

# EVALUATION DEPARTMENT

REPORT 2/2017



## How to engage in long-term humanitarian crises: a desk review

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# Foreword

Policy makers and actors in the humanitarian and development field have been struggling for years with questions of how to better support vulnerable people affected by protracted or recurrent crises, and how to create a better relation between the humanitarian and more long-term development assistance. Even though experiences and lessons learned in long-term humanitarian crises have been broadly documented, there are challenges related to the integration and use of these lessons in engagements in other crises.

In the Norwegian aid administration there is an increasing recognition of the need to rethink how Norway best can work to utilize these lessons. The purpose of this desk study is to identify knowledge gaps on how to improve efforts and engagement in long-term humanitarian crises and thus to provide a basis for upcoming evaluations of the Norwegian engagement.

The desk study was carried out by Overseas Development Institute in collaboration with the Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway.

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**Per Øyvind Bastøe**

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# Executive summary

In recent years, the increasing impact of protracted crises – both in terms of the volume of aid they require and their impact on global peace and security – has sparked renewed efforts by the aid community to improve engagement in such contexts. In 2014, 91% of official humanitarian assistance from Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors went to long-term recipients. In 2015, just five protracted crises – Syria, Yemen, South Sudan, Iraq and Sudan – accounted for over half of all humanitarian funding (GHA, 2016: 7). The impact of such crises is felt at national, regional and international levels, particularly in relation to the spill-over of violence and threats of international terrorism, and the political and social consequences of mass population movements to Western states. However, despite the massive investments made in such contexts over decades, the aid community continues to struggle with the complex challenges these crises pose.

This desk review, commissioned by the Evaluation Department of the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) of the government of Norway, was undertaken with a view to informing and supporting the development of the government's forthcoming strategy on engagement in fragile contexts and, where relevant, its forthcoming, related White Paper on overseas development assistance. At the request of the Evaluation Department this review does not target specific themes, geographic areas or aid actors; rather, it provides a broad mapping of general lessons learnt in relation to aid interventions in long-term humanitarian crises, and of the challenges faced by aid actors in applying these lessons in practice. On the basis of this mapping exercise, the review also discusses some indicative lessons and challenges that may be particularly relevant to the government of Norway, and suggests potential areas of focus for future evaluations of the government's engagement in long-term or protracted humanitarian crises.

The research for this desk review was primarily qualitative in nature and included a review of literature available on this broad topic, as well as semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders in the government and with several of Norway's aid partners.

## **MAPPING OF LESSONS AND RELATED CHALLENGES**

The literature indicates that, despite some important advances in key areas of overseas aid, the debate on how best to respond in protracted crises has remained effectively stagnant for decades. There is limited practical guidance on how identified lessons can be integrated or applied in strategies, programmes and approaches. However, lessons in relation to displacement, such as in the Syria crisis, may be spurring some improvements in the strategic response to protracted crises more generally. There is also growing momentum at global level to change the way that aid actors engage in protracted crises: the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), for example, focus not only on the symptoms of under-development, poverty and fragility, but also their

causes, thereby placing protracted crises at the centre of global development action for the first time.

On an operational level, the overarching lesson emanating from the research is that the prevailing ‘divide’ between short-term, emergency responses, which aim to save lives during and in the immediate aftermath of conflict or disaster, and longer-term interventions intended to tackle the root causes of poverty and vulnerability, is resulting in gaps, duplication and inefficiencies in the overall response. The research evidences a general consensus that, although the conceptual ‘humanitarian–development divide’ is largely artificial to aid recipients, humanitarian and development actors have different approaches, language and priorities (Bennett, 2015; Mowjee and Randel, 2010; Levine et al., 2013). Given the nature of protracted crises, their differing attitudes to and tolerance of risk are particularly important. In general, the changes required to bridge the divide and achieve more integrated approaches are considerable,

and necessitate organisational and cultural shifts across agencies and donors.

New technologies and modalities, such as cash responses, education in emergencies and security of tenure programming, offer promise through new coordinating opportunities and strengthened in-country financial services and social safety nets (NRC, 2011; GCER, 2016a; CAFOD et al., 2016). More comprehensive and joint context and vulnerability analyses could also enhance collaboration and partnerships through building a shared contextual understanding between humanitarian and development actors (ICRC, 2016; CAFOD et al., 2016). However, despite the UN Secretary-General’s call that such efforts are ‘a collective obligation’ (UNSG, 2016: 17), they still remain the exception rather than the rule (UNOCHA et al., 2016b: 12). Institutionalising more integrated approaches will require the creation of ‘mixed humanitarian and development teams with the right incentives and senior leaders with joint responsibility’ (Mowjee et al., 2015: 11).

The recent ‘localisation’ agenda, which places national and local actors front and centre of the crisis response, is essential to ensure that aid strategies and programmes are relevant and responsive to the context, and build upon, rather than replace, existing capacities (Norad, 2016, Report 7). Donors and aid organisations have committed to ‘a global, aggregated target of at least 25 per cent of humanitarian funding to local and national responders as directly as possible’ by 2020 (Grand Bargain, 2016: 5). NGOs including the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the International Rescue Committee (IRC) are adopting this approach in practice, particularly in protracted displacement contexts, and some donors are making local capacity-building a key factor in selecting operational partners (DFAT, 2014a). However, such partnerships have presented dilemmas for some aid actors, particularly those committed to upholding the humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality. One such is Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), which cites its ‘emphasis on preserving a distinct working space in order to maintain its access to

civilians' as a barrier to greater capacity-building (UNOCHA et al., 2016; MSF, 2013a).

Related to this push for greater 'localisation' of crisis responses is the concept of 'building resilience', commonly understood to be a people-centred approach to crises focused on investing in preparedness, managing and mitigating risk and reducing vulnerability. This now features prominently at the highest levels of the global humanitarian agenda (WHS, 2016c). Although far from new, the resilience approach has also generated more creative financing options and 'commitments for policy change' by donors (Gonzalez, 2016: 27). Common to much of the literature is the need for longer-term, predictable, flexible funding not 'earmarked' to specific donor-decided objectives (Itad, 2015; Mowjee et al., 2016). Resilience programming of the type outlined in the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan for the Syria crisis, which aims to address the causes rather than just the symptoms of vulnerability, requires a shift away from traditional models of financing through

grants to more contextualised solutions (CAFOD et al., 2016; Metcalfe et al., 2015).

The literature also frequently cites the global aid system as a source of many of the problems with, and obstacles to, improved engagement in protracted crises. Conclusions differed on the range and severity of these challenges, but there was broad agreement that the global aid architecture is fragmented, overly complex, duplicative, exclusive, unwieldy and resistant to change (see, for example, UNDG, 2016; GCER, 2016a). The enthusiasm generated by recent global processes has to a degree been tempered by concerns that the international aid architecture may be approaching the limits of what is possible via voluntary coordination (ALNAP, 2015).

The research for this study highlighted a range of lessons, as well as immediate challenges in applying them. However, the overarching influence of politics on aid – expressly in relation to donor states – is perhaps the greatest challenge to enhancing aid interventions in protracted crises. Domestic priorities,

including security, commercial and political objectives, are playing an increasing role in narratives around aid in many donor states. The €15.3 billion spent by European Union (EU) members between 2014 and 2016 in a bid to foster economic opportunities and discourage migration from the Middle East, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa is testament to how central concerns around inward migration are to the decision-making of key donors (Cosgrave et al., 2016: 10; Metcalfe-Hough, 2015).

#### **KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR NORWEGIAN ENGAGEMENT IN PROTRACTED CRISES**

Many of the commitments made in recent global processes such as the SDGs and the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) necessitate a move away from this self-interested decision-making. Norway, as a 'progressive voice in the international development landscape', is well-placed to drive this agenda forward (OECD, 2013: 16). However, doing so may also require a greater focus on some of the government's own challenges around delivering more effectively in protracted crises. In operational terms, for example, Norway has sought to

address the humanitarian–development divide with its financial support for education in crises and integrated approaches to disaster response and climate change risks. Building on this, Norway may wish to consider ways to augment its in-house capacity for context analysis and strengthen its approach to building on existing local capacities (Norad, 2015b; Norad, 2016, Report 7). Ensuring the right human resource capacities, and the most appropriate structures for them to operate within, is also critical. In Norway’s case, finding ways to overcome the challenges posed by the short deployment cycles of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) staff, including encouraging staff to share learning and experience, and increasing the use of multi-disciplinary teams for specific crises, may be helpful in maximising existing staff capacities (Norad, 2016, Report 4: 33; Norad, 2016, Report 7).

Providing adequately flexible, long-term financing is crucial to support effective programming for resilience approaches in protracted crises, but has also proved to be one of the most challenging lessons to operationalise.

Norway has shown a degree of flexibility in its multi-year funding for humanitarian responses, as well as good engagement with pooled funds, for example in Afghanistan and Haiti (Norad, 2015b; Norad, 2015c). A greater understanding of local capacities to absorb and manage such funds will be critical to expanding this type of financing (Norad, 2016, Report 7).

#### **AREAS OF FOCUS FOR FUTURE EVALUATIONS OF NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT ENGAGEMENT IN PROTRACTED CRISES**

Based on the literature, interviews and the analytical conclusions reached by the research team, it may be useful for future evaluations to consider the following key areas:

***Bridging the humanitarian–development divide:*** Future evaluations may consider the degree to which Norway has enabled more integrated approaches between humanitarian and development strategies and programmes in its own engagement in protracted crises, and supported them in its operational partners; how the tensions between humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality, and

development initiatives like governance and capacity-building, have been mitigated; and the extent to which Norway has adopted or supported resilience-building strategies in protracted crises.

***Human resource capacities:*** Norway has relatively limited staffing resources compared to some larger donor countries, and therefore how the government seeks to best utilise the staff resources that it has is key to the effectiveness of its overall engagement in protracted crises. Future evaluations may wish to consider the extent to which human resource policies, guidance and training support or hinder a broader skills base in-house that is relevant to protracted crises, and the extent to which they encourage the kind of flexibility in partnerships that Norway has been praised for in its past engagement.

***Risk management:*** Norway’s approach to risk management has reportedly improved in recent years, but since how risks are assessed, managed and tolerated is key to effective engagement in protracted crises



further evaluation of this aspect of the government's approach remains pertinent. Key considerations include: the extent to which Norway's risk management approach reflects an adequate understanding of the nature of risk in such contexts; the extent to which Norway's own risk appetite affects that of its operational partners; and whether there are opportunities for Norway to increase acceptance of the residual risks of engagement in protracted crises.

**Donor self-interest versus altruism:** Given the long-term and pervasive nature of the tensions between aid and politics evidenced in this study, this is arguably an issue that requires continuous monitoring for all donors, particularly those who are part of the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative (as Norway is). In this regard, it is suggested that future evaluations of Norway's aid consider the balance between self-interest and altruism in Norway's strategy of engagement in a given crisis; the extent to which domestic political or commercial priorities have influenced engagement strategies;

and how tensions between Norway's own interests and those of the crisis-affected country have been managed.

# 1. Introduction

In recent years, the increasing impact of protracted crises – in terms of the volume of aid and in terms of global peace and security – has sparked renewed efforts by the aid community to improve engagement in such contexts. In 2014, 91% of official humanitarian assistance from Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors went to long-term recipients. In 2015 just five protracted crises – Syria, Yemen, South Sudan, Iraq and Sudan – accounted for over half of all humanitarian funding (GHA, 2016: 7). The impact of such crises is felt at national, regional and international levels, particularly in relation to the spill-over of violence and threats of international terrorism, and the political and social consequences of mass population movements to Western states. However, despite the massive investments made in such contexts over decades, the aid community continues to struggle with the complex challenges that these crises pose.

This desk review was commissioned by the Evaluation Department of the Norwegian

Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) of the government of Norway. The study was originally commissioned to review the government strategy on engagement in fragile contexts (see terms of reference in Annex IV). Following commencement of the project, the research team was informed that the government strategy would not be ready for review during the project timeframe. Instead, the Evaluation Department requested the team to conduct a desk review providing a broad mapping of general lessons learnt in relation to aid interventions in long-term humanitarian crises, and of the challenges faced by aid actors in applying these lessons in practice. The team was also asked, on the basis of this broad mapping, to indicate lessons and challenges that may be particularly relevant to the government of Norway, and to suggest potential areas of focus for future evaluations of the government's engagement in long-term or protracted humanitarian crises. In this regard, the present report aims to inform and support the development of the government's forthcoming strategy on engagement in fragile contexts and, where relevant, its

forthcoming, related White Paper on overseas development assistance.

## 1.1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research for this desk review was conducted jointly by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI). It was primarily qualitative in nature, and involved a wide review of publicly available literature, alongside select interviews with a small number of key stakeholders. The review included academic literature, as well as documents from non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the UN and donors. Searches were conducted of a variety of online libraries and websites, using key search terms.<sup>1</sup> Journals searched included *World Development*, *Oxford Development Studies*, the *Journal of Development Studies*, *Development Policy Review*, *Disasters* and *Studies in Comparative International Development*, as well as websites

<sup>1</sup> The following key search words and terms were used singularly and in combination: 'protracted crisis', 'humanitarian crisis', 'lessons', 'lessons learned/t', 'learning', 'humanitarian' and 'humanitarian-development nexus', 'risk', 'innovation', 'evaluation', 'aid' and 'aid financing', as well as specific country names (based on countries highlighted as focus areas on the Norad website).

for academic articles including Research Gate and Google Scholar. Various organisations' websites were searched manually, including individual donors, NGOs, NGO coalitions (e.g. the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), InterAction), the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), UN agencies, funds and programmes and the UN Secretariat. Both English- and Norwegian-language documentation was reviewed. The research team found literature originating from the 1990s through to the present day, but the mapping focused as far as possible on literature dating from the last five years in order to capture the most current debates on this topic. The full list of literature reviewed for the study is included in the extended bibliography (Annex I). A small number of key stakeholders were identified for interview, with the assistance of the Evaluation Department. In total, 17 individuals were interviewed (a full list of interviewees is available in Annex II), including staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad, as well as staff of several of the government's key operational partners – both UN agencies and NGOs. Interviews were semi-structured and

based on a set of questions (available in Annex III). Interviews were confidential to the extent that there will be no attribution of information or views to interviewees in the present report.

### **1.2 CAVEATS AND CHALLENGES**

The research team encountered a number of challenges in conducting the research. Specifically, the terms of reference for the study required a broad scoping of literature on this wide-ranging topic. Following guidance from the Evaluation Department, the research was not targeted to specific themes or geographic areas or specific aid actors. Additionally, the team was unable to gather or analyse, in the time available, sufficient material or information indicating the Norwegian government's past, current or future approach in this area, limiting opportunities for more targeted discussion of lessons and challenges that may be of particular relevance to Norway's engagement in long-term humanitarian crises. The study was also conducted over a short period – from mid-November 2016 to early January 2017 – and was thus affected by limited availability of key stakeholders over the end-of-year period.

### **1.3 TERMINOLOGY**

As per the terms of reference, this study focuses on 'long-term humanitarian crises'. Since 'protracted crisis' was also used in the terms of reference, both terms are used interchangeably in this report. 'Humanitarian crisis' is understood as an emergency for which an appeal for international assistance has been issued through the UN system (i.e. a Humanitarian Action Plan (formerly a Consolidated Appeal)). While there is currently no single definition of 'protracted' or 'long-term' humanitarian crises, these terms are commonly understood as referring to 'those environments in which a significant proportion of the population is acutely vulnerable to death, disease and disruption of their livelihoods over a prolonged period of time' (Harmer and Macrae, 2004: 1). There is no agreed or defined period of time that passes before a crisis can be considered 'protracted' or 'long-term', but this report uses a duration of five years or longer. This is taken, in part, from the definition offered by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2009 to denote protracted refugee situations (UNHCR EXCOM, 2009) – to which many aid

actors now refer.<sup>2</sup> Whilst not all protracted crises may be defined primarily as refugee or displacement crises per se, they commonly involve forced displacement.

The terms ‘fragility’, ‘fragile states’ and ‘fragile contexts’ were prevalent in both the literature reviewed and used in stakeholder interviews. The researchers understand ‘fragility’ as ‘the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, system and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks’ (OECD, 2016). Many contexts defined as ‘fragile’ are also long-term or protracted humanitarian crises: the top 11 countries on the Fragile States Index in 2016 are all also host to long-term humanitarian crises, having issued international humanitarian appeals (i.e. by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)) for more than the last five years (Fund for

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2 Other time periods have been used by other UN agencies and aid actors. For example, FAO and WFP have characterised protracted food insecurity crises as being of eight to 12 years’ duration (FAO and WFP 2010: 12). In a more recent HPG/ODI report, the term ‘protracted displacement’ was defined as being of three or more years’ duration, and included both internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. See Crawford et al. (2015).

Peace, 2016).<sup>3</sup> Protracted crises tend to share the same characteristics as fragile contexts, but not all fragile contexts are in a state of crisis – as indicated by the Fragile States Index. Whilst the breadth of ‘fragility’ and the range of contexts characterised by it are beyond the scope of this study, many of the themes and conclusions discussed here are also relevant to that debate.

In Part 2, this report outlines observations on the literature reviewed for this study. It then provides a summary of the lessons that featured most prominently in the documentation reviewed, alongside the immediate challenges faced in their application, and offers some reflections on the overarching challenges to applying those lessons in aid responses. Part 3 outlines some lessons, related challenges and limited recommendations that may be of particular relevance to the government of Norway. In Part 4, the report offers some

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3 These are Somalia, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Sudan, Yemen, Syria, Chad, DRC, Afghanistan, Haiti and Iraq. International humanitarian appeals issued for crises in these countries, including funding provided, are available at [fts.unocha.org](https://fts.unocha.org).

suggestions for areas of focus in future evaluations of Norway’s engagement in protracted crises. The concluding remarks offer overarching thoughts in regard to approaches to protracted crises, including the potential for enhanced Norwegian engagement in such contexts.

## 2. Mapping of lessons and related challenges to implementation

This section first summarises the main observations made by the research team in relation to the literature that was reviewed, including the nature of the literature available on this broad-ranging topic and common or pertinent threads that emerged. It then outlines the lessons, and the immediate challenges that impede their application, that featured most prominently – i.e. those which were discussed with a reasonable degree of frequency and consistency across the different categories of literature reviewed. The literature rarely distinguishes clearly between a ‘lesson’ and the ‘challenges’ that directly impede its application, and thus this section discusses these in tandem. The lessons and challenges have been categorised according to the key thematic areas that were most prominent in the literature, namely: operations, financing, bureaucracy/structures, policy, risk management and innovation and learning – all key elements of global humanitarian response. Notably, some of the lessons and challenges discussed below overlap with several of these thematic areas. Risk management, for example, is a cross-cutting theme which prevails

across all aspects of humanitarian response. The mapping exercise was conducted for each of the categories of literature reviewed (see the discussion on methodology in Section 1.1) and the results were consolidated in a matrix format (Annex V). This section concludes by highlighting several overarching challenges to implementing lessons learnt. These overarching challenges are cross-cutting and, in the view of the research team, present fundamental obstacles to the integration of many of the lessons highlighted in the literature.

### **2.1 OBSERVATIONS FROM THE LITERATURE**

A number of key observations or themes emerge from the literature in relation to lessons learnt on engaging in protracted humanitarian crises. Firstly, in terms of the nature of the literature available there is a surprising dearth of academic discussion on the topic, whilst there is, perhaps unsurprisingly, a large volume of evaluations, lessons learnt exercises and policy documentation from operational actors engaged in protracted crises – namely international NGOs, UN agencies,

funds and programmes and donors (bilateral and multilateral).

Perhaps most pertinent to this desk review is the fact that, despite some important advances in key areas of overseas aid, including the use of new technologies to ensure aid is more responsive and accountable, the debate on how best to respond in protracted crises has remained effectively stagnant for decades. For example, the Dutch parliament discussed the concept of whole-of-government approaches to protracted crises and the importance of flexible, multi-year funding as early as 1993 (IOB Evaluations, 2006: 50).

What may be new, however, is the growing momentum at the highest levels of global aid governance to change the way that aid actors engage in protracted crises, as evidenced in the more recent literature. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), unlike their predecessors the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), focus not only on the symptoms of under-development, poverty and fragility,

but also their causes.<sup>4</sup> This places protracted crises at the centre of global development action for the first time. The 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (WHS)<sup>5</sup> also elicited a range of pledges aimed at addressing the long-standing challenges of protracted crises, including the Grand Bargain, which as part of its broader effort to address the humanitarian funding gap through greater efficiencies and innovation, aims to increase funding to local responders; the Commitment to Action on Collaborating in a New Way of Working; and sector-specific initiatives like the Education Cannot Wait Fund.

What may also be new is the depth of analytical discussion on protracted displacement as a common feature of long-standing crises. Protracted displacement is frequently

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<sup>4</sup> The SDGs, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2015, present a global, overarching framework for development efforts for the next 15 years. The product of an inclusive intergovernmental drafting process, they have 17 goals and 169 targets.

<sup>5</sup> Chaired by the UN Secretary-General, in cooperation with the government of Turkey, the WHS brought together over 9,000 participants including donors, NGOs and a wide range of civil society and private sector organisations.

discussed as the context in which the nexus between humanitarian and development programming is most complex, and where challenges in moving beyond addressing immediate needs to building the resilience of individuals, communities, institutions and societies (including finding interim or durable solutions for the displaced) are most difficult to overcome. Although not a new problem for the humanitarian and development sector, in recent years the availability of greater funding for and political interest in protracted displacement has led to a drive toward new approaches to this phenomenon, which may also be spurring improvements in the strategic response to protracted crises more generally.

Finally, from a practical perspective there appears to be surprisingly limited detailed guidance in the literature on how specific documented lessons can be integrated, in real time, into strategies, programmes and approaches. It may be that much of this kind of documentation is internal to institutions. However, in the literature publicly available there are frequently broad calls

to ‘build resilience’ or ‘partnerships’ (InterAction, 2013: 1, 2). Such non-specific recommendations tend to be difficult to measure and evaluate, and do not take into account the legal, administrative, structural and bureaucratic constraints on aid interventions, or provide clear solutions for how to overcome them. Some organisations, including UN agencies, have mechanisms to track how they have responded institutionally to recommendations made in relation to evaluations and lessons learnt exercises, but more generally there is inadequate concrete evidence in the literature of how past lessons (programmatic or strategic) have been integrated or applied in practice at institutional levels.

## **2.2 KEY LESSONS LEARNT AND RELATED CHALLENGES TO THEIR APPLICATION IN PRACTICE**

### **2.2.1 Operations**

The key lessons relating to operations include the need for more integrated approaches between humanitarian and development actors (i.e. to ‘bridge the divide’ between them);

for more sophisticated/common context analysis; and for greater engagement with local actors. These lessons and related challenges are discussed below.

### ***Bridging the ‘humanitarian–development divide’***

There is common acknowledgement across the aid sector that ‘When a humanitarian crisis breaks out due to violent conflict or fragility, we cannot wait until the lifesaving relief phase is over to begin addressing the causes of the crisis’ (Mercy Corps, 2015: 6). However, the literature shows that ensuring that development and humanitarian programmes operate in synergy in a given context faces a number of significant challenges.

Humanitarian and development sectors are often viewed as ‘two different worlds’, characterised by very different approaches, language and priorities (Bennett, 2015; Mowjee and Randel, 2010; Levine et al., 2013). Some of these differences can be linked to the very ethos of humanitarian and development action: as Macrae and Harmer (2004: 3–4) assert in their review of the relief-to-development

debate, ‘While development aid was designed to be state-enhancing and to buttress national sovereignty, relief aid was premised on state failure’. Philosophical and political differences in humanitarian and development approaches (such as those related to engagement with state actors, timelines and security) manifest in and are compounded by operational ones. For example, development actors are accused of being ill-prepared to shift their programming in response to a humanitarian emergency (Derderian and Schockaert, 2010), and humanitarian actors are commonly criticised, even by themselves, for the short-term attitudes and approaches that obstruct more integrated or better-connected humanitarian and development interventions (MSF, 2013a).

Creating synergies between their respective efforts requires organisational and cultural change across donors and implementing partners, large and small. It requires these changes to take place at the political level, at headquarters and in the field, in a coordinated and coherent way, on both sides of the divide (UN, World Bank and CIC, 2016).

Clearly, given the consistency with which this theme is discussed in the literature, this major shift in approach has proven difficult to achieve in practice. Incentivising this shift, such as through conditional use of funding, is considered key to bridging this deep-rooted divide (CAFOD et al., 2016).

The literature highlights that some agencies, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), are starting to apply more integrated approaches to their programming (ICRC, 2016). The literature also suggests some key programmatic areas where greater humanitarian and development collaboration is both possible and desirable. These include security of tenure arrangements for displaced people (NRC, 2011), education in emergencies and ‘communication for development’ initiatives in schools (GCER, 2016a: 61).

As a cross-sectoral programming modality, expanding the use of cash programming may encourage synergies between humanitarian and development assistance. As well as being



financially more efficient,<sup>6</sup> cash has proved effective in addressing short-term problems while also strengthening institutional capacities, such as in-country financial services and social safety nets (CAFOD et al., 2016). Expanding cash programming has itself faced challenges, however, including relating to the division of responsibilities and accountability between actors and differing definitions of vulnerability (UNOCHA et al., 2016; DRC, 2015a). Suggested mitigating measures include investments in training and advocacy, adoption of common market analyses and more robust and participatory monitoring and evaluation processes to understand better the impact, coping strategies and risks related to cash programming (Ali and Gelsdorf, 2012; ALNAP, 2012). More broadly, however, the widespread acknowledgement of the role that cash programming can play in protracted crises has not yet translated into an expansion of its use: cash and vouchers still comprise only a

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<sup>6</sup> A recent study found evidence that cash can be 25–30% cheaper than in-kind aid (CAFOD, et al., 2016: 30).

very small proportion (6% in 2015) of humanitarian aid (ODI/CDG, 2015: 9).

### **Context analysis**

The UN Secretary-General has stated that ‘collecting, analysing, aggregating and sharing data’ is a ‘collective obligation’ (UNSG, 2016: 127). As discussed consistently in the literature, understanding context is key to ensuring that strategies and programmes are responsive to changing needs on the ground, and that they are demand-, rather than supply-, driven. However, the literature also clearly shows how weak aid actors are in this area. In crises such as Darfur, challenges in implementing programmes were blamed on a critical lack of credible information (ALNAP, 2005), and in relation to NGOs, the lack of more sophisticated and continuous context analysis is reportedly restricting coordination, as well as reducing the potential for organisations to respond to changes on the ground (NRC, 2009; Norad, 2016, Report 7). Better context analysis is also challenged by the fact that current analytical tools are inadequate for protracted crises since they commonly fail to capture

data or information on key issues such as national and local capacities, resource transfers and local, rather than overseas, aid (CAFOD et al., 2016).

The lack of a *shared* contextual understanding between humanitarian and development actors operating in the same crisis is also highlighted. Understanding the contextual dynamics of protracted crises – including displacement, local governance capacity and violence – is considered crucial for integrated responses, because it allows development activities to continue where they can, alongside humanitarian assistance, and because it enables more sustainable responses which build local capacities and resilience (ICRC, 2016; CAFOD et al., 2016). Yet knowledge and analysis remain weakly integrated across sectors, with little appreciation of the potential benefits or trade-offs involved in multi-sectoral or joint short- and long-term programmes (ECOSOC, 2016). The lack of shared contextual understanding also limits future coordination and opportunities for more integrated approaches (NOU 2016; Mowjee et al., 2016).



Overwhelmingly, joint context and vulnerability analyses ‘are the exception rather than the rule’ (UNOCHA et al., 2016: 12). This lack of common analysis is linked to the divisions between humanitarian and development actors noted above.

**Partnerships and capacity-building:  
the ‘localisation’ agenda**

Increasing partnerships with local actors and augmenting their capacities are long-standing themes in the literature. More recently, these discussions have coalesced around the ‘localisation’ agenda. This approach, which places national and local actors front and centre of crisis response, is essential to ensure that aid strategies and programmes are relevant and responsive to the context, and build upon, rather than replace, existing capacities (Norad, 2016, Report 7).

Some agencies are adopting this approach in practice: an NRC review of shelter programming in Baghdad, for example, cites specific roles for staff on local government engagement (NRC, 2014), and IRC emphasises the impor-

tance of local government engagement in its responses to the migrant influx in Europe (IRC, 2016). The recent emphasis on area-based approaches in urban contexts, including protracted urban displacement, similarly highlights the need for engagement with local actors (Global Alliance for Urban Crises, 2016).

However, the literature suggests that there are several challenges to fully operationalising the localisation agenda (UNSG, 2016). Access to finance for local actors remains problematic, for example. In this regard, donors and aid organisations participating in the Grand Bargain have committed to ‘[a]chieve by 2020 a global, aggregated target of at least 25 per cent of humanitarian funding to local and national responders as directly as possible’ (High Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing, 2016: 5). An assessment of its humanitarian response to the Syria crisis also recommended that Australia strengthen its emphasis on building local capacity as a criterion in partner selection (DFAT, 2014a). Reporting by NGOs on this aspect of programming is weak (Inter-Action, 2013a), which may indicate a lack of

understanding of the importance of building local capacities in humanitarian crises.

Aside from these practical challenges, there are also evident policy challenges relating to the tensions between humanitarian principles and partnering with local actors who may be party to a conflict (UNOCHA et al., 2016). MSF, for example, cites its ‘emphasis on preserving a distinct working space in order to maintain its access to civilians’ as a barrier to capacity-building in Mali (MSF, 2013a). This criticism was repeated in a later Syrian evaluation (MSF, 2014). These tensions are linked to more philosophical issues at the heart of the humanitarian–development nexus, including humanitarian exclusivity and the application of humanitarian principles. As a recent ODI report states, ‘the principles have divided humanitarians between those who feel that effective assistance rests on its exceptionalism through strict adherence to neutrality and impartiality, and those who accept a wider interpretation of their life-saving remit that includes addressing the causes of crises as well as their effects’ (Bennett et al., 2016: 69).

### **2.2.2 Bureaucratic/structural/governance**

Key lessons and challenges to their application relating to bureaucracy, structures and governance issues focused on the nature of the current global aid architecture and the internal structures and capacities of aid institutions, particularly donors.

#### ***The global aid architecture***

The literature frequently cited the global aid system as a source of many of the problems and obstacles to improved engagement in protracted crises. Conclusions differed on the range and severity of these challenges, but there was broad agreement that the global aid architecture is fragmented, overly complex, duplicative, exclusive, unwieldy and resistant to change (see, for example, UNDG, 2016; GCER, 2016a). These obstacles are considerable and have a long history, and attempts to overcome them have had mixed results (Chandran et al., 2015; ECOSOC, 2015).

To combat fragmentation within the aid system, an evaluation of the ‘Delivering As One’ agenda in 2012 (UN IET, 2012: 26)

recommended a ‘rationalization of the number of United Nations entities; reform of mandates, governance structures and funding modalities; and a new definition of the range of development expertise expected from the United Nations system’. More recently, consultations around the SDGs and the WHS have suggested the need for an equally radical, systemic change in global governance institutions. However, as Chandran et al. (2015: 9) notes, ‘linking the idea of a holistic agenda to operational implications is much more complex’. Although the SDGs have explicitly taken such an approach, they are non-binding and rely on national action plans (Collinson, 2016). Meaningful reform is also limited by the geopolitical and strategic interests of states. The small number of commitments at the WHS on sensitive issues such as ‘political leadership to prevent and end conflict’ emphasises the point made by ALNAP (2015) that the international aid architecture may be approaching the limits of what is possible through voluntary coordination.

#### ***Institutional structures, capacities and coordination***

Organisational and institutional structures also hamper more integrated approaches to engagement in protracted crises. Some donors are already working to address this problem: for example, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs merged its humanitarian and development policy departments in 2008–2009 in an effort to promote greater cross-working and more integrated approaches (Mowjee and Randel, 2010). Mowjee et al. (2015: 11) suggests that the modus operandi for donors in crisis-affected countries should always be ‘mixed humanitarian and development teams with the right incentives and senior leaders with joint responsibility’. Increased investment in staff skills and capacities is one of 12 lessons identified through OECD DAC Peer Reviews, with key concerns about development staff often being ‘co-opted’ into humanitarian responses, and humanitarian staff in fragile states often left overstretched, meaning they have ‘limited capacity for ... ensuring that lessons are learnt’ (OECD, 2012: 41).

### 2.2.3 Financing

Key lessons and related challenges in financing focused on the flexibility of available funding, including its predictability and longevity, pooled funds and funding outcomes rather than outputs.

#### **Flexible funding**

Unsurprisingly, the research highlights the need for flexible funding to facilitate appropriately responsive programming interventions. But access to such funding remains a central cause of concern for aid actors operating in protracted crises. There is consensus that funding is too inflexible, arrives too late and is insufficient for the scale of need (InterAction, 2013a). While Scandinavian donors (Norway, Denmark and Sweden) receive particular praise for funding flexibly (Itad, 2015; Mowjee et al., 2016), others, including Italy and the European Commission, were considered too cautious in applying longer-term, flexible funding models in protracted crises (Oxfam, 2013).

Operational agencies argue that unearmarking enables funding to be more closely aligned with

assessed needs (rather than political or other preferences). However, the literature shows that this type of funding is becoming less popular with donors. Unearmarked Australian funding to the Syria response, for example, was considered by the Government Office of Development Effectiveness to be both unpredictable and inadequately monitored (DFAT, 2014a). The proportion of fully unearmarked contributions to UN agencies received from government donors decreased from 24% in 2012 to 16% in 2014 (and was just 8% for NGOs) (GHA, 2016: 7), a trend which has generated significant concern among operational agencies (CAFOD et al., 2016; UNHCR, 2016a).

Increasing the predictability and duration of funding is a key lesson in regard to enabling more sustainable programming. The OECD considers the benefits of multi-annual funding partnerships to be uncontested, particularly in relation to their capacity to deliver flexible and holistic responses in protracted crises (OECD, 2012). The UN Secretary-General has recommended that plans and resulting funding need

to be at least three to five years in duration (UNSG, 2016). This idea is not new – the Dutch government introducing 24-month grants based on municipal and local needs assessments in the mid-1990s (IOB, 2006) – but it is clear from the literature that multi-year funding is still not commonly available, with challenges around institutional ‘silos’ and related administrative, legal and bureaucratic challenges within donor institutions (UNHCR, 2016a; DFAT, 2015).

The lack of flexibility in funding arrangements for the many middle-income countries affected by the Syria crisis has prompted a number of proposals for more creative financing options in long-term crises (UNOCHA et al., 2016). A region-wide concessional financing facility combining donor grants and loans from multilateral development banks offers a potential means of closing a crucial funding gap for countries struggling with the effects of the crisis (World Bank et al., 2016). It is unclear to what degree the options being explored in relation to that crisis may be replicated elsewhere, but the literature is clear that moving away from a focus only on

grant-making is essential to address the dynamic financing needs of protracted crises (CAFOD et al., 2016; Metcalfe et al., 2015).

### **Pooled funding**

The literature suggests that the advantages of pooled funds in addressing protracted crises are considerable: they have the potential to overcome declining donor interest over the lifetime of the crisis, help donors share financial risks, facilitate coordination between donors and other aid actors and lessen the administrative burden on smaller donors (ALNAP, 2015). However, there is some skepticism regarding the use of pooled funds in protracted crises due to often limited local capacities to manage such funds and the limited access that many local NGOs have to them (GHA, 2016). For example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), local and national-level NGOs reported difficulties in accessing pooled funding (Street, 2010).

### **Funding for outcomes**

Analysis presented in the literature indicates that enhancing the flexibility of financing in

long-term crises also requires a shift from funding outputs to funding outcomes. The traditional focus on outputs is linked to a desire among donors to finance programmes that deliver quantifiable results. On a sectoral level, this tends to lead to funding being concentrated in food security and nutrition programmes, which are considered easier to quantify, at the expense of less ‘measurable’ areas, such as education and early recovery (both of which are crucial sectors in protracted crises) (GCER, 2016a; Oxfam, 2013). Norway’s investments in education in emergencies and USAID’s Complex Crises Fund targeting conflict prevention and stabilisation are positive examples of donors attempting to buck this trend (NRC and Save the Children, 2015; Mercy Corps, 2015).

### **2.2.4 Policy**

Aside from the lessons and challenges covered in the other categories here, contemporary policy debates focused on lessons around building resilience and the challenges this poses.

### **‘Building resilience’**

‘Building resilience’, commonly understood to be a people-centred approach to crises focused on investing in preparedness, managing and mitigating risk and reducing vulnerability, now features prominently at the highest levels of the global humanitarian agenda (WHS, 2016c). It is considered particularly important in protracted crises because ‘building resilience will mean breaking down the barriers between humanitarian and development approaches more fundamentally than ever before’ (Oxfam, 2013: 5). But this ‘new’ approach has not been without criticism: Levine et al. (2012: 4) argue that the debate on the concept has been too abstract and self-referential to be of practical use in enhancing aid, and that uninformed optimism surrounding the concept may risk diverting humanitarian funding away from urgent priorities.

Nevertheless, the concept – and its strategic and practical application – has become more mainstream in recent years (Gabiam, 2016), driven in part at least by the Syria regional

crisis response. The resilience focus of the regional planning process for the Syria crisis – the 3RP – is considered innovative in that it: ‘(a) integrates humanitarian and development interventions in a single crisis response programming platform, (b) enhances national ownership by centralising the planning process around national plans (for Jordan and Lebanon), (c) refocuses investment in local delivery systems, particularly municipalities, and, finally, (d) has introduced multi-year programming to enhance financial predictability’ (Gonzalez, 2016: 27). This approach has also generated new types of donor engagement, both in terms of more creative financing options (as discussed earlier) and in terms of ‘commitments for policy change’ by national governments (Gonzalez, 2016: 27). NGOs are also adopting resilience frameworks in their own programmes. Christian Aid, for example, outlines how its community-led participatory vulnerability and capacity assessment in the Palestinian territories has ‘encouraged communities to develop coalitions to strengthen advocacy work’ (Christian Aid, 2016a: 11). Action Aid (2013: 14) also adopts a ‘multi-pronged

approach to addressing the underlying causes of vulnerability’.

### **2.2.5 Risk**

Although risk featured prominently in the literature in relation to a range of specific lessons covered in other categories here, the prevailing low risk tolerance of aid actors, particularly donors, was also considered an integral lesson and challenge in its own right.

The low risk appetite among donors engaging in protracted crises has a profound impact on how they and their operational partners do business and, in particular, on their ability to learn and innovate. While some stakeholders suggested that this aversion to risk was most acute in the higher political echelons of government, where vulnerability to domestic pressures may be greatest, it cascades down the chain to individual staff in donor institutions and their operational partners.

Establishing what constitutes an acceptable level of risk in protracted crises is complicated by the fact that humanitarian and development

actors may consider and respond to risks differently, even in the same context: ‘Development actors commonly assess the risks of engaging in a particular context or programme, whereas the emphasis in the humanitarian sphere is on the risk, or human cost, of not engaging’ (Metcalfe et al., 2011: 6). In contexts where both humanitarian and development actors are engaging, including in protracted (or fragile) environments, the risks for development actors may be greater: ‘Although development actors may have more time and resources to undertake comprehensive risk assessment and management, the nature of their broader, longer-term objectives, the complex partnerships that are necessary to achieve them and the more stringent financial regulations they must work within may actually pose greater risks’ (Metcalfe et al., 2011: 6). As indicated by the OECD, development actors thus tend to focus on short-term outcomes, rather than the long-term goals of their strategic engagement (OECD, 2014).

### 2.2.6 Innovation

There is a wealth of recent literature on ‘innovation’ in the aid sector, but limited analytical discussion of the lessons and challenges related to expanding this approach. It has been a key theme in the humanitarian sector since 2009, in part driven by the need to find new ways to address the challenges protracted crises present (Betts and Bloom, 2014). Money for innovation has certainly increased since 2009. Several funds are available, including the Humanitarian Innovation Fund, the Global Innovation Fund and individual funds allocated by the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and other institutions. However, in contrast to the private sector’s innovations in aid responses, the concept has yet to realise its full potential among aid organisations: ‘the number of landmark innovations that have been integrated into the system has been frustratingly low and understanding of best practices for humanitarian innovation remains limited’ (Obrecht and Warner, 2016: 2; Zyck and Armstrong, 2014). The research suggests that this is partly the result of a focus on individual

organisations, and too little attention to system-wide investment (Bessant et al., 2014). It is also partly another consequence of the low-risk approach that aid actors generally practice: ‘many donors and agencies have a strong aversion to untested approaches and to activities that do not contribute directly to the immediate response. These two factors have incentivised humanitarian agencies to continue business as usual, while discouraging [research and development] and long-term business development’ (Betts and Bloom, 2014: 11).

### 2.2.7 Learning

Literature on learning *per se* was scarce, and what literature the review did locate focused on challenges relating to poor institutional approaches to learning. The literature suggests that attitudes to and processes for learning in aid organisations, including donors, are inadequate. The UK Department for International Development (DFID), for example, has been criticised for not being sufficiently open to learning, and has been advised to improve the sharing of learning with its operational partners

and contractors (ICAI, 2015). ICAI also recommends that DFID ensure regular opportunities for feedback, and that adaptation should be built in throughout the delivery chain (ICAI, 2014). Frequent staffing changes and short contracts affecting all aid actors compound the knowledge problem: Borton and Taithe (2016) highlight that learning rarely goes beyond the memory of the current generation of humanitarians.

## 2.3 POLITICS AND AID: OVERARCHING CHALLENGES TO ENHANCING AID INTERVENTIONS IN PROTRACTED CRISES

The research for this study highlighted a range of lessons and immediate challenges in applying them, as discussed above. However, the overarching influence of politics on aid – expressly in relation to donor states – is perhaps the greatest challenge to enhancing aid interventions in protracted crises. The link between politics and aid has been the subject of debate in the aid sector for decades (see for example Macrae, 1998; Duffield and Prendergast, 1994; Leader, 2000; Drummond, forthcoming 2017). More specifically, the research for this study highlighted a lack of resolve or

political commitment from donor states to take the actions necessary, including those they have committed to, to improve engagement in protracted crises, as well as the prominence of donors' self-interest in aid decisions.

Recent global processes have resulted in a plethora of commitments by donor states and other aid actors that, if implemented, could effect profound changes in the way they engage in protracted crises. However, there is significant skepticism that donors will deliver on even some of these commitments. Finding the estimated additional \$1.4 trillion a year for the SDGs remains the primary obstacle to implementation of this agenda (Bennett et al., 2017: 11), while the relatively low number of individual donor commitments at the WHS 'demonstrates that prevention and conflict resolution represent a laudable ambition rather than a concrete and operational activity' (UNSG, 2016: 5/22).

The political commitment of donors to enact change and deliver on their commitments

varies according to a number of factors, including domestic priorities and concerns, notably security, commercial and political objectives. A Norad-commissioned working paper highlights this concern, noting that a number of OECD countries were prioritising aid allocations to fragile states or countries where they have strategic or security interests (Norad, 2017). In the UK, 'aid for trade' is a key theme for the new International Development Secretary: 'British soft power is exactly where [the Department for International Development], and our aid and other relationships around the world, come together to deliver in our national interest and deliver for Britain when it comes to free trade agreements but also life post-Brexit' (as quoted in Merrick, 2016). Countering the threat to national security posed by international terrorist groups operating in protracted crises features prominently in aid decision-making. In particular, counter-terrorism legislation has affected aid allocations in a number of crises, including Syria, the Gaza Strip and Somalia, with donors reducing the amount of aid available for a given crisis or restricting the organisations or

programmes they choose to fund (Seal, 2013; Metcalfe-Hough et al., 2015).

Concerns around the domestic impact of inward migration from protracted crises also appear to be playing an increasing role in aid decision-making: the scale of protracted displacement, particularly the Syrian displacement crisis, has prompted a rapid increase in funding for protracted crises, with over €15.3 billion spent by European Union (EU) members between 2014 and 2016 to foster economic opportunities and discourage migration from the Middle East, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (Cosgrave et al., 2016: 10; Metcalfe-Hough, 2015). To a lesser degree such debates are also playing out in Norway: the Minister of Immigration and Integration has reportedly voiced strong support for local and regional initiatives which aim to reduce migration to Europe (Stokke, 2016).

Stakeholders in this study also highlighted the selective application of political resolve by some donor, when faced with recalcitrant national or other authorities in crisis-affected countries.



In South Sudan and Afghanistan, for example, donors have often failed to adequately face up to the challenges and dilemmas posed by national and/or local authorities – *de facto* and *de jure* – who pursue their own agendas, rather than prioritising the rights and needs of their own citizens. Without a clear and genuine commitment from political actors on the ground towards the resolution of a crisis, overseas aid – humanitarian or development – is unlikely to yield desired results. In some high-profile contexts, this fact has at times been overlooked or ignored by some donors in their rush to make large-scale aid investments aimed at consolidating strategic relations with the affected state, demonstrating political or moral solidarity or responding to domestic calls for such support – or a combination of these factors.



## 3. Key considerations for engagement in protracted crises

This section outlines some key areas for consideration by the government of Norway in regard to enhancing its engagement in protracted crises. The suggestions outlined below are based on the general mapping exercise summarised and presented in Section 2, and on analysis by the research team of how some of the lessons identified may be pertinent to the government of Norway. This analysis was conducted on the basis of limited information and documentation available to the team on the nature of Norway's past, current and potential future approach to protracted crises. As such it presents a relatively broad checklist of issues.

### 3.1 OPERATIONS

Exploiting opportunities to ensure greater synergies between humanitarian and development interventions requires more integrated approaches, as discussed above. Donors have been encouraged to incentivise this approach in operational agencies, and Norway is considered a positive model in this regard, particularly in relation to its long-term development funding for education, which is provided in tandem with financial support for emergency education

programmes (NRC and Save the Children, 2015). OECD (2013) also outlines how linking Norwegian climate change and humanitarian efforts related to natural disasters has helped support national adaptation plans, and recommends that Norway consider ways to promote similar synergies in crisis prevention and risk reduction.

The need for more integrated approaches also applies to donors, and Norway may wish to consider ways in which its staff can be better integrated across humanitarian and development departments. By working together as closely as possible, staff from humanitarian and development teams are more likely to be able to identify the tensions between humanitarian principles and development approaches, their implications in specific contexts and how they can be mitigated. Past evaluations have criticised Norway for contributing to parallel structures by not working to build local state capacities when engaging in fragile states (Norad, 2015b; Norad, 2016, Report 6). However, more integrated approaches between humanitarian and development staff engaging in the same contexts may facilitate better

management of the tensions and trade-offs between the need for humanitarian assistance to be neutral and impartial and the importance of working through and augmenting existing national and local capacities.

Context should be the fundamental basis for determining the nature of engagement of a donor state (or other aid actor) in a protracted crisis. Protracted crises are highly dynamic, so analysis of the context must be continuously revised and updated to ensure that it supports an equally dynamic and responsive strategy of engagement. Adequate in-house capacities are essential; although operational partners can support the analytical process, Norway may wish to consider augmenting its internal capacities in order to better synthesise the information received, ensuring that the overall analysis on which decisions are made is as comprehensive and timely as possible.

### 3.2 BUREAUCRATIC/STRUCTURAL/GOVERNANCE

Ensuring the right human resources capacities, and the most appropriate structures for them to operate within, is critical. Staff with the right

skills, specialisms and expertise are needed to design and implement effective strategies of engagement – whether based at headquarters or in the field. For smaller donors like Norway this can be challenging, and more proactive and flexible human resource policies may be necessary to get the right people on board. In terms of field presence Norway, like other donors, has tended to reduce staff in difficult operational contexts, even though these are often precisely the protracted crises where ‘development diplomacy’ is desperately needed (Norad, 2016, Report 7: 33; Norad, 2016, Report 6). Evaluations have emphasised that field capacities should include aid coordination and programme monitoring and evaluation (Norad, 2016, Report 7; Norad, 2016, Report 4). This is particularly stark in the evaluations in South Sudan and Haiti: in the former, donors collectively did not develop an overall strategic plan for recovery and development, either among themselves or in collaboration with the government (Norad, 2016, Report 6); in the latter, the Norwegian effort is criticised for ‘insufficient synergies between the

implemented actions and with other donors’ (Norad, 2015c).

Ensuring that staff have the breadth of skills to move between the development and humanitarian spheres, and between geographic areas of focus, is also key. In some donor states staffing structures have been merged, or multi-disciplinary teams have been created for specific crises. In Norway’s case, finding ways to overcome the challenges posed by the short deployment cycles of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) staff, including encouraging staff to share learning and experience and increasing the use of multi-disciplinary teams for specific crises may be helpful in augmenting existing capacities at headquarters and in the field.

### **3.3 FINANCING**

Ensuring adequately flexible and long-term financing is crucial to support effective programming in protracted crises, but has proven one of the most challenging lessons to operationalise. Norway has already shown a degree of flexibility in its multi-year funding for humanitarian responses, its contributions

to pooled funding mechanisms, for instance in South Sudan (Norad, 2016, Report 6), and its support for education in emergencies.

In terms of pooled funds, Norway’s engagement has been positive in some cases: in Afghanistan, the multi-donor trust fund reportedly provided funding for specific sectors such as law and order even as most donors began to scale down their physical presence (Norad, 2016, Report 7). In Haiti, Norway’s decision to fund both the Haitian Reconstruction Fund (a pooled fund) and its later adoption of a traditional bilateral aid model was praised by evaluators for helping to bridge the transition to development finance (Norad, 2015c). Yet Norway has also faced some of the same challenges discussed in Section 2.2.3. Evaluations relating to Norway’s engagement in South Sudan, for example, explain that it proved extremely difficult to allocate funds through pooled mechanisms because of the lack of local government capacity to absorb and manage the money (Norad, 2016, Report 6). Increased efforts are required to link pooled funds with support for the localisation agenda,

in terms of both facilitating access for local organisations and augmenting capacities within local authorities to manage the funds.

At the global level Norway has also been at the forefront of discussions in relation to the World Bank's engagement in protracted crises and concessional loans for affected middle-income countries, as well as supporting new, creative thinking around development finance. Building on these achievements, Norway could strengthen its global leadership on financing, for example by increasing funding for multi-year agreements (Norad, 2016, Report 4), finding new ways to provide medium-term support for protracted crises and investing in system-wide innovations that could, for example, facilitate greater donor oversight and monitoring of pooled funding.

### **3.4 POLICY**

The resilience-based approach adopted most prominently in the Syria regional response is gathering momentum as a way to ensure more integrated responses to long-term crises. Norwegian funding allocations to resilience-building activities were broadly

considered reflective of other international donors and strategies, but the literature highlighted that this was often regarded as emergency assistance, rather than explicitly framing the response within the growing discourse on resilience (Norad, 2016, Report 4). Norway is encouraged to expand funding for such activities; as noted in the literature, it is important to understand such activities as distinct from traditional humanitarian interventions so as to avoid diverting funding from life-saving assistance (Norad, 2016, Report 4; Levine et al., 2012).

### **3.5 RISK MANAGEMENT**

Norway is considered tolerant of risk and failure, funding comparatively high-risk activities in contexts like Syria, and is praised for its flexibility around funding (Norad, 2016, Report 4; ODI/CMI interviews, 2016). However, a 2013 OECD review of individual development cooperation efforts indicated that risk tolerance was uneven. While programmatic risk tolerance was 'extremely high', it was low in other respects, for instance in relation to corruption. While there may have been improvements in this respect

since 2013, interview sources indicated that, while implementing partners most often display high levels of risk tolerance, there still is considerable risk aversion concerning corruption at the political level (ODI/CMI interviews, 2016–17). The OECD review advised Norway to adopt a more thorough approach to risk, and to determine, in collaboration with partners, what risks would be tolerable, and how to deal with them (OECD, 2013). In order to improve further, research suggests that clear and transparent guidelines over the rationale and criteria for selecting focus countries and partners could be an important marker of accountability and help establish acceptable risk levels (Seal, 2013; ODI/CMI interviews, 2016; OECD, 2013). Provided such guidelines include a more holistic understanding of risk and a commitment to capacity strengthening, they could encourage greater recruitment of local partners (Norad, 2016, Report 4).

### **3.6 LEARNING**

Evaluations of recent engagement by Norway highlighted similar lessons and challenges to other aid actors in terms of the institutional

attitude to learning. Evaluations of engagement in Haiti indicated that the only evident instances of learning were frequent ministerial visits which, whilst providing an honest assessment of challenges, lacked systematic documentation and lesson-sharing (Norad, 2015c).

In regards to Syria operations the MFA was criticised for transferring reporting responsibilities onto partners, and hence not doing enough to enable learning itself (Norad, 2014, Report 4). Other evaluations have recommended Norway apply more stringent requirements in donor–agency contracts on documenting and sharing lessons learnt (Norad, 2015).

## 4. Areas of focus for future evaluations of Norwegian government engagement in protracted crises

This section outlines issues or questions that the team suggests may be considered in future evaluations of Norway's engagement in protracted crises. These suggestions are based on: 1) the research team's analysis (based on themes emerging from the literature and interviews) of the areas that may be of particular interest to the government of Norway, as outlined in Section 3 above; and 2) the team's analytical conclusions regarding the overarching factors that are stymying the integration of learning into international engagement in protracted crises in general.

### 4.1 MORE INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT–HUMANITARIAN APPROACHES

The research for this study highlights that more integrated humanitarian–development approaches are fundamental to the overall success of aid engagement in protracted crises – for all donors and aid organisations. It is therefore pertinent to consider how Norway can achieve more integrated approaches in its own engagement, and to highlight areas to be strengthened and any good practices that may be replicated across countries and contexts.

Key questions for future evaluations to consider may include:

- To what degree has Norway enabled more integrated approaches in its own engagement, and supported them in its operational partners?
- How have the tensions between humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality and development initiatives such as governance and capacity-building, been mitigated?
- To what extent has Norway adopted or supported resilience-building strategies in protracted crises?
- How are such activities funded by Norway – e.g. from humanitarian budgets or as standalone activities?
- How have these more integrated and resilience-building approaches ultimately served people affected by crisis?

### 4.2 REPLICATING SUPPORT FOR EDUCATION IN PROTRACTED CRISES IN OTHER SECTORS

The research for this study highlighted Norway's recent emphasis of and leadership in funding for both emergency and longer-term education interventions in protracted crises. This is seen as a positive, if still nascent, approach that has the potential to be replicated in other sectors and/or by other donors. In this regard, future evaluations may wish to include the following questions:

- To what extent has Norway's investment in the education sector succeeded in strengthening the links between humanitarian and development strategies?
- To what extent is this initiative replicable in other sectors or in a system-wide approach?

### 4.3 HUMAN RESOURCE CAPACITIES

The research also indicates how fundamental having the right staff with the right skills is to successful engagement in protracted crises. Norway, as indicated in the research, has relatively limited staffing resources compared

to some larger donor countries, and therefore how the government utilises the staff resources that it has is key to its overall engagement in protracted crises. Future evaluations of Norway's engagement may wish to therefore consider the following questions:

- To what extent do human resource policies, guidance and training support or hinder a broader skills base in-house that is relevant to protracted crises?
- To what extent do they encourage the kind of flexibility in partnerships that Norway has been praised for in its past engagement?

#### **4.4 RISK MANAGEMENT**

The literature suggests that Norway's approach to risk management has evolved in recent years, but given its importance in relation to donor engagement in protracted crises, future evaluations may wish to review the government's approach with a view to determining where further strengthening may be valuable, or to highlight areas of good practice. Questions for consideration may include:

- What is Norway's approach to risk management in protracted crises?
- Does it reflect an adequate understanding of the nature of risk in such contexts?
- To what extent and in what ways does Norway's own risk appetite affect that of its operational partners?
- Are there opportunities for Norway to increase acceptance of the residual risks of engagement in protracted crises?

#### **4.5 LEARNING**

The research for this desk review indicated that there is a general lack of emphasis amongst donors and aid organisations on integrating learning into practice. Norway has earned a reputation as a leader in many areas of aid response. It has, however, not adequately captured and integrated lessons learnt in its aid engagements in protracted crises. Future evaluations may wish to consider how Norway can improve its institutional learning with a view to improving its own responses and

documenting good practices for dissemination across other donors and aid organisations. Key issues for future evaluations may include:

- How and to what extent have lessons been shared between Norway and its operational partners?
- Is sharing of lessons learnt a mutual contractual obligation between Norway and its operational partners?
- To what extent has this been undertaken in real time – i.e. in order to adjust 'live' programmes?

#### **4.6 DONOR SELF-INTEREST VERSUS ALTRUISM**

As highlighted in Section 2, the research for this study indicates continuing, if not increasing, concerns amongst aid actors of the dominance of donors' self-interest in their decision-making on aid. The research did not emphasise particular concerns relating to Norway in this regard (when compared to other Western donors), but given the long-term and pervasive nature of the tensions between aid

and politics evidenced in this study, this is arguably an issue that requires continuous monitoring for all donors, particularly those that are part of the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative (such as Norway). In this regard, it is suggested that future evaluations of Norway's aid consider the following questions:

- What is the balance between self-interest and altruism in Norway's strategy of engagement in a given crisis?
- To what extent have domestic political or commercial priorities influenced engagement strategies?
- What have been the consequences of this?
- How have tensions between Norway's own interests and those of the crisis-affected country been managed?

## 5. Concluding remarks

Protracted crises are by their nature some of the most complex, intractable, most resource-intensive (in terms of funding, human resources and political capital) and riskiest contexts in which aid actors – humanitarian and development, governmental and non-governmental – engage. They are generally characterised by ongoing or recurrent violence and conflict; generalised human rights abuses; limited, damaged or near-non-existent state capacities and infrastructure; and weak economic capacity and growth. As such, the opportunities for successful engagement are often limited. These opportunities may also expand and contract over time, for example in relation to political or contextual changes, such as renewed interest by local protagonists in peace talks or a change in the geopolitical landscape. They are perhaps first and foremost highly dependent on the agendas, goals and interests of national actors – including *de jure* or *de facto* authorities at central and local level and non-state groups, armed or otherwise. This fundamental point is not always well understood or adequately considered by international aid actors, but without the full

commitment of local protagonists, engagement by a donor or other overseas aid actor is highly unlikely to yield expected outcomes.

As noted earlier, increasing concerns about the number, frequency and longevity of protracted crises and their national, regional and global impacts have given rise to a range of global processes in the aid system in recent years that are seeking new ways to address and resolve these long-standing crises. However, whilst there is seemingly significant momentum behind initiatives such as the Grand Bargain, it is as yet unclear to what degree this is likely to yield tangible results. Whether these efforts bring about actual progress will depend to a large extent on the political will of donor states to make or accept the changes needed in the way aid is designed and delivered in protracted crises.

A key challenge indicated in this research is the declining sense of altruism or philanthropy in some of the more prominent Western donor states. The increasing emphasis on domestic self-interest in decision-making on aid (both humanitarian and developmental) may well

weaken the argument for increased overall aid budgets to meet increased global needs, particularly in longer-term crises or development contexts which tend to attract less public interest than sudden-onset emergencies. Alternatively, there may be opportunities for a more transparent discussion about aid priorities, and how whatever funding is available can be most efficiently utilised. Ultimately, the research for this study indicates that it is an overly technocratic approach to learning and a lack of focus on tackling the fundamental challenges relating to politics, self-interest and incentives that has resulted in a failure to internalise the many long-standing lessons of engagement in protracted crises.

In the case of Norway specifically, there is much in the research that is positive. Norway continues to occupy a place as a leading donor country, including in terms of its flexibility in financing, its commitment to humanitarian principles and its recent focused support for education in crises. However, the research also highlighted areas for further strengthening, including: ensuring a more integrated approach



in its engagement in protracted crises, helping to mitigate the inherent tensions between humanitarian and development strategies in such contexts; augmenting skills development and knowledge-sharing among staff at headquarters and in the field, in order to help overcome the challenges posed by its relatively small staff base and short-term deployment cycles; supporting localisation of aid responses in protracted crises through expanding support for pooled funds, including capacity-building to address access challenges for local actors; offering more contextualised financing options, including and beyond multi-year grants; and exploring opportunities to increase acceptance of the residual risks of engaging in protracted crises.

Norway is considered among 'the more progressive voices in the international development landscape' (OECD, 2013: 16). It has long held a key position within the donor community and has demonstrated the strategic role it can play in policy dialogue in specific crises. Since it is not (yet) as affected by declining public support for overseas aid as other Western donor states, it remains well-placed to provide

leadership in developing global good practice on engagement in protracted crises. The development of a new strategy for engagement in fragile contexts presents an opportunity for Norway to demonstrate leadership in both policy and practice.

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## Annex II: List of interviewees

### GOVERNMENT

**Lise Albrechtsen**, Senior advisor, Section for Development Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**Tarald Brautaset**, Ambassador, Section for Global Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**Hans Inge Corneliussen**, Senior Advisor, Department for Economic Development, Gender and Governance, Section for Development Strategy and Governance, Norad

**Eirin Mobekk**, Policy Director, Section for Development Strategy and Governance, Norad

**Reidun Otterøy**, Senior Advisor, Humanitarian Affairs Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**Elisabeth Schwabe-Hansen**, Deputy Director, Section for South and Central Africa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**Fridtjov Thorkildsen**, Policy Director, Fragile States, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

### NON-GOVERNMENTAL

**Gry Ballestad**, Humanitarian Director, Redd Barna/Save the Children

**Lesley Bourns**, Policy Analysis and Innovation Section, Policy Development and Studies Branch, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

**Andre Griekspoor**, Policy, Practice and Evaluation, Emergency Risk Management and Humanitarian Response, World Health Organization

**Kjersti Haraldseide**, Advocacy Advisor, Norwegian Refugee Council

**Eirin Hollup Broholm**, Institutional Partnership Adviser, Norwegian Refugee Council

**Alastair McKechnie**, Independent Consultant

**Jason Pronyk**, Development Coordinator, Sub-Regional Response Facility, UNDP Syria Regional Crisis

# Annex III: Interview questions

## **LESSONS LEARNED IN ENGAGING IN PROTRACTED CRISES:**

- What are key dilemmas in the humanitarian-development nexus? Have these become more or less complex over time? How do they vary from context to context? What are the key factors or variables that contribute to these dilemmas?
- What are the key lessons learnt in relation to engaging in protracted humanitarian crises? E.g. in financing or funding arrangements; context analysis; operational issues; bureaucratic impediments, etc?
- How do these differ per stakeholder? E.g. donor, INGO, UN system?
- What are the main lessons learnt for donor governments? Which should be prioritized?

## **CHALLENGES IN APPLYING DOCUMENTED LESSONS LEARNT:**

- What are the main challenges in the application of lessons learned on engaging in protracted crises?
- What are the particular challenges that face donor governments in this regard?
- Since lessons learnt have been documented repeatedly over many years, why is it so difficult to overcome these challenges?
- What are possible (innovative) solutions? What is necessary to ensure real change?
- Are there any good practices or examples that could be highlighted?

## **ANALYSIS OF NORWEGIAN ENGAGEMENT IN PROTRACTED CRISES/FRAGILE STATES:**

- What are the key lessons learnt in the way that Norway has, to date, engaged in protracted crises? Does this differ from other donor

governments? If so, in what way and why is this the case?

- Have past lessons learnt specific to Norway been applied (i.e. from previous evaluations, lessons learnt exercises)? If not, why not? What were/are the key obstacles to enhancing the way that Norway engages in protracted crises?

## **FUTURE EVALUATION TOPICS:**

- What gaps in knowledge on this issue are there which should/could be addressed in future?
- What are the key topics or questions that should be prioritized in a review of engagement in protracted crises with specific reference to the humanitarian-development nexus?

# Annex IV: Terms of reference

[NB. The terms of reference were changed because the government strategy was not ready for review]

## TERMS OF REFERENCE EVALUATION STUDY: HOW TO ENGAGE IN LONG-TERM HUMANITARIAN CRISES

### Introduction and rationale

Policy makers and actors in the humanitarian and development field have been struggling for years with questions of how to better support vulnerable people affected by protracted or recurrent crises, and how to create a better relation between the humanitarian and more long-term development assistance. There has been much debate about how this should be defined, how to put it into practice and the implications this has for the aid architecture. Some key lessons learned for how to better engage and work in long-term or protracted crises are for example (not exhaustive):

- Importance of adapting to the context: Better common analysis of vulnerability and risk before crises appear
- Prevention and resilience: Increase investments in prevention and better response when crises and natural disasters hit

- Coordinated efforts: Common goals and mutual strategic planning to strengthen common action during crises
- Multi-year programming
- More flexible and predictable funding, including more multi-year funding, especially in long-term crises
- More holistic thinking in the relation between humanitarian and long-term development assistance, rather than seeing it in phases

Even though these lessons learned are broadly documented through both evaluations and research, there seems to be challenges in actually applying them in the engagement in long-term humanitarian crises.<sup>7</sup> This is also

<sup>7</sup> See for example: Better Humanitarian-Development Cooperation for Sustainable Results on the Ground. A think piece drawing on collaboration between OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF WFP, and the World Bank, supported by the Center on International Cooperation; ODI/HPG: Time to let go: Remaking humanitarian action for the modern era; ALNAP papers: Working together to improve humanitarian coordination; ALNAP: The State of the Humanitarian System 2015; IASC: Donor Conditions and their implications for humanitarian response; ODI/HPG: Remaking the case for Linking Relief, Recovery and Development.

documented through a number of evaluations of Norwegian humanitarian and development assistance over the last decade.<sup>8</sup> In Norway, there is an increasing recognition that there is a need to rethink how Norway best can work to utilize these lessons learned. One step in this direction is the development of a strategy for Norway's engagement in countries in fragile situations, due to be finalized in October. To contribute to this work, and to future evaluations of the subject, the Evaluation Department is commissioning a study on the topic.

### Purpose and objective

The purpose of this evaluation study is to provide knowledge to improve Norwegian efforts and engagement in long-term humanitarian crises. The study may also guide upcoming evaluations of the Norwegian engagement.

<sup>8</sup> See for example: Evaluation Department report no. 4/2016: 'Striking the Balance' Evaluation of the Planning, Organisation and Management of Norwegian Assistance related to the Syria Regional Crisis; Evaluation Department report no. 8/2014: Evaluation of Norway's Support to Haiti after the 2010 Earthquake; Evaluation Department report no. 3/2012: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation with Afghanistan 2001 – 2011.

The main intended users of the evaluation study are departments in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad involved in work in long-term/protracted crises, in addition to organisations working in this field and receiving support from Norway.

The objectives are to:

1. Map lessons learned and analyse challenges in the use of these in the engagement in long-term/protracted crises
2. Analyse the Norwegian strategy for engagement in countries in fragile situations against the lessons learned
3. Suggest possible areas/topics for evaluation of Norwegian engagement/support in long-term/protracted crises

### **Scope and methodology**

The study is planned as a desk study, including interviews, in which consultants shall collect, review and analyse all relevant academic publications and evaluations related to lessons

learned and the use of these in the engagement and work in long-term/protracted crises. If the number of publications is high, the consultants shall select studies assumed to be of most relevance to Norwegian engagement in protracted crises. The analysis should at a minimum include challenges of linking relief, rehabilitation and development, the main lessons learned and the use of these, and central/common dilemmas in the engagement based on the above.

The study will also analyse the Norwegian strategy against these lessons learned. The consultants will supplement the evaluation study with meetings/interviews in Oslo (or by phone) with relevant stakeholders working on the subject in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (including embassies), Norad and relevant implementing partners/organisations. The analysis of the Norwegian strategy should include an analysis of central documents guiding Norwegian engagements in long-term crises, including the focus of the Norwegian support, whether the strategy is implementable and how the strategy uses lessons learned.

It should also cover whether these lessons learned are known and whether there is a common understanding of these within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Norad and implementing organisations.

### **Research questions:**

- Mapping of lessons learned and analysis of the challenges in the use of these in the engagement in long-term/protracted crises:
  - *What are central dilemmas in the relation between the humanitarian assistance and more long-term development assistance?*
  - *What are key lessons learned for how to engage and work in long-term humanitarian crises?*
  - *What are the main challenges in the use of lessons learned in this area?*
- Analysis of the Norwegian strategy for countries in fragile situations:



- *What is the main focus of the Norwegian strategy?*
- *Is the strategy using lessons learned described in the first section?*
- Based on the above, what are interesting topics that could form basis for possible future evaluations of Norwegian engagement/support in the nexus between humanitarian and long- term development assistance?

### **Budget and deliverables**

The deliverables consist of the following output:

1. An inception note (maximum 5 pages) within 3 weeks after contract signature, presenting a preliminary list of literature to analyse, a list of central policy documents, a list of people/organisations to interview, a plan for systematisation and analysis, and a suggested outline of the report.

2. A report of maximum 25 pages excluding annexes.

The report shall be prepared in accordance with the Evaluation Department's guidelines and shall be submitted in electronic form in accordance with the progress plan specified in the tender document or later revisions. The Evaluation Department retains the sole rights with respect to distribution, dissemination and publication of the deliverables. The desk study is estimated to a maximum of 450 000 NOK. The report will be published (electronically).

# Annex V: Summary of mapping from the literature review

[NB. This matrix was developed as an internal tool to organize and synthesize information from the literature]

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Partnerships and capacity-building, inc. with local NGOs, and current practice	Supporting references
The inadequacy of existing analytical tools to understand humanitarian needs was a common theme of discussion in the FHF dialogues, with participants noting that analysis often overlooks capacities, resource transfers and assistance outside of humanitarians' own narrow frame of reference.	CAFOD, FAO and World Vision (2016) Future Humanitarian Financing (30)
Intensive planning, investment and commitment are needed to successfully transfer NGO staff (e.g. health workers and teachers) to government ministries. In Monrovia it took 18 months to transfer staff and equipment from one NGO to another. Similar handover processes with nutrition programmes are expected to take four years.	InterAction (2013) From Crisis to Recovery: Lost in Transition (2)
Many NGOs do not monitor or evaluate their capacity-building efforts in programmes classified as 'humanitarian' due to the short-term nature of humanitarian project cycles – but one NGO estimated that it had trained over 3,000 health workers because it had been in-country for so long.	InterAction (2013) From Crisis to Recovery: Lost in Transition (4); IOD PARC (2016) 'Striking the Balance'. Evaluation of the Planning, Organization and Management of Norwegian Assistance related to the Syria Regional Crisis. Vol 1: Evaluation Report
The report cites the importance of engagement with the Lesbos Municipal Government in the success of its response, particularly around sanitation services. This was in contrast to the poor communication between host and refugee populations, highlighting the importance of effective public information campaigns.	IRC (2016) Learning from Lesbos
In order to effectively implement community programmes in Cairo's urban areas, UNHCR is systematically developing its relationship with public entities and contributing to national and local development agendas through 'community empowerment projects'. These projects foster community-based protection networks, collective livelihood strategies and other good practices in urban community programming.	IRC (2015) Brief: Urban Response Practitioner Workshop: Meeting Needs in a Context of Protracted Urban Displacement in MENA (6)
MSF emphasised preserving a distinct working space in order to maintain its access to civilians in Mali, potentially at the cost of forging meaningful partnerships with local NGOs. Generally, MSF limits its partnerships to exit strategies and advocacy for policy change.	MSF (2013) The 'New Humanitarian Aid Landscape': Case Study: MSF Interaction with Non-traditional and Emerging Aid Actors in Northern Mali 2012–13 (13); MSF (2014) The 'New Humanitarian Aid Landscape': Case Study: MSF Interaction with Non-Traditional and Emerging Aid Actors in Syria 2013–14

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Partnerships and capacity-building, inc. with local NGOs, and current practice	Supporting references
<p>Danida promotes coordination between humanitarian actors through a range of mechanisms. However, its restricted humanitarian presence at field level has limited its ability to participate actively in policy discussions and donor coordination at country level. Humanitarian Action, Civil Society and Personnel Advisors should allocate funding to partners on the basis of performance and ensure that Danida works with the most effective partners. As part of this, Danida should review the programme delivery and results for affected populations achieved by all partners every three to four years, and find alternative partners where necessary. Danida is also advised to ‘consider whether its level of humanitarian funding to UN agencies is appropriate given efficiency considerations and that they often fail to pass on the benefits of Danida’s adherence to the GHD principles to their implementing partners’.</p>	<p>DANIDA (2015) The Evaluation of the Strategy for Danish Humanitarian Action 2010–2015 (14)</p>
<p>None of the Norwegian humanitarian partner organisations has detailed standard operation procedures for engagement with crisis-affected populations. There is accordingly a disconnect between strategies, policies and actual activities on the ground. Realistically, this implies that field staff’s knowledge, skills and experience are decisive in how things are done, not SOPs.</p>	<p>Nordic Consulting Group AS (NCG) (2015) Work in Progress: How the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Its Partners See and Do Engagement with Crisis-Affected Populations</p>
<p>The political dynamics in Haiti over recent years have discouraged Norway from stronger engagement in the state-building process. This situation contributed to a shift of Norway’s support (historically focused on peacebuilding and governance) towards the local level. This included ‘a package of activities covering a wide range of thematic areas, most with no explicit connection to statebuilding’. Enabling NGOs and the UN to replace government services may have served to create parallel structures which may have negative developmental effects.</p>	<p>Particip GmbH. (2015) Evaluation of Norway’s Support to Haiti after the 2010 Earthquake (xxiv)</p>
<p>The literature suggests that, where possible, relying on local authorities rather than non-state actors as the bridge between humanitarian actors and affected communities leads to better outcomes, though there are exceptions to this rule.</p>	<p>CMI (2016) Country Evaluation Brief: South Sudan</p>
<p>It is important to build coalitions to overcome the divide between refugee-hosting states in the global South and donor and resettlement countries in the North. Elements of this include recognising states that are contributing to solutions for refugees (e.g. Tanzania); conversely, ‘states in the global North must increasingly recognise how restrictions they may place on asylum in their domestic systems may affect their ability to engage in discussions about solutions with states in the global South’.</p>	<p>Milner &amp; Loescher (2011) <i>Refugee Study Centre</i>. Responding to Protracted Refugee Situations: Lessons from a Decade of Discussion (19)</p>
<p>Successful crisis and conflict prevention or resolution requires the robust engagement of people and civil society in political and governance processes. Local constituencies and strong national civil society mobilise public opinion against violence and demand peace. Their participation is critical to addressing marginalisation and ensuring that political solutions benefit the whole population, not just elites or select groups.</p>	<p>UNSG (2016) ‘One Humanity: Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit’ A/70/709, 2 February (Para 44)</p>
<p>Collective programme outcomes that delineate results to be achieved by specific agencies would support accountability.</p>	<p>UN, World Bank and CIC (2016) Think Piece: After the World Humanitarian Summit: Better Humanitarian–Development Coordination for Sustainable Results on the Ground. June (Para 16–20)</p>

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Partnerships and capacity-building, inc. with local NGOs, and current practice	Supporting references
<p>There is a need to exploit the comparative advantages of different actors to achieve collective outcomes. The Refugee and Host Population Empowerment Framework (ReHoPe) in Uganda is a multi-sectoral, multi-year, development-oriented framework, which focuses on meeting the needs of refugees and host communities while building their resilience against future shocks. Continued refugee influxes resulted in the Ugandan government deciding to integrate refugee management and protection into Uganda's national development plan. In support of these national priorities, WFP and UNHCR work together to target refugees and host community households; a public-private partnership involves refugee and host community households in commercial agriculture; a social entrepreneurship initiative trains youth, and Japan supports infrastructure, value chain upgrading and vocational training.</p>	<p>UN, World Bank and CIC (2016) Think Piece: After the World Humanitarian Summit: Better Humanitarian-Development Coordination for Sustainable Results on the Ground. June (10)</p>
<p>Joint planning examples are few but they do exist, e.g. Jordan and Lebanon's national plans for the Syrian refugee crisis (involving government, the UN, donors and NGOs); the Sahel Regional Response Plan; the Sudan Workplan 2005/6; and the Somalia Compact.</p>	<p>UN, World Bank and CIC (2016) Think Piece: After the World Humanitarian Summit: Better Humanitarian-Development Coordination for Sustainable Results on the Ground. June</p>

'Humanitarian' vs 'development' activities	Supporting references
<p>The longer a conflict lasts the more necessary it becomes to engage with people and communities at a structural level to ensure their immediate survival and their ability to live in dignity in deteriorating conditions. In these circumstances, activities that would, in peacetime, be understood, in international policy terms, as development activities will, in fact, serve to meet basic needs and fall under the definition of humanitarian action within the meaning of IHL.</p>	<p>ALNAP (2005) Lessons Learned from the Darfur Response (96); ALNAP (2012) Addressing Food Insecurity in Protracted Crises (4); ICRC (2016) Protracted Conflict and Humanitarian Action: Some Recent ICRC Experiences (12), InterAction (2013) From Crisis to Recovery: Lost in Transition (2); Mercy Corps (2015) Building Community Resilience During Violent Conflict (6)</p>
<p>Early Recovery programmes encompass specific interventions to help people move from dependence on humanitarian relief towards sustainable development. They usually start in the emergency phase, are the key element in the stabilisation or consolidation phase in post-conflict settings and wind down as national institutions take over the direction and guidance of development programming. The authors consider livelihood generation, basic infrastructure-building, governance initiatives and capacity-building as early recovery.</p>	<p>Meritens, J. et al (2016) Guidance Note on Inter-Cluster Early Recovery (30)</p>
<p>MSF does not consider that it has a role to play in development, as reflected in its operational model. It is a humanitarian medical organisation that engages in direct medical action with a focus on crisis situations. This shapes its culture, including the way it interacts with other actors. Due to its focus on emergencies, the organisation does not project itself in the long term, and its structure is vertical to facilitate decision-making. Its expatriate-led model is seen, at times, as paternalistic.</p>	<p>MSF (2013) The 'New Humanitarian Aid Landscape': Case Study: MSF Interaction with Non-traditional and Emerging Aid Actors in Northern Mali 2012-13 (12)</p>

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'Humanitarian' vs 'development' activities	Supporting references
<p>Sida has endeavoured to strengthen resilience while also addressing more immediate needs. This has been done by integrating the perspectives of DRR and early recovery into its humanitarian assistance in four ways: '1) by including them in its analysis 2) by promoting their integration in partners' programmes 3) by supporting targeted DRR/ER actions (making Sida one of the largest humanitarian donors to the global DRR system while also funding DRR activities at national and local levels) and 4) by promoting synergies with long-term development'.</p>	<p>Tasneem Mowjee, Lydia Poole, Langdon Greenhalgh, Sarah Gharbi (2016) Evaluation of Sida's Humanitarian Assistance. Sida Decentralised Evaluation (3)</p>
<p>Distinctions between the stages of relief, rehabilitation and development response are rarely clear and are particularly blurred when considering essential urban services in protracted armed conflict. The asymmetries in quality or coverage of services between neighbourhoods mean that multiple types of programme may be required simultaneously in the same city.</p>	<p>ICRC (2015) Urban Services During Protracted Armed Conflict (34); IRC (2015) Brief: Urban Response Practitioner Workshop: Meeting Needs in a Context of Protracted Urban Displacement in MENA (5); NRC (2014) Lessons from Baghdad: A Shift in Approach to Urban Shelter Response</p>
<p>In Syria and Yemen during 2015, the ICRC estimated that its relief/development mix, or short/long split, was 80/20. In Lebanon and Jordan, different situations enable more sustainable refugee and IDP health and livelihood care, so the split was reversed, at 20/80.</p>	<p>ICRC (2016) Protracted Conflict and Humanitarian Action: Some Recent ICRC Experiences (29)</p>
<p>The Dutch Humanitarian Strategy of 2004 (largely unchanged from the policy document 'Humanitarian Aid Between Conflict and Development' of 1993) focuses on 'Humanitarian aid plus' – a flexible solution to the need to link interventions in the acute phase of emergencies to a return to the path to development. This entails livelihood support, education and employment, with the aim of enabling refugees and IDPs to return home.</p>	<p>IOB (2006) Dutch Humanitarian Assistance: An Evaluation (55)</p>
<p>Humanitarian efforts in fragile states in conflict should be continuously evaluated in connection with long-term aid. These evaluations should be based on thorough conflict analyses in order to hinder that humanitarian efforts are scaled back/ reduced too soon. At the same time, humanitarian efforts must not become a replacement for long-term aid.</p>	<p>Godal, Bjørn Tore et al. (2016) 'A Good Ally. Norway in Afghanistan 2001–2014'. Official Norwegian Report (8); MFA (2008) 'Norwegian Humanitarian Policy'</p>
<p>Crises such as the food price crisis of 2008 defy neat classification: the bifurcated humanitarian/development architecture of responses undermines holistic and effective action.</p>	<p>Maxwell, D. et al. (2010) <i>Food Policy. Fit for Purpose? Rethinking Food Security Responses in Protracted Humanitarian Crises</i></p>
<p>Acute crises, assumed to be short-term, often turn into long-term crises, the responses to which are 'recycled' short-term responses.</p>	<p>Maxwell, D. et al. (2010) <i>Food Policy. Fit for Purpose? Rethinking Food Security Responses in Protracted Humanitarian Crises</i></p>
<p>This 2016 article uses the Syrian refugee crisis to reflect on changing response to protracted refugee crises. The author argues that traditional humanitarian discourse surrounding forced displacement, which focuses on short-term or emergency aid, is evolving into a new discourse 'that not only emphasizes refugees' self-reliance and long-term resilience but also is engaged in re-evaluating encampment as a response to displacement and in recognizing refugees' right to the city'.</p>	<p>Gabiam (2016) 'Humanitarianism, Development and Security in the 21st Century: Lessons from the Syrian Refugee Crisis' <i>International Journal of Middle East Studies</i> (385)</p>

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'Humanitarian' vs 'development' activities	Supporting references
<p>A key recommendation that emerged from regional WHS consultations was for refugee response to focus on humanitarian relief and development assistance at the same time. This differs from previous efforts/responses, which switched from humanitarian to development assistance once the emergency stage was over; rather, 'what is being proposed here is that emergency humanitarian assistance be offered in conjunction with development assistance at the onset of refugee crises. The Syrian refugee crisis played a major role in sparking this proposed shift'.</p>	<p>Gabiam (2016) 'Humanitarianism, Development and Security in the 21st Century: Lessons from the Syrian Refugee Crisis' International Journal of Middle East Studies (385)</p>
<p>Writing in 1998, the author makes poignant reflections clearly still relevant today. These include arguments that approaches to relief premised on linking relief and development and capacity-building lead, in some instances, to a premature declaration of the end of emergencies, and the risks of conducting development work in highly insecure contexts are overlooked. The author also challenges the assumption that resources for development work will be available once humanitarian aid has been used up or cut. He also asserts that 'prevailing development strategies in many countries have often been the key cause of wars in the first place'.</p>	<p>Hendrickson (1998) 'Humanitarian Action in Protracted Crisis: An Overview of the Debates and Dilemmas', Disasters (285)</p>
<p>The article flips the relief to development paradigm on its head, considering whether development actors could respond to a displacement emergency. The author writes that 'The sudden violence, displacement, and urgent need in the Uélés challenged ongoing development in the region to adapt and "shift gears" – to respond to immediate, often life-saving needs; to negotiate between ongoing development programming and emergency response; to build on years of lessons learned about assisting mixed populations of newly displaced and residents facing shared vulnerability; to suspend conditioning of aid or concerns of sustainability to provide timely and unconditional humanitarian assistance during a period which could last for the medium or even longer term'.</p>	<p>Derderian &amp; Schockaert (2010) 'Can Aid Switch Gears to Respond to Sudden Forced Displacement? The Case of Haut-Uele, DRC', Refuge (18)</p>
<p>The ad hoc response to displacement in Haut-Uélé was oriented towards maintaining existing development work while addressing the sudden-onset emergency. This led to delays and gaps in assistance, including inadequate medical response. The approach risked undermining both humanitarian and development objectives: 'Forced displacement and violence may reverse desirable development gains, but the broader policy and often political goal of ensuring their sustainability cannot come at the very real cost of neglecting a life-saving response'.</p>	<p>Derderian &amp; Schockaert (2010) 'Can Aid Switch Gears to Respond to Sudden Forced Displacement? The Case of Haut-Uele, DRC', Refuge (20)</p>
<p>While international humanitarian and development approaches bring relief and advancement to millions, they too often fail to sustainably improve the prospects of many people in fragile and crisis-prone environments. Millions are trapped in dependency on short-term aid that keeps them alive but falls short of ensuring their safety, dignity and ability to thrive and be self-reliant over the long term.</p>	<p>UNGA (2016) 'One Humanity: Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit' A/70/709, 2 February (Para 107)</p>
<p>Development interventions should be more predictable – in programmatic and financial terms – from day one of a crisis, to ensure that a country is put back on the path to achieving resilience and national development targets as soon as possible.</p>	<p>UNGA (2016) 'One Humanity: Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit' A/70/709, 2 February</p>

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'Humanitarian' vs 'development' activities	Supporting references
The report asserts that outcomes should be prioritised (based on criteria such as risk and vulnerability), and aim to positively affect overall national indicators related to the SDGs: for example, emergency food provision to address food insecurity. Requires strategies that include simultaneously short-, medium- and long-term objectives.	UNSG (2016) 'One Humanity: Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit' A/70/709, 2 February (Para 131).
Linking programming with development, humanitarian and peacebuilding actors will necessitate a mindset shift and addressing institutional differences (cultures, discourse and incentives)	UN, World Bank and CIC (2016) Think Piece: After the World Humanitarian Summit: Better Humanitarian–Development Coordination for Sustainable Results on the Ground. June (15)
Joint humanitarian and development programmes that use government delivery channels can face risks related to fiscal sustainability vis-à-vis the government's role; they also face legal and fiduciary challenges, e.g. transferring funds and responsibilities between the UN and World Bank.	UN, World Bank and CIC (2016) Think Piece: After the World Humanitarian Summit: Better Humanitarian–Development Coordination for Sustainable Results on the Ground. June (15)
Humanitarian interventions in long-term crises <i>'resulted in many vulnerable people being stuck in situations where they receive only costly, unpredictable and annual hand outs'</i> .	FAO and World Bank (2014) Making the Links Work: How the Humanitarian and Development Community Can Help Ensure No One Is Left Behind (1)
There is a lack of incentives for humanitarian and development actors to 'innovate, be flexible or take risks'. Other challenges include lack of clarity surrounding 'trigger mechanisms' for collaborative work, and lack of shared standards for humanitarian and development work.	FAO and World Bank (2014) Making the Links Work: How the Humanitarian and Development Community Can Help Ensure No One Is Left Behind (2)

Programming modalities, including cash, and barriers to their adoption	Supporting references
Oxfam America's persistence in pioneering disaster insurance targeting the 'poorest of the poor' at scale in its Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) project in Ethiopia – contrary to policy orthodoxy at the time – effectively shifted accepted wisdom on the possibility of designing affordable disaster insurance for poor people. This model has become the prototype of the large-scale provision of insurance.	CAFOD, FAO and World Vision (2016) Future Humanitarian Financing (26)
Cash- and voucher-based programming has grown in scale and acceptance and can achieve considerable cost savings on the supply side, with a recent study finding evidence to indicate that cash can be 25%–30% cheaper to deliver than in-kind aid.	CAFOD, FAO and World Vision (2016) Future Humanitarian Financing (30); OECD (2012) Towards Better Humanitarian Donorship: 12 Lessons from DAC Peer Reviews
In Uganda, the Self-Reliance Strategy (SRS) for Sudanese refugees was intended to contribute to a durable solution when the time was right for refugees to return home. The approach focused on local settlement without presupposing that refugees would find a durable solution in their country of asylum. It permitted Sudanese refugees relatively free access to education, health and other government-provided services, and granted refugees the right to work and to be economically independent	DRC (2014) What Facilitates Solutions to Displacement? (2)
One of the most important issues in responding to protracted refugee crises is the need to shift from responses focused on care and maintenance to those focused on self-reliance. Pursuing self-reliance and durable solutions for refugees should be done in parallel.	Milner & Loescher (2011) Refugee Study Centre. Responding to Protracted Refugee Situations: Lessons from a Decade of Discussion (19)

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Programming modalities, including cash, and barriers to their adoption	Supporting references
In education, early recovery needs to include communication for development (C4D) so returnees have greater knowledge about the social services they are entitled to. Schoolchildren are more effective than the media in passing such messages on to parents.	Meritens, J. et al. (2016) Guidance Note on Inter-Cluster Early Recovery (61); NRC (2011) From Shelter to Housing: Security of Tenure and Integration in Protracted Displacement Settings (10)
'On housing, identify key laws and regulations on property, including discriminating laws and acts in relation to displacement, age and gender' (Meritens, 2016: 63). 'Valid legal stay and access to documentation is a key precondition for many refugees to be able to access services, livelihoods and humanitarian aid, but it comes with an array of challenges. As long as host countries impose restrictions on refugees' ability to legally remain on their territory, any attempts to strengthen the resilience of refugees and ensure access to humanitarian aid will be ineffective' (ICVA, 2016: 2).	Meritens, J. et al. (2016) Guidance Note on Inter-Cluster Early Recovery (63), ICVA (2016) NGO Statement on the Middle East and North Africa, 15 March 2016 (2); NRC (2009) Research to Improve the Effectiveness of INGO Activities and Future Humanitarian Coordination in Iraq (14)
There needs to be a significant increase in the number of staff (as well as their skills and capacity) working on issues related to conflict prevention and crisis resolution in the foreign and development ministries of Member States, regional organisations and the United Nations.	UNSG (2016) 'One Humanity: Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit' A/70/709, 2 February (Para 40).
See page 7 for examples and descriptions of collective outcomes (including the shift from food distribution to achieving a measurable reduction of food insecurity; a shift from delivering short-term assistance to displaced people to reducing displacement and increasing the self reliance of those displaced.	UN, World Bank and CIC (2016) Think Piece: After the World Humanitarian Summit: Better Humanitarian–Development Coordination for Sustainable Results on the Ground. June (7)
Joint programming examples include: Lebanon Reach All Children with Education (RACE), Lebanon National Poverty Targeting Programme, Timor-Leste Health Sector Programme, Jordan Host Communities Programme.	UN, World Bank and CIC (2016) Think Piece: After the World Humanitarian Summit: Better Humanitarian–Development Coordination for Sustainable Results on the Ground. June (15)
Cash-based programmes can facilitate multi-sectoral programming but are also challenging in terms of securing agreement on responsibilities and accountability for humanitarian and development partners (even where there is agreement on collective outcomes, etc).	UN, World Bank and CIC (2016) Think Piece: After the World Humanitarian Summit: Better Humanitarian–Development Coordination for Sustainable Results on the Ground. June (15)

Context analysis	Supporting references
Deeper understanding of coping strategies has led to a broader range of responses, including school meals, cash for work and food for assets. Cash responses, health and veterinary services and providing agricultural inputs are also options.	ALNAP (2012) Addressing Food Insecurity in Protracted Crises (3)
The lack of understanding of livelihoods and the complex relationships between nomads, agropastoralists and sedentary farmers impedes programming. Indeed, the lack of credible information and analysis of the situation in Darfur cuts across all areas and is one of the single largest obstacles to informed planning and effective action.	ALNAP (2005) Lessons Learned from the Darfur Response (111)

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Context analysis	Supporting references
<p>An evaluation of the WFP operation in Afghanistan from 2010–2012 found ‘insufficiently robust and systematic approaches to monitoring, data paucity, and intermittent access and partner capacity constraints’. This complicated the assessment of results. There was a lack of conflict analysis in the programme design, which made it difficult for WFP to respond to changes on the ground. Comprehensive and continuous conflict analysis is required. The experience with the National Solidarity Programme, a Ministry–NGO partnership, suggests that community participation in planning and implementation, combined with more extensive oversight mechanisms, can help address mismanagement.</p>	<p>CMI (2016) Country Evaluation Brief: Afghanistan. Report 7 (25)</p>
<p>Humanitarian and development actors must accept that ‘results will not materialize in short time frames and that they might be difficult to measure or require qualitative methods’. Institutional change takes up to 30 years.</p>	<p>UNSG (2016) ‘One Humanity: Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit’ A/70/709, 2 February (Para 43)</p>
<p>Aid actors (humanitarian and development) need common context analysis and common problem statements, the key aims of which should be to ‘identify priorities in meeting immediate needs but also reducing vulnerability and risk over several years; the capacities of all available actors, particularly national and local, to address those priorities; and where international actors can support existing capacities, complement and scale them up, and improve the circumstances of the most vulnerable’.</p>	<p>UNSG (2016) ‘One Humanity: Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit’ A/70/709, 2 February (Para 127)</p>
<p>Joint context and vulnerability analyses are the exception rather than the rule. Greater investment is required to expand such approaches across all relevant crises – in skills, methodologies and technical capacities.</p>	<p>UN, World Bank and CIC (2016) Think Piece: After the World Humanitarian Summit: Better Humanitarian–Development Coordination for Sustainable Results on the Ground. June</p>
<p>Need to move away from focus on immediate needs – major shift required. Resources are needed to ensure more holistic analysis of needs, vulnerabilities and context.</p>	<p>FAO and World Bank (2014) Making the Links Work: How the Humanitarian and Development Community Can Help Ensure No One Is Left Behind (1)</p>
<p>Demand for schooling remains high but costs and vulnerabilities/risks can be key barriers to access to education. There are a variety of approaches and the most appropriate in any given context is entirely dependent on an in-depth analysis of the factors prevalent in that context (risks, capacities, demands, local and national government, etc).</p>	<p>DFID/UNICEF (2015) Delivering Quality Education in Protracted Crises: A Discussion Paper. March</p>
<p>UN ‘Coherence across the charter’ means joint analysis of context, risks, needs, vulnerabilities – written into the revised UNDAF guidance for UN agencies, funds and programmes.</p>	<p>UNDG (2016) Interim UNDAF Guidance. May</p>

## BUREAUCRATIC AND STRUCTURAL

Aid Architecture, inc. fragmentation, unresponsiveness/delays, monopolised by UN agencies and INGOs	Supporting references
<p>It was noted that, across multiple clusters, early recovery was successful in this domain when international and national actors focused on the longer term were able to engage. Examples include programmes supporting birth registration and census efforts, and those engaged in technical support to governments on the rule of law.</p>	<p>Meritens, J. et al. (2016) Guidance Note on Inter-Cluster Early Recovery (41)</p>
<p>Donors often have access to humanitarian updates and detailed information from standard reporting requirements. This insight could be more effectively used by technical specialists within donor agencies to engage the political elite within their own establishments.</p>	<p>ICRC (2015) Urban Services During Protracted Armed Conflict (43); CMI (2016) Country Evaluation Brief: South Sudan</p>
<p>World Vision's experience indicates that increased resources can be mobilised for resilient development practice when working in project-based consortia. Evidence from the partnership with the Africa Climate Change Resilience Alliance (ACCRA) programme in Uganda as well as the SomReP Consortium in Somalia demonstrates that the costs of consortia are outweighed by the multiple benefits of working together, not least in terms of resource mobilisation.</p>	<p>World Vision/ODI (2014) Institutionalising Resilience: The World Vision Story (vi)</p>
<p>National and international actors need to commit to developing a shared and prioritised plan with common high-level objectives at country level within each protracted crisis. The plan should be underpinned by thorough and common context and risk analyses and assessments, and built on the experience of resilience analyses and new approaches to joint risk assessments. Senior leaders within donors and aid agencies should take responsibility for implementing measures to ensure greater coherence between humanitarian and development assistance. This will require having in place the necessary tools, allies and influence. Mixed humanitarian and development teams with the right incentives and senior leaders with joint responsibility should be the modus operandi in crisis-affected contexts, including at the regional level, and in the relevant headquarters departments of donors and aid agencies. Partner country governments, the UN and donors should improve links between humanitarian and development coordination structures at country level.</p>	<p>Mowjee, T. et al. (2015) Coherence in Conflict: Bringing Humanitarian and Development Aid Streams Together</p>
<p>The early warnings regarding the famine and health emergency were 'sufficient, timely, and robust' – what failed was timely action/response from national actors and the international system.</p>	<p>Seal &amp; Bailey, A. (2013) 'The 2011 Famine in Somalia: Lessons Learnt from a Failed Response?' <i>Conflict and Health</i></p>
<p>The authors identify five conditions as necessary for a timely response to early warnings by humanitarian agencies. These are: presence; access; adequate funding; operational capacity; and legal protection for humanitarian action. Politics is also a key factor.</p>	<p>Seal &amp; Bailey, A. (2013) 'The 2011 Famine in Somalia: Lessons Learnt from a Failed Response?' <i>Conflict and Health</i></p>
<p>The UN had both a humanitarian and political mandate in Somalia; this, and its links with different stakeholders in the conflict, affected perceptions of neutrality. Agencies working through the cluster system were not perceived as neutral, and those operating outside the cluster system had greater access.</p>	<p>Seal &amp; Bailey, A. (2013) 'The 2011 Famine in Somalia: Lessons Learnt from a Failed Response?' <i>Conflict and Health</i></p>
<p>The political agendas of key stakeholders (donor governments, regional powers and 'warring authorities within Somalia' undermined famine prevention efforts and the independence and effectiveness of the UN-led cluster system.</p>	<p>Seal &amp; Bailey, A. (2013) 'The 2011 Famine in Somalia: Lessons Learnt from a Failed Response?' <i>Conflict and Health</i></p>

→ BUREAUCRATIC AND STRUCTURAL

Aid Architecture, inc. fragmentation, unresponsiveness/delays, monopolised by UN agencies and INGOs	Supporting references
<p>The authors argue that contrary to claims that ‘interventions prolong civil wars and lead to greater humanitarian suffering and civilian casualties, the most violent and protracted cases in recent history – Somalia, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Bosnia before Srebrenica, and Darfur – have been cases in which the international community was unwilling either to intervene or to sustain a commitment with credible force’. The authors assert that operations that have been most successful at ending conflicts (e.g. Bosnia and East Timor) were aggressive operations backed by UN Security Council resolutions.</p>	<p>Western &amp; Goldstein (2011) ‘Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age’ <i>Foreign Affairs</i> (54)</p>
<p>Implementing comprehensive responses to protracted refugee crises requires the engagement not only of humanitarian actors, but also of a range of other stakeholders, including peace and security and development actors.</p>	<p>Milner &amp; Loescher (2011) ‘Responding to Protracted Refugee Situations: Lessons from a Decade of Discussion’, <i>Refugee Study Centre</i></p>
<p>Achieving ambitious outcomes for people, particularly in fragile and crisis-affected environments, requires a different kind of collaboration among governments, international humanitarian and development actors and other actors: one that is based on complementarity, greater levels of interoperability and achieving sustainable, collective outcomes, rather than the coordination of individual projects and activities.</p>	<p>UNSG (2016) ‘One Humanity: Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit’ A/70/709, 2 February (Para 109)</p>
<p>Each sector brings different goals, time frames, disjointed data and analysis and resources to those same communities, creating and implementing activities towards different objectives. The resulting divisions, inefficiencies and even contradictions prevent optimum results for the most vulnerable.</p>	<p>UNSG (2016) ‘One Humanity: Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit’ A/70/709, 2 February (Para 124)</p>
<p>More systematic use of contact groups, at the regional and international levels, that benefit from long-term engagement by their members. These contact groups should sustain political momentum, look beyond narrow electoral cycles and provide a forum to exchange information and monitor developments on a continuous basis. To maintain political attention and sustained investment over the long term, contact groups could explore the possibility of ‘mini-Marshall Plans’ after conflicts.</p>	<p>UNSG (2016) ‘One Humanity: Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit’ A/70/709, 2 February (Para 44)</p>
<p>The nature of protracted and fragile contexts means that effective response plans should span at least 3–5 years in order to adapt to changing contexts, enable progress year on year, invest in national and local capacity, and facilitate the shift of international actors from deliverers of goods to providers of technical and strategic support. Each 3–5-year outcome would be aligned with a broader 10–15-year national development plan and the SDGs.</p>	<p>UNSG (2016) ‘One Humanity: Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit’ A/70/709, 2 February (Para 133)</p>
<p>The aid architecture is inappropriate for delivering quality education in protracted crises – there is a lack of sustainable funding, resources context-specific programmes.</p>	<p>DFID/UNICEF (2015) <i>Delivering Quality Education in Protracted Crises: A Discussion Paper</i>. March</p>
<p>Direct links are required between humanitarian and development strategies and plans.</p>	<p>UNDG (2016) <i>Interim UNDAF Guidance</i>. May</p>

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→ BUREAUCRATIC AND STRUCTURAL

Breaking down internal donor/institutional silos, including administration, staffing and relationships	Supporting references
<p>Recommendations: increase the staffing available to the Section for Humanitarian Affairs in particular and, where appropriate, at embassy level. Develop a structured learning system for the response. Include a statement of risk in the strategic framework. Develop a 'risk framework' which partners must complete as a condition for funding. Institute regular review meetings to consider how risks are being addressed. For all new agreements, partners should be required to demonstrate how they will contribute to the achievement of strategic priorities.</p>	<p>IOD PARC (2016) 'Striking the Balance'. Evaluation of the Planning, Organization and Management of Norwegian Assistance Related to the Syria Regional Crisis. Vol 1: Evaluation Report</p>
<p>In the Philippines after Hurricane Haiyan in 2013, the international (UN ) effort in many ways mirrored the local government's coordination structure, which worked well both in the short and long term. However, too large a share of the total personnel was dedicated to coordination compared to staff dedicated to field work/implementation.</p>	<p>MFA (2014) 'Norwegian Humanitarian Policy. Annual Report 2013', Norsk Humanitær politikk. Årsrapport 2013</p>
<p>There is ongoing competition between actors. The priorities of individual agencies include maximising the benefits of their agency and market share as opposed to the overall system or supporting those affected by crises.</p>	<p>FAO and World Bank (2014) Making the Links Work: How the Humanitarian and Development Community Can Help Ensure No One Is Left Behind. 9 December (1)</p>

## FINANCING

Pooled funding vs. earmarked; sources of funding/countries eligible to receive it	Supporting references
UN agencies have experienced an increase in earmarked funding, reducing flexibility and efficiency and contributing to a growing reporting burden.	CAFOD, FAO and World Vision (2016) Future Humanitarian Financing (19); UNHCR (2016) NGO General Debate Statement for 67th Session of Executive Committee of UNHCR
When well-managed, multi-donor trust funds had distinct advantages in Afghanistan. For donors, pooled funding reduces risk, facilitates coordination and reduces the burden on individual donors to allocate and train staff.	CMI (2016) Country Evaluation Brief: Afghanistan. Report 7
Flexible donor funding and adaptive management enabled timely, aptly tailored interventions. USAID's Complex Crises Fund (CCF) is one of the agency's only sources of global, flexible funding, enabling partners to undertake rapid prevention, stabilisation and response activities when assistance funds cannot be reprogrammed to address emerging crises. Its structure focuses on outcomes, not outputs, and allows for iterative programme rewrites, including a broad mid-term rewrite opportunity.	Mercy Corps (2015) Building Community Resilience During Violent Conflict (6); UNHCR (2016) NGO General Debate Statement for 67th Session of Executive Committee of UNHCR
Danida ensures adequate coverage of its humanitarian assistance in four ways: '(a) by giving partners flexibility to respond within crisis-affected regions, rather than focusing on specific countries; (b) by allocating flexible funds to NGO partners and UNHCR to respond to sudden-onset crises outside the priority crises; (c) by providing additional funding outside framework agreements for new emergencies; and (d) by providing significant funding to the Central Emergency Response Fund, which responds to acute emergencies as well as under-funded crises'.	DANIDA (2015) The Evaluation of the Strategy for Danish Humanitarian Action 2010–2015; IOD PARC (2016) 'Striking the Balance'. Evaluation of the Planning, Organization and Management of Norwegian Assistance related to the Syria Regional Crisis. Vol 1: Evaluation Report
Sida has put considerable time and effort into developing a model for the allocation of its geographical funding envelopes. This includes the production of Humanitarian Crisis Analyses that can be used to prioritise within a crisis, which is a useful tool given common limitations of data on humanitarian need. Sida's allocation model tries to balance funding against objective criteria, providing partners with some funding predictability (this is challenging).	Tasneem Mowjee, Lydia Poole, Langdon Greenhalgh, Sarah Gharbi (2016) Evaluation of Sida's Humanitarian Assistance. Sida Decentralised Evaluation (3)
UN partners value the flexibility associated with Australian unearmarked support. It tends to avoid duplication and facilitate effective needs-based targeting on the ground. The drawback is a strong element of unpredictability, as the response has been characterised by 'a large number of discrete financial allocations of varying value', which in turn negatively affects planning and predictability in protracted crises born of conflict.	DFAT (2015) Australia's Humanitarian Response to the Syria Crisis: Evaluation Report
Pooled funds were prioritised to promote donor coordination and reduce risk. Since it proved extremely challenging to allocate funds through pooled mechanisms, donors chose alternative mechanisms to continue their work and remain relevant. As a result, pooled funds contributed to the fragmentation of funding mechanisms.	CMI (2016) Country Evaluation Brief: South Sudan
Norway is considered flexible, responsive, timely, risk-tolerant and willing to accept failure. Norway has a highly flexible and agile model of decision-making. Turnaround times are comparatively short, and the system is very open to adaptation. Partners value Norwegian assistance highly for these particular characteristics, which are appropriate to the fluid needs of a complex crisis. Drawbacks include that flexibility may risk compromising rigour and reducing accountability, and may act as a disincentive to the more strategic approach required for the protracted crisis in Syria. This means that, while the Norwegian aid management system is conducive to servicing the complex crisis of Syria, 'this is the result of a responsive model, rather than arising from proactive differentiation for a complex emergency'.	IOD PARC (2016) 'Striking the Balance'. Evaluation of the Planning, Organization and Management of Norwegian Assistance Related to the Syria Regional Crisis. Vol 1: Evaluation Report 6
Reforms of the international humanitarian system (CERF and the establishment of Common Action Plans) implemented in 2013 have worked well in natural disasters, but they have proven insufficient in conflict-related crisis situations.	MFA (2015) 'Norwegian Humanitarian Policy. Annual Report 2014'. Norsk Humanitær politikk. Årsrapport 2014

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Pooled funding vs. earmarked; sources of funding/countries eligible to receive it	Supporting references
The use of pooled funding should not per se legitimise cuts to administrative capacities. Follow-up of pooled funds is demanding and time-consuming. Norway should consider using professional surveillance mechanisms to document results. Technical budgetary measures allowing partners to spend aid funds on humanitarian efforts may represent a politicisation of humanitarian funds by being added to budget lines that form part of a long-term, political state-building project.	Godal, Bjørn Tore et al. (2016) 'A Good Ally. Norway in Afghanistan 2001–2014'. Official Norwegian Report 2016 (8)
One lesson from the response to the 2010–12 famine in Somalia, primarily related to cash-based programming, is the need for strengthened, flexible funding and coordination mechanisms.	Ali, D. & Gelsdorf, K. (2012) Risk-averse to Risk-willing: Learning from the 2011 Somalia Cash Response
Drawing on the response to the Somalia famine, the authors conclude by asking what is needed to insulate the humanitarian system from political influences and prevent failures from being repeated. They argue for exploring ways to separate funding decisions from geopolitical agendas, including pooled funds, funds that are released according to pre-established early warning triggers and clear guidelines for when humanitarian interventions are warranted and who will fund them.	Seal & Bailey, A. (2013) The 2011 Famine in Somalia: Lessons Learnt from a Failed Response?, Conflict and Health
Financing needs to be multi-year, predictable, linked to collective outcomes set by diverse actors (private sector, national government, international partners) and delivered through a range of tools. Shift from 'funding projects to financing outcomes' – SG calls for a change in approach that ensures financing is more strategic, predictable and better fits the types of interventions required. Tools may include: risk-pooling and transfer tools, impact bonds, microlevies, loans and guarantees.	UNSG (2016) 'One Humanity: Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit' A/70/709, 2 February (Para 130)
There is also a need to increase and diversify the resource base – increased contributions from member states as donors, the private sector, other financing sources. The scale of need is too great for funding to remain consolidated within a small group of donors: \$25 billion in humanitarian needs is 12 times higher than 15 years ago.	UN, World Bank and CIC (2016) Think Piece: After the World Humanitarian Summit: Better Humanitarian–Development Coordination for Sustainable Results on the Ground. June (v)
Lack of flexibility in funding arrangements for middle-income countries has proven highly problematic for those in crisis (e.g. Syria's neighbours). There is a need to address the terms of loans from multilateral development banks to increase flexibility in the event of a crisis.	UN, World Bank and CIC (2016) Think Piece: After the World Humanitarian Summit: Better Humanitarian–Development Coordination for Sustainable Results on the Ground. June (16)
Under the Grand Bargain donors would not simply give more but give better, by being more flexible, and aid organisations would reciprocate with greater transparency and cost-consciousness.	High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing (2016) Report to the Secretary General: Too Important to Fail: Addressing the Humanitarian Financing Gap. January
Core Responsibility 5 of the WHS commitments: Increase the percentage of ODA targeting fragile countries; financing for long-term investments for displaced populations; increase opportunities for risk-sharing amongst donors (e.g. pooling funds?); MDB replenishments should ensure flexible financing tools; finance the expanded use of multi-sectoral cash programmes.	WHS (2016) Financing: Investing in Humanity. High-Level Leaders Roundtable. May
An MENA concessional financing facility may be a possible option for bridging the financing gap in protracted crises in middle-income countries, blending grants from supporting countries with loans from multilateral development banks to bring down the cost of financing to more concessional levels, not usually accessed by middle-income countries. Equivalent financing is accessed by developing countries through the IDA concessional window.	World Bank, DFID, UNHCR (2016) Forum on New Approaches to Protracted Displacement: Co-hosts Summary Statement. April

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Humanitarian vs. development financing, including funding timescales	Supporting references
Despite recognition at the policy level of the need for development actors to invest in the early stages of recovery, there is often nowhere for humanitarian actors to refer to chronic needs and no possibility of a responsible exit. In reality, development financing is still far too slow protracted crises, and development actors lack the programming tools and tolerance for fiduciary risk.	CAFOD, FAO and World Vision (2016) Future Humanitarian Financing (21); Oxfam (2013) Learning the Lessons: Assessing the Response to the 2012 Food Crisis in the Sahel to Build Resilience for the Future (19, 21); Godal, Bjørn Tore et al. (2016) 'A Good Ally. Norway in Afghanistan 2001–2014'. Official Norwegian Report 2016 (8)
The past ten years has seen the emergence of the global insurance and reinsurance industries as players in resilience financing, developing products tailored to low-income clients that insure against disaster risks. Take-up has been rapid in low- and middle-income countries.	CAFOD, FAO and World Vision (2016) Future Humanitarian Financing (21)
Relative success in maintaining functioning services and essential infrastructure over many years in conflicts like Somalia and the DRC suggests that development finance and expertise could be beneficial to humanitarian action in the same areas.	ICRC (2016) Protracted Conflict and Humanitarian Action: Some Recent ICRC Experiences (21)
One main risk identified with multi-year financing is that it could tie the ICRC down to a given project or location, which may not remain relevant as the situation changes on the ground. If violence displaces the majority of people the ICRC is supporting through a hospital, multi-year investment in that hospital may lose its relevance even though the health of these people remains a priority. This risk is mitigated by a primary focus in multi-year strategies on outcomes rather than projects.	ICRC (2016) Protracted Conflict and Humanitarian Action: Some Recent ICRC Experiences (36)
Crisis Policy Frameworks were introduced by the Dutch government in the mid-1990s. Their major elements include the possibility of 24-month instead of 12-month grants and context analyses that rely on assessments specifically in the municipal/local area rather than nationally.	IOB (2006) Dutch Humanitarian Assistance: An Evaluation (102)
'The coordination and funding system contributed to problems attaining a "neutral, independent, and effective" humanitarian response to the Somalia famine.'	Seal & Bailey, A. (2013) The 2011 Famine in Somalia: Lessons Learnt from a Failed Response?, Conflict and Health
Political and budgetary approval mechanisms can present challenges for donors and governments in terms of multi-year funding commitments.	UN, World Bank and CIC (2016). Think Piece: After the World Humanitarian Summit: Better humanitarian-development coordination for sustainable results on the ground. June.
Separation of humanitarian and development funding negatively affects efforts to achieve collective outcomes. Limits on the duration of certain types of funding make it more difficult to mobilise additional resources that could lead to more sustainable solutions.	UN, World Bank and CIC (2016) Think Piece: After the World Humanitarian Summit: Better Humanitarian–Development Coordination for Sustainable Results on the Ground. June
Rigidities in donor budgets may prevent funds earmarked for humanitarian or development purposes from being used flexibly and effectively to achieve the desired outcome. One way to address this challenge may be for donor budgets to focus on overarching objectives, rather than individual inputs.	UN, World Bank and CIC (2016) Think Piece: After the World Humanitarian Summit: Better Humanitarian–Development Coordination for Sustainable Results on the Ground. June (16)
Innovative investment in humanitarian action which leads to long-term social improvements. Social Impact Bonds and micro-levies on corporations with high-volume transactions have great potential.	High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing (2016) Report to the Secretary General: Too Important to Fail: Addressing the Humanitarian Financing Gap. January

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Humanitarian vs. development financing, including funding timescales	Supporting references
Core Responsibility 5 of the WHS commitments: donors should commit to 'ensuring that organisational structures and internal processes foster coherence between humanitarian, development, peacebuilding, stabilisation and climate finance, removing the internal institutional barriers between humanitarian and development finance, both in capitals/ headquarters and at country level, in order to mobilize the right mix of humanitarian and development finance'.	WHS (2016) Financing: Investing in Humanity. High-Level Leaders Roundtable. May (5)
A range of stakeholders (including humanitarian, development, climate change and peacebuilding actors) need to develop a new 'framework of cooperation' to respond to prolonged crises. Key elements of this framework should include addressing both immediate needs and root causes, shared risk and context analysis and collaborative outcome-oriented planning.	UN/WHS (2016) Restoring Humanity: Global Voices Calling for Action: Synthesis Report of the Consultation Process for the WHS. Executive Summary

Funding and the localisation agenda	Supporting references
To appropriately address the complexity of essential urban services during protracted armed conflicts, local and international agencies (irrespective of whether they are 'developmental' or 'humanitarian') will require larger budgets that cover a longer period and that are easily switchable to respond to emergency needs if needed.	ICRC (2015) Urban Services During Protracted Armed Conflict (43)
The donor community can take a first step towards escaping this negative cycle by changing the way they provide funding to national governments. In accordance with aid effectiveness principles, providing resources via the state should be the preferred mechanism for the disbursement of development funds, promoting greater national capacity and ownership.	Oxfam (2013) Learning the Lessons: Assessing the Response to the 2012 Food Crisis in the Sahel to Build Resilience for the Future (31)
It was logical for Norway to support the Haitian Reconstruction Fund, and to return to more traditional bilateral aid when the mechanism went astray. The share of investment considered 'interim or transitional funding' was also innovative. Norwegian investment in the 'grey area' between disaster and development may become an example to follow as it successfully and effectively helped bridge response to development.	Particip GmbH (2015) Evaluation of Norway's Support to Haiti after the 2010 Earthquake
The Grand Bargain contains a list of commitments, including those oriented towards increased transparency and strengthening local and national responders, partnership and complementarity.	IASC TT and UN Working Group on Transitions (2016) CONCEPT NOTE: Joint Workshop on the Humanitarian, Development and Peace Nexus. October (1)

Funding reporting, including common metrics and duplicate reporting	Supporting references
In annual programme plans and appeals, encourage agencies such as UNHCR and OCHA to develop concrete indicators for transition and/or the achievement of durable solutions in partnership with national and local governments, beneficiaries, NGOs and donors. This could include a mix of quantitative and qualitative elements, such as food security indicators, school attendance and confidence in national or local administrations to address basic needs.	InterAction (2013) From Crisis to Recovery: Lost in Transition (14); Save the Children (2012) Evaluation of Humanitarian Access: Somalia Crisis 2011–12
Resilience will take root in organisations once they can establish a way of monitoring and quantifying financial allocations to initiatives that contribute to resilience outcomes. World Vision's experience suggests that far greater effort is required to establish common financial metrics that can be applied across all programmes, especially during a transition from community-level DRR to a wider multi-sectoral approach to resilience-building.	World Vision/ODI (2014) Institutionalising Resilience: The World Vision Story (iii); OECD (2012) Towards Better Humanitarian Donorship: 12 Lessons from DAC Peer Reviews



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Funding reporting, including common metrics and duplicate reporting	Supporting references
<p>Sida used partners to identify ways to move from a focus on programmatic detail to a more strategic approach based on promoting greater learning and strengthening the humanitarian system. The humanitarian unit made a creditable effort to develop a set of key humanitarian sector indicators in order to assure measureable results could be produced and reported. Sida has found these very useful in terms of communicating achievements, but less so in terms of measuring the quality of its assistance.</p>	<p>Tasneem Mowjee, Lydia Poole, Langdon Greenhalgh, Sarah Gharbi (2016) Evaluation of Sida's Humanitarian Assistance. Sida Decentralised Evaluation (3)</p>
<p>Non-standardised donor reporting requirements increase costs. NRC does not have Theories of Change, Logframes are standardised and baseline data is lacking. Logframes were developed using standardised targets and indicators, and focused mainly on outputs. Overall objectives and outcomes were expressed in ways that meant they could not be measured. The evaluation showed that NORCAP has a highly motivated management team and adequate policies, processes and practices, but that quality control mechanisms are inadequate and that inconsistent practices reduce the quality of the response.</p>	<p>Ternstrom Consulting AB (2013) Evaluation of Five Humanitarian Programmes of the Norwegian Refugee Council and of the Standby Roster NORCAP. Norad Report 4/2013; ICAI (2014) 'How DFID Learns: Report 34'</p>
<p>DFID is not learning enough from its partners and contractors. This needs to improve to increase the impact and value for money of UK aid. Regular opportunities for feedback and adaptation should be built in throughout the delivery chain.</p>	<p>ICAI (2014) 'How DFID Learns: Report 34'</p>

Availability of long-term financing for particular programming areas, including education, livelihoods and the environment	Supporting references
<p>While US humanitarian donors have generally allowed their partners flexibility to engage in transitional programmes, some NGOs reported that they were prevented from including more developmental components, such as capacity-building, in some instances. To cope with the unpredictable nature of funding, one NGO representative said, 'Recovery starts from day one and we begin planning immediately when funding is still available'. Other agencies noted the use of multiple funding sources to support broader transitional programmes, such as complementing an OFDA-funded humanitarian project with a peacebuilding component funded by the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation.</p>	<p>InterAction (2013) From Crisis to Recovery: Lost in Transition (11)</p>
<p>A 2015 OECD Fragile States report found that only 9% of official development assistance globally is dedicated to justice, security and legitimate politics.</p>	<p>Mercy Corps (2015) Building Community Resilience During Violent Conflict (8)</p>
<p>There was relatively generous support for food security and nutrition programmes in appeals, receiving 77% and 71% of requested funds respectively. However, critical but frequently neglected sectors received significantly less funding, including water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) (51%), early recovery (34%) and education (16%). Underfunding of the agricultural component of the food security sector meant that, by June 2012, 5.6 million people had not received the seeds, tools and fertiliser needed for the planting season. This meant that people affected by the crisis were not able to adequately prepare for the next harvest, further limiting their chances of recovery</p>	<p>Oxfam (2013) Learning the Lessons: Assessing the Response to the 2012 Food Crisis in the Sahel to Build Resilience for the Future (18)</p>
<p>One study in Kenya showed that resilience-building activities cost \$1bn less on average each year than a delayed humanitarian response.</p>	<p>Oxfam (2013) Learning the Lessons: Assessing the Response to the 2012 Food Crisis in the Sahel to Build Resilience for the Future (29)</p>

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Availability of long-term financing for particular programming areas, including education, livelihoods and the environment	Supporting references
Three donors (EU/EC, Norway, UK) have detailed policy white papers or working documents outlining their principles, goals and areas of focus related to education in emergencies: 'The only donor policy document found that establishes a firm funding target for humanitarian assistance to education is the Norwegian White Paper "Education for Development 2013–2014"'.	Save the Children/NRC (2015) Walk the Talk: Review of Donors' Humanitarian Policies on Education (8)
The way funding is structured 'overrides' concerns related to programming.	Maxwell, D. et al. (2010) <i>Food Policy</i> . Fit for Purpose? Rethinking Food Security Responses in Protracted Humanitarian Crises
Less than 2% of humanitarian aid goes to education; it is often too late and inadequate to cover needs.	WHS (2016) Education in Emergencies and Protracted Emergencies. Special Session Summary. May (1)

## RISK

Risk, including risk tolerance, concerns about aid diversion, and its effects (e.g. limiting innovation, collaboration)	Supporting references
<p>The African Risk Capacity (ARC) is a specialist agency of the African Union (AU) that pools risk across the continent by offering insurance against severe drought events with a frequency of one in five years to a maximum level of coverage of \$30 million per country per season, estimated through the Africa RiskView satellite system developed by WFP. ARC paid \$25m to Niger, Senegal and Mauritania in 2015.</p>	<p>CAFOD, FAO and World Vision (2016) Future Humanitarian Financing (28)</p>
<p>There is still insufficient understanding of the nature and scale of vulnerability and a reluctance to respond on the basis of risk. In the 2012 crisis, this contributed to different messages being given about the likely severity of the crisis. Some donors waited for more certainty before making firm commitments, and programming could have further integrated risk analysis and management.</p>	<p>Oxfam (2013) Learning the Lessons: Assessing the Response to the 2012 Food Crisis in the Sahel to Build Resilience for the Future (23)</p>
<p>Norway was a risk-willing donor in Haiti. The degree to which there were explicit knowledge bases to underpin Norway's decisions is unclear. The frequent field visits by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a Special Adviser helped create room for debate and flexible exploration of solutions to challenges, 'but the lack of systematic documentation and sharing of approaches is a lost opportunity'.</p>	<p>Particip GmbH. (2015) Evaluation of Norway's Support to Haiti after the 2010 Earthquake (xxi)</p>
<p>Annual reviews should include an assessment of the assumptions and risks set out in the Logframe and theory of change. DFID should work to tighten feedback and learning loops, to enable real-time adjustment of programmes. In its ongoing review of its risk management processes, DFID should explore how to achieve an explicit and balanced risk profile in its country programmes, including high-risk programming with the potential for transformative impact. High-risk interventions should be identified as such from the outset, with the rationale for action clearly stated, and then be subject to appropriate risk management arrangements.</p>	<p>ICAI (2015) DFID's Approach to Delivering Impact: Report (45)</p>
<p>A lesson from the response to the 2010–12 famine in Somalia, primarily related to cash-based programming, is the need for a more enabling environment for honesty and addressing mistakes; there is a 'need to be less punitive and more supportive of NGOs and UN agencies that take risks and publicly share their failures. Even if the cash response reveals a significant flaw in the implementation, including diversion, fraud, or poor targeting', NGOs should not be penalised for responding when many would not.</p>	<p>Ali &amp; Gelsdorf (2012) Risk-averse to Risk-willing: Learning from the 2011 Somalia Cash Response, Global Food Security (62)</p>
<p>The intersection of politics, humanitarian response and financing. The strategy of Western donors towards the Somalia famine was shaped by the war on terror, and 'inadequate funding was a direct and inevitable consequence of donor anti-terror legislation. So was the failure to provide an enabling legal environment for humanitarian agencies to operate without the threat of prosecution'.</p>	<p>Seal &amp; Bailey, A. (2013) The 2011 Famine in Somalia: Lessons Learnt from a Failed Response?, Conflict and Health (3)</p>
<p>'Prior to famine being declared, humanitarian agencies failed to raise the alarm or appeal for funds on the basis that it was politically unrealistic to do so given donor policies towards Somalia'</p>	<p>Seal &amp; Bailey, A. (2013) The 2011 Famine in Somalia: Lessons Learnt from a Failed Response?, Conflict and Health (3)</p>
<p>Diversion is a critical issue. The author asserts that: 'Out of \$250 million of humanitarian aid to Biafra, it was estimated that 15 per cent was directly spent on military items', and that their reputation was of greater concern to humanitarian actors than the military using their aid, an attitude not unique to the Biafra crisis.</p>	<p>Montclos (2009) Humanitarian Aid and the Biafra War: Lessons Not Learned, Africa Development (74)</p>

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→ RISK

Risk, including risk tolerance, concerns about aid diversion, and its effects (e.g. limiting innovation, collaboration)	Supporting references
<p>Need to assess the effects of aid in a war economy, considering both the impact of humanitarian organisations on alleviating suffering, and organisations' political role in sustaining conflicts. The author asserts that 'Like transnational corporations, non-governmental and governmental relief organizations need to exercise social responsibility in war economies'.</p>	<p>Montclos (2009) Humanitarian Aid and the Biafra War: Lessons Not Learned, Africa Development (74)</p>
<p>Early and sustained engagement on prevention and peacebuilding in conflict-prone countries has been undermined by low risk tolerance and demand for short-term, quantifiable results.</p>	<p>UNSG (2016) 'One Humanity: Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit' A/70/709, 2 February (Para 29)</p>
<p>Coordination needs to be stepped up. Humanitarian–development coordination is not a risk to humanitarian principles. While in many circumstances humanitarian actors will need to preserve an independent monitoring of the life-saving response, in most situations this will not be incompatible with developing collective indicators for results that link to the longer-term goals and targets of Agenda 2030'.</p>	<p>UN, World Bank and CIC (2016) Think Piece: After the World Humanitarian Summit: Better Humanitarian–Development Coordination for Sustainable Results on the Ground. June (17)</p>

## INNOVATION AND LEARNING

Innovation and learning	Supporting references
<p>SG recommends creating a new international joint platform for financing protracted crises – with UN, international and regional institutions. Offer different windows of financing for different types of interventions/programmes but based on comparative advantage at a particular time and context. Again, ensuring financing is fit for the job – not making interventions fit the financing available. Windows could include specific targeting of local actors (to address this prolonged gap), and for innovation to ensure adequate investment in research and trials of new approaches to address long-term challenges.</p>	<p>UNSG (2016) 'One Humanity: Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit' A/70/709, 2 February (Para 127)</p>
<p>Five principles for enhancing education in protracted crises: 1) Start with strong contextual analysis that looks at access, quality and protection; 2) Avoid establishing parallel structures; 3) Mobilise predictable medium- to long-term financing that flows through an agreed coordination structure; 4) Prioritise protection, education access and quality in the response.; 5) Build evidence and data on impact and invest in innovation.</p>	<p>DFID/UNICEF (2015) Delivering Quality Education in Protracted Crises: A Discussion Paper. March</p>
<p>Humanitarian learning rarely goes beyond the human lifespan/memory of the current generation of humanitarians.</p>	<p>Taithe &amp; Borton (2016) History, Memory and 'Lessons Learnt' for Humanitarian Practitioners, European Review of History.</p>
<p>Lack of effective learning: humanitarian and development actors largely know what to do but are not systematically capturing and institutionalising how, when and where to replicate successes and go to scale.</p>	<p>FAO and World Bank (2014) Making the Links Work: How the Humanitarian and Development Community Can Help Ensure No One Is Left Behind. 9 December (2)</p>

## POLICY

	Supporting references
<p>Successful humanitarian interventions today share a number of elements that were missing in earlier, unsuccessful missions. Interventions that respond the quickest to unfolding events protect the most lives, highlighting the importance of early warning indicators and immediate action, with the international community learning from Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia that it needs ‘access to enough military power and diplomatic muscle to <i>back up a credible commitment to protecting civilians</i>’. Intervening governments must be sensitive to inevitable opposition from domestic constituencies, designing interventions that can withstand pressure for ‘<i>early exits</i>’. Legitimate humanitarian interventions must also be supported by a broad coalition of international, regional and local actors. Multilateral interventions ‘<i>convey consensus about the appropriateness of the operations, distribute costs, and establish stronger commitments for the post-intervention transitions</i>’. The earliest phases of an intervention must also include planning for a transition strategy with ‘<i>clearly delineated political and economic benchmarks</i>’, in order for international and local authorities to focus on the longer-term <i>challenges of reconstruction, political reconciliation, and economic development</i>.</p>	<p>Western &amp; Goldstein (2011) Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age, Foreign Affairs</p>
<p>When conflicts are protracted and intractable, it often appears easier for the international community to invest in humanitarian responses than in concerted efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts.</p>	<p>UNSG (2016) ‘One Humanity: Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit’ A/70/709, 2 February (Para 27)</p>
<p>Capacity to analyse and monitor situations that may result in humanitarian crises is insufficient and often not sustained, leading to a failure to act on early warning signs.</p>	<p>UNSG (2016) ‘One Humanity: Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit’ A/70/709, 2 February (Para 27)</p>
<p>Political leadership tends to be triggered only once a humanitarian situation has deteriorated, and is motivated by ‘<i>immediate, narrowly defined national security and economic interests</i>’.</p>	<p>UNSG (2016) ‘One Humanity: Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit’ A/70/709, 2 February (Para 28)</p>
<p>The international community suffers from a lack of the political focus and attention needed to respond to multiple crises at different stages at the same time.</p>	<p>UNSG (2016) ‘One Humanity: Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit’ A/70/709, 2 February (Para 40)</p>
<p>Global leaders need to take far greater ownership of political solutions to conflicts and to preventing new ones, working nationally, regionally and through their membership of the United Nations.</p>	<p>UNSG (2016) ‘One Humanity: Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit’ A/70/709, 2 February (Para 27)</p>
<p>The Security Council must overcome its divisions and move from being a predominantly conflict-management body to one that is actively engaged in conflict prevention. Earlier and more unified action by the Council could be a decisive factor in preventing and quickly de-escalating crises and saving lives. The Council should embrace risk analysis earlier and bring its leverage to bear to defuse tensions, urge restraint and open up space for dialogue before positions solidify, often with disastrous consequences.</p>	<p>UNSG (2016) ‘One Humanity: Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit’ A/70/709, 2 February (Para 36–37)</p>
<p>Displacement approaches need to shift from ‘<i>managing displacement in situ</i>’ to securing durable solutions, including interim solutions.</p>	<p>UNSG (2016) ‘One Humanity: Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit’ A/70/709, 2 February (Para 44)</p>

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	Supporting references
The 2030 Agenda, the Sendai Framework, the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the World Humanitarian Summit present an opportunity to leave institutional divides behind. It is time to focus on demand rather than the provision of supplies, and on collective outcomes and comparative advantage, rather than projecting delivery and 'mandates first'.	UNSG (2016) 'One Humanity: Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit' A/70/709, 2 February (Para 125)
Working towards agreed collective outcomes over a multi-year time horizon is necessary to transcend the humanitarian–development divide. The comparative advantage of each actor must be exploited in order to go beyond simply 'coordination' to working collectively to achieve shared outcomes.	UNSG (2016) 'One Humanity: Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit' A/70/709, 2 February (Para 130)
The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the Peace Operations and Peacebuilding Reviews, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development, the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, the COP 21 Climate Conference, the World Humanitarian Summit and the Summit for Refugees and Migrants are all major international mechanisms which, when taken together, should be used to address the humanitarian–development nexus.	IASC TT and UN Working Group on Transitions (2016) CONCEPT NOTE: Joint Workshop on the Humanitarian, Development and Peace Nexus. October (1)
Humanitarian crises are not short-term, isolated events, but are often either ' <i>manifestations of governance failures or more structural and complex environmental or socio-economic developments</i> '.	UN, World Bank and CIC (2016) Think Piece: After the World Humanitarian Summit: Better Humanitarian–Development Coordination for Sustainable Results on the Ground. June
Key policy and practical questions relating to the humanitarian and development nexus include 1) Is closer collaborations feasible and compatible with humanitarian principles? 2) What do collective outcomes, multi-year approaches and working on the basis of comparative advantage mean in practice? 3) What is needed to implement the major shift in approach articulated at the WHS?	UN, World Bank and CIC (2016) Think Piece: After the World Humanitarian Summit: Better Humanitarian–Development Coordination for Sustainable Results on the Ground. June
The humanitarian–development nexus in practice can be seen as a spectrum of collaboration from information-sharing to joint actions/programmes. The nature of the collaboration depends on the context (i.e. the stage of the conflict) and the role and nature of national government (i.e. conflict party, receipt of development funding). The increasing number of protracted crises offers greater scope for collaboration between these actors, with more joint analysis, strategising and even programmes.	UN, World Bank and CIC (2016) Think Piece: After the World Humanitarian Summit: Better Humanitarian–Development Coordination for Sustainable Results on the Ground. June
Any potential negative impact of collaboration between humanitarian and development actors on humanitarian principles can be minimised by context analysis and application of the principle of ' <i>do no harm</i> '. They must achieve a balance between engagement with national government and maintaining principles in the delivery of humanitarian response: ' <i>too little reliance on national or local institutions may undermine the development of local rights-respecting systems, while too much may hurt populations of concern and discredit gradual national institution strengthening</i> '.	UN, World Bank and CIC (2016) Think Piece: After the World Humanitarian Summit: Better Humanitarian–Development Coordination for Sustainable Results on the Ground. June (Para 14)
Humanitarian and development actions can converge around the need to prevent, prepare for and respond to crises, particularly with regard to the most vulnerable and at-risk populations. This is the basis for focusing on collective outcomes.	UN, World Bank and CIC (2016) Think Piece: After the World Humanitarian Summit: Better Humanitarian–Development Coordination for Sustainable Results on the Ground. June (Para 15)
The transition from emergency relief to post-crisis recovery and development is rarely linear, with effective emergency responses helping to protect hard-won development gains by meeting immediate needs in a manner that also builds the basis for longer-term development. Development planning must be as sensitive to risks as humanitarian planning is, and be responsive to sudden shocks and changes in the needs of vulnerable populations.	UN, World Bank and CIC (2016) Think Piece: After the World Humanitarian Summit: Better Humanitarian–Development Coordination for Sustainable Results on the Ground. June (Para 14)

	Supporting references
Displacement is where humanitarian and development actors particularly converge, and where the positives of joint action can be most evident.	World Bank (2016) Forcibly Displaced: Toward a Development Approach Supporting Refugees, the Internally Displaced and Their Hosts. Advance Edition
The so-called gap between humanitarian responses and development cannot be filled with a new construct, programme or project, but must be closed by the agendas becoming complementary and mutually reinforcing to serve common goals.	FAO and World Bank (2014) Making the Links Work: How the Humanitarian and Development Community Can Help Ensure No One Is Left Behind. 9 December (3)
A lack of integration across sectors, in terms of strategies, policies and implementation, has long been perceived as one of the main pitfalls of previous approaches to sustainable development. An insufficient understanding and accounting for positive opportunities to integrate across sectors has resulted in incoherent policies, adverse impacts of development policies focused on specific sectors on other sectors, and ultimately in divergent outcomes.	UNECOSOC (2016) Conference Room Paper: Implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Through Policy Innovation and Integration. May
Providing education in protracted crises is hindered primarily through unpredictable and fragmented finance that is not aligned to the needs of the school system. In addition, the current aid architecture is not delivering targeted and coordinated assistance, and politics and policies matter but are often not prioritised in a crisis.	DFID/UNICEF (2015) Delivering Quality Education in Protracted Crises: A Discussion Paper. March
Norway provided substantial support to the 'Education Cannot Wait' initiative at the WHS, which arose from the Oslo conference in 2015. The initiative constitutes five key aspects: inspire political commitment so that education is viewed by governments and funders as a top priority during crises, plan and respond collaboratively with a particular emphasis on enabling humanitarian and development actors to work together on shared objectives, generate and disburse additional funding to close the US\$8.5 billion funding gap needed to reach the 75 million children and youth affected by crises, strengthen capacity to respond to national and local crises to improve the ability to coordinate activities and deliver learning in the hardest-to-reach areas, and improve accountability in the humanitarian and development systems by sharing knowledge and collecting more robust data in order to make better-informed investment decisions.	WHS (2016) Education in Emergencies and Protracted Emergencies. Special Session Summary. May (1)
Sustainable programming should ' <i>build hope and solutions</i> ' for people in new or prolonged crises through collective action by humanitarian and development actors to ' <i>strengthen resilience by investing in preparedness, managing and mitigating risk, reducing vulnerability, finding durable solutions for protracted displacement, and adapting to new threats</i> '.	UN/WHS (2016) Restoring Humanity: Global Voices Calling for Action: Synthesis Report of the Consultation Process for the WHS. Executive Summary
Humanitarians risk tending to focus on short term goals only, failing to recognise the protracted nature of displacement, whilst development actors tend to focus on the host communities, but not on the long-term needs of the displaced themselves.	World Bank, DFID, UNHCR (2016) Forum on New Approaches to Protracted Displacement: Co-hosts Summary Statement. April
The Wilton Park Principles, developed at the forum, included the need to work through local and national systems, support local communities and build social cohesion, enable economic participation and stimulate growth, provide impactful and innovative financing, and improve the data and evidence base of humanitarian responders.	World Bank, DFID, UNHCR (2016) Forum on New Approaches to Protracted Displacement: Co-hosts Summary Statement. April



# Acronyms and abbreviations

<b>3RP</b>	Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan	<b>IET</b>	International Evaluation Team	<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>ALNAP</b>	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action	<b>IOB</b>	Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (Government of the Netherlands)	<b>UNOCHA</b>	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
<b>AU</b>	African Union	<b>IOD</b>		<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>CAFOD</b>	The Catholic Agency for Overseas Development	<b>PARC</b>	International Organisation Development Ltd.	<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme
<b>CIC</b>	Center on International Cooperation	<b>IRC</b>	International Rescue Committee	<b>WHS</b>	World Humanitarian Summit
<b>CMI</b>	Chr. Michelsen Institute	<b>MDGs</b>	Millennium Development Goals		
<b>DAC</b>	Development Assistance Committee	<b>MSF</b>	Médecins Sans Frontières		
<b>DFAT</b>	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Government of Australia)	<b>NCA</b>	Norwegian Church Aid		
<b>DFID</b>	Department for International Development (Government of the UK)	<b>NCG</b>	Nordic Consulting Group		
<b>DRC</b>	Danish Refugee Council	<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental organisation		
<b>DRC</b>	Democratic Republic of Congo	<b>Norad</b>	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation		
<b>ECOSOC</b>	United Nations Economic and Social Council	<b>NOU</b>	Norges Offentlige Utredninger		
<b>EXCOM</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Executive Committee	<b>NRC</b>	Norwegian Refugee Council		
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organisation	<b>ODI</b>	Overseas Development Institute		
<b>HPG</b>	Humanitarian Policy Group	<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development		
<b>IASC</b>	Inter-Agency Standing Committee	<b>PHAP</b>	International Association of Professionals in Humanitarian Assistance and Protection		
<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee of the Red Cross	<b>SDGs</b>	Sustainable Development Goals		
<b>ICVA</b>	International Council of Voluntary Agencies	<b>UNDG</b>	United Nations Development Group		
<b>IDP</b>	Internally displaced person	<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme		
		<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees		

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