

Institutional cooperation between MIREME and NVE in Mozambique

Mid-term review

KPMG

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Final Report

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The report was written by Thomas Fugelsnes, Director, KPMG; Ralf Tobich, Executive Director, Norconsult Africa; and Mathew McKernan, Manager, KPMG.

The report is the product of its authors, and responsibility for the accuracy of data included in this report rests with the authors. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions presented in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of Norad.

Abbreviations

AfDB	African Development Bank
ARENE	Autoridade Reguladora de Energia/ Energy Regulatory Authority
CA	Cooperation Area
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CNELEC	Conselho Nacional de Electricidade/ National Electricity Council, an advisory body
DNE	National Directorate for Energy
DPC	Directorate for Planning and Cooperation
EDM	Electricidade de Moçambique
EPU	Energy Planning Unit
EU	European Union
FUNAE	Fundo de Energia/ National Energy Fund
MIREME	Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NVE	Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate
SPEED	Support Program for Economic and Enterprise Development
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank

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1. Summary

1.1 Introduction

The purpose of this mid-term review is to assess the status of the progress of the institutional cooperation between Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy (MIREME) and Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE), taking stock of lessons learned from the experience so far, and to consider possible measures to strengthen goal attainment.

In 2017, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Government of Mozambique entered into an agreement regarding financial support to the institutional cooperation between MIREME and NVE. The Program was to be implemented between December 2016 and December 2020 with a grant of NOK 42 mill.

The long term intended impact of the Program is improved energy sector management and more transparent decision making processes. The Program, split across four Cooperation Areas, is assisting the government of Mozambique to improve the attractiveness of the sector by:

- ✓ reducing and removing barriers to private sector participation in the Mozambican power sector through increased clarity and transparency in sector regards plans, rules and procedures, and
- ✓ strengthening the authorities' capacity to interact with private sector players in an efficient way, particularly during licensing and concession processes.

The Program was designed following a fact-finding mission in 2013, followed by a three year Inception Phase that concluded in 2016. Four workshops were carried out to map the needs of MIREME and define the Program during the Inception Phase. Several activities were also carried out during this period by NVE, such as support drafting the ARENE/ regulator law.

1.2 Key findings

The Program is likely to achieve planned outputs in two Cooperation Areas – Legal Framework (CA2) and Soft Skills Enhancement (CA4). Meanwhile, Capacitation of ARENE (CA3) is stalled and Analytic Capacity (CA1) has produced outputs with minimal uptake in MIREME.

Outcome achievement for the Program is at risk. This appears to be driven by a lack of political ownership and lack of support at the right counterpart level, as well as a reflection of Program design, in which the causal link in the Theory of Change between tasks, outputs, intermediate outcomes and outcomes appears weak.

Overall, the Program is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory and scores the highest on relevance, and lower on effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and risk & cross-cutting issues.

Figure 1: Program summary



Relevance: The Program reflects the development priorities of Mozambique and it targets key bottlenecks in the sector. It suffers, however, from shortfalls in its design and implementation. The fly-in/fly-out approach that the Program has defaulted to, does not appear to lend itself well to an institutional cooperation that is fundamentally about systems building, strengthening and capacitation. Furthermore, coordination and alignment among development partners and counterparts appears sub-optimal and key assumptions are lacking in the Theory of Change for the Program.

Effectiveness: Two out of four Cooperation Areas – Legal Framework (CA2) and Soft Skills Enhancement (CA4) – are progressing well. Analytic Capacity (CA1) is off-track while Capacitation of ARENE (CA3), is stalled. Outcome achievement is at risk, even for those Cooperation Areas producing outputs. MIREME values the advice and 'second opinion' NVE and consultants Lund & Co are providing in the drafting of the electricity law, though a 'political track' is needed for completion, enactment, and implementation of the law and supporting regulations (CA2). While individual trainings (CA4) were welcomed by beneficiaries, they also questioned their collective impact on building organizational capacity.

Efficiency: Assessing the extent of cost-efficiency is difficult to estimate. The overall approach of the Program, including fly-in/fly-out, raises questions, as those Cooperation Areas with local presence and resources (CA2 and CA4) have more traction than those without (CA1 and CA3). Generally, implementation is not on time.

Sustainability, risks and cross-cutting issues: The requisite resources at MIREME/ ARENE to sustain activities do not appear to be in place across all four Cooperation Areas. High-level support and ownership at the right level appears to be lacking.

Regarding implementation, the following summarizes the status of each Cooperation Area:

	Analytic Capacity (CA1)	Legal Framework (CA2)	Capacity of ARENE (CA3)	Soft Skills Enhancement (CA4)
Status	 Off-track	 On track, with outcome risk	 Stalled	 On track, with low impact risk
Summary	Minimal progress given lack of capacity and mismatch between Directorate of Planning and Cooperation (DPC) data priorities and CA objectives. Impact is not apparent.	Revision of draft Electricity Law ready for consideration by sector stakeholders, Ministers & Parliament. Regulations under draft. Impact is within reach.	No progress due to leadership vacuum. CEO was instated on 12 November 2019, clearing the way for capacitating and operationalizing ARENE. Impact is not apparent.	Good progress. Beneficiaries pleased with trainings, and value on-the-job training following coursework. Beneficiaries question the collective impact of individual trainings on building organizational capacity.

Note: Red indicates high risk; orange, medium risk; green, low risk.

1.3 Recommendations

Recommendations for improving the effective implementation and impact of the Program are summarised below.

1.3.1 Program recommendations

Recommendation	Suggested Responsibility	Description
1. Implement a no-cost extension of the Program	Embassy/ NVE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ 65% of the budget is still available for the second half of the Program, but time may be too short to achieve lasting impact. A no cost extension is recommended, particularly in view of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ enactment of the electricity law (CA2) likely to still take some time, while Speed+ may be discontinued in 2020. ○ the recent appointment of a CEO to ARENE has enhanced prospects for improving implementation in CA3.
2. Build broad ownership of support interventions at political level and among development partners	Embassy/ NVE/ MIREME	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Develop a joint strategy for sensitization and advocacy at political level, especially for CA2 and CA3. ✓ Embassy could take a pro-active role in support of the Program, facilitated by NVE, to support de-bottlenecking and address ownership challenges. ✓ Leverage existing relations with key development partners (WB, AfDB, EU, Belgium, etc. through Energy Sector Working Group and high-level channels) to coordinate and build political track, especially for CA2 and CA3.
3. Review funding model for Program	Embassy/ Government of Mozambique	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ To build ownership of the Program by counterparts, the Embassy could consider reviewing the funding model in order to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ agree an appropriate level of counterpart funding with the Government of Mozambique (the lack of a government budget for the Program impedes day-to-day counterpart, impacting ownership of the Program). ○ agree on an effective way of administering Program funds internally, including regular accounting and reporting.
4. Re-scope Program/ CAs	NVE/ MIREME	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ NVE should engage MIREME (at a ministerial level), ARENE and relevant development partners in a strategic discussion to align, take stock and revise activities for a no-cost extension. This could be done at Program and/ or CA level: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ CA1: Re-scope or contemplate early termination ○ CA2: Scope approach to build political traction for legal reform, and to manage risks and assumptions of the Theory of Change ○ CA3: Support ARENE in building the overall strategy of the new CEO, and scope how interventions from different development partners complement each other (WB, EU Resource Center, Enable, NVE, etc.) in their support to the agency ○ CA4: Evaluate and ensure that organizational delivery capacity is maximized (the individual Scorecards could be used to spark this discussion), and not just individual capacities.
5. Improve local presence	NVE/ MIREME	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Solicit feedback from counterparts regarding their views on the appropriate approaches for the various CAs ✓ Consider whether the proposed local presence could be built around support for CA2 and CA3, or for the Program as a whole ✓ Evaluate the potential costs and benefits of local presence/ advisors vs ad-hoc support interventions. This could include a coordination 'anchor' for the Program, in addition to embedded technical advisors.
6. Strengthen counterpart role	MIREME	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ MIREME could review the focal point position to ensure that the Program is well anchored within the Ministry.

Recommendation	Suggested Responsibility	Description
		✓ Government could make a small budget available t for day-to-day counterpart activities under the Program, and consistent / in connection with Recommendation 3 (review of funding model).

1.3.2 Cooperation Area recommendations

	Analytic Capacity (CA1)	Legal Framework (CA2)	Capacitation of ARENE (CA3)	Soft Skills Enhancement (CA4)
Recommendations	<p>Re-scope CA (or terminate early) with MIREME leadership, to be more responsive to MIREME strategy and demands.</p> <p>Anchor support for the CA at a higher level in MIREME (Ministerial-level).</p>	<p>Align technical support to policy and political messaging for implementation to ensure a political track and coalition for enactment.</p> <p>Support completion of draft regulations so that these may be considered together with the revised law.</p>	<p>Re-scope CA to align to vision of new ARENE CEO.</p> <p>Prioritize flexibility to manage transfer of responsibilities to ARENE.</p> <p>Align with relevant development partners on political messaging.</p>	<p>Evaluate impact of individual trainings' effect on augmenting organizational delivery capacity.</p> <p>Consider refocusing trainings based on top-down directive, aligned to strategic priorities</p>

2. Review findings

2.1 Program

The Program is likely to achieve planned outputs in two Cooperation Areas – Legal Framework (CA2) and Soft Skills Enhancement (CA4). Meanwhile, Capacitation of ARENE (CA3) is stalled and Analytic Capacity (CA1) has produced outputs with minimal uptake in MIREME.

Outcome achievement for the Program is at risk. This appears to be driven by a lack of political ownership and lack of support at the right counterpart level, as well as a reflection of Program design, in which the causal link in the Theory of Change between tasks, outputs, intermediate outcomes and outcomes appears weak.

Overall, the Program is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory and scores the highest on relevance, and lower on effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and risk & cross-cutting issues.

Figure 2: DAC scoring summary



Note: The Program and each Cooperation Area was rating on a scale from 1 to 6. Six being the highest, one the lowest. See Appendix on methodology for details.

2.1.1 Relevance

The extent to which the Program is suited to the priorities and policies of MIREME, ARENE and the Mozambican Government

The Program is highly relevant and reflects the development priorities of Mozambique. Support to the power sector is anchored at the political level, being one of four main priorities for the administration's previous *Plano Quinquenal de Governo* (PQG 2015-2019).¹ Incentivising private sector investment and entry into the power sector is a critical priority in the National Development Strategy's (2015-2035) second pillar (infrastructure development).²

A transparent, clear and empowering legal framework is critical in order to provide clarity to the private sector on concessions for generation, transmission, distribution and sale of electricity to incentivise market entry and foreign direct investment into the sector. The 1997 Electricity Act (law 21/97) is currently under revision, and will define the overarching framework for the sector going forward and is highly relevant for deploying targeted support by NVE and other donors, such as USAID's SPEED+. A fully-fledged independent regulator, too, is critical, and the lack of one has been a key bottleneck. Since its establishment in 2008, the regulatory functions of Conselho Nacional de Electricidade (CNELEC) have been limited to providing strictly advisory services, with no scope for enforcement in the absence of a regulatory mandate.

Underpinning the enabling environment is the requisite capacity and information to drive effective decision-making in MIREME and ARENE. Quality data needs sourcing, and capacities need to be in place in MIREME, which has often relied on technical expertise in EDM in order for it to fulfil its mandate. Collectively, the Cooperation Areas are well-aligned to driving the vision for the

¹ See: <http://www.portaldogoverno.gov.mz/por/Governo/Documentos/Planos-e-Programas-de-Governacao/Plano-Quinquenal>

² See: https://www.cabri-sbo.org/uploads/bia/mozambique_2015_planning_external_national_plan_author_region_portuguese_.pdf

sector as laid out in key public sector strategies, notably the *Integrated Master Plan*, *National Electrification Strategy*, and EDM's *Ten-Year Strategy*, among others. However, there may be an overemphasis on data collection over analytical use. Similarly, efforts to build MIREME capacities may not be in line and/ or responding to the strategic priorities of MIREME leadership. For instance, the leadership questioned the need for CA1: Analytic Capacity.

There are several development partners' activities across all four Cooperation Areas. For instance, when it comes to CA1, NVE is one of many partners working on data collection and information management, including ICT solutions (currently MIREME does not have one). Similarly, several donors such as Belgium, the European Union (EU) and World Bank (WB) are providing assistance to ARENE, whose appetite to channel more support is likely to grow with the recent appointment of ARENE's CEO. This makes coordination integral moving forward.

However, coordination and alignment could be strengthened. NVE and Belgium appear to coordinate trainings under CA4 (Belgium is complementing soft skills training provided by NVE with more technical trainings), while Speed+ program support to provide revisions to the electricity law opened up an unplanned opportunity for NVE. The collaboration appears to work well (Speed+ is driving the support to MIREME, while NVE acts as MIREME's advisor and provides inputs on legislation texts and participate in review meetings). The other Cooperation Areas could benefit from more coordination and alignment, especially at Program level, as the Program does not appear to capitalize on existing coordination platforms such as the energy sector working group chaired by Norway.

While the Program is highly relevant and targeting key bottlenecks in the sector, it suffers from some shortfalls in its design. A fly-in/fly-out model does not appear to lend itself well to an institutional Cooperation that is fundamentally about systems building, strengthening and capacitation. The CAs with traction appear to be those that have local presence, such as Speed+ for CA2 and the local consultant for CA4. Furthermore, key assumptions are lacking in the Theory of Change (see Figure 3) and across all four Cooperation Areas. For instance, a political track was not planned for how to support the enactment of the Electricity Law, in which a more coordinated and consistent approach with other stakeholders (development partners, private sector, civil society, EDM, etc.) could have been incorporated. NVE reports that the reason for why a political track was not planned for was that NVE thought the counterpart was not ready for it at the time of inception. Further, the technical nature of tasks and support to ARENE appear to be activities that a fully-functional regulator would benefit from; the significant change management and organisation-building process that characterizes the establishment of a new institution appears to be underestimated.

Risks appear to be somewhat understated given the complexity of the context. While flexibility has been built into the design and emphasised in the Program documentation, mitigation strategies are generally not time-bound and/ or implemented. Combined with a minimal ongoing on-the-ground presence, the ability to adjust course in some Cooperation Areas, such as Analytic Capacity (CA1), appears challenging.


Generally, there appears to be limited synergies with Norway's broader support portfolio to the energy sector. Individual Cooperation Areas appear to have been implemented in isolation, with limited coordination, complementarity and direct linkages with the other Cooperation Areas. It was also unclear how the Program compliments or synergises with other projects in the Embassy's portfolio. For instance, Statistics Norway has a Program that includes a component related to energy that may benefit the program (given the emphasis on data collection and recommendations to look more at analytical use).

2.1.2 Effectiveness

The extent to which the Program is on track to achieve its objectives

There are some weaknesses in the results framework and tracking the effectiveness of the Program. All Cooperation Areas have individual results frameworks that feed into the broader agreement of the institutional cooperation, forming an indicative implicit Theory of Change for the project (see Figure 3), which has notable shortfalls. Inputs are in fact pre-requisites for success, indicators for tasks/activities are missing, as are key assumptions across the theory of change for both the Program and Cooperation Areas.

Figure 3: Implicit Indicative Theory of Change³



The causal chain between tasks, outputs, intermediate outcomes, and outcomes needs strengthening and assumptions built-in. Tasks are, from a technical standpoint, logical in establishing informed decision-making and power sector planning within MIREME but most Cooperation Areas ignore the political anchoring at the correct level. For instance, in order for CA1 tasks (establishing planning objectives and organizing the planning cycle) to lead to outputs, they appear to need to be owned and driven at a higher level in MIREME than the current level of engagement. Similarly, given the low levels of resources and capacity in Department of Planning and Cooperation, it is unlikely whether outputs (data, KPIs, and routine planning procedures) will ultimately lead to outcomes (regular reporting and planning cycles) without hands-on support, given minimal ownership/ mutual agreement on the problem/ solution applied for the Cooperation Area.

Two out of four Cooperation Areas are likely to achieve (planned) outputs: Legal framework and Skills enhancement. The draft Electricity Law is ready for consideration by stakeholders and regulations are being drafted (CA2), and MIREME values the advice and 'second opinion' NVE and consultants Lund & Co are providing. Training activities (CA4) have been completed as planned. Capacitation of ARENE (CA3) is unlikely to take effect, given that the necessary pre-conditions (leadership, staff capacity, resources, clear legislated mandate, etc.) are not in place to fulfil the scope of work of this CA as it is defined currently. While CA1 has produced a reporting template (one key output), DPC/ MIREME are not planning to continue its use. MIREME and NVE also report inconsistencies in data collected.

³ Illustration based on results framework in the updated Program Document (November 2018).

Outcome achievement is at risk. Even for those Cooperation Areas producing outputs, achieving outcomes and impact is at risk. Likelihood of achievement is somewhat a reflection of Program design and a theory of change that, in its current form, appears optimistic and ambitious; the causal link between tasks, outputs, intermediate outcomes and outcomes is weak. For instance, it appears that passing of the new electricity law is likely, given the right interventions and coalitions. Moving forward, a further emphasis on the political track is needed, especially considering the planned exit of Speed+ in 2020, which may come before the law is passed. While individual trainings (CA4) were welcomed by beneficiaries, they also questioned their collective impact on building organizational capacity. This may be because demand appears to be sourced from the bottom-up (based on individual staff demands), and not from leadership and anchored to delivery priorities. CA4 would probably benefit from an increased effort on strengthening organizational management moving forward.

A critical factor to be addressed is DPC's role as counterpart directorate and coordinator of the Program among MIREME's other national directorates, which may require DPC to take stronger ownership. To manage such a transition effectively may require intervention at political level. It is recommended that NVE facilitates this – with support from the Embassy – by way of engaging with the MIREME leadership.

It appears the Program struggled to overcome expected bottlenecks which has constrained the attainment of the Cooperation Areas, such as ownership and political buy-in. The potential biggest achievement – the revision of the electricity law – was opportunistic. SPEED+ opened an opportunity for NVE to work more productively in Cooperation Area 2.

2.1.3 Efficiency

The extent to which inputs are translated into outputs

The overall approach, methodology and work plan of the program is ineffective. The fly-in/fly-out approach appears challenging when providing systems strengthening and capacity building support. Those Cooperation Areas with presence and use of (local) consultants (CA1 and CA4) appear to have more traction than those without. The opportunity of relying on SPEED+ and its presence on the ground and as the main advisor to MIREME for the legal framework has worked well for the Program – and the Program's fly-in/fly-out technical assistance model is reported to have complemented the SPEED+ support well. This approach comes with risks though, as it is limiting NVE's influence over the process, especially with the impending withdrawal of SPEED+. The outsourcing of Cooperation Area 4 – Skills enhancement – to a local consultant, appears to have worked well (the on-the-job training after classroom sessions are reported to have been appreciated by the stakeholders interviewed).

Re-scoping Cooperation Areas and the modality of delivery support is advisable. NVE should engage and align with MIREME (Ministerial-level), ARENE and relevant development partners to take stock and revise activities for a no cost extension. A joint scoping with MIREME would help to re-anchor CA1 ownership, while the recent appointment of a CEO in ARENE will undoubtedly bring interest from partners to their support. Crucially, a conversation on the approach would focus attention on how best NVE can transfer its knowledge to counterparts, and whether an on-the-ground presence is a critical requirement in the eyes of the recipient institutions.

Assessing the extent of cost-efficiency is difficult to estimate. To date, NOK 14 mil (35%) of the total budget has been spent with minimal outputs across all four Cooperation Areas. Some activities appear cost-efficient, notably CA2 – legal framework – but it is unclear if activities themselves are cost-effective, as NVE's contribution is difficult to ascertain, given the significant role of Speed+. In CA3, the support has produced no strategic outputs, while those produced for CA1 are deemed irrelevant by Department of Planning and Cooperation/ MIREME leadership, which may be a reflection of the mismatch between Directorate of Planning and Cooperation (DPC) data priorities and Cooperation Area objectives. Generally, it appears that the most effective approach has been using consultancies that engage local resources (CA2 and CA4), with the deployment of NVE staff support to MIREME/ ARENE on a fly-in/fly-out appearing less impactful.

Table 2: Program budget and expenditure

Component	Budget	Expenditure					Balance (remaining)
		NVE***	Consultants**	Travel (NVE)	Misc.	TOTAL	
Backstopping	6.73 mil	3 221	160	854	46	4 280	2 459
CA1	8.07 mil	1 071	-	440	4	1 515	6 564
CA2	12.70 mil	1 077	2 755	647	58	4 537	8 171
CA3	8.51 mil	691	3	392	2	1 087	7 429
CA4	3.95 mil	41	2 636	-	-	2 677	1 280
Sum	40 mil						25 904
Contingency	2.0 mil	-	-	-	-	-	2 000
TOTAL	42 mil	6 100	5 554	2 333	110	14 096	27 904

*All figures in 1000 NOK as reported by NVE for this review. Includes Q3 2019.

** Includes consultant travel & fees

***Hours based on 1 200 NOK hourly rate.

The Program may benefit from a different approach. Program expenditure on project management support appears high, at NOK 4.3 mil (30% of expenditure to date), while travel accounts for 17% of expenditure to date. 1 200 NOK/ hour is broadly reflective of the current market rates for a senior energy advisor, but it is unclear if fees are representative of NVE's cost structure. NVE reports that the rate represents self-cost, calculated according to government regulations. Generally, resources could probably have been used differently to ensure that outputs were produced, coordination took place, and ownership was built (e.g. NVE hiring local staff; NVE staff doing longer missions, etc.).

The funding arrangement for the Program was questioned by DPC/ MIREME. DPC/ MIREME reports that it has been challenging to carry out day to day activities given the government has not provided any budget resource (i.e. counterpart funding) for the Program. MIREME is also not managing any of the funding from Norway, and DPC/ MIREME reports that this could be an underlying reason for why MIREME does not take full ownership of the Program in certain Cooperation Areas.

Implementation is not on time. Two Cooperation Areas have no significant progress to date. For CA1, implementation is complicated by what appears to be a lack of alignment between Department of Planning and Cooperation (DPC) data priorities and Cooperation Area objectives. CA3 has been stalled for a significant amount of time due a leadership vacuum, out of NVE's control. Work on CA2 has shown good progress and the regulations are being drafted. This CA has benefited from an on-the-ground presence of SPEED+, as well as the external support provided by Lund & Co. (though the law must now move through the machinery of government, and therefore largely out of NVE's sphere of influence). CA4 is wrapping up its work, which was well received by beneficiaries.

Overall, the Program reports are a fair representation of the Program's results, and there does not appear to be any deliberate misrepresentation of results. There are some instances of underreporting, for instance CA4 achievements have missed quantitative numbers to showcase the breadth of impact.

2.1.4 Sustainability

The (likely) probability of continued long-term benefit following Program completion

There appears to be ownership challenges in some Cooperation Areas, and, overall, a political 'anchor' for the cooperation appears to be missing. For instance, the legal department in MIREME has taken real ownership over CA2, but despite three public hearings, it is unclear to what extent crucial stakeholders, such as EDM, key decision-makers and development partners, are sufficiently involved in the process. Similarly, MIREME stakeholders interviewed, including those in leadership, questioned the relevance of CA1. The Program would benefit from engaging at a higher level. The extent to which NVE is building and nurturing ownership and understanding with higher level management and leadership, or using the Norwegian Embassy or the Energy Sector Working Group or other partners like the World Bank, to leverage more attention at a political level (where appropriate) appears insufficient. However, it's worth noting that ownership challenges may be a product of the broader power sector reforms underway in the country, and outside of NVE's ability to influence.

The requisite resources to sustain activities are not in place. For instance, CA1 lacked staff to capacitate, while ARENE is in the midst of change-management and institution-building process.

Overall, it is unrealistic to preclude any 'gap filling' support by NVE as stated in section 2.3 of the Program Documents given the context of severe capacity constraints, weak organizational structures, and growing mandate (notably, of ARENE). Though a fine line must be struck, an element of gap-filling is often required in those Programs aimed at strengthening government systems, including coaching, mentoring and capacitating staff to deliver. These critical pre-conditions/ requisites are also missing from the Theory of Change.

There is insufficient time to execute most Cooperation Areas, apart from CA4. CA4 is in the process of wrapping up. While there is enough time for the technical work to conclude for CA2, enactment, ratification, and corresponding implementation support required post-enactment is at risk for the present period (and predominantly outside NVE's control). Regarding CA3, the CEO is freshly appointed and the tasks in the results framework are unrealistic. A re-scope is advisable, as the new CEO is likely to have his own vision and priorities in need of support, and a time extension will be needed, provided a re-scoping proves favourable. CA1 appears unsuccessful and may benefit from early termination, resource redeployment, or a re-scoping exercise that shifts the focus of the Cooperation Area to be more reflective of the high-level priorities within MIREME, is worth exploring.

It is difficult to assess if the program balances scope for opportunism and flexibility versus driving strategic objectives. A good example of being opportunistic is CA2, in which NVE's support has been able to coordinate and adjust to the window of opportunity provided by the entry of USAID's SPEED+ program. On the other hand, CA1 has not been able to adapt to circumstances and adjust training/ technical assistance according to Ministry needs (including an early termination).

2.1.5 Risk & cross-cutting issues

The extent to which risks are identified and mitigated, and the program's impact on Norway's cross-cutting priorities (human rights, women's rights and gender equality, climate and the environment or anti-corruption)

Most risks have been identified, including those beyond the Program's control in the Program document. For instance, the lack of political will and ownership for the Program was flagged given the profound changes following the inception phase (i.e. restructuring into MIREME, replacing senior management, etc.); legislative factors beyond the control of MIREME affecting the work of CA2; the leadership void in ARENE; and ensuring equal gender participation in trainings would have minimal influence over women's promotion or career progression.

Mitigation strategies are, in some cases, under-developed, and are generally not time bound, making them difficult to action. For instance, the mitigation strategy for lack of ownership of the Program is placed on the Embassy as the responsible party to intervene, but the extent of regular collaboration between NVE and Embassy is unclear.

The Program document incorporates cross-cutting issues, but the Program has not found it relevant to address them. Cross-cutting priorities have a stand-alone chapter in the Program document describing the importance and approach, but cross-cutting themes are not incorporated into CA implementation, apart from equal gender participation in CA4 and disaggregating data by gender in CA1 (not implemented). Apart from corruption, cross-cutting risks are absent in the risk matrix. Cross-cutting issues have not been systematically reported on in quarterly reporting. There appears to be no stated or reported negative effects.

2.2 Cooperation Areas

COOPERATION AREA 1: ANALYTICAL CAPACITY

Objective

Strengthen the ministry's human and institutional capacity to collect information on the sector in a systematic way; and plan development of the sector based on quality information.


Budget	Expenditure	Status
 NOK 8 mil	 NOK 1.5 mil (19%)	 Off-track

Progress	Recommendations
 <p>Minimal progress given lack of capacity and mismatch between Department of Planning and Cooperation (DPC) data priorities and CA objectives.</p> <p>Impact is not apparent</p>	 <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Re-scope (or terminate early) CA with MIREME leadership to be more responsive to MIREME strategy and demands. 2. Anchor support for the CA at a higher level in MIREME (Ministerial-level)

Lessons Learned
 <p>Limited evidence of adaptation</p> <p>The program has not been able to adapt to circumstances and adjust training/ technical assistance for CA1. It is unclear if the lack of a continuous ground presence inhibits NVE's ability to identify, assess and judge when alterations in programming may be necessary.</p> <p>Sustainability is at risk</p> <p>The requisite resources to sustain activities are not in place i.e. currently only four staff working in the Statistics and Planning Unit (up from two), who may not have the right background and competencies to take this forward. This is perhaps attributable to the mismatch of DPC data priorities and CA objectives.</p>
<p>Limited ownership in MIREME</p> <p>Notable MIREME stakeholders, including those in leadership, interviewed, question the relevance of the CA. It is unclear the extent to which NVE is attempting to build and nurture ownership and understanding for the CA with higher level management and leadership.</p> <p>Lack of capacity, characterized by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Limited staff with other responsibilities ➢ Limited data collection and analytical planning experience of focal point ➢ Reported miss-alignment between CA objective and data needs of MIREME ➢ No data server, nor appropriate software or IT network

COOPERATION AREA 1: ANALYTICAL CAPACITY

CA Score - 2.3 of 6
Unsatisfactory



COOPERATION AREA				
 Relevance 3.3	 Effectiveness 1.8	 Efficiency 2.2	 Sustainability 1.8	 Risks & Cross-cutting 2.7
 Strengths			 Weaknesses	

In the National Development Plan and the current administration's priority sectors, the energy sector is a key priority. Data collection is critical for power sector planning.

Despite many development partners involved sector data collection, such as Belgium and AfDB, there is minimal active actions taken to align and synergise with other development partners. Counterparts, including MIREME leadership, do not share the same understanding of the purpose of the CA and deployed assistance by NVE.

CA outcomes target a fundamental bottleneck for MIREME: bolstering its routine power sector planning through better data. Tasks are, from a technical standpoint, logical in establishing informed decision-making and power sector planning within MIREME.

There is reportedly no usable output produced e.g. MIREME is unhappy with the reporting template and is not planning to continue using it. There are reported inconsistencies in data collected.

Key assumptions are missing from the results framework and Theory of Change. E.g. in order for tasks to lead to outputs, they must be owned and driven at a higher level in MIREME than the current level of engagement.

Most risks have been identified, including those beyond the program's control. Ownership and buy-in risks were flagged in the Program Document, given the profound institutional changes (i.e. restructuring into MIREME, replacement of senior management, etc.). Mitigating actions are developed, though not time bound and implemented.

A fly in/out approach is difficult when providing systems strengthening and capacity building support, especially given the lack of ownership and capacity (personnel). The desire to not provide 'gap filling' is perhaps unrealistic given the context.

COOPERATION AREA 2: LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Objective

Assist in revising the legal framework to better address the current bottlenecks in the electricity law and associated regulations to reduce uncertainty and risk for all actors in the energy sector.

Budget	Expenditure	Status
 NOK 12.7 mil	 NOK 4.5 mil (36%)	 On track, with outcome risk



Progress

Revision of draft Electricity Law ready for consideration by sector stakeholders, Ministers & Parliament. Regulations under draft.

Impact is within reach. Contribution/ attribution to NVE is perhaps unclear.



Recommendations

1. Align technical support to policy and political messaging for implementation to ensure a political track and coalition for enactment.

2. Support completion of draft regulations to be considered with revised law.



Lessons Learned

Possible lack of political commitment

The extent to which there is a high-level political commitment to the proposed reorganization of the power sector and reallocation of responsibilities under the new law is not clear. A common vision for Mozambique's energy future appears to be lacking.

Clarification of sector structure and institutional roles

The proposed reallocation of some energy sector responsibilities requires a clear understanding of the roles, responsibilities and interplay of the various actors. The position and scope of the new Energy Planning Unit (UPE) needs to be clarified.

Need for wider consultation, coordination


Key stakeholder buy-in is essential for sector-wide acceptance and effective implementation of the new cross-cutting law. The support of EDM, development partners and the private sector should be pursued. Also key is the coordination with other ministries e.g. water, public works.

The importance of a focused working group

The progress achieved is largely attributable to the effective working group that includes dedicated MIREME staff and experienced independent advisors (SPEED+). Advisors' continuous presence in the country and deeper understanding of local circumstances may have contributed to the success of this CA.

COOPERATION AREA 2: LEGAL FRAMEWORK

CA Score – 4.0 of 6
Moderately Satisfactory



COOPERATION AREA				
				
Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability	Risks & Cross-cutting
5.0	3.8	4.0	4.3	3.0
 Strengths			 Weaknesses	

A transparent, clear and empowering legal framework is critical in developing Mozambique's energy sector and encouraging private sector investment.

It is unclear if SPEED+ will continue to fund the independent advisors.

This cooperation area has a strong working group that pro-actively drives the process forward. The SPEED+ intervention has provided an unplanned opportunity for NVE to support the process with legal review activities and experts.

Comprehensive consultation with key stakeholders (like EDM, key development partners, private sector and civil society) and ensuring their buy-in may hinder the expeditious and effective implementation of the new law, once enacted.

EDM has over many years developed concession agreements for large power projects that are acceptable to financiers and have been successfully applied on a number of occasions. This experience can greatly enhance the effectiveness of drafting appropriate model agreements but would require consultation with EDM which presently does not appear to exist.

COOPERATION AREA 3: CAPACITY IN REGULATOR

Objective

Mobilise NVE to build capacities in ARENE, the future regulator, to fulfil its different roles for safeguarding the power sector functioning.

Budget



NOK 8.5 mil

Expenditure



NOK 1.1 mil
(13%)

Status



Stalled



Progress

No progress due to leadership vacuum. CEO was instated on 12 November 2019, clearing the way for capacitating and operationalizing ARENE.

Impact is not apparent.



Recommendations

1. Re-scope CA to align to vision of new ARENE CEO.
2. Prioritize flexibility to manage transfer of responsibilities to ARENE.
3. Align with relevant dev. partners on political messaging



Lessons Learned

Lack of effective leadership sows institutional decay

The lack of progress and institutional build-up in ARENE can be attributed to the leadership vacuum over the past two years. Much could have been achieved as the CA is highly relevant, though political limitations have inhibited impact.

Power sector development bottleneck

The absence of an independent operational regulator (and clear policy/legislation/ regulation) is a key bottleneck in advancing development in the power sector, in particular for bringing in private sector investment.

Assumptions appear to be lacking for the CA


The CA ignores a lengthy establishment phase of a new public institution. The results framework offers technical solutions geared towards a fully operational regulator to meet its mandate, and under-estimates the significant change management and institution-building process that characterizes the establishment of a new institution.

Ensuring ownership for the scope of work

Leadership of a public body enables prioritization, planning and delivery to take place more effectively. The appointment of a new CEO is a window of opportunity to re-scope and align NVE assistance to the new CEO's vision and priorities, ensuring ownership at the very top for the remainder of the program period.

COOPERATION AREA 3: CAPACITY IN REGULATOR

CA Score - 2.7 of 6
Moderately Unsatisfactory



COOPERATION AREA				
				
Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability	Risks & Cross-cutting
4.0	2.3	2.3	1.8	3.3
 Strengths			 Weaknesses	

The ARENE law of 2017 establishes the institutional mandate of the regulator and provides a firm basis for capacitating and operationalizing the organization.

The lack of mandated leadership over the past two years has hampered the establishment of an organizational identity for ARENE. Staff have not been motivated and the working culture appears non-existent. It is hoped that the recent appointment of the ARENE chairman/CEO will result in a rapid improvement of the situation.

The capacitation and operationalization of ARENE has strong support from a number of development partners, such as Belgium, EU and WB.

ARENE is severely under-capacitated to fulfill its mandate. In addition to the urgent need to establish suitable structures, systems and processes, existing staff may have to be redeployed to more appropriate roles commensurate with the organization's needs and their individual skills. Additional staff must be recruited and trained.

NVE knowledge sharing has not had the desired results. For instance, the successful SPEED+ intervention indicates that on-the-ground presence may be beneficial for providing effective support.

COOPERATION AREA 4: IMPROVED SKILLS

Objective

Upgrade the management and technical skills of MIREME staff, complementing the support provided in the other three Cooperation Areas.

Budget	Expenditure	Status
 NOK 3.9 mil	 NOK 2.6 mil (66%)	 On track, with low impact risk



Progress

Good progress. Beneficiaries pleased with trainings, and value on-the-job training following coursework.

Beneficiaries question collective impact n building org. capacity



Recommendation

1. Evaluate impact of individual trainings' effect on augmenting organizational delivery capacity
2. Consider refocusing trainings based on top-down directive, aligned to strategic priorities



Lessons Learned

Consolidate and synergise

A more integrated and complimentary approach to capacity building, in concrete partnership with other donor programmes of Belgium and AfDB, and with other institutions like EDM, may be advisable to foster links and knowledge transfer.

Drive demand at the right level

Demand should be driven from the top down, and based on the strategic needs of Ministry/ ARENE leadership. Demand driven from the bottom does not necessarily reflect the priorities of the Ministry/ARENE nor build collective organizational capacity in a strategic manner.

Anchor within the Ministry

Trainings are cross-cutting across departments. In the initial phase, the CA lacked an anchor within the Ministry to own and lead the initiative. The HR Director has since filled a coordination gap for the CA.


Training ++

While formal trainings are important, on the job training is equally vital. The CA balances well coursework and on-the-job coaching, and end recipients expressed the importance of on the job mentorship and training.

COOPERATION AREA 4: IMPROVED SKILLS

CA Score – 3.9 of 6

Moderately Satisfactory



COOPERATION AREA				
 Relevance 4.5	 Effectiveness 3.3	 Efficiency 4.0	 Sustainability 3.8	 Risks & Cross-cutting 4.0
 Strengths		 Weaknesses		

In order for MIREME to spearhead power sector planning and development functions, and collaborate more effectively with EDM and other public institutions, technical and soft skills needs bolstering. The CA is overlapping with staff-based initiatives by the Belgians and AfDB.

Though based on an assessment of initial needs (and updated following MIREME re-structuring), the CA could have been better designed by being more closely aligned to the Ministerial vision and government priorities for MIREME/ARENE.

Trainings have been demand-driven, and recipient stakeholders have expressed satisfaction with modules provided, especially with the on-the-job mentoring following classroom training.

Despite being demand-driven, it is unclear how individual trainings lead to augmented organisational delivery capacity. Further, demand is driven from individual staff basis at a lower level, instead of directed strategically by Ministry directors. End-recipients recognise the collective impact of the trainings remain unclear.

The programme has been successful, and the extent of trainings/reach is somewhat under-stated (i.e. number of staff trained is est. 141 persons, in which est. 174 certifications have been obtained in a relatively short space of time).

A combination of technical and soft-skills training should be more closely integrated to form a more holistic capacitation programme for MIREME and ARENE staff. Provided there is demand, a Director-level service offering might also be considered to help guide the prioritization, planning and performance management functions needed to drive delivery.

Appendix 1 Background

1.1 Context

In 2017, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Government of Mozambique entered into an agreement regarding financial support to the institutional cooperation between MIREME and NVE. The Program was to be implemented between December 2016 and December 2020 with a grant of NOK 42 mill.

Norad appointed KPMG to conduct a mid-term review of the cooperation agreement between MIREME and NVE in Mozambique. A mid-term review is a contractual component of the bilateral agreement (Chapter 13, section 13.1) and a prerequisite for the Program's continuation.

1.2 Purpose

The purpose of the mid-term review is to assess the status of the progress of the institutional cooperation, taking stock of lessons learned from the experience so far, and to consider possible measures to strengthen goal attainment. The review will focus on topics where there is potential for improvements and where the remaining time of the agreement allows for adjustment. The main questions were:

- ✓ Assess how the partners have succeeded in transferring knowledge from NVE, and enhanced capacity within MIREME.
- ✓ Identify potential need for adjustments in the Program, in order to strengthen results achievement and sustainability during the second half of the Program.

1.3 40 years of energy cooperation⁴


Mozambique became independent from Portuguese colonial rule in 1975. At that time 15 of the country's 130 districts had access to electricity. Today, 40 years later, the national electricity grid covers 147 of the country's current 154 districts. It has been challenging to arrive to this point: Shortly after liberation, Mozambique entered into a 16-year civil war, which ended in a peace agreement in 1992. The brutal destruction of the civil war greatly affected the country's infrastructure and the energy sector was not exempted. Electricity lines and other critical installations were sabotaged nearly every day. The World Bank estimates that less than one per cent of the population had access to electricity after the war. Given the history, the current electricity access rate of 26 per cent is impressive, especially when taking into account that the population has more than doubled from around 14 million in 1992 to almost 30 million in 2017.

The energy cooperation between Mozambique and Norway started around the same time as the civil war broke out in 1977. Since then, Norway's cooperation with the energy authorities in Mozambique and the electric utility EDM has grown into a strong partnership. Norway has followed the development of the energy sector in Mozambique during three important phases from: i) 16 years of civil war through ii) a longer period of power sector reconstruction and an overall positive development, to the final phase of iii) increased focus on the facilitation of private sector participation and catalytic use of the energy support.

The total amount of Norwegian aid to Mozambique from 1980–2016 was around NOK 12.31 billion. Of this, 20 per cent, or NOK 2.4 billion, was support to the energy sector. This includes support to the power sector and clean energy, but not support to Oil for Development (OfD). Support to OfD amounted to approximately NOK 190 million from 2006–2016.

⁴ This section is taken from the Norad report 'Mozambique and Norway: 40 years of energy cooperation'

Figure 4: Energy cooperation between Mozambique and Norway



1.4 NVE-MIREME Institutional Cooperation

The current phase of cooperation with MIREME, with a financial grant of NOK 42 million, began in 2017, and is the latest cycle of Norwegian cooperation agreements with MIREME, which date from 1998-2005 (NOK 37.5 mil) and 2007-2012 (NOK 29 mil). The cooperation builds off a fact-finding mission in 2013 and a three year Inception Phase that concluded in 2016, which mapped the most critical needs of MIREME, which identified support to the recently established regulator, support in the drafting of the new electricity law, and analytical capacity building in MIREME. The Program builds on a strong and successful history of providing Norwegian expertise through "public to public" twinning arrangements with institutions abroad (in particular within energy, oil, statistics and fisheries).⁵ Mozambique is a long-term partner country for Norway.

The intended impact of the Program is improved energy sector management and transparent decision making processes. It is also indirectly supporting the country to respond to its growing fiscal constraints. When it comes to the power sector, a 50% access rate by 2023 is extremely ambitious. And while a degree of debt relief has occurred, the \$ USD 2 billion debt crisis has drastically narrowed the fiscal space and temporarily curbed its ability to borrow.

To meet access targets, significant private sector investment is required. Revisions to the legal framework and establishment of an independent regulator are steps to incentivise private sector participation in the country. Accordingly, this phase of the cooperation, structured across four cooperation areas, is assisting the government to improve the attractiveness of the sector by:

1. reducing and removing barriers to private sector participation in the Mozambican power sector through increased clarity and transparency as regards plans, rules and procedures, and
2. strengthening the authorities' capacity to interact with the sector players in an efficient way, particularly during licensing and concession processes.

1.4.1 Analytical Capacity: increased analytic capacity in MIREME

The objective of this Cooperation Area is to strengthen the ministry's human and institutional capacity to collect information on the sector in a systematic way; and plan development of the sector, based on quality information.

To date, power system planning has, to a large extent, been driven at the political level, and implemented by EDM and consultants, with substantial technical assistance and financial support from bilateral and multilateral donors. Sector planning has therefore been largely conducted without MIREME ownership and / or minimal input due to capacity constraints.

The Cooperation Area is therefore prioritising the establishment of data collection mechanisms and quality data to serve as a basis for planning in MIREME, including identifying methods for periodic

⁵ Norad (2015): Evaluation of Norwegian support to capacity development

planning of the energy system that can be maintained by the Ministry, and established criteria for prioritization of geographic areas, technologies and projects.

1.4.2 Legal Framework: enabling legal framework and procedures for private sector participation in the energy sector.

The objective of this Cooperation Area is to assist in revising the legal framework to better address the current bottlenecks in the electricity law and associated regulations to reduce uncertainty and risk for all actors in the energy sector.

Mozambique's legal framework for the sector continues to evolve. In 1997, the Electricity Act (law 21/97) was enacted to provide clarity on concessions for generation, transmission, distribution and sale of electricity in order to incentivise market entry and foreign direct investment into the sector. ARENE was then established through the ARENE law in 2017, which defined regulator functions and the replacement of Conselho Nacional de Electricidade (CNELEC).

The Cooperation Area is therefore supporting MIREME in identifying key pieces of legislation in need of legal attention, analysing the options and proposing amended legal texts for approval of the legislature. Given the goal of attracting more private sector investment, there is emphasis on addressing the necessary incentives for private sector entry into power projects while still safeguarding national interests. Other donors are also present in this space, including the SPEED+ program by USAID.

1.4.3 Capacity in the Regulator: build capacity in ARENE to fulfil their mandate and support priority processes.

The objective is to mobilise NVE to build capacities in ARENE, the future regulator, to fulfil its different roles for safeguarding the power sector functioning.

In 2008, Conselho Nacional de Electricidade (CNELEC) was established to play the function of regulator. However, its mandate was strictly advisory, with no scope for enforcement. Consequently, a fully-fledged, independent regulator was meant to take shape. While the establishment of ARENE as the independent regulator in 2017 provided further clarity for the sector's regulation, replacing the limited mandate of CNELEC. However, the delayed appointment of a CEO to lead the organisation left ARENE anchorless, and with minimal absorption capacity due to a lack of ability to build activities on internal decisions considered legitimate by the organisation.

This Cooperation Area compliments well with support to the legal framework (Cooperation Area 2), and NVE is therefore focusing on building the requisite capacities necessary for ARENE to fulfil the executive, advisory and arbitration functions. Establishing ARENE as a credible, well-functioning regulator is critical to the management of the sector and private sector entry into the Mozambican power market.

1.4.4 Improved Skills for Efficiency: improved management and technical skills for greater efficiency

The objective is to upgrade the management and technical skills of MIREME staff, complementing the support provided in the other three Cooperation Areas.

To play the leading function, NVE is focusing on providing MIREME and ARENE trainings to strengthen its management and technical skills, based on an Initial Training Needs Assessment carried out during the Inception Phase of the cooperation.

Appendix 2 Methodology

2.1 Approach

The review used a theory-based approach to assess the extent to which knowledge has been transferred from NVE to MIREME, and exploring the degree to which capacities have been built according to needs of stakeholders. The review used utilization- and formative-based approaches:

- ✓ **Utilization:** The team ensured the active involvement of stakeholders in Maputo and Oslo to build consensus and understanding for the project going forward.
- ✓ **Formative:** The review identified the key strengths and weaknesses of the current Program to identify areas for adjustment for the Program going forward.

2.2 Evaluation framework

Evaluation matrix. An evaluation matrix for the Program/ Cooperation Areas was developed based on the Terms of Reference and initial discussions with Norad. The evaluation matrix can be found below.

Scorecards. A Scorecard has been developed for each Cooperation Area to provide targeted, practical findings and lessons for relevant Cooperation Area stakeholders.

Rating scale. KPMG used a rating scale to score the Program/ Cooperation Areas of the NVE-MIREME institutional cooperation (see Table 2 below).

Table 1: Rating scale

Grade	Description	Score
Highly satisfactory	No shortcomings	6
Satisfactory	Minor shortcomings	5
Moderately satisfactory	Moderate shortcomings	4
Moderately unsatisfactory	Significant shortcomings	3
Unsatisfactory	Major shortcomings	2
Highly unsatisfactory	Severe shortcomings	1

Data collection. The review team gathered data from:

- ✓ Project documentation. The team consulted documents shared by NVE, Norad and the Norwegian embassy
- ✓ Field visit to Mozambique. Members of the review team conducted consultations with MIREME, ARENE, NVE, development partners, and other relevant stakeholders in Maputo
- ✓ Meetings with NVE. The review team met with NVE staff in Norway before and after the field visit.

2.3 Limitations

This is not an evaluation, but a review prepared solely for the purpose of the Terms of Reference as agreed between Norad and KPMG AS.

Given the constraints, we have attempted to include all information relevant to this assignment. It is however possible that documents and information exist which were not made available to us, or which we were unable to locate or incorporate.

Table 2: Evaluation matrix

Relevance	The extent to which the program is suited to the priorities and policies of MIREME, ARENE and the Mozambican Government
1.1	To what extent is the program/ cooperation area in line with development priorities of Mozambique?
1.2	To what extent is the program/ cooperation area targeting the key bottlenecks and addressing main needs of recipient?
1.3	To what extent is the program/ cooperation area coordinated and aligned with other, relevant donor-funded programs such as Speed+, Enable and EU/resource centre?
1.4	To what extent is the program/ cooperation area well designed and realistic?
Average Relevance Score	
Effectiveness	The extent to which the program is on track to attain its objectives
2.1	To what extent is the results framework sufficient and appropriate to track the results of the program/ cooperation area?
2.2	To what extent is the program/ cooperation area likely to achieve outputs?
2.3	To what extent is the program/ cooperation area likely to achieve outcomes?
2.4	What are the major factors (planned and unplanned) influencing the achievement or non-achievement of these objectives?
2.5	If there were unexpected challenges that constrained the attainment of the program/ cooperation area objectives, to what extent has it been possible to resolve them?
Average Effectiveness Score	
Efficiency	The extent to which inputs were translated into outputs
3.1	To what extent is the overall approach, methodology and work plan for the program efficient?
3.2	To what extent are activities cost-efficient?
3.3	To what extent are available resources optimally used and to what extent could resources be used differently to attain greater impact?
3.4	To what extent is implementation on time?
3.5	To what extent are the program reports a fair representation of the program's results?
3.6	To what extent are there synergies between the NVE program / cooperation areas and the Norwegian Embassy's broader support portfolio?
Average Efficiency Score	
Sustainability	The (likely) probability of continued long-term benefit following project completion
5.1	To what extent have stakeholders demonstrated real ownership to the program, including at the right level?
5.2	To what extent are resources (infrastructure, human resources, funding) in place to sustain program/ cooperation area results?
5.3	To what extent is there sufficient time left in the program/ cooperation area period to execute planned activities in a proper manner?
5.4	To what extent is there evidence of program/ cooperation area adaptation and/or exit planning?
Average Sustainability Score	
Risk & Cross-cutting	The extent to which risks are identified and mitigated, and the programme's positive impact on human rights, women's rights and gender equality, climate and the environment or anti-corruption
6.1	To what extent have substantial risks been anticipated/ mapped in the program document, materialised, and mitigated?
6.2	To what extent did the program/ cooperation area take - human rights, women's rights and gender equality, climate and the environment and anti-corruption - into consideration in design, planning and execution of the project?
6.3	To what extent did the program/ cooperation area have any negative effects on human rights, women's rights and gender equality, climate and the environment or anti-corruption?
Average Risk & Cross-cutting Score	

Appendix 3 Documents reviewed

Documentation
Program document, 2016: Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy and the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate Institutional Cooperation. Implementation Phase. 2017 - 2020
Update program document, 2018.
Signed NVE-MIREME Grant Agreement
Annual Meeting minutes
Bi-annual meeting minutes
Meeting memorandums
Annual Reports: 2014/15, 2017, 2018,
SCDC Final report, 2015: Training Needs Assessment of the Mozambican Ministry of Energy and CNELEC
World Bank, 2017: National Electrification Strategy (NES) – Draft 2
NVE Quarterly Reports, (latest, November 2019)
Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy and the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate Institutional Cooperation Program – Final training report, November 2019
ITAD/Norad, 2015: Evaluation of Norwegian support to capacity development
Multiconsult/ Norad, 2017: Mozambique and Norway, 40 Years of Energy Cooperation
Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate Institutional Cooperation. Implementation Phase. 2017 - 2020

Appendix 4 Consultations

Organization	Name	Program area/ function
Norad	Endre Ottosen	Senior Advisor, Responsible for the Review
Embassy in Maputo	Tonje Flatmark Sødal	First Secretary, Energy
	Tom Edvard Eriksen	Minister Counsellor - Deputy Head of Mission
NVE	Jonas Sandgren	Program Leader
	Michael Steinfeld	Ass. Program Leader
	Olav Isachsen	CA1
	Valentin Koestler	CA1
	Jørund Krogsrud	CA2
	Alette Hillestad	CA2
	Ole Petter Kordahl	CA3
Lund & Co	Per-Andreas Bjørgan	CA2
MIREME	Augusto de Sousa	Vice Minister
	Pascoal Bacela	Energy Director, DNE
	Egas Colosse	Focal Point CA1/ DPC
	Marcelina Joel	Legal MIREME CA2
	Thelma Matavel	Legal MIREME CA2
	Laura Nhancale	ARENE CA3
	Antonio Manda	Program contact MIREME, Director DPC
	Noa Inacio	Former local Program coordinator, DPC
	Francisco Junior	Program responsible DPC, and involved in CA4
	Eugênio Simbine	Responsible during Inception Phase, Advisor to the Minister
SCDS	Lineia Caldeia	Consultant for CA4
World Bank	Claudio Buque	Energy Specialist
	Zayra Romo	Senior Energy Specialist
USAID/ Speed+	Jennifer Garvey	Project Manager Legal, CA2
	Armando Acabar	USAID representative
	Taciana Lopes	Consultant Legal
EU/ Resource Center	Melita Rogelj	AETS/ ADP International (consultant for EU)
	Magdalena Wankowicz	Team Leader
Enable/ Belgium	Evert Waeterloos	Program Manager



Contact us

Oddbjørn Vegsund

Partner

T +47 40 63 99 19

E oddbjørn.vegsund@kpmg.no

Thomas Fugelsnes

Director

T +47 41 57 03 68

E thomas.fugelsnes@kpmg.no

kpmg.no

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