessment of their competence and capacity for development work.

Relevance and outcomes

There are few standards to assess the outcome of institutional development projects, particularly as regards higher level concerns (institutional efficiency and legitimacy). The problem is exacerbated by the discrepancy between the relatively short project periods on the one hand, and the time needed to ascertain impacts related to networks, sectors and society at large on the other. As a consequence, outcomes are most commonly measured with respect to low level concerns and tangible outputs. Stakeholders tend to disagree on the relative importance of the outcome of institutional development projects, partly because of differences in perceptions of context and what is possible to accomplish. Despite the positive assessment of institutional development projects by the institutions involved, institutional cooperation stops when donor support discontinues. The Norwegian public institutions depend on support from NORAD, and the Southern institutions find it difficult to identify alternative funding for institutional development purposes.

What makes a good institutional development project?

Following from the analysis summed up above, a number of issues are identified as important for a successful institutional development project. These include: i) clarification of policies and their implications; ii) initial assessment of the competence and capacity of the cooperating institutions, and political and economic context; iii) a demand-driven process of planning and implementation with close communication between the partners; vi) establishment of personal relations between individuals with strong institutional backing; vii) establishment of long-term development goals with reference to which all short-term interventions are made; viii) a division of responsibilities where NORAD takes on a guiding rather than active role in project development.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- NORAD should clarify its policy and strategy of institutional development.

NORAD should produce a manual/guide as a common point of reference for institutional development projects, and make it accessible both to NORAD staff, the partner institutions in the South and the partner institutions in Norway. The guide should clarify the practical implications of the concepts of organizational and institutional development respectively.

- NORAD should clarify the division of roles and responsibilities between NORAD and the cooperating institutions.

NORAD should clarify the practical implications of the allocation of responsibility for planning, implementation and reporting of institutional development efforts to the cooperating institutions as this is expressed in policy documents. In doing this, the apparent differences in responsibilities vested with public, private and NGO organizations respectively should be addressed and resolved.

- NORAD should continue to emphasize the principle of recipient responsibility in institutional cooperation projects.

NORAD should continue to pursue the principle of recipient responsibility in institutional cooperation projects, also as regards management of project funds. However, NORAD must address the problem of back-

logs of transfer of resources to the Norwegian partner institution. e.g. by introducing guarantees for payment within a stipulated time.

- NORAD should develop sets of indicators for success or failure of institutional development projects

NORAD should produce a set of indicators for monitoring and evaluation of institutional development projects. These should include indicators related to organizational efficiency (changes in structures and processes, enhanced levels of education, transfers of technology and equipment, volume and quality of outputs) as well as institutional legitimacy (changes in nature and frequency of stakeholder relations, relevance of outputs, transaction costs, impact on sector and national levels).

- NORAD should review the Project Cycle Manual in order to give more room for the Norwegian and Southern institutions to plan and implement their own programs

The responsibilities vested in the cooperating institutions must be reflected in the Project Cycle Manual to ensure that the institutional contract regulating the relations between the partner institutions is accommodated, and that the Norwegian partner institution is involved in the annual project planning meetings.

- NORAD should give a stronger emphasis to monitoring and evaluation of institutional development projects

Parallel with the increased allocation of responsibilities to the cooperating institutions, NORAD should put more emphasis on the monitoring and evaluation of institutional development projects, in order to secure fulfillment of Norwegian aid principles (gender, poverty, environment) and the objectives of long term sustainability. Monitoring and evaluation teams should include both sector and institutional development experts.

- NORAD should ensure that institutional cooperation projects are made long-term and more predictable for the institutions involved

Institutional development takes time, and the current project periods of 3–5 years are normally too short for the planning and implementation process. In looking into the possibilities for extending the project periods, the option of continuing twinning projects independent

of other country program priorities should be particularly assessed.

- NORAD must strengthen its own resource base on institutional development

The existing resource base on institutional development in the Technical Department should be strengthened and made more visible. NORAD should give particular emphasis to cross-sector advice, and make sure that institutional development issues is reflected in all relevant program and project documents.

- NORAD should actively support the Norwegian network of public institutions involved in development work

The network has the potential to become an important forum for dissemination of information and experiences between NORAD and the institutions and between the institutions themselves. A separation of the larger public institutions and institutions of research and higher learning may make each network more relevant and effective.

- The Norwegian public institutions should give stronger emphasis to develop competence and capacity for development work.

While retaining the primary emphasis on transfer of professional competence, the institutions should become more professional with regard to development issues in general and institutional development in partic-

ular. This should mainly be done by more actively involving external milieus and consultants specializing in these fields in twinning projects. The option of establishing a permanent group of institutional development experts on which the public institutions can draw should be considered.

- The Norwegian public institutions should more actively involve their management structures in institutional development projects

The management should be active and visible in order to enhance the legitimacy of institutional development projects both in the Norwegian and Southern institutions, and in order to give added weight to the development of an effective and accountable leadership and strategic thinking.

- NORAD and the public institutions should select two test-cases in order to test the applicability of the broad approach to institutional development advocated in this report.

In addition to an increased emphasis on clarification of the implications of the policy of institutional development through twinning, two projects should be selected as test cases and given all the prescribed project inputs and resources (sufficient time and resources, access to necessary expertise, adherence to revised project cycle principles). The cases should also involve a Process Research component, in order to secure that the experiences gained are properly recorded and disseminated.

1. Introduction

1.1 INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND TWINNING

Institutional development has gained new importance in Norwegian and international development cooperation in the 1990s. Although there are individual cases of institutional development efforts dating back nearly three decades, the official shift of policy took place in the beginning of the 1990s with the publication of NORAD's «Strategies for Development Cooperation. NORAD in the Nineties» (NORAD 1990a) and the establishment of the so-called «Norway Axis». With this shift, the main responsibility for the planning, implementation and reporting of institutional development projects rests with the cooperating institutions in Norway and the South, with NORAD primarily being responsible for funding and coordinating the efforts (NORAD 1997a:8). The shift of policy has already had a number of practical implications, both as regards types of projects, budget allocations and internal organization in NORAD.

The emphasis on institutional development seems to be the combined outcome of a growing realization of the importance of organizations and institutions in the development process, and frustration with the limited results from other forms of development cooperation including technical assistance. The overall aim of the new strategy is to «strengthen institutions in the South so that they can fill their functions independently of external support». More specifically, Norwegian aid should (NORAD 1990b:3):

- Support institutional reforms that increases the effectiveness and legitimacy of public institutions
- Support training and research institutions in order to improve access to scarce human resources in public and private institutions
- Support the establishment and development of institutions in the private sector in order to improve their effectiveness and legitimacy
- Support institutions in civil society in order to contribute to a democratic development

¹ The term «twinning» will be used as synonymous with «institutional cooperation» in this study. We are aware that «twinning» is not an entirely appropriate term. Twinning projects will normally involve institutions in Norway and the South that are not «equals», but a partnership where the Norwegian institution will have superior professional competence.

A basic premise for the shift of policy is that institutional development is something qualitatively different from human resource development being the principal objective of the old technical assistance. Our point of departure in this report is that the concept of institutional development in its present form involves three interdependent levels of intervention.

- One is transfer and use of knowledge on the individual level («human resource development»).
- The second is changes in formal structures, management, administrative routines and technology in individual organizations («organizational development»).
- And the third is changes in the relation between individual organizations and networks, sectors and overall context («systemic development»). This level basically concerns the legitimacy and usefulness of organizations as institutions vis a vis their public or private stakeholders.

Within the general scope of institutional development, increasing emphasis has been given to linking institutions in the South and like-minded institutions in Norway («Twinning»)¹. Institutional cooperation has been used as a means of supporting institutional development between public institutions, private companies and consulting firms, as well as between non-government organizations (NGOs). It is argued that relations of this type have advantages over other forms of institutional support, particularly in addressing the systemic and sustainability dimensions of development assistance. It provides the recipient with a broad range of services through a sister institution which has a comparable institutional mandate. Consultants from the sister institution will have a range of competence and skills of close applicability, a broad backup facility, and a «corporate identity» permitting easier and more effective interaction with their partners in the South. Twinning arrangements will normally contain both learning in technical areas related to the output of concrete products, and learning related to management and institutional issues (SIDA 1997:2).

However, the experiences with institutional development through twinning arrangements are not solely positive. The most common criticism include the supply-driven nature of institutional reform, resistance to change of *status quo* in many Southern institutions, and the cultural and communication barriers between foreign advisers and consultants and local management and

staff. Even in like-minded aid countries such as Sweden, Denmark, Holland and Canada, twinning as a way to promote institutional development seems to receive much more critical attention than what is the case in Norway.

1.2 THE STUDY

The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has decided to do a comprehensive assessment of institutional development efforts in Norwegian bilateral assistance that will examine positive and negative experiences with institutional development through different channels. Altogether four inter-related studies are carried out. A separate synthesis report will present the main conclusions from the individual studies and draw the main lessons to be learnt. The individual studies are:

- A study of institutional cooperation between public or semi-public institutions in Norway and the South (Study 1)
- A study on the cooperation between the Sokoine University of Agriculture and the Norwegian Agricultural University (Study 2)
- A study of institutional development efforts carried out by private companies and private consulting firms in Norway (Study 3)
- A study of institutional development efforts carried out by non-Government institutions (NGOs) in Norway (Study 4).

The present study examines the experiences with institutional cooperation between public and semi-public institutions (Study 1). Altogether 35 institutions of this type are involved in cooperation with like-minded institutions in the South, through more than 100 individual projects. They are all supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs/NORAD in their institutional development efforts. The institutions can be divided into two main types. About 55% are large public institutions (normally Directorates or Authorities) for whom development assistance normally represent a small part of their total activities. The remaining 45% are smaller institutions of research and higher learning with public funding, for whom development assistance normally represent an important part of their activities both in professional and financial terms.

The stated objectives in the Terms of Reference for this study are (see Appendix 1):

- To examine institutional development strategies, experiences and outcomes in institutional cooperation between public institutions
- To analyze the preparation, processes and outcomes of collaboration, and in particular assess how these are perceived by Southern partners
- To contribute towards improving policies and practices in the area of technical cooperation and institution building

The study has been influenced by a set of basic premises that should be mentioned already at this stage. One is that the policy of institutional development through twinning is relatively recent, and hence that the experiences gained are still relatively limited. We have met the argument that the study comes 2–3 years too early and that both NORAD and the institutions are still in the process of developing sound practices. Our perception has been that it is important to identify strengths and weaknesses already at this stage despite the limited experience gained, in order to rectify and improve policies and practices before they become too institutionalized.

A second premise we have had to relate to is the considerable difference in perceptions and opinions regarding what institutional development really is and the distribution of roles and responsibilities between the main actors involved. The main reason for this confusion is the lack of clarity in the policy formulation from NORAD, and the limited capacity of the public institutions to relate to its strategic implications. The differences in perceptions is an issue we will return to throughout the report, but an important general implication is that people's assessment of the policy and concrete projects relate to very different points of departure.

The third premise is closely related to the second. The assessment of the policy shift and its implications for institutional development is generally more positive from the institutions in the South than from their northern partners and NORAD. While this may relate to differences in perceptions discussed above, we will argue that it also relates to a more realistic perception of what is possible to achieve in the area of institutional development within the political, economic and socio-cultural contexts the projects are carried out. Taking the principle of recipient responsibility to also include a stake in the evaluation of policies and projects, Southern points of view have been given a strong emphasis in this report.

Finally we would like to emphasize that what follows is an assessment of positive and negative experiences with institutional development projects, with the purpose of supplying NORAD with practical advice concerning how to develop and improve policy and practice in this important field. It is consequently not an evaluation of individual projects, which in any case would have been irresponsible given the number of cases we cover and the time at our disposal. Having said this, one of our recommendations will be to monitor and evaluate a set of institutional development projects over time in order to get a more detailed understanding of factors explaining variations in outcome in line with the idea of Process Research («Følgeforskning»).

1.3 METHODOLOGY

The study has been carried out by the way of three different methodological components.

i) The first component is a broad survey of Norwegian and Southern public institutions involved in institutional development assistance. This has been done through the participation in a joint meeting in a network established between these institutions in September 1997, where relevant issues were presented. Furthermore, the institutions have taken part in a questionnaire survey covering the content of the cooperation in which they are involved; the cooperation strategy employed; the role of NORAD; the impact of external factors and the perceived outcome of the institutional development projects. We have also consulted reports, reviews, evaluations etc. from some of these institutions. A Southern version of the questionnaire has been circulated to the partner institutions in the South. We have relied on Norwegian Embassies in Bangladesh, Botswana, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Mozambique, Namibia, Palestine, Sri Lanka, South-Africa, Tanzania, Vietnam, Zambia and Zimbabwe to distribute and collect the questionnaires from the relevant public institutions.

ii) The second component has been a set of case studies. In consultation with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, institutional cooperation projects within the sectors of oil, fishery and research and higher learning in Namibia, Mozambique and Tanzania have been selected. The cases do, as we see it, represent the necessary variation with respect to project content, political and economic context, and history of cooperation. More specifically, we have selected the twinning projects between the Institute of Marine Research (IMR)/Directorate of Fisheries (DoF) and similar institutions in Namibia and Mozambique, and between the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) and similar institutions also in Namibia and Mozambique.

As regards research and higher learning, a sub-study has been made of the cooperation between Agder Regional College (HIA) in Norway and Institute of Development Management (IDM) in Tanzania. The results from this sub-study are related to the results from the study of the cooperation between the Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA) in Tanzania and the Norwegian Agricultural University (NAU) at Ås (Study 2).

The case studies were carried out through a combination of in-depth interviews with managers and other employees in the institutions involved, and reviews of reports, evaluations and other relevant documents. We have also interviewed a broad range of representatives from institutions depending on and using the services of the institutions concerned («stakeholders»). These are from other public institutions (normally Ministries), as well as from the private sector.

iii) The third component has been a focus on NORAD. As noted the principal goal of this study is to contribute towards improving the policies and practices of NORAD in the area of institutional development and twinning, and we have maintained a dialogue with NORAD throughout the study. This has been done through a number of meetings in the embassies in Namibia, Mozambique and Tanzania, meetings with NORAD employees in Oslo and a more continuous communication with the Technical Department (Human Resource Development Section) that is responsible for institutional development issues in NORAD. We have also met with people involved in policy formulation and evaluation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

1.4 HYPOTHESES

In collaboration with the other sub-studies mentioned above, we have identified a number of joint hypotheses for the study as a whole. The hypotheses relate to a set of common problem areas linked to the policy of institutional development and the strategy of institutional cooperation. We will keep referring to these hypothesis throughout the report, and they also form the basis for the conclusions outlined in the final chapter (Chapter 5.0). Presenting these now will give an idea about the main issues to be treated in this report. The key problem areas and hypotheses are:

Concepts and Intentions

- What do NORAD and the Norwegian and Southern institutions involved want to achieve through institutional cooperation?
 - To what extent are intentions clear, consistent and shared between the institutions involved?
1. Norwegian organizations are increasingly engaged in institutional development (changes in quantity), and there has been a gradual shift in emphasis from physical to human and social capital (changes in quality).
 2. The stated objectives from NORAD concerning institutional development contain multiple meanings, and are unclear and difficult to measure.
 3. The institutional development objectives of the funder dominate those of the recipient throughout the chain.

Strategies and Action

- How are intentions operationalized and carried out (i.e. what is carried out under the heading of institutional development?)
 - To what extent are strategies and actions coherent, adequate and relevant?
1. There are few relevant objectives that allow organizations to effectively target institutional development.
 2. Institutional development is most often understood as support to specific organizations, and more rarely to organizational linkages, sector or system support.
 3. Most of what is carried out as institutional development is transfer of hardware and gap filling, and not primarily geared towards human and institutional capacity building in the recipient organizations.
 4. In spite of new policy directions which emphasize institutional development the realities of the programs remain the same
 5. There is a movement from value driven to commercially driven incentives for institutional development efforts.

Relevance and Outcomes

- To what extent are strategies and actions effective (in reaching objectives) and efficient (in reaching objectives for limited costs)?

- What are the outcomes of institutional cooperation at the levels of human resource development, organizational development and systemic development respectively?
1. Systems for monitoring and evaluating institutional development efforts are not in place, and there are few benchmarks to assess quality of performance.
 2. The policy intentions (rhetoric) of institutional development is not reflected in implementation.
 3. Activities aimed at addressing lower level concerns (e.g. individual skills) are more likely to achieve their short term objectives than those aimed at higher level outcomes.
 4. Activities which successfully address lower level concerns are less likely to achieve sustainable improvements than those which successfully address higher level concerns.
 5. Differences in objectives and design have less of an impact on institutional development than do difference in organizational capacity to implement programs.
 6. There is frequent disagreement between key stakeholders on the relative importance of the outcomes of institutional development efforts.
 7. Institutional cooperation ends when donor support discontinues.

Factors Promoting Institutional Development

- What factors explain variations in outcomes?
- How do such factors promote or impede outcomes?

Institutional development efforts are most successful:

1. When the cooperation is initiated by the Southern partner and based on their needs (demand driven), rather than by the Northern organization (supply driven).
2. When Northern and Southern counterparts have similar and not conflicting commitment to and/or understanding of institutional development
3. When the cooperation is initiated by committed individuals who know each other, and later supported by a broader network of actors and organizational structures.
4. When an emergent, flexible step by step approach is followed in planning and implementation, and not a fixed blueprint strategy.
5. When both parties are trained and have the skills to handle technical as well as sociocultural aspects of cooperation.

6. When the Southern partner organization in the outset is strong and well equipped with financial, technical and human resources.
7. When the external political and economic environment is stable and predictable.
8. When the support from several donors to the same organizations are coordinated.
9. When NORAD takes on a guiding rather than active role in planning and implementation of the institutional cooperation.
10. When the selection of cooperating partners is based on systematic sector studies and organizational assessments.

The report is divided into five individual chapters. In Chapter 2 we discuss the concepts of institutional development and twinning, take a brief look at the international experiences with twinning for institutional development, present the NORAD policy in this area and outline our analytical framework. In Chapter 3, the focus is on NORAD as coordinator and funder of the new policy for institutional development, on the Norwegian public institutions as main actors in its implementation, and on experiences from actual institutional development efforts. This is based on the survey, and covers the types of projects initiated, how the institutions experience the collaboration with the South, and how they perceive the outcome of institutional development projects. The same issues are pursued in Chapter 4, where we present and discuss the case studies from the sectors oil, fish and research in Namibia, Mozambique and Tanzania. The case studies emphasize the perception from the South. In the final Chapter 5, we sum up the main findings on the basis of the hypotheses presented in the Introduction, and present a number of recommendations to NORAD.

1.5 THE TEAM

The team carrying out this study has consisted of:

- Dr. Steinar Askvik, Associate Professor, Department of Administration and Organization Theory, University of Bergen, Norway.
- Dr. Henning Melber, Director, Namibia Economic Policy Research Unit, Windhoek, Namibia.
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- Mr. Inge Tvedten, Senior Researcher, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway (Team Leader).

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2. The concepts of institutional development and twinning

2.1 INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The concept of «institution» has several connotations, both in ordinary speech, among social scientists, and in the vocabulary of international development assistance. According to Collins English Dictionary «institution» can be defined in the following ways:

- 1) The act of instituting.
- 2) An organization or establishment founded for a specific purpose, such as a hospital, church, company and college.
- 3) The building where such an organization is situated.
- 4) An established custom, law or relationship in a society or community.

Hence «institution» can refer to at least four different kinds of phenomena: an act, an organization, a building and a custom. The utilization of the concept within the social sciences mirror this ambiguity. In economic theory institutions are referred to as the «rules of the game» (North 1991), i.e. those established rules and traditions that govern the interactions between members of the society, especially the rules for exchange of economic goods. A traditional sociological definition emphasizes that institutions are social systems: «...the organized system of practices and social roles developed about a value or series of values, and the machinery evolved to regulate the practices and administer the rules» (Reuter 1941, quoted in Inkeles 1966). In the sociological perspective institutions appear as complex structures of tradition-determined roles and patterns of action, oriented towards important social tasks, and stable over a long period of time.

In organization theory the focus is on formal organizations, and an influential approach defines institutions as «organizations infused with value» (Selznick 1957). That is, some (but not all) organizations are transformed into institutions in so far as they are recognized as valuable in themselves, beyond the technical requirements related to carrying out specific tasks. Significant stakeholders in the environments of such institutional-

ized organizations come to regard them as an end in themselves. Hence the key to institutionalization is the extent to which organizational forms and practices stand out as an integrated part of a larger political and economic context and a normative order.

Within the context of international development, institutions are regarded as central for bringing about socioeconomic change.² According to Goldsmith (1992) four different approaches have been used to create and develop viable and effective institutions.

- First, there were the early efforts of the 1950s and 1960s represented by the institution building school, which focused on specific, important organizations in the newly independent states in the developing world. In this approach the main emphasis was upon how formal organizations, especially public sector and national level organizations, could be constructed to promote social and economic modernization.
- Secondly, institutional development replaced institution building as the central term when the efforts to improve institutions were expanded to also include non-organizational phenomena, i.e. social conventions and rules, legal frameworks etc. Under this label, greater attention was given to how normative systems in general influence the way different sectors perform.
- Thirdly, the new institutional theory took up ideas from the rational choice movement in economics, emphasizing how incentives affect people's choices. According to this theory, formal organizations (as in the institution-building school) is not the proper basic unit of analysis. The central concern should rather be individual behavior and how systems of rewards and penalties influence the way people come to pursue their preferences.
- Fourthly, and more recently, institutional sustainability has become a key concept in development assistance. International donors discovered that institutions in the organizational sense are extremely dependent on a continuous input of resources for their survival. To deal with this problem a strategic management framework has evolved. The focus of this framework is on how organizations can overcome problems of sustainability by acquiring resources and support from stakeholders.

² This has not always been the case, and we are apparently in the middle of a shift of development paradigm. After having spent years deconstructing particularly public institutions, the World Bank spends the major part of its World Development Report for 1997 reconstructing it under the heading «The State in a Changing World» (World Bank 1997).

The review given above indicates that also in the foreign aid context the concept «institution» may refer to various types of phenomena. One way of solving this dilemma is to follow the strategy adopted by Moore (1995) in a recent report to SIDA. He distinguishes between a core and a periphery in the set of activities referred to as institution building. The core of institution-building is organization building, i.e. activities designed to improve the effectiveness of organizations. The periphery refers to activities that influence how people relate to one another, but without being part of any organization building effort, e.g. the legal framework, social rules and norms.

The concepts of core and periphery closely relates to how Israel (1987) in an influential study of the World Bank's experience with institutional development, identifies his research project:

«The broad concept of institution encompasses entities at the local or community level, project management units, parastatals, line agencies in the central government, and so on. This study focuses on individual institutions or groups of institutions: a ministry of education, a railway company, an industrial plant, an agricultural development bank, a power agency, a rural extension service, a farmers cooperative, or the local branch of a central government agency.» (Israel 1987:11)

This perception of institution building as efforts to improve organizational performance tend to be the primary objective of most aid projects under this label. Such an organization-oriented understanding of institution building is also adopted in the present study. We will examine the extent to which various forms of twinning arrangements in aid programs promote organizational development in the sense of effective performance.

Organizations should, however, also be studied in relation to the larger context in which they function. A focus on organizational performance must therefore be complemented with a focus on how organizations survive in a longer term perspective. Organizations only become institutions to the extent that they are able to survive and acquire legitimacy. Hence the success of institution building activities should be assessed on the basis of the extent to which they promote organizational effectiveness as well as institutional legitimacy.

To understand how organizations survive and acquire legitimacy we will introduce the concept of «stakehold-

ers». Stakeholders are groups of actors inside and outside an organization which affect or are affected by its development, first and foremost the providers and users of organizational goods or services. The internal and external stakeholders will determine the kind of resources an organization has access to. And the sustainability of an organization will depend on how stakeholders perceive and use the organization. Organizations may perform well in relation to specific tasks, but fail to survive due to lack of legitimacy among stakeholders. Conversely, there may be organizations which survive despite failing performance due to a broader based legitimacy (as some public institutions). A study of institution building activities should therefore focus on both efficiency and legitimacy as indicators of institutional success.

To sum up this brief review of concepts related to institutional development, we will for analytical purposes distinguish between three levels of institution building. These are the individual level, the organizational level and the systemic level.

The distinction between the three levels of institution building is guided by a UNDP study on capacity development (UNDP 1994). As Figure 1 below indicates, the three levels correspond to various types of intervention activities:

- Human resource development is concerned with how people are educated and trained, how knowledge and skills are transferred to individuals and groups, competence built up and people prepared for their current or future careers.
- Organizational development seeks to change and strengthen structures, processes and management systems in specific organizations in order to improve organizational performance.
- System development emphasizes the linkages between organizations and how legislative frameworks, rules, regulations and cultural norms constrain or facilitate their activities.

In this study we will define planned institutional development as a composite process of change that includes all the three types of activities and that seeks to optimize the performance of organizations in relation to their goals, resources and environments.

Institution building projects will to varying degrees address the different subsystems of an organization. We

Figure 1 Concepts of Institutional Development

INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT		
Process dimension	Level	Focus
1. Human resource development	Individuals and groups	Transfer and use of competence
2. Organizational development	Organizations	Changes in individual organizations
3. System development	(a) network linkages	(a) Patterns of communication/ collaboration between organizations.
	(b) sector	(b) Policies, rules, legislative framework.
	(c) overall context	(c) Macro-level policies and conditions.
		(d) Cultural values, norms and traditions.

will both explore to what extent twinning arrangements aim at changes and improvements at one or more of these levels; to what extent such arrangements actually contribute to the intended changes and improvements; and the particular characteristics of twinning arrangements that either promote or inhibit successful institution building.

We will also use a second and related set of concepts. While the concepts above refer to levels of institution building, the concepts of «operational», «managerial» and «strategic» responsibility and control refer to subsystems of activities at the organizational level. Any organization is composed of such subsystems of activities.

- In the operational subsystem the effective performance of the technical functions is the main concern: e.g. teaching, physical production, surveillance, marketing etc.
- In the managerial subsystem the administration and control of the technical subsystem is the main task: to establish links to those who use the products of an organization and to provide the resources necessary at the operational level.
- In the strategic subsystem the relationship of the organization to its wider environments is the basic challenge: to identify its domain and secure legitimacy.

2.2 TWINNING IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Twinning has been proposed as one of several alternative strategies to promote institutional development in

international aid programs (Berg 1994). The traditional model of such assistance has been to supply experts from the donor countries for an extended period of time (often 2–3 years) to advise and train local counterparts and carry out specific tasks («gap filling»). This model has been criticized for being inefficient and expensive, and various alternatives have been launched. These include the use of traditional short term consultants, intermittent consultants over a long period of time, engagements of local or regional consultants, and twinning arrangements to promote organization-to-organization cooperation (Berg 1994).

Although the idea of twinning has been around for a while, it is a relatively new activity for aid agencies and institutions in the North and experience is limited (Moore 1994). Nevertheless it has been claimed that twinning is more suitable for institutional development purposes than other models of technical cooperation, as it combines support from consultants or experts with a link to an institution in the North that can supply a wider specter of goods and services over time. According to a World Bank paper:

«Twinning can be defined as a professional relationship between an operating entity in a developing country and a similar but more mature organization in another part of the world.» (Cooper 1984:2)

Organizations involved in twinning arrangements are to be found in many sectors: railways, power companies, water authorities, port authorities, irrigation agencies, universities, research centers, dairy development

boards, municipalities, national development banks, mortgage banks, and institutes of management, forestry and agriculture. The purpose of the relationship is for the more mature organization, the supplier, to provide assistance to the developing organization. Twinning is conceptualized as a delivery system in development aid which «on occasion has proved to be an effective means of transferring know-how, training staff, and building up management capabilities» in the receiving organization (Cooper 1984:6). Normally the supplying organization will come from an industrialized country, but they may also come from another developing country. The latter type of relation may have advantages related to the larger specter of common experiences institutions from the South will have.

Twinning may be compared to a consulting relationship where a consulting firm gives professional advice to a client organization. However, the twinning relationship differs from traditional consulting in at least five respects (Cooper 1984:2–5):

- First, the supplying organization has operating experience in similar functions. It can draw upon its own resources and experiences when offering services to the client organization. Experts of the supplier will have dealt with tasks similar to those confronting the staff of the receiving organization, and the supplier will frequently also have in-house training programs to offer to the staff of the client organization.
- Secondly, twinning facilitates the combination and integration of a variety of services to promote capacity building and institutional development. The supplier's staff may visit the client organization for brief or extended periods to give expert advice on particular issues or to conduct training programs. Similarly, representatives of the client may visit the supplying organization's headquarters to learn how things are done there.
- Thirdly, there is opportunity for flexible and long-term cooperation in a twinning arrangement. The overall concern is capacity-building in the client organization. A twinning arrangement provides opportunities to redefine and alter the focus of the program as it unfolds. Due to the multitude of resources available in the supplying organization a variety of needs may be addressed. For instance, within a twinning relationship the type of assistance may smoothly move from technical to managerial issues when this is needed, and vice versa.
- Forthly, a limitation may be that the supplier lacks relevant knowledge and technology for problem-solving in less developed countries. The environments in such countries will differ significantly from those of the industrialized countries, and a supplier without sufficient prior experience from operating in a Third World context may provide assistance that is not adapted to the local conditions.
- Fifthly, the supplier may lack consulting skills. If a twinning arrangement is to function properly as a delivery system for transfer of knowledge and competence, members of the supplying organization should have some experience in consulting: e.g. negotiating contracts, formulating objectives and a plan of operations, selecting methods to achieve the objectives and implement the plan. Without such skills the twinning cooperation may become inefficient and not produce the intended results.

Various options are available with regard to how the staff of the two partner organizations can collaborate. On the one hand, members of the supplying organization can work with the client organization either individually or in groups. They may take on long-term positions either as advisors or trainers, or in line positions. They may also come as visiting experts for shorter periods. Training may be formal or informal, on the job or organized as study tours to visit other organizations. It can be designed as part of the supplier's regular training programs for its own staff, or it can be specially tailored to the client's needs.

Normally the supplier will set up a separate consulting unit to manage its engagements under the twinning agreement, or allocate one or two staff members to have twinning as their primary task. The members of this consulting unit will rarely perform the assistance tasks themselves, but draw on staff from the operational departments to implement the assignments. Sometimes there may be a potential conflict of interest between reallocating highly competent staff for twinning assignments, or keeping them for their regular operational duties. Also client staff may confront similar problems: whether to attend to their normal obligations or participate in project generated from the twinning agreement. For these reasons suppliers occasionally may discover that inappropriate client personnel are selected for twinning projects.

Compared to the traditional expert-counterpart model of technical assistance the following advantages of twinning arrangements are frequently mentioned (Moore 1994). First of all twinning gives greater credibility and acceptance of the external experts/consultants in the recipient organization. In a twinning arrangement they come as fellow professionals from similar organizations with similar problems. Likewise, twinning provides greater flexibility in the type of assistance to be provided, in the timing, and in the variety of person-to-person relationships that can be established. On the other hand there may also be a number of problems in conjunction with twinning as a strategy for technical assistance and institution-building. It can be difficult to find the right type of supplier organizations, or after a twinning arrangement has been established, some organizations may turn out to be inappropriate as suppliers, especially if their activities are not congruent with their client's activities. The initial contract to regulate a twinning cooperation can also turn out to be a source of misunderstandings and disagreements since it normally will be difficult to take into account all future problems. What is more, the criteria for evaluating progress in the cooperation will frequently be ambiguous, and it may be difficult to decide when, for instance, the supplier staff does not perform effectively.

Cooper (1984:11–13) identifies the following conditions for successful twinning:

- The client's staff should be committed to the assistance provided.
- The tasks to be dealt with should be feasible to handle, given the resources available and the time allocated.
- The supplier should have prior experience in doing what the client wants to do.
- Mutual trust and prior experience of each other will promote good cooperation.
- The work program should be open to changes over time to adapt to the client's changing needs and capabilities.
- Sufficient professional support should be provided for the client's staff when they are to implement new programs after initial training.
- Adequate funding should be available. In particular Cooper emphasizes that twinning works best when the supplying organizations concentrate their assistance to areas where they know they are skilled and competent. Conversely, they should acknowl-

edge their limitations and leave out tasks which they do not have any experience in how to handle.

As emphasized above a twinning agreement should ideally move beyond technical assistance and contribute to institutional development in the receiving organization. This will take place when the twinning process also has an impact upon the design and practice of the management system and strategic decision-making of the receiving partner. Not only technical experts, but also managers, including those at the very top, should be involved in the cooperation between the two twinning partners. Top managers in the two organizations should visit each other's facilities to increase the mutual understanding of how they operate and how they can work together. When such links are established the client may be positively influenced by seeing examples of good management in the supplying organization. However, it may take some time to achieve an institution-building impact, and it is claimed that 10–20 years will not be unusual to produce this kind of results. In contrast, according to Cooper (1984:19), most twinning contracts normally cover only two to three years' work. Hence their institutional impact will be limited. Exceptions to this are normally within education and research, where twinning relationships may continue for 15–20 years.

Sometimes a third party may be involved in a twinning arrangement. Such a third party may be a consulting firm from either the supplier or client country, or it may be an operating company that can provide additional competence to the client. Cooper (1984:18) refers to a European mortgage bank, acting as a supplier and working with two consulting firms: one from its own country and the other from the client's country. The former brought expertise in management and training to complement the bank's technical competence in mortgage banking. The latter contributed knowledge of the indigenous political and cultural environments. There may be several advantages to bringing in a third party to a twinning arrangement. A third party may contribute additional capacity, competence and experience, attend to administrative and logistical aspects of the cooperation, provide professional backstopping and quality control.

From a more general perspective twinning may be conceived of as an inter-organizational learning process. The supplier transfers relevant knowledge and competence to the recipient organizations. This perspective on twinning is not yet very developed in the international literature, i.e. what kind of learning processes are taking

place when two organizations are involved in institutional cooperation projects.³ In general terms organizational learning involves two types of processes (Cohen and Sproull 1996). At the individual level members of an organization acquire new knowledge and change their behavior. Organizational learning may, however, also involve acquisition of competence at a collective level: organizations develop new routines that combine existing competence among individual members in a new way. Routines include programs, rules, structures, norms etc. that regulate behavior in organizations.

In twinning arrangements both types of learning may take place: the outcome of the learning process may rest in the individual as an improvement in members' skills, or the outcome may imply a change in the routines governing the organizational members' actions. In the more general literature *imitation* is seen as an central way of learning between organizations, i.e. one organization is learning from another organization through for instance copying its technologies, structures or strategies, particularly when the latter is a high status organization. In relation to twinning similar dynamics will be at work both at the individual and the organizational level. Having said this, the transfer of knowledge between two organizations with different levels of competence and working within different contexts, represent a particular challenge in twinning projects between the North and the South.

2.3 NORWEGIAN POLICIES

The concepts of institutional development and twinning have not been around for a long time in Norwegian development assistance (Jerve 1993). They came to the forefront of policy debates with the introduction of NORAD's «Strategies for Development Cooperation. NORAD in the Nineties» (NORAD 1990a) and were followed up in White Paper No. 51 (1991–92) and White Paper No. 19 (1995–96).⁴

The change of policy came as a result of a growing realization that past Norwegian aid efforts had been

«shortsightedly result-oriented and donor-dominated» (NORAD 1990b:1). As regards institutional development more emphasis had been put on implementing a project within a reasonable time horizon and in accordance with Norwegian standards, than on supporting institutions in the recipient countries to solve relevant development problems in a longer term perspective. Hence, Norwegian priorities had dominated the choice of sectors and institutions to be developed as well as the measures to be adopted, without sufficiently involving the institutions in the recipient countries themselves.⁵

Looking first at the White Papers mentioned above, they describe the new focus on institutions in Norwegian development cooperation in very general terms. According to White Paper No. 5 (1991–92)

«..it is necessary to increase the competence levels of the institutions in the recipient countries. To a greater extent than previously, is it necessary to emphasize capacity building and institutional development, both as an independent subject and as a part of other types of development cooperation (p.219).»

Still according to the White Paper No.5 (1991–92) institutional development is a broad concept which covers different activities that aim to strengthen the capacity of an organization to solve its tasks. Relevant organizations are those of public administration, but also other public entities in research and education, and non-governmental organizations like voluntary organizations and trade unions. Institutional development will often entail changes in organizational and administrative conditions to improve efficiency and effectiveness. The document notes that institutional development traditionally has not been an end in itself, but rather a means to achieve something else, e.g. to solve some socially important tasks. Thus it has not received priority. Institutional development is conceptualized almost synonymous to organizational development. All the examples the White Paper provides are examples of typical organizational development interventions.

³ For a report focusing on the issue of institutional learning, see SIDA 1997 (forthcoming).

⁴ The formulation of policies for development aid is in principle the responsibility of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this case, however, the initiatives behind the policy of institutional development and the involvement of Norwegian public institutions in twinning arrangements (The Norway Axis) mainly came from NORAD under its former director Per Gunnar Grimstad.

⁵ These conclusions mainly came out of a large Nordic evaluation of the effectiveness of technical assistance personnel financed by Nordic countries (Forss et.al. 1988). The immediate implication was a sharp drop in the number of classical experts and an increase in the use of consultant companies. The idea of the «Norway Axis» was the outcome of a realization that larger public institutions often possess more relevant expertise than consultancy companies.

White Paper No. 19 (1995–96) is a follow-up of a report presented by the Public Commission of 1995: «A Norwegian Development Cooperation Policy for a Changing World» (NOU 1995 No.5). Also in this White Paper is institutional development presented as a priority area. It is noted that institutional development can occur both at the local and national level, with more emphasis being put on the local level than in the previous White Paper. Yet the treatment of the topic is even less extensive than in White Paper No. 5, and it does not provide further insights into the more concrete implications of the new policy.

In NORAD's «Strategies for Development Cooperation. NORAD in the Nineties» it is argued that key institutions in the developing countries have to be strengthened. Relevant institutions are to be found at different levels of society, in both the public and the private sector. They may be central government agencies, parastatals, private enterprises, cooperatives, NGOs etc. (NORAD 1990a:3).

In a follow up to the Strategy (*Strategies for Bilateral Cooperation – Part II. Basic Principles*) the purpose of institution-building is identified as making the institutions in question «...in the long term...able to carry out their responsibilities independently of foreign assistance» (NORAD 1992:23). A list of relevant measures is provided:

- support to reforms and organizational development efforts which will increase the efficiency of the public administration at the central, regional and local level
- support to educational and research institutions which may improve the supply of relevant expertise and knowledge
- support to establishment and development of institutions which may improve the functioning of business, industry and the market
- emphasis on making institutional development an important condition for all forms of development cooperation
- identification of institutions in partner countries which are suitable for Norwegian assistance
- identification and strengthening of Norwegian institutions which are suitable for institutional cooperation in selected sectors
- priority to using local expertise in projects and programs supported by Norway,

- support to training programs, with particular emphasis on organizational development, administration and management training.

The role of institution-building in NORAD's new strategy should be related to another important component in this strategy, i.e. the principle of recipient responsibility. According to this principle the recipient countries themselves should be responsible for their development. In contrast to previous policies Norwegian aid authorities will no longer be the main actor in planning and implementation of development programs. This is the responsibility of the recipient countries. Consequently any institution-building project should be initiated and developed by the institutions in the recipient countries themselves.

In the policy documents of Norwegian development assistance there are few references to twinning. The term more frequently used is institutional collaboration, which is presented as a method to promote institutional development. In Part II of NORAD's Strategy (NORAD 1992) there is a reference to the «Norway Axis» which refers to a network of Norwegian institutions involved in collaboration with similar institutions in developing countries. The purpose of such collaboration is to «create viable institutions in the recipient countries, through direct cooperation with institutions in Norway or similar institutions in other countries in the South». In addition, it is a stated objective to involve larger parts of the Norwegian society in development assistance, in order to create broader participation and thereby a better understanding for development issues.

NORAD's Strategy for Institutional Development (NORAD 1990b) maintains that the purpose of the policy of institutional collaboration is to design a more efficient and flexible, and less donor-dominated, system of support compared to the traditional type of development assistance. It is also stated that an important motive for encouraging twinning arrangements is to relieve NORAD from some of the tasks it has been instructed to deal with. The institutional development strategy identifies a set of guidelines for successful twinning:

- Relevant Norwegian institutions need to have a good understanding of the governing principles in Norwegian development assistance, the sociocultural context of the recipient countries they work with, and the characteristics of the collaborating institutions.

- The collaborative relationship should be as balanced as possible, giving the partner institutions an equal role in designing the content of the collaboration, with a primary focus on the needs of the recipient partner, and on adapting objectives to the capacity of the latter.
- Before any twinning agreements are signed and supported, the top management of the relevant institutions should demonstrate their commitment to such arrangements. Moreover, any twinning arrangement must be consistent with the current priorities in Norwegian development assistance.
- A successful collaboration takes time to develop, and it is important that both parties expect some advantages to follow from the collaboration. In an early phase expectations should not be too high. Rather, the collaboration should evolve through a stepwise, experience based approach.
- NORAD's role will vary, depending upon the nature of the institutional collaboration agreement. Nonetheless, NORAD should always secure that it regularly can control that the progress and financial situation of a project correspond to NORAD's rules and regulations. Yet, it shall also recognize that an increased emphasis on recipient responsibility and twinning will imply that the amount of control is reduced. The local NORAD representation will have a particular responsibility to follow up projects in each country.
- When several donors are involved in collaboration with one recipient institution, there is a need to coordinate the activities. Otherwise, the different donors may propose conflicting approaches to institutional development.

2.4 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK


The purpose of the following study is partly to describe, partly to explain. As we have stated in the introduction, we want to describe the experiences of twinning in Norwegian development cooperation with regard to actors, processes and outcomes: who are the main actors involved, what are the critical processes taking place, and what part does institutional development play in such arrangements? In addition we will assess the outcomes of twinning arrangements: to what extent can characteristics of the actors and processes explain suc-

cess or failure of specific twinning arrangement in promoting institutional development?

To do this we will refer to the analytical framework illustrated in Figure 2. In this framework there are three main actors: the two twinning partners and NORAD. The interaction and relationships between the three main actors are identified through the twinning design and mode of collaboration. The intended outcome is identified as institutional development.

The first step is to provide valid portraits of each of the main actors. What kind of organizations are involved in twinning from the Norwegian side? Who are the recipient organizations of the South? What is the role of NORAD in this kind arrangements? Secondly, we will describe the formal design and the actual process of collaboration. Twinning can be conceived as an inter-organizational learning process where the supplier is supposed to assist the recipient in acquiring new knowledge and competence. And thirdly, we will describe outcomes in terms of the institution building impact of twinning. The focus will be on the organizational level and to what extent institutional development implies that an organization becomes more efficient in its performance and/or acquires more legitimacy among its stakeholders.

Figure 2: Analytical Framework



3. Twinning in Norwegian Development Aid

Whereas the previous chapter discussed concepts and policies related to institutional development and twinning in general terms, the current chapter will assess the actual practices of institutional development efforts in Norwegian development aid.

Institutional cooperation and capacity building have been part of Norwegian development aid since the end of the 1960s. The first public institutions involved were institutions of research and higher learning, with the relation between the Norwegian College of Veterinary Medicine and the Makerere University in Uganda, the Norwegian Agricultural University and the Sokoine University of Agriculture in Tanzania, and Chr. Michelsen Institute and the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies as early examples. Other public institutions in Norway were also involved in development cooperation at an early stage, but these were normally directly engaged in the implementation of projects and programs. Among them were the Norwegian Public Roads Administration in Botswana, the Norwegian Water Resource and Energy Administration in Tanzania, and the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate in Mozambique. Throughout the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, several other public and semi-public institutions became involved in Norwegian development aid.

The shift of policy towards institutional development and a stronger emphasis on involving Norwegian public institutions from around 1990 is thus to some extent a formalization of a type of relation that has been there for a long period of time. The most important new developments following the policy shift are the increased emphasis on institutional development as an objective in its own right, and the equally strong emphasis on the responsibility of the Southern and Norwegian institutions themselves for the planning, implementation and reporting of institutional development projects. The shift has had two major practical implications: One has been the need to restructure the policies and practices of NORAD, and the other has been a large increase in the number of public institutions involved in development cooperation projects.

We have identified a total of 35 Norwegian public and semi-public organizations involved in more than 100 institutional development projects with the South (see Appendix 2). The organizations fall within two main categories. 55 % are public institutions such as directorates, administrations and authorities, and 45 % are semi-public institutions of research and higher learning.⁶ As we shall see, the policy shift has implied a considerable challenge both to NORAD as a government agency and to the institutions themselves.

In the following chapter, we will first assess how NORAD relates to the new policy of institutional development and twinning, and the competence and capacity for development work among the Norwegian institutions involved. We will then go on to describe the characteristics of and lessons learnt from actual institutional development projects on the basis of the general survey we have carried out.

3.1 THE ROLE OF NORAD

NORAD is a large and complex public structure, with around 200 full-time employees in the Head-Office in Oslo, around 75 full-time employees in thirteen different Norwegian Embassies⁷ in developing countries, and a total budget of NOK 4,726.6 million (1996)⁸.

The organization has gone through a number of major policy shifts from its establishment three decades ago. Some of these have been related to changing paradigms on the international development scene, under headings such as modernization, dependency, liberalization and, currently, «the state in a changing world» (World Bank 1997). Others have been initiated as a result of changes in the overall development policy in Norway. One of the most important changes has been the increasing emphasis on recipient responsibility, which has resulted in a substantial degree of delegation of responsibility to governments and partner institutions in the South. No other country has emphasized and pursued the principle of recipient responsibility to the extent that Norway has

⁶ We will use the terms «public institutions» and «semi-public institutions» to designate this difference in the report, realizing that the distinction in some cases is rather arbitrary.

⁷ Norwegian Embassies and Norad Missions are in a process of being merged. «Norwegian Embassy» will be used as a collec-

tive term that also includes Norad activities.

⁸ The budget is disbursed as follows (1996): i) Administration NOK 113.4 mill. ii) Bilateral aid NOK 1,412.0 mill. iii) Multilateral aid NOK 914.9 mil. iv) Multilateral aid NOK 2,260.4 mill (Norad 1997)

done. An important additional implication of this has been the delegation of responsibility and work from NORAD/Oslo to Norwegian Embassies in the countries of cooperation.

The shift towards institutional development and the active participation of Norwegian institutions in development work has in many ways been more far-reaching than other policy shifts. It has not only implied changes in development objectives and internal procedures in NORAD, but also a delegation of responsibility to public institutions that in many cases are large, highly professional in their field and with their own strong institutional identity. The delegation to directorates and authorities also indirectly involve other ministries than MFA in development aid.

Below the level of general policy statements discussed in Chapter 2.0, there are few documents referring to concrete measures to be taken to implement the policy change. One early statement is found in the strategy for institutional development referred to above (NORAD 1990b:2–3). This still has status as the official strategy for institutional development, in line with similar strategies on poverty, the environment and gender. The specified strategic measures outlined include:

In Norway:

- Increase the understanding of institutional development issues in the NORAD Head Office and among personnel who are sent out to work in NORAD missions. The Foreign Service Institute will be an important element in this capacity development.
- See to it that routines for the assessment and acceptance of projects and programs take the issue of institutional development sufficiently into account.
- Identify and strengthen Norwegian institutions that are relevant for institutional cooperation within selected sectors.

In Developing Countries:

- Strengthen the analysis of relevant institutional conditions in central planning documents.
- Identify institutions that are particularly relevant for Norwegian institutional support, and document

and analyze their functions and capacities in a realistic way. The political and economic framework and development potential are to be given particular emphasis.

- Give priority to the use of local experts in projects supported by Norway.
- Support training programs with a particular emphasis on management and leadership training.
- Make sure that technical assistance acquires a more flexible and advisory function, and reduce the use of individual experts on 2–3 year contracts.
- Develop institutional cooperation projects within sectors of special priority.
- In exceptional cases contribute with support to budgets/running costs.

Anchoring the Policy

Early reactions to the strategy within NORAD indicated a mixed response among its employees (Statskonsult 1995). While the idea of making institutional development a key component of NORAD's new development policy received strong support, the idea of making external institutions central actors in planning and implementation met with less enthusiasm. At the professional level the skepticism was based on a concern that the Norwegian public institutions would not be in a position to follow up development policies and the broad interpretation of institutional development outlines in NORAD's policy and strategy papers. As regards the institutions in the South, the support for the idea of strong recipient responsibility was coupled with a skepticism concerning their capacity to become equals in their relation with their Norwegian partners.

In order to establish the new policy in the organization, NORAD has gone through an internal process of dissemination of information. The process has centered around discussion groups in the various department (most notably the Technical Department and the Regions Department), the production of internal discussion papers, and (from 1996) the establishment of two separate courses in institutional development at the Foreign Service Institute.⁹ The courses take three days, and are perceived as the main source of information about the policy of institution development and the strategy of institutional cooperation for NORAD employees.¹⁰

⁹ One course is about institutional development in general (A12: «Institusjonsutvikling») and the other is designed for cooperating institutions (A22: «Kurs for samarbeidende institusjoner»). The latter is developed for the Norwegian institutions, and not their Southern partners.

¹⁰ The initial courses were criticized by Norad staff for being too theoretical and irrelevant for practical development work, but the current courses are considered to be more adapted to their work and responsibilities.

The staff at the Norwegian Embassies have been informed about the policy shift through written information and by attending the courses at the Foreign Service Institute when possible. However, no particular attention seems to have been paid to the NORAD missions despite their central role for implementing the policy and for conveying it to the partner institutions in the South. In line with this there is a considerable variation in the extent to which the staff at the missions understand and endorse the new policy. Particularly staff recruited from outside the NORAD system seem to be uncertain about the more concrete implications, and there are examples of staff members relating to it as «just another invention from the Head Office in Oslo». The most common implication of this is a reluctance to «let go» of responsibilities that should be transferred to the institutions.

Our general impression is that the policy of institutional development and what it implies has received less attention within NORAD than other policy focuses such as poverty, gender and environmental issues.¹¹ This is also evident from the limited extent to which the issue of institutional development is reflected in the hierarchy of policy and strategy documents at the country level. The implication of this is a continued uncertainty about policy implications, as well as the division of roles and responsibilities between NORAD Oslo, the Embassies and the institutions involved in Norway and the South.¹² As regards the dissemination of information about the policy to Norwegian public institutions themselves, the increasing involvement of Norwegian institutions in development aid was given considerable attention in the beginning of the 1990s. This resulted in a large number of inquires particularly from non-government organizations and private enterprises, but also from the public sector. The inquires came from institutions that had not been involved in development work before, as well as from institutions with prior experience that wanted to increase their involvement.

¹¹ One indication of this is the «photo-copy state» in which the strategy on institutional development (Norad 1990b) still finds itself, in strong contrast to the glossy publications of the strategies for other overriding policy goals.

¹² The uncertainty include key issues such as the extent of delegation of responsibility, the extent to which institutional development projects compel the Southern institutions to use the services of their Norwegian partner only, and the management responsibility («forvaltningsansvar») related to interventions done by public Norwegian institutions falling under other ministries than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

While the general policy statements and the ideas behind the «Norway Axis» received much attention, there were few initiatives taken to inform the institutions about the more practical implications of the new policy. No common point of reference outlining the policy and division of roles was available to the institutions. The NORAD Documentation Center had no special responsibility for disseminating information, and no special section or unit in NORAD was given the responsibility as «first point contact» to relate to external inquires. The most concrete measure taken was an initiative to make the special courses in institutional development at the Foreign Service Institute accessible for the institutions. However, the Survey shows that 31 % of the institutions have not sent any employees to courses, 49 % have sent 1–5 employees (which in most cases is only a part of the people involved) and 20 % have sent six employees or more (*The Survey*: Question 6.8). Access to information has been better for the institutions with formal framework agreements with NORAD (see below) than for the newcomers, but the general impression is still that the knowledge about the policy and its implications is limited.

The weakest link in the process of disseminating information to the relevant actors about the policy change and its implications is that between the Norwegian Embassies and the partner institutions in the South. The latter have not had access to any relevant written information, and there does not seem to have been any consistent strategy for informing them. This has resulted in a widespread uncertainty both regarding the general policy of institutional development, the ideas behind the formalization of links with sister organizations in Norway, and the concrete implication of this for their own status and role. As a consequence, many Southern institutions have problems seeing the difference between the former type of relation where NORAD was the main point of contact and Norwegian institutions represented the professional link, and the current type of relation where the institutions themselves are to take over much of NORAD's former responsibility.

Adapting the Organization

Moving on to the organizational implications of the policy shift, we have already mentioned that NORAD's internal structure has been increasingly characterized by allocation of responsibility from the NORAD Head Office in Oslo to the Embassies abroad. While the NORAD Head Office still has the overall responsibility for policy implementation, the Embassies have been

allocated an increasingly important role for screening, monitoring and evaluating individual development programs and projects.

The importance of the Embassies for institutional development projects is acknowledged by the Norwegian public institutions. According to the Survey, 60 % of them agree that «the Norwegian Embassy in the recipient country has been more important for the cooperation than NORAD in Oslo» (*The Survey*: Question 3.1c).

The Head Office in Oslo is centered around the Regions Department (REG) with the overall operational responsibility for bilateral aid, and the Technical Department (FAG) serving in an advisory capacity to the NORAD organization at large. No unit in NORAD has been designated any special responsibility for projects of institutional cooperation, neither as first point contact for external institutions nor for relating to concrete institutional development projects. Hence institutional development projects are handled by a large number of different sections and units (*The Survey*: Question 1.6).

The Technical Department has gone through a reorganization where a number of small sector based units have merged into four larger sections (Administration Office, Environmental Affairs Project, Economic Development Section and Human Resource Development Section). In this process, the Human Resource Development Section has been designated the responsibility for institutional development issues and renamed «Seksjon for menneskelige ressurser og institusjoner» (MERI).¹³ Three people have been designated special responsibility for institutional development issues. So far they have mainly worked with sector-specific issues (local government, non-government organizations and public administration), and not as cross-sector advisers.

The section is still in the process of consolidating a professional milieu on the issue of institutional development. In line with this, the existence of a special expertise on institutional development issues in NORAD does not seem to be very well known. There are still people in the Head Office who are not aware of the existence of this special resource base, and very few at the NORAD missions abroad seem to know about it.


At the level of country programs, the hierarchy of policy and planning documents have not been specifically accommodated to the new policy of institutional development and twinning. The country strategies, country programs and sector programs are developed both with reference to Norwegian aid priorities and the situation in the country concerned, and normally have strong implications for the program and project levels. The programs and strategies are to relate specifically to the issue of institutional development (in line with issues such as poverty, gender and the environment). While this seems to be done to an increasing extent, there are still examples where the issue is left out. In addition, it is not clear whether an institutional development project can be initiated or continued in sectors that are not given priority in the country strategy. This has important implications both for the issue of predictability and the option for long-term planning.¹⁴

As regards the level of specific programs and projects, the formal procedures for initiating, implementing and evaluating projects have also largely remained the same. No specific steps seem to have been taken to accommodate the relation between the partner institutions in the South and Norway into the project cycle manual, even though they are expected to write a formal agreement of cooperation between themselves (see Figure 3).

¹³ The change is for some reason not reflected in the English translation of the Section, which still is called «Human Resources Development Section» (cfr. Norad Årsmelding/Norad Annual Report 1996).

¹⁴ In the draft country strategy for Mozambique the fishery sector is taken out as a priority area, which has created an unpredictable situation for two fishery-related institutional development projects. In addition, the strategy states that «institutional cooperation as a means of developing and strengthening institutions has somewhat limited potential in Mozambique» without really qualifying this.

Figure 3: Program and Project Cycle Management



Source: Manual for Programme and Project Management (NORAD 1994:8)

The main actors involved are the partner in the South and NORAD; the latter either directly or through external consultants. The Norwegian partner institution may be directly involved, but this will depend on the stage in the process where they are identified as partners. At the same time, NORAD/Oslo specifically states that they want to retain the option of relating to the Southern institutions directly without involving the partner institution in Norway. For new projects this will

normally be in the early phase, i.e. in the production of the draft program document. However, there are also cases where the relation with the partner institution is formalized only after the draft program document has been written.¹⁵

¹⁵ There are also cases where the future partner institution has been involved in the identification and draft program document phase, which may create role conflicts.

For projects already being established reviews and evaluations are normally done by NORAD through consultants, with the partner institutions being only indirectly involved. The consultants tend to be sector specialists, rather than specialists in institutional development. At the same time, the Survey shows that relatively few institutions (20 %) have developed their own formal routines for monitoring and evaluation (*The Survey: Question 6.4*) The main occasion when the institutions are engaged in formal consultation with NORAD and the Embassy is the Annual Meeting where progress reports and future plans are being discussed. However, also here the practice varies. In some cases the Norwegian partner institution is always present at the Annual Meeting; in other cases they are normally not.

The only new type of document being directly related to the new policy and strategy of institutional cooperation is the bilateral contract regulating the professional content of the relation between the partner institutions in Norway and the South. Again the practice seems to vary. Some institutions have contracts of this type, while others do not.

Involving the Public Institutions

Moving to the formal relation between NORAD and the Norwegian institutions that are involved in the Norway Axis, we have already mentioned that NORAD gets a large number of requests from organizations who want to become involved in development work. As no first point contact or key unit has been established, the screening of institutions seem to be relatively informal. Some are rejected at a very early stage, while others become more formally evaluated.

Looking at public institutions in particular, the inquiries regarding participation in the Norway Axis have not been as frequent as with NGOs and private enterprises. Many of the relevant institutions have already established formal agreements with NORAD, and new institutions are normally approached by NORAD as a result of specific requests from the South via the Embassies.^{16 17} Most of the Norwegian public institutions involved in

development work have thus largely «lent themselves» in the sense of being obvious choices for involvement in a given sector. There is consequently no «screening» in the sense of going through a selection process, and there are no formal evaluations neither regarding professional competence nor their competence and capacity for development work in general and institutional development interventions in particular.

The formal agreements existing between NORAD and public and semi-public institutions cover two main areas. One is support to carry out activities related to ongoing projects and programs. The support covers funding for development related work done in Norway, and for specific expenses related to projects in the South. Most project related expenses will be covered by the specific project budgets, even though there are cases where the frame agreement covers total inputs and expenses for an institution. The second is support to perform backstopping functions for NORAD as advisers on general professional matters, evaluations of project proposals etc.¹⁸ There are four main types of agreements, distinguished more on the basis of types of institutions than content (Table 2).¹⁹

Table 2. Formal Agreements between Norad and Public Institutions

Institutions with Annual Agreements («Årsverksavtaler»)	Budgets -97
Havforskningsinstituttet/Fiskeridirektoratet	2.300.000
Direktoratet for naturforvaltning	1.900.000
Statens Forurensningstilsyn	3.200.000
Riksantikvaren	500.000
Norges Vassdrags og Energiverk	2.400.000
Oljedirektoratet	1.605.000
Vegdirektoratet	1.310.000
Sjøfartsdirektoratet	500.000
Statens Teleforvaltning	540.000
Statens Helsetilsyn	2.982.691
Sum	14.255.691

¹⁶ In at least one case (The International Center for Teaching and Development at the Oslo Regional College), Norad has take the initiative to establish a new institution.

¹⁷ Having said this, there are cases where particularly research institutions in Norway and the South have entered into formal agreements of cooperation on their own and approached Norad for funding at a later stage.

¹⁸ For some of the large and specialized institutions, there is also here a danger of becoming involved on «both sides of the table» by having the same institutions involved in advice to Norad and implementation of Norad funded projects.

¹⁹ Due to changes in formalities related to agreements between public institutions from 1998, the distinctions existing will disappear.

Institutions with Frame Agreements («Rammeavtaler»)	Budgets -97
Statskonsult	100.000
Universitetet i Oslo	–
Institutt for Menneskerettigheter	1.340.000
Kystdirektoratet	150.000
Statens kartverk	60.000
Noragric	2.370.000
Norges Fiskerihøgskole	708.000
Lærerutdanningens Intenasjonale Senter	3.100.000
Statistisk Sentralbyrå	830.000
Sum	8.658.000

Institutions with Cooperation Agreements (non-government)	Budgets -97
Ungforskning	200.000
Diakonhjemmets Internasjonale senter	3.800.000
Norsk Institutt for By og Region- forskning	1.200.000
Kommunenes sentralforbund	1.187.000
Selskapet for Norges Vel	250.000
Sum	6.637.000

Eight public institutions have agreements specifying the number of person/years to be used and paid for («Årsverksavtaler»). Another nine public institutions have framework agreements («Rammeavtaler») where the nature of the work is not specified to the same extent. And there are five agreements of cooperation («Samarbeidsavtaler») with semi-government institutions in the areas of research and higher learning. The specific content and budgets vary for each type of agreement and institution, but all cover the two main areas mentioned above.

Conclusions

Summing up the measures taken to develop and implement the policy of institutional development and twinning, NORAD still has some way to go. There is still uncertainty both regarding the institutional development policy and what it implies, and the division of roles between NORAD Oslo, the Embassies and the partner institutions in the South and Norway. Having said this, we have also found that there is a positive will to develop the policy further. The people dealing with institutional development in the Technical Department are well qualified and represent an important resource base. NORAD is in the process of developing a «Guide for Evaluation of the Sustainability of Institutional Development Projects Funded by NORAD» which at least partly should take care of the need for a common point

of reference. And there is an open and critical self-evaluation about institutional development projects and the Norway Axis in the organization.

The main conclusions from an internal evaluation group (NORAD 1997b) dealing with these issues are: i) The responsibility of the Department of Information and Cultural Cooperation (AKS) as «first point contact» should be clarified, and AKS should be given resources to develop the necessary competence. ii) Evaluations and monitoring of institutional cooperation projects should be given a stronger emphasis. iii) The agreements of cooperation between NORAD and the Norwegian partners should be better coordinated and streamlined, with a clearer division of responsibility for the different channels. iv) The problem of potential double roles should be looked into, in order to avoid that the same institution screens, implements and assesses the same institutional development project. And v), a stronger element of competition between institutions relevant for participation in institutional development projects should be introduced.

In addition, it is emphasized that there is a danger that Norwegian development aid may become more supply-driven when the volume of aid channeled through Norwegian institutions increases. In line with this it is stated that NORAD must be given sufficient resources and personnel to secure «close monitoring and steering» of the Norwegian institutions. The current perception in NORAD thus seems to be that the involvement of Norwegian institutions in institutional development projects is positive and should continue and that there is a need to improve policy implementation, but also that it is necessary to «hold back» in order to avoid that the Norwegian institutions lead Norwegian development aid away from its basic goals and become too dominant.

The continued uncertainty concerning the practical implications of the new policy of institutional development is reflected in the relatively negative attitude towards the role of NORAD among the Norwegian public institutions (Table 3). The Survey shows that only 50 % of the institutions agree that the policy directives and support from NORAD contributed constructively in the initial phase of projects. An even lower percentage (41 %) argue that NORAD has taken an active and constructive part in the implementation of projects. And only 33 % agree that the administrative procedures in NORAD function constructively in relation to the project. At the same time, there is a strong consensus that NORAD

plays a vital role for the development of projects. Only 6 % argue that other donors have influenced the institutional development project more than NORAD. And 63 % argue that NORAD systematically pursues the principle of recipient responsibility in its relations with the partner institutions. The case studies largely verify these figures.

Table 3: Perceptions of the Role of Norad in Institutional development Projects

Statement	Percentage in Agreement
a) The policy directives and support from NORAD contributed constructively to the cooperation in its initial phase	51
b) NORAD has taken an active and constructive part in the implementation of the cooperation	41
c) The desk officers in NORAD have a good understanding of the objectives and activities of the project	55
d) The administrative procedures in NORAD function constructively in relation to the project	33
e) NORAD systematically pursues the principle of recipient responsibility	63
f) Other donors have influenced the partner institution more than NORAD	6

The general attitude towards NORAD's role in institutional development projects is considerably more positive among the institutions in the South. The survey carried out among institutions in the South confirms that 85 % feel that the policy directives and support from NORAD contributed constructively to the cooperation in its initial phase, 95 % feels that NORAD has taken an active and constructive part in the implementation of the institutional cooperation project, and 95 % feel that the administrative procedures function constructively in relation to the project. While these figures do reflect a positive attitude towards NORAD's role in institutional development projects, our case studies also indicate that there is a widespread uncertainty as to what rights and obligations the new policy really implies for the partner institutions in the South.

3.2 PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS AS AGENTS OF AID

The success or failure of institutional development projects through twinning does not only depend on NORAD, but also on the competence and the capacity of the public institutions themselves.²⁰ We have as already mentioned identified a total of 35 Norwegian

public and semi-public organizations involved in over 100 institutional development projects in developing countries. The organizations fall within two main categories. 55 % are larger public institutions for which development work in the South normally is only a small part of total activities and budget. The other category (45 %) are semi-public institutions of research and higher learning with public funding from the Norwegian Government.²¹ For these, institutional collaboration with the South represents an important part of activities both professionally and financially.

There are variations within these broad categories. Some larger public institutions have established separate departments of international cooperation for which frame agreements and projects through NORAD are important (Norwegian Water Resource and Energy Administration, Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Norwegian Public Roads Authority), while others are involved only in one or two projects implemented by one or a few individuals (Directorate for Cultural Heritage, Norwegian Maritime Directorate). Some of the research institutions have all their activities focusing on developing countries (Chr. Michelsen Institute, Noragric), while others only have a few individuals specializing on conditions in the South (Norwegian College of Veterinary Medicine, Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research). Nevertheless, we have found the distinction to be relevant.

Incentives for Involvement in Development Cooperation

Some public institutions have been involved in development work more than two decades. While there are examples of institutions being contracted directly to provide services in the South already from the 1960s, it was more common that individuals with special backgrounds and interests were contracted either as NORAD employees or as employees for one of the many consultancy companies being established from the mid-1970s. These people were motivated by a combination of the

²⁰ The following overview is based on the Survey carried out in Norway, the case studies of NDP, IMR, DoF and Agder College, and interviews with several other public institutions in Norway involved in development aid.

²¹ In accordance with Terms of Reference, the university sector is not included in this study. Norwegian universities are normally involved in cooperation with universities in the South under a different financial arrangement than the research institutions included in this survey. The so-called NUFU-program has recently been evaluated in a separate report (Helland et.al. 1996).

professional challenge of working in a different environment, solidarity, curiosity, and economic incentives.

The initiation of broader institutional involvement often centered around individuals coming back to their Norwegian institution from work in developing countries. The incentives for making development work an integrated part of public institutions were also many-faceted.

Some public institutions realized early that linkages to the South represented possibilities for exposure to international conditions and milieus that could be of value professionally. For others the motivation was related to the incentives working abroad represented for individual staff members. There was also an element of »institutional solidarity«, where the option of supporting a «sister institution» in the South was seen as important in its own right. Commercial considerations were not among the most important ones in the early phase, with the exception of some research institutions specializing in development issues and depending on project income. For most public institutions, selling goods and services was not an option.

With the introduction of the Norway Axis around 1990, the involvement of public Norwegian institutions entered a new phase. The Norway Axis was largely perceived as a right to take part in development projects in the South, also by public institutions that had not been involved in such work before. The Norway Axis consequently consists of a variety of institutions, of which some are well prepared for development work and others not. In order to ascertain the incentives currently existing for taking part in institutional development projects, we have asked the public institutions to relate to the statements given in Table 4.

Table 4. Incentives for Development Cooperation

Statement	Percentage in agreement
a) Institutional cooperation with the South is important for our own development	53
b) Institutional cooperation with the South is important for commercial reasons	29
c) Institutional cooperation with the South is important for ideological reasons	49
d) Public institutions are expected to take part in institutional cooperation with the South	52

The table reveals that nearly half of the institutions see relations with the South as important for ideological reasons, implying that there still is an element of «institutional solidarity» involved. Furthermore, a majority of the institutions feel that cooperation with the South is important for their own professional development. Many of these are research institutions, but there are also larger public institutions who see the value of exposing their staff to the kind of challenges relations with institutions in the South represent.²² Over 50 % of the institutions also argue that they are expected to take part in institutional development projects, implying that there is an element of external pressure or expectations.

A significantly smaller proportion argue that involvement in development cooperation is important for commercial reasons. Many of those who do are research institutions, but recent changes in the public sector have also opened up opportunities for public institutions to act in consulting capacities. Even for those who do not see money as an incentive, however, it is a clear condition that expenses must be covered by NORAD. In line with this, none of the public institutions would continue the involvement in development work without access to funding through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs/NORAD.²³

There are thus several incentives for taking part in development work, but the responses do not indicate any strong institutional commitment (which does not mean that individuals in public institutions are not highly committed). At the same time the management in many public institutions are faced with limited resources and personnel, and have to give priority to their responsibilities in Norway. The most common implication of this is that qualified personnel normally working with other issues are not released for work in developing countries. In some cases, however, the very idea of being involved in development work is being questioned.

²² Having said this, few of the Norwegian institutions feel that their partner in the South are in a position to exchange knowledge and experiences on an equal basis the way they do with twinning institutions in Europe and North America. Exceptions are some of the research institutions, who may be superior in terms academic qualifications but who acknowledge other important qualifications (e.g. empirical knowledge) their partners possess.

²³ No other Ministry than MFA has an aid budget. MFA/NORAD argues that spreading the aid budget on several ministries would create formal as well as practical problems for Norwegian development aid.

Competence and Capacity

Looking at the competence and capacity of public institutions to take part in development work, the institutions are highly professional in their fields and relate to projects and programs of considerable size and complexity in their work in Norway. In fact, some argue that their professional competence is so much higher than what they meet in NORAD that they find it difficult to relate to the aid bureaucracy in professional matters. The extensive use of consultants by NORAD only partly rectify this problem, as key decisions are made by employees in NORAD and the Embassies. Institutions with a history in the South also have people well qualified for development work, with long experience and insight into Norwegian development principles and goals.²⁴ The management of the public institutions is involved in strategic decisions related to the allocation of resources and personnel etc., but most of the decisions related to the implementation of specific projects are done by core groups or special departments where these exist.

However, most institutions also draw on personnel who have not been involved in development work. These are often younger staff, as senior staff members are normally not released for such work. The institutions themselves argue that it is necessary to strengthen the competence of these people. Some institutions relate to this by actively involving people outside the core group in seminars, courses etc. in order to prepare them for development work. However, many argue that the best way of preparing people for work in developing countries would be to include them in the work in a training capacity. This would require additional earmarked funding, which NORAD apparently has not been willing to supply.

There are also public institutions without a real resource base for development work. Only a few people are involved, they lack experience with development work, and the projects are not integrated into the rest of the organization. With such an inadequate resource base, the very idea of institutional collaboration (i.e. being

able to draw on a broad range of technical expertise) will be difficult to fulfill. There are indication that the initial assessments done by NORAD before contracting some of the public institutions has been inadequate, and that the screening process has not taken the fact that Norwegian public institutions have very different competence and capacity for development work sufficiently into consideration.

For institutions with a weak initial resource base for development work, a much more active policy of building up capacity needs to be pursued. This relates to general knowledge about conditions in the developing countries, as well as to more specific cross-cultural competence. The possibility to do this with internal resources is limited, and NORAD acknowledges that it cannot in the outset expect the public institutions to contribute with more than their professional competence and their own experience in administration and management. It will therefore in many cases be necessary to draw on external competence, either from NORAD or from other specialized institutions.²⁵

Having argued that many of the public institutions in Norway have an adequate professional background for being involved in development work, most of them are still at an early stage when it comes to formulate policies and strategies for institutional development more in particular. As a consequence of this, the institutions tend to see institutional development as transfer of technical skills and interventions at the operational level. Planning is normally made with reference to concrete outputs and within a relatively short time horizon, and not to issues of organizational and systemic development. Having said this, many argue that interventions related to lower level concerns is a prerequisite for making institutions effective and legitimate, and, conversely, that it is difficult to target higher level concerns before organizations have a minimum of competence in their professional field. It is also argued that the right level of interventions will vary with the stage in which the partner institution finds itself. Recently established Southern institutions need support in basic technical and organizational skills, whereas established organizations may be in a position to relate more actively to their current and potential stakeholders.

Nevertheless, most institutions do see the need for improving their qualifications in institutional development issues and are interested in developing their competence in this respect. The most natural source of information

²⁴ According to NORAD the institutions are not formally obliged to take Norwegian aid principles into consideration, even though NORAD assumes that they so.

²⁵ NORAD is currently identifying Norwegian milieus to undertake «assessments and analyses of economic and social conditions in priority partner countries». The main objective is to develop a resource base for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NORAD, but the option of making the expertise accessible also for other institutions involved in development work should be considered.

would be NORAD itself. However, many institutions argue that there is no obvious point of reference for inquiries about institutional development issues. As already mentioned, the Survey confirms that the institutions have to relate to a large number of different department and persons (*The Survey*: Question 1.6). Only a few of the institutions state that the Human Resources Development Section is their main point of reference, and most of them are not aware that there is special competence in institutional development issues in NORAD.

The most obvious alternative source of information are the courses in institutional development at the Foreign Service Institute mentioned above. However, as the figures on attendance by the institutions mentioned above indicate many find it difficult to allocate time to spend three days at courses like this. A second alternative is to utilize the network that has recently been established between public institutions involved in institutional development in the South. The aim of the network is to share experiences with this kind of projects, and the meetings take up specific issues related to the new policy and what it implies.²⁶ The network is actively supported by NORAD.

However, there are also arguments for involving institutions or resource groups specializing in institutional development issues more directly in advisory functions in twinning projects. This can be done by having the specialists in institutional development actively relate to the public institutions through inputs into the planning and implementation process, or by using them as a resource base the institutions can draw on when needed.

Perceptions from the South

The survey and case studies reveal that the relations between the public institutions in Norway and the South are generally very positive. The institutions appreciate the direct contact to professional milieus in Norway, and the access to resources and expertise they represent (Table 5). They are, however, not equally convinced that the partner institution in Norway has benefited from the collaboration. The positive attitude is particularly

²⁶ The institutions are either larger public institutions or applied research institutions. It has been argued that the issues confronting these are different, and that the network would be more useful if it was divided into two groups along these lines.

²⁷ Having said this, some institutions in the South also see close relations with the Norwegian partner institution as a condition for continued Norwegian aid.

strong in sectors where Norway is seen as being in the forefront internationally (e.g. fish and oil). Many of the institutions have cooperated for long periods of time, and the shift towards a stronger emphasis on bilateral relations between two «sister» institutions is generally regarded as positive.²⁷

The importance of developing personal relation as part of the institutional cooperation is strongly emphasized. Many of the institutions have relatively frequent contact with each other, both in connection with projects and in regular meetings in Norway or the recipient country. Most institutions argue that it is vital that people from the partner institutions in Norway are present over longer periods of time. Short term consultancies tend to be too brief, and easily lead to inadequate involvement of colleagues in the Southern institution. As seen from Table 6, 33 % of the institutions in the South prefer that people from the Norwegian institution stay for long periods of six months or more, 22 % prefer that they stay for intermediate periods of one to six months, and 44 % prefer that people stay on short term consultancies for less than one month. The institutions preferring shorter periods argue that this forces the Southern institution to take on more responsibility for their own development. The optimal solution seems to be a combination of a longer term presence and the option of drawing on people and resources from Norway for shorter periods. It is also emphasized that the longer term resident adviser should have a broad orientation and experience and act as a facilitator rather than an expert.

Table 5: Perceived Outcome of Institutional Cooperation

Statement	Percent in Agreement (%)
a) Overall, we are satisfied with the outcome of the cooperation	93
b) The partner institution has benefited significantly from the cooperation	30
c) Our own institution has benefited significantly from the collaboration	85

Table 6: Preferred length of Stay of Consultants/Advisors

Preferred length of stay	Percent (%)
Short-term stays (one month or less)	44
Medium-term stays (one to six months)	22
Long-term stays (six months to two years)	33

There are also cases where institutions in the South have not been able to establish constructive relations with their partners in Norway. The reasons for this vary. Personal relations clearly play an important role, but there are also examples of misunderstanding related to objectives of projects, the division of roles and responsibilities and a lack of institutional ownership. It seems particularly important that the top management of the institutions meet at an early stage in order to give the cooperation the necessary legitimacy, and that the key personnel from the two institutions initially have time to develop personal relations. Public institutions working in sectors where Norwegian competence is not as obvious as in e.g. oil and fish have a more difficult task selling their competence in relation to alternative sources of support. The unresolved issue of the extent to which a twinning project compels the Southern institution to seek services and advice through the Norwegian partner institution («tied aid») is most relevant in sectors where Norwegian competence is not self-evident.

The increasing emphasis on recipient responsibility has also made the issue of costs more transparent. As we shall return to in the next section it is difficult to compare twinning arrangements with the old expert-based institutional development efforts, as the former involves a much broader range of activities. However, institutions in the South are increasingly aware of the high costs of consultants, goods and services from Norway. Many seem to look at it as an inevitable part of receiving Norwegian aid,²⁸ but there are also examples of Southern institutions using the high costs as an argument for seeking services elsewhere. Focusing on price one would expect them to look for alternatives in their own region, but most institutions seem to look to the North to get «value for money». This is partly related to a perceived lack of expertise in the South, but there are also historical, cultural and political factors making institutional cooperation with neighboring countries difficult.²⁹

The importance of the recipient institution for planning, implementation and financial issues does, however, also put an increasing responsibility on the Southern institu-

tions that many find it difficult to fulfill. It seems necessary with a thorough assessment of the institutional capacity also among the Southern partner institutions particularly regarding financial management. There are examples where projects of cooperation are severely hampered by slow decision-making, slow implementation of decisions and problems in the transfer of funds to the Norwegian partner institutions. There are also examples of inadequate control of project finances. Financial management is a key aspect of institutional capacity building, and none of the partner institutions will benefit from inadequate financial control. Financial management should, in fact, become an integrated part of institutional development projects where this is needed. The issue underlines the importance of realizing that institutions in the South vary in competence and capacity and find themselves at different stages of development. Consequently, NORAD needs to apply a flexible and pragmatic approach to the principle of recipient responsibility.

Conclusions

In sum, we will argue that most of the Norwegian public institutions involved in development aid have the necessary competence and qualified staff. The management of the institutions is generally positive towards work in developing countries, but have to give priority to their responsibilities in Norway. There are, however, also cases of public institutions who lack the necessary competence and capacity. The main problem for all the institutions is the limited attention given to the broader institutional development issues currently being advocated by NORAD. Most of the institutions acknowledge the shortcoming, and are positive to strengthening their capacity in this area. The Southern partner institutions are generally positive towards the cooperation with their Norwegian partner organizations. However, there are also cases where the initial institutional assessment has not been good enough and where the collaboration does not function as intended.

3.3 INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

Having assessed the competence and capacity of NORAD and public Norwegian institutions as actors in institutional development projects, we now move on to take a closer look at the projects themselves. The purpose is to identify the types of projects initiated, how the institutions perceive the collaboration with partners in

²⁸ ...either concluding that Norwegians must earn a lot of money or that the costs of living must be killing...

²⁹ Referring to our case studies, the idea of collaborating closely with South Africa is still difficult for many both in Namibia and Mozambique. As regards Angola as the obvious candidate in the oil sector, they are largely seen as too «anarchistic» in their approaches to relate to.

the South, and how they perceive the outcome of the institutional development projects.

Our point of departure is the questionnaire survey carried out among the Norwegian institutions (see Appendix 3). The survey includes information from 33 different institutions and a total of 66 different projects based in 21 different countries. 55 percent of the returned questionnaires are from the larger public institutions, with the remaining 45 percent coming from semi-public institutions of research and higher learning.³⁰

Referring to the list of the total number of 35 institutions and 105 projects presented in Appendix 1, two institutions have not responded³¹ and 49 projects have been left out. The main reason for lack of responses is that a number of projects are in the process of being established, and the relevant institutions have felt that there is too little experience to draw on. Some have also argued that the projects they are involved in do not have institutional development as a principle objective. And finally some institutions involved in a large number of projects have left out some of them for practical reasons. All in all, however, we are very pleased with the number and quality of the responses received.

We will also refer to the responses received from 39 public institutions in Namibia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Botswana, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Zambia and India who have taken part in the survey designed for institutions in the South (Appendix 3). The number of responses from the Southern institutions is relatively low compared to the over 100 institutions involved in twinning projects with Norwegian institutions, and the figures presented should therefore be treated with caution.

The presentation of the data is organized along the same lines as the questionnaire: In the first section we present basic information about the projects, including age, size and source of funding. In the second section we discuss

the responses to statements related to collaboration strategy, the impact of external factors, and project outcome. And in the final section we will present a summary of the findings from the questionnaire.

Age, size and funding of projects

We have previously pointed out that the policy of institutional development and the strategy of twinning came to the forefront of Norwegian development aid with the publication of NORAD's «Strategies for Development Cooperation. NORAD in the Nineties» (NORAD 1990a), White Paper No. 5 (1991–1992) and White Paper No. 19 (1995–1996). This is reflected in the age of the twinning projects that is covered by the Survey (Table 7).

Table 7: Project Age

Year of initiation of project	Percentage of projects (%)
Before 1980	3
Between 1981–90	7
Between 1991–95	62
After 1995	28

A few projects can trace their history back to the late 1970s, but only 10 % were established before 1991. The large majority (62 %) were established between 1991 and 1995, and 28 % of the projects were established after 1995 and are consequently still in a very early phase of development.

Although institutional development projects and twinning has been a part of Norwegian development assistance for a relatively long time, the table shows that the extent of such collaboration has increased drastically during the past few years. NORAD's new strategy consequently has resulted in a significant number of new agreements of cooperation between Norwegian public institutions and similar institutions of the South. A number of the Norwegian institutions were involved in development work also prior to 1990, but many have become involved as a result of the establishment of the Norway Axis.

Projects vary significantly in size. The size of a project may be measured in different ways, e.g. its duration in time, the number of people involved, or the amount of money spent. The Survey shows that the average total period of duration of a project is 3–5 years, and that the average period of a single agreement period is 2–3

³⁰ There is again considerable variation in the number and size of twinning projects the Norwegian institutions are involved in. Among the public institutions, the Norwegian Water Resource and Energy Administration, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate and the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority are the largest both in terms of size and number. Among the applied research institutions, the institutions involved in the largest number of projects are Chr. Michelsen Institute, the Institute of Marine Research, and Noragric.

³¹ Statens Institutt for Folkehelse and Statens Datasentral have not responded.

Table 8: Project duration.

Years of duration	Total project period (%)	Years of duration	Present project period (%)
1–3 years	38	1 year	21
4–6 years	43	2 years	20
7–9 years	9	3 years	30
10+ years	10	4–5 years	28

years. Even though some of the projects may be prolonged for a longer period than currently envisaged, very few projects are initiated with reference to the kind of time span recommended in the literature on institutional development projects of 10–15 years (see Chapter 2). As we shall return to, one reason for this is the time constraints set by the current system of budgeting in the Norwegian public sector. A short time span has implications for the type of activities that can be planned and, ultimately, for the extent to which institutional development in the broad sense of the word can be accomplished.

In Table 9 we have used the amount of money disbursed to the projects as indicator. We have distinguished between the amount of money for the total and the present project period, with the former referring to the total amount of money allocated for a project.

Looking at the amounts of money allocated for the present project period, about two out of ten project can be defined as small projects having less than one million NOK at their disposal for periods of 2–3 years. About one in three projects are larger projects with a budget of more than 10 million NOK for periods of 2–3 years. Most of the projects are thus relatively modest in terms of costs, at least compared to classical development projects involving physical infrastructure and other capital intensive interventions. However, costs of more than ten million NOK for an individual project is substantial irrespective of point of reference.

Table 9: Project costs.

Amount of money	Total project period (%)	Present project period (%)
Less than 1 mill. NOK	11	22
Between 1 – 10 mill NOK	42	47
More than 10 mill NOK	47	31

We do not have detailed information on how the money is spent, and this will vary from project to project. However, the case studies indicate that decreasing

amounts are allocated to capital investments and increasing amounts to technical assistance (including consultancies) and training. The major part of the money is spent on Norwegian goods and services.

It is difficult to compare the costs of twinning projects as a strategy for institutional development compared with other strategies. The costs per person-year is likely to be higher due to (often high) institutional overheads, but at the same time the range of services provided is broader through a twinning relation.³² As pointed out earlier, the need to demonstrate «value for money» will increase with the responsibility for financial planning and monitoring currently being vested in the southern institutions.

It is equally difficult to calculate the total amount of money allocated for institutional development projects involving public institutions on the basis of the data we have. With the average size of a project in our survey being about 10 million NOK for a project period of three years and the number of projects being around 100, a rough estimate imply total costs of approximately 300 million NOK per year. Money allocated through the annual- and framework agreements between NORAD and Norwegian public institutions of approximately 28 million NOK will come in addition to this (see Table 2).

The survey also includes information on sources of funding for the projects (Table 10). A number of projects get funding from more than one source. However, MFA/NORAD is contributing to all projects except one. Regarding the relative proportion of NORAD funding in each project, our data show that about half the projects are 100 percent funded by NORAD, while NORAD covers less than 50 percent of the costs in only 12 percent of the projects.

³² This presupposes that the relation functions in accordance with the intentions. There are cases where the institutional consultant is recruited from outside the twinning institution, which may make them mere «expensive experts».

Table 10: Source of Project Funding*

Source of funding	Percentage of projects (%)
MFA/NORAD	98
Your organization	9
Your partner organization	14
The government of your partner	27
Others	11

* Respondents could answer more than one alternative

From the table it also appears that the government of the recipient organization contributes financially in one out of four projects. In addition to direct funding they contribute by providing offices and other infrastructure. In a few projects the institutions themselves contribute with money from their own budgets. The data confirm that NORAD has a dominant financial role, but that many projects have other sources of funding as well.

The Survey furthermore reveals that other donor agencies are involved in 43 % of the projects (*The Survey: Question 1.10*). Most of the Norwegian institutions argue that they coordinate their activities with these agencies, but as many as 30 % of them do not. The coordination mainly concerns professional matters, and not issues relating to funding and budgeting. This is an area where improvements can be made with potentially important implications for the efficiency of institutional development interventions.

Characteristics of the collaboration

The Survey also provides data on how the twinning agreements have developed in practice. First we have inquired who originally took the initiative to establish the collaboration (Table 11). Ideally the recipient organization shall request assistance on the basis of felt needs. On the other hand, it is often argued that development assistance is supply driven and hence that the initiative will come from the North.

Table 11: Project initiation

Project initiated by	Percentage of projects (%)
MFA/NORAD	52
Your organization	34
Your partner organization	39
Others	17

* Respondents could answer more than one alternative if the initiative was taken jointly.

The table indicates that both alternatives take place. In about half of the projects MFA/ NORAD is identified as having taken the initiative, and in one third of the cases the Norwegian institutions is perceived as having initiated the project. These observations support the hypothesis that twinning is donor driven. According to our data this seems particularly to be the case with regard to semi-public institutions of research and higher learning, who take the initiative more frequently than the public institutions.

The respondents could tick more than one alternative in cases where the original initiative was taken jointly. As the table indicates, the recipient institution is regarded as having been part of the initiative in four out of ten cases. What this seems to verify is that many projects have been initiated jointly, often with the original initiative taken by the institutions in the South with the request being followed up with more concrete initiatives by NORAD (itself or through consultants) or by the institution in the North. NORAD seems to be the most active partner when new projects are initiated, while the Norwegian public institutions are more involved when projects grow out of an already established relation with a partner in the South.

The involvement of the Southern institutions is verified by these institutions themselves: 60 % argue that they have taken the initiative, 23 % agree that the initiative was taken by MFA/NORAD, and 13 % argue that the Norwegian partner institution took the initiative to the twinning project they are involved in (*The Southern Survey: Question 1.4*).

Table 12: Number of professionals involved in projects.

Number of professionals involved	None (%)	1-5 (%)	6-10 (%)	11+ (%)
How many professionals from your organization are directly involved in the twinning project?	0	65	24	11
How many professionals from you partner organization are, as you see it, directly involved in the twinning project?	2	33	39	27

In the previous section we examined projects in terms of duration and the size of funding. An alternative way of measuring the size of a project is by number of people involved. The table below (Table 12) shows the number of professionals involved in the relevant project in the Norwegian organization, and their assessment of the number of people involved in their partner organization in the South.

The number of people involved from the Norwegian institution is less than ten in 90 % of the cases, and less than six in 65 % of the cases. The number of people involved from the partner institution in the South is somewhat higher, with 63 % involving six people or more and 27 % involving more than ten people. We do not have information on the proportion this represents in relation to the total number of people in the respective institutions. Nevertheless, it is clear that more people are directly involved than what would be the case with the old individually based technical assistance, and hence that most projects do draw on a broad human resource base.

As pointed out in our review of the twinning literature, the collaboration between the two organizations may take different forms. Professionals from the supplying organization may take up positions as long-term resident advisors and managers in line positions, or they may come to the recipient organization as visiting consultants for shorter periods. Similarly, members of the recipient organizations may visit the supplying organization either on a short-term or on a long-term basis.

Table 13: Number of Norwegian professionals working in Southern organizations

Working period	None (%)	1-5 (%)	6-10 (%)	11+ (%)
Less than one month	23	53	19	6
One to six months ...	49	42	7	2
More than six months	59	36	2	2

Table 13 shows that in 40 percent of the projects at least one person has worked in the recipient organizations for more than six months, while the longest stay is less than 6 months in about 60 percent of the projects. Our case studies confirm that long term working periods are still relatively common and hence that the «expert» is still very much alive. We have also shown that the Southern institutions prefer to work with people who they feel know their organization from the inside. The principal difference from the old experts is, again, that the people

staying for longer periods have an institutional backing that the traditional expert normally did not.

In the literature on organizational development and institution-building there are frequently references to the key issues in successful approaches (Moore 1995:49). One issue is the distinction between a «blueprint» and a «process» strategy. The former refers to the traditional view that effective administrators have to apply a planned strategy if they are to promote institutional development. That is, they need to formulate clear and precise objectives if they want to change and improve the effectiveness of organizations. Contrary to this there is the more modern view stating that in order to act effectively a process-based learning strategy has to be applied. Ends and means have to be treated in a flexible way as a project evolves.

In Table 14 we have examined the cooperation strategy in the twinning projects in terms of the blueprint-process distinction. We have also included other common indicators of successful institution-building. These include i) the degree of commitment to the collaboration, ii) the role of individuals as key actors in institutional collaboration projects, iii) the principle of recipient responsibility, iv) the availability of development expertise in the Norwegian partner institution, and iv) the decision-making strategy applied in the relationship between the two partner institutions.

Table 14: Characteristics of the cooperation strategy

Statement	Percentage in Agreement (%)
a) The original objectives of the institutional cooperation were clear and precise	63
b) The level of ambition in the original objectives was too high	29
c) The agreement of cooperation gives few options for changes underway	13
d) The management in the partner institution is weakly committed to the cooperation	16
e) The management in your institution is weakly committed to the cooperation	13
f) The cooperation strongly depends on one or a few individuals	64
g) The partner institution attaches considerable importance to the principle of recipient responsibility	66
h) Your institution possesses a high degree of expertise on developing countries	59
i) Important decisions are made jointly after discussions between the institutions	80

The table reveals that in a majority of the projects the original objectives are considered to be clear and precise (Item a). Almost two out of three respondents agree to this statement. Conversely, only one out of three agrees to the statement that the original level of ambition was too high (Item b). The institutions are thus generally satisfied both with the original objectives of their project and the level of ambition. However, as we have indicated several times the stated objectives do not normally relate to the wider definition of institutional development. Furthermore, objectives and goals are often set with reference to tangible outputs (human resource and organizational development), and to a smaller extent with reference to the longer term intangible development objectives (strategic capacity and legitimacy).

Further underlining the generally positive attitude towards the projects is the perception that the agreements of cooperation provide options for changes underway (Item c). Only in a small minority of the projects is there a perception that it is difficult to make adjustments during the project period. However, changes in the objectives almost never occur in practice. The Survey shows that only seven percent of the projects have actually changed the initial objectives (*The Survey*: Question 6.2). More generally this suggests that the formal agreements provide options for a process approach, but in practice the objectives of the cooperation tend to remain more or less the same.

The management is committed to the cooperation both in the Norwegian and in the Southern partner institutions (Item d and Item e). The proportions of respondents claiming the opposite is low, and the difference between the public and semi-public institutions is insignificant. As discussed previously, the management of the Southern institutions will often be directly involved in the project, whereas the management particularly in the larger Norwegian public institutions tend to be more indirectly involved. We have also emphasized the importance that direct relations are established at this level.

The survey furthermore confirms that one or a few individuals very often play a vital role for the development of projects (Item f). There is in other words a strong personal component to the cooperation despite its institutional basis. This makes the quality of the collaboration very dependent on the personal qualifications of the individuals involved.

NORAD's recent emphasis on recipient responsibility is mirrored in the responses to the statement that the part-

ner institution attaches considerable importance to the principle of recipient responsibility (Item g). This implies that to the extent that such an allocation of responsibility is not followed up (which we will argue often is the case), the explanation is likely to be related to capacity rather than resolution from the Southern partner.

In a small majority of cases the respondents also argue that their institutions possess a high degree of expertise on developing countries (Item h). Here our data show that there is a significant difference between the semi-public research institutions and the public institutions proper, with research institutions more frequently claiming that they have such expertise. This implies that the larger public institutions acknowledge that there is a need to enhance their knowledge in this respect.

Finally, as regards decision-making the main pattern seems to be that decisions are made jointly after discussions between the institutions (Item i). In four out of five projects this is the main model. This is in accordance with the ideal of a balanced relationship which is propagated by NORAD as most conducive to successful institutional development.

The perceptions of the characteristics of the cooperation strategy is largely shared by the institutions in the South (*The Southern Survey*: Question 2.1). As many as 80 % argue that the original objectives were clear and precise. However, a larger proportion (43 %) than for the Norwegian institutions (29 %) argue that the level of ambition was too high, and a smaller proportion (63 % versus 80 %) feel that important decisions are made jointly after discussions between the two institutions. This implies that the Southern institution see the relation as less «equal» than the Norwegian partners tend to do.

Outcomes and environments

Institutional development projects are in principle to relate to both human resource development, organizational development and systemic development. Put differently, projects of this type should be measured in terms of their impact on the efficiency as well as on the legitimacy of institutions. As discussed earlier, outputs tend to become more difficult to measure the higher up in the «hierarchy» one moves.

We have asked the respondents themselves to assess the institution building impact of their project in two different ways. First we have asked them more generally how they perceive the outcome of the cooperation, overall

and for each of the partner institutions. In addition, we have asked how much progress they have made in the most relevant areas for institutional development.

Only 20 percent of the projects are making use of specific indicators or data to evaluate and monitor progress (*The Survey*: Question 6.4). The lack of attention paid to the issue of monitoring progress is a combined outcome of the difficulty of finding tangible ways of doing it and the limited priority given to the issue from the institutions themselves.

Table 15: Perceived outcome of the institutional cooperation.

Statement	Percentage in Agreement (%)
a) Overall, we are satisfied with the outcome of the cooperation	70
b) The partner institution has benefited significantly from the cooperation	76
c) Our own institution has benefited significantly from the collaboration	43

The first table (Table 15) suggests that in seven out of ten projects the Norwegian institution is reasonably satisfied with the overall outcome (Item a). When it comes to the perceived outcome for the recipient organization, an even larger proportion argue that their partners have benefited significantly (Item b). As regards the outcome for the Norwegian institution itself, the positive response is significantly lower. Only 43 % argue that they have benefited from the cooperation as an institution. The data compare well with the perceptions of the Southern institutions discussed above (Section 3.3).³³

The figures clearly suggest that the institutions are pleased with the outcome of the projects. Nevertheless, it is again necessary with some remarks of caution. First, the institutions evaluate the projects with reference to their understanding of institutional development projects, which in most cases exclude higher level concerns. Looking at the data in more detail, moreover, only 25 per cent strongly agree (score 1) that they are satisfied with the outcome of the cooperation, 44 per cent agree (score 2) and 20 per cent are neutral (score 3). Assessed in another way, 64 per cent (score 2 and 3) are

neither very pleased nor very dissatisfied with the outcome.

Although the positive impression of project outcomes remains, there is clearly still room for improvements. The caution is verified by the response to the question : «In your opinion, will your partner organization be able to deliver their output to the satisfaction of their clients without donor assistance within the next five years?» (*The Survey*: Question 6.11). Only 54 % of the institutions answered yes to this question, while 46 % answered no. The perception about this issue is even more cautious from the South. Among the Southern institutions, only 43 % believe that they will be able to deliver their output without donor assistance within the next five years, with 57 % arguing that they will not be able to do this (*The Southern Survey*: Question 6.11).

To assess the possible relation between the characteristic of the cooperation strategy discussed above (Table 14) and the overall satisfaction with the outcome of the cooperation, Table 16 correlates the results from the two questions.

Table 16: Outcome by characteristics of cooperation strategy.

Statement	Percentage in Agreement (%)
a) Original objectives clear	87 **
Original objectives unclear	41
b) Ambition too high	50
Ambition appropriate	78
c) Few options for changes	75
Many options for changes	68
d) Partner management uncommitted	20
Partner management committed	79 **
e) Your management uncommitted	50
Your management committed	72
f) Dependent on a few individuals	58
Independent of individuals	90 **
g) Recipient responsibility important	81 **
Recipient responsibility unimportant	48
h) Much development expertise	74
Little development expertise	63
i) Joint decision making	76 **
Not joint decision making	42

From the table it appears that five out of nine characteristics of the cooperation strategy have a significant impact on the overall outcome of the twinning projects (marked **).

1. Clear and precise objectives will have a positive impact.

³³ Interestingly, however, the Norwegian institutions argue that they benefit more (43 %) than the Southern partners tend to believe (30 %).

2. A weakly committed management in the partner institution will have a negative impact.
3. A cooperation strongly depending on one or a few individuals will have a negative impact.
4. Partner institutions taking the principle of recipient responsibility seriously will have a positive impact.
5. Important decisions made jointly after discussions between the institutions will have a positive impact.

To further assess the outcome of the twinning projects, Table 17 focuses on the relevant targets for institutional development. As discussed in Chapter 2, organizations may be conceptualized as composed of three subsystems that each refers to a distinct level of responsibility and control. On the operational level the effective performance of the technical functions is the main concern: e.g. teaching, physical production, surveillance, marketing etc. On the managerial level the administration and control of the technical suborganization is the main task: to establish links to those who use the products of an organization and to provide the resources necessary at the operational level. On the strategic level the relationship of the organization to its wider environments is the basic challenge: to identify its domain and secure legitimacy. The institutions were asked how much progress that has been made in the various areas.

Table 17: Outcome as progress in specific areas.

Statement	Percentage in Agreement (%)
a) Development of technical competence/general competence building	72
b) Development of improved administrative routines/procedures	31
c) Development of effective and accountable leadership	24
d) Introduction of improved technology/equipment	59
e) Stronger linkages to other organizations in the recipient country	34
f) Improved services to the clients of the partner organization	33
g) Higher legitimacy among external users and other stakeholders	35

The table shows that development of technical competence and general competence building (Item a) is the area where most of the projects have made progress. Also introduction of technology and equipment (Item d) is an area where a majority indicates that progress have

taken place. These two areas are closely associated with institution building at the operational level of the recipient organizations, and the observations suggest that the operational level is a main target of this kind of projects.

The institution building impact of the projects seems to be significantly less prominent on the other two levels. On the managerial level, progress in development of improved administrative routines and procedures is reported in one out of three projects (Item b), and a similar proportion report improved services to the clients of the partner organization (Item f). With regard to effective and accountable leadership (Item c) the progress is even less notable. Similarly, at the strategic level the progress in terms of stronger linkages to other organizations in the recipient country (Item e) and higher legitimacy among external users (Item g) is rather limited. The findings thus support one of the initial hypotheses of the study, namely that much of what is carried out as institutional development is transfer of technical knowledge and hardware.

The findings are largely verified by the responses from the Southern institutions. Progress is seen as highest in development of technical competence (82 %), in introduction of improved technology and equipment (74 %) and in improved administrative routines and procedures (56 %). A smaller proportion argue that progress has been made in the areas of effective and accountable leadership (51 %), improved services to the clients of the organization (45 %) and development of stronger linkages to other organizations (38 %). At the same time, however, 60 % argue that they have developed a higher legitimacy among external stakeholders, which may imply that the presence of an external twinning organization is important in its own right.

A central topic in all forms of development cooperation is the impact of the political, economic and socio-cultural context on goal achievement. The perceived impact of these factors is assessed in Table 18. The results are somewhat surprising. Although both culture (Item a), economy (Item b), bureaucracy (Item c) and politics (Item d) are considered to have a negative impact by some of the respondents, the majority do not agree with this. Thus the perception of a negative impact of the general context in developing countries is less widespread than expected.

Table 18: Impact of external factors on institutional cooperation

Statement	Percentage in Agreement (%)
a) The cultural context in the recipient country has a negative impact on goal achievement	22
b) The economic context in the recipient country has a negative impact on goal achievement	26
c) The bureaucratic tradition in the recipient country has a negative impact on goal achievement	48
d) The political context in the recipient country has a negative impact on goal achievement	31
e) The institutional cooperation has a limited impact on institutional development compared with the external context	34

The bureaucratic tradition in the recipient country (Item c) is the factor that most frequently is rated as having a negative impact. This would suggest that problems of organization and management are experienced as the most prominent. Finally the majority of the institutions disagree with the statement that the institutional cooperation has a limited impact on institutional development compared with the external political and economic context. However, research institutions tend to agree with this statement to a much larger extent than the larger public institutions.

Conclusions

In sum, the survey gives a relatively positive impression of the content and outcome of the institutional development projects. The positive attitude is shared by the southern and Norwegian institutional partners. The positive evaluation is noteworthy, not least on the background of the relatively negative perception of NORAD as facilitator and funder of projects discussed in the preceding section. It may imply that projects are functioning despite the negative role of NORAD, but it may of course also imply that the impact of NORAD is not as problematic as the institutions argue.

More specifically, the survey has shown that most of the projects are recently established. The size of budgets vary significantly. NORAD is the main funder in the large majority of cases, but around half of the projects also have additional sources. In contrast to stated policy intentions, most projects are confined within a limited project period. The number of professionals involved in the projects is relatively limited particularly in the Norwegian institutions, but the involvement nevertheless

represent a significant change from the classical technical expert without an institutional link.

Initiatives for projects are normally taken by several actors in combination, but with different roles. Original requests often come from institutions in the South, but normally in close cooperation with NORAD (in the case of new projects) or with the partner institution (in cases of a continuation of existing relations). The development of more specific programs and budgets are normally done with a strong Norwegian input, either by consultants hired by NORAD or by the partner institution in Norway.

The institutions argue that project objectives generally are clear and with adequate levels of ambition, even though the Southern institutions feel the ambitions are too high more often than their Norwegian partners. The institutions also argue that there are options for changing objectives underway (even though most projects do not change objectives), and that the management in the Norwegian and Southern institution are committed to the projects. Nevertheless, it is conceded that most projects do depend strongly on one or a few individuals. The institutions also argue that the general political and economic context in developing countries do not influence the projects significantly, with the bureaucratic system being an exception.

Despite the positive self-evaluation, however, most projects primarily address issues at the operational level (technical competence, improved technology and equipment and, to a smaller extent, administrative routines and procedures). The impact on higher level concerns (effective and accountable leadership, improved services to clients of the partner institution, stronger linkages to other organizations in the recipient country and higher legitimacy among external users and other stakeholders) is less frequent and less positive. While this to some extent relate to the problem of the lack of proper indicators to measure impact on these levels, it is also the outcome of the inadequate attention paid to development in these areas. The significance of this is indicated by the fact that a large proportion of the institutions involved do not believe that the Southern institutions will be able to deliver their output to the satisfaction of the clients without donor assistance within the next five years.

A preliminary conclusion to be drawn seems to be that individual projects largely function well, but that they

do not fully adhere to the stated policy and strategy for institutional development. There is, in other words, established positive working relations between public institutions in Norway and similar institutions in a large number of developing countries. However, the content of these relations should be developed further in order to secure recipient ownership and sustainable institutional development.

Moving on to the case studies, we will be in a position to make a closer assessment of the relations existing and the possibility and utility of broadening the scope of institutional development projects.

4. Institution Building in the Sectors of Oil, Fish and Research

In order to make a closer assessment of the policy of institutional development and the strategy of institutional cooperation within country-specific contexts, we have selected the following case studies:

1. The cooperation between the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD), and the National Petroleum Corporation of Namibia (NAMCOR) and the National Directorate for Coal and Hydrocarbons (DNCH) in Mozambique
2. The Cooperation between the Institute for Marine Research (IMR) and the Directorate of Fishery Administration (DoF) in Norway, and the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources (MFMR) in Namibia and the Directorate of Fishery Administration (DNP) in Mozambique.
3. The cooperation between the Agder College in Norway and the Institute of Development Management (IDM) in Tanzania, with references also being made to the cooperation between the Norwegian Agricultural University (NAU) and the Sokoine University of Agricultural (SUA) in Tanzania.³⁴

The cases do, as we see it, represent the necessary variation with respect to both project history and sectors. In addition, we will be in a position to compare twinning arrangements involving the same Norwegian institution in different national contexts, as well as different Norwegian institutions in the same national context. The Tanzania cases make it possible to assess twinning arrangements in the same national context and sector involving two different partners in Norway.

The cases will throw light on some of the main issues identified for this study, i.e. the relative importance of the competence and capacity of i) NORAD and the cooperating partners, ii) the design and mode of collaboration, and iii) the political and economic context in which the cooperation takes place. Namibia and Mozambique represent very different types countries, with Namibia having a relatively stable political system and economy and Mozambique being among the poorest

countries in the world and going through a period of political transition and civil service reform.

While the survey discussed in the preceding chapter primarily reflects Norwegian perceptions, the cases presented below emphasize the Southern perceptions of the institutional development projects. Perceptions do, as we have seen, tend to differ between the Southern institutions, the Norwegian partner institutions and NORAD both as regards relevance and outcome. On the basis of the survey and the case-studies, we will return to conclusions and recommendations in the final chapter (Chapter 5.0).

Before going into the case studies, we will give a brief presentation of the Norwegian institutions involved. The Southern partner-institutions and country contexts will be presented in the case-studies themselves.

The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) was established in 1972 and has approximately 350 employees. The Directorate is located in Stavanger, and functions as advisor to the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and the Ministry of Local Government and Labor. NPD's main responsibility is to exercise supervisory control of petroleum activities on the Norwegian continental shelf. In addition, the Directorate is involved in a broad range of international activities. These include activities directed towards developing countries, primarily related to concrete projects financed by NORAD and training courses in petroleum policy and management (also financed by NORAD) through the International Program for Petroleum Management and Administration (Petrad). The Directorate has been involved in development work since the early 1980s. It is currently involved in institutional development projects in 10 countries, i.e. Angola, Namibia, South-Africa, Mozambique, Tanzania, Eritrea, India, Bangladesh, Vietnam and Nicaragua. NPD has a separate department dealing with developing countries, with a permanent staff of only 1–2 persons. However, the international department draws heavily on employees from other departments at NPD.

³⁴ The cooperation between the Norwegian Agricultural University and the Sokoine University of Agricultural is evaluated in a separate sub-study («Institutional Cooperation between Sokoine and Norwegian Agricultural Universities». Sub-study No.2).

While primarily being a traditional evaluation, the study raises a number of issues of broader relevance for institutional development and twinning in the sector of research and higher learning.

The Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries (DoF) and the Institute of Marine Research (IMR) have 468 and 256 employees respectively, and is located in Bergen. The main responsibilities of the institutions are to secure a sound management of Norwegian marine resources (DoF) and do fishery research relevant for this task (IMR). The institutions have been involved in work in developing countries since the early 1970s. A Coordination Unit (CU) was established in 1992 on the initiative of NORAD, in order to merge project activities related to research and management. The CU has three permanent staff members, and another 5–6 are working with development project on a permanent basis. The Unit also draws on additional personnel, mainly from IMR. The Unit is currently involved in projects in Namibia, Angola, Nicaragua, Vietnam, China and Mozambique. The research vessel «Dr. Fritjof Nansen», which in many ways is the «flag-ship» of the institutional development activities of IMR/DoF, is primarily involved in Namibia and Angola, but also in South Africa and North West Africa. The activities directed towards developing countries represent around 15 person years and a total budget of approximately 30 million NOK (1996). Of these around 18 million NOK are expenses related to «Dr. Fritjof Nansen».

Agder College (HIA) has 600 employees and 6000 students, and is one of the largest colleges in Norway. It has over one hundred different study activities, ranging from half year units to full Master Programs covering most academic disciplines. The college has offered a program in development studies since 1983. The program falls under the Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Social Science. Three of the 45 permanent employees at the Department work full time with development issues, but a total of around ten people are involved in other capacities. The activities directed towards developing countries involve training of Norwegian students, courses and seminars for foreign students and project cooperation in addition to research and consultancies. The relation with Institute of Development Management in Tanzania was formally initiated in 1991, and represents the core project activity. The total budget for activities directed towards developing countries is 3–4 million NOK (1996).

4.1 INSTITUTION BUILDING THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION – MOZAMBIQUE

4.1.2 Introduction

Despite its considerable agricultural and mineral potential Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the world. This fragility is demonstrated by conventional economic criteria and its heavy dependence on donor assistance. Equally important manifestations are its meager human resource base, and its weak institutional framework – in particular the government, financial and legal systems.

These difficulties are compounded by the many rapid transformations over the last ten years and the last five in particular: from war to peace, from a single to a multi-party system, from reactive war and drought-imposed emergency measures to pro-active reconstruction and development initiatives, and from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented one via a rigorous structural adjustment program.

The combined effect of peace and economic reforms makes greater demands of public institutions while simultaneously debilitating them. The government's abdication of its role as the main actor in the economy is virtually complete. But divestiture and the privatization of state holdings have proved much simpler and faster than the counterpart exercise, the government's assumption of its new role of facilitator and regulator – involving the identification of new legal and regulatory frameworks, new organizational systems and procedures, new attitudes and skills on the part of public officials. A slow process under any circumstances, it cannot keep pace with the strong upsurge in private sector initiatives, frequently spearheaded by foreign investment that on the one hand requires a more agile and timely response from government, the establishment and monitoring of the rules of the game, yet on the other hand siphon off its already scarce capable and experienced cadres.

4.1.2 The Fisheries Sector

Background

Fishing makes an important contribution to the Mozambican economy³⁵ – as an important source of food, of income and employment for 75–80,000 predominantly small-scale fishing families and as a source some US\$ 60 million in export earnings (its relative weight having

³⁵ 8 % of GDP in 1996.

increasing substantially when the war virtually wiped out agricultural exports). In recognition of its importance, the Secretariat of State for Fisheries (SEP), a sort of «mini-Ministry» was created in 1979, based on a handful of raw biology graduates. During the eighties it worked in three main areas: commercial and technical support services and inputs for artisanal fishermen through the UDPPE/IDPPE³⁶; promotion and involvement in the state-owned fleet and joint ventures; and fisheries research through the Fisheries Research Institute, IIP, established in 1984.

As in all other sectors, the post 1987 economic reforms had a profound impact on fisheries and brought about major transformations in the role of government fisheries institutions. The new 1990 Fisheries Law in particular required major changes in SEP functions, structure, staffing and lines of communication and consultation. One of its important consequences was the creation of National Directorate for Fisheries Administration (DAP), charged with controlling and managing fishery resources. Direct commercial involvement in both industrial and artisanal fishing was gradually phased out. The UDPPE became the IDPPE, to conduct research into small scale fishing organization and technology. In 1992 work began on the preparation of a ten-year Fisheries Master Plan, that would reflect the sector strategy, serve as a planning instrument and dispense with projects based on donor owned strategies and development concepts.

The post-election government reorganization brought changes of a different kind. The cohesive semi-autonomous SEP with considerable independent decision making powers was abolished and fisheries integrated into a new Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAP). SEP became the National Directorate of Fisheries (DNP), one of eight such directorates in the Ministry, and the institutes became two of ten such institutions. Fisheries became the responsibility of a Deputy Minister who was also responsible for several other directorates. Although not necessarily the intention, this effectively downgraded the status of the fisheries sector.

³⁶ Unidade de Direccão de Pesca de Pequena Escala (IDPPE), that later became the Instituto de Desenvolvimento de Pesca de Pequena Escala (IDPPE).

³⁷ IIP, SEP and ISPPE (all institutional support) and experimental fishing

³⁸ Between IMR-IIP in December 1992 and between IMR/DoF-SEP in July 1993.

Cooperation with Norway

Norwegian assistance to the fisheries sector can be divided into three main phases, each corresponding to a different assistance modality.

a) 1977–92 combined Nansen program surveys with conventional projects, initially though a joint Nordic funded program but bilateralized from 1988 with projects in IIP, UDPPE/IDPPE, experimental fishing and a fisheries school. They had the traditional institutional support components of technical assistance, consultancies, equipment, training and scholarships, and operating costs. Funds were administered by NORAD but could be used to acquire assistance from any source. Throughout the period there was close collaboration with IMR in the technical field of fishery resource assessment, with Nansen surveys, consultancies and training.

In 1989 Norway provided additional funds to support the production of a new Fisheries Law, and Mozambique requested support for fisheries administration and resource management systems and structures (the embryonic DAP at that time having a staff of four.) A new project «institutional support for SEP» but targeted specifically at DAP, began at the end of 1991. This marked the advent of DoF, which assisted in the project's formulation, as a new institutional partner. Although not specified in the project title, given the nature of the task to be addressed – the creation of organizational and management capacity in a new government structure – it also represented the first systematic institution building effort. It comprised the creation of fisheries administration structures, the collection and processing of fisheries data, and support for economic evaluation and management, planning and legal advice.

b) 1993–95 saw more emphasis on institutional cooperation but within the confines of ongoing projects. There were several changes in form and procedure. First, support for the existing four projects³⁷ was reorganized under the umbrella of a single sector agreement, signed in December 1992. The objective was «to strengthen Mozambique's ability to manage and exploit the fish resources in an ecological sustainable and economical sound way». Secondly, funds were transferred to Mozambique, to be managed by the sector's Fisheries Development Fund (FFP). Thirdly, it was noted that the use of «Norwegian technical competence» would increase, through «institutional cooperation with Norwegian institutions». Contracts were signed³⁸ and the newly established «Coordination Unit» (CU) became a sin-

gle point of contact, ostensibly replacing the bilateral IMR-IIP and DoF-DAP contacts.

However, institutional cooperation (primarily consultancies and some training) was in fact still only among several components in each of the projects. Others included technical assistance (contracted through NORAD or directly by Mozambique as well as additional consultancies from other sources), training and scholarships unrelated to the CU, equipment and contributions to running costs. In addition, although new project documents were foreseen these never materialized, and the individual projects continued with the same content and organizational setup as before. Only the DAF project initiated a year earlier was new and, by its very nature, incorporated institution building concerns.

This does not appear to have been fully appreciated by a subsequent review³⁹ of the program. While it concluded that the DAP project had been efficient and effective in establishing DAP as an improved body for fisheries administration and management and that IMR/DoF consultancies had provided useful inputs to the Fisheries Master Plan, it was critical of both the overall «sector program», and the institutional cooperation component. It noted that the sector agreement had made no difference to the way the individual projects were conducted, and had not re-directed assistance towards institutional development (nor could they, the projects had not been revised). The institutional cooperation contracts had been used randomly as little more than open consultancy contracts, not as a tool for institutional development. In the case of IIP, both overall project resources and the IMR contribution (including longer term technical assistance) had been directed towards scientific activities and surveys, with limited impact on institutional capacity building.

c) 1997–1998 see stronger institutional cooperation-building emphasis. Although the previous agreement terminated at the end of 1995, the new one was only signed a year later in December 1996.⁴⁰ It was based on a single project document covering both IIP and DAP (now DNP), prepared jointly by the four partner institutions, that was itself based on the Fisheries Master Plan and in particular one of its component programs, the «Program for the Institutional Development of Fish-

eries Public Administration». The partner relationship has thus become structured, organized and targeted in such a way that institutional cooperation, institutional development and project implementation were in theory at least virtually synonymous.

However, although six project components correspond to specific outputs in the Fisheries Master Plan and can be considered to contribute in one way or another to human resource, organizational and systemic development⁴¹ their respective activities do not form a cohesive whole, for reasons presented below. And the two other components/outputs seem superfluous. One is the «institution strengthening» of «core research and management activities» when this is meant to be the purpose of the project as a whole. The second is «institutional cooperation», more a cooperation instrument or modality than an output per se.

Administrative arrangements involve oversight through bi-annual meetings of a Committee of Cooperation comprising representatives of the four institutions and chaired by the Deputy Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries. The project is managed by a Coordinator, the National Director for Fisheries.

Assessment

Institutional cooperation in fisheries has existed throughout the two decades of Norwegian development assistance to the sector, during which time the relationships has evolved and become increasingly productive. However, full blown «institutional cooperation» of the twinning kind has really only existed for about a year which provides a limited basis for drawing lessons. Moreover, this also means that the notion of «twinning» as a major innovation in cooperation exists predominantly on the Norwegian side. As far as the Mozambican partners are concerned there has been a working relationship with IMR and DoF ever since IIP and DAF were created, such that there is a tendency to equate Norway=NORAD=IMR/DoF, differentiation only occurring in relation to specific issues.

Nevertheless, there is recognition that the relationship has intensified in recent years and been accompanied by «recipient responsibility» measures such as the decon-

³⁹ Program Review of Norwegian Support to the Fisheries Sector in Mozambique (NORAD 1995)

⁴⁰ ...causing a considerable slowdown in activities during 1996.

⁴¹ i.e improved assessment and monitoring of resources; fisheries management models; research and management personnel trained; productive sector participation in fisheries management; consultations on inspection and surveillance systems.

centration of financial management. Piecemeal IMR/DoF inputs to a series of wide-ranging projects prepared by outside consultants and with substantial components over which they have no influence have been replaced by a single homogeneous project prepared by the parties concerned. Joint preparation has at one and the same time increased Mozambican ownership while also giving the Norwegian partners a constructive voice they did not have before.

Both sides also consider that the intensification of the relation has produced positive results overall. It has resulted in the transfer of know-how and information based on cumulative mutual knowledge, particularly given the stability of key personnel⁴² in the partner institutions and the Technical Department in NORAD/Oslo⁴³ and the establishment of close personal relationships. Under the current project communication has been further enhanced by the regular bi-annual meetings to assess progress, take corrective measures and plan work programs. The CU feels that since they have been deeply involved in their partner institutions they understand them better.

The Mozambican side has benefited from access to a hot line for advice and general backstopping. The response to problems and requests for assistance is faster than earlier when more had to be channeled through the embassy and NORAD. There is more autonomy and flexibility, including financial flexibility. It was also stated that resources are used more effectively where there is a «mediator» between a donor whose aim is to provide money and a recipient whose aim is to spend it.

It is more difficult to separate out the specific contribution of institutional cooperation to institution building, other than in the obvious case of the DAP-DoF project. In the case of IIP, a 1992 review concluded that the project as a whole had had a positive impact on the institutional capacity, including capacity to give management advice, staff competence, services for users, research tools and activities and publications. On the other hand, the 1994 review criticized both the project as a whole and the IMR component for concentrating too heavily on scientific activities and surveys with little having been achieved in the way of institutional capacity development.

⁴² although this is changing rapidly on the Mozambican side.

⁴³ especially when compared to the embassy.

However, the IMR component was but one of several components and was intended to target technical and scientific competence in the field of resource assessment. Many of the other project activities were outside its influence.⁴⁴ The director of IIP points out that it is only with the strong twinning links under the current project that IMR has become more involved in IIP as a whole, yet still resource assessment as the main input since this is the IIP's main priority. A stakeholder from the private fishing industry who also felt that cooperation here had been less fruitful than in DAP blamed IIP itself, for over-extending its research areas, and ignoring organizational advice. For its part IMR considers that while the project has many shortcomings, it cannot be considered a failure if it has helped the institution to function under adverse circumstances and to maintain catches at a sustainable level.

The gradual reduction in technical assistance to just two advisers is presented as evidence that capacity building has taken place, although this could equally reflect the new policy to replace TA with consultancy assistance. This move is not viewed sympathetically, since it means that considerable effort has to be expended to convince the donor of the need for advisers. It is argued strongly that certain problems and issues still require knowledge accumulated through an on-the-ground presence and cannot be tackled by short in-out consultancies. Moreover, in order to be truly effective institutional collaboration requires the presence of some-one able to act as a bridge and a lobby with the partner institutions, the embassy and NORAD.⁴⁵

While there are conflicting accounts of the freedom to acquire assistance from other sources under a twinning project, the existence of such a project does not constrain relations and programs with other donors. Moreover, the Master Plan is intended to be a key instrument for ensuring coordination and complementarity between donor inputs.

There has been the occasional problem with the introduction of project components inappropriate to the

⁴⁴ A recent paper by the Norwegian adviser to IIP notes that of the 23 person years of TA over the life of the project, only 2 had been directed towards IIP's priority research area. In the consultancy field however, where IMR predominated, there were 25 consultancies on resource assessment.

⁴⁵ on the grounds that they tend to give greater credence to information and opinions supplied by their own people

local situation, such as the excessive sophistication of bio-economic modeling. However, as soon as the problem was recognized simpler alternatives were sought. On the other hand, there have been positive innovations based on Norwegian experience, such as the introduction of a forum for dialogue and consultation with producers, and the adaptation of scientific resource information to make it more accessible. And the presence of a permanent adviser can help ensure that foreign consultants tailor their recommendations to Mozambican reality. Moreover, in sensitive areas where Mozambican technical expertise is limited (or is perceived to be so by important stakeholders), as in the case of the annual stock assessments and establishment of TAC quotas, the presence of external specialist assistance is crucial to establishing the legitimacy of the research findings and the resulting management decisions.

The partners on both sides feel that relations with the embassy improved after it moved back from day to day involvement in the project and project preparation. Nevertheless it still has considerable clout in the conception of projects. The CU considers the current project, which it helped prepared, to be a «catch-all improvisation» to comply with the somewhat contradictory orientations: the embassy decision to reduce support to fisheries, ongoing activities that could not be interrupted (overseas studies), and more of an institution building focus. It thus became a confused mixture of new and ongoing activities, trying to give coherent shape to something that has none.

Although the four partner institutions have established practical working communications among each other, the «outside bodies» of NORAD and the embassy pressure for simplification to meet their own need/desire for a single interlocutor. The creation of the CU itself was established for administrative reasons, a response to NORAD's desire to have a single point of contact in, and to link up the research and management components. Yet a) the CU has no equivalent in NORAD but has to deal with a variety of contacts and b) in practice contacts with Mozambican partners continue bilateral. In Mozambique, the creation of the «Committee of Cooperation» for the current project was an artificial construct required by the embassy that wanted a single contact in MAP. The main work is still done bilaterally prior to the meetings that are essentially formalities (although it is acknowledged that the Deputy Minister can have a role mediating conflicts).

Another bone of contention is the contract system. The 1994 review attributed the poor development of institutional cooperation in part to the fact that contracts between the institutions were merely legal texts laying down administrative procedures offering to provide goods and services as requested. The CU would also prefer inter-institutional agreements that are operational, not legalistic but this opinion is not shared by the NORAD legal department. Although some progress has since been made, and more recent agreements/contracts reflecting better the needs and possibilities of the partners the Mozambique contracts date back to 1992 and discussions have been dragging on for two years. NORAD is insisting on a system involving plans subject to prior approval.

Finally, both the parties find it difficult to cope with delays and conflicting signals emanating from the embassy/NORAD on the future assistance to the sector. Although the previous project ended in December 1995, it was only in January/February 1995 that MAP was informed of the decision to phase out other assistance and concentrate on IIP/DAP. The project document was ready by June but did not become active until the agreement was signed, which took place in December, causing a year's hiatus in activities. The project reflects a decision to scale down assistance to the sector even before the Country Strategy Exercise concluded that fisheries would no longer be included in the country program. This appears to have arisen from the need to reduce the wide spread of NORAD activities to more manageable proportions and the feeling that after many years fisheries was a problematic sector, and that results did not reflect the inputs provided over such a long period (a view not shared by any of the partners).

4.1.3 The Petroleum Sector

Background

Despite the discovery of extensive natural gas reserves and some limited petroleum exploration activity, at independence in 1975 Mozambique had absolutely no institutional or technical capacity in this field. Following approaches by oil companies interested in prospection in 1980 the government formed the state oil company, Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos (ENH). The following year the government enacted a petroleum law assigning ENH rights over exploration and development, a model production sharing agreement was drafted and exploration and production contracts were signed with four oil companies. There followed a period of

considerable seismic work by both these companies and ENH, which also took a variety of initiatives to promote the country's hydrocarbon potential internationally. From about 1986 onwards, however, with the war and waning oil company interest in high risk exploration ENH concentrated its attention on the country's only known resources, the Pande natural gas deposits, verifying reserves and pursuing development options. Although the Ministry for Mineral Resources created in 1983 included a National Directorate for Coal and Hydrocarbons (DNCH), given the shortage of qualified staff it only existed on paper.

Until 1993 all hydrocarbon activities and functions, both governmental and commercial, were concentrated in ENH: oil and gas exploration, promotion and licensing, investment, operation and service provision. That year it was decided to activate the DNCH,⁴⁶ which would take over the governmental functions hitherto performed by ENH. Moreover, new legislation requiring the transformation of all state companies into more commercial and autonomous public companies also applied to ENH, which would in the future concentrate on its commercial function of managing state equity and engaging in joint ventures. The timing of the changes reflects two important developments. The end of apartheid in South Africa opened up strong market prospects for the country's only known reserves, natural gas. In Mozambique, the peace agreement removed a major deterrent to foreign investment and coincided with renewed international interest in oil prospection in general. Consequently, there was a sudden upsurge of interest in Mozambique and by the end of 1996 production sharing agreements or memorandums of understanding had been signed with seven companies, and were pending with four others. In 1996 ENH and the American company Enron signed an agreement for the sale of natural gas to South Africa.

DNCH started up in 1995, with a staff of five (compared to 150 for ENH). This has since grown to 15, but only about four professionals who have been hard put to respond to the heavy pressures imposed by the burgeoning oil exploration and gas activity in the country, in particular the preparation of a new Petroleum Law, new

regulations and model agreements, and the negotiation of a cross-border treaty with South Africa. Since it has no capacity to assume all its mandated functions in the short term, it has been decided that some areas such as resource assessment and data storage will remain with ENH for the time being.

Co-operation with Norway

Bilateral co-operation between Norway and ENH dates back to 1982, shortly after the company was formed. The first sector agreement signed in November 1983 was subsequently prolonged in 1986 to cover 1986–92. Throughout this period assistance focused on upstream activities: assistance in monitoring the activities of foreign companies and promotional work, seismic surveys and the processing and interpretation of geophysical data, gas utilization and transport studies, some running costs and some training and technical assistance. Right from the very early days the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate was always an active partner, although there was never any reference to this in bilateral agreements between NORAD and the Ministry, nor any formal arrangement between the two organizations.

Since ENH was a state company, Statoil might have been considered a more appropriate point of contact. However, in the absence of resource exploitation and commercial undertakings most of what ENH did, and what NORAD funded, was essentially governmental – resource assessment and management, licensing and promotion, making NPD the natural choice.⁴⁷

In December 1992⁴⁸ a new sector agreement was signed covering the period 1993–96. While co-operation continued in the same fields as before, the changed economic and political environment was reflected in greater downstream emphasis on gas: its development for export and local gas applications. In keeping with the «recipient responsibility» policy increasingly emphasized by NORAD, financial procedures were changed to allow for the semi-annual transfer of funds to ENH account, with disbursements being made by Mozambique.

This period also saw the introduction of development assistance from a second source, the World Bank, com-

⁴⁶ The 1993 statutes of the ministry defined the tasks of DNCH as including the preparation of development proposals, promoting, approving and controlling prospection and exploration, the establishment of norms and regulations, the maintenance of geological and reserves data bases and documentation.

⁴⁷ Although some funds were also provided for small localized commercial production in the Pande gas field, this was considered to have the nature of an experimental undertaking.

⁴⁸ just two months after the signature of the peace agreement

prising technical assistance and consultancies and culminating in the mid-1994 approval of a USD 30 million Gas Engineering Project. NPD provided advisory services for ENH in its relations with the World Bank, participating in discussions, supervising work by sub-contractors and generally ensuring that inputs from the two sources complemented each other. ENH-NPD relations were built around annual workplans, but without any formal contract.

Recognizing the changing political and economic environment and the changes within the petroleum sector itself, in early 1994 NORAD manifested its willingness to support the new DNCH. NORAD also stated that it would reconsider institutional support to ENH now that it was getting more involved in commercial field activities. Following an NPD study on institutional and regulatory issues, NPD-DNCH discussions resulted in the signature of «Terms of Reference» on an immediate work program in 1995 on these issues covering petroleum in general but Pande gas in particular, while awaiting the preparation of a new four-year assistance plan⁴⁹. From this time on NPD involvement in the petroleum sector in Mozambique intensified considerably.

Since it had no budget allocation of its own, DNCH received some preliminary assistance from the ENH allocation to set up new office installations, and acquire furniture and office equipment. Moreover, since DNCH is unable to assume all its functions immediately, in technical fields such as resource management and data storage where expertise and hardware have been accumulated in ENH, the company will continue to receive assistance, but channeled through DNCH on a subcontract basis.

In mid-1996 an addendum to the existing sector agreement provided additional funds specifically for the «development and institutional strengthening of DNCH», to be based on a contract between DNCH and NPD. Although the funding allocation under the agreement covered only 1996 (the final year of the existing sector agreement) the attached program outline indicated a NORAD commitment up to the year 2000.

However, there was an element of uncertainty since throughout 1996 NORAD undertook its «Country Strategy Study» exercise, that was to determine which of the many sectors receiving support would continue to do so in the future. Although in the 1996 annual meeting it was asserted that «there is no indication that the energy sector will not be given priority» the inclusion of energy was only confirmed when the exercise was concluded one and a half years later.

Assessment

Compared to the bumpy road to more effective and systematic co-operation for institutional development witnessed in fisheries, progress in the petroleum sector has been smooth. There are probably several reasons for this, simplicity and inevitability being fundamental. Although three co-operating partners are involved, the relationship has spanned two historic moments each of which entailed a single partner on each side, first ENH-NPD, then DNCH-NPD. Each was in full agreement as to the type of assistance necessary at the time, since they arose from a situation of a new institution being subjected to heavy external pressures requiring a particular kind of response. The relationship was facilitated by Norway being a major partner in the fields in which it operated, thus obviating the need to adapt and improvise in the light of inputs by many others. The unique nature of the sector also helped. It requires constant international technological and commercial networking, relating to sophisticated multi-national companies brimming with specialist expertise and experience. Working with and through a sister institution already implanted in this milieu, and which had itself learned from others, was not only logical but inevitable.

Although created as a state company, ENH combined both commercial and governmental functions. The transfer of support from ENH to DNCH was neither acrimonious nor messy because it was recognized as being mutually beneficial and an essential step forward in the evolving petroleum scene in Mozambique. In essence, and even in human terms, the one grew out of the other. Finally, although NPD will in the future assist both, the channels and the institutional context are clear,

⁴⁹ NPD was to provide assistance in the following areas: on the use and co-ordination of consultants in general and in particular the consultant providing General Advisory Services to DNCH (PETROTEAM hired in June 1995); the development of appropriate policies, laws and regulations (the immediate output being a new Petroleum Law, standard joint venture contracts, pipeline safety and environmental regulations); organizational development

(the organizational structure, manning plan and assessment of training requirements); implementation of a training program; assistance on technical matters relating to DNCH supervision of the Pande gas exploration; assistance to DNCH participation in the Enron-ENH negotiations (including the negotiation of a cross-border treaty).

ENH being the temporary «repository» for some DNCH functions.

Both NPD and ENH agree that Norwegian assistance provided to the company was never intended to be institution building in the sense of organizational provision of management and business competence and systemic development in the sense discussed in Chapter 2. It provided and helped build up technical competence at the operational level – knowledge of resources, information banks, seismic survey and geological interpretation skills, information banks, contract negotiation skills. The specific NPD contribution provided flexible back-stopping support and guidance, technical expertise and skill transfer, and also helped at the strategic networking level in terms of sources of expertise and relations with companies.

Norwegian assistance during this period undoubtedly contributed to the technical growth and development of ENH, but in fields that belonged primarily to the governmental sphere (i.e. it contributed to DNCH before that institution even existed.) It contributed little if anything to the development of ENH as a commercial enterprise,⁵⁰ nor was this the intention. As pointed out above, if it had been then Statoil would have been the appropriate partner.

The program of assistance to DNCH comprises all the essential components of institution building, but with particular emphasis on organizational and systemic development. This is hardly surprising given that a) it is a government body with regulatory and control rather than executive-technical functions b) it is completely new and its indispensable initial requirements are a legal framework and organizational development, and c) the sector as a whole and key staff have a long-standing relationship with the homologous institution NPD.

It is still much too early to assess the effectiveness of the co-operation, although progress to date in terms of legislative and regulatory output, and assistance with negotiations is impressive. However, although training has started with participation of one professional in a Petrad course, this will probably be the most problematic area given DNCH's manpower constraints, and thus its limited receiving capacity. There are not enough people to train, those that do exist are mainly raw graduates who

require intensive initial preparation in English and computer skills. The public service salary issue will also eventually result in a staff retention problem – particularly as more foreign oil companies set up shop in Mozambique.

DNCH considers broad institutional co-operation with a similar organization more fruitful than individual technical assistance. However, it does not obviate the need for longer-term resident-assistance, but gives it the extra dimension. It results in a symbiotic relationship whereby on the one hand the technical assistance is more effective with solid institutional backing and on the other hand the presence of the adviser as a bridge makes the institutional co-operation as a whole more effective. The head of DNCH requested that occasional consultancy visits be transformed into a permanent technical assistance advisory post. The adviser also serves as the permanent NPD field representative. One observer noted the crucial importance of this function in a donor-receiver context where the receiver is either hesitant or unable to articulate his requirements/demands. Although the system has not been in place for long the adviser + consultancies arrangement has on the whole worked well. The personal and professional qualities of the adviser are clearly crucial – from the establishment of rapport with the director to acceptance of the need (and the ability) to switch from strategic issues to gap-filling fire brigade type actions. The Mozambique experience thus coincides with the NPD Stavanger assertion that its best success stories involve a local «co-ordinator» who stays for a long period and combines gap filling with training, and becomes almost a local staff member.

While not stated overtly, donor emphasis on institution building as principally intangible organizational capacity building does not coincide totally with local perceptions that hardware and funds for operating costs that contribute to a conducive working environment are equally important. It is stressed that consultancies are extremely expensive and consumes a high proportion of available funds. More general criticism of the heavy recourse to consultancies are that they are too short to acquire real local knowledge and produce useful output («during lightning visits you give and receive the basics and don't go beyond»); they worked alone with little input from locals and little transfer of knowledge (compared to a technical assistance gap filler); they rarely include someone who speaks Portuguese. However, it was also recognized that these defects were

⁵⁰ for a while Norwegian funds financed consultancy services on accounting and contracting procedures

reduced if the supplier was an institution with an on-going relationships.

The consultancy work on the initial draft of the petroleum law was considered «too Norwegian» (and possibly affected by the absence of a Portuguese speaker) but after consultations with stakeholders the drafters showed that they were willing and able to adapt to the requirements of the Mozambican situation. Moreover, the practice of consultations with stakeholders and the introduction of a seminar to discuss it and provide feedback was considered an important innovation in helping to introduce consultation and counter the culture of verticality and centralization in Mozambican public institutions.

The nature of relations with the embassy have clearly changed; it now has a much lower profile with less direct involvement on a day-to-day basis. This has made transactions more agile, responsive and rapid. The relationship has become more one of providing information, with embassy participation only visible in relation to agreements and the discussion of annual workplans and budgets.

There are however problematical aspects of relations with NORAD, particularly in Oslo, which undermine the agility and responsiveness anticipated under the twinning policy. The long delay in approving the new sector strategy (reportedly due to the tardy initiation of preparations and/or unjustified delays in the legal department) has resulted in the interruption of assistance to ENH (coinciding with the upsurge in oil company activity when NPD assistance was all the more necessary) and slowed the pace in DNCH, where work continues on the basis of balances transferred from the previous year. Although only an occasional exercise, the excessive duration of the Country Strategy process (almost two years) creates an unnecessarily long period of uncertainty, particularly in a field such as capacity building which necessarily has a long-term horizon.

4.1.4 Conclusions

Institutional cooperation in the fisheries and petroleum sectors in Mozambique has existed almost as long as the cooperation program itself and has involved such disparate institutions as a state enterprise, a research institute and public administration. Its manifestations have ranged from the simple provision of information, to technical assistance, components inputs to larger projects, and to comprehensive project-wide commitments.

Relations between the partner institutions and the intensity of the cooperation reflected the growing mutual knowledge of needs and response capacity, and received additional impetus from the new NORAD emphasis on this cooperation modality.

Under these circumstances, it has not been possible to assess a) the specific contribution of institutional cooperation to the achievements (or failings) in a particular sector, b) even less its specific contribution to institution building and c) the mutual effect of the decentralization of project financial management which occurred around the same time.

What has become clear is that when a good fit is achieved between the partners, the benefits of institutional as opposed to earlier forms of cooperation – mutual knowledge, flexibility, timely response, less embassy interference – outweigh such shortcomings as cultural appropriateness, or administrative lapses and delays in the NORAD-Norwegian partner relationship.

It is also clear that institutional cooperation has achieved both the transmission of technical competence and partial (through occasional inputs) or comprehensive institution building. Both are important. The assistance provided to strengthen the technical competence and knowledge of ENH and IMR scientific research capacity was an appropriate response to an expressed need, a declared priority. In a country like Mozambique developmental needs are many and varied, and an over-zealous interpretation of institution building as requiring simultaneous efforts at the organizational or strategic level can be counterproductive. In a similar vein, the donor preference for consultancies and its corollary, a distaste for technical assistance, does not always coincide with the recipient's view of the best way to build organizational competence.

The Mozambican experience with comprehensive institution building efforts may perhaps be atypical in that they concerned the establishment of new bodies, benefited from a long-standing relationship, and NORAD was the predominant, all though not the only, donor. Serious staffing constraints notwithstanding, under such circumstances the process as such is probably simpler than in a more established institution like IIP. In such cases the effects of poor staff development programs, or vested interests in existing structures and procedures, or even recognition of the need for change, may be more problematic.

Full twinning relationships are very recent – 1996 DNCH and 1997 IIP/DNP so the overall assessment by Mozambican partners and stakeholders necessarily refers more to the effects of the assistance program over time. While discretion may have prevented them from expressing their full misgivings or enumerating all failings, the general sentiment expressed by the heads of various institutions is captured in the statement: «we are what we are today because of this assistance». In other words, even if they operate deficiently, they exist and do work they would otherwise not do. In a small and fragile institution in an equally fragile economic, social and institutional environment, an accomplishment that may be modest and pass unnoticed in a more privileged context is of much greater importance in Mozambique.

4.2 INSTITUTION BUILDING THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION – NAMIBIA

4.2.1 Introduction

At Independence in March 1990, the Namibian Government inherited an over-dimensioned, while at the same time fragmented public service with confusing and complicated administrative structures. This Apartheid legacy of so-called separate development was left behind by South Africa under the conditions of a constitutional article 141 that no public servants with a permanent post could be dismissed or subjected to deterioration in the conditions of their employment. One of the major imbalances of the new society emerging has as a result been the size of the administration and a lack of commitment to the new Government and its efforts to achieve social change by many public servants.

As a consequence, Government aimed at restructuring this administration into a larger number of ministries and other agencies and institutions representing the new Namibian state authority, while at the same time promoting new people into leadership positions to execute the policy formulated. This has contributed to a further expansion of civil service especially on the top levels. This process was not only justified by the need for further loyal competence and skills serving the new society and its political leadership. Another contributing factor was the need to create employment opportunities for higher ranking members of the former liberation movement now executing the political power within a sovereign state structure. New appointments were therefore not necessarily a reflection of true qualifications in the sense of the professionally required abilities, but also

in some cases symptom of a reward system and strategy of cooperation.

Much of the core apparatus of an independent state system existed, if at all, only in the form of the provincial branches of a ministry or agency in Pretoria. Many organs have had to be created virtually from scratch. The strategy employed has in many cases been to introduce into them a nucleus of foreign experts and advisers, often in managerial positions, and entrust them with the institution-building process. This approach reflected to some extent the rather positive perception the political office bearers and officials of the new Namibian society had towards external support for the nation building project. While this attempt might have produced positive results, it has not been painless and free of contradictions and conflicts. In many instances, external advisers and foreign experts incited also negative reactions from Namibian counterparts and other local employees. Furthermore, this is a rather expensive option, while not necessarily solving the problem of creating sustainable local capacity. The continued effectiveness of having large numbers of foreign advisers therefore needs to be analyzed and questioned.

Institutional twinning might be one of the alternatives to technical assistance in the «traditional» way. The following sections investigate the case studies of the oil and fish sectors in Namibian society and the twinning arrangements with Norwegian institutions.

4.2.2 Fisheries

A commercial fisheries sector became established in Namibia as an exclusive domain of expanding South African capital in the late 1940s and early 1950s, mainly at the country's only deep sea port of Walvis Bay. While the South African fishing companies prospered during the 1960s and 1970s due to the abundance of fish along the Namibian coast, overexploitation of the biomass resulted in dramatic deterioration of the once favorable conditions and disclosed the limitations of the potential. As a result, already during the mid-1980s, the depleted fishing grounds along the Namibian coast could be amply described as a «disaster zone» (Moorsom 1984: 70), requiring special attention during the phase of decolonization and socio-economic reconstruction.

In acknowledging the relevance of fisheries as an important source of future income for the economy of Namibia, the official blueprint for the establishment of a post-colonial social order presented by the United Na-

tions Institute for Namibia devotes one of its 27 chapters (UNIN 1986: 193–242) to an assessment of the sector. Among the essentials identified is the need for introducing the necessary legislation – including the establishment of a 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which in fact was proclaimed soon after Independence – and establishing the administration for management and control. It further concludes that «the task of advising and making recommendations regarding catch quotas on the various stocks and other measures for fishery regulations ... wuld (*sic!*) necessitate the establishment of a research institution with the necessary technical staff and equipment, including research vessels for resource surveys» (UNIN 1986: 238).

Anticipating the possibility of «aid programs of considerable magnitude ... made available to Namibia upon independence», it is argued in favor of technical aid programs with a long-term perspective, «seeking to secure high level personnel training, basic research data (especially on stock levels and catch limits), and assistance in fleet and factory rebuilding and development on an aid basis (UNIN 1986: 240). It is finally emphasized once again that the establishment of a fishery administration and research institution «represent tasks which can only be accomplished with strong support from foreign technical experts. The research and training units should be developed as institute building projects.» (UNIN 1986: 241).

After Independence, the relative importance of the fisheries sector was acknowledged with the transformation of the previous Department of Sea Fisheries in the Ministry of Agriculture into a full fledged Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources (MFMR) in 1991. Its initial major task was the drafting of a White Paper, published in 1991 with the title «Towards Responsible Development of the Fisheries Sector». The defined policy subsequently became translated into a legal framework through the 1992 Sea Fisheries Act and the Fisheries Regulations Act of 1993, a set of rules which fishing right holders, fishing vessels, fishermen and the fish-processing industries have to obey.

Fishery research is important to secure necessary in-

formation to safeguard the policy, and the National Marine Information and Research Centre (NATMIRC) was established in 1994 for this purpose. One of its most relevant tasks is to collect and analyze a variety of data on the fish stocks, on the basis of which recommendations are submitted to the Fisheries Advisory Council annually for the Total Allowable Catches (TACs) of each species: Due to a shortage of experienced researchers, however, NATMIRC has only been partially able to execute the functions and has relied on external assistance.⁵¹

Cooperation with Norway

Norwegian-Namibian cooperation in the fisheries sector became an essential factor at Independence and has contributed considerably to the achievements since then. In fact, Norway became the most relevant single donor country in the fisheries sector, both in terms of quantity and diversification of the support (MFMR 1997: 4–6): While the cooperation started already in 1990, it became formalized by means of an agreement in 1991, providing for a financial grant of NOK 60.5 million (i.e. about 40 million Rand/N\$ at the present exchange rate) for a cooperation program for 1991 to 1993. A renewed agreement in 1993 provided further NOK 60 million for 1993 to 1996. In mid-1997 a third agreement for 1998 to 1999 was agreed upon. The emphasis is on institution building aspects within the fishery sector, in particular staff development. Provision is also made for assistance to marine fisheries research and management through the Nansen Program, which is funded separately. Between 1990 and 1997, total Norwegian contributions under both the Country and the Nansen Program amounted to more than 110 million N\$ (72 and 38 million N\$ respectively). Norway has been involved with funding and expertise both in the establishment of the EEZ, the White Paper on marine resources and the development of the Sea Fisheries Act.⁵²

The proposed budget for 1998/99, tabled at the annual meeting between Namibia and Norway on the Fisheries Sector Agreement in October 1997 at Swakopmund, makes provision for a total Norwegian contribution to the fisheries sector of 33 million NOK (18 million NOK and 15 million NOK from the Sector and Nansen Pro-

⁵¹ According to National Development Plan I (NDP I), 27 out of a total of 37 scientific research posts at the Directorate of Resource Management under the MFMR were filled in 1995. There is a strong possibility that the understaffed research institutions are facing further cuttings due to the need of downsizing the civil

service, which would hamper the full execution of their tasks even more.

⁵² Norway has furthermore funded the preparation and running of SADC's Regional Fisheries Planning and Management Course, and the development of a White Paper on inland fisheries.

gram respectively). This is roughly equivalent to 18 million N\$. Considering the overall amount of 78 million N\$ allocated to the MFMR within the annual budget of Namibia for the financial year 1997/98, the Norwegian contribution, representing a proportion of approximately 25% of the budget allocation, is substantial.

Assessment

The cooperation with Norway is perceived as generally successful and beneficial to the development of the sector, with an interest from both sides in further long term material and technical collaboration. Norwegians tend to be more critical in their judgment of performance and achievements than the Namibians. One possible explanation is, as we have discussed in previous chapters, that the Southern expectations tend to be more realistic.

The experiences so far should be judged with reference to the two main fields of activity, namely the Country Program on the one hand and the Nansen Program on the other. The Country Program has as its main component (90%) assistance in developing a fisheries surveillance system and concentrating on associated training activities. This component is executed by the private Norwegian company NFDS-Engineering AS (Nordenfjeldske). While the MFMR (1997: 13) expressed satisfaction with this state of affairs, the Norwegian partners involved cast doubts on the utility of private sector involvement in twinning arrangements. It is argued that this is not twinning in the true sense of the word, but rather a commercial business venture which may fail to implement important aspects of Norwegian aid policy.

Furthermore, the purchase of the private services implies additional costs.⁵³ While Nordenfjeldske's personnel are undoubtedly qualified to perform the duties as required and have built up the fisheries surveillance system from scratch, there seems to be a tendency to ignore the institutional development aspect and the options for a complete hand-over of the surveillance system in the near future seem limited. The experiences suggest that the involvement of a state institution in twinning arrangements probably represents a more conducive environment for capacity building.⁵⁴

⁵³ Originally, the Norwegian Coast Guard was supposed to execute the tasks required. It is understood, however, that for principal reasons the request was turned down, since the Coast Guard defined itself as a type of military unit not wanting to be involved in external affairs. Ironically, Norwegian personnel is presently mainly recruited from the same Coast Guard on private individual contract basis with high overheads for Nordenfjeldske added.

A minor component (10%) of the Country Program regards advisory services within the central ministerial administration of MFMR. It has mainly been vested in planning advisers serving in the Ministry. The tasks of the advisers have been closely linked to institutional development efforts at the organizational and strategic levels. While undoubtedly well qualified, their positions exemplify some of the problems with individual advisers without strong institutional backing. The advisers had problems becoming involved at the managerial level, which probably would have been easier if the Ministry has access to a strong institutional partner with the necessary broad range of expertise and legitimacy. This does not mean that long term resident advisers are not useful. On the contrary, also in Namibia the public institutions emphasize the importance of combining institutional cooperation with longer-term resident advisers who know the Southern partner institution from the inside.

Much more so than the Country Program does the Nansen Program represent institutional cooperation in line with NORAD policies. Until 1993 the vessel «Dr. Fritjof Nansen» operated primarily as a research vessel with no direct mandate for institutional development. When this mandate was broadened in 1994 to primarily include institutional development in the fields of research and resource management, this was to a large extent the outcome of a realization that the countries in the South did not have sufficient institutional capacity to utilize the data supplied by the Norwegian research vessel.

The current Nansen Program emphasizes marine fisheries research and management with the key objective to provide scientifically based knowledge on the state of resources and environment as a basis for rational and sustainable exploitation. The program emphasizes transfer of knowledge and skills to local institutions. The Norwegian Institute of Marine Research (IMR) is instrumental in the cooperation with the National Marine Information and Research Center (NATMIRC).

While during the original phase of cooperation the tasks executed under the former Fritjof Nansen Project were mainly «gap filling», this has more recently changed with increasing back up support of IMR and the gradual

⁵⁴ For a discussion of the competence and capacity of private companies and consulting firms for institutional development, see Study 3 («Institutional Development Efforts by Private Companies and Private Consulting Firms in Norway»).

consolidation of NATMIRC. Differences in strength and capacity between the cooperating partners reduced the degree of human resources and organizational development in the initial phase. While the project achieved as a merit the supply of required data which was vital for formulating and implementing policies for the control of resources, this was undertaken largely as a Norwegian exercise with only limited transfer of knowledge and skills. One reason for this was undoubtedly the lack of relevant skills among the Namibian colleagues at that time, but some of the training (including that on the research vessel «Dr. Fritjof Nansen») does not seem to have been sufficiently adapted to the existing needs and levels of qualifications.

In the course of establishing NATMIRC as the local research institute, IMR took over a substantial role (representing about 80% of the international involvement, with further assistance mainly from DANIDA and FAO). To a large extent due to demands from Namibia and NORAD, training and eventually institutional development became a more important part of the program. Still, however, there seems to be differences in opinion as to what the concept of «institutional development» should imply. While IMR argues that institutional development is «not an end in itself» and that training of researchers should be their main responsibility, NORAD seems to have a broader definition emphasizing the need to relate all interventions to the objective of making NATMIRC self-sustainable.⁵⁵ The Ministry and NATMIRC on their part see the need to combine the development of qualified researchers with the strengthening of the organization per se, and argue that the weakest link in the collaboration still is the support to the parts of the Ministry that is to utilize the data the researchers produce.⁵⁶

The deliberate effort to contribute more to a Namibianization process, and broaden the basis for the collaboration, acknowledged increasing concerns from external stakeholders (mainly in the industry) being suspicious of the role, motives and impact of foreign researchers. The degree of hostility and mistrust between the parties involved (i.e. the state authorities controlling

and regulating the fishing sector on the one side and the private business companies with interests in a maximum access to the available stocks on the other) has more recently successfully, though gradually, been replaced by a climate of mutual consultation. As a result, suspicions regarding the Norwegian interests in the «aid business» have also lessened and thereby increased the legitimacy of NATMIRC itself among external stakeholders.

Norwegian support is seen by the private sector stakeholders by and large as a constructive and useful impact towards a further consolidation of professional execution of necessary duties by state authorities. They generally agree with the ministerial bureaucracy that it should be continued with a long term perspective in the interest of strengthening local scientific and institutional capacity. This argument is further supported by the fact that under the present circumstances the only available Namibian research vessel «Welwitchia» has not the required technology and capacity to take over the functions essential for maintaining a sound surveying task. This view is shared by national researchers at NATMIRC.

With reference to the constraints of a society in transition with limited resources and expertise, Norwegian involvement in Namibia's fisheries sector can claim to have been rather constructive and successful (notwithstanding a number of limitations suggesting improvements in the further course of cooperation). It certainly has created the expectation of further commitment in the field. From a Namibian point of view, however, it seems not a decisive factor whether the concept of cooperation is based on institutional twinning or any other organizational arrangements, as long as the outcome of the exercise produces the desired results. As shown, there is still some room for improvements in this regard.

4.2.3 The Oil Sector

In contrast to fisheries, the petroleum sector has so far received relatively limited attention in Namibia. As a result, there is very limited information beyond recent seismic surveys on the petroleum potential. The few accessible earlier studies on the country's mineral re-

⁵⁵ Emphasizing this point, representatives from the Embassy argued that if a defunct switchboard is a problem for the effectiveness and legitimacy of a research institution, then that should be seen as part of the institutional development mandate.

⁵⁶ There is currently one long-term expert from IMR working at NATMIRC with the mandate of supporting organizational de-

velopment in a broader sense. The challenge for all the Norwegians attached to the Nansen Program remains to relate constructively to Namibian colleagues who have much less experience, and work within a much weaker institutional framework, than the Norwegian researchers are used to.

sources have all in common that oil is by and large a non-issue due to the lack of reliable data. However, one of the problems identified in the literature as an «overriding constraint» to the mining sector (by implication including petroleum) is «the shortage of skilled Namibians» (*CIIR 1983: 101*). The validity of this judgment has since then basically remained.

Due to the absence of any oil discoveries, the studies undertaken to anticipate the country's needs at Independence (most prominently *UNIN 1986*) also made only limited provisions and recommendations for oil-related initiatives. For similar reasons, remarkably little space and even less substance has been devoted to the petroleum sector in general and the National Petroleum Corporation (NAMCOR) in Namibia's National Development Plan 1.

Despite this gap, however, the Ministry of Mines and Energy and Namcor are known for having a relatively strong institutional basis and for working systematically with issues of human resources and organizational development. A strong positive factor is the extraordinary continuity in the bureaucratic and political structure, enhancing institution building. The MME is one out of three Ministries in which the Ministers have served since Independence (the other two are Foreign Affairs and Justice). Even more so, MME is the only Ministry in which also the Deputy Minister have been in place since then. Despite the fact that as political office bearers they had little to no knowledge of the subject matters before assuming their duties, this long period of service has produced a sound degree of familiarity with the issues at stake.

According to NDP 1 (*Government of the Republic of Namibia 1995: 287*), the energy sector operates on the principle of a mixed economy, with state-owned parastatal corporations and private sector companies acting alongside and complementing each other. MME's re-

sponsibility lies in overseeing the general development as well as in the drafting of the legislative and policy framework. In 1990 and 1991 the Petroleum Products and Energy Act, the Petroleum Exploration and Production Act, and the Petroleum Taxation Act were promulgated accordingly.

Cooperation with Norway

Shaping the legal framework for an oil sector has been a first successful step of cooperation between Namibia and Norway in this area and created a conducive environment for any further institutional twinning arrangement between the newly established NAMCOR and the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. Putting the laws in place within a comparatively short period of time assisted in a positive spirit for continued collaboration based on previous achievements. While Government strives to promote measures encouraging exploration and exploitation of the country's energy resources in a sustainable manner as well as foreign and local investment in the sector, it is also committed to provisions avoiding conflict with Article 95 of Namibia's Constitution emphasizing the obligation for protecting the environment. Here again, a wide range of Norwegian expertise based on own experiences is available to reconcile interests for optimizing economic exploitation of natural resources with the need for securing a safe and sustainable natural environment (in particular within such a sensitive and high risk area as petroleum exploration).

There is a parastatal electrical utility responsible for electricity generation, transmission and distribution.⁵⁷ The national oil company NAMCOR, established in accordance with the 1991 Petroleum Exploration and Production Act, has the function of assisting the MME in the promotion and development of oil and gas resources. At present, NAMCOR has a total of 14 staff members and cooperates closely with the Directorate of Energy. Five petroleum exploration companies and five

⁵⁷ Norway's involvement in energy sector cooperation concentrates on a rural electrification scheme in Northern Namibia, a solar electrification program, a feasibility study for the controversial Epupa dam project and training and technical assistance (with NAMCOR being responsible for the administration of the bursary fund). Norway's total contribution to the Energy Sector Cooperation Program for 1996 to 1998 amounts to NOK 59.3 mio. The biggest share is allocated with 37 % or 22 mio NOK to technical and institutional support to NAMCOR, with a further NOK 4 mio put aside for training and technical assistance to the Ministry.

Within the framework of the Public Sector Investment Program (PSIP), Norwegian contributions to the total amount of 3.173 mio NS were identified for the period 1995 to 1997 as estimated expenditure for the petroleum exploration and production program (including the drafting of further regulations in the areas of safety, emergency preparedness, licenses, internal control, supervisory activities, drilling and well activities, geological data and environmental data collection) (*Government of the Republic of Namibia 1995: vol. 2, 129*).

petroleum marketing companies represent the private sector involvement. In order to encourage private companies to undertake further exploration, NAMCOR initiates geological surveys to provide basic data.

In February 1997, NAMCOR signed an agreement with the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) regarding institutional cooperation for NORAD supported assistance to the petroleum sector. So far, this newly entered contract might represent the formally most advanced stage of institutional twinning in Norwegian-Namibian cooperation, although direct cooperation funded by NORAD has taken place since 1991. The effectiveness and efficiency of the new twinning arrangement, especially in contrast to previous relations, however, cannot yet be tested due to the short period of time.

Assessment

It is nevertheless an indisputable fact that the establishment and consolidation of NAMCOR was largely influenced by Norwegian assistance both in terms of money and know how. NAMCOR as a rather small institution operating within a clearly defined area and with concrete tasks could optimize the external support without a lot of bureaucratic red tape and time consuming structural complexity often imminent to larger institutions. On the other side, such a cooperation stresses the structural discrepancies possible in twinning arrangements between a newly created institution in its infant stage on the one side and well developed, complex bodies on the other side. NAMCOR has appreciated the variety of expertise made available through the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate – but used their expertise for understandable reasons sometimes more for gap filling purposes than building own capacity. But as learning processes (especially within the context of institutions and their collective identity) are long term, it is too early to reach any valid conclusions.⁵⁸

As an earlier desk appraisal of Norwegian assistance concluded, «Namibia seems to be a good example of the benefit which can be achieved by technical assistance in the early development phase of the sector» (*Morkrid*

1993: 4). At the same time, given the limited capacity and competence to administer and control the activities, it is argued that Namibia «will also in the future need to acquire foreign technical assistance, with mainly the same content as was procured under the Norwegian assistance in the past first phase» (*Ibid.*: 18). These statements illustrate that in the particular case of NAMCOR for a variety of reasons an institutional twinning arrangement to some extent continues to cultivate the technical assistance of the past. Expert advice from abroad shall remain a need for the Namibian institution under whatever agreement.

A further potentially critical issue remains the concentration on institutional support to NAMCOR. Despite being a 100% state owned parastatal, it is likely that NAMCOR is privatized (like Statoil) if oil is found. As a result then, NORAD support would have benefited not the state structures and institutions. At present, there is an obvious discrepancy in the sense that support is mainly channeled to NAMCOR. The Directorates in the Ministry have much less benefit from the transfer of skills and expertise, and the process of institutional strengthening and empowerment, of both individuals and structures. Norwegian support might therefore in future be more diversified in the sense the ministerial level(s) relevant for the oil sector activities are more deliberately included.

During 1991 to 1995 the total Norwegian support to the petroleum sector amounted to 42.5 million NOK. The financial contributions covered activities including the mentioned development of a legal and contractual framework, of geophysical surveys, a study on gas utilization, regulating petroleum exploration activities, analyzing geological and hydrocarbon samples, promoting new exploration areas, assist during license negotiations, assessing future training needs, evaluating drilling programs and operations, assisting in provisions for emergency cases, offering training for employees at NAMCOR and MME, supporting administration and monitoring of exploration activities, creating a geological/geophysical database and financing of different specialized studies.

Given the pioneering role assumed and executed almost from the beginning of a sovereign Namibian state authority and the central role of Norwegian support, it is hardly surprising that the responses to the bilateral cooperation in this sector were exceptionally positive. In fact it is not an exaggeration to state that the development of

⁵⁸ Along similar lines, an internal Norwegian document on the energy sector cooperation of 11 August 1995 stated that «Even though representatives of MME and NAMCOR are learning fast, the activities so far have only been related to the earliest stages of exploration». This by implication suggests that a wide range of potential activities in the oil sector would still require further assistance and preparation to empower the local bodies and individuals to carry out the tasks.

a Namibian oil sector is inextricably linked to Norwegian support both in terms of material assistance as well as expertise. This has not been exclusive, since especially the Commonwealth Secretariat has provided further relevant know how through highly qualified and skilled experts in an advisory role.

But the Namibian oil sector as institutionalized by NAMCOR obviously to a considerable extent also reflects Norwegian priorities. The result is a comparatively high and strict standard in terms of security, ecological and environmental protection as well as related regulations. Such a rather sophisticated and strictly regulated environment for the oil exploration business might to some extent even discourage the less responsible type of potential investors in the field. Given more liberal and laissez fair environments in neighboring countries with a considerably larger chance for successful offshore explorations (such as Angola), temptations to operate there instead of taking the investment risks in Namibia may be created. The corporate identity at NAMCOR and within the MME, however, seems to prefer the high safety and quality standards in terms of reputation and image. Arguments that caution to introduce North Sea levels of oil regulations are met with the view that if these are the best in the world, then there should be no reason for not introducing them as well. Since the security awareness among serious companies in the business is rather high, they are consequently prepared in most cases to honor the preference and priority for a safe environment. It shall ultimately be the degree of likelihood to discover oil which is the decisive factor in the decision-making process.

While the institutional twinning arrangements between NAMCOR and NPD have not reached a very advanced stage, individual advice, know how and skills continue to play a crucial role. It has been pointed out that a particular Norwegian expert assisting NAMCOR since its establishment on a continuous basis on technical matters, has executed an essential role in the organizational and legislative development as well as in establishing the links to the international oil companies. Together with two other experts from the Commonwealth Secretariat serving in similar functions on legal and financial matters, this individual has decisively shaped the Namibian oil sector of today. As an independent consultant, he accompanied the project throughout the years and could operate rather autonomously as an honest broker and mediator. Combining personal commitment, competence and integrity, he became well re-

spected and an accepted authority. This example illustrates that notwithstanding the values and benefits of any less personalized twinning arrangements, the individual impact to the success (or failure, for that matter) of such projects remains critical.

It should finally be noted as an overall positive sign of successful cooperation that despite the possibility of misperceptions the private sector stakeholders seem to honor and support the institutional strengthening of NAMCOR through external support by Norwegian institutions and their expertise. The involvement of Norsk Hydro (as Hydro Namibia) in a prominent way in the petroleum sector (the first exploration license was awarded to them) is not classified as a potential collision of interests or favoritism. This is another indication that Norwegian support is generally accepted as a constructive benefit to the development of the oil sector in Namibia. What is required now is the discovery of oil to fully utilize the scope of the cooperation and to receive the maximum benefits in socio-economic terms.

4.2.4 Conclusions

The bilateral Namibian-Norwegian relations since the establishment of a sovereign Namibian state in 1990 have been very positive. Norwegian support to Namibia features prominently and ranks among the most relevant external assistance offered so far. The special emphasis on sectoral cooperation in fisheries and energy has been reflected in the above sub-chapters. Notwithstanding certain shortcomings and weaknesses that might be reduced within the further course of cooperation, the overall achievements in both fields have received positive judgments by a variety of stakeholders involved.

Critical observations generally do not question the relevance of Norwegian assistance so far completed. It is rather interesting and instructive to note, however, that the most uncritical and positive perceptions exist within the public administration of Namibia, i.e. the recipient side of the cooperation. As partners in the process, they are prepared to base judgments on pragmatic and modest assumptions. Furthermore, their overriding goal is to achieve certain results within the process of cooperation, with less concern spent on the way these results are obtained. In other words: The emerging paradigm of institutional twinning seems to be much less a matter of principle to the Namibian side than to its Norwegian partners, as long as the desired effects are obtained.

A number of factors seem to have a more or less direct

effect and impact on the performance in the sectors (and, by implication, the results of twinning arrangements). Among them is the continuity (or fluctuation) in the institutional structures of the local bodies, including most prominently the political office bearers and higher ranking civil servants. A high degree of stability of staff contributes to the success of cooperation, and creates a more suitable environment for both twinning arrangements and their efficiency, as well as the general competence, acceptance and legitimacy of the institutions involved. Another influential effect is the economic relevance of the sector and its activities. A commercially promising, profit-making sector (such as in the Namibian case fisheries), produces by nature of the variety of interests in this constellation much more potential for conflicts and constraints than less attractive sectors will (like in Namibia the case of oil exploration).

From the insights gained from the two Namibian case studies, it should be noted that twinning arrangements are still in a very infant stage. Cooperation is not yet guided exclusively by this comparatively new approach. The much proclaimed shift from technical assistance to twinning as institutional cooperation can so far only claim partial success. It has not yet replaced the personal commitment by individual experts (and might even in the long run not be able to do so: even a shift towards more collective, institutional responsibilities would not be able to replace individual motivation – and should not). Despite the proclaimed shift towards more institutional cooperation individual experts continue to play a prominent, influential and to some extent even decisive role. Their expertise, know how, professional skills, experience, ability to manage and communicate and to enter into communication in different environments will remain relevant factors contributing to the success or failure of twinning arrangements.

It should be finally pointed out that further monitoring of twinning arrangements and their results is a prerequisite for more solid and well-based conclusions. Presently conducted stock-taking exercises – as useful they might be for a first, provisional insight into the state of affairs – seem to be slightly premature for drawing any definite, final conclusions on the potential scope of such concerted efforts.

4.3 INSTITUTION BUILDING THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION: TANZANIA

4.3.1 Introduction⁵⁹

Tanzania has for many years been archetypal of the failures and missed opportunities of development in Africa; – failures characterized by misconceived policies, centralized and authoritarian one-party rule, a bloated and ineffectual public sector, a mismanaged command economy, increasing poverty and a decreasing standard of living. Tanzania is also one of the countries on the African continent which suffered most from the effects of the oil crises in the 1970's and the debt crisis of the 1980's. In the process it became increasingly dependent on foreign aid, for public investments as well as running costs. To many, Tanzania's situation was aptly summed up as «aid addiction».

After several years of acrimonious exchange, mostly on ideological grounds, Tanzania and the IMF and the World Bank in 1986 finally agreed on a severe Structural Adjustment Program, with the fundamental aim of reforming the public sector and the introduction of a market economy. The Structural Adjustment Program has been politically controversial and economically agonizing to a lot of Tanzanians, but in spite of delays and a lack of enthusiasm in its implementation, the consensus now is that the Structural Adjustment Program seems to work. The process of structural adjustment is still ongoing, however, and institutional development in response to the changing political and economic environment is still an important issue.

4.3.2 Norwegian Support to Research and Higher Learning

Tanzania has been a major recipient of Norwegian development assistance throughout this period. Assistance to the higher education sector has been a constituent part of the Norwegian development assistance program in Tanzania since the early 1970's. The three main institutions to receive support have been the University of Dar es Salaam, Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA) and the Institute of Development Management (IDM). The cooperation between SUA and NAU has a number of characteristics distinguishing it from that between Agder College and IDM, to which we will return in the end of this section.

⁵⁹ This is a summary version of a separate sub-study on the institutional cooperation between the Institute of Development Management in Tanzania and Agder College in Norway.

NORAD has funded various activities at the Institute for Development Management, which was established in July 1972, with the primary purpose of providing training in management, accountancy, secretarial practice, public administration, the administration of justice, local government and rural development. It has since its inception been primarily concerned with providing training of a practical rather than an academic nature, to meet manpower needs in a number of public service organizations in Tanzania.

There have been two recurrent themes running through the various phases of NORAD assistance to IDM, viz. improvement and consolidation of the physical facilities and infrastructure on the one hand, and improvement and consolidation of the academic quality of the staff at IDM and the training offered by IDM on the other.

Staff development has been important. The Nordic project through which NORAD initially supported IDM provided a comparatively large number of expatriate instructors on technical assistance contracts. A first priority was obviously to nationalize the staff; secondly to upgrade it. NORAD (and other donor agencies) have thus funded further training abroad of IDM staff (often themselves IDM graduates) to Master's and (less commonly) Ph.D. levels. At present, 7 staff members out of 110 instructors hold Ph.D. degrees. Approximately half the staff, however, are still at junior levels and less than 10% of the staff are women.

IDM's mission of being a practical, down-to-earth and work-related institution has been maintained, even if the scope of training offered at IDM has been expanded into a large number of specialized short courses on the one hand, and into a graduate program offering Master's degrees in Public and Business Administration on the other. This expansion has been driven by the need to meet the demands of a wider market, and concerns to maintain and enhance the quality and standards of the training offered at IDM.

Although NORAD, as the principal donor (and indeed the principal source of funds for the overall budget at IDM for long periods of time) did not actively support the establishment of a graduate program, NORAD has supported staff development, particularly training up to Masters level. NORAD has historically been reluctant to fund staff training at the Ph.D. level; funds have never the less been available in the local budgets of IDM for staff to undertake small research projects. This apparently self-contradictory policy seems to have combined a concern to avoid unwarranted «academization» of IDM with an acceptance of the importance of research in maintaining quality standards, in particular with respect to ensuring the relevance of the training offered to the realities of Tanzania.

With the underlying tension between the «academic» and the «practical» both in NORAD and at IDM it is perhaps not surprising that the funds made available for research were poorly utilized. An overview provided in a 1989⁶⁰ evaluation indicates that only 5 projects (or 13%) of the 38 projects started between 1977 and 1986 were completed. No assessments were made of the quality of the completed research reports.

The 1989 evaluation concluded unequivocally that attempts to build a research program at IDM had failed. The evaluation also concluded very strongly that if IDM were to continue to offer training directly relevant to the administration and management issues in Tanzanian society, there were no alternatives to a well planned and properly executed program of management research.

The issue of how research activities contribute to staff competence and institutional legitimacy is a matter which has become increasingly acute in the changing environment of Tanzania in the 1990's, where IDM has to compete for students, commissioned work in the form of short, specialized training courses and consultancies as a source of revenue.

4.3.3 Institutional Cooperation between IDM and Agder College

IDM initially signed a contract for a twinning arrangement with the Norwegian School of Management (Bedriftsøkonomisk Institutt – BI) in 1984, and maintained this relationship up to the middle of 1989.⁶¹ The assumption was that BI would offer advice and training related to the kind of practical management issues which is IDM's primary brief. For reasons which are not entirely

⁶⁰ EMETIC (1989): Evaluation of the Tanzanian Institute of Development Management. Evaluation Report 5.89. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Development Cooperation.

⁶¹ This arrangement is specified in the bilateral agreement making available the project grant. According to the text, BI is «commissioned» by NORAD to assist in the implementation of the qualitative improvement of the project, and is contractually responsible to NORAD for the «conduct, execution and quality of its services».

clear, the relationship did not live up to the initial expectations. A main problem seems to have been that BI came to see itself as a consultant to NORAD rather than as a partner to IDM. In any event, the relationship was terminated in 1989. The twinning arrangement with BI has since become a standard reference in IDM documentation as a technical assistance arrangement which was unsuited to the needs at IDM.

Agder College staff were working at IDM as curriculum development advisors when IDM staff first visited the College on a study tour in 1986. In 1988 the two institutions signed a memorandum setting out possible areas of co-operation. It was agreed that IDM should make funds available from the NORAD-funded Academic Improvement Program for some pilot projects, the first of which was a workshop on research methodology taught by an Agder College staff member in the summer of 1989.

A new Memorandum of Understanding was signed by IDM and Agder College in June 1990, according to which the two institutions would co-operate to increase competence and capacity in research at IDM, although the Memorandum emphasizes the mutually beneficial nature of the project in terms of benefits to the academic programs at Agder College.

Research co-operation and joint publications received most attention from among the various areas of co-operation listed in the Memorandum of Understanding. In the first period of co-operation (1991–1994), approximately 4 joint research projects were approved per year and 14 research reports were published. Some delays were experienced, but none of the research projects which were embarked upon have been terminated. The causes for the delays seem to have been quite evenly distributed on the two institutions.

The research projects have been quite limited in size, with a limited amount of resources (in terms of time and money) being made available to each project. Given the modest funding (which barely covers travel expenses and other direct costs) the number of publications must be seen as a quite respectable achievement, in terms of volume. It should be pointed out that given the lack of established routines and a general environment conducive to research at IDM, these first research projects clearly emphasize research training (i.e. how to do research) as much as the actual substantive research.

The research results have apparently not, however, been submitted to full quality control and assessment through e.g. a peer review process outside the two participating institutions. The results have been published in a separate series of papers. This publication policy has advantages in terms of drawing attention to the cooperation and the processes involved in generating the research, but is less than fully satisfactory when it comes to safeguarding quality.

Most of the effort in the institutional co-operation project between IDM and Agder College has gone into the joint research program. The most obvious omissions involve teaching and participation in joint consultancy work. Since the first workshop on research methodology in 1989 Agder College has not been involved in teaching activities at IDM. IDM staff visiting Norway to write up their research have given occasional lectures to Norwegian students, but have not undertaken to teach longer courses.

As for joint consultancy it is an open and unanswered question whether Agder College staff (with a few obvious exceptions) hold the skills, experience and competence required to enhance IDM's competitive advantages on the Tanzanian market for consultancies. Individual staff members at IDM do very well as consultants, but the same is not true for IDM as an institution. If the cooperation is to assist IDM in becoming self-sufficient and more competitive in the market, the institutional capacity of IDM to deliver high-quality consultancy services must be enhanced.

The restricted field of co-operation is of course a considerable dilemma, because a large part of the overall justification for the institutional co-operation program between IDM and Agder College hinges on an assumption that improved research skills and enhanced research capacity hold a dual importance to IDM:

First, under the circumstances of a change in education policies in Tanzania, IDM must offer an education (in its regular programs) and training (in its short-term courses) which are of high quality and relevant to the needs of potential customers, i.e. those who sponsor students, pay student fees and commission short-term training courses. The research co-operation with Agder College is intended to contribute to academic quality in this sense. In the first period of co-operation it seems that Agder College has been able to address these issues only indirectly.

Second, it is assumed that given the changes in the structure of funding to Tanzania's institutions of higher learning, IDM must adapt and be prepared to compete in an emerging market for commissioned research, advisory work and consultancies. Again, it is assumed that improved academic quality will produce pay-offs in terms of enhancing IDM's competitive advantages in this market. How true this is remains to be seen. But in terms of the co-operation with Agder College, there have not been any activities to date which have focused on these issues.

This may, to a certain extent, be besides the point, because if the co-operation project is to contribute positively to the main issue at hand, viz. the professional sustainability and financial survival of IDM as an institution of higher learning, then clearly a much more focused approach is called for. There is often a difficult balance to be struck between academic quality in terms of methodological refinement and sophistication and the relevance of research in terms of addressing issues of concern to the potential clients for the products IDM will have to offer in the new market.

The concerns regarding the limited impact which the co-operation with Agder College has on IDM's chances of success in the market have been expressed in the joint pre-study which was organized by IDM and Agder College in early 1995 (IDM and Agder College 1995). The study recommends a continued co-operation on the basis of the trust and mutual familiarity which has been established between the two institutions. It also recognizes the need for a more active and aggressive relationship to the market. It is proposed to increase the scale and format of co-operation, with greater importance being attached to identifying:

«(research) topics of special relevance for the ongoing profound changes in Tanzania and for which there exists a common ground for IDM and Agder College, both in terms of competence and commitment, Broad research programs around specific topics should be developed» (IDM and Agder College 1995: p.4).

The pre-study recommends a concentration on fields of study which on the one hand are of great importance to the context in which IDM will have to operate in the future, and on the other hand, where Agder College believes it could mobilize the required resources. When the final budgets for NORAD's support to IDM were

approved it was decided to concentrate initially on one research program on entrepreneurship and small scale business development, and later on expand into a research program on local government studies. Furthermore, it was decided to concentrate on improving the quality of the research output, compared to the first phase of co-operation.

The main vehicle of co-operation in the current phase will therefore be support to a small number of Ph.D. projects to be undertaken by IDM staff members within the fields selected. Since neither IDM nor Agder College offer Ph.D. degrees a link with the Faculty of Commerce and Management at the University of Dar es Salaam has been established. Agder College staff will participate in teaching courses, both in Tanzania and in Norway, in curriculum development, field collaboration and supervision of students and provide institutional support like e.g. specialized library acquisitions. This project, with a much sharper focus and greater attention to issues like research quality, started in October 1997.

Assessment

There are some interesting aspects to the relationship between IDM and Agder College which in isolation may seem insignificant, but which overall may have contributed in important ways to the success of the project so far.

On the basis of experiences from the asymmetrical «twinning» relationship established between IDM and BI, there has been an insistence throughout the various phases of co-operation with Agder College on partnership, equality and mutual benefit. Paradoxically, the insistence on equality has moved beyond being simply an ideological statement and been given actual reality by NORAD insisting on a certain measure of [us2,5]inequality[us]. The slow process of formulating areas of mutual interest coincided with a major change in the management structure of the NORAD project at IDM. Financial management in the IDM/Agder relationship has since this first phase been the responsibility of IDM. Agder College has always had to deal directly with IDM, without any independent linkage to NORAD. Projects and budgets have thus been managed by IDM from the very outset of the co-operation.

The importance of this management structure, which conforms to NORAD's policy of «recipient responsibility», should not be underestimated. Particularly in the current phase this policy has been consistently imple-

mented, with all funds to the project going to IDM through the Tanzanian Treasury.

It is also interesting to note that in a World Bank Technical Paper (Cooper 1984) discussing the first experiences with twinning arrangements it is pointed out that:

«... the lack of international experience could also mean that they (staff involved in twinning arrangements) will have fewer preconceptions and a greater willingness and ability to be flexible in adapting to a new environment».

This is a lesson which seems to have been borne out by the experiences gained in the co-operation between IDM and Agder College.

Furthermore, it is not entirely clear why Agder College appeared as an attractive partner to IDM. At face value Agder College at the time had very little to offer in terms of research experience or research programs of relevance to IDM. But perhaps this very lack of a strong research program has promoted the egalitarian partnership which IDM insisted on. Additional factors may have been the features like size and the general profile of Agder College, being a regional college with most its activities in undergraduate programs, but with a reasonably active research program, albeit without any particular competence on Tanzania.

The slow pace and evolutionary nature of the first phase of contact and pilot projects (from 1986 to 1990) has no doubt been important in establishing the trust and mutual confidence which both parties have been insisting on. One should also note, that when the co-operation started, it concentrated on a limited set of activities (even more limited than what was indicated in the Memorandum of Understanding) which were managed according to a set of quite strict criteria. Research projects had to conform to a model which determined scope, time frame, budgets, etc.

Finally, it is interesting to note that IDM and Agder College agreed on a fairly elaborate structure to manage the co-operation, in spite of a fairly limited budget and a limited set of activities. This involves a yearly meeting between the top management of each institution and two consultative meetings per year between project managers at the respective institution.

The contributions Agder College could make to enhance research capacity and research skills at IDM cannot therefore be perceived in terms of transferring competence and skills from a well-established institution to a fledgling one, but must rather be seen in terms of a complementary relationship between two institutions with differing profiles as far as strengths and weaknesses are concerned. While the co-operation on joint research projects have exposed Tanzanian staff members to a research environment and imparted research skills, there is no doubt that also the Norwegian staff have benefited in terms of gaining research experience and international exposure.

The co-operation between IDM and Agder College has grown out of a long standing relationship between IDM and NORAD, in which NORAD has tried various approaches to institutional development, – through traditional technical assistance arrangements, staff development programs involving overseas training and a twinning arrangement. A major premise underlying these attempts have been that IDM's position as a training institution and its sustainability as a revenue-generating organization can only be safeguarded through academic quality. This in turn has demanded a certain level of training of the staff, but also a management research program to ensure that the training programs offered at IDM are relevant to the realities of Tanzanian society.

The IDM-Agder co-operation can only be seen as an exercise in institution-building in this general perspective. The co-operation is limited to a few, quite precisely defined activities. In line with the analytic framework adopted for this study, one may point out that these activities are primarily directed at the human resource development level. Research competence must necessarily be vested in individuals. But the expected pay-offs in terms of improved performance will be found on the systemic level. These will be proportional to the extent which enhanced research capacity and better quality research improves the competitive advantages of IDM in the market.

4.3.4 The Cooperation between Agder/IDM and SUA/AUN Compared.

The cooperation between Agder college and IDM contrasts in many ways with the cooperation between the Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA) and the Norwegian Agricultural University (AUN).⁶²

The Norwegian government has provided support for capacity building in education and research at SUA for nearly 25 years, for almost 300 million NOK. Over the years the objectives of the agreements of collaboration have been held in rather vague and general terms. The main objective of the program has been support to education and staff development, while the main component budget-wise has been infrastructure development. The project has thus basically related to lower-level concerns of technical competence building and improved technology/equipment.

The development of the project has been strongly influenced by the Norwegian partner institution (supply-driven), with one implication being that there has been a strong concentration of activities on a few departments of particular relevance for the milieu at AUN (i.e. mainly Faculty of Forestry). The project components remained largely unchanged until the signing of a framework agreement in 1996, when it was stated that NORAD was willing to «move from supporting a few individual projects to a much broader institutional program support». At the same time, SUA has taken the initiative to emphasize a broader approach to institutional development and the relevance of the research and training for the agricultural sector in Tanzania.

While it is too early to assess the implications of this shift, it is clear that the history and current orientation of the cooperation contrasts significantly with that of Agder College and IDM. First, the cooperation between Agder and IDM has been much more low-key than that between SUA and AUN, both in terms of funding and level of activities. This has made the partnership in the former agreement more equal, and hence given a better opportunity for the Southern partner to influence the relation. Secondly, the issue of relevance has been taken much more seriously in the relation between Agder and IDM than between SUA and AUN. The former institutions have systematically related to stakeholders

both in the private and public sector, and the fact that many of the teachers and students are recruited from institutions using the expertise and services of IDM has contributed to the institution's legitimacy. And thirdly, the project of cooperation between Agder and IDM has involved all levels in the twinning institutions, including the management. This has not only broadened the approach, but also given the project legitimacy. The cooperation between SUA and AUN has to a much larger extent been centered around individual researchers.

An important outcome of the differences in approach (and, admittedly, also of differences in the size and complexity) of the two projects has been the nature of NORAD's involvement. The project involving Agder and IDM is to a large extent planned and implemented by the institutions themselves with IDM administrating the funds available. NORAD is hardly involved at all, except through the Annual Meetings. In the case of SUA and AUN, NORAD has been and is much more directly involved in planning, implementation and financial control. Up till 1996, when the cooperation was dominated by AUN, NORAD intervened on several occasions. Since 1996, the cooperation has been based on a NORAD-to-University agreement with AUN being increasingly sidelined.

In effect, the AUN/SUA twinning project has never developed into a real institutional cooperation project based on a broad interpretation of institutional development. In fact, the current heavy involvement by NORAD in general and the Embassy in particular makes the project both rather untypical as an institutional development projects and apparently at odds with the stated policy for this kind of projects. The twinning project between IDM and Agder cannot either be seen as a full-fledged institutional development project, but it has developed on the basis of a relatively equal partnership and with attention being paid to both individual, organizational and systemic levels of developments.

4.4 CONCLUSIONS

The case studies largely confirm the findings from the survey presented in section 3.4. On the one hand projects are generally perceived as important and beneficial by the institutional partners, mainly with reference to their implications for transfer and use of technical competence and (albeit to a smaller extent) changes in individual organizations. On the other hand the projects do not to the same extent relate to and address higher level

⁶² For a detailed presentation of cooperation between SUA and AUN, see Sub-Study No. 2 («Institutional Cooperation between Sokoine and Norwegian Agricultural Universities»)

concerns of network linkages, sector framework and macro-level policies and conditions. This has implications both for the legitimacy and the sustainability of the institutions concerned.

In addition, the cases demonstrate the importance of context. In Namibia the policies, rules and legislative framework within which the relevant public institutions find themselves is well developed and predictable. The institutions themselves also have a relatively strong foundation, with conducive working conditions, well educated people and a relatively high level of remuneration for civil servants. Both Namcor and NatMirc have consequently been in positions to develop their own organizations, actively relate to external stakeholders and target higher level concerns. In the oil sector this has been done by relating to the immediate network (private oil companies) and sector linkages (development of laws and regulation). The relevant public institutions in the fishery sector have worked within the same framework. The research on fish resources has been important for the definition of fish quotas and the recuperation of stocks, with important consequences for the Namibian economy at large.

The situation in Mozambique is very different. The country has gone through a long period of war and instability, the public sector has been weak, and it is currently going through fundamental changes with emphasis on privatization and changing roles and responsibilities. In addition, civil servants are badly paid, with a large number of middle and higher level employees going to the private sector. The institutional development efforts both in the sectors of oil and fish have been affected by this situation. After many years of cooperation with the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, ENH was made into a private enterprise with the consequence that the support was diverted to DNCH as a newly established public institution starting from «scratch». In the fishery sector, the semi-autonomous Secretariat of State for Fisheries was downgraded and integrated into a new Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries with SEP becoming one of eight directorates with a much more modest role. Also in Mozambique the institutions have attempted to relate constructively to the external context by producing a petroleum law and defining fish quotas, but with a much more modest impact on the development of the sectors due to the much less predictable environment.

All this does not mean that the twinning design and mode of collaboration is unimportant, as the cases from Tanzania vividly demonstrate. Within the same sector of research and the same political and economic context, the institutional development projects of Sokoine and the Institute of Development Management have very different relations with stakeholders. The cooperation between IDM and Agder College has actively related to network linkages and macro-economic policies and emphasized the need to do relevant research and training in order to develop legitimacy and long term sustainability. The Sokoine-NAU project has, on the other hand, operated much more in a vacuum and focused on areas with much less relevance for the agricultural sector and the society at large. It is too early to see whether the current change of focus will lead to increased legitimacy and hence options for sustainability.

Arguing that institutional development projects are more likely to be efficient and achieve legitimacy in stable and predictable political and economic contexts does not necessarily mean that the development potential is stronger than in less stable and predictable environments. The importance and potential implications of developing public institutions to a certain level of competence and capacity is in many ways more pronounced in a country like Mozambique than in for example Namibia. The current transition in Mozambique also indicates that volatile public structures may be more adaptable to changes than established bureaucracies. In other words, getting from A to B may have bigger implications both for the institutions themselves and their role in society in a country like Mozambique than going from B to C in a country like Namibia. What the cases do demonstrate is the importance of relating focus and type of interventions both to institutional capacity and context. In Mozambique, development efforts at the levels of human resource and organizational development should have first priority. In Namibia, on the other hand, the initial strength of the public structures makes it more relevant to focus on linkages to the external environment and the role of the institutions at large. For NORAD, the differences in competence, capacity and context makes it necessary to think in a flexible and long term manner.

5. Institutional Cooperation as a Development Strategy

In the preceding chapters we have discussed the conceptual framework for institutional development and twinning; the policies pursued internationally and by NORAD in this area; the capacity of NORAD and the public institutions to implement the policy; and the current practices of institutional development in Norwegian development aid. The latter was done through a broad survey of Norwegian and Southern institutions as well as in-depth case studies in the sectors of fisheries, oil and research/higher learning.

Our basic argument has been that institutional development is an important aspect of the development process, and that institutional cooperation is an important way of strengthening institutions in the South. We have also identified a number of positive practices in institutional cooperation that point in the right direction.

Having said this, we have also shown that there is room for improvements. This relates both to the policies and practices of NORAD as a funder and coordinator of institutional development efforts; to Norwegian institutions who are involved in the transfer of professional competence in contexts with which many of them are unfamiliar; and to institutions in the South who are to relate to professional support within a weak political and bureaucratic environment and with reference to a Norwegian aid policy that often seems complex and unclear.

In this chapter, we will briefly sum up our finding with reference to the key questions and hypotheses given in the Introduction (Chapter 1.3). We will also present a set of recommendations. We have tried to make the recommendations as specific as possible, but they cannot be fully developed within the framework of this study. Their practical implications should be further specified as a joint effort between the main actors involved in institutional development efforts in the South.

5.1 CONCEPTS AND INTENTIONS

1. 1) What do NORAD and the Norwegian and Southern institutions involved want to achieve through institutional cooperation?
2. 2) To what extent are intentions clear, consistent and shared between the institutions involved?

- Norwegian institutions are increasingly engaged in institutional development, and there has been a shift of emphasis from operational interventions

and physical outputs to development of human and social capital.

The shift of policies has been a combined outcome of an increased emphasis on the role of public institutions in the development process, and negative experiences with classical aid projects and technical assistance. The main implications have been an increased emphasis on institutional development as an objective in its own right, and a broadened focus including human resource development, organizational development and systemic development. At the same time, there has been a strong increase in the number of Norwegian public institutions involved in development aid as well as in the number of institutional development projects.

- There is a confusion on the conceptual level, particularly as regards the differences between organizational and institutional development.

The main problem seems to be the relation between the more immediate objectives of strengthening organizational efficiency and capacity, and the longer term objectives of institutional legitimacy and sustainability. The conceptual confusion is largely a result of the absence of a common point of reference and a systematic emphasis on institutional development issues in NORAD's strategic planning documents. There are, however, also differences in opinion between NORAD, the Southern institutions and the Norwegian institutions about the relative importance of and relation between the two. While NORAD tends to emphasize the importance of relating directly to the system level of network linkages, sectors and overall context, the institutions tend to argue that strengthening the organizations is a precondition for institutional legitimacy and sustainability.

- Despite the confusion at the conceptual level, objectives at the project level tend to be clear and unambiguous.

In line with the understanding of institutional development in the organizations the objectives tend to concentrate on lower level concerns such as general competence building, improved technology and equipment, and development of improved administrative routines (i.e. human resource and organizational development), rather than on development of effective and accountable

leadership, linkages to other organizations and relevance of services to clients (systemic development). There is no evidence to suggest that the institutional development objectives of the funder dominate those of the recipient. The Southern institutions are generally positive towards the emphasis on more immediate objectives, also on the basis of their (often) more realistic perceptions of what is possible to achieve within the political and economic context they operate.

- NORAD still has some work to do before the policy of institutional development and the strategy of twinning is sufficiently anchored in the organizations.

There are ongoing efforts to clarify policies and their implications in NORAD. These include the establishment of a resource group on institutional development, courses in institutional development efforts at the Foreign Service Institute, production of guidelines for assessment of institutional development efforts, and support to networks between public institutions involved in development aid. In addition, there is an internal debate looking critically at the growing importance of the Norway Axis. In addition to the clarification of the institutional development policy, it is necessary with a clearer definition of the division of roles and responsibilities between NORAD and the twinning institutions.

5.2 STRATEGIES AND ACTIONS

1. How are intentions operationalized and carried out (i.e. what is carried out under the heading of institutional development?)
 2. To what extent are strategies and actions coherent, adequate and relevant?
- Looking at concrete strategies and actions, there are few operational objectives that allow organizations to effectively target institutional development.

Institutional development projects vary considerably in their approach and content. This is partly related to the ambiguity existing on the conceptual level, but also to the fact that it is problematic to target higher level concerns of linkages to other organizations, sectors and the society at large. The notion of «legitimacy» in the sense of acceptance and usefulness for stakeholders is also difficult to target and measure. In addition, while institutional development is a long term process, pro-

jects are short-term. Having said this, it is important to develop meaningful indicators of success and failure of institutional development encompassing the issues of both efficiency and legitimacy.

- Given the conceptual confusion and the difficulties in targeting institutional development, institutional development projects are mainly understood as support to specific organizations.

The concrete interventions tend to concentrate on competence building and introduction of improved technology and equipment; less on improved administrative routines and development of an accountable leadership; and least on linkages between the organization and the larger context it is to serve. Having said this, we have shown that organizational development often does have wider implications on the levels of networks, sectors and overall context. This is partly by default, but also because organizational efficiency is a precondition for legitimacy in relation to external stakeholders. The main problem is that interventions on the level of organizations are often done without clear reference to their longer-term implications for legitimacy and sustainability.

- Much of what is carried out at the level of organizational development is «gap filling» in the sense that the Norwegian institution takes active part in concrete activities with tangible outputs, and transfer of improved technology and hardware.

While transfer of hardware is still an important part of many institutional development projects, there is an increasing emphasis on «soft» interventions related to specific tangible outputs («Gap filling»). Even though such interventions may be problematic with reference to the issue of recipient responsibility, gap filling can also be necessary and useful under specific circumstances. For recently established institutions, producing a useful output in the form of research data, a law or a regulation with external support can be important both internally and for their relation with stakeholders. Moreover, there are indications that «learning by doing» is more effective than being sent away on training courses outside of the institution. The important thing is that the Norwegian input is done in close collaboration with colleagues in the institution in the South.

- Even though institutional development projects still mainly relate to the development of organiza-

tions, there has been a shift of emphasis in most projects.

There has been a shift of emphasis in many institutional development projects towards looking at organizations as part of a wider context. The shift is partly the outcome of initiatives from NORAD and the Norwegian institutions, but equally much a result of initiatives from the Southern partners. The increasing importance of the Norwegian institutions as partners in development has exposed the Southern institutions to a wide specter of expertise and services, which has led the projects in the direction of institutional development. At the same time, however, the utility of the old expert role has been emphasized both by institutions in Norway and the South. It is important to create and maintain links with individuals who know the recipient organization well and can relate to its capacity and context. The main advantage of the «shift» is seen to be the option of combining a long term relation with access to a broad professional milieu.

- How far and in what direction the shift of strategies and actions will go will depend on the competence and capacity of the NORAD and the institutions themselves.

Whereas NORAD is concerned about the competence and capacity of public institutions to relate to the objectives of Norwegian development aid in general and the objectives of institutional development in particular, the Norwegian public institutions are concerned about NORAD's lack of professional competence and inadequate understanding of the professional issues at hand. There is no easy solution to the apparent conflict of perceptions. Some projects develop and function well with the main responsibility resting with the institutions themselves, whereas others need a close follow up by NORAD. The most important conclusion to draw seems to be the need for a flexible approach, where the competence and capacity of the institutions is taken into consideration. There is in any event a need for close monitoring of projects particularly in the initial phase.

- While twinning is an important strategy for institutional development in the South, public institutions are no obvious partners in development

Norwegian public institutions are not development institutions. There are also alternative ways of implementing institutional development projects, e.g. through con-

sultants, through other public institutions in the South or through emphasis on alternative interventions such as transfer of financial support and hardware. At the same time, there is no strong institutional commitment among Norwegian public institutions even though there are a number of incentives at the level of individual employees. NORAD should make a closer assessment of the institutions before involving them in development work, and actively promote incentives for those that have the necessary competence and capacity.

5.3 RELEVANCE AND OUTCOMES

- 1) To what extent are strategies and actions effective (in reaching objectives) and efficient (in reaching objectives for limited costs)?
 - 2) What are the outcomes of institutional cooperation at the levels of human resource development, organizational development and systemic development respectively?
- There are few standards to assess the outcome of institutional development projects, particularly as regards higher level concerns.

A basic problem in assessing the relevance and outcomes of institutional development projects is the lack of proper tools for monitoring and evaluations. The classical evaluation methods used tend to emphasize concrete tangible outputs rather than the broader issues of institutional efficiency and legitimacy. The latter require different types of data, and a long time horizon. Monitoring and evaluations is mainly considered to be the responsibility of NORAD, but the important role of the institutions themselves imply that they should develop systems of monitoring and evaluations of their own in order to secure relevance of their project activities.

- Following from this, outcomes are most commonly measured with reference to lower level concerns.

Outcomes are generally seen in a short term perspective, with emphasis on technical competence, improvements in technology and equipment and administrative routines (i.e. organizational development). Interventions to support the management level and their strategic capacity is not emphasized to the same extent, partly because it is more difficult to target and partly because of resistance from institutions in the South. A large number of projects do show positive results in terms of efficiency at the level of organizational development. However, as many interventions are not done with reference to high-

er level concerns and central objectives in Norwegian development aid, projects are often weaker as regards the relevance of project inputs which has negative implications for the sustainability of interventions.

- Nevertheless, there are projects that have related constructively also to higher level concerns even though these may not be specifically targeted.

Despite the problems of targeting systemic change in relation to network linkages, sector policies and the overall macro context, many projects do constructively relate to this level. Some take context into account when designing project activities, and some work on specific activities influencing such links. In fact, some of the most successful projects have carried out activities such as developments of laws and regulations with tangible impact and positive implications for institutional legitimacy. The central issue seems to be to find a balance between development of organizational efficiency and institutional legitimacy that takes differences in existing competence and performance into consideration. This necessitates thorough and consistent assessments of the macro context which the organization relates to.

- Interventions at both levels are strongly influenced by the political and economic context within which the institutional development project takes place.

A public institution is more likely to become effective and sustainable in a relatively developed and predictable context. This makes the organization more stable and makes it easier to define relevant stakeholders. On the other hand, the potential importance and impact of a well functioning public institution is also considerable in a more fragile environment where the institution may become a catalyst for development of other public as well as private institutions. Having said this, we have shown that the outcome of an institutional development project also depends on the objectives and design of projects. One of the main problems identified is the discrepancy between objectives and design and the competence and capacity of organizations to carry them out.

- Key stakeholders tend to disagree on the relative importance of the outcome of institutional development projects.

We have shown that the institutions themselves are generally positive towards the relevance and outcome of the

institutional development projects. Furthermore, institutions in the South tend to evaluate the projects more positively than institutions in the North. The former seem to have a more realistic perception of what is possible to achieve, while the Norwegian institutions tend to assess outcomes with reference to their own institutions and NORAD with reference to broader development objectives. Assessments should take all factors into consideration: General development objectives and broader institutional development objectives are central, but must be evaluated with reference to the context in which they are carried out.

- Despite the positive assessment of institutional development projects, institutional cooperation ends when donor support discontinues

Despite the positive assessment of the institutional development projects and the fact that professional links are established both at the levels of institutions and individuals, institutional cooperation ends when donor support discontinues. At the same time, most institutions argue that they will depend on external support beyond the stipulated project periods. From the Norwegian side, the inability to continue development cooperation without NORAD funding is a consequence of the lack of access to development funding through other channels. For the Southern institutions, NORAD funding normally makes up a large proportion of the resources used particularly for development initiatives. Together, this indicates the importance of extending the time horizon for institutional development projects and stretch the funding to cover a longer period of time in order to secure recipient responsibility and sustainability.

5.4 WHAT MAKES A GOOD INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT?

- 1) What factors explain the variations in outcomes?
- 2) How do such factors promote or impede outcomes?

- Clarification of policies.

A precondition for improved institutional development projects is that NORAD clarifies its policy and objectives, and makes sure that these are reflected in the hierarchy of policy and program documents. The institutions themselves must also improve their understanding of Norwegian aid objectives in general and

institutional development objectives in particular, if necessary by more actively involving external expertise.

- Initial assessments.

More emphasis must be put on the initial assessment of the competence and capacity of the Norwegian and Southern institutions involved. The strengths and weaknesses of the institutions must be used to identify the most relevant areas of support, with an option for securing support from other institutions when necessary. In addition, it is vital to make a thorough assessment of the context and major stakeholders, in order to make interventions relevant and secure the legitimacy of the institution.

- Close communication.

Few institutional development projects seem to be initiated and planned by NORAD, the institution in Norway or the institution in the South alone. Even though the objective should be to anchor as much as possible with the partner institution in the South, the process of initiation and planning should be flexible enough to take differences in competence and capacity into account. Some institutions will need support to formulate goals and strategies, while others are in a position to do this on their own. The important thing is to establish an open communication with real options for participation and influence for the Southern partner at an early stage.

- Personal relations.

The study has clearly demonstrated the importance of committed individuals for institutional development projects. However, a strong dependence on a few individuals makes the cooperation vulnerable. It is therefore vital to widen the scope of the cooperation to a broad base of personal relations on all levels of the institutions. It seems particularly important to involve the top management at an early stage, in order to give the cooperation the necessary legitimacy. Knowledge about the total resource base in the Norwegian institution is a precondition for the Southern institution to be able to draw on the expertise the way the institutional development policy prescribes.

- Flexible planning.

Most projects adhere to a blue-print planning principle, partly because NORAD's project cycle procedures

makes this necessary and partly because it is a convenient way to organize a project. It is necessary to find a balance between the need for clear objectives and indicators of progress, and the need to be flexible enough to change strategy when objectives turn out to be irrelevant or difficult to fulfill. A flexible planning strategy makes it necessary with a clearer definition of roles and responsibilities particularly between NORAD as funder and coordinator on the one hand and the institutions as responsible for planning and implementation on the other.

- Adapted professionalism

Despite the emphasis on the issue of institutional development, the core of the twinning projects is transfer of professional competence. The studies has shown that the Norwegian institutions are professional in their own fields. There are, however, also examples where the special conditions and needs of the partner institution are not taken sufficiently into consideration. A proper adaptation of professional knowledge makes it necessary with a real understanding of the political and economic context the Southern institution is to relate to, the competence and capacity of the institutions to absorb and use new knowledge, and socio-cultural differences in perceptions and ways of life.

- Long term goals.

All experience indicate that institutional development is a long term process. At the same time, we have shown that most of the Norwegian development projects have a short time horizon focusing on immediate lower-level concerns. Longer term projects will make it possible both to relate operational interventions to longer term goals as well as to target higher level concerns at the system level. When relevant, longer term projects should be carried out with a more careful approach in terms of level of activity and costs.

- Support adapted to capacity and needs.

Parallel with the need to create clearer policy directives and division of roles between the different actors, the fact that institutions find themselves on different levels of development must be taken into consideration. Weaker institutions will often need support to develop a basic competence in the organization, while stronger institutions will be in a position to focus on output and the issue of legitimacy. The central issue is that in-

terventions at one of the two levels must take the implications for the other level into account.

5.5 RECOMMENDATIONS

- NORAD should clarify its policy and strategy of institutional development.

NORAD should produce a manual/guide as a common point of reference for institutional development projects, and make it accessible both to NORAD staff, the partner institutions in the South and the partner institutions in Norway. The guide should clarify the practical implications of the concepts of organizational and institutional development respectively.

- NORAD should clarify the division of roles and responsibilities between NORAD and the cooperating institutions.

NORAD should clarify the practical implications of the allocation of responsibility for planning, implementation and reporting of institutional development efforts as this is expressed in policy documents. In doing this, the apparent differences in responsibilities between public, private and NGO organizations should be addressed.

- NORAD should continue to emphasize the principle of recipient responsibility in institutional cooperation projects.

NORAD should continue to pursue the principle of recipient responsibility in institutional cooperation projects, also as regards management of project funds. However, NORAD must address the problem of backlogs of transfer of resources to the Norwegian partner institution, e.g. by introducing guarantees for payment within a stipulated time.

- NORAD should develop sets of indicators for success or failure of institutional development projects

NORAD should produce a set of indicators for monitoring and evaluation of institutional development projects. These should include indicators related to organizational efficiency (changes in structures and processes, enhanced levels of education, transfers of technology and equipment, volume and quality of outputs) as well as institutional legitimacy (changes in nature and frequency of stakeholder relations, relevance of outputs, transaction costs, impact on sector and national levels).

- NORAD should review the Project Cycle Manual in order to give more room for the Norwegian and Southern institutions to plan and implement their own programs

The responsibilities vested in the cooperating institutions must be reflected in the Project Cycle Manual to ensure that the institutional contract regulating the relations between the partner institutions is accommodated, and that the Norwegian partner institution is involved in the annual project planning meetings.

- NORAD should give a stronger emphasis to monitoring and evaluation of institutional development projects

Parallel with the increased allocation of responsibilities to the cooperating institutions, NORAD should put more emphasis on the monitoring and evaluation of institutional development projects. Emphasis should be put on the objective of long term institutional sustainability, as well as on the fulfillment of central Norwegian aid principles. Monitoring and evaluation teams should include both sector and institutional development experts.

- NORAD should ensure that institutional cooperation projects are made long-term and more predictable for the institutions involved

Institutional development takes time, and the current project periods of 3–5 years are normally too short for the planning and implementation process. In looking into the possibilities for extending the project periods (if necessary without increasing budget allocations), the option of continuing twinning projects independent of country program priorities should be particularly assessed.

- NORAD must strengthen its own resource base on institutional development

The existing resource base on institutional development in the Technical Department should be strengthened and made more visible. NORAD should give particular emphasis to cross-sector advice, and make sure that institutional development issues are reflected in all relevant program and project documents.

- NORAD should actively support the network of public institutions involved in development work

The network has the potential for becoming an important forum for dissemination of information and experiences between NORAD and the institutions, as well as between the institutions themselves. A separation of the larger public institutions and institutions of research and higher learning may make each network more relevant and effective.

- The Norwegian public institutions should give stronger emphasis to develop competence and capacity for development work.

While retaining the primary emphasis on transfer of professional competence, the institutions should become more professional with regard to development issues in general and institutional development in particular. This should mainly be done by more actively involving external milieus and consultants specializing in these fields in twinning projects. The option of establishing a permanent group of institutional development experts on which the public institutions can draw should be considered.

- The Norwegian public institutions should more actively involve their management structures in institutional development projects

The management should be active and visible in order to enhance the legitimacy of institutional development projects both in the Norwegian and Southern institutions, and in order to give added weight to the development of an effective and accountable leadership and strategic thinking.

- NORAD and the public institutions should select two test-cases in order to test the applicability of the broad approach to institutional development advocated in this report.

In addition to clarification of the implications of the policy of institutional development through twinning, two projects should be selected as test cases and given all the prescribed project inputs and resources (sufficient time and resources, access to necessary expertise, adherence to revised project cycle principles). The cases should also involve a Process Research component, in order to secure that the experiences gained are properly recorded and disseminated.

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Appendix 1

TERMS OF REFERENCE

A STUDY OF INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION TWINNING OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS¹

1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

In recent years Norwegian development assistance has focused increasingly on a policy of «recipient orientation». In practice this means transferring greater responsibility for implementation from the donor organisation to the recipient of development assistance. However, many of the organisations and institutions responsible for implementation are not sufficiently equipped with human, technical and financial resources.

To improve this situation Norwegian development assistance has introduced new strategies and programmes with a view to strengthening national capacities and capabilities in partner countries. NORAD is currently channelling support through three sectors in Norwegian society (the public, private and civil sector) which are collaborating with institutions and organisations in selected countries:

- Norwegian public institutions and their «twinning arrangements» with similar institutions in the South.
- The private for-profit sector which has two sub-sectors as follows:
 - a) Norwegian companies involved in providing goods and services to the public and private sector in developing countries, and
 - b) Norwegian consulting firms managing specific programmes for NORAD.
- Norwegian NGOs and their southern counterparts.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has decided to undertake a comprehensive Evaluation of Institutional Development in Norwegian Bilateral Assistance in the course of 1997. The evaluation will be undertaken in the form of five inter-related sub-studies. The principal findings will be synthesised in a composite final report. The five sub-studies are as follows:

1. A Study of Institutional Cooperation («twinning»)
2. A Case Study of the Co-operation between Soikoine and Norwegian Agricultural Universities
3. A Study of Private Companies
4. A Study of Private Consulting Firms
5. A Study of the NGO Channel

Each sub-study will be undertaken by independent teams, but MFA has requested Diakonhjemmet International Senter (DiS) in co-operation with Nordic Consulting Group (NCG) to prepare a common framework for all the studies and coordinate the implementation in order to identify a core set of cross-cutting issues and concerns which should be traced in all channels and provide a basis for comparative analysis.

2. INTRODUCTION

'The term 'twinning' means linking Public Institutions (PIs) in the North with similar structures in developing countries. As a result of so-called 'twinning agreements' between institutions it is anticipated that transfer of professional competence as well as other knowledge vital for the strengthening of these Southern institutions on a permanent basis, will take place.

NORAD has now more than twenty collaboration agreements with other Norwegian public institutions where twinning is part of the development strategy. The agreements have two aspects: Firstly, NORAD contracts the Norwegian institution to provide advice and consultancy to the agency on a specific sector or thematic area. These institutions function as resource bases for NORAD in many sectors. Secondly, a link is developed between the Norwegian institution and the recipient institution. It is this link which constitutes the institutional development components of the «twinning arrangement».

However, the competence and capacity of these public institutions to carry out institutional cooperation has never been systematically studied. The aim of the pre-

¹ This mandate should be read in conjunction with the Plan of Implementation for all the studies.

sent study is therefore to record and analyse the experiences in this field. This will subsequently be fed into a comparative analysis of institutional cooperation in other channels.

3. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES

The *purpose* of this study is to collect and analyse experiences with «twinning» arrangements in order to increase the understanding of what factors influence and contribute to institutional development.

The *objectives* are:

- a) to examine institutional development strategies and experiences in institutional cooperation («twinning»),
- b) to analyse the preparation, processes and outcomes of collaboration and in particular assess how these are perceived by Southern partners,
- c) to contribute towards improved policies and practices in the area of technical cooperation and institution building.

4. OUTLINE OF ISSUES AND QUESTIONS

4.1 General

The overall aim of organisational cooperation in the public sector is to build administrative and professional capacity and create favourable conditions for strong and vital organisations. frameworks.

In the past ten years there has been an increasing criticism of technical co-operation and assistance as a means of effective development assistance. Many evaluations of technical cooperation have concluded that results in the area of capacity building are generally poor. Limiting factors include poor policy environments, internal power struggles and bureaucratic resistance against change of status quo, the supply-driven nature of organisational reforms, short-term technical contracts, lack of donor coordination, and not the least all the cultural and communication barriers between foreign advisors/consultants and local management and staff. The temporary and transient character of technical co-operation has not been of a sustainable or long term nature. Only by supporting the recipient institutions themselves can a degree of sustainability be achieved.

In order to rectify some of these short-comings, this study will seek to identify the objectives, strategies, institutional arrangements and practical mechanisms employed by Norwegian PIs in institution building and assess their practical competence and capacity to carry out plans to reach such goals. As with the studies of the other channels it will discuss under what conditions these objectives are best achieved.

Other joint ambitions for these studies are better understanding of how the counterpart institutions in the South views and responds to institutional development efforts, and to what extent there is a convergence or conflict in interests and approaches between North and South. This is because the results and impacts of institutional development to a large extent depend on how the process is implemented. It is assumed that underlying culture-specific assumptions and attitudes strongly influence the level and success of mutual adaptation between different objectives, strategies, cultures and capacities among the parties.

4.2 Questions and issues

The following questions and issues should be examined:

Overview of study area

1. What are the policies and strategies for institutional development, resources used and experiences gained from a broad range of Norwegian organisations/institutions within the respective study area.²
2. What is the «state of the art» in institutional development in similar organisations in other contexts (the international comparative perspective).

Role of NORAD

1. NORAD's process of screening and selecting Norwegian organisations for institutional contracts, and monitoring and evaluation of performance.
2. Role and performance in coordinating and facilitating institutional co-operation.

Organisational assessment

1. Background and evolution of institutional development efforts within the organisations.
2. Motivation and interests in the organisations for institutional collaboration.
3. Formulation of policies and aims for institutional development.
4. Operationalisation of institutional development

² Guidelines for the survey instrument will be worked out by the coordinating team.

(specific strategies and working methods defined as institutional development).

5. Level of competence and capacity in the organisations to effectively handle all aspects of institutional cooperation (technical, cultural, managerial, administrative etc.) and efforts to strengthen the same.
6. Quality and effectiveness of collaborative programmes within each institution to facilitate effective communication, maintain stability in relationships, control quality of programmes, etc. (Assess expressed relative strengths of institutional cooperation.)

Process of mutual adaptation (implementation)

1. Strengths and weaknesses (critical factors) in the preparation and mutual adaptation of collaborative programmes.
2. Extent to which principles like recipient responsibility, national ownership and participation have guided the preparation and implementation of programmes.
3. How counterparts and collaborative programmes are perceived and valued by the organisations involved.
4. Scope of convergence or conflict between Northern and Southern perspectives and experiences.

Contextual issues

1. Linkages and interactions with other organisations in the sector.
2. Role and impact of other donors and donor coordination.
3. Organisational and institutional development within the context of political and administrative reforms and social and economic progress.
4. Level of coordination and communication between institutional development efforts through the various channels in Norwegian bilateral assistance in planning and implementation. Potential for synergy effects.

Outcomes and impact

1. Availability of proper monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, indicators and data to assess outputs and effects.
2. Extent to which institutional programmes are reaching their objectives by strengthening national ownership, participation and capacity.
3. Potential for sustaining and replicating institutional

development programmes without external assistance.

4. Effectiveness and efficiency of institutional development strategies in a comparative perspective.

5. STUDY PLAN

5.1 Components

The study will have the following key components:

A. Survey and desk study phase

1. The team shall carry out a survey among a broad range of Norwegian institutions in order to provide an overview and summary of objectives, strategies, resources (expertise, funds etc.) and experiences.
2. Briefly summarise findings from studies of twinning drawing on international literature and relevant examples from other countries.

B. Case study phase

1. Analyse and assess in more detail the suggested cases:
 - Document and analyse policies and strategies adopted by the Norwegian institutions, and assess their capacities and capabilities.
 - Assess how Southern counterparts perceive the involvement of Norwegian institutions.
 - Assess the process of implementation (institutional learning and development), and the outcomes and impact of joint efforts.

C. Synthesis phase

1. Identify lessons learnt and recommendations for improvement of future policy and practice for the respective channel.
2. Generate common issues and concerns which are shared among all studies.

5.2 Methods

The studies will use a variety of appropriate methods, but after the initial survey and document/literature review primarily follow a case study approach where review of documents and interviews will complement information collected through the case studies.

- Survey including a broad range of Norwegian institutions.
- Literature and document review.
- Interviews with NORAD and the relevant Norwegian institutions.
- Case studies in selected countries with interviews.

5.3 Selection of cases and countries

From the total number of cooperation agreements between NORAD and Norwegian PIs at least three cases will be chosen for closer examination. The study will focus on their cooperation with one twinned institution in Namibia, Mozambique or Tanzania.

The institutions are not a homogenous group, and it is difficult to determine what sample will provide sufficient depth and variation. The consultants will be requested to present a package of mutual enriching case studies taking into account factors like degree of experience, established links, innovative/promising activities, representativity in Norwegian bilateral aid, comparativity, project size and a balance of sectors.

The table in Chapter 9 presents a list over projects³ where Norwegian public institutions and private non-profit research institutions participate. The form of cooperation listed may vary from ad-hoc technical advice to formal cooperation agreements (twinning)⁴. The consultants are free to suggest case studies in the listed countries, and may also suggest additional case studies in optional countries.

The study plan must include a minimum of three case studies (Sokoine not included) from minimum two of the listed countries. When ranking the competing evaluation plans the package of case studies offered will be considered. It is, however, possible to alter the case study plan in cooperation with the coordinators if necessary in a later phase of the study.

After discussions with NORAD potential cases for investigation could be the relationship between:

- Norwegian Public Roads Administration, NPRA (Vegdirektoratet) and the Ministry of Public Works in Tanzania,
- Agder Regional College's support to IDM Murogora in Tanzania. (School of Management).
- Norwegian Institute of Marine Research, Norwegian College of Fishery Science and Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries support to Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources and University of Namibia in the regulation and development of the fisheries sector,

- Norwegian Pollution Control Authority's assistance to a national management system in relation to maritime accidents and accidents related to the petroleum sector,
- Norwegian Oil Directorate and the relevant public authorities in Mozambique, e.g. the state oil company, ENH,
- Norwegian Institute of Marine Research and Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries support to Institute of Fisheries Research and regulation of the fisheries sector in Mozambique, and
- Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Administration's support to Ministry of Mine and Energy (MME) to regulate the energy sector.

Administratively, the collaboration with Norwegian PIs and Southern PIs vary. Some Norwegian PIs have organised their contract activities into separate international divisions or departments, while others have a network structure lead by a coordinator who is also involved in other local activities and call in colleagues and other resources persons according to specific needs. The institutional relationships with Southern partners also vary according to the sector, level and field of cooperation.

5.4 Organisation and coordination

DiS is coordinating the study on behalf of MFA and the teams will communicate and report regularly to the appointed Team leader. NCG provides support, advice and quality control at critical junctures in the process.

All teams shall participate in joint workshops to prepare methods and instruments for field visits, to discuss draft reports and contribute to the synthesis process. Teams are professionally responsible for their own products according to mandates prepared for each study. DiS/NCG in consultation with the Advisory Group is responsible for the review and quality control of reports.

5.5 Time frame

The study will commence when teams and consultants are approved by MFA, and not later than end of June 1997. Major events and deadlines will be in accordance with the time-schedule presented in the general study plan. Deadline for draft report is 15 November and final report 15 December 1997.

6. STUDY TEAM AND QUALIFICATIONS

The team should consist of two international and one national consultant in each country to be recruited by the

³ The list may be incomplete.

⁴ Institutions with such an agreement in 1996 is printed in bold text.

international team. The national consultant should collect relevant background information and in particular cover the analysis of the selected national organisations.

The international consultants should have relevant theoretical knowledge and practical experience from institutional development programmes within a North-South context, and be familiar with Norwegian development policy and strategies.

7. REPORTS

The results of the study should be presented in a study report. The team is responsible for the validity of data, analysis and the overall quality of the report. Details will be regulated in accordance with specifications in the contract.

The report should contain all major findings, models for future organisational co-operation and recommendations for specific policy and institutional mechanisms. It will provide inputs for the synthesis report which will make a comparative assessment of institutional cooperation in the different channels.

Appendix 2

NORWEGIAN INSTITUTIONS AND COUNTRIES OF INVOLVEMENT

Institution	Country
1) Agderforskning/SISU	Zambia
2) Chr. Michelsen Institutt	Bangladesh, Botswana, Namibia, Palestine, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia
3) Diakonhjemmets Internasjonale Senter	Botswana, Mosambik
4) Direktoratet for naturforvaltning	Etiopia, Mosambik, Namibia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe
5) FAFO	Botswana, Eritrea
6) Fiskeridirektoratet	Angola, Mosambik, Namibia, Nicaragua, Sør-Afrika, Vietnam
7) Fiskerihøgskolen i Tromsø	Namibia
8) Havforskningsinstituttet	Angola, Mosambik, Namibia, Nicaragua, Sør-Afrika, Vietnam
9) Høgskolen i Agder	Tanzania
10) Høgskolen i Nord-Trøndelag	Botswana
11) Institutt for menneskerettigheter	Etiopia, Pakistan, Zambia
12) Kommunenes Sentralforbund	Sri Lanka, Zambia
13) Lærerutdanningen Int. Senter	Bangladesh, Eritrea, South Africa, Zambia
14) Noragric	Botswana, Eritrea, Etiopia, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Pakistan, Uganda
15) Norges Geologiske Undersøkelser	Eritrea, Etiopia
16) Norges Geotekniske Institutt	Etiopia, India
17) Norges vassdrags- og energiverk	Etiopia, Laos, Namibia, Nepal, Palestina, Zambia, Angola, Bhutan, Uganda
18) Norges Veterinærhøgskole	Zambia
19) Norsk institutt for by- og regionforskning	Sri Lanka, Tanzania
20) Norsk institutt for luftforskning	Botswana, Kina
21) Norsk institutt for naturforskning	Botswana, Pakistan, Mosambik, Sør-Afrika, Kina
22) Norsk institutt for vannforskning	Palestina, Sri Lanka, Kina
23) Norske Boligbyggelags Landsforbund	Sør Afrika, Zambia
24) Oljedirektoratet	Angola, Bangladesh, Eritrea, India, Mosambik, Namibia, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Vietnam
25) Riksantikvaren	Sør-Afrika, Zimbabwe
26) Sjøfartsdirektoratet	Mosambik
27) Statens datasentral	Vietnam
28) Statens forurensningstilsyn	Namibia, Palestina, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Vietnam, Indonesia, Laos, Sør-Afrika, Pakistan, Angola
29) Statens helsetilsyn	Botswana
30) Statens institutt for folkehelse	Botswana, Mosambik, Nicaragua
31) Statens kartverk, Sjøfartsverket	Mosambik, Palestina, Tanzania, Vietnam
32) Statens teleforvaltning	Eritrea
33) Statistisk sentralbyrå	Botswana, Mosambik, Palestina
34) Statskraft	Nepal, Pakistan
35) Vegdirektoratet	Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia

Appendix 3

«*TWINNING FOR DEVELOPMENT*»

INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION BETWEEN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS IN NORWAY AND THE SOUTH QUESTIONNAIRE

I. INTRODUCTORY QUESTIONS

1.1 Name of your organization

1.2 Name of the twinning project

1.3 Name and address of the organization with which you cooperate.

Name: _____

Address: _____

1.4 Name and position of person in charge of the twinning project in the organization with which you cooperate.

Name: _____

Position: _____

1.5 Duration of the twinning project in years.

Year of initiation: _____

Present project period: _____ to _____

Estimated year of termination: _____

1.6 Department and main contact person for the project in NORAD.

Department: _____

Contact person: _____

1.7 Who took the original initiative to the twinning project (if you tick more than one alternative, please explain why under section VII).

MFA/NORAD

Your organization

Your partner organization

Others Specify: _____

- 1.8 Who is financing the twinning project
- MFA/NORAD % (approx) _____
- Your organization % (approx) _____
- Your partner organization % (approx) _____
- The government of your partner organization % (approx) _____
- Others % (approx) _____
- Specify: _____
- 1.9 What is the total amount of money allocated to the twinning project.
- Total project period: _____
- Present project period: _____
- 1.10 Are there other organizations involved in a similar project with your partner organization
- Yes No Don't know
- 1.11 If yes, does your organization co-operate or co-ordinate activities with this organization/these organizations
- Yes No
- If yes, please describe briefly how this coordination takes place _____
- _____
- _____

II THE COOPERATION STRATEGY

- 2.2 How would you characterize the cooperation (1=strongly agree,5= strongly disagree)
- | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|
| a) The original objectives of the institutional cooperation were clear and precise | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| b) The level of ambition in the original objectives was too high | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| c) The agreement of cooperation gives few options for changes underway | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| d) The management in the partner institution is weakly committed to the cooperation | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| e) The management in your institution is weakly committed to the cooperation | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| f) The cooperation strongly depends on one or a few individuals | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| g) The partner institution attaches considerable importance to the principle of recipient responsibility | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| h) Your institution possesses a high degree of expertise on developing countries | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| i) Important decisions are made jointly after discussions between the institutions | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

2.1 What are your organization's most important incentives for taking part in institutional cooperation with the South (1=strongly agree, 5= strongly disagree)

a)	Institutional cooperation with the South is important for our own development	1	2	3	4	5
b)	Institutional cooperation with the South is important for commercial reasons	1	2	3	4	5
c)	Institutional cooperation with the South is important for ideological reasons	1	2	3	4	5
d)	Public institutions are expected to take part in institutional cooperation with the South	1	2	3	4	5

III THE ROLE OF NORAD

3.1 How would you characterize the role of NORAD (1=strongly agree, 5= strongly disagree)

a)	The policy directives and support from NORAD contributed constructively to the cooperation in its initial phase	1	2	3	4	5
b)	NORAD has taken an active and constructive part in the implementation of the cooperation	1	2	3	4	5
c)	The Norwegian Embassy in the recipient country has been more important for the cooperation than NORAD in Oslo	1	2	3	4	5
d)	The desk officers in NORAD have a good understanding of the objectives and activities of the project	1	2	3	4	5
e)	The administrative procedures in NORAD function constructively in relation to the project	1	2	3	4	5
f)	NORAD systematically pursues the principle of recipient responsibility	1	2	3	4	5
g)	Other donors have influenced the partner institution more than NORAD	1	2	3	4	5

IV THE IMPACT OF EXTERNAL FACTORS

4.1 How would you characterize the impact of external factors for achieving the goals set for the institutional cooperation? (1=strongly agree, 5= strongly disagree)

a)	The cultural context in the recipient country has a negative impact on goal achievement	1	2	3	4	5
b)	The economic context in the recipient country has a negative impact on goal achievement	1	2	3	4	5
c)	The bureaucratic tradition in the recipient country has a negative impact on goal achievement	1	2	3	4	5
d)	The political context in the recipient country has a negative impact on goal achievement	1	2	3	4	5
e)	The institutional cooperation has a limited impact on institutional development compared with the external context.	1	2	3	4	5

V PERCEIVED OUTCOME

- 5.1 How would you characterize the outcome of the institutional cooperation (1=strongly agree, 5=strongly disagree)
- | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| a) Overall, we are satisfied with the outcome of the cooperation | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| b) The partner institution has benefited significantly from the cooperation | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| c) Our own institution has benefited significantly from the collaboration | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
- 5.2 How much progress has been made in the following areas as a result of the cooperation for the partner institution (1=much progress, 5=little progress)
- | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|
| a) Development of technical competence/general competence building | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| b) Development of improved administrative routines/procedures | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| c) Development of effective and accountable leadership | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| d) Introduction of improved technology/equipment | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| e) Stronger linkages to other organizations in the recipient country | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| f) Improved services to the clients of the partner organization | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| e) Higher legitimacy among external users and other stakeholders | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

VI. CONTENT OF COLLABORATION

- 6.1 What are the main objectives of the twinning project?

- 6.2 Have the objectives of the twinning project changed significantly?

Yes No

If yes, how have they changed _____

6.3 Were there any major disagreements between your organization, the partner organization and NORAD concerning the objectives or content of the twinning project

Yes No

If yes, what was this about and how was the issue resolved

6.4 Is your organization using specific indicators or data to evaluate and monitor institutional cooperation projects

Yes No

6.5 How many professionals from your organization are directly involved in the twinning project

1–5 6–10 11+

6.6 How many professionals from your partner organization are, as you see it, directly involved in the twinning project.

1–5 6–10 11+

6.7 How many people from your organization have worked in the partner organization for periods of

Less than one month 0 1–5 6–10 11+

One to six months 0 1–5 6–10 11+

More than 6 months 0 1–5 6–10 11+

6.8 How many people from your organization have followed courses at the NORAD Development Cooperation Training Centre («Bistandsskolen»)

or the Norwegian Foreign Centre Institute («Utenrikstjenestens Kompetansesenter»).

0 1–5 6–10 11+

6.9 Can you describe one area where the role of MFA/NORAD has contributed positively to the institutional cooperation?

6.10 Can you describe one area where the role of MFA/NORAD has been negative?

6.11 In your opinion, will your partner organization be able to deliver their output to the satisfaction of their clients without donor assistance within the next five years?

Yes No

If no, please explain why _____

VII OTHER COMMENTS



EVALUATION REPORTS

- | | | | |
|-------|---|-------|---|
| 1.87 | The Water Supply Programme in Western Province, Zambia | 1.96 | NORAD's Support of the Remote Area Development Programme (RADP) in Botswana |
| 2.87 | Sosio-kulturelle forhold i bistanden | 2.96 | Norwegian Development Aid Experiences. A Review of Evaluation Studies 1986-92 |
| 3.87 | Summary Findings of 23 Evaluation Reports | 3.96 | The Norwegian People's Aid Mine Clearance Project in Cambodia |
| 4.87 | NORAD's Provisions for Investment Support | 4.96 | Democratic Global Civil Governance Report of the 1995 Benchmark Survey of NGOs |
| 5.87 | Multilateral bistand gjennom FN-systemet | 5.96 | Evaluation of the Yearbook Human Rights in Developing Countries |
| 6.87 | Promoting Imports from Developing Countries | | |
| 1.88 | UNIFEM - United Nations Development Fund for Women | 1.97 | Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Prevent and Control HIV/AIDS |
| 2.88 | The Norwegian Multi-Bilateral Programme under UNFPA | 2.97 | «Kultursjokk og korrektiv» – Evaluering av UD/NORADs studiereiser for lærere |
| 3.88 | Rural Roads Maintenance, Mbeya and Tanga Regions, Tanzania | 3.97 | Evaluation of decentralisation and development |
| 4.88 | Import Support, Tanzania | 4.97 | Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Peace, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation in Mozambique |
| 5.88 | Nordic Technical Assistance Personnel to Eastern Africa | 5.97 | Aid to Basic Education in Africa – Opportunities and Constraints |
| 6.88 | Good Aid for Women? | 6.97 | Norwegian Church Aid's Humanitarian and Peace-making Work in Mali |
| 7.88 | Soil Science Fellowship Course in Norway | 7.97 | Aid as a tool for promotion of human rights and democracy: What can Norway do? |
| 1.89 | Parallel Financing and Mixed Credits | 8.97 | Evaluation of the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala |
| 2.89 | The Women's Grant. Desk Study Review | 9.97 | Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Worldview International Foundation |
| 3.89 | The Norwegian Volunteer Service | 10.97 | Review of Norwegian Assistance to IPS |
| 4.89 | Fisheries Research Vessel - "Dr. Fridtjof Nansen" | 11.97 | Evaluation of Norwegian Humanitarian Assistance to the Sudan |
| 5.89 | Institute of Development Management, Tanzania | 12.97 | Cooperation for Health Development WHO's support to programmes at country level |
| 6.89 | DUHs forskningsprogrammer | | |
| 7.89 | Rural Water Supply, Zimbabwe | 1.98 | «Twinning for Development» Institutional Cooperation between Public Institutions in Norway and the South |
| 8.89 | Commodity Import Programme, Zimbabwe | 2.98 | Institutional Cooperation between Sokoine and Norwegian Agricultural Universities |
| 9.89 | Dairy Sector Support, Zimbabwe | 3.98 | Development through Institutions? Institutional Development promoted by Norwegian Private Companies and Consulting Firm |
| 1.90 | Mini-Hydropower Plants, Lesotho | 4.98 | Development through Institutions? Institutional Development promoted by Norwegian Non-Governmental Organisations |
| 2.90 | Operation and Maintenance in Development Assistance | 5.98 | Development through Institutions? Institutional Development in Norwegian Bilateral Assistance. Synthesis Report |
| 3.90 | Telecommunications in SADCC Countries | | |
| 4.90 | Energy support in SADCC Countries | | |
| 5.90 | International Research and Training Institute for Advancement of Women (INSTRAW) | | |
| 6.90 | Socio-cultural Conditions in Development Assistance | | |
| 7.90 | Non-Project Financial Assistance to Mozambique | | |
| 1.91 | Hjelp til selvhjelp og levedyktig utvikling | | |
| 2.91 | Diploma Courses at the Norwegian Institute of Technology | | |
| 3.91 | The Women's Grant in Bilateral Assistance | | |
| 4.91 | Hambantota Integrated Rural Development Programme, Sri Lanka | | |
| 5.91 | The Special Grant for Environment and Development | | |
| 1.92 | NGOs as partners in health care, Zambia | | |
| 2.92 | The Sahel-Sudan-Ethiopia Programme | | |
| 3.92 | De private organisasjonene som kanal for norsk bistand, Fasel | | |
| 1.93 | Internal learning from evaluation and reviews | | |
| 2.93 | Macroeconomic impacts of import support to Tanzania | | |
| 3.93 | Garantiordning for investeringer i og eksport til utviklingsland | | |
| 4.93 | Capacity-Building in Development Cooperation Towards integration and recipient responsibility | | |
| 1.94 | Evaluation of World Food Programme | | |
| 2.94 | Evaluation of the Norwegian Junior Expert Programme with UN Organisations | | |
| 1.95 | Technical Cooperation in Transition | | |
| 2.95 | Evaluering av FN-sambandet i Norge | | |
| 3.95 | NGOs as a channel in development aid | | |
| 3A.95 | Rapport fra presentasjonsmøte av "Evalueringen av de frivillige organisasjoner" | | |
| 4.95 | Rural Development and Local Government in Tanzania | | |
| 5.95 | Integration of Environmental Concerns into Norwegian Bilateral Development Assistance: Policies and Performance | | |

