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Blind Sides and Soft Spots – An Evaluation of Norway's Aid Engagement in South Sudan



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Institute (ODI) and Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI)

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This report is the product of the authors, and responsibility for the accuracy of data included in this report rests with the authors alone. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions presented in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the Evaluation Department.

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Table of Contents

Foreword	5	Chapter 3. The South Sudanese Context and the Norwegian Support	24
Acknowledgements	6	3.1 Summary Timeline of Contextual Development and Norwegian Priorities	24
Executive Summary	7	3.1.1 Overall Norwegian Assistance to South Sudan	26
Chapter 1. Introduction	12	3.2 Pre-2005–2011: Peacebuilding and Statebuilding	27
Chapter 2. How the Evaluation was Undertaken	14	3.2.1 2005 to 2011 Norwegian Funding	29
2.1 What is Evaluated?	14	3.2.2 Theory of Change 2005–2011	29
2.2 The Timeline Theory-based Approach	14	3.2.3 2005 to 2011 Dilemmas	33
2.3 Developing Retrospective Theories of Change	16	3.3 2011 to 2013: Celebrations and Reality Checks	35
2.4 Using the Theory-based Timeline Approach to Respond to the Evaluation Questions	17	3.3.1 2011 to 2013 Funding	36
2.5 The Use of Case Studies	19	3.3.2 Theory of Change 2011 to 2013	36
2.6 How – and How Much – Data was Collected	20	3.3.3 2011 to 2013 Dilemmas	37
2.7 Managing Limitations and Risks	21	3.4 2014–2018: Civil War and Peace Negotiations	38
		3.4.1 2014 to 2018 Funding	39
		3.4.2 Theory of Change 2014–2018	40
		3.4.3 2014 to 2018 Dilemmas	41



Chapter 4. Evaluating the Aid Implementation	43
4.1 Effectiveness of the Norwegian Engagement	43
4.1.1 Development Effectiveness	51
4.1.2 Peacebuilding Effectiveness	57
4.1.3 Humanitarian and Recovery Effectiveness	61
4.1.4 Effectiveness for Women and Vulnerable Groups	66
4.2 Relevance and Coherence of Norway's Engagement	69
4.2.1 Relevance to Beneficiaries, Government and International Agenda	69
4.2.2 Norway's Contribution to Coordination	70
4.2.3 Policy and Aid Coherence	71
4.3 Conflict Sensitivity in the Norwegian Support	74
4.4 Strategising and Learning from Results	77
 Chapter 5 Conclusions	 80
 Chapter 6 What Can we Learn?	 83
 Chapter 7 Recommendations	 85

References	87
Annex 1: Terms of Reference	102
Annex 2: List of Interviewees	111
List of Annexes	122
List of Tables, Figures and Boxes	123
Acronyms and Abbreviations	124
Former Reports from the Evaluation Department	126



Foreword

Norway's support to countries in fragile situations has increased in recent years. Such support requires different approaches than support to more stable countries. Often there is a need for peacebuilding, humanitarian aid and long-term development assistance at the same time.

Previous evaluations have pointed out that good contextual knowledge is crucial for robust development aid. On this background, the Evaluation Department has initiated evaluations examining overall Norwegian support in selected countries in fragile situations. The evaluation of the Norwegian engagement in South Sudan is the first of these.

Norway has contributed to the development and peace processes of South Sudan for decades. The purpose of the evaluation is to draw lessons from Norway's involvement over time in a country affected by conflict. There is limited explicit knowledge about how dilemmas and challenges are discussed and handled by Norwegian actors, especially in fragile contexts, and on which basis decisions are made during different phases and at different levels. The evaluation aims to feed into this discussion. The evaluation found that even though

such dilemmas have been discussed internally, justifications for how Norway addressed these dilemmas were never explicitly spelled out in relevant Norwegian documents. The engagement suffered from a lack of a common reference point, such as a country strategy. This is a well-known finding from many evaluations. A strategy could have enabled a more explicit justification of the engagement and made handling of dilemmas easier.

The evaluation was carried out by a team from Tana in collaboration with Chr. Michelsen's Institute (CMI) and Overseas Development Institute (ODI).

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Executive Summary

BACKGROUND

Norway has contributed to the development and peace processes of South Sudan for decades. Since the 1970s, Norwegian non-governmental organisations have been providing services, humanitarian aid and political support. The Norwegian government has provided high-level political support to the various peace processes since the early 2000s. In parallel, the Norwegian government has contributed with humanitarian and development aid reaching NOK 4.2 billion from 2011–2018. Throughout this long history, Norway's aim has been to reduce poverty, increase stability and promote peace.

To assess Norway's engagement in South Sudan, the Norad Evaluation Department commissioned this evaluation. The main purpose of the evaluation was to assess the effects of the total Norwegian engagement (development and humanitarian) in South Sudan, consider whether the engagement has been coherent and conflict sensitive, and assess how the Norwegian engagement has been adapted to a changing

context. While the focus is on the development and humanitarian aid provided, the evaluation also examines the links between political engagement and aid to see how the two complement each other. The evaluation focuses primarily on the strategic and portfolio levels. The effectiveness part of the evaluation covers South Sudan since its independence in 2011 until 2018, while the remaining parts, concerning coherence, conflict sensitivity and learning, covers the period from the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 to 2018.

METHODOLOGY

As a consequence of the limited use of detailed strategies and policies for the Norwegian engagement in South Sudan, the evaluation team decided to apply a theory-based realist approach to the evaluation. Through desk studies, interviews and a Theory of Change workshop, the team identified the Norwegian Theories of Change for South Sudan from 2005–2018. A Theory of Change is a reflection tool and a results-focused approach to describe the logical

change pathways or linkages that are embedded in development, peacebuilding, and humanitarian programming. Each Theory of Change has a number of underlying assumptions that the team assessed through reviews of documents and through interviews.

To illustrate the changes brought about by the Norwegian support to South Sudan and trace evidence from the field, four cases were selected to provide examples and evidence to nuance the overall findings. These included capacity development projects, peacebuilding projects and a food security project. The projects chosen all align with the dominant Theories of Change of the Norwegian support from 2011–2018.

The evaluation is based on extensive desk research and interviews. The team has had access to over 5,000 documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Norad, and the Embassy in Juba, in addition to a large number of resources from implementing partners, other donors and from internet and database research. The documents were used to inform the



desk phase analysis and feed into the subsequent extensive data collection phase, with multiple visits to Oslo for interviews with MFA/Norad and interviews with other stakeholders, such as the headquarters of Norwegian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operating in South Sudan. Finally, the team went to Juba, Bor, Wau and Kuajok in South Sudan in May and June 2019 to interview beneficiaries, implementing partners, resource persons and government and donor representatives. A total of 232 people were interviewed either individually, in focus group discussions, or in a targeted Theory of Change workshop.

Undertaking an evaluation of this complexity does provide challenges and limitations. These in particular relate to: availability of data, availability of interviewees, the ability to attribute results specifically to the Norwegian support, as well as the challenge of undertaking the evaluation in a conflict-affected environment with access challenges and a risk of politicising the dialogue. However, the team has emphasised rigorous verification and triangulation of evidence. While there are limitations to what can be assessed, the team nonetheless finds that the data collected is representative of the Norwegian engagement in South Sudan.

FINDINGS

The team found that throughout the evaluation period Norway aligned its support with the peace agreements and national plans, and that its Theories of Change are largely based on these. Four complementary Theories of Change were identified:

- **2005–2011:** Norway assumes that supporting the key political commitments and institutions outlined in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement will motivate the parties to implement the agreement.
- **2009:** Norway assumes that the government of South Sudan (semi-autonomous at the time) is receptive to support to strengthen its core functions and capacities. Norway thus aligns its engagement according to requests for this kind of support made by the government, and with United Nations (UN) priorities.
- **2011:** Norway assumes that capacity development will make the newly independent government transparent, accountable and democratic.
- **2014:** With the outbreak of civil war, Norway assumes that emergency assistance, food security and local-level peacebuilding will support stability to allow for peace and eventual statebuilding.

EFFECTIVENESS

The evaluation found that Norway was effective in contributing to the implementation of the CPA. However, Norway and international development partners were not effective in assisting in transforming the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) into an accountable, transparent and democratic government. The leadership of the government of South Sudan never prioritised democratic development, nor allocated funding for development activities for its people. Instead, Norway and other international partners stepped in to provide for the people of South Sudan on behalf of the government.

The assumptions underlying the Theory of Change from 2014 onwards (that peacebuilding efforts and emergency assistance would contribute to stability) is largely confirmed as there is now enhanced stability in South Sudan. Initial resilience and local-level peacebuilding work are also being implemented. However, the underlying root causes of conflict that led to the South Sudanese crisis remain.

At the individual project level, the team found that effectiveness among the projects assessed varied. Several projects were not effective as they were terminated with the outbreak of the civil war, while

other projects failed as a consequence of the design. The projects that were assessed to be effective were implemented with a high degree of adaptability to the changing context. The evaluation found that the adaptability is, to a large extent, enabled by a very flexible and long-term commitment by Norway to its implementing partners.

Norwegian support for women and gender equality in South Sudan varies during the evaluation period. In the first several years up until 2016, support to women is mentioned in the documentation, but was often not prioritised in terms of funding. With the enhanced global Norwegian focus on Women, Peace and Security (WPS), the country enhanced the support to women's projects and took the lead in the WPS donor group. Norway is thus much more proactive in its support in the latter part of the period evaluated. There are, however, very few tangible outcomes of the support for gender and WPS. The evaluation did not find evidence that support focusing on vulnerability was a significant priority for Norway.

COHERENCE

The evaluation found that Norwegian priorities, throughout the period evaluated, are relevant to formal GoSS and international treaties, policies and national

plans. Similarly, the team found that there was a high degree of relevance for the beneficiaries of Norwegian-supported projects.

In terms of coordination, Norway played a proactive role up to and in the years after the signing of the CPA in 2005. As the key aid effectiveness instruments, such as the Multi-Donor Trust Fund and the Joint Donor Team, failed to deliver as expected, Norway, together with other donors, turned towards more bilateral engagements. Since 2009, Norway has not taken a lead role in donor coordination, except for its role as lead of the WPS donor group.

The evaluation team found a high degree of alignment between Norwegian political priorities, policy dialogue and funding priorities. The alignment is particularly evident in the strong support for the institutions underpinning the different peace agreements related to South Sudan.

Throughout the period evaluated, Norway was exposed to a number of dilemmas in South Sudan, which impacted upon its support. Most important was the dilemma of how to engage with a government that did not act in the interests of its people and remained non-transparent and unaccountable. Faced with this

dilemma, Norway decided to stay engaged and work closely with the government until around 2015. While there is verbal evidence of discussions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs around this and other dilemmas, such discussions are not evident in the documentation, nor is there evidence of analyses used to inform the decisions taken.

CONFLICT SENSITIVITY

Throughout the period evaluated, Norway has funded multiple peacebuilding initiatives at the local level, as well as provided support to institutions supporting the various peace agreements. However, while the analysis of the Norwegian portfolio shows a significant emphasis on peacebuilding, there is very little trace of the application of conflict sensitivity analyses. The use of conflict analyses in key documentation is limited, and there are no references to any assessment of the Norwegian portfolio's impact on conflict. In short, the evaluation team found limited evidence of a Norwegian approach to the operationalising of conflict sensitivity.

LEARNING AND ADAPTABILITY

Learning and adapting requires feedback loops that provide information on what works and what does not work. The evaluation team found that Norway has very limited use of such results-based management



approaches. Consequently, the portfolio prioritisation is first and foremost related to political priorities and relevance assessments. There is almost no evidence of Norwegian government reporting on the performance of its portfolio. The team also found that the lack of a proper strategy for South Sudan meant that there was no reference point for learning. Had Norway used such a strategy, it would have allowed for clearer direction and transparency in its support.

CONCLUSIONS

There are an estimated 400,000 deaths from the civil war in South Sudan from end-2013 to date. The country ranks amongst the poorest in the world, and it is a country run by a government with limited accountability and transparency, as well as a limited vision for the development in the interest of its people. Thus, South Sudan is far from where Norway and other donors envisaged when signing the CPA in 2005.

This evaluation shows that many of the assumptions underlying Norway's goals and objectives did not hold. The key assumption that the government of South Sudan wanted to contribute to the development and welfare of its own people turned out to be misplaced. The evaluation has found that there were soft spots for, and a high level of trust in, the South Sudanese

leadership, and that even as the leadership obviously reneged on its democratic and peace promises, Norway continued the support.

It is possible that even if Norway had had a more reflective and systematic approach to conflict engagements, its engagements would have had only limited impact on the South Sudanese leadership. It is possible that no foreign engagement would have prevented the catastrophe that South Sudan became. After all, the leadership of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) did not shift its stance or actions when Norway and other Troika (the political alliance between the UK, the US and Norway) members became more vocal in their criticism after further violent escalation in 2016. For Norway, voicing criticism came at a price: from the perspective of South Sudan's government, Norway lost its unique reputation of being supportive and neutral.

Irrespective of the difficulties of working in South Sudan and with the South Sudanese leadership, Norway's aid engagement was not well informed. The Norwegian aid suffered from the lack of a proper analysis-based strategy guiding its aid interventions. Such a strategy would have enabled a more explicit and results-based justification of its engagement and made it easier to

withstand pressure from South Sudanese individuals and institutions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The team recommends that Norway implements the following approaches in its engagement in South Sudan and in other fragile and conflict-affected situations where relevant:

- **Develop multi-year flexible strategies building on conflict and actor analysis.** The strategies need to clearly articulate Norway's objectives, priorities, baselines, targets and Theories of Change, and the underlying assumptions of the Norwegian support. Such analyses must pay specific attention to political economy and political settlements, as well as conflict drivers and dynamics, to identify possible entry points for development assistance and policy dialogue. The analysis should be flexible, and possibly rolling, allowing for changing the approach once the assumptions of the support are no longer valid. For South Sudan, this strategy needs to consider how to deal with the dilemma of working with an authoritarian government whose goals and objectives de facto differ from those of Norway. Therefore, Norway needs to articulate – on paper – how it foresees change to happen, and thus how it will ensure inclusive politics and reconciliation.

- **Operationalise the use of conflict sensitivity in programming.** Norway needs to articulate how it wants to see conflict-sensitive approaches put into practice across its portfolio. Norway needs to analyse possible impacts of any of its engagements on conflict dynamics. For South Sudan, Norway needs to undertake an assessment of its existing portfolio from a conflict sensitive perspective.
- **Systematise learning and reflection.** The MFA and Norad have been good at ensuring that knowledgeable people have engaged in the administration and policy work around South Sudan in the past. To further emphasise learning, a more formalised learning and reflection practice in the MFA linked to conflict and political economy research is needed, and should be combined with the processes to develop an overall strategy, a development portfolio and articulated ways of how to react to changing information or circumstances.
- **Engage in more thorough results-based management approaches to development.** To measure impact of aid and allow for adaptation, the evaluation team recommends that portfolio decisions are not only linked more explicitly to the Norwegian strategy, but also based on the

performance of the portfolio and the individual projects. In effect, this means keeping track of the performance of the individual projects at output and outcome levels and use this as a basis for funding decisions. For South Sudan, the evaluation team recommends that the Embassy, and the departments managing the aid, undertakes bi-annual stocktaking of portfolio performance and only extend existing projects if there is solid evidence of effectiveness of the project performance.

- **Strengthen focus on gender equality and Women, Peace and Security.** The evaluation team recommends that Norway continues (and strengthens) its focus on gender equality and women's empowerment in South Sudan, particularly the emphasis on the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 focus on Women, Peace and Security. Norway needs to more proactively ensure that the individual projects and programmes in its portfolio mainstream gender and promote women's empowerment.
- **Recognise that development engagement is political work.** Development engagement is a political exercise both for the donors and beneficiaries. Donors pursue global priorities or use development engagement to position themselves internationally, and beneficiaries

can use development engagement for political gains. The case of Norway in South Sudan makes it exceptionally clear that politics and development cannot be separated; Norway's political work naturally influenced the abilities of its development portfolio, as well as how Norway was perceived by South Sudanese beneficiaries. In light of this, Norway should consider whether future evaluations of its aid engagement be combined with an assessment of the impact of the country's political work.



Introduction

South Sudan – the world's youngest country – is today one of the world's most challenging places, with its citizens living at the very bottom of the Human Development Index.¹ They are threatened by war, disease, displacement and hunger, in addition to having barely any access to basic social services. South Sudan's government has been discredited through its record of large-scale corruption and war crimes. As a strong supporter of South Sudan's statebuilding, this was not the path Norway – which allocates the largest share of its aid on the African continent to South Sudan – had envisioned.

For decades, Norway has played a prominent role in what has led to the present-day South Sudan. Norwegian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) provided services during the times of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement (1971–1983), they delivered humanitarian aid and political support during Sudan's Second Civil War between north and south Sudan

(1983–2005), and the Norwegian government provided high-level political support to peace negotiations to end the war. Furthermore, since the early 1970s there has been academic co-operation between Norway and Sudan.

Throughout this half-century long history, Norway's aim has been to reduce poverty, increase stability and promote peace in different ways.² Later, programmes on civil society development, infrastructure building, governance of natural resources, security sector reform, financial management and service delivery cover almost the entire spectrum of post-conflict reconstruction, peace and development. Various Norwegian government ministries, civil society actors and private sector companies have been, and in some cases continue to be, committed to supporting South Sudan.

However, the commitment to development in South Sudan suffered when the South Sudanese Government

For decades, Norway has played a prominent role in what has led to the present-day South Sudan. Throughout this half-century long history, Norway's aim has been to reduce poverty, increase stability and promote peace in different ways.

1 (UNDP, 2018) South Sudan ranks 187th out of 189 ranked countries.

2 (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2017).



and the armed opposition went to war with each other in December 2013 – a war in which both sides committed war crimes, caused civilian suffering and threatened the future of South Sudan, including its international relationships both inside and outside Africa.

South Sudan thus provides an opportunity to learn broader lessons on international support in fragile states or acute conflict situations.³

Specifically, this evaluation seeks to:

1. Map and assess the effects of Norway's total engagement during the evaluation period, including any positive or negative unintended effects of the engagement.
2. Assess whether Norway's engagement in South Sudan has been coherent.
3. Assess conflict sensitivity of Norway's engagement in South Sudan.

4. Assess how Norway has used learning, both by utilising available knowledge and by learning from experience, to inform the engagement in South Sudan.
5. Formulate lessons learned from Norway's engagement in South Sudan and provide recommendations on how to adjust the engagement in the future.

In the following chapters we first present the evaluation approach and methodology applied; this is then followed by two separate chapters of findings. The first chapter seeks to describe the context combined with Norway's funding and approach to development in Southern and South Sudan, thus responding to the first set of questions in the Terms of Reference (ToR) (see [Annex 1](#)). As the dilemmas faced by Norway in South Sudan are closely linked to the context, the evaluation will also present key dilemmas and Norway's response to them in the same chapter.

The second chapter on findings ([Chapter 4](#)) covers the remaining evaluation questions. This includes an

assessment of effectiveness, as well as the questions related to relevance, coherence, conflict sensitivity and learning. The two chapters on findings are followed by the conclusions of the evaluation in [Chapter 5](#), lessons learned in [Chapter 6](#), and finally recommendations for Norwegian engagement in [Chapter 7](#).

³ (Autesserre, 2019).



How the Evaluation was Undertaken

2.1 What is Evaluated?

The evaluation covers the total of Norwegian aid engagement in South Sudan. In effect, this means that the evaluation covers everything that is funded by the Norwegian aid budget, and which influences the priorities and implementation of the aid budget. Therefore, in addition to assessing the prioritisation and impact of the aid in itself, the evaluation also takes into consideration diplomatic and political efforts influencing Norwegian aid to South Sudan.

The evaluation is focusing on the strategic and portfolio level of the Norwegian aid. To do this, it delves into selected individual programmes rather than evaluating every single intervention. However, to get more detailed evidence to inform the strategic level, the evaluation looks more closely at four engagements that, in one way or another, are representative of the Norwegian aid.

As per the Terms of Reference ([Annex 1](#)), the assessment of the effectiveness part of the evaluation

covers South Sudan since its independence in 2011. For the remaining evaluation questions, the evaluation will look at the Norwegian aid from the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005.

2.2 The Timeline Theory-based Approach

The evaluation team has applied a Theory of Change timeline approach for this evaluation. The longitudinal nature of the evaluation meant that the evaluation team had to identify and apply an approach that would allow assessing the changes in South Sudan over time against the priorities, policies and funding applied by Norway in the same period. As there is limited strategy guidance in the Norwegian documentation, the team has had to rely on reconstructing the Norwegian priorities and rationale behind the Norwegian aid through a realist Theory of Change approach.

To apply the longitudinal elements and map changes over time, the team decided to combine the theory-

based approach with a timeline process. Combining the two allows for consecutive Theories of Change to be mapped over time – an approach that has been developed and applied by Tana across a number of longitudinal evaluations in the past.⁴

The approach applied relies on the use of Theory of Change (ToC). ToC is a reflection tool and a results-focused approach that describes the logical change pathways that are embedded in development, humanitarian and peacebuilding programming. The approach is concerned with overall programme outcomes and synergies between various strands of an intervention.⁵ The ToC approach allows the evaluator to evaluate interventions even when strategies are less clear. As Weiss states, Theory of Change ‘... *concentrates evaluation attention and resources on key*

4 The timeline element of the approach was developed by Tana in 2017 and has since then been applied to several longitudinal complex evaluations, such as the evaluation of twenty-five years of Sida peacebuilding work globally.

5 See (Blamey et al., 2007: 450).



aspects of [a] program... [and]... facilitates aggregation of evaluation results into a broader base of theoretical and program knowledge...'⁶

What are Theories of Change?

- ToC is always context-related, but also reflects beliefs or hypotheses about how change occurs. Through evaluations, these hypotheses can be tested and validated/disproved in relation to the context concerned.
- ToC clarifies the assumptions relating to the context and asks the question 'given this set of conditions, the following effect(s) can be expected from this input *because of XYZ*'.
- Similar to the logical framework approach, ToC is a way of mapping out the logical sequence of an initiative from input to outcome. However, an important difference is the focus placed on the contextual conditions and the assumptions about how change takes place.

The evaluation team has been exploring how Norway's approaches in South Sudan have sought to produce

positive change during the period evaluated and have identified the underlying assumptions for the Norwegian approach. The evaluation then assessed whether the ToCs materialised by testing whether or not the assumptions of the Norwegian ToC can be validated.


The ToC part of the evaluation methodology is based upon the assumption that Norway had an overall understanding, or expectation, of what its interventions were expected to achieve in terms of change, and what Norway's assessment of the preconditions for change were (i.e. the assumptions). Therefore, the assumption confirms or rejects the ability of the Norwegian Theory of Change to be effective. In a situation where there are no strategies in place, the Theories of Change then become the baseline against which the Norwegian engagement is evaluated.

The approach was used to map Norwegian ToCs against the changes to the context and development indicators, as well as other key development events, in an effort to then correlate these changes. Using this approach, the team was able to assess the extent to which the assumptions for the Norwegian (implicit) theories were upheld, and thus whether the objectives of the Norwegian support were met. [Figure 1](#) (next page) shows how the theory-based timeline approach works in practice.

A Theory of Change is a way of mapping out the logical sequence of an initiative from input to outcome. The focus placed on the contextual conditions and the assumptions about how change takes place is key.

⁶ (Weiss, 1998: 69).

Figure 1. The Timeline Theory-based Approach



2.3 Developing Retrospective Theories of Change

Many of the individual projects and interventions supported had their own programme theories or Theories of Change, but Norway did not articulate any overarching ToCs in the period evaluated. To facilitate the use of the timeline theory-based approach, the team had to reconstruct *de facto* ToCs for the period covered by the evaluation. The team therefore retrospectively articulated the pathways through which Norway sought to produce positive change in South Sudan during the period evaluated.

The team has retrospectively articulated these ToCs based on:

- Evidence from existing documentation on Norway's support, such as Embassy work plans and reports, Ministry of Foreign Affairs policies, finance bills, project portfolios and funding priorities; and
- A ToC workshop, interviews and focus group discussions with key Norwegian staff at relevant departments and sections at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (Norad) and the Norwegian Embassy in Juba.

Norwegian support spans decades and the ToCs have evolved over time to reflect realities on the ground. If we look at how Norwegian priorities evolved since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the ToCs can be divided into four periods. The evaluation uses these periods when assessing the evaluation questions:

- January 2005–December 2009
- January 2010–June 2011
- July 2011–December 2013; and
- January 2014–December 2018.

However, much of the underpinning assumptions of the ToCs are based on Norway's history in South Sudan pre-2005.

The Theory of Change approach does, as with any evaluation approach, come with limitations. First and foremost, reconstructing a Theory of Change in a situation where there are no clear results framework or clear justification of the support gives the reader the impression that the organisation evaluated (in this case the Norwegian government) has a clear internal understanding of the organisation's objectives and how these would be reached. In reality, however, the processes around prioritisations will often be less structured when no strategy is in place. The Theory of Change is a simplified overview of the support which

allows for evaluation of change. The ToC does not, however, cover all the nuances of the support provided.

The reconstructed Theory of Change allows for an organisation to be evaluated against overall objectives and intervention logics. This requires that the reconstructed theory builds on data and interviews that reflect the ToC. Therefore, another limitation is to agree on the reconstructed Theory of Change, which may be disputed as results emerge from an evaluation. Thus, the team has worked to ensure an element of buy-in to the Theory of Change through interviews and a Theory of Change workshop. As the Theory of Change may be contested, the ToC in this report relies extensively on direct references to policy documents and statements of key decision makers.

Nevertheless, even if tested there is always a risk that the close involvement of the people evaluated in the Theory of Change development 'leaves [evaluators] open to criticism with regard to their objectivity'.⁷ However, the close relationship in the ToC development process is needed to enable the evaluator to properly ascertain an understanding of the object of evaluation.⁸

⁷ (Blamey et al., 2007: 451).

⁸ See (Blamey et al., 2017) and for more elaboration on Theories of Change

The ToC covers the Norwegian aid objectives in line with the evaluation mandate. It does not cover the diplomatic and political goals, which may differ from the aid objectives. In that sense, it does not cover all of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs efforts in South Sudan (see also the section on managing limitations below).

2.4 Using the Theory-based Timeline approach to Respond to the Evaluation Questions

Below we provide an overview of how the team has responded to the overall evaluation questions:

1. **Effectiveness:** The effectiveness is first and foremost assessed against whether the changes foreseen by Norway in South Sudan (as expressed in the Norwegian policy framework and the reconstructed Theories of Change) have materialised, and thus whether the objectives of the Norwegian support to South Sudan have been met. In line with the methodology applied, the assessment of effectiveness includes an

options and limitations, see (Vogel, 2012) and (CDA, 2013).



assessment of whether the assumptions underlying the Norwegian support can be confirmed. There are no baselines for the Norwegian support to South Sudan other than the national indicators and peace agreements reached. Consequently, effectiveness is assessed by analysing whether Norway's approach contributed to change by validating the underlying assumptions of the Norwegian support. If the assumptions are not validated, the assistance cannot be effective. This assessment explains the overall effectiveness of the total Norwegian engagement, which is then linked to the South Sudanese development indicators, to show overall impact of development assistance to South Sudan of which Norway was a major contributor.

The overall assessment is followed by an assessment of case studies as well as other examples of projects aligned to the Norwegian Theories of Change. The evaluation relies on findings from the field research complemented with data from other existing evaluations.

In the sub-chapters under the effectiveness pertaining to development, humanitarian and peacebuilding, the effectiveness is assessed based on the type of aid provided and the data available.

Development effectiveness is assessed against results achieved for selected individual projects, and the peacebuilding section looks more broadly at peacebuilding effectiveness in a context where the definition of peacebuilding is unclear. The approach to assessing peacebuilding effectiveness is also a consequence of the fact that Norway sees most of its funding as peacebuilding, and the section therefore relates to peacebuilding effectiveness beyond the individual project. The humanitarian section assesses the support in light of the modalities applied. Measuring effectiveness of humanitarian support at the national level is not possible with the data available for South Sudan. Humanitarian effectiveness is therefore measured by assessing the effectiveness of the largest receivers of Norwegian funds as well as the support to ensure humanitarian access and the upholding of humanitarian principles.

2. **Coherence:** Coherence is assessed in accordance with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Development Assistance Committee's (OECD/DAC) definition focusing on the consistency between security, developmental, trade and military policies, as well as humanitarian policies and their application in practice. The evaluation team has thus assessed the policy

priorities of Norway, the ToCs and how these complemented (or failed to complement) the actual development, peace and humanitarian engagements supported by Norway. The assessment builds on the policy framework available, the Theories of Change, programmes and projects supported, and key policy dialogue messages as expressed in Norwegian documentation or through interviews.

As part of coherence, the team is also assessing dilemmas. Dilemmas are situations in which contextual or institutional changes require that decisions are made. In a dilemmatic situation not any one option offers a superior path of engagement or promise of success. In addition, dilemmas are characterised by possibly having negative effects in the sense that one constructive engagement can cause unintended negative consequences elsewhere. The evaluation team identified dilemmas through: (i) interviews with key international and Norwegian decision makers; and (ii) the evaluation team's desk review. Interviewees were not always attentive to whether the issue discussed comprised an explicit dilemma, yet in the interviews the interviewees reflected on the challenges of Norway and the different options at the time.



3. **Conflict sensitivity:** Conflict sensitivity is assessed based on: (i) Norway's understanding of the conflict context as expressed in documentation and interviews; and (ii) the extent to which conflict sensitivity is mainstreamed in the Norwegian policy framework and work plans, and whether there is evidence of conflict sensitivity featuring in the dialogue with implementing partners. Combined, these assessments provide evidence of the extent to which Norway has acted upon its understanding of conflict in programme design and implementation, and whether Norway has been able to respond to changes in conflict dynamics by adjusting programming.
4. **Learning and adaptation:** Learning and adaptation are assessed based on the ability of Norway to learn (and use the learning) to adapt its portfolio and programming. The evaluation is assessing the ability of the MFA to document results and lessons, and trace whether these feed into strategies, work plans, portfolios and project and programme design. Therefore, the evaluation team assessed Norwegian results-based management and Norwegian learning combined, as it takes systematic assessment of results to enable an organisation to learn from its past.

2.5 The Use of Case Studies

While the focus of the evaluation is more at a strategic and portfolio level, the evaluation team decided to complement the strategic level assessment with a more detailed assessment of four specific projects in order to provide additional project-level examples to inform the evaluation. These four projects were selected as they each represent part of one, or several, of the Norwegian Theories of Change in the period 2011–2018. It was originally envisaged that the projects assessment would focus on Most Significant Change and provide examples to be replicated. In the course of the evaluation, however, the team found significant relevant data that could be used to inform the evaluation. Consequently, the assessment of the individual projects went beyond Most Significant Change and included an assessment of the projects aligned with the evaluation criteria. The case studies provide good examples and evidence of how Norwegian aid has delivered results. The findings do not include a full evaluation of the individual projects, but rather evidence that feed into the overall evaluation of Norwegian support.

By using the four projects as case studies, the team was able to illustrate the findings from the strategic level through evidence from the project level. The information

from the case studies has therefore been used to support or nuance the overall evaluation findings. The selected case studies were chosen in consultation with stakeholders at the inception phase validation workshop. The four projects each represent a thematic priority for Norway in its support to South Sudan since 2011. The four projects are:

1. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)-managed Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Regional Initiative for Capacity Enhancement in South Sudan. The programme represents a Norwegian invention applying capacity development through the deployment of civil servants from the region (Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda) as mentors for counterparts in South Sudan's public sector. The programme was implemented in two phases from 2010 and came to an end in 2019. A third phase of Norwegian support is being prepared. The case study is thus aligned with the Norwegian support to South Sudan core functions and capacity development emphasised in the Theories of Change 2009–2013.
2. The Oil for Development (OfD) engagement has been implemented in South Sudan since 2006. The programme works with Government of South



Sudan (GoSS) institutions as well as civil society. The institutional co-operation involving government agencies was reduced in 2014 and postponed indefinitely in 2016. It continued with support to civil society organisations (Norwegian People's Aid [NPA] and Global Witness) and through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Trust Fund for capacity building in South Sudan. Norway is considering re-engaging its co-operation with the South Sudanese authorities, but any re-engagement will be based inter alia on the commitment by the government to the implementation of the peace accords. The OfD support is part of the initial support to wealth sharing aligned with the CPA in the 2005 Norwegian Theory of Change. The support is also aligned with the Norwegian Theories of Change 2009–2013 on core functions and capacity development.

3. The Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) peacemaking project provides an example of how Norway not only supports national-level peacemaking, but also peacebuilding from lower levels through the churches. The NCA project focus on local engagement in peacemaking is a key element in the Norwegian ToC for 2011 and in particular in the Theory of Change from 2014.

4. The Norwegian People's Aid food security/ livelihood project aims to ensure resilience and improve food security by developing food producers' capacity, improving agricultural practices and access to credit for producers and buyers. The project is an example of post-2013 Norwegian food security support. The NPA project thus represents a key element in the Norwegian Theory of Change 2014.

2.6 How – and How Much – Data was Collected

Data was collected through desk research, interviews, focus group discussions and workshops. The evaluation team has had access to more than 5,000 documents from the MFA, Norad and the Embassy in Juba, in addition to a large number of resources from implementing partners, other donors and from internet and database research. Not all documents are available in the electronic databases, but the team worked on those we could find and made assessments based on these. This also meant that, for example, the team did not assess all decision documents and project documents, but nonetheless covered a significant number of these.

Key types of documents used include:

- Internal documentation like Embassy work plans, half-yearly reports and internal strategy documents, briefings to the minister, or similar. These documents include Norway's assessment of the situation and the planned and/or executed actions. These are used in the report as direct references to Norway's position.
- Partner progress reports and similar partner documents. These documents provide the partner's assessment of progress and the situation. The documents are insufficient to constitute a finding on their own. Findings from these reports have been verified through multiple other sources including other evaluations, as well as from interviews.
- Documentation from individuals in notes, books, etc. These documents provide part of the background documentation. The documents are insufficient to constitute a finding on their own. Findings from these documents have been verified through multiple other sources including evaluations and interviews.
- General country data from recognised institutions like the World Bank or the UNDP Human Development Index is applied directly into the report



with referral to the source. The team is not in a position to verify the quality of these sources.

- External independent evaluations, as well as peer-reviewed articles, are a cornerstone in the evaluation. These have been subject to external review mechanisms and are generally assessed to be of the quality needed to serve as evidence combined with the team's own findings.

The findings in the report are a combination of the team's own findings verified with the data sources above and/or by combining data sources.

The data collection phase included multiple visits to Oslo for headquarters interviews and interviews with other stakeholders, such as Norwegian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operating in South Sudan. The team went twice to South Sudan (Juba, Bor, Wau and Kuajok) in May and June 2019 to interview beneficiaries, implementing partners, resource persons and government and donor representatives. An additional visit was also made to Addis Ababa to interview the African Union, IGAD and other stakeholders and resource persons.

In total, 232 people were interviewed either individually or in focus group discussions (e.g. in a targeted ToC

workshop). Interviewees included representatives from the Norwegian MFA, Norad, the Government of South Sudan and the current Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU), NGOs, United Nations (UN) agencies, donors, implementing partners, beneficiaries and resource persons.

Several rounds of validations of findings of the evaluation were undertaken. This included validation of the methodology presented in the inception report at a presentation in Oslo in February 2019, validation of the desk report presenting the first findings from the desk study in April 2019, and finally presenting of the first draft of the full report for validation to stakeholders in Oslo on 21 October 2019.

2.7 Managing Limitations and Risks

This evaluation mandate is on the aid of the Norwegian support against the aid objectives. The Norwegian aid is the final responsibility of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and for the MFA the aid forms part of the political and diplomatic objectives. For the MFA, therefore, the aid is part of the overall peacebuilding and stabilisation goals for South Sudan. However, as the objective of the evaluation is the Norwegian aid, the

effectiveness is assessed against the aid objectives only. Consequently, the MFA may meet its political objectives which may have shorter-term goals without being effective vis-à-vis long-term development objectives (having achieved its immediate political objectives, but not the development objectives). As the evaluation focuses on the aid objectives, the diplomatic and political effectiveness against the political and diplomatic objectives are not reflected in the report, and therefore does not fully capture all the work and effectiveness of the MFA in South Sudan.

In line with the Terms of Reference (ToR), the evaluation covers the total aid engagement and thus the strategic and portfolio level of the Norwegian support. Not all projects supported are evaluated. Instead the team has focused on whether the combined efforts of the Norwegian support have been effective in meeting the Norwegian objectives (as expressed in policy documents and the ToCs). Using (i) the case studies, (ii) existing external evaluations, and (iii) complementary documentation and data from interviews, the team has tried to identify projects that represent the Norwegian support and examples of effectiveness. While the data used is comprehensive, there may still be projects supported by Norway which the team has not been able to identify.



Irrespective of methodology applied, an evaluation of this complexity and timeframe has limitations. The evaluation covers a long time period, operates largely at a macro level and relies heavily on information from Norwegian government staff and implementers of Norwegian support. Norway has played a significant role in Sudan and South(ern) Sudan for several decades, which meant that many interviewees saw the evaluation as an opportunity to send messages to Norway and influence the findings of the evaluation. To counter the potential interest in influencing the evaluation, the team stressed its own independence and that all interviews would be anonymised. Most importantly, however, the team has rigorously verified evidence through independent interviews with several sources and triangulated this verbal evidence with documentary evidence.

Other major challenges, limitations and mitigations include:

- **Availability of data:** The evaluation team found it challenging to establish a comprehensive overview of Norwegian funding and programming in South Sudan, as information is not kept in one case file. Furthermore, the quality and amount of primary data varies for different periods. The team had less primary documentation available for the pre-

2011 period than for other periods. This has been sought and mitigated through verification with other secondary data or interviews with Norwegian staff and external experts. Prior to South Sudan's 2011 independence, aid data was not disaggregated by whether support went to northern or southern Sudan, making it impossible to say precisely what support went to the South. Furthermore, while the team received an impressive amount of data from the MFA, Norad, the Embassy and other sources, there will still be gaps in the data. Secondly, there is substantial data in the physical archives in Juba. Data collection from the Juba archives was limited to the case studies. While the team has tried to extract the most pertinent documents, we have not been able to assess the entire archive. However, the team has no reason to consider the data not representative overall.

- **Attribution vs. contribution:** The evaluation focuses at the macro (and thus aggregate) level, where the effects of Norway's engagement were often a product of multiple inputs, including joint approaches and pooled funding mechanisms with other like-minded donors and/or multilateral contributions. The joint approaches and joint objectives make it difficult to attribute changes

The evaluation team found it challenging to establish a comprehensive overview of Norwegian funding and programming in South Sudan, as information is not kept in one case file. The quality and amount of primary data also varies for different periods.



to Norwegian input. Therefore, the evaluation findings are in most cases referring to Norwegian contribution rather than attribution.

- **Availability of staff:** There is a high turnover of international staff in Juba and South Sudan in general and the longitudinal nature of the evaluation meant that interviewees have moved on and were not available in South Sudan. Consequently, the team spent time tracking former employees and conducting Skype interviews as needed.
- **Working in a conflict-affected environment:** South Sudan has seen multiple conflicts and has been in a civil war in the period evaluated. The conflict has a number of consequences for data availability and evaluation opportunities. First and foremost, the environment is polarised and politicised with the information from conflict parties not always nuanced. As an example, the extreme disappointment by Norway's perceived withdrawal of support that was expressed by some members of the Transitional Government of National Unity of the Republic of South Sudan (TGoNU) interviewed in Juba, needs to be seen as an expression of an ongoing debate around Norway's political engagement (partly as part of the Troika – the political alliance between the

UK, the US and Norway), rather than an accurate reflection of the level of Norwegian support to South Sudan (which has remained stable at around Norwegian Kroner (NOK) 500–600 million since independence). Secondly, the conflict means that people move around, making it more challenging to meet members of the opposition for example. Thirdly, there are areas that are less accessible due to security reasons. Again, a key measure of seeking solid evidence has been to verify data using different sources.



The South Sudanese Context and the Norwegian Support

In the following, we respond to the evaluation questions that pertain to the Norwegian support and priorities, the context and Norway's response to the dilemmas of working in South Sudan:

- What have been Norway's goals and priorities in South Sudan in the evaluation period?
- What dilemmas has Norway faced in its engagement in South Sudan?
- How did Norway assess different options in different phases and at different levels related to these dilemmas? Which assessments had more weight in these decisions?

The evaluation team found that Norway, throughout the period evaluated, has been one of the largest donors in South Sudan, and that Norway in the full period supported the peace processes and agreements and aligned its funding with these. In the same period, Norway faced an extensive number of dilemmas of

which the most prominent was the dilemma of co-operating with a South Sudanese government that never prioritised the wellbeing of its own people. The team found that Norwegian staff and leadership were aware of these dilemmas and did discuss internally, but that the options and justifications of the Norwegian response to the dilemmas were never made explicit in the relevant Norwegian policy frameworks.

As the above evaluation questions are largely informed by the context and vice versa, we have in the following decided to respond to the questions alongside the description of the background and contextual developments in South Sudan.

The chapter begins with a summary timeline overview of how the Norwegian support is linked to the context and developments in South Sudan for the full period evaluated, followed by a summary overview of the support. For each period evaluated we then present the context, the dilemmas identified and Norway's response to the dilemmas, as well as the Norwegian

aid objectives and priorities as expressed in the reconstructed Theories of Change for each period.

3.1 Summary Timeline of Contextual Development and Norwegian Priorities

For all four Theories of Change (ToCs) used for this evaluation there is an underlying assumption that a peace process will provide the grounds for long-term development efforts. This assumption underscores the importance of linking development with the political work in the Troika and the coherence in the Norwegian engagement. In [Figure 2](#) (next page) we present an overall summary of selected development and humanitarian indicators for South Sudan, the key events and the Norwegian Theories of Change.






Figure 2. Summary of Key Indicators, Events, and Norwegian Theories of Change

Note that the timetable for 2011 to 2013 does not include South Sudanese refugees in Sudan, and that the GDP up to 2011 is for all of Sudan.

3.1.1 OVERALL NORWEGIAN ASSISTANCE TO SOUTH SUDAN

Norway has been a major contributor of development and humanitarian aid to South Sudan in the period evaluated. According to Norwegian Aid Statistics, Norway provided NOK 10.5 billion in aid to South Sudan between 2000 and 2018 (including Sudan for the period 2000–2011).⁹ The funding to Sudan increased after the signing of the Machakos Protocol in 2002, which was the precursor to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), reaching a stable level of funding of around NOK 500–700 million annually from the signing of the CPA in 2005 and onwards (until 2011 this includes funding to Sudan). For the period 2011–2018 – when it is possible to clearly identify funding to the South – the total amount was NOK 4.2 billion. In the full period, Norway remained amongst the largest development partners to South


9 (Norad, 2019a). The actual disbursement from the Norwegian aid budget to South Sudan is higher. This is partly because core contributions to UN agencies are not included – some of this will be spent on South Sudan. More importantly, the team also noted that certain bilateral global programmes with specific South Sudan components are not included. This includes the deployment of Norwegian police officers to UNMISS (114 police officers between 2011 and 2018 at the cost of approximately NOK 137 million), support for higher education and research through the NORHED programme, and support to IGAD and AU on peace related interventions in South Sudan. See more in Annex 3.

Sudan, and the sixth largest in the last couple of years.¹⁰ In addition, Norway had a number of non-aid funded interventions including direct support to the United Nations Mission to South Sudan (UNMISS) and deployment of Norwegian military officers being the main disbursements. Additionally, Norway played a political role not captured in these statistics.

10 (OECD, 2019a). As per OECD-DAC Norway contributed USD 70.9 million to South Sudan in 2016–2017, making it the sixth largest development partner following the US, EU, UK, Germany and Canada.

Figure 3 gives a yearly overview of support during 2011–2018 (a more detailed overview of the aid programme in the period can be found in [Annex 3](#)).

Figure 3. Norwegian Development and Humanitarian Assistance to South Sudan 2011–2018



3.2 Pre-2005–2011: Peacebuilding and Statebuilding

Norway's history in South Sudan is long and distinguished.¹¹ Already in 1972, after the signing of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement (which ended the First Sudanese Civil War), Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) was extensively engaged in Eastern Equatoria as the main service provider to the people.¹² When the peaceful Addis Ababa period came to an end, with the start of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) rebellion in 1983, Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA) started providing support to the goals of the South Sudanese.¹³ Part of the opposition, forcing the Sudanese government to the negotiating table, started amongst the Sudanese diaspora in Norway in 2000 in an attempt to use the Norwegian safe space to solve the problems back home.¹⁴

As Sudan's Second Civil War was edging towards a peace deal from the late 1990s onwards, Norway became part of the 'Troika' – the political alliance between the UK,

the US and Norway – and in that function supported the negotiations, with Norway credited as doing much valuable background work in this function.¹⁵

After the violent split of the Sudan People's Liberation Army in 1991, reconciliation between Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) leader Dr John Garang de Mabior and Riek Machar took place with the 1999 Wunlit Conference. Norway supported the reconciliation process through NCA.¹⁶ According to interviewees, during this time many of the close relationships between Norwegian and South Sudanese actors developed.

On 9 January 2005, the Government of the Sudan and the SPLM/A signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with Norway as a signatory.¹⁷ The CPA provided the framework for the resolution of the conflict between Sudan and the SPLM/A and committed the warring parties to share power and to the joint endeavour of making Sudanese unity attractive while setting up government structures in the South. The CPA also clarified – at least on paper – security

arrangements and wealth sharing between North and South. It committed the Sudanese government to finding a solution to the conflicts in the three contested areas of Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile.¹⁸

In July 2005, SPLM/A leader Dr John Garang de Mabior became First Vice-President of Sudan and President of the then semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), which marked the start of the CPA interim period designed to last for six years. Garang's death in a helicopter crash only weeks later was a shock to the fledgling peace implementation and to the relationship between Norway and South Sudan, with Garang having been a prominent interlocutor.

In this period, the evaluation team found that Norway continued to play a key role in supporting CPA politically as a lead (with Italy) of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Group of Friends and as chair of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) 2006–2008. From an aid perspective, the support included its role as a founding member of the aid effectiveness instruments identified in the CPA and the institutions supporting the CPA. Norway was co-founder

11 For a background and overview of Norway's history and engagement in South Sudan see (Piene, 2014) and (Hanssen, 2017).

12 (Nordic Africa Institute, 1994).

13 (Rift Valley Institute, 2012).

14 (Assal, 2006).

15 (Woodward, 2016).

16 (Rift Valley Institute, 2006).

17 (Government of Republic of Sudan and SPLA/M, 2005).

18 Implementation of the agreements on the 'three areas' has been significantly less successful than the North/South CPA.



of the Joint Donor Team (JDT) and an advocate of, and contributor to, the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), and finally a major contributor to the UN peacekeeping mission in Sudan (UNMISS). Support was much needed, as was also articulated by the SPLM/A themselves.¹⁹ Transformation of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) into a viable political party and then into a responsible government was not a given;²⁰ neither was turning the SPLA into a professional army. The SPLM/A was aware that it had to heal rifts with a civilian population that had suffered directly and indirectly in the SPLA war, including at the hands of the SPLA.²¹

The CPA coincided with an international focus on peacebuilding and statebuilding approaches, with the mandate of the JDT explicitly informed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) Fragile States principles.²² Statebuilding according to OECD-DAC refers to an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and

legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations. In Southern Sudan there was initially a strong focus on the financial aspects of statebuilding and procurement, such as the MDTF process and the direct engagement in public financial management through financial audit firms. Statebuilding was pursued in Southern Sudan creating a contradictory setting in which the international community was supporting the CPA commitment to 'making unity attractive', while simultaneously building the institutions and the semblance of an autonomous south.²³

Despite the contradictions and shortcomings, on paper this period looks successful. The evaluation team found that Norway played a crucial role in the planning for peace through the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), which provided an overview of the support needed to bolster development in Sudan.²⁴ Norway further organised the international donor conference in Oslo in April 2005, rallying support amongst other donors for supporting development in Southern Sudan. Compared to Norwegian engagement in other countries, the involvement was marked by an 'exceptionally strong structure [within the

Minsitry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)] to back up its support to the Sudan peace and democracy process'.²⁵

The CPA did succeed in creating the Government of Southern Sudan and the Government of National Unity (GNU). It integrated some militias into the SPLA through the Juba Declaration and allowed for the conduct of a national census in 2008. In this period, however, the first challenges also emerged, with the first signs of high levels of corruption and poor prioritisation of service delivery. Similarly, interviewees pointed to the fact that the emphasis on statebuilding contributed to a centralised government structure at the detriment of the vast peripheries.²⁶

Norway was one of the first countries to set up a General Consulate in Juba (in 2006), primarily with the MFA, and to some extent the Embassy in Khartoum, being responsible for managing aid flows to Southern Sudan. At the same time the ambitions of peacebuilding through reconstruction and statebuilding were extensively challenged.²⁷ Hostilities between northern

19 (SPLM Economic Commission, 2004).

20 (Kalpakian, 2008; Branch and Mampilly, 2005).

21 (Small Arms Survey, 2008).

22 (Norad, 2009).

23 (Schomerus and de Vries, 2018).

24 (JAM Sudan, 2005).

25 (Scanteam/Overseas Development Institute/Stockholm Policy Group/Nord/South Konsulentene of Norway, 2010).

26 See also (Bennett et al., 2010).

27 (Bennett et al., 2010); (Lacher, 2012).

and southern Sudan continued, albeit on a much smaller scale. It was also during this time, specifically from 2008 onwards, that first indications of large-scale south-on-south violence emerged.²⁸

With the nation-wide elections slightly delayed into early 2010, time was running extremely short for the continued implementation of the CPA. The elections – supported with international funds and with Norwegian programmes – proved as troublesome as analysts had expected.²⁹ The elections were contested, at times violently, in some parts before and after the overwhelming victory for the SPLM/A was announced. Jonglei and Unity State saw long-standing rebellions emerge from contestation of election results, led by David Yau-Yau, George Athor and Peter Gadet.³⁰

The referendum, to be held in January 2011, was a clear milestone for SPLM and donors alike. It focused the minds and received celebrations from all sides, with the Norwegian Minister for Development Co-operation, Erik Solheim, lauding the process on the day of the result announcement in Juba.

28 (Rolandsen & Breidlid, 2012).

29 (Hemmer, 2009).

30 (Carter Center, 2010).

3.2.1 2005 TO 2011 NORWEGIAN FUNDING

The significant increase in Norwegian aid to Sudan from 2005 comprised development assistance mainly focusing on: statebuilding, peace, higher education, civil society in general and humanitarian assistance (while it is difficult to distinguish between Sudan and Southern Sudan, there are multiple projects aimed specifically at Southern Sudan and interviews show the direct link between the CPA and the increase in the funding).³¹ Roughly half of the Norwegian funding was provided to multilateral agencies and pooled funds (including the MDTFs referred to above), a portion that was further increased to two thirds of the total funds disbursed in 2007. Throughout the period 2004–2009, Norwegian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) received roughly NOK 200 million annually for activities in Southern Sudan. There is also a shift midway through the period with enhanced emphasis on support to GoSS and related capacity development, evidenced by a tripling of the funds between 2008 and 2011, reaching close to NOK 200 million in 2010.³²

31 (Ministry of Finance, 2005); Norwegian Finance Bill of 2005.

32 However, noting that the team is not in a position to differentiate the assistance given to Sudan overall and specifically to Southern Sudan prior to 2011.

3.2.2 THEORY OF CHANGE 2005–2011³³

With the limited documentation at hand the priorities of Norway are less explicit, but the evaluation team found that four things stand out:

1. Norway's commitment to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement acted as a guide for all of the support provided. For the period 2005–2008, interviewees and documentation point to the emphasis given to the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC),³⁴ which was mandated to monitor and support the CPA implementation. Furthermore, Norway had a strong focus on support to the upcoming elections, the population census and the referendum ensuring that these would be implemented as per the CPA.³⁵

33 NOTE: Norway did not have any explicit ToC or similar strategy for the support to South Sudan. Thus, as highlighted above, the ToCs are retrospectively articulated by the evaluation team and then validated through workshops and interviews. As such, they present a reconstituted picture of the thinking at the time to enable evaluation in line with the theory-based approach.

34 Note, that the first leader of AEC was Tom Vraalsen from 2005–2008, former Norwegian Minister for Development (1989-1990).

35 (Norwegian Embassy in Khartoum, 2008); (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010).



2. Support to the oil sector was a high priority. According to the Sudan Embassy work plan for 2008, oil was assessed to be a conflict as well as a peace driver in South Sudan. Norway's priority for the oil sector was to ensure South Sudan's oil management within the framework of the CPA.³⁶
3. The rationale for the support throughout Norway's engagement in South Sudan is also based on the wish to continue the long-term support already provided through the engagements of Norwegian organisations, in particular Norwegian People's Aid and Norwegian Church Aid).³⁷
4. Support for humanitarian purposes, mainly channelled through the UN.

Continuing the trend with a strong CPA focus, the main priorities of the Embassy (in Khartoum at this stage) from 2009 onwards were the 2010 elections and

the 2011 referendum.³⁸ An assessment of Norway's support to Sudan from February 2010 underscores the importance given from the Norwegian side to the elections, by stating 'the elections in spring will be an important indication of the will to include all parts of Sudan.'³⁹

However, there was also a shift towards enhanced focus on capacity development of the GoSS, with an emphasis on enabling the Government to manage its operations following a possible independence post-2011, or what is labelled by the key international development partners as 'core state functions'.⁴⁰ The 2010 Sudan Assessment specifically refers to the need for the capacities to ensure the active fight against misuse of public funds and corruption.⁴¹ From a Norwegian perspective, this included continued support to the oil sector.⁴² The rationale for support to the oil sector

was based on an assessment that oil management was the key for long-term conflict resolution in Sudan.⁴³

Thus, Norway's Theory of Change (ToC) during this time revolves around the commitments to implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and 'making unity attractive'.⁴⁴ There was also a strong emphasis on key modalities expressed in the CPA, such as the Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) and related joint funding mechanisms. On the bilateral front, Norway focused on ensuring support to higher education linked to the need of providing human resource capacity for government institutions and natural resource management (especially oil and hydropower, but also forestry).

So, a ToC for Norway's support 2005–2011 may thus be defined as presented in [Figure 4](#) (next page) and articulated as follows:

'If Norway prioritises a balanced approach to development in Sudan focusing on the Government of National Unity as well as GoSS and fund core elements of the CPA, including e.g. (i) support to the AEC, (ii)

³⁶ (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008b) See p.4. This is further confirmed in Note of 14 October 2008: Sudan. Visit by Minister for Oil el Zubeir 15 October 2008, where it is stated that 'Norwegian assistance to the oil sector is an important contribution to consolidating peace between North and South'.

³⁷ (Norwegian Embassy in Juba, 2011a).

³⁸ (Norwegian Embassy in Khartoum, 2009).

³⁹ (Norwegian Embassy in Khartoum, 2009).

⁴⁰ The Norwegian Finance Bill also specifically refers to the role of the MDTF as statebuilding for South Sudan.


⁴¹ (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010).

⁴² (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010); (Norwegian Embassy in Khartoum, 2009; 2010b; 2011); (Støre and Solheim, 2011).

⁴³ (Norwegian Embassy in Juba, 2011).

⁴⁴ ToC workshop 25 April 2019; (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010).

Figure 4. The Norwegian 2005 Theory of Change for South Sudan



support to the elections, census and referendum, (iii) support to the aid instruments enabling development in all regions of Sudan (primarily the MDTF, but also the JDT), and (iv) support GNU as well as GoSS in implementing the oil management schemes between South Sudan and Sudan, then Norway provides the financial and diplomatic backing of the CPA implementation (together with other development partners) needed to motivate continued peace, leading to a peaceful implementation of the CPA.'

Key assumptions at the impact level, as articulated by the evaluation team for this ToC, are that: (a) the parties to the agreement perceive financial backing as well as a balanced approach, supporting both parties from a lead Troika member, as an important motivator for implementing the CPA; and (b) that other key development partners – not least the US and UK – remain committed to the same. At the lower outcome level the assumptions are assessed to include: (c) that the key instruments identified in the CPA will work as intended;⁴⁵ and (d) that the parties are receptive to capacity development and dialogue around oil and wealth distribution. Finally, there was the overall assumption that the key conflict potential was between


45 These key institutions include the AEC and MDTF(s).

North and South, with less emphasis on internal conflict in the South.⁴⁶

In 2009, an additional element was added to the ToC, which is evident in the increased funding to GoSS (see Figure 5). The work plan for 2011 states that Norway will 'actively contribute to follow-up on...the plan for ensuring GoSS' core functions are in place prior to independence'.⁴⁷ The objective was to ensure two durable states after the referendum.⁴⁸ This was in line with the approach taken by other donors and led by the UN at the time. There was increased recognition that the referendum was likely to result in the independence of South Sudan,⁴⁹ also because it had become clearer that Salva da Kiir was not committed to unity, and that Norway had to operate in an environment where holding on to the commitment of making unity attractive was futile.⁵⁰

In this period Norway, together with the US, emphasised the importance of sticking to the timeline of CPA and the

Figure 5. The 2009 Norwegian Theory of Change for Southern Sudan



⁴⁶ As discussed in interviews.

⁴⁷ (Norwegian Embassy in Juba, 2011).

⁴⁸ (Norwegian Embassy in Juba, 2011).

⁴⁹ See also (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010).

⁵⁰ Based on interviews.

referendum (reiterating Norway's assumptions in the first ToC), while other development partners felt that more time was needed.⁵¹ There was increased funding to the UN for capacity development as well as initiatives related to the South, such as support for the transfer of the Faculty of Law from Khartoum to Juba as well as the introduction of Norfund investment funds to South Sudan, including hydropower.⁵² The second ToC – which supplemented and was in addition to the first ToC – is thus assessed to be (see Figure 5, previous page):

*If Norway provides funding for the development of core functions of GoSS – including the oil sector – then GoSS will have enhanced capacity to undertake its core functions, eventually contributing to GoSS providing services to the people of Southern Sudan in a transparent and accountable manner.*⁵³

Key assumptions of this additional ToC are assessed to be: (a) that it is feasible within the timeframe before

the elections to provide the needed capacity assistance required to enable core state functions; and (b) that GoSS is willing and able to take on these efforts in a transparent and accountable manner.

3.2.3 2005 TO 2011 DILEMMAS

The 2005 CPA provided a clear direction for Norwegian assistance, but the evaluation team found that the CPA also exposed a number of dilemmas facing Norway, as well as other donors. The first dilemma was concerned with the heavy emphasis on aid effectiveness in the CPA. Several interviewees specifically pointed to the active role of Norway in ensuring that the CPA included modalities in line with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.⁵⁴ Norway played a key role in the establishment of the Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTF) for South and National, and the Joint Donor Team (JDT) in Juba. As one of the driving forces behind the JDT, Norway took on the leadership in donor coordination, which sought to 'promote policies in support of sustainable peace, poverty reduction and the attainment of MDGs in Southern Sudan; to support the MDTF-South and co-operate with the GoSS and other stakeholders in South Sudan' and 'to encourage donor

harmonisation in Sudan, as well as to act as a pilot for donor integration elsewhere'.⁵⁵

Around 2006, Norway decided to stop producing bilateral country assistance strategies and instead participate in joint donor assessment missions, and making joint donor country assistance strategies based on national development strategies/poverty reduction strategy papers. The move towards joint strategies was also pursued in the case of Sudan. Thus, responding to the dilemma of bilateral engagement versus aid effectiveness agenda engagements in 2005, Norway decided, in line with the CPA, to make: (1) the two Multi-Donor Trust Funds (National and Southern Sudan) managed by the World Bank the major channel for long term assistance to Sudan in the six-year transitional period (2005–2011); (2) the JDT in Juba the major manager of the Norwegian support to the Government of Southern Sudan; and (3) the Sudan Common Humanitarian Fund managed by the UN the major channel for humanitarian funding.⁵⁶

51 ToC workshop 25 April 2019.

52 ToC workshop 25 April 2019.

53 (Norwegian Embassy in Khartoum, 2011). The 2011 Khartoum Embassy work plan also talks about utilising natural resources for the benefit of the entire population, and good governance ensuring that everyone takes part in the development of the country Work Plan.

54 See <https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm>.

55 (Norad, 2009).

56 Interviewees as well as (Norwegian Embassy in Juba, 2009) and (Norad, 2009).

However, as the MDTFs failed to show progress and results (see Chapter 4) Norway in 2008 stopped further disbursements to MDTF-S. According to interviewees, it became obvious to Norway that the GoSS did not have the capacity to handle the MDTF support and that the World Bank (who managed the MDTF) did not have the necessary in-country staffing, nor the support mechanisms needed, for compensating these shortcomings.⁵⁷ In 2008 Norway hosted a Donor Consortium in Oslo, which resulted in pledges of USD 4.8 billion.

The second dilemma that Norway faced in this period concerns how to deal with a leadership in the South that was not always true to the unity commitment of the CPA, nor always acted in the best interest of its people. Leading up to South Sudan's independence, donors – including Norway – had been criticised for their somewhat apolitical assumption that development was a natural peacebuilding component and that, in turn, lack of development could constitute the spark to light the next conflict fire.⁵⁸

Supporting the southern government became ever more difficult as it became clear that GoSS used the state apparatus for personal enrichment, while donors continued to build the capacity of the same state apparatus to enable state 'core functions'. Approaching this challenge constructively was not aided by close personal relationships. Norway and its implementing partners in interviews often highlight the 'special relationship' with South Sudan. Various respondents in our interviews argued that Norway's love for Southern Sudan did not always make this dilemma easier to handle.

Finally, this period also saw the emerging third dilemma of where to focus the efforts of peacebuilding. In light of the history, the conflict between north and south and the need for supporting the CPA, many donors, including Norway, had a somewhat myopic perspective on the north-south conflict. According to interviewees (and the ToC in [Figure 4](#)), the conflict dynamics between the different factions in the south – which later erupted into full-scale civil war – went largely unnoticed.

In summary, Norway's dilemmas and responses at this time were as follows:

1. The dilemma of experimenting with the new Aid Effectiveness agenda in conflict-affected contexts. Responding to this dilemma respondents clearly state, and financial figures show, that Norway chose alignment with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and joined all major pooled funding mechanisms at the time. However, as the performance dwindled, Norway decided to change its approach and move more towards bilateral engagements (including earmarked support through the UN).
2. The second dilemma faced was the dilemma around the commitment to making unity attractive, as was the spirit of the CPA, while working with a government in the South which was not working towards this commitment. For the first three to four years Norway stuck to the wording and spirit of the CPA, yet eventually realised that Salva da Kiir did not work for the same course. Thus, Norway instead shifted the focus to *de facto* preparing for an independent South in terms of statebuilding.

⁵⁷ Interviewees and (Ofstad, 2019).

⁵⁸ (Bennett et al., 2010).



3. The final dilemma concerns keeping the CPA alive and limiting the North-South conflict potential while recognising the emerging tensions in the South. Here, Norway explicitly in all its documents and interviews strongly focused on implementing the CPA with less engagement in the emerging south-on-south conflict.

These responses to the dilemmas are also reflected in the Theories of Change for the period described above.

There are no Norwegian government documents explicitly discussing the pros and cons around the dilemmas, nor are there reflections on the dilemmas in the policy framework, or references to analyses shedding light on these dilemmas (for the 2005–2011 period or the periods that follow). Instead, interviews show that the dilemmas were driven by political commitments and by the changes in the context, which forced a change in direction of the Norwegian support.

3.3 2011 to 2013: Celebrations and Reality Checks

On 9 July 2011, South Sudan declared independence. While the independence was widely celebrated by South Sudanese and internationals alike, South Sudanese

were simultaneously wary about the willingness of the government to build a state welcoming to all.⁵⁹

Soon, unresolved tensions with Sudan began to show, leading to a shutdown of all oil production in January 2012 as South Sudan could not agree with Sudan on the cost of use of the oil pipeline. Several observers have called the shutdown of the oil the worst possible decision that the GoSS has made after independence and the underpinning reason for South Sudan's violence that was to follow.⁶⁰ In April 2012, South Sudan invaded Heglig, an oil producing area of Sudan, immediately inviting criticism and recrimination from the international community, including from Norway through its role in the Troika. Throughout this period, Norway politically worked to keep the peace between Sudan and South Sudan, which was largely ensured post-Heglig. The lack of oil revenues, together with unrestrained expenditures (even though the country was functioning under an austerity budget), sowed the seeds of economic demise. In August 2012, agreement was reached on oil and a number of other bilateral issues with the Government of Sudan. Oil production re-started in April 2013.

⁵⁹ (Schomerus and de Vries, 2018).

⁶⁰ (Twijnstra, 2015; de Waal, 2014).

In parallel, internal conflicts within the Sudan People's Liberation Movement Politburo came to a head and were exacerbated when in July 2013 President Salva Kiir fired the entire cabinet, Vice-President Riek Machar and the SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amum on the same day. The political crisis was compounded by an economic downturn, which led to a devaluation in November 2013.

South Sudan's government was unable to deal with the twin political and economic crises, which turned into civil war in December 2013, leaving an estimated 400,000 people dead as of 2018. Donors, Norway included, did not foresee the state-organised ethnic mass killings in Juba and other towns.⁶¹ Riek Machar escaped and, with the support of Peter Gadet's troops, moved to northern Jonglei State and created the SPLM-IO (Sudan People's Liberation Movement-In Opposition). The conflict also saw the unleashing of the Lou Nuer 'White Army' and attacks on Dinka civilians in Bor. Soon, what was a political crisis within the SPLM engulfed the country in a complex conflict. Juba was swiftly evacuated of most international partners and humanitarian staff.

⁶¹ (African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, 2014).



3.3.1 2011 TO 2013 FUNDING

Following the 2011 referendum and the declaration of independence, Norway continued support for statebuilding. Politically, Norway took less of a leading role and left the peace engagement work to be led by the UN.⁶² In terms of aid, the period saw an increase in aid of NOK 100 million from 2012 to 2013, with the bulk of the increase going to Norwegian NGOs and the multilateral system (see Annex 3). A key Norwegian priority was to ensure that South Sudan could increase its revenue base. This also included improving public financial management as a way of fighting corruption,⁶³ particularly through transparency in the oil sector.⁶⁴ When oil production resumed, Norway further increased support to GoSS' PFM (Public Financial Management) capacity development, as well as general capacity development through, among others, the Intergovernmental Authority for Development's Regional Initiative for Capacity Enhancement, aimed at enhancing capacity through secondments of mentors to state institutions from neighbouring African countries. It also provided funding for the construction of

government offices in the energy sector and seconded several long-term advisors. Also, in this period, Norway continued its support for the UN Mission in South Sudan and the efforts – through NPA – to assist in transforming SPLM from a guerrilla movement to a political party.

3.3.2 THEORY OF CHANGE 2011 TO 2013

Post-2011, the Norwegian focus on the Sudan and South Sudan relationship becomes less pronounced in the documentation, though still part of the priorities. The ToC, derived directly from the Embassy work plans and the Theory of Change workshop, centres on four areas in this period: firstly, ensuring that natural resources were used for the benefit of the people; secondly, good governance ensuring people's participation in the development of South Sudan; thirdly, and less pronounced, was the support to higher education; and finally, support to security sector reform.⁶⁵ There was an increasing focus on capacity development of GoSS and the oil sector.⁶⁶ After the first challenges to GoSS' operations emerged, and with the pause in the oil production, it became evident that

more was required to ensure financial capacity and transparency of GoSS – not least vis-à-vis the revenue generated from the oil production.⁶⁷ In the same period, Norway also started funding various projects to improve governance (mainly channelled via United Nations Development Program (UNDP)) and seconding staff to the Ministry of Finance. This funding priority highlights the assumption that financial transparency was needed to ensure that the state core functions operated to the needs of the people of South Sudan. Norway also funded civil society and democracy through Norwegian Church Aid's and Norwegian People's Aid's civil society strengthening programmes and NPA's Oil for Development (OfD) project for example.

The humanitarian funding for this period also became more cross-sectoral. Norway enhanced the funding to resilience and food security, in addition to emergency assistance, as well as linking humanitarian assistance to educational activities where the state was not in a position to deliver these services. Thus, we see an enhanced emphasis on *de facto* humanitarian-development nexus work.

62 According to interviewees.

63 (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012b).

64 (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013).

65 (Norwegian Embassy in Juba, 2011); (Norwegian Embassy in Juba, 2012a); (Norwegian Embassy in Juba, 2013).

66 (Embassy of Norway in Juba, 2012a).

67 See also (Norwegian Embassy in Juba, 2011d); (Work Plan 2012a); Work Plan (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010) and Theory of Change workshop at the Norwegian MFA.




Support to the security sector was provided through UNMISS, as well as through direct payments and secondments of Norwegian military officers, from non-aid budget sources. This support was combined with the secondment of Norwegian police and project support via UNDP for UNMISS country offices, funded over the aid budget.

For this ToC, the underlying assumption was that GoSS and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement had an interest in reforming and making institutions more transparent, participatory and accountable. This assumption translated into support for capacity building of state institutions, including Norwegian bilateral priority interventions within oil. With the challenges around the oil revenues and oil production, it also became evident – from the Norwegian documentation – that more focus was required on ensuring financial capacity and transparency of GoSS – not least vis-à-vis the revenue generated from the oil production.⁶⁸ The 2011 ToC is shown in Figure 6.

3.3.3 2011 TO 2013 DILEMMAS

During the 2011–2013 period, the South Sudanese Government's lack of will to run a country to the benefit

Figure 6. The 2011 Norwegian Theory of Change for South Sudan



⁶⁸ (Norwegian Embassy in Juba, 2011d); (Work Plan 2012a); Work Plan; (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010) and Theory of Change workshop at the Norwegian MFA.

of its citizens became increasingly clear. While it was obvious that few South Sudanese had profited from the country's oil wealth, the stopping of the oil production and the attack on Heglig starkly highlighted the lack of concern to ensure a state income needed to provide services. This lack of commitment to service delivery created a difficult dilemma for Norway. GoSS failed to provide any significant funding for basic services such as education, water, sanitation or health, including areas where Norway channelled much of its funding.

The dilemma for Norway emerging from the findings through interviews and document review in this period is a continuation of the dilemma from the previous period: The dilemma of working with a government whose priorities do not resonate with those of the Norwegian Government. These challenges with GoSS become evident in four ways:

1. The limited commitment by GoSS to allocating resources to fund development activities in spite of (initial) significant oil resources.
2. GoSS' aggressive stance towards Sudan through the occupation of Heglig and the stopping of the oil export severely affecting the state budget and compromising the peace with Sudan.

3. The continued allegations of misuse of government funds.
4. The lack of a GoSS constructive response to the escalating pockets of violence in the South.

Interviews show (though written documentation is poor on this) that Norway was aware of this dilemma. The response was to continue funding to development and welfare, not funded by the South Sudanese Government, and emphasise statebuilding even further as presented in the Theory of Change above. As in the previous phase, the evaluation team found no documents discussing the pros and cons to this dilemma.

3.4 2014–2018: Civil War and Peace Negotiations

By early 2014, South Sudan was in full-scale military war. The Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) took over the protection of Juba's key infrastructure, including the airport. UPDF air assets were also deployed on the side of the government forces in their attacks on the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-In Opposition forces. One of the major immediate impacts of the conflict was the increase in the number

of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), not only in Juba but also in other places as the conflict spread (see [Figure 2](#)).

The Intergovernmental Authority for Development swiftly reclaimed its role as a mediator, supported by the international community, including the Troika. Ethiopian-led peace talks began in Addis Ababa in 2014 while heavy fighting and atrocities continued. Civilians sought protection in IDP camps, Protection Of Civilians (POC) sites and refugee camps in Uganda.

Negotiations continued through 2014 and the early part of 2015. Attacks on civilians never stopped throughout this period as the conflict intensified even though a cessation of hostilities agreement was signed. Implementation of local deals – for example in Jonglei – struggled due to lack of resources. The collapse of internal governance systems had begun not only due to political turmoil, but also from lack of financial resources. Already scarce oil revenues due to globally falling oil prices were diverted towards the war effort, and the economic downturn began to spiral out of control.



In August 2015, IGAD imposed the Agreement on Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS),⁶⁹ which was initially signed by Riek Machar in Addis Ababa, and later by Salva Kiir in Juba. While ARCSS covered major areas of security, political power, economics and justice and reconciliation, its implementation proved difficult. A major milestone was Riek Machar's return to Juba in May 2016 as part of the power-sharing deal. The success was not to last long. In July 2016, violence escalated again when the soldiers protecting Salva Kiir and Riek Machar were involved in a major battle outside the Presidential Office while the two principals met inside. Machar fled towards The Democratic Republic of Congo, pursued by Kiir's forces. A long process to revitalise the peace agreement began.⁷⁰

By mid-2017, four million South Sudanese were displaced, either as refugees or internally. An estimated 400,000 people have been killed during the conflict.⁷¹ The conflict spread, with famine appearing in parts of Unity State and the economy in free-fall. Humanitarian

69 (IGAD, 2015).

70 (Sudd Institute, 2017).

71 (Checchi et al., 2018).

assistance cost the international community USD 1 billion per year. What was once viewed as a country with a huge natural resource base and tremendous potential was now a major humanitarian disaster.

Leadership changes in 2018 in Ethiopia reduced Ethiopian involvement in the peace process. IGAD shifted the peace process to Uganda and Sudan; the South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC) continued its engagement in the process by involving itself in the High-Level Revitalisation Forum (HLRF). In September 2018, Salva Kiir and Riek Machar in Khartoum signed the Revitalised Agreement on Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS).⁷² A number of smaller opposition groups and the former detainees also signed. Norway was absent as a signatory, as was the rest of the Troika.

3.4.1 2014 TO 2018 FUNDING

The outbreak of civil war in December 2013 prompted a major shift in Norwegian support. Norway scaled down or ended direct support to government institutions while increasing support to humanitarian assistance. To further enhance the international humanitarian donor funding to South Sudan, Norway hosted an

72 (IGAD, 2018).

international donors conference in 2014. The period also saw a new focus on engagements that could provide a link between humanitarian relief and long-term development. At the same time, new changing Norwegian global aid priorities led to new Norwegian initiatives in relation to areas such as basic education, women, peace and security.

After evacuation in December 2013, the long-term resident advisors of the Oil for Development programme never returned. The government-to-government co-operation was put on hold with support now being channelled through NGOs and the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Trust Fund for South Sudan (now being implemented through short-term training courses in neighbouring states). Funding was no longer to be provided directly to the government. However, funding to capacity building of government institutions channelled through UN Development Programme, the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), or UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) meant, in several cases, continued direct support to government institutions.⁷³

There was new emphasis on food security and basic education, as well as new projects related to women,

73 (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018a).



peace and security, and gender-based violence. Peacemaking was supported through UNMISS, IGAD and mechanisms established to ensure the implementation of the peace agreements, as well as new initiatives related to local peacebuilding.

3.4.2 THEORY OF CHANGE 2014 TO 2018

The December 2013 civil war outbreak prompted a complete overhaul of the Norwegian aid strategy and portfolio to reflect the new reality on the ground. A priority note was developed to adjust the portfolio to these changes.⁷⁴ Thus, in early 2014, Norway shifted the long-term development focus of its support to South Sudan to a short- to medium-term ToC. This shift meant increasing support to humanitarian assistance and less support to development projects with government institutions. Norway either terminated or put on hold an extensive number of long-term engagements, such as the hydropower and forestry projects, as well as democratic development projects, though it continued assistance to UNDP/IGAD capacity development and, initially, also assistance to OfD, statistics and hydropower. The new engagements focused more on a combination of humanitarian assistance, food security and peacebuilding, combined with the upscaling of

support to basic education from 2015 onwards. On the political front, Norway supported the new peace process with IGAD using development assistance and eventually decided to fund the key institutions monitoring and supporting the peace agreement. These institutions included UNMISS, the Ceasefire, Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) and Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC). The ToC post-2013 can thus be divided into three elements:

(1) If Norway provides additional humanitarian assistance to South Sudan, then immediate suffering as a consequence of civil war will be reduced (this by default is a short-term ToC) and in doing so focusing increasingly on medium- to long-term food security; (2) if Norway continues to provide lower-level capacity development engagement to GoSS – in particular at the local level and in the education sector – then there is an improved basis for re-engaging in long-term development in South Sudan once a viable peace agreement is in place; and (3) if Norway supports peacebuilding at local and national level (including support to the peace agreement institutions), then this peacebuilding will enhance stability and peace

and allow for a resumption of long-term development activities.

The assumptions for the latter two parts of this ToC are, therefore: (1) that peace will eventually be achievable in a sustainable manner; and (2) that Norway expects that a more limited engagement in GoSS' capacity development is sufficient to ensure a basis for scaling up once this peace emerges. Norway's engagement continued along the same lines for 2017–2018, as expressed in the Norwegian Government White Paper on Selection of Partner Countries. The chapter on South Sudan focuses on support to the peace process, stabilisation in the form of development assistance to basic education and food security, and humanitarian assistance through NGOs and the multilateral system. It is further emphasised that 'because of the political

74 (Norwegian Embassy in Juba, 2014c).




situation Norway does not have a state-to-state development co-operation with South Sudan.⁷⁶ The 2014 ToC is presented in Figure 7.

3.4.3 2014 TO 2018 DILEMMAS

After the outbreak of violence in December 2013, it became even clearer that GoSS was neither capable nor willing to provide services to its people or ensure security for everybody. The question arose for Norway and other donors: what to do now? Ending all engagements and support was not a viable option as a continued dialogue seemed necessary to ensure implementation of the peace agreement despite its flaws. Human suffering caused by the continued conflict had to end, both for humanitarian and cost reasons. Norway faced a dilemma that is not unfamiliar for humanitarian actors: what to do when helping the people requires collaboration with the government; yet, that very government is targeting its own people and blocking humanitarian aid?

As described in the funding section and elaborated in the Theory of Change for this period below, Norway engaged in a change of portfolio in response to this new dilemma. The Embassy in Juba, with the MFA, drafted

Figure 7. 2014 Norwegian Theory of Change for South Sudan



76 (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018b).

a revised disbursement plan in response to the civil war outbreak.⁷⁷ They also developed a degree of scenario planning to help guide future engagement depending on how the crisis evolved. The plan and document behind this scenario have very few reflections on the justification of the change. The response, however, does include less engagement with GoSS and more emphasis on emergency assistance. In none of the documents did the evaluation team find any analysis of the GoSS' motivations and how Norway or other donors could have worked to tackle these dilemmas.

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77 (Norwegian Embassy in Juba, 2014c).



Evaluating the Aid Implementation

The previous chapter identified key Norwegian objectives, funding priorities and underlying assumptions, key dilemmas and the response to these. In this chapter we respond to the questions pertaining to the effects and the management of the Norwegian assistance. We first assess the overall effect of Norwegian support by analysing and seeking to confirm Norway's Theories of Change (ToCs) and the assumptions underpinning these. This first part represents the overall effectiveness assessment. This is followed by more detailed analysis of examples of effectiveness in the development, peacebuilding and humanitarian and recovery support. Note that we, for the overall effectiveness assessment, include the period from 2005 onwards to provide a contextual overview of the effectiveness.

Following the effectiveness section, we present the findings related to relevance, coordination and coherence. In this part, we assess whether the Norwegian support has been relevant to the beneficiaries, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) priorities and the international community's plans and strategies. This is followed by an

assessment of Norway's commitment to and engagement in aid coordination in South Sudan. Finally, we evaluate the coherence between the Norwegian policies and what is funded through the aid budget.

After the coherence section, we evaluate the conflict sensitivity of the Norwegian support. This includes an assessment of the overall approach, as well as examples from case studies, and an assessment of the Norwegian documentation. Finally, in this chapter we will assess Norway's ability to learn from the past and apply results-based management in its programming and aid management in South Sudan.

4.1 Effectiveness of the Norwegian Engagement

To what degree has Norway's engagement contributed towards achievement of Norway's priorities and objectives?

Without country strategies or baselines for the Norwegian support, effectiveness is assessed by tracing if the

changes foreseen in the Norwegian support, as expressed in the Theories of Change, have occurred. In line with the methodology of this evaluation, this approach means assessing whether the assumptions underlying the Norwegian support identified in Chapter 3 hold. The extent to which assumptions held and changes were achieved point towards the overall effectiveness of the total Norwegian engagement. Following the overall effectiveness assessment, the report will provide more detailed reflections on effectiveness exemplified through projects that represents the Theory of Change. The latter uses the four case studies combined with effectiveness assessment of selected projects or engagements relevant for the Norwegian Theory of Change. As no overall Norwegian country strategy relates to these projects, the findings thus present a snapshot of what has been effective and less effective. In this chapter, we also respond to the evaluation question of the possible unintended consequences of the Norwegian support in the respective sub-chapters where relevant.⁷⁸

⁷⁸ The terminology 'unintended consequences' is a widely debated topic. In this



At an overall effectiveness level, the evaluation team found that Norway has not been effective in achieving its objectives for an accountable and transparent state working to enhance poverty reduction. Up until 2011, Norway did play a key role in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), but specifically in the period 2011–2013 the support did not achieve the objectives and the underpinning assumptions did not hold as the Government of South Sudan failed to provide for its citizens and enhance its democratic practices. There is also in this period less Norwegian attention to the internal South Sudanese conflict dynamics compared to the extensive North-South focus, especially the relations at the local and sub-national level. Following the outbreak of the civil war in late-2013, Norway responded to the emerging humanitarian situation and delivered against expected outputs; the potential contribution these outputs made to expected outcomes is too early to assess. The underlying governance and security challenges remain the same and thus the prospects for effectiveness are poor.

evaluation it specifically refers to consequences and side-effects of Norway's support at the outcome or impact level; it is thus first and foremost relevant for the summaries of the Norwegian support, but we also refer to it in the sub-sections where there is a link to this. See also (Evaluation Department Norad, 2014).

If we look at the overall achievements of Norway and other development partners in South Sudan, the evaluation team found that results have been meagre compared to the visions and optimism expressed around the time of the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. Norway's, and the international community's, overall aim of reducing poverty, increasing stability and promoting peace has not been achieved. At the time of this evaluation, South Sudan ranks at the bottom of the corruption perception index,⁷⁹ capacity at the central government level is limited as confirmed by interviewees, and the civil war runs counter to the peacebuilding and development objectives set out by all donors at the time of the signing of the CPA and again at independence in 2011.

Human rights violations and violence against civilians have increased in particular since 2013. The number of displaced people has reached the highest level since 2011: 4.2 million in 2018. Never have more people been food insecure. Poverty has never been more extensive than in the last assessment in 2016, with 82.3 per cent of the population assessed as living below the national poverty

79 In 2018, South Sudan ranked 178 out of 180 countries measured on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index. See <https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018>.

line.⁸⁰ There are some measurable improvements in terms of an increase in life expectancy from 51 years in 2005 to 57 years in 2017, as well as a reduction in maternal mortality ratios from 730 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2013 to 556 in 2017.⁸¹ However, the majority of key development indicators have overall deteriorated (for details on key indicators, see the compiled data in [Annex 6](#)).

In the following, the team presents the findings on Norwegian effectiveness, measured against the different Norwegian ToCs and their underlying assumptions for each of the individual ToCs outlined in the chapter above. We focus on the period 2011–2018, but also reflect on the 2005–2011 ToC achievements, as these achievements feed into the post-independence period.

We start with 2005, where the team finds that large parts of the Norwegian ToC were completed by 2011, and most of the Norwegian assumptions were confirmed, as illustrated in [Table 1](#). As per Chapter 3, the Norwegian focus in this period was on the key institutions of the CPA. The assumption was that supporting the CPA would suffice to make peace and development occur. The evaluation team

80 (World Bank, 2018).

81 (World Bank, 2018).



has found that Norwegian (and other donor) support for CPA implementation helped with achieving CPA milestones. Interviewees confirm that by not only providing the political support but also supporting key institutions identified for support in the CPA, Norway played a key role in ensuring the implementation of the CPA. However, the findings from the evaluation also show that not all of these institutions were effective. In particular, Norwegian and other donor interviewees pointed to the limited effectiveness of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC), specifically in terms of ownership in the South.

The evaluation team found that the mostly successful implementation of the CPA is evidenced by the fact that: (i) North and South Sudan refrained from major conflict escalations up until independence, though some clashes did take place; and (ii) the CPA commitments to the population census and the elections and the referendum were upheld, albeit with some delays. The evaluation found that the element of the CPA, which was less successful, was the border issue around Abyei state. This issue remains unresolved by the fact that unity was never made attractive by either conflict party. Similarly, while wealth sharing of the oil was agreed upon, the post-independence clashes in Heglig and the shutting down of the oil production showed how wealth sharing was never made sustainable, and continues to remain

a contentious issue.⁸² Finally, but of critical importance to the evaluation, was the fact that the CPA focused on the North-South conflict and that this focus removed the donor and Norwegian attention from the reconciliation needs and conflict potential internally in South Sudan.

The international role in the achievements related to the implementation of the CPA are confirmed by several external evaluations: the 2010 joint OECD-DAC evaluation describes how diplomacy bore the significant fruit that Sudan and South Sudan did not go back to full-scale military confrontation;⁸³ an evaluation of the MDTF states that 'international engagement in the negotiations changed the strategic calculus of the two CPA Parties and created positive momentum. International engagement locked the Parties into a process from which they could not credibly withdraw. It reduced and then closed options to circumvent negotiations and provided a structure of incentives that changed the strategic calculus and reinforced the positive momentum of the negotiating process. This included significant pressure on both Parties to compromise on key negotiating positions and remain within the negotiations.'⁸⁴

⁸² (BBC News, 2012).

⁸³ See also (Bennett et al., 2010).

⁸⁴ (Fafo, 2013).

However, the evaluation team found that some of the underlying assumptions for the 2005 ToC did not hold: aid was not delivered effectively (see also the section on coordination further below).⁸⁵ One reason for why the assumption did not hold was that the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), which was seen as a key instrument for the statebuilding process, did not deliver as expected. As elaborated in Chapter 3, Norway played a key role in ensuring that the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the aid effectiveness agenda were reflected in the CPA and the donors' engagement. However, a few years into the implementation of the MDTF, Norway and other donors realised the limited effects of the MDTF, and later the Joint Donor Team (JDT). The limited success of the MDTF is confirmed by interviews with key Norwegian staff and other development partners engaged in South Sudan at the time, as well as in the MDTF evaluation.⁸⁶ Similarly, the JDT, to which Norway was one of the founding members, never materialised to enhance the aid effectiveness, according to Norwegian as well as other development partner interviewees and the 2009 JDT evaluation.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ See among others: (Bennett et al., 2010); (Fafo, 2013); and ToC workshop 25 April 2019.

⁸⁶ (World Bank, 2013).

⁸⁷ (Evaluation Department Norad, 2009).



Table 1. [Goals achieved and assumptions validated for Norwegian Theory of Change 2005¹](#)

Issues assessed	Outcome/assumption	Effectiveness in terms of outcome achievement and assumptions confirmed
Expected outcome 2005–2011	North and southern Sudan implement CPA and refrain from new violent conflict	Outcome met: Major parts of CPA implemented with relative peace by 2011
Assumption 1	North and southern Sudan perceive financial backing in balanced approach as key motivator for CPA implementation	Assumption validated. Parties enabled key aspect of CPA to be implemented
Assumption 2	New aid architecture will work	Limited validation. Aid architecture slow in implementation and later abandoned
Assumption 3	Parties receptive to dialogue around oil and wealth distribution	Assumption initially validated until 2011, but not validated 2012. By 2011 stability around oil fragile. Stability broken in 2012 with shutting down of oil and South Sudan forceful takeover of Heglig

¹ In the following effectiveness tables, green means that the outcome was met or assumption validated, yellow means that it was partly met/validated, orange that there was limited progress towards outcome or assumption has limited validation, and red that the outcome or assumption was not met or validated.

As reflected in Chapter 3, around 2009 Norway (in line with the United Nations (UN) and other international development partners) enhanced its focus towards ensuring that the core state functions of GoSS would be developed in time for possible independence to allow for a functioning independent state to operate. This ToC was carried over to the 2011 ToC, which focused extensively on GoSS capacity development. The evaluation team has, however, found that the statebuilding process, which focused on transparency, accountability and service delivery for poverty reduction, was at odds with the actions of GoSS. Interviews with the evaluation team, donors, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and resource persons stressed GoSS' limited ownership to capacity development as a major obstacle to achieve this goal. The limited ownership was also recognised by the Norwegian government, which in the evaluation ToC workshop reflected on how the South Sudanese leadership reduced funding for education while donors stepped in and took over responsibility. As also described in Chapter 3, in this period the South Sudanese leadership engaged in retaliations against Sudan and shut down the oil production, limiting the opportunities for providing finances for services and poverty alleviations for its people.

GoSS, in other words, did not follow its own development plans, but instead, according to interviewees, left it for

the donors to meet the development gap. According to interviewees, as well as studies and evaluations,⁸⁸ capacity of the government had remained weak without core functions in place. The first major cases of corruption were reported in this period, with up to USD 4 billion in oil money having gone missing, providing evidence of corrupt practices and poor transparency in the management of oil revenue.⁸⁹ Interviewees across the board confirm how the limited willingness to transparency and accountability of GoSS has remained a challenge since this period, and that the limited commitment to poverty reduction and using resources for development remains weak.⁹⁰

The limited attention to the people's needs is reflected in the MDTF-SS evaluation, which elaborates that 'the context affected GoSS decision making on the resources available for recovery and development activities, particularly in relation to security expenditures. Most visibly, conditions have resulted in the government prioritising expenditures to security

and public administration, with smaller than expected investments made in public service delivery and development-related activities that would reinforce MDTF-SS accomplishments.'⁹¹

Specifically, the core priority areas of the Norwegian ToC in terms of capacity development, democratic control and security sector reform today remain in a poor state. While there is staff in place and key ministries operate, interviewees confirmed that the ability of GoSS/TGoNU to provide services to the citizens has remained limited throughout. Acts and regulations have only been partly adopted. As the World Bank has found 'for many of these acts, implementing regulations were still being prepared as of 2016. Thus, for the past decade, staff and institutions have operated in an uncertain and fluid regulatory environment, which has been a constraint for using capacity effectively and for providing in-service training to bring staff together around a common system. Subsequent recruitment as well as the allocation of positions among existing staff was driven by considerations related to the political settlement, more than merit. For senior appointments all the way down to hiring of drivers and cleaners,

88 (Bennet et al: 2010); (World Bank, 2013); (World Bank, 2017).

89 Letter from the President of South Sudan on repayment of USD 4 billion unaccounted funds, 3 May 2012.

90 The only exception to this is, according to interviewees, a minor increase in the budget for education in 2019. The same interviewees, however, question the willingness of the government to deliver against the budget.

91 (Fafo, 2013).



patronage and loyalty played a role.⁹² The latter also points to the failure of achieving the Norwegian (and other donors') objective of enhanced democratic practices in South Sudan. South Sudan has not seen a democratic election since independence, and the political settlement has, as described in [Chapter 3](#) and confirmed by interviewees, allowed the South Sudanese leadership to act without accountability and transparency. The latter was confirmed by a beneficiary interviewed in the field who, as an example, explained how they did manage to speak to parliamentarians, but that this dialogue was never brought to the presidency, and that parliament in general lacked power to hold the executive to account – a situation which was confirmed by resource persons and development partners.

The Norwegian ToC of 2009 and the ToC of 2011, which focus specifically on enabling core functions of GoSS to enhance accountable and transparent service delivery, were thus not achieved as foreseen, as presented in [Table 2](#) (next page).

92 (World Bank, 2017). See also (African Union, 2014) which states that the aspirations of the statebuilding project in South Sudan has not matched performance and outcomes, and that the process has not resulted in strong, accountable and transparent institutions.

The team also notes that the 2009 and 2011 ToC (four and two years prior to the outbreak of the South Sudanese civil war in 2013) remained focused on statebuilding and keeping the peace with the North, while South Sudan's internal peace challenges are only reflected to a limited extent. The first three-year rolling plan from the Embassy in Juba in 2011 contains limited or no reflection on internal conflicts in South Sudan and does not indicate any initiatives to engage with the south-on-south conflict. Subsequent reports from the Embassy and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in 2012 and 2013 indicate a rapidly growing concern with political tensions and instability, but there is limited trace of this knowledge having implications for planning and programming of development support except for some support to Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) peacebuilding. The evaluation team found this lack of attention to south-on-south conflict (in particular up to and immediately after independence) relevant in light of the UK Parliamentary Group finding that 'failures to address reconciliation from the long and bloody civil war – on the part of leaders, communities and international partners – led to the 2013 outbreak of fighting', and that there 'was a tendency within the international development community to emphasise stabilisation and short-term outcomes over transformation and long-term

goals'.⁹³ While the evaluation team has found Norway to have had long-term statebuilding, poverty alleviation and democratic goals for South Sudan, the evaluation team's findings show less Norwegian engagement in South Sudan's internal reconciliation efforts before 2013, in particular at the sub-national level (though the team notes that some of the NGOs support, such as Norwegian Church Aid and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) did have local-level peacebuilding as part of their portfolio).

93 (UK All Party Parliamentary Group for Sudan and South Sudan, 2015).



Table 2. [Goals achieved and assumptions validated for Theory of Change 2011](#)

Issues assessed	Outcome/assumption	Effectiveness in terms of outcome achievement and assumptions confirmed
Issues assessed	Expected condition	Level of achievement
Expected outcome 2011-2013+	GoSS performs core functions in transparent, accountable and democratic manner to the benefit of the people	Outcome not met. Excessive divergence of public funds and limited government accountability
Assumption 1	GoSS willingness to apply new capacities in transparent, accountable and democratic manner	Assumption not validated. Evidenced in misuse of funds and lack of democratic practice
Assumption 2	GoSS bureaucracy receptive to capacity development activities	Limited validation of assumption. Limited ownership to donor agenda of transparency and accountability

South Sudan's civil war started in December 2013 and was punctuated by two national-level peace agreements as elaborated in Chapter 3. The post-2013 ToC was heavily influenced by the civil war outbreak and the 2016 escalation of violence, and consequently the ToC had three different areas of support (as presented in [Chapter 3](#)). Had this Norad South Sudan evaluation taken place in 2018, the ToC would have failed entirely as the country faced its worst atrocities ever, with limited access and options for delivering against the ToC. However, by the time of this evaluation in mid-2019, renewed access and relative stability allowed for re-

engaging, even if key parts of the latest peace agreement still need to be implemented. As a consequence of the more short-term nature of the 2014 ToC the ToC is more output oriented (see [Table 3](#) next page).

The evaluation team found that Norway contributed to several of the expected outputs in terms of an improved humanitarian situation (see section on humanitarian assistance below), improved resilience capacity (see [Annex 5](#)), and improved local level conflict management (see [Annex 5](#) and section on peacebuilding below). In terms of capacity development support to government



institutions post-2014, few evaluations are available, but the team's own case study on the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) capacity development project shows the difficulties of achieving enhanced capacity in such short periods in the South Sudanese context (see [Annex 5](#)). The team thus finds Norway to be partly effective at the output level.

The Norwegian assumptions of the 2014 ToC can thus be partly confirmed (see [Table 3](#)). It is, however, too early to assess whether these outputs will contribute to the expected outcome and impact. The evaluation team has found that the deficits of the South Sudanese leadership, in terms of limited resource allocations for development and continued negation of democratic principles as well as the poor efforts towards national reconciliation, remain in place, and that the prospects of effective support at the outcome remains bleak.

Table 3. [Goals achieved and assumptions validated for Theory of Change 2014](#)

Issues assessed	Outcome/assumption	Effectiveness in terms of outcome achievement and assumptions confirmed
Issues assessed	Expected condition	Level of achievement
Expected outcome	Enhanced stability and basis for re-engaging in statebuilding	Outcome partly met. Failed in 2015 with excessive displacement, but relative stability following Sept. 2018 agreement. Root causes of conflict remain
Assumption 1	Sufficient stability and peace across South Sudan to allow for activities to be implemented	Assumption partly met. Implementation feasible in large part by 2018, but limited access before 2018 and close to no capacity development efforts possible in 2016-2017
Assumption 2	Beneficiaries receptive to capacity development efforts	Assumption partly met. No evaluation available for the period, but less activity in 2014/2015 and 2016/17 due to civil war
Assumption 3	Peace process eventually successful in providing needed stability for statebuilding	Assumption partly met. Relative stability in 2018, though key elements of peace process still to be implemented



4.1.1 DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS

Norwegian long-term development support from 2011 onwards falls into three main categories: i) capacity building of the public sector; ii) civil society strengthening and governance; and iii) higher education and related activities (see also [Annex 3](#) for a presentation of the interventions supported).

The Norwegian support to capacity building in the public sector in South Sudan revolved around two main initiatives in the period evaluated. One was multilateral support through United Nations Development Program (UNDP) for a programme to deploy civil servants from neighbouring states to mentor and provide on-the-job training to civil servants in South Sudan. The other was a bilateral and more targeted effort to make use of Norwegian expertise in providing support to priority sectors, mainly around energy (oil and hydropower) and the Ministry of Finance, and using consultants and staff from several Norwegian government departments, Statistics Norway and other agencies for short and long-term secondment to government departments. Additionally, Norway funded office buildings for some of the government departments.

The implementation of the capacity building projects was badly affected by the deteriorating economic crisis

from 2012, the formation of new states and the civil war that erupted in December 2013. The evaluation team assessed the UNDP-managed Intergovernmental Authority for Development Regional Capacity Building Programme and the Norwegian bilaterally-managed Oil for Development (OfD) programme – both considered flagship programmes in the Norwegian support (see [Boxes 1 and 2.](#))

The IGAD regional programme – which has been running since 2011 with Norway as the sole funder – delivered, as per the findings of the evaluation team, on commitments and implemented most of the planned activities, albeit with severe delays. The outcome level capacity building results have been modest. The evaluation team found that the programme has suffered from targeting too many institutions and that the mentoring has not built sustained capacity in most of the participating institutions. The transfer of knowledge remained limited, and furthermore many of the South Sudanese civil servants also left the service due to slow or non-payment of salaries (See [Box 1](#) (next page) as well as [Annex 5](#) for a full review and references to evidence).



BOX 1: IGAD REGIONAL INITIATIVE FOR CAPACITY ENHANCEMENT IN SOUTH SUDAN (2010–2019)

Norway has provided NOK 240 million as the sole donor to this programme implemented by UNDP. It is the only programme working with the South Sudanese government that has been funded by Norway from 2011 to the present.

The project provides for secondment of civil servants from three IGAD countries (Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda) to public institutions at national and state level in South Sudan; 199 civil servants were seconded in the first phase (2010–2015) and 121 in the second (2013–2019) for up to two years. During secondments, regional experts mentored and coached South Sudanese counterparts and provided technical assistance in the host departments. 1,200 persons were mentored in 22 institutions in the first phase and 1,000 persons in 48 institutions in the second.

The programme has delivered many of the planned outputs despite being an extremely difficult

programme to implement. The programme was considered highly relevant by all, and aligned with Norwegian, South Sudanese and IGAD priorities. Tangible results and impact in relation to capacity building of state institutions on the other hand have been limited and highly uneven, as have knowledge transfer and strengthening of institutions. The activities have been thinly spread across too many institutions with little attention to building capacity over time. The programme has not—despite claims to the contrary—managed to make the capacity building strategic.

The project survived the 2014–2016 crisis, and Norway continued its financial support in contrast to other bilateral support to government institutions, which largely was terminated or put on hold from 2014. According to interviewees, the decision to continue to fund the UNDP/IGAD project was also partly motivated by political concerns and the importance of continued involvement by IGAD and neighbouring states.

The evaluation team has found that the OfD programme delivered and built capacity and improved policy making in the targeted institutions, as per past reviews and interviewees (see [Annex 5](#)), but the programme *de facto* collapsed following the outbreak of civil war in December 2013. The deployed Norwegian experts were evacuated, and the institutional co-operation soon came to an end. The programme continued on a more modest scale, based on support to NGOs (Norwegian People's Aid and Global Witness) and the short-term training provided through the IMF's Trust Fund for South Sudan (providing short-term training in Nairobi, Entebbe and elsewhere). The evaluation team found that most outputs were achieved with the NPA support and some elements of outcome, which resulted in exposing environmental degradation, among others (see [Annex 5](#)). The evaluation team found that OfD has succeeded in building some technical capacities and also ensured improved legislation in the oil sector, but has had limited success in achieving the overall programme objective of transparency and accountability in the oil sector management, mainly due to limited political will from the South Sudanese government to ensure transparent and accountable oil management.

Other main bilateral support for capacity building is reviewed in [Annex 3](#). This includes the support to



the Ministry of Finance and the National Bureau of Statistics (macroeconomic analysis and statistics with technical assistance from Statistics Norway), and the

Ministry of Electricity and Dams (this included capacity building through the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate).

BOX 2: OIL FOR DEVELOPMENT

The Norwegian Oil for Development (OfD) programme seeks to contribute to improved petroleum sector management through long-term institutional co-operation between Norwegian government institutions and institutions in partner countries. The main approach in the programme is co-operation, with Norwegian civil servants and consultants providing direct support and advice for the benefit of host country counterparts.

In South Sudan, OfD has been a key intervention stemming from the importance of the oil in the wealth sharing agreement under the 2005 CPA. In 2012, Norway and South Sudan entered into a bilateral agreement regarding support to the sustainable development of the petroleum sector. A total of NOK 108 million was disbursed from 2012 to 2018. This included a number of resident advisers to MPMI and MoFCIEP. No Norwegian advisers have been present in Juba since the

end of 2013. From 2016 nearly all support was channelled through the IMF's Trust Fund, NPA and Global Witness.

In the context of South Sudan, the OfD programme had twin priorities: wealth sharing of oil revenue between Sudan and South Sudan, as well as effective and efficient extraction processes and management of oil revenue, which is crucial since almost all of South Sudan's revenue comes from oil.

The OfD programme has managed to contribute to significant outputs and some outcomes as well in the course of the implementation. These include the drafting and passing of key legislation, such as the Petroleum Act of 2012 and the drafting of the Petroleum Revenue Act of 2013. From 2005 until 2012, OfD brought improvement in South Sudanese capacity within: (i) oil wholesale processes; (ii) calculating oil production and

export through the pipeline; and (iii) advancing the capacity of staff in the oil sector. From 2012 onwards, OfD has fewer significant results to show. OfD also provided finance for the construction of offices housing the Ministry.

OfD has shown limited success in terms of achieving the overall programme objective. This is mainly due to low political will from the Government of South Sudan to ensure transparent and accountable oil management, despite receiving more than a decade of capacity development and support. The passing and implementation of oil management legislation has not shifted the government's opaque practices. The evaluation team found that neither media nor communities are able to exert pressure on the government. Thus, oil remains a main trigger of conflict in South Sudan and the revenue generated from it has not greatly benefitted the people of South Sudan.



Support for good governance, democratisation and human rights have been recurrent themes in the Norwegian support. Since 2010, this support has revolved around: improved management in public institutions (a cross-cutting issue in the capacity building support discussed above); support for security sector reform and police training; political party support, constitutional reform and preparations for elections; and civil society support. Most of these were small in financial terms and came to an end, or had not begun any significant implementation, with the outbreak of civil war in December 2013 (see also [Annex 3](#) for an overview of these initiatives).

A major Norwegian initiative was efforts to help transform Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) from a liberation movement to a political party. MFA provided significant funding for this from 2007. This was channelled through the NPA. The project came to an abrupt end with the outbreak of civil war at the end of 2013. Reviews undertaken in 2010 and 2013 found that the activities undertaken were significant. The political crisis and then outbreak of civil war meant that the project failed to reach the objectives (see [Box 3](#)).

BOX 3: NORWEGIAN PEOPLE'S AID'S SUPPORT TO SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT 2007–2013

The 2007–2013 NPA project to assist in transforming SPLM from a liberation movement to a political party had a significant track record in implementing activities. A very large number of SPLM activists and cadres participated and took part in training courses. In phase 1 (up to 2010), a Training of Trainers programme trained a total of 377 women in political party mobilisation. These trainers then managed to reach out to more than 20,000 women. In the second phase, NPA facilitated a training of more than 2,400 SPLM cadres in nine out of the ten states. These and

other activities, however, failed to achieve the overall objective of assisting in restructuring the SPLM from a liberation movement to a democratic political party. The eruption of political tensions in the SPLM in mid-2013 and the outbreak of war from December 2013 marked the end, not only of the project, but also of the special relationship between 'NGO No. 1' (NPA) and SPLM.⁹⁴

94 See more on this in the two independent reviews commissioned by NPA in 2010 and 2013 (NPA & Norlat, 2010; NPA & Norlat, 2013). The project is also presented in a book written by the former NPA Secretary General, Halle Jørn Hanssen (Hanssen, 2017). The team also interviewed former NPA officials in Norway involved in this project.



Significant Norwegian support has been provided for the strengthening of civil society in South Sudan. The main channel for that support has been through Norwegian NGOs, with funding both from the Embassy/Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from Norad's civil society grant. In recent years, the Embassy in Juba has also supported pooled funding for strengthening of civil society managed by the Dutch Embassy. The evaluation team examined the two main Norwegian NGOs – Norwegian Church Aid and Norwegian People's Aid – and the effectiveness of their support for civil society (see Annex 5 and Boxes 5 and 6).⁹⁵

These two NGOs have a history in South Sudan of primarily implementing development projects, including running hospitals and schools. Both still run many projects on their own – especially in humanitarian relief operations – but they have also developed strategic guidelines and programmes for supporting civil society in South Sudan.⁹⁶ In line with their global priorities and

funding guidelines from Norad, they have gradually shifted towards working with or through local partners in South Sudan.

Both NGOs in interviews and documents highlight the effort they put into strengthening the capacity of their partners. However, recent evaluation reports and the evaluation team's own observations from our case studies identify numerous challenges and mixed results.⁹⁷

A notable feature emerging from these reports, as well as from the team's own interviews and observations, is that most partners are organisationally weak, as measured by indicators such as ability to manage their own finances, internal democracy and accountability of leaders, as well as ability to develop their own strategic plans. Nearly all local partners are fully dependent on their Norwegian partner for financial income.

These evaluation reports also have other findings: the 2018 review of NCA support to civil society in South Sudan noted that there was a disconnect

between NCA's global civil society priorities and the context in South Sudan. This included both how NCA conceptualised civil society and, to an even greater degree, how NCA as an organisation operationalised the efforts to strengthen civil society. The report found that partners' capacity was built so that they could deliver services, but not necessarily as part of a longer-term strategy to improve civil society as a whole.

The 2018 review of NPA observes that the key civil society priorities of strengthening democratic practices and financial performance of local partners are not easily achieved by NPA. NPA supports many membership organisations, but many of NPA's longest-standing partners do not have the best records on democratic practices in governing their own organisations. The review concludes that progress towards improved internal democratic practice has been modest.

Significantly, the 2018 NPA review also shows that NPA's partners have delivered results, despite working in an environment where social and political relations are being violently reconfigured around ethnicity and basic freedoms are restricted. NPA's work on Land and Natural Resources is identified as a good example in mediating local land disputes and mobilising communities to manage and protect their rights in land and natural resources.

⁹⁵ There are also several other Norwegian NGOs receiving support for civil society support—primarily the Stromme Foundation, YMCA-YMCM, the Norwegian Red Cross, Save the Children, Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) and Caritas—but the vast bulk of the funding is channelled through NCA and NPA.

⁹⁶ See for example the NPA's 2012-2015 civil society development strategy for South Sudan (NPA, 2011) and their 2013-2015 country strategy (NPA,

2013); and NCA's 2011-2014 report (NCA-Act Alliance, 2015) and their 2016-2020 country strategy (NCA, 2015a) and country results report for 2016-2018 (NCA, 2019).

⁹⁷ See the NCA commissioned report from (NCA, 2018c) and 2018 report commissioned by NPA (NPA, 2018c).



The third and final main pillar of the Norwegian development aid in the period was higher education. This has been an on-going component of the Norwegian support. The team has not assessed the effectiveness of this, but the team notes that interviewees stated that the various projects delivered results both in terms of students graduating, joint research with universities in other developing countries through the Norwegian Norhed programme and in the visibility and outputs of the specialised research centres funded from Norway.

In sum, the evaluation team has found that the effectiveness of the Norwegian aid for long-term development has been mixed. Symbolically, this is perhaps best illustrated with the Norwegian independence gift to South Sudan – a National Archive (see [Box 4](#)). Preparations for the construction of the new building housing the new archive progressed smoothly, but with the outbreak of civil war in 2013, everything was put on hold. Modest support has, however, continued to be provided for some activities with reportedly good results.

The emphasis on support for statebuilding and capacity building of government institutions has not reached the expected results. It led to evidence of some increased capacity where the Norwegian support was strategic

and long-term (as in the bilateral OfD programme, see [Box 2](#)), but led to little improved capacity where this was not the case (as in the support provided for the IGAD/UNDP programme, see [Box 1](#)).

There are also challenges and unintended consequences of the support provided to civil society

organisations. Most importantly, the weaknesses of the state institutions at all levels – including poor or non-payment of salaries – has, according to interviewees, led to a significant brain drain to NGOs and UN agencies, creating further aid dependencies.

BOX 4: NORWAY'S INDEPENDENCE GIFT TO SOUTH SUDAN

In 2011, the Norwegian Government offered the new nation of South Sudan a special independence gift in the form of a National Archive. This was in recognition of the long road to freedom, the special relation between Norway and South Sudan and the importance of preserving South Sudan's national heritage and identity. The South Sudan Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports has since been working with UNESCO, the UN Office for Project Services and the Rift Valley Institute on the safeguarding of

the current collection. By 2014, the architectural drawings for a building to house the archives had been completed. Norway decided that year not to continue with funding for the construction; NOK 27 million had originally been planned for this. The support was reduced to NOK 2 million in 2014, with a focus on preservation/digitalisation of the documents in the archives. This was managed through UNESCO. For 2018–2019 NOK 7.7 million was allocated for the ongoing preservation and digitisation of the collections and the team witnessed digitisation taking place.



However, the evaluation team did find that the Norwegian modus operandi provided a sound basis for ensuring effectiveness in an otherwise fragile and conflict-affected context. Almost all partners interviewed confirmed that Norway was flexible in terms of: (i) listening to implementing partner needs; (ii) adjusting planned activities and budgets when the context changed; and (iii) providing short response times to such requests. These findings mirror those expressed by OECD-DAC in its 2019 peer review of Norway, which in particular emphasise the importance of the flexibility of the Norwegian aid system.⁹⁸

4.1.2 PEACEBUILDING EFFECTIVENESS

Work covered under this headline is diverse and includes local peacebuilding and reconciliation work (which can include dispute resolution, peace meetings, livelihood programmes, water and sanitation, as well as local-level justice support), support to implementation modalities of the IGAD-negotiated process, support to national-level peace actors, such as the South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC), as well as the substantial portfolio of Norwegian support for the UN mission. Several interviewees further stressed that the entire

portfolio of Norway in South Sudan was concerned with peacebuilding.

Considering South Sudan's situation of civil war and the extremely precarious security situation for many, if not most, of its citizens, judging this portfolio as effective is impossible. Measuring effectiveness of peacebuilding provides particular measurement challenges that need to be kept in mind when viewing this portfolio: Peacebuilding is often the meta-goal of more concrete programmes within the Norwegian portfolio. An example is NPA's 'Conflict Transformation through Livelihood Recovery Project' in Rumbek East, Yiral West and Mvolo Counties, which was evaluated as highly effective in supporting reciprocal arrangements on accessing resources.⁹⁹ Whether in the long run this valuable contribution will have a peacebuilding effect is less easily measured.

⁹⁸ (OECD, 2019b).

⁹⁹ (Africa Development Torch for Norwegian Peoples Aid, 2017).



UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has been a main pillar of the Norwegian support to peacebuilding in South Sudan. UNMISS is a large, multidimensional peacekeeping operation of 17,000 troops, 2,000 police and 2,000 civilians, and has been provided with significant resources and an extraordinarily ambitious mandate. The evaluation team has not assessed the effectiveness of UNMISS or the Norwegian support, but a recent major external evaluation provides a number of findings, summarised in [Box 5](#).¹⁰⁰

BOX 5: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UN MISSION IN SOUTH SUDAN

UNMISS' four main mandate areas (2014–2018) are: (i) the protection of civilians (POC); (ii) facilitation of humanitarian delivery; (iii) promotion of human rights; and (iv) support to the peace process (before 2014 its mandate also included capacity building support to South Sudanese state institutions). A 2019 evaluation finds that by providing space within its compounds to those fleeing brutal and widespread violence in 2013 and 2016, UNMISS provided immediate physical protection to more than 200,000 people, including large numbers of women and children.

UNMISS' mandate to facilitate conducive conditions for humanitarian delivery also has some untold success stories, according to the evaluation. In recent years, the Mission's protection of humanitarian convoys and rehabilitation of supply roads have opened access to at least 100,000 vulnerable people who would otherwise have been beyond the reach of life-saving aid.

However, the lifesaving POC efforts came at a price. Because the majority of UNMISS' troops were providing perimeter security to the sites, there were few peacekeepers left to patrol in conflict-prone areas or protect the remaining two million people displaced outside POC sites.

The human rights monitoring and reporting work of UNMISS has publicly documented some of the egregious patterns of abusive behaviour by the parties to the conflict, reports which have been used by UN leadership to advocate for greater restraint by the parties. The evaluation notes that the direct impact on rates of human rights violations is extremely difficult to assess, though it is worth noting that the reports over the past two years have been more direct in their assessments of abuses than in previous years.

The evaluation also noted that UNMISS and the UN had a relatively minor role in influencing the political process and the implementation of the peace agreements. According to the evaluation, evidence of impact appeared most clear where the UN was able to align approaches with key stakeholders – IGAD, the African Union, and the parties.

100 (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2019).



The evaluation team found that Norway's most visibly effective roles in peacebuilding have been in funding the peace process with other Troika members at the request of IGAD,¹⁰¹ and in pushing as a member of the Troika for the IGAD High-Level Revitalisation Forum (HLRF).¹⁰² As a follow-on from both peace negotiations, Norway has supported the implementation modalities such as the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) and Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM), which, according to interviewees, have had varying success. In our evaluation, interviewees were cautious in their assessment of Norway's contribution towards goals for the implementation of the peace agreements, pointing to broader limitations (such as the lack of chair for JMEC or the lack of use of CTSAMM reports to shape the next steps).

Norway has also provided funding for work on the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, focusing on peace and reconciliation processes, implementation of peace agreements, operations and missions, as well

as capacity building.¹⁰³ In practice, in South Sudan, Norway emphasised training and inclusion of women, particularly in the HLRF negotiations, where Norway supported a women's summit in Djibouti and women's participation in the HLRF increased from 11 women delegates (out of 90 in December 2017) to 30 out of 120 in May 2018.¹⁰⁴ However, while increased women's participation in the peace process was a priority for Norway, the effectiveness at the outcome level is less evident. A 2016 Norad evaluation found that 'beyond women's participation at the talks, it is unclear what this has led to in practice...many see South Sudan as a failure from a WPS perspective.'¹⁰⁵ Interviewees also confirm that significant outputs were achieved, but that the women supported never really managed to influence the peace processes (see also the section on gender and vulnerability below).

Another prominent peace engagement supported by Norway is through the South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC) and its joint 'Action Plan for Peace' implemented by NCA. The Norwegian funding has focused on

advocacy and reconciliation, while funding from the EU has been used by NCA to strengthen the Council and its member churches in their capacity to administer a national-level campaign. The evaluation team found that the support enabled the Council's work in breaking an impasse and emphasising South Sudanese ownership of the peace processes at a crucial time during the IGAD negotiations. These results were acknowledged among interviewees (see [Box 6](#) on NCA's peacebuilding work and [Annex 5](#) for the full assessment).

The evaluation team found that other Norwegian-funded work on conflict and security garners less visibility, such as local-level peacebuilding. While areas in which Norway's partners' work have seen decreased violence (see [Annex 5](#) for a case study on NCA's work in Gogrial), it is challenging to establish causality, due to the intricate connections between local-level conflicts and national-level developments, seasonal variability of violence and other reasons why violence swells and subsides. The evaluation team found that measurement of effectiveness of local-level peacebuilding supported by Norway in South Sudan also suffers from uneven data collection and an emphasis on outputs, rather than on outcomes. A large number of initiatives have been implemented and need to be seen as holistic contributions to a more peaceful South Sudan, rather

101 (International Peace Institution, 2018).

102 103 (International Crisis Group, 2019).

103 (Norwegian Ministries, 2019).

104 (Lopidia, 2019).

105 (Evaluation Department Norad, 2016b).



than a causal input to an end of violence.¹⁰⁶ Effects might not be felt for a long time and might never be attributable, yet it lies in the ethos of peacebuilding as a practical approach (and particularly the local-level in peacebuilding) that it supports a perspective that community-level engagement towards changing a culture of violence might have to be seen as a valuable contribution in its own right, even if the conceptual underpinnings, measurement and effectiveness of these approaches are the subject of heated scholarly debate.¹⁰⁷

BOX 6: PEACEBUILDING AND NORWEGIAN CHURCH AID

Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), one of Norway's main partners on peacebuilding, has had a presence in South Sudan since 1971, which means that relationships and local presence are well suited for the multifaceted and relationship-based work that peacebuilding requires. NCA has long supported the South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC), which has become a crucial (if also controversial) actor in the peace process, including with a delegation to the IGAD talks, which is credited with unlocking the talks at crucial moments.

On the local level, NCA works on a broad range of peacebuilding activities through various implementing partners, connecting emergency

assistance, development, and advocacy to a comprehensive peacebuilding effort, speaking to NCA's holistic approach to understanding conflict. Some of NCA's reconciliation efforts through the peacemaking project assessed by the team (see [Annex 5](#)) have gained national prominence and achieved noticeable results in finding agreements; most other work that involves community relationship building, however, does not necessarily produce measurable results, but instead shows improved processes.

The holistic perspective – e.g. linking access to water to conflict and designing programmes accordingly – might in itself offer a valuable contribution to understanding conflict and development in South Sudan.

¹⁰⁶ (Norad, 2018).

¹⁰⁷ See for example (Campbell, Chandler and Sabaratnam, 2011).



4.1.3 HUMANITARIAN AND RECOVERY EFFECTIVENESS

Work under this headline covers multiple funding channels provided under the humanitarian funding. The Norwegian support to humanitarian and recovery efforts in South Sudan has consisted of funding for humanitarian-recovery activities and policy dialogue support to ensure humanitarian access and upholding of humanitarian principles. The data available does not allow for an assessment of effectiveness at national level. Instead, the effectiveness is measured through an assessment of the main recipients of Norwegian humanitarian funding in the period evaluated.

Almost half (42%, or NOK 1.8 billion) of the total Norwegian aid was provided as humanitarian assistance.¹⁰⁸ The humanitarian support almost doubled after South Sudan's independence in 2011, and again after 2013 – with annual assistance since 2014 ranging between NOK 200 million and almost NOK 350 million (in 2014) (for details, see [Annex 3](#)). The NOK 1.8 billion in humanitarian assistance provided by

¹⁰⁸ From 2011 to 2018 Norway provided over NOK 9 billion in un-earmarked humanitarian funding to multilateral organisations, international NGOs and the ICRC, some of which contributed to emergency assistance in South Sudan as well, but which is beyond the scope of this evaluation.

Norway constitutes around 2.5% of the total humanitarian funding to South Sudan during 2012–2018 (NOK 1.8 billion of a total of approximately NOK 72 billion¹⁰⁹). The doubling of humanitarian assistance from 2013 to 2014 reflects the increased humanitarian needs following the outbreak of civil war. The support is aligned with the ToC of 2014 focusing on addressing immediate suffering.

During the evaluation period, the number of food insecure people and displaced people did not reduce despite massive humanitarian support from the international community as the conflict continued unabated. As the data in Annex 6 shows (and illustrated in the timetable figure in Chapter 3), the humanitarian needs have increased steadily between 2012 and 2018 despite substantial humanitarian support from Norway and other donors. The number of displaced people has increased from half a million to over four million, and the number of food insecure people has increased from around two million to six million. The evaluation team finds that it is not feasible to ascertain what would have happened if there had been no humanitarian assistance, but as a minimum more people would have suffered and possibly died. Several interviewees and

¹⁰⁹ Data from Financial Tracking Service (FTS) on <https://fts.unocha.org>, accessed on 9 April 2019.

individual sources thought that humanitarian assistance contributed to averting a famine in 2017.¹¹⁰

The humanitarian support provided by Norway has been aligned with the 2008–2013 policy for Norwegian humanitarian support.¹¹¹ The policy's main goals have been to ensure that people in need receive assistance, that the assistance is based on the humanitarian principles, that the international community is ready to meet future humanitarian challenges and to support recovery of communities.

There is, however, less evidence to support that the support has been adhering to humanitarian principles; very few documents available to the evaluation team contain direct references to the humanitarian principles, and no interviewee raised the issue of the humanitarian principles as a focus area for Norwegian support. A June 2018 NPA humanitarian evaluation recommended that NPA develop a vision and narrative that outlines NPA's relationship to

¹¹⁰ See for example <http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/1103429/icode/>.

¹¹¹ Norway's Humanitarian Policy, MFA, October 2008. The Policy was not updated in 2013 as anticipated. A new humanitarian strategy was published in August 2018 but has not been in effect long enough to have any significant influence on the humanitarian support provided to South Sudan.



the four core humanitarian principles, how these principles are met and what NPA's policy is if their humanitarian assistance work and long-term political and development work come into conflict.¹¹² The evaluation findings indicate that there is still work to do for NPA to ensure full compliance with the humanitarian principles. However, the evaluation team did not identify challenges with NPA's application of humanitarian principles in the field in South Sudan. Furthermore, the desk study report from 2017 on Education in Conflict through CSO (not only addressing South Sudan) state that adherence to humanitarian principles has been an explicit requirement of both MFA programme grants or framework agreements since 2016, and a specific guidance note was prepared in June 2016 on 'ensuring respect for the principles'; nevertheless, Norad grant schemes to CSOs do not explicitly cite adherence to the principles as a condition of funding.¹¹³ The guidance note does, however, highlight that Norad's Principles for Support to Civil Society in the South reference the humanitarian principles indirectly through discussion on neutrality and independence, and that MFA-funded CSOs most consistently reference the principles

112 (Jones et al., 2018).

113 (Evaluation Department Norad, 2017).

since 2016, in response to the policy directive above. There is also evidence of ongoing dialogue between CSOs and MFA on adherence to the principles around framework agreements.¹¹⁴ There is thus attention to the issue. Among the multilaterals supported, there is also evidence confirming application of the principles: A World Food Programme (WFP) evaluation for its engagement in South Sudan stated that 'the country office adhered to its commitments to protection and humanitarian principles while maintaining engagement with the Government.'¹¹⁵ Similarly, initial findings from the on-going evaluation of country-based pooled funds, including the South Sudan Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF), show that the funds have contributed to provide principled assistance.¹¹⁶ Given Norway's support to the CHF (see more on this below), Norwegian humanitarian funding has contributed to ensure adherence to the humanitarian principles.

Humanitarian access has been an issue in South Sudan throughout, especially immediately after the December 2013 outbreak of civil war. Throughout the

114 (Evaluation Department Norad, 2017).

115 (WFP Office of Evaluation, 2017).

116 OCHA Evaluation of Country-Based Pooled Funds – Evaluation update for the IASC Humanitarian Financing Results Group 6 October 2019.

evaluation period dozens of access impediments has been reported every month.¹¹⁷ Between the outbreak of the war in late 2013 and the end of 2018, more than 100 aid workers have been killed in South Sudan.¹¹⁸ There is limited information available in Embassy work plans or related information on Norway's work on access. However, the evaluation team found that Norway has supported efforts to advocate for better humanitarian access, directly as part of joint statements by the Troika, and indirectly through its support to JMEC and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), both of whom have repeatedly brought up the issue of impediments to delivery of humanitarian assistance.¹¹⁹

Overall, the evaluation team finds that the Norwegian humanitarian support has helped towards achieving Norway's objective of contributing to reducing the suffering of the people of South Sudan, as evidenced

117 https://reliefweb.int/updates?primary_country=8657&source=1503&search=ocha_product:%22Humanitarian%20Snapshot%22%20AND%20title:%22Access%22.

118 <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-coordinator-calls-end-attacks-against-civilians-and-aid>.

119 See for example Troika press releases on <https://reliefweb.int/country/ssd?search=troika#content>; press releases and reports from JMEC on <https://jmeccsouthsudan.org/>; and CTSAMM reports and news on <http://ctsamm.org/>.



in the following assessment: 79% of the Norwegian humanitarian funding went to five organisations, namely OCHA (including the CHF), the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), WFP, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Norwegian Refugee Council.

The largest recipient of Norwegian humanitarian assistance was the Common Humanitarian Funds with NOK 500 million, comprising 28% of total Norwegian humanitarian funding to South Sudan. This made Norway one of the top-five donors to the CHF. Support to CHFs is specifically mentioned as a priority in the 2008 Norwegian Humanitarian Policy. Given the CHF's capacity to absorb large grants, the evaluation team found the CHF being an efficient avenue for allocation of humanitarian funding. Informants interviewed during the evaluation stated that the CHF was a useful tool to ensure strategic coverage and reduce sectoral and geographical gaps. The evaluation team found that provision of humanitarian funds to common funds, such as the CHF, ensures a more strategic use of humanitarian funds for gap fillers, be it geographical or sectoral, and is in line with Good Donor Principles of not earmarking humanitarian funding and supporting the unique role of the UN in leading and coordinating humanitarian action. This is supported by evidence from a past evaluation (2015), and inputs to an ongoing

(2019) global evaluation of country-based pooled funds, that finds the CHF disbursements were timely and well managed, that it has served a critical role allowing the international community to meet emerging needs and gaps effectively and coherently, and that it has made a difference in people's lives.¹²⁰ The global 2015 evaluation of CHFs found that CHFs ensured alignment with humanitarian strategies and funding priorities of the largest humanitarian donors, even those that do not contribute to the CHFs through e.g such donors' participation in the Advisory Boards.¹²¹ The 2015 evaluation, however, also found that opportunities for recovery and resilience approaches for ensuring sustained results had been missed.¹²² While only 8.2% of CHF funds were allocated to national NGOs according to the 2015 evaluation, the allocation has increased to 39% in 2018, surpassing the 25% target of the localisation agenda of the Grand Bargain.¹²³ Taking into consideration the CHF's ability to provide strategic support and the opportunities it gives for NGOs, including

¹²⁰ (UNOCHA, 2015b); (UNOCHA & Konterra Group, 2019).

¹²¹ (UNOCHA, 2015a).

¹²² 'Approaches' as opposed to programmes, whereby humanitarian activities incorporate a beneficiary focus aimed at understanding and supporting how individuals better withstand and recover from shocks.

¹²³ (SSHf, 2019)

national NGOs, to access humanitarian funding, the evaluation team finds that the support to the CHF has been effective in alleviating humanitarian needs.

The second largest recipient of Norwegian humanitarian assistance has been the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation, receiving NOK 321 million for its Emergency Livelihood Response Programme in South Sudan (ELRP) during 2014 to 2018. The programme partly counters the CHF's lack of recovery and resilience support (as described in the 2015 CHF evaluation), while at the same time is effective in contributing to reducing the immediate suffering through its emergency interventions. Support to food security is in line with the priorities put forward in the Norwegian 2008 Humanitarian Policy on supporting recovery of communities. Although the ELPR had the potential to reduce future suffering in line with the Norwegian 2014 Theory of Change, a 2016 evaluation of the ELRP found that the programme's overall effectiveness has been limited as agricultural inputs – although of good quality – were distributed late. The 2016 evaluation also found that the livestock vaccination was unlikely to have been effective, and that although there was some impact of the emergency intervention, there was insufficient data on the impact of seed distribution and vaccinations.¹²⁴

¹²⁴ (FAO, 2016)



The third largest recipient of Norwegian humanitarian aid is WFP, which received NOK 211 million in 2011–2018. The support to WFP aimed at ensuring access to food, which, according to interviewees in Juba, was effective. According to multiple reports by IPC, food assistance in South Sudan has been instrumental in avoiding famine – notwithstanding the fact that food security has persisted, and indeed has worsened, since the outbreak of the civil war in 2013.¹²⁵ An evaluation of WFP's operation in South Sudan from 2011 to 2016 conducted by the WFP Office of Evaluation found that the emergency food assistance was effective, but that some targets such as road construction and resilience building were not met. The evaluation report concluded that the operation helped to prevent a precipitous decline in food security, although livelihood interventions were less successful.¹²⁶

NRC was the fifth largest recipient of Norwegian humanitarian support, receiving NOK 160 million

in funding.¹²⁷ Two previous evaluations of the NRC humanitarian interventions found they had improved in quality over time, and became more effective, until 2015. An external evaluation conducted in the second half of 2012 of NRC humanitarian programmes found that shelter interventions in South Sudan were less relevant and effective, but that a programme on Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance (ICLA) was more relevant. A 2015 evaluation of NRC's emergency response in South Sudan from December 2013 to December 2015 found that NRC during that time improved its timeliness, relevance and effectiveness from partially to largely. The 2015 evaluation also found that during 2013 to 2015, NRC managed to move from mainly supporting returnees to also supporting Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and increasingly supporting hard-to-access areas.¹²⁸ There are no evaluations of the performance of NRC's humanitarian programmes after 2015.

The Norwegian focus on food security has been operationalised not only through humanitarian funding

to the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation as described above, and to the World Food Programme – the second largest recipient of humanitarian funding with NOK 211 million in the period evaluated – but also through support to NPA through, for example, its work with WFP and with several agricultural development projects. One of these is the Building Resilience of Smallholders and Market Actors (BRSMA) project funded by the MFA. The evaluation team selected the BRSMA as an example of the Norwegian engagement for further assessment and found it was effective in improving food security (see details of the project in Annex 5).¹²⁹ The BRSMA was highly relevant for the context, striving to implement recovery or development activities in what is basically a humanitarian setting, and was effective in making changes not only in the lives of beneficiaries, but also in the lives of their families and the wider community (See Box 5 for an overview of the project). In line with the evaluation team findings, a 2018 evaluation of the project also found that the objective of the project was without doubt relevant but noted that the results framework was too comprehensive and would be insufficient to adequately assess if increased resilience had indeed been achieved.¹³⁰

¹²⁵ Integrated Food Security Classification Phase. A full list of the 51 IPC South Sudan publications covering 2012 to 2018 can be found on <https://reliefweb.int/country/ssd?source=3495#content>.

¹²⁶ WFP Office of Evaluation, Country Portfolio Evaluation - South Sudan: An evaluation of WFP's Portfolio 2011 – 2016 (June 2017).

¹²⁷ (NRC, 2019) NRC's globally funded operations in South Sudan covers the sectors of Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance (ICLA); Education; Livelihoods and food security; Shelter and Settlements; and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH). The ICLA support included information and training on housing, land and property rights and resolution of land conflicts.

¹²⁸ (NRC, 2016).

¹²⁹ Note that there have been no evaluations of NPA's humanitarian programme covering the evaluation period.

¹³⁰ (NPA, 2018b).



In summary, the evaluation team has analysed four large recipients of Norwegian humanitarian support: CHF, FAO, WFP and NRC, constituting 68% of the Norwegian humanitarian support to South Sudan.¹³¹ The evaluation team finds that the humanitarian assistance and the support to improved food security has been mostly effective. Almost a third of the humanitarian funding has been provided through a pool fund mechanism (the CHF) that is used effectively to alleviate gaps. The evaluation team found that the effectiveness of the humanitarian support through NGOs has been mixed, as has the support to the second largest recipient of humanitarian funding (to FAO for the Emergency Livelihood Response Programme in South Sudan [ELRP]) aimed at improving food security. The Building Resilience of Smallholders and Market Actors (BRSMA) project, selected by the evaluation team as a case study of Norwegian support, is found to have been effective in improving food security.

131. No evaluation reports were available of the Norwegian support to ICRC, the fourth largest recipient of Norwegian humanitarian support. The support to ICRC constituted 10% of the total Norwegian humanitarian support.

BOX 7: NORWEGIAN PEOPLE'S AID BUILDING RESILIENCE OF SMALLHOLDERS AND MARKET ACTORS

NPA is the largest recipient of Norwegian NGO funding since 2011 (NOK 570 million). NPA has spent parts of the funding on livelihoods/food security projects. In Bor, Jonglei State, NPA has implemented the Building Resilience of Smallholders and Market Actors (BRSMA) project. The BRSMA is funded through the aid budget and phase III has just ended. Although the BRSMA was a follow-up to a previous similar project, there were no references to lessons learned from this in the BRSMA documents.

The project's ToC is that increased access to agricultural inputs, including quality seeds and veterinary drugs, will contribute to increased agricultural production. The increased production, including of seeds, will in turn, through the market, be available for consumption, or in the case of seeds for production, to entire communities. Grain banks will contribute to cope with lean seasons with high food prices.

The evaluation team finds (as presented in [Annex 5](#)), in line with a 2018 external review, that the BRSMA has overall successfully improved food security in Bor through improved agricultural production via

improved agricultural practices and better access to markets and credit. Providing that there are no new displacements, looting or replacement of country staff, the results of the projects are likely to be sustained without future NPA support.

No gender analysis was available in project documents despite women belonging to some of the most vulnerable groups in South Sudan; the project indeed supported many women, including widows. The beneficiaries of the BRSMA are pre-existing groups, likely leaving out other more vulnerable segments. Ensuring sufficient agricultural production to increase resilience of entire communities might, however, require a focus on beneficiaries/groups with existing skills. The project documents contain no analysis on potential conflicts arising as a result of the BRSMA project.

Overall the evaluation team finds that the BRSMA has been effective in increasing incomes for farmers, traders and others, contributing to increased food security for not only direct beneficiaries, but also indirect beneficiaries and the larger community. The project also appears to be sustainable. Overall, the project is a good example of a project with a developmental approach in a fragile and uncertain context.



4.1.4 EFFECTIVENESS FOR WOMEN AND VULNERABLE GROUPS

Have men, women and vulnerable groups been affected differently by Norway's engagement?

Overall, the attention to vulnerability is not pronounced in the Norwegian support; the links between vulnerability and conflict sensitivity are weak (as documented in the conflict sensitivity section further below). In terms of gender, while it has throughout the period evaluated been on the Norwegian agenda, the issue was deprioritised in Embassy work plans based on resources available. This changed in 2015/2016, after which gender re-emerged as a priority area primarily as a consequence of the Norwegian policy focus on gender-based violence and Women, Peace and Security. A significant number of women have been reached through the Norwegian support; however, the effectiveness in terms of enhanced women's empowerment remains limited with few tangible outcomes documentable as at the end of 2018.

The evaluation team has looked at gender broadly; from women as beneficiaries to the extent to which the support enhances women's empowerment. The fragile and conflict-affected context of South Sudan means that the evaluation specifically includes Norway's

engagement in and attention to the Women, Peace and Security agenda, as expressed in UN Security Council Resolution 1325. Similarly, vulnerability is assessed in terms of the context pertaining to children, disabled and minorities (note that there is no reflection on the issue of ethnicity and vulnerability in any of the Norwegian documentation studied, even if ethnicity in the South Sudanese context is key in terms of conflict sensitivity and development).¹³²

The evaluation team can find traces of reference to gender equality and elements of WPS priorities in the documentation for the full period evaluated. There are, however, also years where attention to gender is less significant. From 2011–2014, around half of the semi-annual progress reports from the Embassy do not reference gender and vulnerability.¹³³ Six reports between 2013 and 2016 reference gender and/or ethnicity, but offer no reflections on Embassy actions related to women or vulnerable groups.¹³⁴ Thus, in

¹³² Vulnerability in South Sudan is a broad term comprising women, children, internally displaced as well as ethnically marginalised groups. There is no information on the latter in any of the documentation. Similarly, for children and IDPs the information is less pronounced and thus more difficult to assess the emphasis.

¹³³ (Norwegian Embassy in Juba 2011a; 2011b; 2013c; 2014a).

¹³⁴ (Norwegian Embassy in Juba 2013d; 2015a; 2015b; 2016a; 2017a;

the full period evaluated gender and vulnerability are not always priority areas for the Embassy in terms of resource prioritisation. The mixed attention to gender was confirmed when the evaluation team assessed the Embassy work plans (for Sudan and South Sudan). As an example, aid was requested by the Embassy in Khartoum in 2008 and 2009 for gender equality projects, and some projects did receive support in those years. However, in 2010 and 2011, gender was deprioritised due to human resource constraints at the Embassy in Khartoum, or due to 'lack of qualified projects' at the Embassy in Juba in 2013.¹³⁵ Thus, for some years Norway has not directly contributed to gender equality in South Sudan.

The evaluation team has found that from 2015 onwards, the Embassy increased its attention to gender, WPS as well as vulnerability. The evaluation team found that gender is mentioned specifically in evaluations of projects and programmes supported by Norway in this period. This includes evaluations of UNICEF, FAO, UNDP and Norwegian NGO projects. For

2017b).

¹³⁵ (Norwegian Embassy in Juba, Work Plan 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011d; 2013e). Note that (Norwegian Embassy in Juba, 2014b) also recognises that not enough has been done due to constraints in human resources.



all these projects the evaluations point to activities and results specifically related to women, Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV), IDPs and vulnerable children.¹³⁶ Similarly, much of the humanitarian support is by default targeting some of the most vulnerable groups, including those displaced and those who are food insecure. Protection concerns, again often related to the most vulnerable groups such as women and children, are also addressed through humanitarian assistance and in several of the peace related support, such as UNMISS (see [Box 5](#)).

To assess the degree of Norwegian emphasis on gender, the evaluation team undertook a more detailed assessment of project documents from projects supported by Norway (see [Annex 4](#)). While these documents are not a full catalogue of all projects, they do provide an overview of how gender and vulnerability are considered. The assessment analysed the degree to which: (a) gender was included and mainstreamed; and (b) whether vulnerable groups were targeted in the documents. In terms of gender, the team's assessment show that in the period 2005–2011 gender is integrated in 33% of the projects. In the

period 2014–2018 this figure increases to 59%. Thus, in the documentation there is evidence to show that there was an enhanced focus on gender and vulnerability in the Norwegian portfolio in the last period evaluated. However, there are also projects with no gender reference (for the period 2005–2011 17% of the projects assessed had no gender reference in activities and indicators, while this figure was 37% in 2012–2013 and 12% in 2014–2018).¹³⁷ There is thus room for further emphasising gender in the dialogue with implementing partners.

In terms of vulnerable groups, a similar assessment by the evaluation team shows enhanced Norwegian engagement in projects with specific activities and indicators concerning vulnerable groups. In the period 2005–2011 17% of the projects include elements of vulnerability, which increases to 51% in 2014–2018. There is thus an enhanced focus on vulnerability in the Norwegian programming over the period evaluated. Again, the assessment represents a selection of some projects and, as such, the assessment is only indicative (see the full assessment in [Annex 4](#)).¹³⁸

¹³⁷ Based on an assessment by the evaluation team of 75 decision documents and project documents available from the MFA archives.

¹³⁸ Based on an assessment by the evaluation team of 75 decision documents

As is evident from the evaluation team's assessment of decision documents and programme documents, most programmes funded by Norway include a gender angle in their work, and several include attention to vulnerability as well; the level varies, as is reflected in the four case studies assessed specifically by the evaluation team:

- The UNDP/IGAD capacity building programme had specific targets for female experts and partner twins (30%); however, the target was not reached (they managed just over 15%). The bulk of the women were seconded to health institutions, especially among nurses and midwives. There was limited influence on policies and performance in relation to gender issues or vulnerable groups (the latter not reflected specifically in the documentation or interviews).
- In the programmes assessed under the OfD some aspects of gender are included. These first and foremost include ensuring women's representation in awareness raising activities and training, though the actual numbers were limited. Gender issues are also reflected in the Petroleum Act. However, the number of women involved and trained was

¹³⁶ (FAO, 2016); (UNICEF, 2016b); (UNDP, 2017a); (Evaluation Department Norad, 2017).

and project documents available from the MFA archives.



very limited and there is little evidence to suggest that gender has been a priority in any of the programmes.¹³⁹

- The NCA peacebuilding project prioritises the inclusion of women at various levels in peacebuilding as part of implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1325.¹⁴⁰ Much of the peacebuilding activities focus on including women and showing an impressive female participation rate – often reaching the aim of 30% – and women outnumber men in some of the training provided and in forming peace groups.¹⁴¹ In practice, however, according to interviewees, the challenge remains that men do not participate as much as women in peace trainings. Yet, perhaps more significant is how NCA's holistic peacebuilding approach relates to gender. NCA adjusted its gender approach in its peacebuilding programmes based on an evaluation that recommended including women's economic

empowerment.¹⁴² The adjustment includes a reflective approach to adjusting gender relations as they explicitly seek to find ways to allow men to participate in changing gender roles. The evaluation team, through interviews and focus group discussions, found that the work has empowered women because the effect is seen as positive by men, who now encourage their wives to take part as well.

- The BRSMA project implemented by NPA included a larger number of female beneficiaries, including some of the most vulnerable – widows. Although no detailed gender analysis was conducted as part of the project preparations, women interviewed during the field mission praised the empowerment they had achieved due to the project. However, because a criterion for participation in the BRSMA project is that the group is pre-existing (ensuring sustainability), more vulnerable segments of the population are likely to have been left out, illustrating the difficulties of addressing vulnerability in this context.

The Norwegian attention to Women, Peace and Security is evident in the first available Embassy work plan for Sudan 2008, where NOK 750,000 was requested

for the implementation of the action plan related to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSC 1325), which forms the basis of WPS. This request can be referred to as a global Norwegian policy focus on UNSC 1325 at that time. The emphasis varies, however, throughout the period evaluated.

Following the global Norwegian action plan on WPS of making South Sudan a WPS priority country, attention and funding for WPS activities were increased by the Embassy in Juba. The main manifestation was the support to UN Women and a local NGO (EVE) for activities to enhance women's leadership in the peace process, as well as a major 2018 support to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) related to sexual and gender-based violence. Increased attention is also reflected in the Embassy's role as chair of the WPS donors working group from 2018 onwards.¹⁴³

The emphasis on WPS in South Sudan is partly documented by a Norad evaluation on WPS;¹⁴⁴ the evaluation found that 58% of the Norwegian speeches concerning South Sudan mention women (though this

139 As an example, in (Oil for Development, 2014) for the OfD programme it is stated that no activities were undertaken related to gender. In interviews, people quoted 2–5 female participants in training events. Finally, see (Norad, 2015c). Note also that (woli7201) does not report on gender at all.

140 (NCA, 2016).

141 (NCA-Act Alliance, 2015).

142 (NCA-Act Alliance, 2015).

143 (Evaluation Department Norad, 2015b); (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019a).

144 (Evaluation Department Norad, 2015b).



number says little about the depth of the emphasis on women in development), and around 30% mention women, peace and security specifically. From a more actionable perspective, the evaluation recognised Norway for advocating women's roles in the CPA process, though the impact was limited (see also the peacebuilding section under effectiveness).¹⁴⁵

4.2 Relevance and Coherence of Norway's Engagement

In the following we present the evaluation team's findings on relevance and coherence of the Norwegian support. First, we look at the Norwegian aid vis-à-vis the priorities of the Government of South Sudan and the international community (as expressed in the GoSS and international agreed documents at the time of the support), as well as the relevance as expressed by beneficiaries interviewed. We then look at how Norway, over time, has contributed to aid coordination as an active agent as well as a financial contributor to pooled and joint funding mechanisms. Finally, we assess the coherence between the political, development and humanitarian support to South Sudan.

¹⁴⁵ (Evaluation Department Norad, 2016).

4.2.1 RELEVANCE TO BENEFICIARIES, GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL AGENDA

To what extent has Norway's engagement been relevant for, and aligned to, the country's own needs and coherent to other international support?

Norway has, throughout the period evaluated, focused on ensuring alignment with the priorities expressed in government and joint donor plans and peace agreements, even when these did not resonate with the actual actions and priorities of GoSS. Based on the case studies assessed, there is also evidence of a high degree of relevance of the Norwegian support to the people of South Sudan.

Relevance is assessed by linking Norwegian funding priorities and Theories of Change with the plans and agreements of the government and international community, while the relevance to beneficiary needs is assessed through interviews with beneficiaries using the four case studies of the evaluation.

The evaluation team has found that Norway's support is, throughout the period evaluated, in one way or another aligned with the needs expressed in jointly agreed international documents, such as the Joint Assessment Mission outline of 2005 and later the

United Nations Development Assistance Framework of 2012–2013 for example. Similarly, Norway fully aligned with the GoSS formal priorities throughout most of the period evaluated. For the period 2005–2011, this meant aligning with the CPA by supporting key CPA institutions like the AEC, and focusing on wealth sharing through the OfD programme. From independence in 2011 until 2013, the focus was on core state functions in line with GoSS formal priorities as expressed in the South Sudan Development Plan 2011–2013. However, as argued in [Chapter 3](#), this formal alignment is not necessarily congruent with GoSS' actual priorities. GoSS' budget allocation of own resources did not follow their own plans and failed to prioritise development, which is also confirmed by multiple interviewees in South Sudan. In the end, Norway and other donors funded a large part of the development even when South Sudan was classified as a middle-income country with large funds available from the oil revenue.

After the outbreak of civil war in 2013, and an escalation in 2016, Norway focused on alignment with the two peace agreements: ARCSS (Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan) and Revitalised-ARCSS. This alignment included funding to the peace process through IGAD as well as funding to JMEC, and secondments to JMEC and CTSAMM.



Interviews with past and present government officials in South Sudan confirmed that Norway was always aligning with the needs in the country and government priorities, though there were explicit statements of dissatisfaction with Norway not funding the National Dialogue Process (which is not a formal part of the peace process) and the National Pre-Transitional Committee. However, in this area, according to interviewees, there is consistency in the donor perspective in the sense that these processes should be funded by South Sudan, not the international community. As in the past, Norway decided to align with the international community.

Using the case studies from this evaluation, the evaluation team found some good examples in the engagements assessed. In the NCA peacebuilding work, beneficiaries interviewed highlighted NCA's commitment to the most vulnerable in situations of emergency. However, while there is an attempt at systematic needs assessments, it was not always clear to the evaluation team what information and how much of it was used to make programmatic decisions, as was also documented in a recent evaluation of NCA's Emergency Preparedness and Response Programme in South Sudan.¹⁴⁶ Similarly, the evaluation team found that, in the other case study of

Building Resilience of Smallholders and Market Actors (BRSMA), the support was very relevant and aligned with the needs of beneficiaries. All beneficiaries interviewed, be it farmers or small agro-businesses, stated that the support provided through the project was relevant to their needs. The relevance was confirmed by representatives of local authorities and is in line with a 2018 evaluation that found the project's objective relevant.¹⁴⁷ Similarly, the OfD programme beneficiaries interviewed at CSO level (NPA partners) and at national level (government officials) all confirmed the relevance of the support provided to their needs. The IGAD/UNDP capacity building project was relevant in terms of meeting immediate needs at the state and local level. However, the approach applied was less relevant in terms of ensuring institutional capacity development (See [Annex 5](#)).

4.2.2 NORWAY'S CONTRIBUTION TO COORDINATION

Has Norway contributed to international coordination and alignment to country needs?

Coordination in South Sudan has been poor since the failures of the aid effectiveness agenda in the years leading up to independence, and in particular since the outbreak of civil war in late 2013. Besides the

chairpersonship of the Women, Peace and Security donor group, since 2014 Norway has not taken a lead in any major coordination efforts or related aid effectiveness initiatives. However, Norway has contributed to the very few joint funding mechanisms that currently exist in South Sudan (the question of the degree of alignment with country needs is assessed in the previous section).

Coordination is assessed by collecting data that shows Norwegian contribution to coordinated and joint mechanisms and Norway's role in coordination, as well as the GoSS, donors, and implementing partners' perception of Norway's role in coordination.

A substantial number of key Norwegian decision makers interviewed by the team agreed that Norway was originally a key actor in ensuring that the aid effectiveness agenda was promoted extensively in South Sudan as part of statebuilding. According to interviewees, Norway's emphasis on aid effectiveness started during the CPA negotiations when the country played a key role in ensuring that the Aid Effectiveness Agenda was given a prominent role in the CPA, and with Norway hosting the first Sudan Donors' Conference in Oslo in 2005.¹⁴⁸ As a consequence, Norway supported the establishment

¹⁴⁶ (NCA, 2018d).

¹⁴⁷ (NPA, 2018b).

¹⁴⁸ Oslo Donors' Conference on Sudan 2005—Chair's Conclusions 12 April 2005.



of the World Bank-led Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) for all of Sudan (MDTF-National), and specifically for Southern Sudan (MDTF-SS). Norway also contributed significant funds for the MDTFs (NOK 820 million) and engaged in funding other joint initiatives, such as the Capacity Building Trust Fund as well as supporting the establishment of the Joint Donor Team (JDT) in Juba.

However, the success of these efforts was limited, as evidenced by the closing down of all the joint initiatives before or immediately after South Sudanese independence in 2011. The MDTF-South Sudan was the longest running of these joint initiatives, which was evaluated in 2013 (though no new donor contributions were received after 2011). This MDTF evaluation found that the 'MDTF-SS delivered partial outputs against its original targets and that the contextual knowledge gained from the JAM (Joint Assessment Mission) process did not feed into this. The fault in the MDTF design included the limited acknowledgement of the capacity challenges at GoSS level.'¹⁴⁹ Among interviewees there was general agreement that the mechanisms had not worked as planned. The JDT was assessed as lacking the political backing to perform its functions and also suffered from the fact that the partners could not agree on a joint

strategy. The MDTFs were assessed by interviewees to lack the flexibility and risk willingness required to operate in a fragile setting like South Sudan. Following this, Norway, as reflected on in [Chapter 3](#), moved towards more bilateral engagements and was less engaged in leading coordination efforts. Consequently, the overemphasis on aid effectiveness promoted pre-2005, and the failure of the aid effectiveness instruments, had the unintended consequence that development assistance from around 2008/2009 onwards became more fragmented and less coordinated, counter to the Norwegian and other donors' commitment to Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness principles.

Following the outbreak of civil war in 2013, donor coordination has been weak. According to reports and interviewees from bilateral and multilateral donors, coordination has been hampered by the humanitarian crisis and the evacuation of staff, limiting resources for development coordination. The evaluation team found limited evidence of Norway taking an active lead in donor coordination since the late 2000s. The exception is the Norwegian co-chairpersonship of the Women, Peace and Security donor group.

Most Norwegian funding not channelled through NGOs is provided as earmarked funding to multilateral

organisations. The evaluation team found that there are currently only three joint or pooled funding mechanisms in South Sudan (in addition to UNMISS and core funding provided to UN agencies): CHF, the Civil Society Fund, and the International Monetary Fund Trust Fund for South Sudan. Norway provides aid to the three funds.

The evaluation team found that coordination in South Sudan was primarily managed through the humanitarian cluster. The evaluation team found, through interviews with bilateral donors, that the humanitarian focus meant that there was limited knowledge in the donor community of development programmes and projects funded by others. Norway supports the cluster structure and is currently a member of the CHF Advisory Board and of the Humanitarian Country Team, playing active roles in these fora according to interviewees.

4.2.3 POLICY AND AID COHERENCE

[To what extent has Norway's peace engagement, humanitarian and long-term assistance been coordinated?](#)

The evaluation team found that there is a high level of coherence in the Norwegian support in terms of aligning the Norwegian funding with the different peace agreements. The evaluation team found the coherence

¹⁴⁹ (Fafo, 2013).



to be slightly less stringent post-2013, though the aid is still aligned with the two new peace agreements. However, overall coherence is difficult to assess when there are limited Norwegian strategies in place for South Sudan to guide policy implementation

Coherence is assessed in accordance with OECD-DAC’s definition focusing on the consistency between security, developmental, trade and military policies, as well as humanitarian policies and their application in practice. The evaluation team examined the policy priorities of Norway and how they complemented (or failed to complement) the development, peace and humanitarian aid. Due to the lack of explicit long-term Norwegian strategies for most of the period evaluated, the evaluation team has based its assessment on: (i) the ToCs, programmes and projects supported; and (ii) key policy dialogue messages as expressed in documentation or through interviews.

The evaluation team found that there is coherence in the Norwegian aid prioritisation and policies for most of the period evaluated. With the signing of the CPA, which was a Norwegian foreign policy priority, Norwegian aid was used to fund a string of institutions directly related to CPA implementation and priorities established through the CPA. A summary of this prioritisation is presented in [Table 4](#). In interviews with

key stakeholders, it was made evident how the Sudan team in the MFA had the task, inter alia, of establishing synergy between diplomatic efforts (including Troika co-operation) and peacebuilding efforts, humanitarian assistance and long-term development assistance.¹⁵⁰

Table 4. [Examples of Coherence in Norwegian Aid in the Period 2005–2011](#).

The table identifies two key Norwegian policy priority areas and the institutions and programmes funded illustrating the link between policy priority and funding.

Norway policy priority	Key institutions and programmes funded ¹⁵¹
Aid effectiveness	Multi-Donor Trust Fund-South
	Multi-Donor Trust Fund-National
	Joint Donor Team ¹⁵²
CPA priorities	The Assessment and Evaluation Commission
	Population census
	Elections
	Referendum
	Oil for Development / wealth sharing

150 (Ofstad, 2019) and interviews.

151 Embassy work plans and half-yearly plans, as well as Norwegian Aid Statistics.

152 On the JDT note, however, that Norway, as well as other donors, provided considerable funding outside the JDT office as well.



In the years up to and immediately following independence, the evaluation team found that Norway, in its bilateral engagement, focused extensively on core functions and capacity development of the government institutions, along with an emphasis on service delivery and humanitarian aid. The funding was thus aligned with the ToC and the policy messages. As in the previous period, there was thus a high degree of coherence in the Norwegian support, as presented in [Table 5](#). However, the evaluation team did find inconsistencies as well. Interviewees pointed to a high engagement by Norway in ensuring anti-corruption and transparency of GoSS; however, the actual funding allocated by Norway for these two areas was limited. As an example, the OfD reports from 2012–2013 provide only limited reflection on the capacity development influence on transparency in the management of oil revenues, even though oil was the main source of misuse of public funds in the past.

After 2013, the evaluation team found that the policy and development support was less stringently aligned in message and implementation. On the one hand there is a high consistency in the support to the two consecutive peace agreements (the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) and the Revitalised-ARCSS) through financial support to

IGAD, as well as support to the institutions overseeing and supporting the ARCSS, and subsequently R-ARCSS implementation. On the other hand, the evaluation team found that Norway's support to the Government in South Sudan from 2014–2018 includes policy messages focusing on terminating funding to the government, while still engaging in projects that work with government institutions. The evaluation team found that several projects were closed down as a consequence of security and logistics, such as the Fula Rapids Hydropower project.¹⁵³ Also, a wide range of other bilateral engagements were terminated, discontinued or scaled down (see effectiveness section above), and funds were reallocated to humanitarian assistance. However, support was continued to the Government of South Sudan mainly through indirect support to various UN programmes that worked with the government, primarily at local level, but also through the Norwegian funded IGAD/UNDP government capacity development project.

New Norwegian policy guidelines were developed from 2016 (e.g. the White Paper on Norwegian priority countries and the government budgets); the guidelines stated that no direct bilateral support to the government

¹⁵³ (Norwegian Embassy in Juba, 2017c) and interviews with people involved in the process.

in South Sudan would be provided, and that the emphasis should be on support to peacebuilding and aid that should provide a bridge between humanitarian relief and development. The new guidelines led to new initiatives in several areas: basic education, food security, gender-based violence, Women, Peace and Security, and local level peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts.

From a humanitarian and recovery perspective, the evaluation team has found that there is a high degree of coherence in the support emphasising the link between humanitarian and development assistance. This coherence is, for instance, in the example in the NPA case study assessed by the evaluation team (see [Annex 5](#)), as well as in the support to FAO (see humanitarian effectiveness section), where there is emphasis on food security and resilience in addition to the more emergency related humanitarian assistance, thus combining humanitarian assistance with a more long-term development objective.

The evaluation team found that a new issue around policy coherence emerged from around 2015. Post-2013, and in particular since 2016, interviews showed how the Troika started to take a much sharper tone towards the government in South Sudan, with Norway supporting a more confrontational stance alongside



the UK and the US. At the same time, Norwegian NGO engagement in the country had changed with NPA disavowing the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The evaluation team found that since the Troika had been openly critical of GoSS and not co-signed the R-ARCSS, the impact of this criticism trickled down to Norway's other engagements, according to interviewees. For some of Norway's development partners, the Troika membership created problems once relations turned sour, with one partner reporting that they had been accused of 'being Troika' as a synonym for being an ally of the West. More recently, partners have been concerned about a possible backlash due to Norway's Troika membership. As another partner interviewee stated: 'If something goes wrong it could go very wrong, and Norway could become a scapegoat and that could have repercussions on us on the ground if things go sour. If GoSS could choose, they would probably go with the bigger actors and would sacrifice Norway in that relationship and that has a risk.' Another partner argued that the government now viewed the Troika as an enemy. The evaluation team found that while this potential negative impact on aid does not in itself illustrate policy incoherence, it underscores the close link between diplomatic efforts and development assistance.

4.3 Conflict Sensitivity in the Norwegian Support

- To what extent have conflict sensitive measures been applied in Norway's engagement?
- To what extent has the conflict or the context affected Norway's engagement?
- Has Norway supported specific conflict sensitivity initiatives promoting peace, including on political, portfolio and project levels?

Over the full period evaluated Norway has funded several peacebuilding initiatives, of which some specifically work on conflict mitigation or peacemaking. However, the use of conflict analyses to inform policy and programming has remained limited throughout. With the exception of a 2017 study commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no documented conflict assessments have been undertaken. The evaluation team found that without a clear approach to operationalisation of conflict sensitivity, the Norwegian emphasis on conflict sensitivity falls short of making an operational impact.

The concept of conflict sensitivity originally proposed that any outside engagement that brings resources into

an area might stir conflicts due to competition for such resources. A recent set of definitions highlights that conflict sensitivity means 'understanding the conflict context' and 'carefully considering the interactions between planned or ongoing interventions and the conflict context,' while 'acting upon the understanding in programme design and implementation, to minimise potential negative impacts, and responding to changes in conflict dynamics by adjusting programming.'¹⁵⁴ Development or humanitarian aid is precisely such a resource that has huge potential to create and fan conflict.

Policy documents outline Norway's approach to working in conflict settings. A recent MFA document highlights that to engage in a conflict context 'strategic awareness is vital, as is up-to-date knowledge, patience and a willingness to take risks. Any action taken must be based on thorough analyses of the national and regional context.'¹⁵⁵

The evaluation team found that there are a number of common points from past evaluations outlining lessons learned from the international community's engagement in South Sudan. A key common point is

¹⁵⁴ (UNICEF, 2016a).

¹⁵⁵ (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ca. 2016).



the need for a better understanding of the context to enable the identification of implementable ToCs. As was stated already in the OECD-DAC evaluation in 2010 'the transition from war to peace is not a technical exercise but a highly political process. A sophisticated and nuanced analysis of power relations, the causes of vulnerability, and drivers of conflict and resilience indicators, was largely missing from the design and execution of many aid programmes. In dynamic conflict settings, an analysis of the political economy of the transition must also be continuously revised in order to remain useful. This analysis was not done, as donors have instead tended to focus on administrative delivery and implementation.'¹⁵⁶

With the exception of the Norwegian MFA-commissioned 2017 report on the political economy of South Sudan,¹⁵⁷ the evaluation team has found limited evidence of the commissioning, or use of, political economy and conflict analyses to inform policy or strategy development as such. Much

¹⁵⁶ (Bennett et al., 2010).

¹⁵⁷ See (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2017). In 2016 the MFA commissioned Norwegian research institutions to do political economy analysis of all of Norway's main partner countries. NUPI coordinated the project and PRIO was responsible for the South Sudan report.

research on South/South conflict dynamics was, however, available throughout the period evaluated. The lack of commissioning or use of conflict analyses does not mean that there was no awareness of conflictual dynamics, as all work plans and half-yearly reports, as well as the 2010 strategy document, all refer to aspects of the conflict in description of the context. Nonetheless, there is limited reflection on the consequences of injecting additional Norwegian resources into the South Sudanese context, as well as the implications of this injection in terms of probable beneficiaries of such additional resources, and the potential conflicts arising as a result.

Previous evaluations have highlighted that Norway's learning about its role as a donor, and in supporting its partners, is not systematic, particularly in understanding conflict dynamics. The learning challenges do not only apply to Norway. Norad's Evaluation Department's South Sudan Country Evaluation Brief stated that 'donors worked with a poor understanding of local power relations, drivers of conflict and causes of vulnerability; this created flawed and unsustainable programme designs which barely involved existing structures or communities...Ignorance about drivers of conflict, particularly at the sub-national level, left little room for early warning that developing

tensions might affect programming.'¹⁵⁸ The finding was echoed again by the UK All Party Parliamentary Group stating that comprehensive conflict analysis was not properly integrated into donor and development planning, and was paid insufficient attention by many, leading to faulty assumptions and missed opportunities, and that 'the potential for large-scale violence was known long before the fighting initially broke out'.¹⁵⁹

The limited inclusion of conflict-sensitive considerations is a consequence of the lack of clarity of what such considerations could be, and that being so, results in unintended consequences for the operationalisation of the Norwegian engagement. Without a clear definition and approach to operationalisation, the Norwegian emphasis on conflict sensitivity falls short of making an operational impact and guide decision making. Conflict sensitivity – when mentioned – is often tagged on in an ad hoc manner, without clear operational approaches attached to it.

¹⁵⁸ (Evaluation Department Norad, 2016c).

¹⁵⁹ (All Party Parliamentary Group for Sudan and South Sudan (UK), 2015).



Norwegian government documents go further in acknowledging the political nature of violent conflicts.¹⁶⁰ But, looking back over the period of this evaluation, the picture of what a practical understanding of conflict sensitive approaches entails is bleak. In practice, according to interviewees, Norway has implemented conflict sensitivity primarily as risk management to highlight challenges.

Conflict analysis in the reviewed programme and policy documents was largely superficial as shown through an assessment of 21 MFA decision documents for funding to development projects and programmes in South Sudan, only two documents specifically included reference to the impact of the project on the conflict, and 70% of the documents did not refer to conflict sensitive elements (see [Annex 4](#) for details). As a case in point, the OfD programme has no real reflections of how the support will influence the conflict potential in the country, despite the fact that access to the oil revenue is considered a main trigger for conflict.

The challenges of how to address conflict sensitivity in projects and programmes are also evidenced in the four case study projects assessed by the team (see [Annex 5](#)):

1. In the IGAD/UNDP capacity development programme, the attention to conflict dynamics and risks were limited in the first project phase. The limited attention to conflict was also emphasised in Norad's 2013 appraisal of the draft programme document for the second phase. The proposed third phase carries a high risk that project implementation may suffer from the political conflict and government intervention. Furthermore, there is no consideration of which geographical areas should be supported in light of the conflict potential. The risk mitigation measures of the current draft are weak.
2. The support for OfD shows a consciousness of the need for transparency and accountability in the oil revenue sector, in particular vis-à-vis Sudan. There is, however, limited reflection in the OfD documentation on the importance of oil and its role in south-south stability and conflict, as well as how the programme will address this conflict potential.
3. The peacebuilding project is the most conflict sensitive of the four case studies. Many of the project's programme documents and evaluations highlight that conflict sensitive approaches are

a standard, which is put in practice by offering sensitisation, appropriate selection of meeting participants and venues, and do-no-harm training. However, while it is the case that the project's conflict analysis underpinning its peacebuilding programme considers many of the layers that make South Sudan a conflictual society, conflict sensitivity is deployed solely as an outward-looking concept. While competition for resources is explicitly identified as a driver of conflict, and the various types of competitions and resources are clearly spelled out,¹⁶¹ there is less evidence that NCA considers the impact of its project potentially influencing conflict dynamics negatively.

4. Similarly, there are no reflections on conflicts that might arise as a result of the BRSMA (Building Resilience of Smallholder and Market Actors) project. There is a risk that BRSMA beneficiaries will gain an unfair advantage over others; for example, provision of free credit to traders of drugs and seeds might be perceived as unjustifiable to non-participants. Reflections on potential conflicts that might arise, if members default on repayment of loans, are also absent.

¹⁶⁰ (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ca. 2016).

¹⁶¹ (NCA, 2016).



While there is limited focus on conflict sensitivity within the individual programmes and projects supported, the evaluation team found that there is a high degree of focus on supporting projects and programmes, specifically aimed at building peace and stability. This support is first and foremost evident in Norway's strong focus on supporting the peace process and the institutions around these, as described in the Theories of Change and policy coherence section in this report. Thus, Norway has specifically engaged in projects that would support the agreed priorities in the peace agreements, as well as follow-up and monitoring mechanisms linked to these. In parallel, Norway has been supporting local-level peacebuilding processes, such as the one implemented by NCA as presented in [Annex 5](#).

The team found some evidence of enhanced conflict-sensitive understanding. Respondents pointed towards changes in Norway's approaches that indicate some reflection of past conflict insensitivity, even if these reflections are not yet fully captured. The support to, for example, the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) is notably different from the support to ARCSS, with Norway continuing to support the IGAD office and the special envoy beyond the signing, which shows awareness about the fact that peace work does

not end with the moment of signature. The evaluation team also found a growing understanding of own knowledge-gaps and gaps in realising and implementing conflict sensitivity. The MFA now seeks to 'consider new ways of enhancing Norway's conflict analysis capacity at country level, for example by appointing roving or permanent conflict advisers at selected missions.'¹⁶²

4.4 Strategising and Learning from Results

To what extent has knowledge of results been used to inform decisions? To what extent has lessons learned, context and conflict analyses from partners receiving funding from Norway informed decisions for Norway's engagement?

In the previous section the team presented the use of conflict analysis to inform decision making. In the following, the evaluation therefore focuses on the part of the evaluation question that concerns learning and results-based management.

¹⁶² (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ca. 2016).

The evaluation team found that Norway does not have an institutionalised process of learning around its engagement in South Sudan. There is also not a process of ensuring a regular assessment of portfolio or project results. Decisions on funding priorities are based more on relevance and political priorities than on whether the supported projects contributed to the expected changes on the ground.

According to OECD-DAC, the overall objective of Results-Based Management (RBM) should be the same as the ultimate purpose of development co-operation. The management strategy of development should support the achievement of development results.¹⁶³ The evaluation team has assessed RBM and learning together, as it takes systematic assessment of results to enable an organisation to learn from its past.

Norwegian aid administration does not have a clear statement on what it understands by RBM or how to operationalise it. The evaluation team found several notable learning dimensions in the management of the Norwegian support to South Sudan:

¹⁶³ (OECD, 2018).



- Support is not guided by any country strategy making it difficult to track progress against Norwegian objectives.¹⁶⁴ A strategy assessment was made in 2010 in preparing for support to an independent South Sudan, and in the 2011–2013 period, the Consulate General/the Embassy in Juba developed a short three-year rolling work plan. Still, the plans provide limited guidance on justification, assumptions of the support, and expected change at output and outcome level. In other words, there is limited basis for assessing whether the support is effective.
- Norwegian support is provided from different budget sources and a range of departments and sections in MFA and Norad.¹⁶⁵ Therefore, tracking of portfolio progress requires cross-departmental information sharing.

¹⁶⁴ This was a result of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which led to a Norwegian decision to end the practice of having country strategies.

¹⁶⁵ For example, the Norwegian support to basic education in South Sudan is funded from several sources: the regional Africa grant, the transitional grant, the education grant, the civil society grant and the humanitarian grant; each is managed by a different section with its own grant management rules. Furthermore, the bulk of these funds are channelled through either Norwegian NGOs or multilateral agencies and funds.

- The Embassy in Juba has a high turnover of diplomatic staff with most serving for only two years, making institutional learning a challenge. However, MFA's Regional Department has had a continuous team on Sudan/South Sudan for most of the period evaluated (but not the full period), and a high level of internal knowledge and continuity. The Special Envoy is also located there, facilitating interaction between development and political engagement. In the period evaluated, MFA also recruited specialised staff from the Norwegian academic milieu on Sudan/South Sudan and from NGOs. The evaluation team also noted that there is regular contact between the Sudan/South Sudan desk in the Regional Department and staff in other departments and sections dealing with South Sudan. This includes participation in the weekly teleconferences with the Embassy in Juba, and joint study/familiarisation tours to South Sudan. The team also noted that there are regular (now monthly) meetings for information sharing between the Embassy and the Norwegian NGOs with offices in Juba.

The arrangement of the aid management in the Norwegian context is thus complex and requires steering to ensure coherence and results-based management. The evaluation team's assessment of the

available strategy documents and Embassy work plans show that there is limited reflection and assessment of results in the management of the support. While the work plans include overall objectives, the reflections on how to meet these objectives are limited, and instead only describe what is being supported.

From an overall programmatic perspective, there is limited indication of systematic follow-up on portfolio performance. Despite the considerable funds provided to South Sudan in the period evaluated, the Norwegian support has not been subject to any overall review or evaluation until now. There were some reflections on the need to learn from the 2010 OECD-DAC evaluation,¹⁶⁶ as spelled out in an internal MFA follow-up note.¹⁶⁷ However, an internal MFA email from 2015 explains that there was no follow-up on the 2010 report within the Norwegian MFA.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁶ (Bennett et al., 2010).

¹⁶⁷ (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011).

¹⁶⁸ (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015b).



The findings of this evaluation on RBM chime with those of the Norwegian Auditor General's report on Norwegian development support to the education sector, which found that more could be done to ensure reliable and relevant information on results,¹⁶⁹ as well as a 2016 Norwegian Syria country evaluation that found a lack of a strategic framework and limited learning and accountability in the provision of aid.¹⁷⁰ Similarly, a 2018 Norad evaluation of the Norwegian Aid Administration's Practice of RBM found severe shortcomings in the RBM by the MFA and Norad.¹⁷¹ It follows earlier evaluations and studies from the Evaluation Department addressing RBM, including the February 2017 *The Quality of Reviews and Decentralised Evaluations in Norwegian Development Co-operation*.¹⁷²

The evaluation team's
assessment of the available
strategy documents and
Embassy work plans show
that there is limited reflection
and assessment of results
in the management of the
support.

169 (Office of the Auditor General of Norway, 2019).

170 (Evaluation Department Norad, 2016a).

171 (Evaluation Department Norad, 2018a).

172 (Evaluation Department Norad, 2017).



Conclusions

South Sudan today is far from what Norway and the international donor community envisaged at the 2005 signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA); it ranks among the poorest in the world and low on human development indicators, and the civil war caused huge numbers of people to be displaced from 2013 onwards. In the period evaluated, Norway and other donors have faced significant challenges and dilemmas in their work, of which many offer opportunities for learning and reflection. Most significant of these dilemmas was continuing to work with a government that: i) barely allocated resources to development activities despite (initially) significant oil resources; ii) took an aggressive stance towards Sudan through the occupation of Heglig; iii) stopped its oil export to address a political conflict, but thereby cutting its only source of non-aid income; iv) knowingly compromised peace; v) misused and embezzled public funds and continues to face the same allegation; and vi) turned its weapons on its own people, resulting in killings and one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world.

The team found that Norwegian staff and leadership internally discussed these dilemmas, however options considered, and justifications for how Norway responded, were never explicitly spelt out in relevant Norwegian policy frameworks. Responding to these dilemmas, Norway chose to provide its support in line with international commitments to development, relevant peace agreements, or government plans. Most funding was provided through multilateral channels and Norwegian non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Crucially, Norway's engagement was guided by dominant approaches to development, focusing on technical approaches to its development portfolio and dominant statebuilding theories.

So, was Norway effective? Did it achieve what it set out to do in South Sudan? Norway did play a key role in ensuring that the core elements of the CPA between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) were implemented, and that relative peace between the two parties persisted until 2011, allowing for elections and the independence referendum.

Yet, on the path to independence and in the years after the expected results of the development aid did not materialise, and Norway and other donors continued to rely on, and increasingly expand, humanitarian relief as a way of supporting the people of South Sudan. South Sudan did not develop into an accountable and transparent state serving its people – or at the very least, into a state that does not physically harm its citizens. Following the outbreak of the civil war in late 2013, Norway responded to the emerging humanitarian situation and delivered against expected outputs, but the specific way in which Norway's response contributed to expected outcomes is too early to assess. The underlying governance and security challenges – and thus the prospects for effectiveness – in South Sudan remain poor.

This evaluation shows that several of the assumptions underpinning Norway's goals and objectives did not hold. The key assumption that the Government of South Sudan wanted to contribute to the development and welfare of its own people turned out to be misplaced. The evaluation has found that a level of trust in the South



Sudanese leadership – Norway's soft spots – meant that as the leadership obviously reneged on its democratic and peace promises, Norway and its partners continued their support to the Government of South Sudan.

The evaluation team found that the Norwegian support was largely guided by (knowledgeable) management and broad political priorities, yet suffered from inadequate systematic strategic planning and an overemphasis on the North-South conflict that took away attention of developing south-south conflict dynamics. Lack of strategic elaborations limited the understanding of the consequences of the Norwegian support. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) did develop a more long-term internal strategy for South Sudan in 2010, yet provided only few reflections on the rationale for development programmes and the particular challenges of operating in a (post-)conflict context. Even as the actions of the South Sudanese leadership became more blatant, structured reflections on the consequences of continuing to co-operate with a leadership that worked against the interest of its people, were limited.

A written strategy would likely have helped to strengthen coherence in Norwegian aid engagements, articulate and assess dilemmas, and identify options for support. It would have spelt out goals and objectives,

assumptions, conflict sensitivities and measures for monitoring the implementation and appropriateness of the strategy. Moreover, a strategy would have made it easier to withstand pressure from South Sudanese individuals and institutions and to navigate multiple Norwegian global priorities for its development aid.

It is possible that even if Norway had had a more reflective and systematic approach to conflict engagements, its engagements would still have had limited impact on the South Sudanese leadership. It is possible that no foreign engagement would have prevented the catastrophe that South Sudan became. After all, the leadership of the SPLM did not shift its stance or actions when Norway and other Troika members became more vocal in their criticism after further violent escalation in 2016. Norwegian People's Aid terminating its co-operation with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement at the same time also had limited impact on the leadership. For Norway, however, voicing criticism came at a price; from the perspective of South Sudan's government, Norway lost its unique reputation of being supportive and neutral. The tougher, but principled, stance alienated Norway from the South Sudanese leadership, reducing access and dialogue opportunities.

While overall effectiveness of Norwegian support has been limited, individual projects have met part of their

objectives as laid out in agreements with Norway. This evaluation zoomed in on projects particularly relevant to the Norwegian Theories of Change and that were aligned with the Norwegian emphasis on food security, as well as local peacebuilding work. There are also indications that the humanitarian support provided has been effective and contributed to alleviating the humanitarian needs in the country.

There are, however, also projects where results are meagre, ranging from the NGO support to more state-centred support. These include some of Norway's flagship projects, such as the long engagement to build state capacity at the central and state levels. Design flaws of the programme have resulted in limited transfer of knowledge. The Oil for Development programme, which was highly relevant and likely did contribute to developing some capacities, left behind few lasting development effects following its withdrawal.

Where Norway has been most effective is at the individual project level. This is because Norway offers a high degree of flexibility and rapidly responds by supporting individual programmes and projects. Successes here also speak to the high degree of relevance of Norwegian-supported projects to national plans, as well as to local beneficiary needs. While there were significant changes

in the portfolio around 2013, Norway has still partnered and funded many of the same institutions throughout. However, the portfolio has not been results-focused, and its shape has been guided primarily by what was feasible in terms of security and logistics, rather than by past results of the individual intervention.

The evaluation found that Norwegian support has not prominently paid attention to vulnerability, and that the link between conflict and development programmes is rarely made explicit. Norway puts greater emphasis on gender considerations in programming, though initially more so in the planning than in the implementation. Gender was de-prioritised due to limited resources until around 2015/2016, after which it re-emerged as a priority area primarily as a consequence of the broader Norwegian policy focus on Women, Peace and Security. Norwegian support has reached a significant number of women; however, effectiveness in empowering women or advancing Women, Peace and Security issues remains limited, with few tangible outcomes documented as of late 2018.

Throughout the period evaluated, Norway has focused on ensuring programmatic alignment with formal South Sudan government plans and peace agreements, even when in reality these did not represent the actions and actual priorities of the Government of South Sudan.

This alignment also meant that there was a level of coherence in how Norwegian funding supported the initiatives and institutions established by, or needed for, the implementation of the peace agreements.

In terms of coordination, Norway played a significant role in aid harmonisation and alignment post-2005. However, following the limited success of the Joint Donor Team, the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, and related joint mechanisms, appetite for joint and coordinated initiatives decreased. Today, coordination is poor. Norway has engaged in the very few joint initiatives that exist and has played a lead role in the Women, Peace and Security donor group, but has otherwise not taken the lead in further development or humanitarian coordination processes.

Overall, learning at project and programme level, and the use of results-based management, are limited in the Norwegian South Sudan support, as is the application of risk assessment and risk management tools. New interventions, or continued support to existing interventions, are in most cases based on an implicit Theory of Change, and rarely reflect past outcomes or impact-level results. Nonetheless, there continues to be a high level of knowledge within the MFA and Norad (and in the Norwegian development environment) on South Sudan. There is thus an implicit institutional

learning process within the MFA. Still, this learning seems to rarely translate into changing approaches at the intervention level.

During 25 years of engagement in South Sudan, Norway did make adjustments along the way. Yet overall, the end results remain poor. One interviewee from the Norwegian development community stated to the team that 'we did everything right, but we have nothing to show', which points towards an understanding that the lack of results is not due to the approach. However, the evaluation team found that while Norwegian intentions might have been to do the right thing, the underlying assumptions of its engagement in many cases never held up, thus creating a skewed and likely-to-fail engagement. The evaluation team was asked to identify unintended consequences of the overall Norwegian engagement. There is an obvious overall unintended consequence: the strong commitment to the South Sudanese leadership around and after independence supported an authoritarian leadership with no democratic vision long after an understandable immediate post-war grace period. However, a more nuanced and multifaceted view shows a number of unintended consequences that resonate with some of the dilemmas prominent in engaging in South Sudan: the strengthened capacity to extract oil revenues has allowed elites to extract more resources for personal gain.



What Can We Learn?

Norway's long-term engagement in South Sudan offers many lessons, particularly because Norway had to deal with South Sudan's changing context. Some of these lessons are specific to working in South Sudan, others point towards the broader challenge of development work in a conflict or post-conflict setting.

In a disorienting environment, a strategy can provide the guidance needed to function.

Norway did not have a clear strategy for its engagement in South Sudan. We learned that this had several consequences: (i) high-ranking South Sudanese government officials could not always distinguish between Norwegian Government policies and priorities and actions of Norwegian non-governmental organisations (NGOs); (ii) donors were not aware of Norwegian priorities; (iii) there was no clear written guidance against which to prioritise and measure against; and (iv) a clear strategy would have allowed everyone within the Norwegian system to understand and prioritise funding and activities in a transparent

and accountable manner. More transparency would also reduce risks to implementing partners, who could refer to Norway's objectives and Theory of Change.

However, to function in a context like South Sudan a narrow strategy will hinder the ability to function. Norway instead needs a strategy that encompasses both a sound basis that can be used to weigh and assess decisions with the flexibility to navigate specific situations in ways that are flexible, but not simply *ad hoc*.

A country strategy is a frame built from policy dialogues that helps shape portfolio coherence. Such a strategy can be aligned with peace agreements and can become the touchstone against which a portfolio's performance can be judged. Norway's work in South Sudan has been strongest when it used peace agreements as the framing for the design of the development portfolio. But, engagement in South Sudan is not static; it needs flexible engagement. A strategy needs to have enough room to manoeuvre to allow adjustments within the overall framing without entirely abandoning the overall direction.

The reality of working flexibly in a fragile or conflict setting

Development work in a fragile environment is expected to be flexible and adaptable to swift changes. At the project level, Norway's aid management in South Sudan has reflected that approach. Norway has worked flexibly with development partners. Emphasising dialogue and trust in its relationship with partners has meant that Norway and implementing partners were able to adapt to a changing context and to maintain the ability to operate. This is a strong base. However, this adapted engagement was not always driven by an explicitly articulated Theory of Change, which often requires a different technical and evidence-based perspective. Programme management on the basis of trust and relationship lacked systematic reflection that would have allowed Norway and its partners to assess their learning, or clearly articulate on what evidence or experiences programmatic adaptations were made. Trust and good relationships are vital for day-to-day operations, but cannot alone ensure long-term quality



and effectiveness of aid projects. To be effective means to track results and to assess – also through independent reviews – whether the tacit operational knowledge that partners gain through implementation is combined in the best way with technical advice. A lesson is that learning from implementation needs to be combined with other technical perspectives to then feed into the project and programme selection process. This might go a long way towards ensuring that there is consensus about the pursued Theory of Change, and whether or not the programme will be able to credibly achieve measures of effectiveness.

The need for a broader perspective on conflict sensitivity

In development work it is a truism that each individual project matters. The sum of many projects is expected to add up to broader development. This in turn means that the impact that even a small project can have on local conflict dynamics can add up to a bigger conflict picture too. On the project level, a clear understanding of how even a small project might influence conflict dynamics is crucial. This requires articulating a project's conflict-sensitive measures during selection and tracking of projects. A practice which was not emphasised by Norway in the period evaluated. Conflict

sensitivity needs to be more explicitly included in initial project assessments as well as in the dialogue with project partners to ensure that these apply a conflict sensitive approach. This is in particular relevant in the fragile South Sudan context.

Further learning on how to engage in fragile contexts is needed

Norway's experience in South Sudan has shown that engaging in a situation of violent conflict is not just development work with implementation challenges. Looking at development as a management challenge alone runs the risk of obscuring the political aspects and broader engagement with the question of whether a development approach is appropriate. Better programming, better strategic alignment and better use of analysis might have improved Norway's effectiveness in South Sudan.

Engaging with the dilemmas of working in a fragile and conflict environment would allow Norway to go deeper than just adjusting management tools. Development that seeks to improve lives has to continuously question its own engagement. The experience in South Sudan highlights the need for demanding that development actors ask the big questions about the foundations

of their own work: is statebuilding appropriate in a post-conflict setting? Does improving capacity create capacity for abuse of resources? Do economic development projects set up an unsustainable economic path? Without willingness to genuinely reflect on whether an approach is appropriate for a specific situation, rather than just following a well-trodden path, international support will do little to shift patterns of governance towards sustainably improved lives of citizens.



Recommendations

Based on the evaluation findings, the evaluation team recommends that Norway enhances its institutional approach to enable more proactive and informed engagement in a fragile state setting. The recommendations are in many ways aligned with the June 2017 Norwegian strategic framework for Norwegian engagement in fragile states and regions. The evaluation team assess that a proper application of this strategy in the South Sudan context would make – and could have made – a difference for the Norwegian engagement. The evaluation team's recommendations are as follows:

- **Develop multi-year flexible strategies building on conflict and actor analysis.** The strategies need to clearly articulate Norway's objectives, priorities, baselines, targets and Theories of Change and the underlying assumptions of the Norwegian support. Such analyses must pay specific attention to political economy and political settlements, as well as conflict drivers and dynamics, to identify possible entry points for development assistance and policy dialogue. The analysis should be flexible, and possibly rolling, allowing for changing the approach once the assumptions of the support are no longer valid. The flexibility would allow for provision of strategic direction yet retain the adaptable nature of the Norwegian flexible funding modalities. The strategies should be assessed regularly and progress against targets, as well as assumptions, should be assessed and updated to inform changes to the Norwegian portfolio. For South Sudan, this strategy needs to consider how to deal with the dilemma of working with an authoritarian government whose goals and objectives *de facto* differ from those of Norway. Norway thus needs to articulate – on paper – how it foresees change to happen, and thus how it will ensure inclusive politics and reconciliation.
- **Operationalise the use of conflict sensitivity in programming.** Norway needs to articulate how it wants to see conflict-sensitive approaches put into practice across its portfolio. Norway needs to analyse possible impacts of any of its engagement on conflict dynamics. This analysis should ensure that strategy, dialogue processes and programmes supported by Norway are conflict sensitive. The conflict analyses can be linked to the rolling political economy analysis suggested above. For South Sudan, Norway needs to undertake an assessment of its existing portfolio from a conflict sensitive perspective. This assessment should include conflict sensitivity of the individual projects supported, as well as conflict sensitivity of the combined Norwegian portfolio.
- **Systematise learning and reflection.** The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Norad have been good at ensuring that knowledgeable people have engaged in the administration and policy work around South Sudan in the past. The evaluation team recommends that this focus on South Sudanese capacities is continued when filling future MFA and Norad posts related to South Sudan. It is, however, crucial to recognise the difficulty of understanding politics and conflict dynamics, and how to best programme in a conflict context. To further emphasise learning,

a more formalised learning and reflection practice in the MFA linked to conflict and political economy research is needed and must be combined with the processes to develop an overall strategy, a development portfolio and articulated ways of how to react to changing information or circumstances.

- **Engage in more thorough results-based management approaches to development.** To measure impact of aid and allow for adaptation, the evaluation team recommends that portfolio decisions are not only linked more explicitly to the Norwegian strategy, but also based on the performance of the portfolio and the individual projects. In effect, this means keeping track of the performance of the individual projects at output and outcome levels, and use this as a basis for funding decisions. For South Sudan, the evaluation team recommends that the Embassy, and the departments managing the aid, undertake bi-annual stocktaking of portfolio performance and only extend existing projects if there is solid evidence of effectiveness of the project performance.
- **Strengthen focus on gender equality and Women, Peace and Security.** The evaluation team recommends that Norway continues and

strengthens its focus on gender equality and women's empowerment in South Sudan, particularly the emphasis on the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 focus on Women, Peace and Security. Norway needs to more proactively ensure that the individual projects and programmes in Norway's portfolio mainstream gender and promote women's empowerment. Norway should, in its dialogue with partners, ensure that programmes and projects actively contribute to strengthening women's roles in decision making linked to development and peacebuilding.

- **Recognise that development engagement is political work.** Development engagement is a political exercise both for the donors and beneficiaries. Donors pursue global priorities or use development engagement to position themselves internationally, and beneficiaries can use development engagement for political gains. The case of Norway in South Sudan makes it exceptionally clear that politics and development cannot be separated; Norway's political work naturally influenced the abilities of its development portfolio, as well as how Norway was perceived by South Sudanese beneficiaries. Keeping funds, and assessment of spending of those funds, separated

into development aid and support for political engagement risks undermining coherence. The politics of development needs to be articulated more clearly, as does the impact of politics on aid results. In light of this, Norway should consider whether future evaluations of Norwegian aid engagement be combined with an assessment of the impact of Norway's political work.



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Annex 1: Terms of Reference

BACKGROUND

The number of people living in fragile contexts is expected to grow from 1.8 to 2.3 billion by 2030. Poverty is also increasingly concentrated in fragile contexts. According to OECD, about 80% of the world's poor could be living in these contexts by 2030.¹⁷³ Support to countries directly or indirectly affected by conflict, great humanitarian challenges and high degree of fragility, requires different approaches than support to more stable countries. Most often in these contexts, there is a need for humanitarian assistance, long-term development efforts and peace building all at the same time.

Norway's approach to engagement in fragile states is anchored in the New Deal principles¹⁷⁴ agreed at Busan in 2011. In 2014, Norway defined its approach to engagement in fragile states through a designated category of focus countries for fragile states. In White Paper 24 (2016–2017) *Common responsibility for common future* this was reinforced and it was stated

that “prevention of violent conflict is a precondition for sustainable development. This requires increased engagement in regions and countries with high degree of fragility”.¹⁷⁵ Norway's goal of increasing support to fragile states and regions was re-confirmed in White Paper 36 (2016–2017) *Setting the course for Norwegian foreign and security policy followed by a new Strategic framework for Norway's support to fragile states and regions* in 2017.¹⁷⁶ In August 2018, a new humanitarian strategy was launched. The strategy emphasises the need for a coherent and holistic approach where the interaction between humanitarian assistance, long-term development policy and peace building is seen together.¹⁷⁷ The strategy reconfirms Norway's international commitments to a new way of working in humanitarian response.¹⁷⁸

Up until now, written, publicly available country strategies for Norwegian engagement at country level have not been the norm. Evaluations and DAC Peer reviews have described the Norwegian aid administration as flexible, being able to make decisions comparatively swift, and that it is open to adaptation. However, this flexibility has also been criticised of acting as a disincentive to a strategic approach some would say is needed for protracted crises and fragile contexts.¹⁷⁹ The strategic framework states that specific country strategies will be developed, in order to ensure that the Norwegian engagement is coherent at country level.¹⁸⁰

On the basis of Norway's priority of fragile contexts in recent years as described above, the Evaluation Department is planning to conduct evaluations

173 OECD 2018, States of Fragility 2018, OECD Publishing, Paris: 37.

174 www.newdeal4peace.org/about-the-new-deal

175 Meld. St. 24 (2016–2017). Report to the Storting (White Paper) Common responsibility for common future: 23.

176 Meld. St. 36 (2016–2017) Report to the Storting (White Paper) Setting the course for Norwegian foreign and security policy; MFA 2017. Strategisk rammeverk for norsk innsats i sårbare stater og regioner.

177 MFA 2018. Strategi for norsk humanitær politikk. Handlekraft og helhetlig innsats.

178 Ref. for example The Grand Bargain – A Shared Commitment to Better Serve People in Need. Istanbul, Turkey, May 2016.

179 See for example: OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Norway 2013, OECD Publishing. Evaluation Department Report 8/2014 Evaluation of Norway's Support to Haiti after the 2010 Earthquake. Evaluation Department Report 4/2016 'Striking the Balance' Evaluation of the Planning, Organisation and Management of Norwegian Assistance related to the Syria Regional Crisis; Evaluation Department Report 5/2016 Evaluation of Norway's support for advocacy in the development policy arena; Evaluation Department Report 9/2017 Evaluation of Norwegian support for education in conflict and crisis through civil society organisations. More information about Norwegian Aid Management, see guide, last updated April 2017: <https://norad.no/en/toolspublications/publications/2017/guide-to-norwegian-aid-management/>

180 MFA 2018: 4.



examining overall Norwegian support in selected countries in fragile contexts. There have been no previous evaluations looking at the totality of Norwegian support in South Sudan. This evaluation will assess the effects of Norwegian engagement in South Sudan since independence (2011) until today (2018). However, a long-term perspective on the period also before 2005 and up until 2011 will be important.

SOUTH SUDAN

According to OECD, South Sudan has been one of the top-three most extremely fragile contexts in the world in both the 2016 and 2018 states of fragility frameworks.¹⁸¹ South Sudan became an independent country in 2011, following the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) signed in 2005 that ended the civil war between the north and the south. However, the peace agreement only dealt with the north-south conflict and not with south-south tensions, and already in December 2013, South Sudan itself was in civil war and faced enormous setbacks.

This conflict has resulted in substantial loss of life and the displacement of more than 4.2 million people. Currently, 1.7 million people are internally

displaced, and 2.5 million are refugees in neighbouring countries.¹⁸² Violation of humanitarian principles, especially related to access to affected people has affected planning, implementation and effects of humanitarian support in the country. Since the end of 2013, more than 100 aid workers have been killed, making South Sudan one of the world's most dangerous countries for aid workers to operate in.

South Sudan's national budget is entirely dependent on oil revenues. However, revenue from this sector has fallen dramatically since 2013, even with rising oil prices. International aid forms an important part of the state's finances. For example, it is reported that donors fund 80% of health care and that the government funds just 1.1%.¹⁸³

NORWEGIAN ENGAGEMENT IN SOUTH SUDAN

Norwegian organisations have been present in South(ern) Sudan since the 1970s. Up until 2005, almost all Norwegian and international aid to southern Sudan was humanitarian. The aid was mainly motivated by the need to relieve human suffering due to the civil war, and by political support for the peace negotiations between

the north and the south.¹⁸⁴ The Norwegian government, as part of the Troika together with the UK and the US, was heavily involved in and supported the peace negotiations that led to the signing of the CPA in 2005. In the Troika and the support to the peace processes, Norway had (and still has) a lead role in the work with women, peace and security (UNSR 1325).¹⁸⁵ Norway's role in the peace process up to and after the CPA is an important background for Norway's engagement after the independence of South Sudan in 2011.

After the CPA, Norwegian aid was focused on state-building and long-term development. In addition to establishing the Joint Donor Team (JDT) office together with Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, in line with the Paris declaration on aid effectiveness,¹⁸⁶ Norway initiated several long-term projects. These include Oil for Development and a collaboration between

184 Evaluation Department Report 6/2016. Country Evaluation Brief: South Sudan: 11.

185 For more on Norway's work with UNSR1325 in South Sudan, please refer to Evaluation Department Report 5/2016 Evaluation of Norway's Support for Advocacy in the Development Policy Arena. Annex 5: Case Study on Norway's Engagement in Women, Peace and Security.

186 See evaluation of the JDT: Evaluation Department Report 2/2009. Mid-term evaluation of the Joint Donor Team in Juba, Sudan. Evaluation Department Norad 2009.

181 OECD 2018: 85.

182 UN OCHA, South Sudan: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-bulletin-issue-6-16-july-2018>, report from July 2018.

183 OECD 2018: 39



Norway statistics and South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics. However, long-term development has been challenging after the recurring conflicts since 2013. Both the Oil for Development and the statistics initiatives have been postponed indefinitely.

The Norwegian engagement in South Sudan currently (2018) focuses on three main areas: Support to the peace process and the ongoing revitalisation process; support for increased stability (including education, increased food security and sustainable agriculture in crises); and reduction of humanitarian needs.¹⁸⁷ Most funds are channelled through multilateral and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Norway is still an active partner in the Troika. In the support to the peace process, Norway works through the sub-regional organisation, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), in addition to local and international NGOs and institutions.¹⁸⁸ South Sudan is also one of the priority countries for Norwegian support to education as a follow up to White Paper 25 (2013–2014) *Education for Development*.¹⁸⁹

187 Budget Proposal (Prp1S) 2018-2019: 92.

188 Meld. St.17 (2017–2018). Report to the Storting (White Paper). Partner Countries in the development policy 70-71

189 For more information on support to education in South Sudan, see Evaluation

Total Norwegian aid (ODA) to South Sudan amounted to NOK 603.9 million in 2017.¹⁹⁰ More than 50% of this was humanitarian assistance. In general, there has been an increase in Norwegian humanitarian aid to South Sudan since 2013, with a peak in 2014, and again an increase from 2016.¹⁹¹

EXISTING KNOWLEDGE

A synthesis of evaluations of the international development engagement in South Sudan, provides lessons that are relevant for both this evaluation, and for future Norwegian engagement in the country.¹⁹² Main lessons from the synthesis are that firstly the international donor community did not develop an overall strategic plan for recovery and development for itself or in collaboration with the government. Secondly, different actors, such as diplomats, politicians and development practitioners did not collaborate closely enough to develop joint approaches. Thirdly, the donor community mostly

Department Report 9/2017 Realising Potential Evaluation of Norway's Support to Education in Conflict and Crisis through Civil Society Organisations

190 Statistics for 2018 will be available in April 2019.

191 Please refer to Annex 1, Mapping and analysis of humanitarian assistance and support in fragile states (2018), for an overview of Norwegian support to South Sudan over the past 10 years.

192 Evaluation Department Report 6/2016.

failed to adapt their development interventions to the South Sudanese context. Support in South Sudan was not sufficiently informed about the conflict context to allow them to mitigate rather than exacerbate conflict. Lastly, learning from past experiences has been weak. The aid architecture was inconsistent, and lessons learned did not alter approaches.¹⁹³

Coherence in fragile contexts could be challenging. Donors in fragile contexts face real dilemmas. In facing these, donors make decisions that may affect the context in one way or the other and may also affect the coherence of the support. Dilemmas could arise due to contextual factors, but also between the development policy and other policy areas, like migration and security. Donors' own national interests add another layer of complexity. In South Sudan, international aid is an important part of the country context. Dilemmas could range from overall policy and strategy decisions like geographic priority, sector priority and institutional collaboration, to the day-to-day strategic choices within each project and partnership. An example of one dilemma is that aid could contribute to legitimise some groups at the expense of others, at the same time as distance to the government or the governing party might

193 Evaluation Department Report 6/2016: 3, 30.



create challenges. Dilemmas could also be related to the coherence between the policy work the embassy does towards the South Sudanese government and the opposition, and the official development assistance (ODA) from Norway to South Sudan. This could especially be related to Norway's role in the peace processes in South Sudan. Even though the support to and promotion of peace in Sudan and later South Sudan has been a main focus for Norway, we have limited knowledge of the content of this engagement.¹⁹⁴

There is limited explicit knowledge about how dilemmas and challenges are discussed and handled by Norwegian actors in fragile contexts, and on which basis decisions are made during different phases and at different levels.¹⁹⁵ The evaluation may therefore

give more insight on how these dilemmas have been discussed and addressed by Norway in South Sudan.

PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE EVALUATION

The main purpose of the evaluation is to assess effects of the total Norwegian engagement in South Sudan, consider whether the engagement has been coherent and conflict sensitive, and assess how the Norwegian engagement has been adapted to a changing context.

The evaluation findings may be used to inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs's (MFA) planned country strategy for South Sudan. The main users of the evaluation are the MFA, the Norwegian embassy in Juba, Norad and others (i.e. NGOs and multilateral organisations) working with South Sudan. The evaluation will contribute to both accountability and learning.

The objectives of the evaluation are to:

1. Map and assess effects of Norway's total engagement during the evaluation period, including any positive or negative unintended effects of the engagement
2. Assess whether Norway's engagement in South Sudan has been coherent

3. Assess conflict sensitivity of Norway's engagement in South Sudan
4. Assess how Norway used learning, both by utilising available knowledge and by learning from experience, to inform the engagement in South Sudan
5. Formulate lessons learned from Norway's engagement in South Sudan and provide recommendations on how to adjust the engagement in the future

EVALUATION OBJECT AND SCOPE

The evaluation object is Norway's total engagement in South Sudan affecting development. Engagement in this evaluation includes both financial and technical support, and diplomatic and political advocacy. In this evaluation, 'Norway' will be understood as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as responsible for developing Norway's policy on the engagement in South Sudan, and as responsible for ensuring coherence in Norway's engagement. The evaluation will involve stakeholders from other ministries and non-state actors, such as NGOs, multilateral organisations and private sector companies if relevant for the engagement in South Sudan. It will also be important to involve relevant national and local actors in South Sudan, including government representatives, traditional lead-

194 One exception is Johnson, Hilde F. 2016: South Sudan. The untold Story. From Independence to Civil War. I.B. Tauris & C. Ltd. London-New York. The Evaluation Department has conducted two evaluations of Norway's involvement in peace processes that may shed light on how Norway has worked in other processes: Evaluation Department Report 5/2011. Pawns of Peace Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997–2009, and; Evaluation Department Report 10/2018. A Trusted Facilitator: An Evaluation of Norwegian Engagement in the Peace Process between the Colombian Government and the FARC, 2010-2016.

195 Evaluation Department Report 8/2018. Evaluation of Norwegian Efforts to Ensure Policy Coherence for Development used Myanmar as a case to assess how relevant dilemmas were addressed at country level.



ers, civil society, academics, journalists and others that may contribute to shed light on the Norwegian engagement in the period of evaluation.

The main period for the evaluation is from independence in 2011 until and including 2018. However, a long-term perspective will be necessary. When assessing objectives 2–4, the evaluation team will also cover the period leading up to the CPA until 2011 in order to examine how the Norway's engagement has adapted to a changing context.

The evaluation will cover the evaluation criteria of effectiveness, relevance and coherence.

A first step will be to document Norway's goals and priorities in South Sudan in the evaluation period. The evaluation will assess the effects of Norway's engagement based on already existing documentation from actors that have received support, such as NGOs, multilateral organisations and trust funds, and others.¹⁹⁶ The evaluation will not evaluate the organisations' performance in itself. The evaluation will rely on already

existing documentation and try to say something about the effects of the support both based on the organisations own donor reporting, own evaluations, and other donors' evaluations of the organisations in the country. The team will also look at what kind of information Norway asks for and whether the information is used to inform decisions about what and whom to fund.

In addition to documenting effects of the Norwegian engagement, the evaluation will assess the coherence of Norway's engagement. Related to this there are some guiding policies for Norway's engagement. Norway has committed to ensure that its policy affecting developing countries is coherent for development.¹⁹⁷ We understand *Policy Coherence for Development* (PCD) as OECD has defined it, which is “to ensure that policies do not harm and where possible contribute to international development objectives”. This means ensuring that wider aspects of development in addition to development aid, such as trade, migration, investments, climate change, and security are coherent with the development policy. This includes coherence

between the different initiatives in Norwegian development and foreign policy (including advocacy and diplomacy), but also coherence between Norway and other actors (for example national government, donors, multilaterals, NGOs and local actors).

In addition, the evaluation will assess whether the engagement has been conflict sensitive.¹⁹⁸ Conflict sensitivity is highlighted by the government as an operational principle that should guide all country and regional efforts in fragile contexts.¹⁹⁹ *Conflict sensitivity* means working in a way that reduces the risk of fuelling a conflict (do no harm) and contributes to reducing the level of conflict. It involves the analysis of the conflict and its actors, understanding how engagement may affect the context (and vice versa), and using this knowledge to adjust and adapt the engagement in a way that reduces the probability of negative impacts, and contributes to positive change.

¹⁹⁶ Please refer to Norwegian Aid Statistics, International Development Statistics and Annex 1: Mapping and analysis of humanitarian assistance and support in fragile states (2018).

¹⁹⁷ Jeløya platform (political platform of the current Solberg government): <https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/e4c3cfd7e4d4458fa8d3d2bb1e43bcbb/plattform.pdf>; See also Evaluation Department Report 8/2018.

¹⁹⁸ The Evaluation Department is planning to conduct a separate evaluation of Conflict sensitivity in Norwegian development aid, as communicated in the Evaluation Programme 2018-2020. The evaluation of the Norwegian engagement in South Sudan, will be one contribution related to this.

¹⁹⁹ MFA 2017: 23.



A general lack of publicly available, written strategies in the Norwegian aid administration has been found in previous evaluations and reviews. However, it will be necessary for the team to identify Norway's implicit strategies, goals and priorities in the period of the evaluation.

EVALUATION QUESTIONS

1. The following evaluation questions will guide the evaluation.

- What were the effects of the Norway's total engagement in South Sudan during the evaluation period?
- What has been Norway's goals and priorities in South Sudan in the evaluation period?
- To what degree has Norway's engagement contributed towards achievement of Norway's priorities and objectives?
- Has Norway's engagement had any likely unintended consequences, positive or negative?
- Have men, women, and vulnerable groups been affected differently by Norway's engagement?

2. To what extent has Norway's engagement in South Sudan been coherent?

- To what extent has Norway's engagement been relevant for and aligned to the country's own needs and coherent to other international support?
- Has Norway contributed to international coordination and alignment to country needs?
- To what extent has Norway's peace engagement, humanitarian and long-term assistance been coordinated?
- What dilemmas has Norway faced in its engagement in South Sudan?
- How did Norway assess different options in different phases and at different levels related to these dilemmas? Which assessments had more weight in these decisions?
- To what extent were considerations on conflict-sensitivity and policy coherence for development important in decision-making related to these dilemmas?

3. How and to what extent has Norway's engagement in South Sudan been conflict sensitive?

- To what extent have conflict sensitive measures been applied in Norway's engagement?
- To what extent has the conflict or the context affected Norway's engagement?

- Has Norway supported specific conflict sensitivity initiatives promoting peace, both on political, portfolio and project level?

4. How did Norway demonstrate learning, both from available knowledge and from experience, to inform its engagement in South Sudan?

- How did context and conflict analyses influence choices in terms of goals and priorities, channels, partners and interventions? What was the quality of these analyses?
- To what extent has knowledge of results been used to inform decisions? To what extent has lessons learned, context and conflict analyses from partners receiving funding from Norway informed decisions for Norway's engagement?
- To what extent have context and conflict analyses included gender issues?

5. What are the main lessons learned and recommendations to inform the Norway's future engagement in South Sudan?

POSSIBLE APPROACH

The evaluation team will propose an outline of a methodological approach that optimises the possibility



of producing evidence-based assessments. All parts of the evaluation shall adhere to recognised evaluation principles and the OECD DAC's quality standards for development evaluation, including their guidelines for evaluations in settings of conflict and fragility, in addition to relevant guidelines from the Evaluation Department. The methodological approach should rely on a cross-section of data sources and using mixed methods to ensure triangulation of information through a variety of means.

The evaluation *will include* the following components:

- **Conflict context:** The consultants should base their work on a clear understanding of the conflict context, its key drivers, political economy, dynamics and actors. This way they can assess the conflict analyses used by Norway. The team will also have to analyse of how their own activities will interact with and impact the context. This will be included in the inception report.
- **Identification of dilemmas:** The evaluation will identify and analyse dilemmas faced by Norway in South Sudan. Which dilemmas to analyse, will be suggested in the inception report. The evaluation will identify all key actors involved in Norway's engagement, also outside the Norwegian aid administration. The evaluation will analyse, interpret and discuss decisions

made by Norway in different phases of the engagement in light of the knowledge and opportunities available at the time and changes in the context.

- **Document effects:** The evaluation will document effects of Norway's engagement through the main channels of Norway's support. This will include an overview of Norway's goals and priorities in South Sudan, including cross-cutting priorities, in the period of the evaluation.
 - A description of Norway's strategies, priorities and goals in the evaluation period, will be included in the inception report.
 - A separate deliverable with an analysis of achieved results, through different channels and modalities, based on already available documentation will be completed as a separate annex in the inception report. The analysis will uncover potential gaps in the data and a plan for how to respond to these gaps in the main evaluation phase.

The evaluation team will:

- Collect and analyse all relevant internal documents relevant for unpacking Norway's strategy in South Sudan.

- Collect and analyse relevant programme documents and reports, reviews, evaluations and research carried out in the evaluation period of Norway's assistance as well as relevant studies, evaluations, research and reviews of other donors' and/or national comparable assistance to South Sudan during the same period.
- Collect and analyse existing national statistical data, household surveys, programme monitoring, or any other already available material (from government, NGOs/civil society organisations, multilateral organisations and other research) that can shed light on the results of Norway's assistance.
- Interviews with a wide range of stakeholder and experts in Norway and South Sudan, group discussions or stakeholder survey(s) to identify stakeholder perception and analysis, to supplement and qualify other methods and to enable direct inputs from stakeholders to selected evaluation questions. The evaluation aims to bring out views of various relevant national and local actors in South Sudan, on the international and Norwegian engagement in the period, to contextualise findings on the results Norway's engagement.



The evaluation team will synthesise the above in an evaluation matrix in the inception phase. The evaluation matrix will include an assessment of the evaluation questions in terms of whether these are realistic to respond to and if so how they will be responded to, a breakdown of the evaluation questions, in addition to an overview of availability and access to existing data. The evaluation matrix will be presented in the inception report and used as the key organising tool for the evaluation.

The evaluation team may propose an alternative approach that responds to the purpose and objectives in this Terms of Reference in other ways than those laid out above, demonstrating comparable rigor and ability to respond to the evaluation questions. Innovative methods of data collection and use of existing data is encouraged.

CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS

The evaluation team will in the inception phase identify potential areas where the evaluation process could have a negative effect – on the evaluation process, the evaluand or stakeholders. Based on the potential risks identified, the team will develop mitigation strategies. This will need to be continuously updated during the evaluation period. Some potential risks may be:

Security: Travelling in South Sudan is challenging. The security situation may affect the evaluation in terms of timing of field visits and access to people and areas in South Sudan. This requires flexibility and will have to be carefully considered throughout the evaluation.

Access to and availability of data: Any limitations to the data as well as to the methods and analysis should be stated clearly in the inception report. Some challenges may be:

- Documents in the archives (such as decision memos, project documents and reports, reviews, appraisals and correspondence) may not be sufficiently complete or structured. It will therefore be especially important to triangulate these sources.
- Working with the archival documents of the MFA may require an appropriate security clearance as some relevant documents may be classified according to different levels of sensitivity.

A large share of Norwegian funds are channelled as core support to multilateral organisations and may be challenging to track. The evaluation team will have to find a way to address this.

Perceptions of Norway: A potential challenge is how Norway is viewed in South Sudan and how this may affect or skew results of the interviewing process among some stakeholders.

ETHICS

The evaluation process itself should be conflict sensitive. The evaluation process should show sensitivity and respect to all stakeholders. The evaluation shall be undertaken with integrity and honesty and ensure inclusiveness of views. The rights, dignity and security of participants in the evaluation should be protected. Anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants should be protected. An introductory statement to the evaluation report may explain what measures were or were not taken to ensure no harm/conflict sensitivity of the evaluation itself, as well as the security of the interviewees.

ORGANISATION OF THE EVALUATION

The evaluation will be managed by the Evaluation department, Norad. The evaluation team will report to the Evaluation department through the team leader. The team leader shall be in charge of all deliveries and will report to the Evaluation department on the team's progress, including any problems that may jeopardise the assignment. The Evaluation department



and the team shall emphasise transparent and open communication with the stakeholders. Regular contact between the Evaluation department, team and stakeholders will assist in discussing any arising issues and ensuring a participatory process. All decisions concerning the interpretation of this Terms of Reference, and all deliverables are subject to approval by the Evaluation department.

The team should consult widely with stakeholders pertinent to the assignment. In some evaluations, the Evaluation department participates in parts of the field visits to better understand the context of the evaluation. This may also be discussed for this evaluation. Stakeholders will be asked to comment on the draft inception report and the draft final report. In addition, experts or other relevant parties may be invited to comment on reports or specific issues during the process. The evaluation team shall take note of all comments received from stakeholders. Where there are significant divergences of views between the evaluation team and stakeholders, this shall be reflected in the final report. Quality assurance shall be provided by the institution delivering the consultancy services prior to submission of all deliverables. Access to archives and statistics will be facilitated by Norad and stakeholders. The team is responsible for all data collection, including archival search.

BUDGET AND DELIVERABLES

The evaluation should not exceed an estimated maximum of 50 weeks (2000 hours), to cover all phases of the evaluation including travel time, debriefing and dissemination to stakeholders. All costs including costs for research assistants, all travel costs including allowances, and costs for data collection will be specified in the budget.

Deliverables:

- Inception report not exceeding 20 pages, excluding annexes. Draft analysis of effects of Norwegian support (15 pages) will be included as an annex.
- Analysis of effects of Norwegian support based on already available data and reports, not exceeding 15 pages, including figures and tables.
- Debrief at the Norwegian embassy in Juba, presenting initial findings after field visit.
- Draft report, not exceeding 30,000 words (approx. 50 pages). The Evaluation Department will circulate this to stakeholders for comments.
- Workshop on draft findings and conclusions to inform recommendations in Oslo.

- Final report not exceeding 30,000 words (approx. 50 pages) excluding summary and annexes.
- Evaluation brief on a topic identified during the evaluation process, not exceeding 4 pages.
- Presentation at a seminar in Oslo

PHASES AND DEADLINES

The evaluation will be organised into four work phases; (i) inception phase and analysis of results based on existing documentation; (ii) data collection - country visits and interviews; (iii) analysis and report writing; and (iv) dissemination. The main parts will be carried out over the period February 2018-November 2019. Please refer to deadlines in the tender document. Time frame and deadlines will be subject to change if necessary, due to security and other relevant factors in the context.



Annex 2: List of Interviewees

The evaluation team conducted interview with 147 individuals and 85 participants in group interviews. The interviews were held in Norway (Oslo), South Sudan (Juba, Bor, Wau and Kuajok) and Ethiopia (Addis Ababa). The details can be seen in tables below.

OSLO, NORWAY

Position	Organisation
Senior Advisor. Former Ambassador to South Sudan 2012–2014. Minister Councillor 2011–2012, Juba	Section for Horn of Africa and West Africa
Senior Advisor	Section for Security Policy, MFA
Former program director and manager, NPA in South Sudan (1999–2009)	Chair, Støttegruppen for Sudan og Sør-Sudan
Senior Advisor (South Sudan)	Section for Humanitarian Affairs, MFA
Minister of International Development (2005–2012)	MFA
Ambassador to Sudan (2005–2009)	Retired
Consul General/Ambassador Juba (2009–2012)	Retired
Development Aid minister (1997–2005), Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Mission in South Sudan (2011–2014)	Secretary General, Christian Peoples Party
Minister Councillor (2014–2016) and Ambassador, Juba (2017–2018)	Current Ambassador in Accra (phone interview)
Multiple roles, including as special envoy and councillor, regional affairs at the Embassy in Addis Ababa	Policy advisor, UNDP governance centre in Oslo
Ambassador to South Sudan (2014–2016)	Current Ambassador in Yangon (phone interview)
Minister Councillor, Norwegian Embassy, Khartoum (2009–2011)	Retired



OSLO, NORWAY

Position	Organisation
Multiple roles, including former deputy consulate general in Juba	Senior advisor, Department for Economic Development, Gender and Governance, Section for Human Rights, Governance and Fragility, Norad (by phone)
Former Secretary General, Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)	Retired
Former country director, Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA) South Sudan	Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)
Senior advisor	Statistics Norway
Special advisor, South Sudan	Norwegian Church Aid
Head, East Africa	Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)
Advisor, South Sudan	Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)
Advisor, South Sudan	Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)
Former advisor, South Sudan	Advisor Southern Africa, Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)
Senior Advisor	Department for Economic Development, Gender and Governance, Section for Human Rights, Governance and Fragility, Norad
Senior Adviser	The Knowledge Bank, Oil for Development Section, Norad
Assistant Director	Section for Civil Society, Education, Health and Coordination of Comprehensive Agreements, Norad (phone)
Special Envoy (South Sudan/Troika)	Section for Horn of Africa and West Africa
Senior advisor, South Sudan focal point in the Department	Section for Civil Society, Human Rights and Democracy, Norad (by phone)
Focus group/workshop (Validation workshop MFA, representation from MFA and Norad).	



JUBA, SOUTH SUDAN

Position	Organisation
Ambassador	Norwegian Embassy
Minister Councillor	Norwegian Embassy
Councillor, Humanitarian Aid	Norwegian Embassy
Councillor, Development Aid	Norwegian Embassy
Programme officer	Norwegian Embassy
Country Director	Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)
Programme advisor PMER	Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)
Head of programmes	Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)
Chair	South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
Registrar of NGOs	South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
Professor, Centre of Peace and Development Studies	Juba University
Director of Research	SUDD institute
Deputy Head of the Health Programmes	DFID South Sudan
Adviser Governance	DFID South Sudan
Senior Policy Adviser	DFID South Sudan
Governance Adviser	FCO DFID Joint desk (London)
Deputy Head	USAID South Sudan



JUBA, SOUTH SUDAN

Position	Organisation
Head of Cooperation	EU South Sudan
Head of Office	Swedish Embassy
First Secretary	Swedish Embassy
Ambassador	Embassy of the Netherlands
Head of Cooperation	Embassy of the Netherlands
US Ambassador	US Embassy
Vice-President	GoSS
Former Ministry of Finance and Planning and former Minister of Petroleum	GoSS
Former Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management	TGoNU
Former Minister of Finance 2011–2013	GoSS
Ministry of Finance 2013–2015	GoSS
Former Ministry of Agriculture	GoSS
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	GoSS
Ministry of Petroleum 2006–2011	TGoNU
Ministry of Education 2013–2016	GoSS
Minister of Labour	GoSS
Deputy Chair of South Sudan Land commission	GoSS
Former DG of Petroleum	Minister of Petroleum / GoSS



JUBA, SOUTH SUDAN

Position	Organisation
Former Minister	Minister of Petroleum / GoSS
Former Acting Secretary General of the SPLM	SPLM
Director of Archives	National Archives
Dep. Rep. UNICEF	UNICEF South Sudan
Chief of Education	UNICEF South Sudan
Country Representative	UNDP South Sudan
Deputy Country Director	WFP South Sudan
Chief of Staff	UNMISS
Humanitarian Expert	UNMISS
Special Advisor	UNMISS
Senior Rule of Law Officer	UNMISS
Deputy Country Representative	UNWOMEN South Sudan
Country Representative	UNFPA South Sudan
Deputy Country Representative	UNFPA South Sudan
Deputy Representative	FAO
Programme Development Officer	FAO
DSRSG Political	UNMISS



JUBA, SOUTH SUDAN

Position	Organisation
DSRSG Political	UNMISS
DSRSG Resident Coordinator & Humanitarian Coordinator	UNMISS
Head of Office OCHA	UNOCHA South Sudan
Deputy Head	UNOCHA South Sudan
Focus group/group interview JMEC (4 men)	
Former CTSAMM	CTSAMM
Focal Points UNDP/IGAD Capacity Building Project	UNDP
Focal Points UNDP/IGAD Capacity Building Project	UNDP
Senior Programme Adviser	UNDP
Coordinator - UNDP/IGAD Capacity Building Project	Ministry of Labour
Senior programme officer	IGAD Liaison Office
Head	IGAD Liaison Office
Human Rights Expert	African Union Office
Head of Office	ECHO
Finance Manager	Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)
Rural Development Programme Manager	Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)
Civil Society Programme Manager	Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)



JUBA, SOUTH SUDAN

Position	Organisation
Emergency Programme Manager	Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)
Civil Society Coordinator	Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)
Programme coordinator of Land and Resource Rights/Oil for Development	Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)
Deputy Country Director/Head of Programmes	Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)
Head of Office	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
Country Manager	Norwegian Red Cross
Director	Conflict Sensitivity Resource Facility
Secretary General	South Sudan Council of Churches
Head of Programming	South Sudan Council of Churches
Former advisor to South Sudan Council of Churches	South Sudan Council of Churches
Former Inspector General of the Police	Retired
Secretary Director	South Sudan NGO Forum
Acting Chairman	Workers Trade Union of Petroleum and Mining (WTUPM)
Deputy Chairman	Workers Trade Union of Petroleum and Mining (WTUPM)
Chair GPOC Sub-Office	Workers Trade Union of Petroleum and Mining (WTUPM)
Ministry of Mining Sub Office	Workers Trade Union of Petroleum and Mining (WTUPM)
Deputy Secretary Finance	Workers Trade Union of Petroleum and Mining (WTUPM)



JUBA, SOUTH SUDAN

Position	Organisation
Director	Steward Women
Executive Director	Association for Media Development in South Sudan
Assistant officer	CSCNR
Executive Director	Hope Restoration South Sudan
Programme Manager	UNYDA / Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA) partner
Focus Group/Group interview – five women (EVE Organisation for Women Development)	



BOR, SOUTH SUDAN

Position	Organisation
County Technical Committee Member	County Livestock and Fisheries Department / Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA) project
County Technical Committee Deputy Chair	County Agricultural Department / Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA) project
County Technical Committee Chair Person	County Agricultural Department / Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA) project
Focus Group (Farmer's group members – 8 women, 1 man)	Youth Mama Farmer Group / Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA) project
Focus Group (Fishery Group Members – 5 women, 1 man)	Women Dry Fish Group / Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA) project
Focus Group (Fishery Group Members – 5 women, 1 man)	Women United VSLA / Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA) project
Owner	Panjeng Animal Drugs Pharmacy
Owner	Ajak & Sons Agro-entreprise group
Senior Project Officer	Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)
Project Officer	Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)
Project coordinator	Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)
Extension Worker	Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)
Extension Worker	Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)
Extension Worker	Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)
Extension Worker	Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)
Extension Worker	Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)
Driver	Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)
Extension Worker	Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)



WAU AND KUAJOK, SOUTH SUDAN

Position	Organisation
Principal of training of teachers/principal county education center	Ministry of Education, Science and technology, Wau State
Director General	Ministry of Finance & Public Service, Wau State
Former twin/supervisor	Wau Teaching Hospital
Social worker, child welfare	Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare, Wau State
Director General	Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare, Wau State
Social worker, child protection	Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare, Wau State
Archbishop	ECS Diocese of Wau
Director	CARD (Norwegian Church Aid/NCA partner), Wau
Focus group: Group interview - Wau Church Leaders/ICC – 4 men (Africa Church; Catholic Church; South Sudan Council of Churches; AIC)	
Focus Group Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) and partner Daughters of Mary Immaculate (Kuajok) – 11 persons	
Focus Group: residents of CARD IDP camp, Wau Hai Masana (about 10 persons)	



ADDIS ABABA

Position	Organisation
Chief of Staff	African Union High-Level Implementation Panel
Councillor, Development, Norwegian Embassy in Juba (2012–2014)	Councillor, Development, Norwegian Embassy
Military staff officer, UNMISS (2014–2015)	Defence Attaché, Norwegian Embassy
Councillor, regional affairs	Norwegian Embassy
Political advisor	Office of the EU special representations for the Horn of Africa
Counsellor Regional Affairs	Danish Embassy
Ambassador, Special Envoy to South Sudan	IGAD
Programme officer, Office of the Special Envoy	IGAD



List of Annexes

- Annex 1: Terms of Reference
- Annex 2: List of Interviewees
- Annex 3: Overview of Norwegian aid 2011–2018
- Annex 4: Assessment tables
- Annex 5: Specific engagements assessed
 - 5.1: Engagement 1: IGAD Regional Initiative for Capacity Enhancement in South Sudan (2010–2019)
 - 5.2: Engagement 2: Oil for Development (OfD) in South Sudan 2011–2018
 - 5.3: Engagement 3: NCA Peacebuilding project
 - 5.4: Engagement 4: NPA Food Security engagement – the Building Resilience of Smallholders and Market Actors (BRSMA)
- Annex 6: Indicators for South Sudan
- Annex 7: Definitions

Annexes 3–7 can be found at <https://norad.no/evaluation/>



List of Tables, Figures and Boxes

Tables, Figures and Boxes

Table 1:	Goals achieved and assumptions validated for Norwegian Theory of Change 2005	43
Table 2:	Goals achieved and assumptions validated for Theory of Change 2011	45
Table 3:	Goals achieved and assumptions validated for Theory of Change 2014	46
Table 4:	Examples of coherence in Norwegian aid in the period 2005–2011. The table identifies two key Norwegian policy priority areas and the institutions and programmes funded illustrating the link between policy priority and funding	66
Figure 1:	The timeline theory-based approach	16
Figure 2:	Summary of key indicators, events, and Norwegian theories of change	24
Figure 3:	Norwegian development and humanitarian assistance to South Sudan 2011–2018	25
Figure 4:	The Norwegian 2005 Theory of Change for South Sudan	30
Figure 5:	The 2009 Norwegian Theory of Change for Southern Sudan	31
Figure 6:	The 2011 Norwegian Theory of Change for South Sudan	36
Figure 7:	2014 Norwegian Theory of Change for South Sudan	39
Box 1:	IGAD Regional Initiative for Capacity Enhancement in South Sudan (2010–2019)	47
Box 2:	Oil for Development	48
Box 3:	NPA support to SPLM 2007–2013	49
Box 4:	Norway's independence gift to South Sudan	51
Box 5:	The effectiveness of UNMISS	52
Box 6:	Peacebuilding and Norwegian Church Aid	54
Box 7:	NPA Building Resilience of Smallholders and Market Actors	58



Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency	ICLA	Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance
AEC	Assessment and Evaluation Commission	IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
APP	Action Plan for Peace	IDP	Internally Displaced Person
ARCSS	Agreement on Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan	IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority for Development
BRSM	Building Resilience of Smallholder and Market Actors	IMF	International Monetary Fund
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund	JAM	Joint Assessment Mission
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement	JDT	Joint Donor Team
CSO	Civil Society Organisations	JMEC	Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission
CTC	County Technical Committee	MDG	Millennium Development Goals
CTSMM	Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism	MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
DMI	Daughters of Mary Immaculate – Religious Help Organisation	MDTF-N	Multi Donor Trust Fund – National
DRC	The Democratic Republic of Congo	MDTF-SS	Multi Donor Trust Fund – South Sudan
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General	MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
ELRP	Emergency Livelihood Response Programme	MoFEP	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
EVE	Organisation for Women Development	MoFCIEP	Ministry of Finance, Commerce and Economic Planning
FAO	UN Food and Agricultural Organisation	MPMI	Ministry of Petroleum, Mining and Industry
GBV	Gender Based Violence	MSC	Most Significant Change
GNU	Government of National Unity	NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
GoSS	Government of South Sudan	NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
HLRF	High-Level Revitalisation Forum	NOK	Norwegian Kroner



NorCross	Norwegian Red Cross	SSCC	South Sudan Council of Churches
NORHED	Norwegian Programme for Capacity Development in Higher Education for Development	TGoNU	Transitional Government of National Unity of the Republic of South Sudan
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid	ToC	Theory of Change
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council	ToR	Terms of Reference
ODA	Official Development Assistance	UK	United Kingdom
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
OfD	Oil for Development	UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
PCD	Policy Coherence for Development	UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
PFM	Public Financial Management	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
POC	Protection of Civilians	UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
PRC	Peace and Reconciliation Committee	UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
R-ARCSS	Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan	UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
RBM	Results Based Management	UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence	UNSC	United Nations Security Council
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army	UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Force
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement	US	United States
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army	USD	United States Dollars
SPLM-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition	VSLA	Village Savings and Loans Association
SPMP	Smallholder Production and Marketing Project	WASH	UNICEF's Water, Sanitation and Hygiene programme
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General	WFP	World Food Programme
		WPS	Women, Peace and Security



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of the Norwegian Refugee Council and of the
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Development Program

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of Travel Compensation in Three Developing
Countries

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development paradigm

2011

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to Botswana

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A study of Select UN Organisations

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Multilateral Organizations: A Synthesis Study

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Cooperation to Promote Human Rights

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Efforts, 2002–2009

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efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997–2009

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Lessons Learned

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Culture and Sports Cooperation with Countries in
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Norwegian Development Assistance

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through Norwegian NGO's in East Africa

2010

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International Climate and Forest Initiative

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International Climate and Forest Initiative.
Country Report: Tanzania

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International Climate and Forest Initiative.
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International Climate and Forest Initiative.
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International Climate and Forest Initiative.
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International Climate and Forest Initiative.
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