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
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Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation







Evaluation website

The Evaluation Department has its own website at norad.no:

http://norad.no/evaluation




On this website you will find updated information, based on the annual evaluation programme, on the status of the evaluations in which the department is involved. This applies to both evaluations for which we ourselves are responsible and international evaluations in which we are participating. We also publish information on evaluations that are currently being planned and update the list of future evaluations.

Invitations to tender are posted on this website, and completed evaluation reports can be downloaded or ordered here.

The purpose of this website is to provide an up-to-date, dynamic presentation of the work being done by the Evaluation Department at any given time.

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Evaluation contributes to critical debate

In 2006 there was more debate on development cooperation in the Norwegian media than there has been for a long time. Much of the debate focused on the need to evaluate development assistance.

There has been no lack of critical voices. "Development aid in darkness", says Torild Skard, former Assistant Secretary General for Development Cooperation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the *Dagbladet* newspaper in May. Less evaluation is being carried out today and thus we know less about the results, she states. The editor of the national daily newspaper *Aftenposten*, expressed his opinion in an editorial in December: "The critical evaluation of its own efforts has not been among the stronger points of the Norwegian aid community." The Rattsø Committee Report on rethinking NGO roles in Norwegian development assistance states that we have "an acute lack of reliable information on long-term goal achievement", and recommends delegating to experts outside the development aid administration the responsibility for carrying out evaluations.

Some parts of the criticism that has been voiced are justified. Other parts are not. Hardly any area of Norwegian public administration is evaluated as systematically as development cooperation. This has long been the case. And not everyone takes the same view as Aftenposten. One of the first journalists to take international development cooperation to task was the Washington Post's Africa correspondent in the 1980s, Blaine Harden, who published the book "Africa - Dispatches from a Fragile Continent" in 1990. He devoted one whole chapter, entitled "Good Intentions", to Norway and the eventually so notorious fisheries programme in Turkana, Kenya. Describing the Norwegian development cooperation staff, he wrote, "They made no attempt to downplay their mistakes... They hired team after team of anthropologists, ecologists and development economists to pick apart the fishing project. These experts wrote dozens of damning reports." And on the subject of Norwegian transparency: "Whenever I asked, Norad gave me all their embarrassing reports. Willing disclosure of government failure, rare in the United States and Europe, unheard of in Africa, seemed a source of pride."



It is true that we do not know enough about the long-term effects of the development assistance provided by Norway and other countries.

We won't claim that this has always been the case. But there is no lack of critical thinking in the Norwegian development cooperation community. If any one is in doubt, they are more than welcome to go through a collection of the latest evaluation reports. The question is then how it can be possible for people to gain a different impression. Is there a lack of communication or openness on the side of the development aid community, or is there a lack of interest among the media and the general public?

It is true that we do not know enough about the long-term effects of the development assistance provided by Norway and other countries. This is not due to any lack of evaluation per se. However, to give clear answers is difficult. In developing countries there is usually a significant lack of statistics and other information, and cultural differences can also complicate the picture. Admittedly, evaluations of development assistance have been deficient in a number of respects. Up until 2000, evaluations were largely projectoriented, and the results were fragmented. Furthermore, there have been - and still are - differences of opinion among experts in different fields as regards the evaluation of development assistance, where economists, political scientists, anthropologists and other specialists have attached importance to different factors. Moreover, there has been surprisingly little Norwegian research on the effects of development assistance.

Nor has it become any easier to evaluate impact as aid modalities have changed with greater emphasis being placed on more donor cooperation, various forms of budget support and stronger integration into administrative systems in recipient countries. Most of the evaluations have therefore been unable to provide answers as to the real results of the programmes.

At the international level, we are now seeing a shift of focus, and a growing interest in learning more about the results of development assistance. The Evaluation Department participates in international collaboration aimed at improving knowledge in this field. In Norway we are responding by making evaluation projects more result-oriented. In several of the evaluations that are being initiated in 2007, we will focus more directly on registering the impact of development cooperation.

The fact that we know too little about the long-term effects of development cooperation does not mean that we cannot see any results from the aid provided. Results are documented both in connection with individual projects and programmes and at the macro level. Many of the evaluations can demonstrate good results. A more general picture of the results of Norwegian development assistance will be provided in the first edition of Norad's new annual report on results, which will be published in October 2007.

In this annual report, we present the most important lessons learned from our evaluation activities in 2006. We begin by singling out four main findings from the whole range of evaluation projects, and then presenting the main conclusions in each evaluation.

This year we can also for the first time present an overview of the efforts being made to follow up the evaluations.

Asbjørn Eidhammer, Director of Evaluation March 2007

A new mandate and evaluation policy

The evaluation function was defined and responsibility for carrying out evaluations was allocated in a revised mandate for evaluation activities in Norwegian development cooperation, which came into effect in May 2006. According to these instructions, the Evaluation Department is responsible for evaluating all aspects of Norwegian development cooperation. The evaluations must be carried out by external experts who are neutral and independent of any control by those responsible for planning and implementing the projects and programmes. This is consistent with prior practice. The Evaluation Department itself decides what is to be evaluated. This is new. The department or agency responsible for a project or programme under evaluation must prepare a follow-up plan and report on its implementation. This is also new.

In August 2006 the Evaluation Department drew up a policy document establishing strategic priorities for evaluation up to 2010.

This policy defines the following main priorities

- 1) Quality assurance for all development cooperation
- 2) Stronger focus on results of Norwegian aid
- 3) Adapt evaluation work to new aid modalities
- 4) Improved communication of evaluation results and improved learning
- 5) Strengthen evaluation as basis for development policy
- 6) Strengthen quality and reliability of evaluation activities

New guidelines for evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation and a rolling two-year evaluation programme for the period 2006-2008 were also drawn up.



The evaluations must be carried out by external experts who are neutral and independent of any control by those responsible for planning and implementing the projects and programmes.

Lessons learned from evaluation activities in 2006

We wish to emphasise four main lessons learned:

1

The integration of gender equality has failed

The strategy of integrating women's issues and gender equality into general development assistance, which has been the prevailing policy in most countries since the fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, has failed. This does not mean that all development assistance for women has been a failure. We have seen many successful women's projects. But we have not succeeded in making gender equality a truly cross-cutting issue in development cooperation. Both a Norwegian evaluation of the implementation of the Strategy for Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation between 1997 and 2005, and a number of evaluations carried out by other bilateral and multilateral donors reach the same conclusion.

The lesson to be learned here is that the integration of women's issues can only succeed if it has strong support in the form of policies, personnel and funding specifically earmarked for this purpose. An aid organisation must have special advisors and staff members responsible for women's issues and gender equality, as well as the support of the organisation's leadership. Special budget funds are probably also required for women's projects to supplement the funds spent within the framework of larger programmes, and it will be necessary to continue to carry out special projects to promote gender equality in most partner countries.



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2

Budget support improves government administration

Budget support can be an effective, sustainable way of supporting national efforts to combat poverty. This is the conclusion of a comprehensive, international evaluation of budget support in which Norway has participated. The report documents that budget support has had a number of positive effects with regard to donor harmonisation, adaptation to partner countries' own systems, efficiency of public expenditure and improvement of public finance management, as well as helping to support national reform processes. At the same time, we have learned that budget support is vulnerable to a number of risk factors, particularly political risk, and that good risk analyses therefore are essential. The evaluation concluded that budget support is not more exposed to corruption than other forms of development assistance.

The evaluation team also had to conclude that it is too early to assess the final effects of budget support on the poverty situation in the countries concerned.

Good technical and professional cooperation and exchange programmes do not automatically lead to capacity and institution-building

Several of the evaluations carried out in the last couple of years have dealt with various forms of technical and professional cooperation. The evaluation of the Norad Fellowship programme found that the programme had been extremely useful for individual grant recipients, whose expertise and career opportunities had been enhanced. But it was harder to find the same positive effect at institutional level, even though some good examples could be seen here too. The report recommends that the programme be moved closer to the "South". The evaluation of cooperation between the Norwegian Ministry of Education and its counterpart ministries in Zambia and Nepal shows that while individuals in the two countries have benefited from the programme, the effects for the institutions are yet to be seen. The evaluation of FK Norway (Fredskorpset) shows the same findings: the individuals who are exchanged benefit greatly. As far as the beneficial effect for organisations in the South is concerned, it proves to be much greater when two organisations or institutions in developing countries cooperate than when the cooperation takes place between organisations in Norway and the developing country. Furthermore, the international evaluation of general budget support shows that technical assistance linked to such support has largely been unsuccessful.

This means, firstly, that we have not found the optimal form of technical and professional cooperation and training, and secondly, that such assistance must be based to a greater degree on needs and resources in the South. The Evaluation Department has initiated efforts to identify new, more effective forms of capacity-building in development cooperation.

4

It is too easy to ignore national and local capacity

The major international evaluation of the response to the tsunami disaster presented a conclusion that is related to the above lessons: while local forces were responsible for the vast majority of the life saving operations and support for victims during the period immediately following the tsunami, these resources were largely ignored by the major international organisations when they arrived with massive assistance.

Earlier evaluations of humanitarian aid have reached similar conclusions.



In 2005 Norad took part in an international evaluation of the development aid provided to Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka and the Maldives following the tsunami. The evaluation concluded that there is a need to reorient the way the international community responds to humanitarian crises. The picture is taken in Galle, Sri Lanka.

Follow-up of evaluation

We do not know enough about how evaluation reports are used. This does not necessarily mean that the reports are simply filed away, but that there is no overview of follow-up activities. The new mandate for evaluation aims at remedying this situation by establishing more formal follow-up requirements. Within six weeks after the report and the Evaluation Department's comments have been sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the MFA department concerned must have drawn up a follow-up plan for each evaluation, which must be approved by the ministry. One year later, the same department must report on the follow-up activities.

With regard to evaluations carried out in 2005 and 2006, the following follow-up measures have been implemented:

The evaluation of the Norad Fellowship programme for students from developing countries resulted in changes in the focus and name of the programme, which is now called the Norwegian Masters Programme (NOMA). Since these changes, the programme has focused more strongly on the South.

The evaluation report on the Strategy for Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation was discussed at a major seminar in January 2006. The evaluation findings have been essential in the establishing of the new action plan for increased efforts to promote women and gender equality in development cooperation that will be presented in early 2007. The Government has also followed up on its intentions to strengthen efforts in this field by resuming a special allocation for purposes relating to women and gender equality within the aid budget.

The evaluation of the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) resulted in a new framework agreement between Norway and UNEP, in which the main recommendations from the report were incorporated. However, the evaluation also pointed to clear deficiencies in UNEP's system of quality assurance and reporting of results. A key recommendation to the effect that UNEP must improve its own system of reporting results does not appear to have been followed up by the organisation.

The report following the international evaluation of budget support was forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in September. The report constituted part of the basis for a revision of the Norwegian guidelines for budget support, and also provided input in the preparations for the government budget for 2007. No follow-up plan, however, has been prepared.

After the evaluation of Women's World Banking (WWB), a new system for planning, reporting and follow-up has been devised for the organisation.

The report on the evaluation of cooperation between the Norwegian Ministry of Education and Research and its sister ministries in Zambia and Nepal was presented in September. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has presented a plan that includes a broader discussion of fundamental issues relating to cooperation between government institutions. Norad has been asked to prepare terms of reference for a study, and the importance of including relevant Norwegian ministries and directorates was emphasised. The Norwegian embassies in Lusaka and Kathmandu will be asked to follow up this matter with the governments of the two countries.

In January, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in the process of preparing a plan for following up the joint evaluation of the international response to the tsunami disaster.

This review shows – gratifyingly and somewhat surprisingly – that to a large extent the evaluation reports are being followed up. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also begun work on drawing up follow-up plans, even though this process is taking longer than stipulated in the Evaluation Instructions. In next year's annual report we will also be able to evaluate the reporting on the follow-up plans.

Communicating the results of evaluations is an important part of the follow-up process. The Evaluation Department has systematically organised presentation seminars of evaluation reports. This applies to the evaluation of the Strategy for Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation, the evaluation of international tsunami relief, the evaluation of budget support and the evaluation of the FK Norway (Fredskorpset). Furthermore, two reports from the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme on support for conflict-affected countries were presented at a separate seminar. The seminars were well attended by both the development cooperation administration and by external groups in the development assistance community. Systematic efforts have been made to ensure media coverage, which have been successful in the case of the most comprehensive evaluations.



International cooperation



The Evaluation Department participates in donor cooperation in the OECD/DAC evaluation network, which carried out the joint evaluations of the tsunami response and general budget support. Through this network we are now involved in plans for evaluating donor support that aims to strenghten people's political participation and expression of voice in developing countries, as well as how authorities in these countries report back to their citizens (accountability) on actions and achievements, or lack thereof. Norad has also participated in a Swedish-headed DAC initiative for evaluating all development cooperation in one country. The Evaluation Department is heading an international process under the auspices of DAC to draw up a set of guidelines for evaluating peace-building and conflictpreventing activities. We have also taken part in a group that has assessed UNICEF's evaluation function.

The Department is also a member of an informal group for Nordic + , which comprises the Nordic countries, the UK, Ireland and the Netherlands. The last meeting was held at Utstein Kloster outside Stavanger, Norway, in September 2006. This group exchanges information and discusses cooperation beyond the framework of the OECD/DAC.

The Department has continued its cooperation with the World Bank and the UNDP. We have provided partial funding for evaluations carried out by the World Bank's Independent Evaluation Group, and Norway has participated to some extent in these evaluations. In 2006 reports were presented on the evaluation of the World Bank's support for developing countries' participation in international trade, the Bank's support for conflict-affected countries and support for regional programmes. Under the partnership agreement with the UNDP Evaluation Department, we have, among other things, financed an evaluation of UNDP support for conflict-affected countries. Through the agreements with the World Bank and UNDP, support has also been provided to strengthen evaluation capacity in developing countries.

Finally, the Evaluation Department takes part in an international network for evaluating humanitarian assistance, the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP). This network played a key role in evaluating the aid provided in the wake of the tsunami.

Evaluations completed in 2006

Evaluation report Inter-Ministerial Cooperation.

1/2006 An Effective Model for Capacity Development?

Evaluation report Evaluation of Fredskorpset

2/2006

Synthesis report Lessons from Evaluations of Women and Gender Equality

in Development Cooperation

Joint report Evaluation of General Budget Support

Joint report Joint Evaluation of the international Response

to the Indian Ocean Tsunami

Joint report Peer Review of Evalutaion Function at United Nations

Children's Fund (UNICEF

Joint report Joint External Evaluation of Women's

World Banking (1996-2003)

Sida evaluation Too Good to be True? UNRISD 1996-2005

World Bank report Engaging with Fragile States: An IEG Review of World Bank Support

to Low-Income Countries Under Stress

World Bank report Assessing World Bank Support for Trade, 1987-2004

UNDP report Evaluation of UNDP Support to Conflict-Affected Countries

UNDP report Evaluation of Gender Mainstreaming in UNDP

State-of- The Long-Term Effects of Assistance to the Power Sector

the-art study

State-of- Norwegian Assistance to the Petroleum Sector

the-art study

Evaluations in progress as of 31 December 2006

- **Initiated by Norad** Norwegian Petroleum-Related Assistance

- Joint evaluations Exit Management

with the World Bank 1995-2005

- **Under Partnership** A Decade of Action in Transport: World Bank Assistance,

Under Partnership • Development Assistance to Strengthen Citizens' Voice with DAC and the Accountability of Authorities towards Citizens

Inter-Ministerial Cooperation. An Effective Model for Capacity Development?



Evaluation report 1/2006

No. of pages 68 (Synthesis Report)

ISBN 82-7548-171-6

Carried out by Stein Erik Kruse, Wim Hoppers, Gideon Bulwani and Basudha Gurung, Centre for Health and Social Development (HESO)

Evaluation of

Inter-ministerial cooperation in the educational sector in Zambia and Nepal. The Norwegian Ministry of Education and Research has been engaged in cooperation with the Ministry of Education in Zambia and the Ministry of Education and Sports in Nepal since 2000. In Zambia, cooperation has concentrated on technical advisory services in connection with educational reforms, while cooperation with Nepal has consisted of research on the implementation of sector programmes. Work has been based on a belief that collaboration between sister ministries could offer new and effective ways of providing technical assistance and support for capacity building.

Purpose of the evaluation

The evaluation had a dual purpose. It was to provide insights into inter-ministerial cooperation as a model for development cooperation, with particular focus on the educational sector. The evaluation was also to assess prior collaboration with a view to developing cooperation in Zambia and Nepal.

Findings

This cooperation has been useful in terms of the personal development of the individuals who participated and has strengthened organisational capacity at certain administrative levels. Important goals for cooperation in the two countries were thereby achieved. However, one of the main findings is that cooperation in both countries has not realised the full potential of this special model of cooperation (twinning) between ministries that are in principle equal. The same results could probably have been achieved by means of a more traditional form of technical assistance, such as the Norwegian Ministry of Education and Research acting as advisor to Norad and the embassies. Therefore it is not possible, based on the experience gained so far, to answer the question of the extent to which this form of cooperation can contribute to institutional capacitybuilding in partner countries.

Recommendations

The report makes a large number of detailed recommendations. Some of the most important include:

- The Norwegian Ministry of Education and Research, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Norad in Oslo and the embassies must clarify their roles in cooperation of this nature. A clear distinction must be made between what is inter-ministerial cooperation (on an equal footing), on the one hand, and technical assistance or programme assistance on the other. The Ministry of Education and Research should clarify what type of collaboration it wishes to pursue in future in relation to cooperation partners in developing countries.
- The funding arrangements for inter-ministerial cooperation should be adjusted to the type of cooperation that is chosen. If ministry-to-ministry collaboration is chosen, it is suggested that this should be financed by special budgets in each ministry, not from the development cooperation budget.
- A system should be devised for evaluating the results of inter-ministerial cooperation.
- It is proposed that inter-ministerial cooperation between Norway and Zambia be continued, subject to certain changes, provided that Zambia is willing to prioritise such cooperation.
- It is proposed that current cooperation with Nepal be phased out and integrated more closely into the sector plan for education, with funding provided from a joint donor fund for support for the education sector. Future institutional cooperation with the ministry aimed at capacity-building should be further developed on the basis of clearly defined goals.

Follow-up

The results of the evaluation were presented at a seminar in May 2006 as part of a consultation process between the stakeholders concerned. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has prepared a plan for following up the evaluation, which calls for a discussion of fundamental issues relating to institutional cooperation between government institutions in Norway and partner countries, including technical consultancy services. This will also include the strategic aspects of and principles relating to the use of specialised ministries and directorates in development cooperation. The plan also calls for a follow up of the evaluation at country level based on the assessments and recommendations of the report.

Evaluation of Fredskorpset

Evaluering av Fredskorpset



Evaluation report 2/2006

No. of pages 95

ISBN 82-7548-178-3

Carried out by PEMConsult in association with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)

Evaluation of

The activities of FK Norway (Fredskorpet) from its establishment in 2000 up until mid-2006. Through FK Norway's exchange programmes participants are exchanged between Norway and partner countries, and between developing countries in the South. Since it was established in 2000, FK Norway has received approximately NOK 671 million in support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and some 1800 persons have participated in the programme.

Purpose

The purpose of the evaluation was to assess how and to what the extent the work of FK Norway concurs with the overall objectives of Norwegian development cooperation. and to provide recommendations regarding the future role of the organisation and useful data on performance and goal achievement as a basis for learning.

Findings

The consultants concluded that FK Norway is a reasonably effective mechanism for implementing the overarching aims of Norway's cooperation with developing countries. By combining the objective of strengthening organisations and institutions in developing countries with the desire to promote increased knowledge and engagement in Norway, FK Norway fills a special niche within Norwegian development cooperation.

The evaluation shows that exchanges of young people between Norway and partner countries usually have excellent results for individual participants from developing countries. The benefit to Norwegian FK participants who work in developing countries is usually also considerable. However, institutions in the South have not benefited as much from this collaboration. This is largely due to the fact that in many cases the participants are not employees of the organisations that send them to Norway, and the participants' stay

in Norway gives them qualifications that enable them to obtain new and better jobs when they return to their home countries. On the other hand, exchanges between institutions in developing countries have proved to be extremely successful in terms of strengthening the institutions. This type of cooperation entails stronger participation on the part of the institutions in the South, and the participants are more quickly able to make an effective contribution in their new organisations. According to the consultants, the Norwegian institutions have not benefited to any great extent either, partly because work on capacity-building has been neither well planned nor well implemented.

FK Norway's information and communication activities are considered to be relevant, but they lack an overall strategy that links the various activities in this field. Public meetings such as Bringing People Together are considered to have helped build a large network of Norwegian municipalities, which offers a unique - but hitherto unexploited - opportunity for public debate on North-South issues.

Recommendations

At the more strategic level, the report recommends that FK Norway's Board establish a planning and budgeting system based on performance indicators. Furthermore, it is the view of the Evaluation Team that better feasibility studies and planning will enhance capacity-building among partner organisations.

Follow-up

The evaluation results were presented at an open seminar on 20 November 2006, as part of a consultative process involving stakeholders. The evaluation is also intended to contribute to FK Norway's formulation of a strategic plan for the period 2006 to 2011. Norad's Evaluation Department will present its recommendations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a follow-up memorandum in January 2007.

Lessons Learned from Evaluations of Women and **Gender Equality in Development Cooperation**

Erfaring fra evaluering av kvinne- og likestillingsrettet bistand



Synthesis report 1/2006

No. of pages 18

ISBN 82-7548-176-7

Carried out by Berit Aasen, Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research (NIBR)

Synthesis of

Evaluations carried out by bilateral and multilateral donors of development assistance to promote gender equality in the period from 2002 to 2006. The report also draws on recent literature dealing with women's empowerment and gender equality.

Purpose

The purpose of this synthesis report is to show the lessons that have been learned in development cooperation aimed at promoting gender equality. The report summarises the experience gained in connection with institutionalisation of efforts to promote gender equality, the mainstreaming strategy and the results achieved, and examines gender equality activities in the light of new aid modalities.

Findings

The main conclusion of the synthesis report is clear: The strategy to mainstream women and gender equality has failed. There are a variety of reasons for this. The evaluations point out, for instance, that this work has had low priority and that insufficient resources have therefore been invested in implementing the strategy. Reference is also made to problems encountered in concretising the mainstreaming strategy in operational activities.

The evaluations also point to the fact that, in many organisations, efforts to promote women's empowerment and gender equality have been given low priority since the late 1990s. For example, the institutional apparatus has been weakened by the closure of gender networks and systems for staff responsible for women's issues.

Only the most recent evaluations have taken a closer look at efforts to promote gender equality in relation to new forms of development assistance, such as sector programmes and budget support, and the goal of greater harmonisation of efforts in development cooperation. Experience indicates that these new aid modalities have made it more difficult to work with cross-cutting themes such as women and gender equality, and that these themes have suffered as a consequence. However, several evaluation teams have pointed out that these aid modalities have opened up new opportunities for promoting gender equality since this theme can now be incorporated at the higher level of general development cooperation policy. The author therefore concludes that efforts to promote women and gender equality can only succeed if they can prove their relevance and usefulness in relation to the challenges faced in development cooperation today.

Recommendations

An element common to all the evaluations is a set of comprehensive recommendations that include establishing clearer goals for efforts to promote women and gender equality, stronger leadership, more resources, more systematically organised work and better reporting of results.

Follow-up

The report is intended to serve as input for ongoing processes, such as the revision of the Norwegian Strategy for Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation, and as basic information for stakeholders interested in gender equality issues.

Evaluation of General Budget Support



No. of pages 146 plus annexes (Synthesis Report)

ISBN 1-86-192-791-6 (Synthesis Report)

Carried out by The International Development Department (IDD), University of Birmingham

Evaluation of

General budget support has accounted for a growing share of development assistance in the last decade, and this is the first major study to be conducted on this form of aid. It is the first comprehensive attempt to systematise the experience gained from and the results of budget support across a range of countries. The study covers seven countries: Malawi, Uganda, Mozambique, Rwanda, Burkina Faso, Nicaragua and Vietnam, and examines the results of four billion development assistance dollars provided in general budget support to these countries, largely during the period 2000-2004.

Purpose

Assess to what extent and under what circumstances General Budget Support is relevant, efficient and effective for achieving sustainable impacts for achieving sustainable impacts on poverty reduction and growth.

General budget support can be an efficient, effective and sustainable way of supporting national poverty reduction strategies. Budget support can have a number of positive effects in terms of advancing donor harmonisation, aligning development assistance to national systems, improving the allocative and operational efficiency of public expenditures and strengthening the country's public finance management, and can help to support national reform processes. However, the report also shows that the risk factors related to general budget support, particularly political risk, can be considerable.

While stressing that the variety of designs and contexts for budget support requires care in generalising, the evaluation concludes that:

- · budget support has had positive effects on institutional capacity in the field of public finance management. Budget support is not a panacea, but this aid modality has strengthened government ownership and accountability,
- through budget support donors can support the implementation of reforms, but donors cannot create a will to carry out reforms,
- · budget support tends to enhance the quality of countrylevel development assistance as a whole, through its direct and indirect effects on coherence, harmonisation and alignment,
- budget support is vulnerable to a number of risks, including political risk, which can arise from political conditions in both donor and recipient countries. Predictability and stability are important if budget support is to contribute to sustainable reforms.
- · democracy and human rights are underlying principles in the budget support agreements signed with all the countries covered by the study, except Vietnam. With reference to experience from Uganda and Malawi, the report emphasises that these issues are high-risk factors,
- budget support in Mozambique, Uganda and Vietnam has been a useful instrument to supplement other aid modalities as a forum for dialogue on cross-cutting issues such as the environment, HIV/AIDS and women/ gender equality,
- it is important not to overload budget support agreements with unrealistic goals or too many reform objectives,
- nothing was found to indicate that budget support is more vulnerable to corruption than other types of development assistance,

• it is too early to assess the final effects of budget support on poverty reduction and the impact of the support depends on the quality of the national poverty reduction strategy. Given the bias of early poverty reduction strategies towards the expansion of public services, most of the effects of general budget support so far have been on access to services, rather than income poverty and employment of the poor.

Recommendations

The report offers some forty recommendations for future budget support. Some of the main recommendations are:

- · donors should adopt an incremental approach in introducing budget support, i.e. start out with limited support and gradually expand,
- greater use should be made of the national authorities' financial systems in order to accelarate moves to bring aid funds fully on-budget, and donors should help to strengthen capacity of line ministries and finance ministries in policy analysis, budgeting and expenditure management capacities, also addressing local government capacity,
- · focus more on income poverty, economic growth, and the quality of basic public services (rather than the focus on the extent of such services or budget percentage),
- · take more account of complementarity between aid instruments, including general and sector budget support, at country level and sector level,
- symbolic earmarking and other forms of political signals should be assessed on the basis of their potential utility, not simply dismissed,
- retain the IMF's role in monitoring macro-economic performance, but do not link all budget support funds to the IMF's own conditions.
- donors must exploit the potensial for budget support to help strenghten public finance management and limit corruption, continue to pursue broad anti-corruption strategies and risk analyses relating to corruption must cover more than just donor funds

- undertake more systematic analysis of political risk in relation to budget support,
- · donors must engage in budget support on the basis that it is a long-term endeavour.

Follow-up

An open seminar was held in autumn 2006 to disseminate and discuss the results of the evaluation to specialised Norwegian institutions and non-governmental organisations. The Norwegian guidelines for budget support are currently being revised and the findings and recommendations of the evaluation are being used in this process. Based on inputs received, the Evaluation Department has made recommendations regarding Norwegian follow-up of the evaluation. The Ministry is preparing a plan for follow-up activities.

Joint Evaluation of the International Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami



No. of pages 175 (Synthesis report)

ISBN 0-85003-807-3 (Synthesis report)

Carried out by The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (www.tsunami-evaluation.org) by John Telford and John Cosgrave, with contributions from Rachel Houghton

Evaluation of

Evaluation of international tsunami response, focusing on the role of coordination, the effect on local and national capacities, the role of needs assessment, the links between relief, rehabilitation and development and finally, the funding response to the tsunami.

The evaluation focuses on the immediate response and the work done in the first eleven months following the disaster. It considers international tsunami response in its entirety during this period, totalling an estimate of 13.5 billion in international aid.

Purpose

The purpose of the evaluation and the establishment of the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition was:

- to improve the quality of humanitarian action, including linkages to longer term recovery and development;
- · to provide accountability to the donor public and affectedcountry populations on the overall tsunami response; and
- to test international evaluation mechanisms that promote sector-wide learning for future joint, multi-agency evaluation.

Findings

Overall, the evaluation concludes that the response did not achieve the potential offered by the generous funding. Key findings are that:

- International efforts were most effective in terms of pure emergency relief and less effective in terms of rehabilitation and reconstruction. Reconstruction of societies and livelihoods takes time. The focus on the distribution of material assets, especially boats, demonstrated a lack of understanding of the importance of other factors that play a role in the rehabilitation of societies and livelihoods. On the other hand, there were positive examples of assistance in the form of financial donations bringing good results.
- The gap that often appears between the relief phase and recovery was avoided. After a few months, children were back in school and health facilities and services were partly restored and, and in some cases, much improved. By month six in Aceh, 500,000 people had a solid roof over their heads. In Sri Lanka, more than 80 per cent of damaged fish markets, boats and fishing equipment w rapidly restored, and 70 per cent of affected households in the country were reported to have regained a steady income.
- In all four countries (Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand and the Maldives) the local community took charge of most of the life-saving and initial emergency support. The international response was most effective when enabling, facilitating and supporting these actors, and when accountable to them. However, when the international organisations entered the scene, local capacity and ownership were often neglected and undermined.
- The unusually large number of agencies made coordination more difficult and more expensive, and many of the agencies had little or no experience or competence in relief. A recurrent complaint was that many NGOs did not manage to agree on common policies that could have helped to improve predictability on important issues. The constant stream of visitors, not least high-profile guests, was a strain on the local authorities, the military forces and NGO personnel.

- There was widespread discontent with the UN's coordination and joint services. There was a high turnover of international personnel. Too little information was provided about the purpose of the UN's coordination and joint services. The UN's security rules and financial procedures may also have hindered rapid deployment to outlying areas. On the positive side, there was a marked improvement in the coordination of UN and international actors and within the Red Cross movement in late 2005. The military forces played a key role in disaster response. However, there is little joint planning or training between the military and traditional humanitarian actors and coordination between them in the field is weak.
- The international appeal system results in a skewed distribution of financing and does not reflect genuine needs at the global level. For example, assistance in connection with the tsunami response totalled more than USD 7,100 per affected person, which stands in stark contrast with, for example, USD 3 per affected person following the flood disaster in Bangladesh in 2004.
- · Needs assessments were of variable quality and assessment reports often failed to influence relief action. Supplydriven identification of needs resulted in poorly adapted housing design and poor understanding of the needs of various groups, for example for measures to re-establish income-generating employment and livelihoods. These weaknesses led to lack of sensitivity and waste, and assistance largely went to those who had something already.

Recommendations

The reports contain many recommendations, but the synthesis report provides four main recommendations, primarily aimed at international actors:

- The international community needs a fundamental reorientation from supplying aid to supporting and facilitating communities' own relief and recovery priorities;
- All actors should strive to increase their disaster response capacities and to improve the linkages and coherence between themselves and other actors in the international disaster response system, including those from the affected countries themselves;
- The international relief system should establish an accreditation and certification system to distinguish agencies that work to a professional standard in a particular sector from the others;
- All actors need to make the current funding system impartial, more efficient, flexible, transparent and better aligned with principles of good donorship.

Follow-up

The findings and main conclusions were discussed at an open seminar in Oslo in September 2006. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is preparing a plan for Norway's follow-up of the evaluation.

Peer Review of Evaluation Function at United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)



Joint report

No. of pages 148

Availability Published by CIDA

Consultants Ruth Baldwin and Ingrid Eide

Carried out by Françoise Mailhot (chair), CIDA; Finbar O'Brien, Ireland Aid; Agnete Eriksen and Beate Bull, Norad; Giordis Gietinet, African Development Bank; Donatella Magliani, UNIDO and Sulley Gariba, Institute for Policy Alternatives, Ghana

Evaluation of

UNICEF's evaluation function. Norad was a member of a group of countries which, at the initiative of the OECD DAC Evaluation Network, reviewed UNICEF's evaluation function in the period after 2000. This initiative was the second in succession and followed a review of the UNDP's evaluation function.

Purpose

The purpose of the evaluation was to find out the extent to which the UN system's own evaluation functions are credible, user-oriented and independent. The purpose was also to help strengthen the evaluation capacity and results of the multilateral organisations.

Findings

The panel concluded that UNICEF's evaluation function might be said (with a qualified "yes") to be credible, useful and sufficiently independent for learning and decisionmaking within the organisation, but that critical gaps in the supply of resources weakens the ability of the evaluation function, especially at the decentralised level, to contribute towards promoting accountability and learning within the organisation.

Ninety per cent of all evaluations are carried out at country level, but their quality varies considerably, partly due to a lack of resources. The evaluation office at UNICEF headquarters has few and unpredictable resources available for planning evaluations. This is also the case at country level, which weakens the capacity of the evaluation function to carry out strategically important evaluations.

Recommendations

The recommendations were addressed to: the UNICEF Executive Board, the UNICEF management and the UNICEF Evaluation Office. The report recommended that evaluation should be regarded as a "core function" and that a corresponding increase should be made in core resources, both at headquarters level and at country and regional level. It also recommended that the Executive Board should be better informed about the Evaluation Office's access to funds and follow-up of evaluation results. It was recommended that an evaluation policy be drawn up containing criteria for what is to be evaluated, and that there should be more strategic evaluations in UNICEF's priority areas, with more focus on development effectiveness. It also recommended that the system for reporting results should be improved.

Follow-up

Some of the panel's recommendations will be considered in connection with an ongoing organisational review which UNICEF is carrying out itself and which is expected to be completed in September 2007.

In the formal response to the review, most of the recommendations were welcomed and it was promised that they would be followed up.

Joint External Evaluation of Women's World Banking (1996-2003)



Joint report

Carried out by A consortium of consultants represented by FACET BV, InterCooperation and the Nordic Consulting Group

Evaluation of

Women's World Banking (WWB) in the period 1996-2003. This is a network of institutions that are working to give poor women in developing countries access to microfinancing credits. In 2003 Norway joined forces with other donors (the Netherlands and Switzerland) to commission an independent evaluation of WWB.

Purpose

The purpose of the evaluation was to evaluate the activities and results of WWB with respect to technical assistance, financial products and services, training and networkbuilding, and influence on policy. The consultants were also asked to evaluate WWB's follow-up systems and financing mechanisms and their strategy for the period 2002-2004 in the light of the findings of the evaluation.

Findings

WWB works on the basis of a business model that respects the independence of members of the network, and WWB is regarded as being a reliable adviser by member organisations. WWB has also demonstrated a unique ability to bring together network members and others working in the field of micro-financing with a view to both training and networkbuilding. WWB is considered to have built up impressive expertise in the field of micro-financing.

WWB's reputation as a leading institution in the field of micro-financing has been significantly weakened over time. Since it started to accept cooperation with organisations headed by men, WWB was also losing some of its focus on organisations headed by women. The report also points out that the added value of WWB's activities had shown a tendency to decline, while WWB's role as a service provider did not correspond with modern donor practices because it offered strongly subsidised services to organisations that were often capable of purchasing similar services. Donors' monitoring of WWB has been weak.

Recommendations

WWB must build further on its strong points as a networkbuilder and on its role as an adviser and agent for change, and at the same time it must take into account growing local micro-financing markets. The report also recommended that WWB strengthen its focus on female leadership, develop its knowledge and communication agenda, and develop a better system for following up results.

Follow-up

The final evaluation report was published in December 2004. In its formal response to the evaluation, the WWB agreed with many of the findings, but questioned some of the assessments and conclusions of the evaluation team. In its work on its strategy for 2005-2007, the WWB focused on following up important recommendations from the evaluation. The three donors drew up a joint document addressed to the WWB outlining the main frameworks for dialogue between donors and the WWB in the light of the evaluation.

In the course of 2006 the WWB has prepared a new system for planning, reporting and follow-up which includes the main donors in the process. This system will facilitate closer monitoring.

Norad's Evaluation Department commissioned Erlend Sigvaldsen from the Nordic Consulting Group to prepare a summary of the extensive evaluation report. The purpose was to give a brief, reader-friendly presentation of the main findings and conclusions.

Too Good to be True? UNRISD 1996-2005



Sida evaluation 06/46

No. of pages 121

ISBN 91-586-8226-0

Carried out by an evaluation team headed by Deepak Nayyar, Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Dehli, India

Evaluation of

United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) activities and research in the last 10-year period.

Purpose

The evaluation was a joint project between the Nordic countries Sweden, Norway and Finland, with Sweden (Sida/ Sarec) having the main responsibility. The main purpose was to evaluate research activities at UNRISD, their quality, relevance and impact. Research processes and costeffectiveness were also evaluated.

Findings

The evaluation report has the expressive title "Too Good to be True? UNRISD 1996-2005", which reflects the main findings of the evaluation. UNRISD scores very well in terms of the quality, relevance and cost-effectiveness of research activities, particularly in view of the limited number of researchers involved. The research addresses issues of great interest for the international foreign policy debate. Its ability to challenge established knowledge is especially praised. And the report points to pioneering activities relating to social indicators, ethnic conflicts, sustainable development, gender and social policy. At the same time it points to certain weaknesses, in that the research is sometimes more descriptive than analytical. UNRISD research has been relevant for academics and for the UN system, and particularly for contributions to UN summit meetings. However, the report points to deficiencies in the dissemination of results, which affects the impact and reach of the research, especially in the rest of the UN family.

Recommendations

The evaluation clearly recommends maintaining and continuing to support UNRISD. Donors should help ensure that UNRISD financing is more long-term and is increased in terms of volume. It also recommends that UNRISD further develop its strategy for disseminating results and find ways to engage and involve more researchers and institutions in the South in its activities.

Follow-up

Sida/Sarec had the main responsibility for the evaluation, and Sweden is the most important financial contributor to UNRISD. In connection with the debate on the draft report, Sida arranged a meeting where donors also discussed the financial issues raised in the report in more detail.

Engaging with Fragile States: An IEG Review of World Bank Support to Low-Income Countries Under Stress



World Bank report

No. of pages 186 ISBN 0-8213-6847-8

Carried out by The Independent Evaluation Group, the World Bank, Supported under the Evaluation Department's partnership agreement with the World Bank. http://www.worldbank.org/oed/licus/

Evaluation of

World Bank Support to Low-Income Countries Under Stress – LICUS. The evaluation includes country studies in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, the Central African Republic, Haiti, Laos, Sudan, Tajikistan, East Timor and Zimbabwe.

Purpose

The purpose of the evaluation was to assess how effective the World Bank's approach to fragile states has been, how relevant the Bank's criteria for categorising these states have been and how appropriate the Bank's internal support for LICUS work has been.

Findings

- · Donors' ambitions for reform in fragile states should be more selective. In such countries, there will usually be a need for reform in almost all sectors. It is therefore important to adapt and phase reform activities within a realistic time-frame.
- The LICUS initiative in 2002 has resulted in the Bank paying more attention to this category of countries, but it is too early to evaluate the effects of this increased focus. The lessons learned so far have been mixed and, for the most part, the results from the few country strategies that have hitherto been the subject of independent evaluations indicate that the goals that were set for support have not been achieved.
- In 2005 the World Bank introduced state-building and peace-building as main objectives of assistance for fragile states, rather than development. At the same time, capacity-building and governance are not the World Bank's strongest areas. The World Bank must define its comparative advantages and clarify its role in relation to these objectives.

 Little progress has been made on critical human resource reforms relating to staffing numbers, staffing quality, and incentives to undertake LICUS work internally. An adequate number of field staff with the appropriate authority and skills is required.

Recommendations

The report makes the following key recommendations:

- · clarify scope and content of the Bank's state-building agenda and strengthen the design and delivery of capacity development and governance support in LICUS, develop aid allocation criteria for LICUS that ensure that these countries are not under- or over-aided.
- · strengthen internal Bank support for LICUS work over the next three years; and
- · reassess the value-added of the LICUS approach after three years.

Assessing World Bank Support for Trade, 1987-2004



World Bank report

No. of pages 246

ISBN 0-8213-6591-6

Carried out by Independent Evaluation Group, the World Bank. Supported under the Evaluation Department's partnership agreement with the World Bank. http://www.worldbank.org/jeg/trade/

Evaluation of

The World Bank's support for trade in the period 1987-2004. The Bank's lending for trade-related measures in this period amounted to USD 38 billion divided between 117 countries and comprised various forms of assistance. Country studies were carried out in six countries (India, Indonesia, Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal and Zambia).

Purpose

The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the development effectiveness of the World Bank's support for trade, focusing on the extent to which the support has been relevant to promoting improved trade and economic outcomes and whether Bank-supported interventions were effective and efficient in achieving their stated objectives.

Findings

• The World Bank's support for trade has led to more open markets, but the results in the form of increased exports, poverty reduction and employment have been mixed, especially in Africa. Trade reforms alone are not enough, and the Bank has sometimes neglected the fact that these must be accompanied by reforms in other areas. The Bank's trade advice and support in the 1980s and 1990s was too narrow in focus. It underestimated the complexity and sequencing of complementary policies; the role of the external environment; the interaction among trade, growth, and distributional outcomes; and the country-specific context in which these policies interacted. On the positive side, the evaluation found that the Bank's support for trade since 2001 has been more relevant.

- Many of the borrowing countries in Africa have not succeeded in diversifying their exports and are still highly vulnerable to price fluctuations on the commodity markets, resulting in insufficient integration into global economic development and loss of market shares. Import restrictions have been reduced and imports have increased in all regions. However, the speed with which import restrictions were reduced increased competitive pressures in countries that were unable to generate dynamic and sustained manufacturing growth.
- Distributional outcomes received too little attention and even where the Bank incorporated distributional concerns, it was hampered by poor implementation.
- The World Bank's support for trade-related research has been of high quality and in recent years the Bank has played an important role as promoter of a fairer global trading system. On the other hand, the report shows that the World Bank's dependence on donor financing, in the form of trust funds for research and capacity development, is a serious threat to ensuring an independent work programme.

Recommendations

The report provides three main recommendations:

- to a greater extent address poverty-distributional outcomes and external shocks in a balanced approach;
- revisit the Bank's balance between attention to global and country agendas and strengthen operational links on trade issues; and
- strengthen the Bank's knowledge management efforts.

Evaluation of UNDP Support to Conflict-Affected Countries



UNDP report

No. of pages 181

Carried out by Professor Mary Kaldor (team leader), LSE; Carrol Faubert and Rajeev Pillay for Abacus International Management; the UNDP Evaluation Office

Evaluation of

The UNDP's efforts to improve conditions with respect to security and development in conflict-affected countries. Six country studies were carried out (Haiti, D.R. Congo, Guatemala, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Tajikistan). Norad's Evaluation Department supported the study under its partnership agreement with the UNDP.

Findings

The international community has contributed towards reducing the number of conflicts by supporting peace agreements, usually through the UN. The UN has helped to stabilise conflicts, mainly by means of a considerable international presence. However, the international community has not sufficiently taken into account the structural situation in conflict-affected countries. Fundamental human security is therefore still fragile in most places and there is a risk that armed conflict may break out again.

The report points out that the UNDP plays a pivotal role in international efforts in this area, and that the organisation should be in a good position to do something about the structural conditions that often underlie a conflict. According to the evaluation, however, the UNDP's effectiveness is limited, by the structure of the international organisations and the lack of guaranteed basic financing. Consequently, the UNDP often ends up filling the "aid gap" for donor countries.

Other weaknesses of the UNDP are a lack of systematic analysis of conflicts, a failure to apply the good lessons learned previously, and insufficient attention to civil society and gender equality in conflict-affected areas. Furthermore, the training and competence of personnel who are assigned to conflict-affected areas are not good enough.

Recommendations

At the strategic level, the report recommends improving the integration of the development perspective in peacekeeping operations and strengthening the role of the UNDP at an early stage in connection with work on peace agreements. At the operational level, the report recommends, among other things, strengthening the UNDP's access to core resources and the UNDP's internal decision-making procedures, and building up the UNDP's capacity and competence in core areas of the peace-building field.

Follow-up

The final evaluation report was published in December 2006. In its formal response, the UNDP agreed with many of the findings of the evaluation without going into much further detail about how they would be followed up. The evaluation was commissioned by the Executive Board of the UNDP and presented to it in January 2007. It will be the responsibility of the members of the Executive Board to ensure that the evaluation is followed up.

Evaluation of Gender Mainstreaming in UNDP



UNDP report

No. of pages 117

Carried out by Dr. Nafis Sadik (team leader); Ause Ayata, Michael Bamberger, Marcia Greenberg, Annet Lingen, Kalyani Menon Sen, Ruth Pearson and Fatou Sarr for the UNDP **Evaluation Office**

Evaluation of

The UNDP's efforts to integrate and promote the gender equality perspective in its activities in the period from the Beijing Conference on Women in 1995 until 2005. Fourteen country studies were carried out. Norad's Evaluation Department supported the evaluation under its partnership agreement with the UNDP. Norad's Evaluation Department has also participated in an advisory panel of experts for the evaluation through former Director of Department Bjørg Leite.

Findings

Since 2000, the UNDP Executive Board has created a lack of clarity and reduced visibility by transferring responsibility for integrating the gender perspective to various UNDP units and by not allocating enough personnel or financial resources for this purpose. Active gender equality advisers at the regional level have therefore had little influence or control over follow-up in this area. Responsibility for gender equality was often delegated to junior staff (especially at the country offices), job descriptions were lacking, and this area often drowned under the pressure of other tasks. Little has been done at the central level, for example by arranging courses, to build a common understanding of the UNDP's work in this field. This weak effort is also reflected in the UNDP's personnel policy, among other things in the gender distribution of leading positions, where only 26 % of local representatives are women.

Recommendations

The evaluation recommends a more proactive attitude on the part of the leadership: increased focus on and the allocation of more resources for integration of the gender equality perspective into programmes and strategies and improved institutional frameworks for this work. It also recommends introducing more incentives and mechanisms to make employees accountable and strengthening gender equality expertise at country office level.

It also recommends that the UNDP Executive Board promote and monitor the UNDP's efforts to integrate the gender equality perspective into its work, among other things in connection with approval of country programmes. Another recommendation was that the Executive Board should ensure that the recommendations of the evaluation are followed up.

Follow-up

The final evaluation report was published in January 2006. In its formal response, the UNDP stated that it agreed with many of the findings and recommendations of the evaluation and committed itself to improving the UNDP's results in this area, among other things by revising the action plan for 2006 and 2007 and by integrating indicators into the reporting of results at various levels and into assessments of employees. The evaluation, which was suggested by the UNDP Executive Board, was presented at a meeting of the Executive Board in January 2006.

The Long-Term **Effects of Assistance** to the Power Sector

Norwegian Assistance to the Petroleum Sector



State-of-the-art study

No. of pages 163

Carried out by the Nordic Consulting Group represented by Stein Hansen

State-of-the-art study

No. of pages 67

Carried out by Norsk Energi represented by Ole F. Ekern

The state of the art study shows that there has been little documentation of the short-term and long-term effects of assistance to the power sector, even internationally. A total of more than NOK 10 billion has been spent on this sector so far. The main purpose has been to promote more general economic growth, while there has been little emphasis on direct poverty reduction. The socio-economic effects of investments in the power sector depend on access to other types of infrastructure, especially roads and telecommunications. The welfare effect for the population therefore increases when investments in the power sector are combined with other types of infrastructure development.

The lack of reliable electricity supplies has been a significant obstacle to investment and has made companies and public agencies vulnerable. Energy is essential for companies and households but electricity is not, because there are alternatives. Electricity supplies for impoverished people are often dependent on subsidies.

Norwegian assistance for training local staff in the energy sector has been successful, but experience has been mixed with respect to institutional cooperation. Environmentrelated measures in the energy sector have had low priority in partner countries. The evaluation aims to fill important gaps in knowledge that were identified in the state of the art study.

Norway has spent almost NOK 500 million on petroleumrelated assistance, and the state of the art study limits itself to the information provided in Norwegian reports. The most successful assistance has been in the field of resource assessment and management, while there has been little focus on cross-cutting themes. The implementation of several Norwegian programmes has been weak. The four most important reasons have been delays in political processes, unclear institutional structures, limited recipient capacity and major changes (dynamism) in the petroleum sector. Norway's petroleum-related assistance has only been used to a limited extent in ordinary planning and management systems.

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