

EVALUATION DEPARTMENT

Report 11 / 2020 **COUNTRY EVALUATION BRIEF**

Indonesia



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
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ABBREVIATIONS

The purpose of this Country Evaluation Brief is to present relevant knowledge about donors' development efforts in Indonesia. The brief systematises relevant findings from existing evaluations of development interventions in the country. The idea is to present the findings to the reader in a succinct and easily accessible format.

Readers who want to explore key issues in depth can access the underlying reports through the reference list. At our website, you can also find a set of short "Evaluation Portraits" summarising the key contents of those documents.

The Country Evaluation Brief was researched and produced by Particip GmbH.

Oslo, November 2020

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Siv J. Lillestøl', with a stylized flourish at the end.

*Siv J. Lillestøl, Acting Director,
Evaluation Department*

Main Findings

The report draws on findings presented in 27 evaluations and reviews published since 2013 of major donor-funded programmes and projects in Indonesia.

- **DECENTRALISATION**, the most decisive transformation of the administrative infrastructure in Indonesia's history, has been actively supported through ODA over many years. This assistance resulted in strengthened participatory policy-making, improved regional and local development planning and, in some cases, better public service delivery. It also helped regional governments to increase their share of their own source revenue.
- Interventions in the **ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE** sector produced mixed results. On the positive side, donors effectively assisted Indonesia in meeting its obligations under international treaties, made some contributions to the implementation of the REDD+ framework to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and helped rural coastal communities that are particularly prone to climate change to

adapt their livelihoods to new conditions. However, donor support has achieved little in changing Indonesia's position within the Top 5 of the world's largest emitters of greenhouse gases.

- While the substantial donor assistance in the **WATER, SANITATION AND HYGIENE (WASH)** sector has contributed to decisive improvements, universal access to water and sanitation has not yet been achieved. According to most recent data, 29 million Indonesians still lack safe water, and 71 million do not have access to improved sanitation facilities.
- The vast majority of donor-funded programmes included **GENDER AS A CROSS-CUTTING ISSUE**, but showed mixed degrees of effectiveness, with some lacking specific targets and indicators for gender equality. Several interventions contributed to women's empowerment in general terms, but evidence of a reduction in gender-based violence and better access to justice for survivors is scarce.

- At least partly due to donor support, Indonesia's overall institutional **DISASTER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM** has gradually improved as natural disasters have occurred in the country, although some issues – such as the unclear demarcation of institutional responsibilities, and insufficient human resources – are yet to be addressed.
- Overall, during the period under review, development co-operation was well aligned with Indonesian policy and reform agendas, and was characterised by **STRONG NATIONAL OWNERSHIP**. At the same time, socio-economic inequalities have not decreased. Reducing them is likely to require major investments, which go beyond the possibilities of ODA.

Key Facts Indonesia

Estimated population: 267,663,435

(World Bank 2020; 2018 data)

Population under the age of 15: 26.6%

(World Bank 2020; 2018 data)

Urban population: 55.3%

(World Bank 2020; 2018 data)

Urban population growth (annual %) : 2.3%

(World Bank 2020; 2018 data)

Human Development Index (HDI):

111 (of 189)

(UNDP 2020; 2019 data)

Gender Inequality Index (GII): 103 (of 162)

(UNDP 2020; 2018 data)

Poverty headcount ratio at USD 1.90 a day

(2011 PPP): 5.7%

(World Bank 2020; 2017 data)

Adult literacy rate: 95.7%

(World Bank 2020; 2018 data)

Life expectancy at birth (male/female):

71 (69/74)

(World Bank 2020; 2017 data)

Child mortality rate (under 5, per 1000 live births): 25

(World Bank 2020; 2018 data)

Net ODA received (% of GNI): 0.02%

(World Bank 2020; 2017 data)

Corruption Perception Index rank: 85 (of 180)

(Transparency International 2020; 2019 data)

Internally Displaced Persons (new displacements in 2018 due to disasters):

853,000

(World Bank 2020; 2018 data)

Mean years of schooling: 8.0

(UNDP 2020; 2018 data)

Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, PPP

(current international USD): 12,670

(World Bank 2020; 2018 data)

GNI growth (annual %): 5.3%

(World Bank 2020; 2018 data)

GNI per capita growth (annual %): 4.1%

(World Bank 2020; 2018 data)

GINI index: 39.0


(World Bank 2020; 2018 data)

From the camp deep in the rainforest in Indonesia where the logging teams live. Work is seven days a week except when it is raining. The logging fields are deserted, but there are roads that spread over a large area. A steady stream of tractors drives the timber out of the area. Inside the logging area, several teams of two people are working to cut down the laid out trees. From the logging area to the loading area, there are large tracked vehicles that pull the large logs out through the dense forest. Photo by: Ken Opprann/ Norad





Key Events



Introduction

Indonesia's population of 267 million people is the fourth largest in the world. It is a middle-income country, placed within the category of high human development, and has made significant progress towards eradicating poverty. However, income inequality has grown at a fast pace.



*Vendors sell fresh produce on the streets of Indonesia to earn income.
Photo by: Asian Development Bank / Flickr*

Stretching across 5,300 km and comprising more than 17,000 islands, Indonesia is the largest archipelago state and is home to 360 distinct ethnic groups. It represents the seventh largest economy globally in purchase power parity (PPP) terms. Democratically-elected governments since 1998 have made significant progress in reducing the country's poverty rate (ADB 2019).

At the same time, income inequality remains high and rural poverty continues to be a problem. Today, Indonesia is considered the country with the sixth greatest wealth inequality in the world (Oxfam 2020). Its main development hurdles are infrastructure bottlenecks, a weak business environment, skills shortages, and low productivity and competitiveness. Due to its status as a middle-income country,

many donors have phased out or transformed their development co-operation with Indonesia. While ODA accounted for more than 6 per cent of GNI four decades ago, it was almost negligible in 2017 (World Bank 2020c).

With the second longest coastline (54,716 km) of any country, a large and densely-populated coastal zone, and landscapes prone to floods, droughts and fires, Indonesia is very vulnerable to climate change. Indonesia was strongly affected by the Covid-19 pandemic, but, as of late July 2020, had a markedly lower number of confirmed cases per one million inhabitants (38) than most neighbouring countries. However, only about 738,000 people, less than 0.3 per cent of the population, had been tested (CSIS 2020).



Ten years after the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, there has been remarkable progress and the lives of many of those affected by the 2004 tsunami have improved immensely. Aceh, Indonesia.

Photo by: Asian Development Bank / Flickr

Country Context

Emerging from decades of authoritarian rule since the late 1990s, Indonesia has built a stable democratic political system and has achieved impressive economic growth. At the same time, the nation struggles to improve living conditions for its growing population while addressing environmental pressures and climate change.

*The last major election meeting of the coalition from party 2 with Joko Widodo / Jusuf Kalla was held at the national stadium Gelora Bung Karno. Tens of thousands of supporters had turned up when presidential candidate Joko Widodo arrived. This was the last political celebration before a 72-hour ban on campaigning leading up to the July 9, 2014 election took effect. There were 188,268,423 eligible voters in Indonesia and 2,038,711 eligible Indonesians abroad. July 2014, Indonesia.
Photo by: Ken Opprann / Norad*



Over the last 10 years, the proportion of the population living below the national poverty line decreased from 14.2 per cent (2009) to 9.2 per cent (2019).

Indonesia is a country of superlatives. It is by far the largest country in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the only Southeast Asian member of the G20 group. It has the largest Muslim population of any country, and is considered the third largest democracy in the world.

With a per capita gross national income (GNI) of USD 3,840 in 2018 (World Bank 2020a), Indonesia is classified as a lower middle-income economy. Since 2002, annual GDP growth has hovered between 4.5 per cent and 6.3 per cent (World Bank 2020b), and thus contributed to a significant reduction in poverty. Over the last 10 years, the proportion of the population living below the national poverty line decreased from 14.2 per cent (2009) to 9.2 per cent (2019) (Beritasatu 2020). The country has also made remarkable progress in improving key human development indicators, but with large geographical disparities across provinces. The major economic activities and population are concentrated in Western Indonesia, in urban areas such as Jakarta and Surabaya, which have experienced high economic growth. Eastern Indonesia lags behind other parts of the archipelago. Papua and West Papua, in particular, are provinces with high

poverty levels (UNICEF 2018). Indonesia has one of the fastest rising rates of inequality in Asia. Gender inequality is an ongoing barrier to Indonesia's socio-economic development, and violence against women is a significant problem (DFAT 2018: 3).

Over 90 per cent of the country's population is exposed to risks of natural disasters, such as earthquakes, flooding, tsunami, volcanic activity, forest and land fires, drought, epidemics and disease outbreaks. In 2017, Indonesia responded to 2,341 natural disasters, with 99 per cent of these caused by weather-related hazards. In the latter half of 2018, Indonesia was struck by a series of disasters, causing significant damage and loss of life. Several strong earthquakes hit Lombok Island in July and August, and in late September a major earthquake on the island of Sulawesi triggered a tsunami and the liquefaction of soil. In total, more than 2,700 people were killed and about 930,000 people were affected in Lombok and Sulawesi (International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 2019).

Indonesia's exposure to the forces of nature is exacerbated by the country's vulnerability to climate

change. The country is the third largest emitter of carbon dioxide (CO₂) and the world's largest emitter from agriculture, forestry and other land use. Indonesia's annual deforestation rate averages around 1 million hectares, which contributes to an estimated 87 per cent of the country's annual emissions (DFAT 2018). The National Medium-Term Development Plan, 2015–2019, included a policy focus on preventing natural disasters and the effects of climate change (FAO 2015). The Government introduced several measures to reduce deforestation and prevent forest fires. Actions comprised a logging moratorium, which was introduced in 2011 and became permanent in 2019. It declared logging illegal in 66 million hectares of natural forest – an area larger than the combined land size of Germany and Italy. Since the draining of peatland enables forest fires, the 2016 Peatland Regulation outlawed the draining of remaining intact peatlands. In 2018, a palm oil moratorium stopped the issuing of new palm oil licences for a three-year period. Furthermore, in 2017, Indonesia reduced its deforestation, compared

to a 10-year historical average (Ministry of Climate and Environment Norway 2019; Mongabay 2018; World Resources Institute 2016).

In response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the Government created a national task force, as well as regional task forces in 34 provinces and 249 districts and cities. The use of sea, inter-city land and air transportation – including commercial flights for all international and domestic routes – was banned. To mitigate the social and economic impact of the pandemic, the Government provided assistance for poor and vulnerable people. These measures included the disbursement of social transfers, as well as tax cuts and loan-payment relief for workers and businesses (Ocha 2020, ADB 2020b). In late April 2020, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) announced the provision of USD 1.5 billion in support of the Government's efforts to alleviate the impact of the disease on public health, livelihoods and the economy (ADB 2020a).



*Borneo, Indonesia, October 2013.
Photo by: Ken Opprann / Norad*

Donor Engagement

Indonesia's net official development assistance (ODA)¹, which has decreased rapidly since the country fully recovered from the long-term effects of the Asian financial crisis, accounted for just 0.024 per cent of gross national income (GNI) in 2017. Partners have mainly focused on helping to improve Indonesia's economic and social infrastructure.


1 The CEB uses the term ODA in accordance with the official OECD-DAC definition: "ODA flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral development institutions are: i. Provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and ii. Concessional (i.e. grants and soft loans) and administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective." (OECD 2019).



Since achieving the status of a lower-middle income country in 2003, Indonesia has become less and less dependent on foreign aid. ODA as a percentage of GNI dropped from 0.933 per cent in 2005 to 0.024 per cent in 2017. That year, Indonesia's net ODA amounted to USD 158.2 million (constant 2015 USD) (World Bank 2020c), which is dwarfed by the USD 2.38 billion that fellow ASEAN member Vietnam – also a lower-middle income country – received (World Bank 2020d). Between 2013 and 2017, Indonesia's repayments exceeded gross ODA amounts, resulting in negative net ODA values peaking at USD -486.2 million in 2014 (World Bank 2020c). Between 2014 and 2018, Germany was Indonesia's largest donor, followed by Japan and Australia (Figure 1).

Germany has focused its development co-operation on energy, sustainable economic development, technical and vocational education and training, and environmental protection (BMZ 2020). Japan's priority areas have been economic infrastructure development, business environment improvement, local development, disaster management, climate change and natural environment preservation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2019). Australia supported Indonesia in improving economic institutions and infrastructure, strengthening the development of human capital, and creating an inclusive society through effective governance (DFAT 2020). Norway's co-operation with Indonesia – as the seventh largest donor – has addressed three

Figure 1 Top 12 Donors of Gross ODA, 2014–2018



The category "Other Multilateral" includes the Global Fund and, of lesser financial expression, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI), the Climate Investment Funds (CIF), the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). Source: OECD CRS Aid Activity database data 2020.


thematic areas: climate and forestry; energy; and democracy, gender equality and human rights (Norad 2015). In addition to political and policy dialogue, as well as technical assistance and capacity-building for government institutions, Norway has supported the monitoring and reporting of forest cover and has provided strategic assistance to strengthening law enforcement and anti-corruption work related to forest and land use.

These examples are reflective of overall ODA since 2007, which – in line with Indonesia’s development plans and priorities – has had a strong emphasis on the development of the country’s economic and social infrastructure (Figure 2).

■ Social Infrastructure & Services ■ Economic Infrastructure & Services
 ■ Multi-Sector / Cross-Cutting ■ Production Sectors
 ■ Commodity Aid / General Programme Assistance
 ■ Humanitarian Aid ■ Action Relating to Debt
 ■ Unallocated / Unspecified ■ Administrative Costs of Donors

“Social Infrastructure and services” comprise i) Education, ii) Health, iii) Population Policies/Programmes & Reproductive Health, iv) Water Supply & Sanitation, v) Government and civil society. “Multi-Sector / Cross-Cutting” comprise i) General Environment Protection, ii) Multisector aid, iii) Urban development and management, iv) Rural development, v) Disaster Risk Reduction, vi) Multisector education, vii) Research/scientific institutions. “Economic Infrastructure & Services” comprise i) Transport and storage, ii) Communications, iii) Energy, iv) Banking and financial services, v) Business and other services.

Figure 2 Total ODA by Sector, 2007–2018




Source: OECD CRS Aid Activity database data 2020

The initial years of Reformasi – the reform era that followed the demise of the Suharto regime – were characterised by a significant increase in international donor funding to CSOs.² By 2004, with the election of President Yudhoyono and a more stable government, donor funding had shifted from supporting CSOs to supporting government agencies (Australia Indonesia Partnership for Justice 2016: 20). This trend has continued and, as figure 3 shows, the lion's share of ODA has been channelled through the public sector. Norway's approach, for example, was more diversified compared to many other donors. Since 2013, support has been provided through various partners, including multilateral organisations (i.e. UN agencies and the World Bank), an inter-governmental treaty organisation (i.e. the Global Green Growth Institute, GGGI), and CSOs (Norad 2018).

Public Sector Other Multilateral Organisations
 Not reported Civil Society Organisations
 Teaching institutions, research institutes or think-tanks
 Private Sector Institutions Public-Private Partnerships (PPP)

² The report uses the term civil society organisation (CSO) in line with the OECD DAC definition: "CSOs can be defined to include all non-market and non-state organisations outside of the family in which people organise themselves to pursue shared interests in the public domain" (OECD 2011). CSOs thus include non-governmental organisations and international non-governmental organisations.

Figure 3 Total ODA by Channel, 2007–2018



Source: OECD CRS Aid Activity database data 2020

Many of Indonesia's partners have transformed traditional aid programmes into more comprehensive economic partnerships.

Many of Indonesia's partners have transformed traditional aid programmes into more comprehensive economic partnerships, in recognition of the country's progress and the distinct development challenges it faces as a lower middle-income country. For example, from 2020 onwards, Indonesia will no longer receive ODA from the Netherlands – after almost 70 years of development co-operation – “in order to establish a more equal, mature bilateral relationship” (University

of Leiden 2018: 6). The OECD's engagement with Indonesia has deepened significantly since 2007, when the country became one of the organisation's five Key Partners (OECD 2018: 4). In 2019, Indonesia became a donor itself when the Government launched the Indonesian Agency for International Development (AID), which will manage an initial USD 283 million endowment fund (Development Aid 2019).

Evaluation Findings

Donors have mainly provided assistance in the fields of governance, economic infrastructure, environment and climate resilience, human development, gender, and access to justice. Aid has been particularly effective in strengthening sub-national levels of decision-making. However, the sustainability of interventions remained unclear in many cases.



Indonesia is the third largest emitter of carbon dioxide (CO₂) and the world's largest emitter from agriculture, forestry and other forms of land use. Indonesia's annual deforestation rate averages around 1 million hectares, which contributes to an estimated 87 per cent of the country's annual emissions (DFAT 2018). July 7, 2014. Photo by: Marit Hverven / Norad

Governance

From the onset of the decentralisation process in the late 1990s, several donors – such as Germany, the Netherlands, the World Bank, Japan, Canada, UNDP and USAID – provided assistance to the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Finance as the major actors in developing the regulatory framework for decentralisation and democratic reform (Government of Canada 2013).

One of the largest interventions in this field was UNDP's "Provincial Governance Strengthening Programme" (PGSP), which concluded in 2013. It supported the national government in re-defining and strengthening the roles and functions of provincial governments through participatory policy-making, regional development planning, and public service delivery (UNDP 2014a, 2014b). A second major intervention, the "Public Sector Management Programme" (PSM), was at the core of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) support to Indonesia from 2005 to 2018 and, inter alia, strengthened economic governance at the sub-national level. Support for decentralisation helped regional governments to increase their share of their own source revenue. PSM also achieved the application of minimum service standards for basic services in national and regional government planning (ADB 2019).

Overall, donors were successful in making key contributions to the design and implementation of the national decentralisation framework and in empowering provincial and district governments to plan and budget for pro-poor service delivery. In this regard, the support has been sustainable, as the Government has exerted strong ownership over decentralisation, public financial management reforms and related policy reforms that are unlikely to be reversed. However, few programmes directly resulted in sustained improvements to actual service delivery, especially at local level (ADB 2019; UNDP 2014a, 2014b).

Economic Infrastructure

Infrastructure bottlenecks, coupled with a poor business environment, are one of the main challenges in accelerating Indonesia's economic growth (ADB 2019; DFAT 2018). While Indonesia's development partners have tried to address these problems, almost every evaluation report highlights the hurdles – some substantial – involved in implementing infrastructure projects. Notwithstanding these shortcomings, infrastructure development has been a main area of support in recent years, in line with the priorities of Indonesia's 2005–2025 National Long-Term Development Plan (RPJPN), and particularly the

Overall, donors were successful in making key contributions to the design and implementation of the national decentralisation framework and in empowering provincial and district governments.



*The market in Bogor, Indonesia, 2014.
Photo by: Ken Opprann / Norad*

nine-point reform agenda of the Widodo administration's "Nawa Cita" development programme. Within the donor community, Japan has had the strongest emphasis on infrastructure, prominently focusing its ODA on railway and power development. The most visible result of Japan's engagement is the Jakarta Mass Rapid Transit (MRT), which enhanced public transportation capacity in the metropolitan area. Phase 1 of the country's first underground train system officially opened in March 2019 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2019). Australia, on the other hand, through its Multilateral Development Bank Infrastructure Assistance Programme (MDB-IAP, 2013–2019), helped Indonesia to increase investment in infrastructure against the backdrop of declining private investments. Australian technical assistance to key Indonesian ministries supported the preparation, planning, budgeting, and application for multilateral loans to fund major infrastructure projects. MDB-IAP also supported project preparation and financing through two trust funds administered by the World Bank (Indonesia Infrastructure Support/INIS) and the ADB (Sustainable Infrastructure Assistance Programme/SIAP) (DFAT 2018).

Environment and Climate Resilience

Apart from capacity-building and technology support, as well as assistance to institutional, regulatory and policy reforms, donor support has mainly focused on four broad areas: assisting Indonesia to meet its obligations under international treaties; implementation of REDD+; adaptation of livelihoods to climate change; and renewable energy production.

Interventions by UNIDO and UNDP in particular have helped Indonesia to implement obligations under international treaties such as: the Stockholm Convention, a global treaty to protect human health and the environment from chemicals that remain intact in the environment for long periods; the Basel Convention, which aims to protect human health and the environment against the adverse effects of hazardous wastes; and the Rotterdam Convention, which promotes shared responsibility and co-operation in addressing the international trade of hazardous chemicals. Projects also contributed to the elimination of ozone-depleting substances, under the Montreal Protocol (UNIDO 2015: xiii; UNDP 2014b).

Mutual interest in the strategy for "Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest/Land Degradation"

(REDD+) – plus safeguards for biodiversity and forest-dependent peoples – by Indonesia and Norway led to a Letter of Intent (LoI) in May 2010 that established the Indonesia-Norway REDD+ Partnership. Overall, the LoI has proved to be an important tool for continued close collaboration and policy dialogue between Indonesia and Norway on issues related to deforestation, fires, land use, transparency, anti-corruption, law-enforcement, and indigenous people's rights. The partnership financed various capacity-building initiatives at the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, as well as a strategic initiative linking ministerial databases to detect networks of individuals, holding companies and licensees who may be involved in violations. According to two evaluations, forest sector law enforcement was improving (Norad 2018; UNDP 2017). At the same time, however, according to an extensive academic study, the REDD+ readiness phase in Indonesia has mainly emphasised policy framing, with few concrete measures identified to meet the "intended nationally-determined contributions" that Indonesia reported at the 2015 UN Climate Change Conference in Paris. "None of the main REDD+ core elements – drivers of deforestation, REL [Reference Emission Level], MRV [Monitoring, Reporting and Verification], multi-actor negotiation, benefit-sharing schemes, social safeguards or on-the-ground



The head of the agricultural team in Panenga, Mr. Berson, presents information material on the wall of the REDD+ office. November 2013. Photo by: Ken Opprann / Norad

experiences with REDD+ at the local level have yet been fully addressed and operationalised” (Casse et al. 2019: 808). In spite of this critical general finding, various evaluation reports show that individual interventions have been largely effective in relation to their stated objectives.

Core activities under REDD+ have been supported by smaller interventions – including, but not limited to, support from the Rainforest Foundation Norway (RFN) to the Association for Law Reform Based on Community and Ecology (HuMa), which produced several in-depth legal studies on the rights aspect in the REDD + scheme, and conducted related advocacy work (RFN 2015: 73). The project “Strengthening Criminal Justice Responses on Forest Crimes to Support REDD+ Implementation in Indonesia” (2010–2016), under the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Indonesia country programme, focused on three districts in three hotspot provinces. The final evaluation of the project, which was entirely funded by Norway, finds that the project has contributed to: a) improved criminal justice responses according to international standards; b) strengthening the capacity of law enforcement agencies and the judiciary in selected districts; c) the promotion of co-operation between responsible agencies within and across borders with Malaysia,

Singapore and Brunei; and d) the involvement of CSOs in supporting compliance with legislation, practices and programmes to prevent forest crimes. However, an envisioned database on forest crime (illegal logging, illegal encroachment, forest fires), associated with Monitoring Reporting and Verification (MRV) of REDD+ implementation, has not materialised (Independent Evaluation Unit, UNODC 2016).

According to the evaluations analysed, the overall sustainability of achievements under REDD+ largely depends on how well the results are mainstreamed into national priorities, how well they are institutionalised and, generally, whether the Government establishes the necessary ownership and commitment to continue the momentum. As Indonesia’s first climate change adaptation (CCA) project, the UNDP pilot project “Strategic Planning and Action to Strengthen Climate Resilience of Rural Communities” (SPARC) tested a multi-sectoral, multi-hierarchical model of working with the Government. It identified and engaged communities at risk in the implementation of CCA actions to increase resilience. However, while the pilot was effective, thousands of communities across Indonesia facing similar levels of vulnerability were not able to benefit from the results because – at the time of evaluation – there was no attempt at scaling-up the project (UNDP 2019b).

In recognition of the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the National Energy Policy 2014 set out a target share of 23 per cent of total energy consumption for renewable energy to be reached by 2025. Even before this policy came into force, the Finland-supported “Energy and Environment Partnership (EEP) Programme” (2011–2014) contributed to renewable energy-related (exclusively bioenergy) capacity-building, pilots and demonstration projects, and policy development at national and regional levels. However, the short timescale and restriction to two provinces constrained the programme. It failed to find enough quality project proposals to fund, and consequently technical delivery – in terms of greenhouse gas reductions and number of people involved – was well below initial expectations. Some projects either did not deliver or ceased to function after a trial period because of technical, market or social failings (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2016: 6-8).

Human Development

Indonesia has achieved some remarkable success in advancing key human development indicators, but these show large geographical disparities (World Bank 2015). Two large-scale programmes designed to improve access to basic quality health and education

– the conditional cash transfers to households programme, known as the “Hopeful Family Programme” (PKH), and an incentivised community block grant approach, known as the “Bright Healthy Generation” (Generasi) programme – were both initiated in 2007. These two complementary interventions were implemented in six provinces to reduce poverty, maternal mortality, and child mortality, and to ensure universal coverage of basic education. Since 2009, the overall health and education environment in districts covered by Generasi have improved substantially. One of Generasi’s greatest accomplishments was the sustained revitalisation of the “posyandu”, monthly local health clinics for mothers and children that were first established in the early 1980s. (World Bank 2018).

In 2018, spending on education was greater than in any other sector, approximately meeting the 20 per cent target of total government expenditure as mandated by the Indonesian constitution (World Bank 2018). The multi-donor “Education Sector Support Programme” (ESSP, 2010–2015), funded by the European Union (EU), Australia and the ADB, was the sector’s flagship intervention during the period under review. The ESSP made a number of significant contributions to the provision of education, including: the construction or

expansion of over 1,000 new junior secondary schools in remote or isolated parts of the country; measurable improvements to the physical infrastructure and skills-base of educational personnel at 1,500 private Islamic schools; and the provision of training programmes to over half a million education management staff. However, overall results were largely confined to the direct beneficiaries of programme activities, with little effect in terms of advancing the education sector as a whole. This was partly due to the limited involvement of district governments, which play a decisive role in the sector as they receive approximately two-thirds of Indonesia’s education budget (Australian Aid 2016: ix-x).

Most of the sample interventions related to human development were implemented in the Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) sector. For example, between 2010 and 2015, Dutch support to WASH in general provided access for more than 1.5 million people to sanitation, and assisted 486 towns with sanitation development (University of Leiden 2018: 44). As one of the largest donors in the sector, Australia delivered its support bilaterally through its Water and Sanitation Hibah [grant] Programme. Phase 2 (2009–2019) was the only results-based WASH programme to be replicated by the Indonesian government. Key strengths, particularly of the water component of

The support of UNICEF and other donors has undoubtedly contributed to decisive improvements in the WASH sector, but 29 million Indonesians still lack safe water, and 71 million do not have access to improved sanitation facilities.

the intervention, included policy influence, strong participation of local governments, and achievement of a significant increase in access to services for 250,000 households (DFAT 2017: iii). UNICEF, another key donor in this field, aimed at providing universal access to sanitation in the country by 2019 (UNICEF 2017). The support of UNICEF and other donors has undoubtedly contributed to decisive improvements in the WASH sector, but 29 million Indonesians still lack safe water, and 71 million do not have access to improved sanitation facilities (USAID, globalwaters.org 2020).

Gender

The vast majority of programmes in the sample included gender as a cross-cutting issue, but showed mixed degrees of effectiveness. Several interventions had a direct gender focus. For example, at regional level, the OECD's "Southeast Asia Regional Promoting Gender Equality Programme" focused on gender issues specific to the region, including Indonesia, and supported efforts to increase women's economic opportunities in co-operation with ASEAN (OECD 2018: 42).

An evaluation of one of the largest interventions implemented by an international CSO, Oxfam's "Women's Empowerment in Indonesia" project (2012–

2016), reports positive and significant results in terms of overall women's empowerment. Women in project communities scored 61 per cent on the Women's Empowerment Index, compared with 52 per cent in comparison communities. While the evaluation found no evidence of direct achievements towards the key objective – a reduction of episodes of gender-based violence (GBV) attributable to the project – there was strong proof that, in supported communities, women who had become victims of violence were more likely to receive legal support and medical assistance (Oxfam GB 2018). CSOs, with support from the Australia Indonesia Partnership for Justice, played an important role in raising issues of gender – as well as disability – that have historically been left out of many justice reforms (Australia Indonesia Partnership for Justice 2016: 26).

In other interventions, which could have been expected to include an explicit gender dimension, evidence for addressing gender inequalities and the empowerment of women and girls did not emerge strongly. Most prominently perhaps, UNICEF's "Child Protection System Building Approach", as part of the organisation's 2011–2015 country programme, did not target gender inequalities in design and implementation. "Essentially gender inequality was not part of their

thinking in the design and implementation of policies and activities.” (UNICEF 2015: 79-80). Likewise, “the promotion of gender equity has not been particularly pro-active” in UNDP’s “Provincial Governance Strengthening Programme” (UNDP 2014a: 73). The formative evaluation of the current UNICEF “Indonesia Partnership Strategies” (2016–2020) notes that the majority of programme documents did not define specific targets for gender equality (UNICEF 2018: 9). By contrast, a project that is cited as being exemplary in this regard was the Japan-funded project “Enhancing the Role of Religious Education in Countering Violent Extremism” (2014–2019). Implemented by UNDP and the Centre for Study of Islam and Society from Islamic State University Jakarta, it made it mandatory that, for campaign activities and public engagement, each project partner had to involve women proportionally in their activities, with a minimum of 30 per cent female participation (UNDP 2019a: 53).

Human Rights and Access to Justice

Since 1999 and the promulgation of the progressive Law Number 39 on Human Rights, Indonesia has laid great emphasis on overhauling the judicial system as a key contribution to the human rights agenda (UNDP 2013: 19). The donor community has

actively supported this process. UNDP’s 2011–2015 country programme, for example, made a “very useful and effective” contribution in helping the national government to develop and extend frameworks for legal aid and public complaint procedures, and in bringing together local customary justice systems and the formal justice system (UNDP 2014b: 9).

One of the main interventions in the sector, “Strengthening Access to Justice in Indonesia” (SAJI, 2012–2015), implemented by UNDP and the National Development Planning Agency BAPPENAS, and co-funded by Norway, helped to recognise and strengthen the country’s informal justice system. SAJI replicated best practices from the province of Aceh in the provinces of Central Sulawesi and Central Kalimantan, especially the development of guidelines for informal justice. The capacity-building and training of Adat (customary law) leaders is also found to be instrumental in improving access to informal justice channels. The project also increased the opportunities for women to participate in informal justice institutions (UNDP 2013: 5-6).

With regard to a broader focus on human rights, the “Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Justice Phase 2”, which started in 2018, provided technical assistance



*Presidential election, Indonesia 2014.
Photo by: Marit Hverven / Norad*



Students take shelter under a desk as part of a disaster simulation at Wadoi Primary School in Nabire District of Papua, Indonesia. The simulation is part of a health and disaster management programme funded by Australia that aims to teach the community about disasters and how to minimize risk when they strike. Nabire was struck by an earthquake in 2004 that killed over 130 people, injured hundreds and left over 1,000 residents homeless. Photo by: Dian Lestariningsih / AusAID / Flickr

to the National Human Rights Secretariat to improve Indonesia's Human Rights Action Plan for 2018 to 2019. According to the donor's own assessment, advisory input resulted in over 30 per cent of the actions specified in the plan being related to disability rights and women's empowerment. Specific measures in the revised plan include new indicators focused on the prevention of violence against women and the implementation of the disability law (DFAT 2018: 2). Most programmes and projects of the sample, however, did not have an explicit human rights focus, neither in terms of direct support nor mainstreaming.

Disaster Response and Prevention

While not a major focus of donor support, foreign assistance has been provided mainly to the National Disaster Management Authority (BNPB). It was established in 2008 in an effort to build a disaster management structure and capacities at national,

provincial and district levels following the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. The main intervention in support of BNPB has been the "Australia-Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction" (AIFDR), which represents Australia's largest investment in disaster risk reduction and is a core component of its bilateral development programme in Indonesia. The Evaluation of Phase 1 (2009–2013) finds AIFDR to be highly relevant to Indonesia's needs and is effective in achieving them. However, it needed better monitoring and evaluation procedures, along with stronger knowledge management (DFAT 2014). Subsequent phases of the facility have not yet been evaluated. Generally, and at least partly due to donor support, Indonesia's overall institutional disaster management system has gradually improved as natural disasters have occurred in Indonesia, although some issues – such as the unclear demarcation of responsibility and insufficient human resources – remain to be addressed (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2019; International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 2019).

Lessons

Donors generally closely aligned their support with national reform programmes and development agendas. State and non-state actors alike demonstrated high levels of ownership. Overall, however, development co-operation has not succeeded in decreasing socio-economic inequalities. Reducing them will require major investments that overstretch the possibilities of traditional aid.



Members of Indonesian trade unions protest against the government's labor reforms bill in Serang, Banten Province, Indonesia, October 2020. Photo by: Antara Foto/Asep Fathulrahman/via Reuters

Strengths

There is a long history of describing Indonesia as a success story. Ever since the heyday of the so-called East Asian miracle in the early 1990s, and only interrupted briefly by the Asian Economic Crisis and its aftermath, analysts and observers have been explaining why Indonesia has seemingly mastered the path to development in a particularly effective way. However, the cited reasons have differed. A quarter of a century ago, it was customary to identify Suharto's developmental state approach as the key to Indonesia's rise. It focused on technology-driven economic diversification and growth, and put a strong emphasis on education – but not on political freedom. Since the regime change in 1998, the subsequent fast transition to a stable democracy is considered to be one of the most decisive factors in Indonesia's development. Consequently, for about one and a half decades, donors provided substantial support for institutional reforms. This is still evident in evaluation reports from the earlier years of the period under review. Most evaluations conclude that, in particular, interventions to strengthen and consolidate the process of decentralisation and to empower sub-national levels of decision-making have been effective.

By and large, these programmes and projects strongly contributed to participatory policy-making, regional and local development planning, and increased transparency and accountability in political decision-making processes at all levels. The community-driven development approach of many projects was considered to be a cost-effective way of delivering small, community-based projects to enhance approaches to governance and to build both the physical and socio-economic infrastructure at village level. Reports identify support to the judicial sector as another area of successful intervention, as this assistance improved access to justice and – at least, indirectly – strengthened human rights.

Across the human development sector, interventions performed well in providing outputs for hundreds of thousands of beneficiaries. Particularly in the poorer provinces, with a strong emphasis on East Nusa Tenggara, access to education, health facilities, and clean water and sanitation has markedly widened in supported communities. The picture in the environment and climate change sector is less clear. The reports nevertheless suggest that donors effectively assisted Indonesia in meeting its obligations under international treaties, made some contributions to the implementation of REDD+, and helped rural coastal

Most evaluations conclude that, in particular, interventions to strengthen and consolidate the process of decentralisation and to empower sub-national levels of decision-making have been effective.



Gadjah Mada University (UGM) is an academic powerhouse in Indonesia and a key driving force in the democratisation process that ended Suharto's authoritarian rule in 1998. At the Faculty of Public Administration, Dr. Nunuk Dwi Refrandari teaches economics. July 2014. Photo by: Ken Opprann / Norad

communities prone to the impacts of climate change to adapt their livelihoods to new conditions.

Across the sample, success factors identified in the effective implementation of projects are high levels of government ownership, the generally exemplary buy-in of Indonesian state and non-state stakeholders, and the close alignment of donor support with national reform programmes and development agendas.

Weaknesses

While some weaknesses were related to deficiencies in the design and implementation of projects, others were largely outside the control of donors. An often-mentioned example of the latter is a lack of co-ordination between national, regional and local planning levels as a factor that negatively affected project implementation. Another and overall more important shortcoming identified is that bottlenecks were created by, for example, infrastructure projects suffering from the uncertain legal and regulatory environment, cumbersome and lengthy procurement systems, ineffective procedures, and lack of financing, especially at the local government level.

However, several weaknesses were of the donors' own making. Except for a small number of projects, most short-term, community-focused interventions were designed as pilots. Although many achieved their objectives, donors regularly did not consider or implement scaling-up. Effective interventions, which operated only in small parts of the country, were thus not expanded to, and replicated in, other provinces, districts or communities facing the same or similar challenges. Several reports refer to the lack of scaling-up as a missed opportunity. It is also evident that, while governance-related interventions usually succeeded in strengthening the framework conditions for service delivery, pro-poor service delivery, in particular, did not improve directly as an outcome.

With regard to specific thematic agendas, the main weakness identified in a large number of projects is insufficient gender mainstreaming and a lack of defined specific targets for gender equality. Some reports note that donor support – while correctly identifying the problem and doing its best to address it – was not rigorously focused on reducing socio-economic inequalities. A few years ago, the World Bank found that growth “has primarily benefited the richest 20 per cent

A gap in support of key development agendas does not necessarily exist. What we see is rather a gap in evaluation.

and left behind the remaining 80 per cent of the population – that is, more than 205 million people” (World Bank 2015). This assessment is still valid today and inequality has increased even further since then, providing evidence that measures aimed at narrowing the gap between rich and poor – including those supported by donors – have not come to fruition.

Indonesia is no exception to the finding that sustainability is regularly the most critically assessed OECD/DAC evaluation criterion. However, sustainability is difficult to analyse if an intervention is still ongoing or was just completed – and this is usually the time when an evaluation takes place.

Gaps

The discussion of gaps needs to take two different perspectives into account: gaps in programme and project design and implementation, as identified by the selected evaluation reports; and gaps in the overall donor support to Indonesia. As for the former, several evaluations point to a shortcoming that also reflects a very common criticism in the assessment of development co-operation in general: the lack of, or weaknesses in, monitoring systems that are based

on well-elaborated success indicators. The frequent unavailability of baseline studies is a related problem.

With regard to the second point and potential gaps in the general approach to development co-operation, the review in section 4 might give the impression that key agendas for Indonesia’s development have received only limited support. This includes, but is not limited to, the broad and inter-related fields of sustainable resource and forest management and climate change mitigation. Since Indonesia is the top palm oil producer worldwide with a share of 53 per cent (GIZ 2020b), and – due to the related land clearing – the third largest emitter of greenhouse gases, more donor actions on climate change would be expected. While it is true that only a few interventions address palm oil production – one example would be GIZ’s “Low-Emissions Oil Palm Development (LEOPALD)” (2017–2022) (GIZ 2020b) – a gap in support of key development agendas does not necessarily exist. What we see is rather a gap in evaluation.

It needs to be kept in mind that the available evaluation reports are not fully representative of the entire spectrum and range of development co-operation with Indonesia. Some major programmes have not yet

been evaluated or reports are not publicly available. A good example of this limitation is the “Forests and Climate Change Programme” (FORCLIME), 2009–2020, funded by Germany, with the Indonesian Ministry of Environment and Forestry as the lead executing agency. It is one of the most important long-term interventions to improve the country’s legal and institutional framework in the areas of forest management, biodiversity conservation, and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from the forestry sector (GIZ 2020a). However, no openly-accessible evaluation or other type of study exists.

The same applies to the “Oceans, Marine Debris and Coastal Resources Multi-Donor Trust Fund” (2017–2020), led by the World Bank and supported by Norway. Indonesia is one of the world’s largest sources of marine waste, and the problem of marine pollution and debris has attracted sizable foreign aid since 2018 as a contribution to Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 14.1. This states that, by 2025, the world should prevent and significantly reduce marine pollution of all kinds. Equally important, several donors who terminated their bilateral development co-operation programmes still actively support Indonesia through other channels. In this sense, Indonesia has greatly benefited from the EU regional-level support, the “2014–2020 Regional

Multiannual Indicative Programme for Asia” (EU 2014), which has not yet been evaluated.

Looking Ahead

As a G20 member and middle-income country expected to achieve higher middle-income status within the next half-decade, Indonesia is no longer a main recipient of aid and has, in the eyes of some donors such as the EU, already “graduated” from ODA. Between 2013 and 2017, Indonesia even repaid more aid than it received, and thus had a negative net ODA balance of over USD 154 million (World Bank 2019). In many cases, new partnership agreements with a strong focus on trade and investment relations have replaced traditional development co-operation, but still focus on key aspects that are crucial for Indonesia’s development. For example, the EU and Indonesia are in the process of negotiating a bilateral free trade agreement – between 2016 and 2019, eight rounds of talks took place – that will not only facilitate trade and investment, but will also address various dimensions of sustainable development. To give a further example, in 2019, in an attempt to move beyond ODA, the Netherlands and Indonesia agreed on the joint production of sustainable palm oil with the objective of enabling smallholder farmers to improve their capacity with sustainable

farming. Likewise, Australia’s development co-operation with Indonesia has evolved from a traditional aid programme into an economic partnership, which, however, still centres on ODA to a large extent. While not all donors – among them Germany and Norway – have phased out their respective bilateral aid programmes (partly delivered through multinationals), there can be little doubt that the future of development co-operation in the case of Indonesia will not be traditional ODA. Major investments, which overstretch the possibilities of aid, are required to reduce deforestation in Indonesia, which is also at the core of reducing the detrimental effects of climate change, building a modern economic infrastructure, meeting the enormous and growing need for electric power and building up the capacity for renewable energy, as well as reversing the trend of rapidly increasing socio-economic inequalities. However, at least in the short-term, development efforts are likely to be negatively affected by the Covid-19 crisis, with a decline in commodity prices and increased financial market volatility representing the most decisive risks.

Methodology

This evaluation brief presents the synthesised main findings of 27 evaluations and reviews published since 2013 of major donor-funded programmes and large projects in Indonesia.



*Children helping out with the fishing net
in Gentuma Raya, Gorontalo, Indonesia.
Photo by: Asian Development Bank / Flickr*



Photo by: Ken Opprann / Norad

The evaluations reviewed for the brief were identified through a systematic search of global development co-operation databases, websites and report databases of individual multilateral and bilateral donors and CSOs. Through this search, a total of about 50 evaluations were found, and subsequently narrowed down to 27 with the help of certain selection criteria. The selection was made to ensure that: a) the main sectors and areas for development co-operation are covered; b) a good balance between different sources and channels of ODA exists; c) the evaluations are of a high scientific quality; d) a good mix of evaluations commissioned

by large bilateral donors, multinational organisations and major international CSOs is achieved. While this approach resulted in a balanced sample, the fact that Country Evaluation Briefs are, by definition, based on evaluations constitutes a degree of limitation, as the available reports do not always cover all crucial areas of development co-operation and development challenges. To mitigate these limitations, the Brief also draws on a small number of relevant academic articles, policy studies, government publications, and other types of assessment.

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Abbreviations

ADB	Asian Development Bank	OCHA	United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
AIFDR	Australia-Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction	OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations	OECD CRS	OECD Creditor Reporting System
BMZ	German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development	OECD/DAC	OECD Development Assistance Committee
BNPB	National Disaster Management Authority	PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
CCA	Climate Change Adaptation	PSM	Public Sector Management Programme
CLTS	Community-Led Approaches to Total Sanitation	REDD+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries
CSO	Civil Society Organisation	RFN	Rainforest Foundation Norway
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia	SAJI	Strengthening Access to Justice in Indonesia
ESSP	Education Sector Support Programme	STBM	Indonesia National Sanitation Programme
EU	European Union	UN	United Nations
GBV	Gender-Based Violence	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
GIZ	German Corporation for International Co-operation	UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
GNI	Gross National Income	USAID	US Agency for International DevelopmentUSD US Dollar
MDB-IAP	Multilateral Development Bank Infrastructure Assistance Programme	WASH	Water Sanitation and Hygiene
MRT	Mass Rapid Transit		
ODA	Official Development Assistance		

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