




# **Building Blocks for Peace**

## An Evaluation of the Training for Peace in Africa Programme

Report 6/2014 Annex 2-6



Norad  
Norwegian Agency for  
Development Cooperation

Postal address  
P.O. Box 8034 Dep. NO-0030 OSLO  
Visiting address  
Ruseløkkveien 26, Oslo, Norway

Phone: +47 23 98 00 00  
Fax: +47 23 98 00 99

Photo Ken Opprann

ISBN: 978-82-7548-744-3

## **Annex 2 - 6**



## 2: Profile and Overview of Training for Peace 1995-2010

The decision to establish TFP originated in discussions between the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in 1994. It followed an emerging emphasis within the UN to work with regional organisations in peacemaking as well as a Norwegian wish to engage with the new South Africa. Following a fact-finding mission to South Africa in 1995, two South African NGOs – the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) (then named Institute for Defence Policy) and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) - were selected as partners in Southern Africa. Together with NUPI as coordinating partner they were responsible for implementing the programme with funding from MFA.<sup>1</sup>

### *Phase 1: 1995-2001*

The objectives of TFP, as spelled out in the first project document, included:

- contribution to the building of regional capacities for participation in peacekeeping operations through delivery of training programmes in SADC countries;
- provision of training to personnel from Defence, Foreign Affairs and NGOs in the region in these countries;
- develop knowledge of peacekeeping and conflict management through seminars and workshops; and
- promotion of policy development in peacekeeping.

ISS and ACCORD held a range of seminars and workshops and developed a strong capacity to do further work and training in this area. Facilitated by the TFP partners as well as the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare a number of people from Southern Africa also attended UN training courses in Norway and in other Nordic countries.

NUPI played a key role in the early years in transferring knowledge of peacekeeping to the partners in South Africa. They also provided lecturers -including staff from the Norwegian Police Directorate/Police Academy as well as the Norwegian Defence Force - to most of the workshops. The first workshops can best be described as introductory “awareness” seminars familiarising participants with peacekeeping issues.

Over time, and in conjunction with other initiatives outside of TFP, ISS and ACCORD developed significant capacity as African non-governmental organisations engaged in the peace and security sector. A division of labour also crystallised with ISS focusing more on the police and ACCORD on

---

<sup>1</sup> The main sources of information in this overview are L. C. Andresen et al., *The Project “Training for Peace in Southern Africa”*, Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2000 (*Evaluation Report 3/2000*); M. C. Goulding et al., *Review of the Training for Peace in Southern Africa programme*, 16 August 2004 (unpublished review commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs); Elling N. Tjønneland & Chris Albertyn, *Navigating Complexity. A Review of Training for Peace in Africa, Commissioned by Norad, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy of Norway in Pretoria*, Oslo: Norad 2010 (*Norad Collected Reviews 2/2010*); and Training for Peace in Africa, *An Overview of the Training for Peace Programme, 1995-2008*, n. p. (Oslo), n. d. (2009). Additional data are derived from the TFP website, [www.trainingforpeace.org](http://www.trainingforpeace.org) and project documents.

civilians. In 1998 ISS launched training courses for the police and in 1999 ACCORD launched its first training courses in civil-military coordination and conflict management.

The partners also produced a range of publications and undertook activities seeking to contribute to policy development, especially in relation to South Africa's emerging peacekeeping policies, but also at the regional level and the evolving SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation.

### *Phase 2: 2002 – 2005/6*

An independent evaluation in 2000 recommended a continuation of the programme. A new programme document covering the 2002-2005 period was finalised and funding was provided for a second phase.<sup>2</sup> The project document defined the overall objective of TfP as being to

- contribute to state and human security in the SADC area through the establishment of a self-sustaining, multifunctional peacekeeping and peace-building capacity in the region.

Furthermore, a specific objective focused on the provision of advice to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in the formulation of policies for peacekeeping, peacebuilding and reconciliation issues relevant to co-operation between Southern Africa and Norway.

The project document identified two key outputs from the second phase:

- a substantial pool of trained people who are ready to participate in peacekeeping operations; and
- a self-sustaining, multifunctional peace operations/peacekeeping training capacity in the SADC region.

The main activities would remain training; research; and policy development, publicity and information. In the preparation for the second phase it was considered to invite a fourth partner, the regional police organisation (SARPPCO) based in Harare, but due to the evolving political situation in Zimbabwe it was decided to drop that proposal. It was envisaged that a fourth partner would be identified in the first year. The evaluation report had suggested the involvement of NGOs in Zimbabwe.

Specialised training programmes were further developed. ISS provided its police training in close co-operation with SARPPCO while ACCORD provided its civilian peacekeeping and peacebuilding courses. ISS and ACCORD also provided lecturers to training courses organised by others, including courses targeting military officers such as the South African War College and the Southern African Defence and Security Management Programme (SADSEM).

In 2003 an agreement was concluded between TfP and the Zimbabwe-based African Civilian Response Capacity for Peace Support Operations (AFDEM) (then SAFDEM) whereby AFDEM would maintain a database – a stand-by roster – of trained civilians available for deployment in peace support missions. AFDEM was also funded from Norway and in the early days also from Canada, but outside the TfP-

---

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Training for Peace in Southern Africa 2002-2005, Programme document*, Oslo: NUPI n. d. (unpublished).

budget. AFDEM was based in Bulawayo and was managed as a project within the Legal Resources Foundation. It was conceived as an African-owned and African-managed parallel to the Northern/Norwegian rosters such as the Norwegian Refugee Council's NORCAP roster.

This period saw a major expansion of ISS' and ACCORD's activities in Sub-Saharan Africa with both opening offices in other countries. TFP was one of several components in their activities on the continent. The evolution of the African Union's African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) also provided new opportunities and new demands. In particular the AU decision to develop an African Standby Force (ASF) was to have important implications for the direction and focus of TFP.

MFA commissioned a mini-review of TFP in 2004. Following their recommendations and a subsequent report from NUPI it was decided in 2005 to expand TFP to West Africa and to invite the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana to become a new partner. KAIPTC was a Ghanaian institution owned by the government through the Ghana Armed Forces. A pilot phase was envisaged. Shortly thereafter the original TFP partners also recommended that TFP be extended to cover the whole of Africa (for practical purposes Sub-Saharan Africa). This was later approved by MFA.

### *Phase 3: 2007-2010*

In 2006 the MFA decided to extend TFP for a new phase, but made a number of changes and adjustments. These included:

- TFP should have a stronger focus on AU and the evolving ASF; and
- MFA's strategic and political management of the programme should be strengthened.

The financial frame should stay the same (NOK 15 million per year to the four partners), but it was also stated that additional funding may be allocated from 2007 for activities that could strengthen the civilian dimension -including policing - of peace support missions.

Changing management structures delayed the start-up. Bridging funding was provided for 2006 and 2007 while the third phase – now covering the 2008-2010 period – was prepared. Furthermore, at the end of 2007 MFA – as a result of growing demand for training, especially of police personnel to the UN/AU hybrid mission in Darfur (UNAMID) – decided to expand the framework to NOK 23 million in 2008. In addition it decided upon an increased TFP focus on East Africa with funding provided directly to Eastern Africa Regional Standby Force Coordinating Mechanism (EASFCOM), the Secretariat of the Eastern African Standby Force – the Regional Mechanism set up by the AU to facilitate the provision of a regional standby force from that region to the African Standby Force.

The programme document for the third phase became available as a programme framework document in May 2008.<sup>3</sup> It was prepared by MFA based on applications from each of the four partners. It stated that the

*“overall goal of the TFP programme is to promote peace through improved and self-sustaining African civilian and police capacity for the management and*

---

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Training for Peace in Africa, Phase 3: 2008-2010, Programme Framework* (22.05.08) (unpublished).

implementation of peace operations and peacebuilding missions in Africa, adapted to the emerging African security architecture.”

The needs and priorities of the African Union (AU), Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and other regional mechanisms, as well as that of the United Nations in Africa, inform the direction and strategies of the TFP Programme. The programme focus is on the operationalization of the civilian and police components of the African Standby Force (ASF), and on contributions to the development of an operational ASF roster with a pool of trained civilian capacities. Both training and policy development should focus especially on support to the AU, RECs and African states in developing the ASF. The civilian and police capacity developed for the ASF are also intended to benefit United Nations peace operations in Africa.

The *purpose* is to contribute to strengthening African capacities for effective integration of civilian and police dimensions in African peace operations and peacebuilding missions. In order to achieve this, the programme aims at delivering capacity-building training, research and policy development support that serves to enhance the efforts of the AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in building African capacities for peace missions under UN or AU auspices by focusing on the following *key objectives*:

- Contributing to building stronger regional police training capacity, including a flexible and significant pool of police trainers, to cope with the raising demands for mission specific police training in Africa;
- Contributing to building a reliable regional stand-by capacity of civilian experts for peacekeeping missions and peacebuilding elements of the African security architecture, including AU PSOD [Peace Support Operations Division] and relevant sections in the regional communities/mechanisms;
- Advocate and support the development of the ASF civilian dimension;
- Contributing to the creation of a common language and common culture of peacekeeping and peacebuilding on the continent that will serve to support collective approaches to security, peace support operations, conflict management; and
- Promoting policy development and innovate ideas from both within and outside the continent so as to improve the understanding, organization and conduct of peace support operations in the African region.

“The Programme shall strive for cost-effective, demand-driven and sustainable approaches. This also implies an increased focus on cooperation and coordination with international and regional organisations, in particular the UN and AU. Also, TFP partners should cooperate actively on training issues and programs. The partners should strive to follow up and implement UNSC Resolution 1325. Gender and HIV/AIDS dimensions should be incorporated at all levels where relevant.”

The main programme *outputs* identified in the programme framework consist of training of civilian and police peacekeeping and peacebuilding personnel, applied research and policy development and public outreach.



In the third phase a main focus of ISS has remained on training of police, especially through the delivery of police pre-deployment and train-the trainer courses through the regional police organisations in SADC and Eastern Africa. Training on HIV/AIDS and Violence and Women and Children were also provided through SARPCCO. ISS also began developing a database of police personnel trained through ISS courses. ISS also sought to provide technical support to policy development at the AU, EASFCOM and SADC.

ACCORD shifted its training to in-mission and mission-specific training in UN and AU missions. It also concentrated on technical support to the AU in developing policies and capacities on the role of civilians in peace support missions, on staffing requirements and in development of policies and guidelines for civilian rosters for the African Standby Force.

NUPI's role in the third phase primarily revolved around research, including being a focal point for joint research projects, as well as being in charge of the information strategy, website and TfP-branding. They also do advisory work for MFA, especially in relation to UN.

KAIPTC provided police pre-deployment training courses, mainly for UNAMID, as well as applied research and advisory work on broader security issues in West Africa. The TfP programme funding to KAIPTC is channelled through the KAIPTC research department. Additional core funding was provided to KAIPTC by the Norwegian embassy in Abuja - through the Embassy office in Accra - from 2008-2009 to compensate for the funding crisis that KAIPTC experienced at the time. This paved the way for Norwegian core funding from 2010 for a five-year period being channelled through a joint financing agreement with Denmark and Sweden. This was core funding to the KAIPTC five-year strategic plan based on annual work plans. This core funding was also coming from the MFA's allocation to TfP and was provided in addition to the programme grant disbursed to the research department.

Eastern Africa also became a major new focus area for TfP-support with the coordinating secretariat (EASFCOM) of the Eastern Africa Standby Force as the main anchor. A TfP-funded Norwegian police commissioner was seconded to EASFCOM from 2008 and from 2009 TfP provided direct funding to EASFCOM, mainly for staffing in the police and civilian components.

The Norwegian police were also brought more directly into the programme in this phase. The Norwegian police history of engagement with TfP dates back to 1995. It played an important role through NUPI in facilitating transfer of knowledge to TfP partners in South Africa on the police dimension in peace keeping operations. Up until 2007 this was mainly through the Norwegian Police Academy. Since 2008 there has been a direct involvement by the Norwegian Police Directorate (POD) in TfP. The directorate has delivered instructors to TfP training programmes in West Africa and in Eastern Africa in addition to seconding a police commissioner to EASFCOM. POD is, together with EASFCOM, defined as a supporting partner in TfP.

The involvement of POD was closely linked to the expanded demand for training of police officers, especially pre-deployment training for missions in Darfur in Sudan (UNAMID) and Somalia (AMISOM). The Norwegian Police Directorate was brought into the programme to help manage the demand for pre-deployment training of police for UNAMID. Training was delivered in Nigeria (2008) and Ghana

(2009) through the national police agencies in those countries as well through KAIPTC (2009), in addition to training programmes through EASFCOM in Eastern Africa.

AFDEM continued to expand and maintain its database and civilian roster for civilians with Norwegian funding, but outside Tfp. It worked closely with ACCORD, in particular.

The third phase also saw a much stronger involvement by the MFA, both in the strategic management of Tfp and especially in relation to the UN. This was also crucial in facilitating the greater use of Tfp resources and the police directorate in pre-deployment training.

The Norwegian Embassy in Pretoria in cooperation with Norad and MFA commissioned a major review of Tfp in 2009. The review concluded in its assessment of the dominant Tfp activity, training, that the programme had succeeded in delivering highly relevant training activities and outputs. Tfp had also achieved significant outcomes, but these were found to be more uneven. The review noted an insufficient attention to monitoring and reporting results beyond the listing of outputs. This gap was found to be a weak link in Tfp programme management. Tfp was found to be institutionally under-developed in providing systems for monitoring, learning and developing from its own interventions. Furthermore Tfp did not have an overall strategic plan from which the programme could monitor and determine its overall impact. This weakened the effectiveness and efficiency of the programme, according to the review.

The 2010 review recommended a continuation of the programme, but also proposed a series of changes and adjustments to ensure that the programme can continue to make a relevant contribution. This included recommendations for:

- a more clearly defined focus and strategic framework for the programme; and
- stronger strategic and administrative management of the programme.

### **3: Data Capturing: Instruments, the Sample and a Further Note on Methods**

The ToR requested for impact assessment of training and suggested the use of tracer studies to assist in this. A tracer study would seek to trace the personnel who had participated in TfP training courses to see what impact the training had. They should be followed from training course admission to deployment in a peacekeeping mission and post-deployment. Furthermore, the ToR suggested the use of a comparison group of personnel who had not participated in TfP-supported training to help assess impact of training courses. The team was also invited to consider if the method for selecting trainees could be used to construct a control group or used in other ways to enable use of quasi-experimental methods in assessing impact.<sup>1</sup>

#### **Assessing impact of training: The tracer study**

The use of tracer studies and quasi-experimental methods turned out not to be feasible in practice with the data that was available and the team was able to collect. The team decided to focus on pre-deployment training of individual police officers. This is by far the dominant training component in the evaluation period with a total of 44 courses and 2700 trainees in the period from January 2010 to the end of 2013. This is nearly 75 percent of all those who have participated in a TfP-supported training course in this period. In addition, we attempted to assess the impact of driving course for female police officers and the train-the-trainer courses for pre-deployment training by examining the deployment and use of such trainees. In total these three types of courses accounted for nearly 90 percent of all those who have been trained with the support of TfP in the 2010-2013 period. The findings from the use of trainees are presented in Annex Four.

However, there was no pre-deployment training course planned for or taking place in the period between the submission of mid-way report in November and the planned date for the submission of the draft report in February. More importantly: The TfP partners were not in any substantive way involved in selecting participants for training. Nor do they systematically capture data on trainees after deployment, necessary for tracing of trainees in deployment and beyond. The team was able to collect some data on individual police officers from police contributing countries and from the missions visited, but this was not sufficient number for quasi-experimental analysis (see more on the data sample below). Partly because data on who has received and not received pre-deployment training turns out to be very patchy and is typically not captured by missions; and partly because of sensitivities related to any outside effort to capture data on uniformed personnel, especially when they are involved in violent conflicts.

#### **Structured Interviews**

Structured interviews lasting 40 minutes each were conducted with 107 current and former individual police officers: 36 were with the UN Mission in Liberia, 36 with former police in Ghana and 35 with former police in Rwanda. In addition we had two focus group discussions with a total of 12 police officers in the AU Mission in Somalia. An overview over those interviewed is provided in Annex Six.

---

<sup>1</sup> Quasi-experimental evaluation designs use statistical means to construct a comparison group, which, like the control group in a randomized control trial, has the same characteristics as the treatment group.

We used a structured interview format in the interviews with the police officers. A core set of questions was asked to all and some additional questions were added for returned police officers in Ghana and Rwanda. We originally considered distributing a survey either electronically or in hard copy, however we were advised that response rates to electronic surveys would not be sufficiently high. We also discounted a written questionnaire as we were concerned that different levels of English comprehension and written fluency would affect the fullness and usefulness of responses. We wanted a forum in which we could explain the questions to the police and to ask them closed as well as open-ended questions. We opted to conduct a structured questionnaire. We piloted this questionnaire in the UN mission in Liberia, refined it, and then used it in Ghana and Rwanda. The questionnaire focused on outcome areas covering reaction, learning (basic knowledge and skills), behaviour, attitudes and expectations, which we had identified as relevant from our key informant interviews and scoping visits to the missions in Somalia and Liberia. However, the questionnaires also gave room for police officers to highlight important areas that we had not identified as a key outcome area, and it is because of this that ‘respect for diversity’ emerged in our research as an important outcome area from the training. We stored our interview data in an excel database, allowing us to analyse both closed and open-ended questions using content analysis and data coding searching for key words and themes. The results of our content analysis are included in Annex Five. Our structured interview format is included below.

**The limits of comparison**

In Chapter Two we pointed out that use of comparison groups was not possible in this design. The findings from the interviews uncovered further reasons why this would be difficult. A number of other factors impact upon how a police officer in deployment performs. The ones observed are country of origin, age, seniority and previous mission experience. It is likely that there are other unobserved factors, such as the personal background of the police officer and degree of previous exposure to diversity.

However, the presence of police officers without such pre-deployment training in our sample has allowed us to capture perspectives of what impacts lack of such training had on them. It also proved very useful in our analysis of the contribution this training is making. For example, when we asked respondents to consider where they would rank pre-deployment training alongside other learning processes in building knowledge, skills and attitudes, we were able to build a picture of how police officers compensate for lack of training, and in which areas it is easier or harder to compensate.

The breakdown of police officers without pre-deployment training in our sample is provided in Table A3.1 below.

**Table A3.1**

***Police officers interviewed without pre-deployment training***

<i>Location</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Training</i>	<i>No pre-deployment training</i>
UN mission in Liberia	36 (13 women)	28	8
Ghana	36 (10 women)	20	16
Rwanda	35 (7 women)	30	5
AU Mission in Somalia	12 (2 women)	10	2

Information on who has received and who has not received pre-deployment training is not recorded by the missions.<sup>2</sup> The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations undertakes global surveys of all personnel deployed and captures global data on this. The 2008 survey found that 67 percent of police surveyed reported receiving pre-deployment training while the 2013 survey found that 70 percent of police had received such training.<sup>3</sup> We do not know how many of the around 2500 individual African police officers currently (early 2014) on deployment in missions in Africa have received pre-deployment training. It is generally believed to be a high proportion. Generally, the levels of pre-deployment training provided appear to remain insufficient in terms of the demand for deployment. This is further discussed in Chapters Four and Five.

Many of the police officers interviewed by the team had missed out on pre-deployment training because they were selected by missions for their specific skill, for example in engineering, immigration support or IT skills, interviewed and then quickly deployed. These police officers provided an interesting illustration of how police officers with significant professional experience may be at an advantage in overcoming lack of pre-deployment training. Some more junior officers had missed training because they were deployed too quickly.

Another important observation also revolves around what pre-deployment training is. While the UN has a standard curriculum (see more on this in Chapter Five) the training courses vary greatly in length (from a few days up to one month or more) and on the emphasis placed on individual modules in the curriculum. For some officers interviewed the training came before the Assessment Test by the UN or the AU (which has to be passed before deployment) and was then sometimes referred to as a “pre-SAT” (Selection Assessment Test) training. For others it came after the test. Some officers had received training before the current missions, but had previously been deployed without any training. This is a further reminder that pre-deployment training is contributing to preparing police officers for deployment alongside other variables.

**Measuring training outcomes**

How far along the results chain and how many dimensions of training outcomes will we be able to measure? One of the most established models for evaluating training is the Kirkpatrick ‘four level’ model.<sup>4</sup> We map our findings against the four levels in Annex Five.

**Table A3.2**

**Measuring training outcomes: The four levels**

Level	What is measured	Explanation
1	<b>Reaction</b>	Reaction evaluation is how the delegates felt about the training or learning experience.
2	<b>Learning</b>	Learning evaluation is the measurement of the increase in knowledge – before and after
3	<b>Behaviour</b>	Behaviour evaluation is the extent of applied learning back on the job – implementation.
4	<b>Results</b>	Results evaluation is the effect on the business or environment by the trainee.

<sup>2</sup> The team was informed that that UN mission in South Sudan was attempting to pilot such registration in 2013.  
<sup>3</sup> UNDPKO Integrated Training Service (2008) *Report on the Strategic Peacekeeping Training Needs Assessment*; & UNDPKO Integrated Training Service (2013) *Global Peacekeeping Training Needs Assessment, Final Report - 2012-2013*  
<sup>4</sup> Kirkpatrick, D.L. (1994). *Evaluating Training Programs: The Four Levels*, San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler.

Our evaluation questions and data collection tools aimed to cover the four levels, taking into account in our design that the outcomes are harder to capture in an unbiased way from one level to the next, with levels three and four being the hardest to capture accurately. We were not able to test the knowledge or behavior due to time constraints and sensitivities especially in missions. So our findings on learning and behavior and results are based on self-reporting by police officers, including questions on how they used their learning and how they acted differently as a result. It is clearly possible for such self-reporting to be biased, and we relied on variations between the responses, and police comments on their peers, and crucially on triangulation to address this. Many police officers were excessively positive about pre-deployment training, but when asked to explain what other factors contributed to their learning, skills and attitudes, gave a fuller picture of the other factors that played a part. Where police officers with and without pre-deployment training was in agreement on the impact (or its absence) we paid particular attention in our analysis. We triangulated responses on learning and behavior change with the opinions of managers in mission and in home police services. The results level of the evaluation is the hardest to capture, and we have used the strongest findings from our interviews with police officers, findings from other reports and the responses of senior managers to draw suggestive conclusions at this level.

**Interview guide**

The figure below reproduces the interview guide used in interviewing at the UN mission in Liberia and with returning police officers in Ghana and Rwanda.

**Fig. A3.1**

**Structured interview guide**

**Structured interview – this is the Ghana example. Questions 12, 13 and 14 were added for Ghana and Rwanda**

Date: \_\_\_\_\_ Number: \_\_\_\_\_

<b>A.</b>	<b>Name and rank</b>	
	<b>How many years in Ghana Police Service?</b>	
<b>B.</b>	<b>Gender</b>	1. Male 2. Female
<b>C.</b>	<b>Your current job description /function?</b>	
<b>D.</b>	<b>To which peace-keeping missions have you been deployed?</b>	
	<b>Where, When, How many months in mission?</b>	
	<b>What was the overall mandate of the mission(s)?</b>	
	<b>What was your key task/function in each deployment?</b>	
	<b>Was this a management position?</b>	
<b>E.</b>	<b>Did you attend a pre-deployment training course ahead of going on mission?</b>	
	<b>Who offered the course.</b>	

**How long before your deployment(s) did you undertake the course(s) - dates (month and year).**

If NO, go to question M.

F.	ii How long did the training course (s) last?	Less than 1 week (please specify) 1 week 2 weeks  More than two weeks (please specify)
J.	Thinking back on what was required for IPOs to be effective in the particular mission(s) you were deployed to, what :  a) was the most useful knowledge that PDT reinforced or provided you with?  b) the most useful or important skills that PDT further developed your capacity in?  c) the most important attitudes and values that were highlighted in pre-deployment	
K.	How relevant was the pre-deployment course you received in preparing you for the mission(s) you participated in?	
L.	<b>FOR THOSE WHO DID NOT RECEIVE PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING</b>  Why did you not receive pre-deployment training?  Please tick the relevant box	I was not offered pre-deployment training  I could not find an available course  I missed the course that I was supposed to attend  There were insufficient funds available  Other reason (please specify)
M.	<b>FOR THOSE WHO DID NOT RECEIVE PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING</b>  What is your opinion on how much more difficult it was for you in adjusting to the circumstances of the new mission because you did not receive PDT?  Do you think you would have benefitted from pre-deployment training? Did any colleagues in mission who had undertaken pre-deployment training share their knowledge with you?  How much more challenging were your induction training and first months in mission, compared to colleagues who did receive PDT?	

Can you tell me more about why you answered in this way?

The capacity of IPOs to perform their tasks in mission is a result of many factors in their past, including education, years of experience and also training courses. Can you help us understand which of the following three contributions to building your capacity were most influential for you – ranking which was most important, and second most important.

1. **The UN, how it works, its core values and peacekeeping principles:**  
For those with pre-deployment training:  
 A. Pre-deployment Training  
 B. Induction Training  
 C. In-mission experience  
For those without pre-deployment training:  
 A. Other Training (from your professional background)  
 B. Induction Training  
 C. In-mission experience
2. **Understanding the mission mandate and country history**  
For those with pre-deployment training:  
 A. Pre-deployment Training  
 B. Induction Training  
 C. In-mission experience  
For those without pre-deployment training:  
 A. Other Training  
 B. Induction Training  
 C. In-mission experience
3. **Communication, listening and mentoring skills**  
For those with pre-deployment training:  
 A. Pre-deployment Training  
 B. Induction Training  
 C. In-mission experience  
For those without pre-deployment training:  
 A. Other Training  
 B. Induction Training  
 C. In-mission experience
4. **Police reform and restructuring**  
For those with pre-deployment training:  
 A. Pre-deployment Training  
 B. Induction Training  
 C. In-mission experience  
For those without pre-deployment training:  
 A. Other Training  
 B. Induction Training  
 C. In-mission experience
5. **Report writing**  
For those with pre-deployment training:  
 A. Pre-deployment Training  
 B. Induction Training  
 C. In-mission experience  
For those without pre-deployment training:  
 A. Other Training  
 B. Induction Training  
 C. In-mission experience
6. **4x4 all-terrain Driving and Vehicle Check**  
For those with pre-deployment training:  
 A. Pre-deployment Training  
 B. Induction Training  
 C. In-mission experience  
For those without pre-deployment training:  
 A. Other Training  
 B. Induction Training  
 C. In-mission experience
7. **Do you have an opinion on the best methods or ways of running training courses?  
How well was your course presented?**
8. **What do you now think were the most useful modules or components of the pre-deployment course (s)?**



9.		What proved to be not relevant for you?
10.		If you were to change anything in the way courses are presented what would you change?
11.		Do you feel that pre-deployment training challenged or changed your beliefs or attitudes on any issues? Could you say more about that?
12.	Ghana and Rwanda only	Thinking back to the new knowledge, skills or attitudes you were introduced to during your pre-deployment training – is there anything from that training that is still relevant and useful to the work you are doing now in Ghana?  Is there anything in the way you carry out your duties back home that is different now, compared to how you did this before you went on international mission?
13.	Ghana and Rwanda only	Did you debrief with your superiors in training and/or deployment office after your return?
14.	Ghana and Rwanda only	Has your training and international peace-keeping experience helped you advance in your professional career back home? For example – have you become more specialized in a certain area, or have you received recognition or promotion due to your added training and international experience?
15.		What is your opinion on the value of pre-deployment training?  How well would you say that PDT prepares you to handle challenging situations in mission? (Can you think of a practical example)?  Do you think PDT helps IPOs get more out of their induction training? Why do you say this?

Other open-ended follow-up depending upon content offered

## The sample: A profile of the individual police officers interviewed

The tables below provide a profile of the samples interviewed in the UN Mission in Liberia, in Ghana, in Rwanda as well as the two focus groups interviews conducted at the AU Mission in Somalia

**Table A3.3**

### *Police officers interviewed in the UN Mission in Liberia*

UNMIL	Actual IPOs in Monrovia		IPOs interviewed							Pre-deploy trained		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Avg. years in police	Months in UNMIL	First deployment	Second deployment	Third deployment	In-country course	Out of country	None
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	13	7	4	4	19	5	8	0	0	8 (Zim Police)	0	0
<b>Zambia</b>	5	2	1	3	18	8	4	0	0	2 (Pearson)	0	2
<b>Uganda</b>	5	1	2	0	17	11	2	0	0	1 Uganda Pol	1 Nairobi	0
<b>Rwanda</b>	6	0	2	0	17	10	2	0	0	0	0	2
<b>Nigeria</b>	4	1	1	0	26	21	1	0	0	0	0	1
<b>Namibia</b>	2	2	1	0	11	19	1	0	0	1 Namibia / ISS	0	0
<b>Kenya</b>	8	2	5	2	15	10	7	0	0	2 Nairobi EAPTC	1 Stavanger Norway 3 Ethiopia Pol Academy	1
<b>Ghana</b>	6	8	4	4	19	11	6	2	0	6 KAIPTC	0	2
<b>Gambia</b>	7	0	3	0	18	15	0	2	1	3	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	56	23	23	13	17.5	10	31	4	1	23	5	8
			41.07%	56.52%						63.89%	13.89%	22.22%
			Of Monrovia IPOs									

**Table A3.4**

### *Police officers interviewed in Ghana*

Ghana	Total	With PDT	No PDT	1 mission	> 1 mission	AMIS OM	Bosnia	East Timor	Kosovo	UNAMID/AMIS	UNMIL	UNMIS/UNMISS
<b>Interviewed</b>	36	20	16	20	16	3	6	3	6	16	12	7
<b>Males</b>	26	13	13	15	11	3	4	2	5	10	9	6
<b>Females</b>	10	7	3	5	5	0	2	1	1	6	3	1
<b>Corporal/Sergt</b>	3	2	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
<b>Inspector/Chief Inspector</b>	13	6	7	5	8	1	4	2	2	6	5	1
<b>Assistant/Dep. Superint.</b>	8	4	4	5	3	1	1	1	1	2	3	3
<b>Superint./Chief Superintendent</b>	11	7	4	7	4	1	1	0	2	7	2	1
<b>Assistant Commander</b>	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0

**Table A3.5**

**Police officers interviewed in Rwanda**

Rwanda	Total	With PDT	No PDT	1 mission	> 1 mission	MINUSTAH	AMIS/ UNAMID	UNMIL	UNMIS/ UNMISS
<b>Interviewed</b>	35	30	5	32	3	4	23	4	7
<b>Males</b>	28	23	5	25	3	3	17	4	7
<b>Females</b>	7	7	0	7	0	1	6	0	0
<b>Sergeant/Senior Sergeant</b>	7	7	0	7	0	1	6	0	0
<b>Assistant Inspector/Inspector/Chief Insp.</b>	14	13	1	14	0	0	10	2	2
<b>Superintendent/Senior/Chief Superintendent</b>	13	9	4	11	2	3	6	2	4
<b>Commissioner</b>	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1

**Table A3.6**

**Focus Group 1: AU Mission in Somalia**

**(Police working in Headquarters)**

Respondent	Contingent	Gender	Time in mission	Previous mission experience	Pre-deployment training	Any extra info on professional background
1	Uganda	M	6m	No	Yes	Background dealing with conflict
2	Ghana	F	7m	No	Yes – KAIPTC 2 week course	Regional police commander
3	Ghana	M	7m	No	Yes KAIPTC 2 week course	Worked in training unit
4	Kenya	M	5 weeks	No	2 week course in Nairobi	Trainer in the police academy
5	Nigeria	M	6m	Yes, Cambodia and Haiti	Two courses: 2 week course in Elarabu Nigeria (2009) and 2 week course in HPSS in Nairobi	
6	Uganda	M	11m and about to leave	No	2 week course in HPSS in Nairobi	Previously worked on mission related training
7	Sierra Leone	M	7m	No	2 week course at a training	

school in  
Sierra Leone

**Table A3.7**

**Focus Group 2: AU Mission in Somalia**

(all respondents were mentoring Somali Police)

Respondent	Contingent	Gender	Time in mission	Previous mission experience	Pre-deployment training	Any extra info on professional background
1	Nigeria	M	7m	2009-2010 East Timor	Pre-deployment trained in the Peace-keeping centre in Abuja. Also in KAIPTC for a two week course June – July 2011. Also acted as a facilitator for UNPOL course in Nigeria with special focus on South Sudan in 2008 at which Norwegian police also taught. Very complimentary about this.	Involved in training of IPOs and FPU's in Nigeria.
2	Nigeria	F	7m	2008-2009 Sudan	KAIPTC for a two week course June – July 2011. Various other courses including a course on SEGBV in Canada.	As with 1, worked in the peace-keeping centre in Abuja.
3	Sierra Leone	M	6m	No	None – none offered	
4	Nigeria	M	9m	No	Two week UNPOL course in Abuja peacekeeping centre	
5	Kenya	M	2 weeks	No	None – missed the chance as needed to deploy quickly	Constable back home

## 4: Course Statistics and the Use of Trainees

The TfP documents do not enable us to arrive at precise figures on the numbers of personnel trained and the use of trainees. The team therefore had to rely on variety of sources to arrive at estimates presented in Chapter Four. Below we have summarized the sources of information and how we arrived at our conclusions.

### Training-of-trainer courses

The team attempted to assess the effectiveness of this training by examining the nine courses implemented by ISS in cooperation with the regional police organisations in Eastern and Southern Africa. However, neither ISS nor its partners have a consolidated list of the persons trained through these training-of-trainers (ToT) courses. We managed to put together such a list and arrive at a number of persons trained by examining the list of participants in each course.

Nor have ISS and the police organisations any record of the extent to which these trainers have been used. The team relied on several approaches to arrive at an estimate of the use. The bulk of the trainees are coming from the police contributing countries but there are also a few coming from member countries in the Eastern African Regional Police Chiefs Coordinating Organisation (EAPCCO) (e.g., the Seychelles) and SARPCCO (e.g., Mozambique, Lesotho) that are not contributing individual police officers to international missions. We note that 21 of the 46 participants at the most advanced regional clinic courses are coming from countries not deploying any police officers to peacekeeping missions in the period under review. Nor are these countries – we assume – providing any pre-deployment training although they are nominally responsible for pledging police to the standby forces.

We then looked at the delivery of pre-deployment courses by ISS. How many of the graduates did they use as instructors or facilitators? We examined the three pre-deployment courses that ISS conducted in Eastern Africa in the period: two in Rwanda and one in Uganda. The Uganda 2013 course used four instructors which according to the course report were certified regional trainers from the training-of-trainers courses. We found that two of these had participated in a this course in Kenya in August 2010, and two in the the course in Ethiopia in August 2011. None had participated in the 2012 training-of-trainers clinic course – the only course certifying regional trainers. The course in Rwanda in 2013 had five facilitators, one of which also was a facilitator at the 2013 Uganda course. Two had participated in the clinic course, one had participated in a regular training-of-trainers course only, and one had not participated in any of the training-of-trainers courses in the period (but may have done so before 2010). At the Rwanda 2012 course four facilitators were contracted. Three of them were also used in the other courses, while the last person was a graduate of the 2012 clinic course. In sum: Out of those 70 persons receiving training-of-trainers training in Eastern Africa in 2010-2013 a total of eight had participated as instructor/facilitator in a pre-deployment course. This includes three of the 16 graduates from the more advanced 2012 clinic course.

We have not been able to trace any course report or list of trainers used at the three other pre-deployment courses delivered by ISS in Southern Africa in the period - two in Namibia in 2010 and 2011, and one in Malawi in 2011. Since the bulk of the training-of-trainers may have taken place after

these pre-deployment courses were held we expect that the proportion of trainees used as trainers are even lower in the Southern Africa region.

We then attempted to get an indication of how many of those trained are used as trainers by others – by national or regional training institutions. We note for example that some countries in Southern Africa – South Africa and Zimbabwe in particular – are sending trainees to the training-of-trainers courses, but are not relying on TfP to help them deliver pre-deployment courses. Some of the graduates from the training-of-trainers courses may thus still have been used, but we did not have the resources and time to explore this. In Eastern Africa we looked at EASFCOM. EASFCOM in Nairobi is in quantitative terms the main provider of pre-deployment training in Eastern Africa. It also receives funding from TfP for its training. The team notes that the POD officer seconded to EASFCOM in almost every report to the MFA and Norwegian Embassy in Pretoria in the 2010-2012 period complained that he has failed to get access to the pool of trainers trained by the ISS. This has apparently now improved. The team was provided access to EASFCOM's 2013 pool of African trainers. The list contains 15 names. Four of them had received training-of-trainers training from ISS in the evaluation period. All of them are also on the list of facilitators used in the ISS' own training in Uganda and Rwanda in 2012 and 2013. We expect that several of the others have received this training from ISS before 2010. None of the graduates from the 2012 training-of-trainers clinic are on the 2013 list of EASFCOM trainers.

The team cannot be precise about the use the trainees from the training-of-trainers - courses. Based on the above it is however, very low. We estimate that perhaps not more than 5 – 10 percent of those trained have been used as instructors.

### **Pre-deployment training of police officers**

It is also difficult to arrive at precise figures on how many have received pre-deployment training with support from TfP. The figures provided in TfP documents were found to be incomplete and in some cases inaccurate. A major source of confusion is the definition of what counts as a "TfP supported" course. The team has included all courses that receive TfP support, either as a direct financial contribution or as a contribution of course instructors and/or facilitators from POD.

In the case of EASFCOM there is no funding for courses through the regular TfP grant, but funding has been provided on an annual and *ad hoc* basis. In 2010 the Embassy in Pretoria funded two courses with unspent funds from the TfP. In 2011 the Embassy funded one course, but drawn from funds outside TfP.<sup>1</sup> No funding was provided for courses in 2012 and 2013. POD provided instructors to all of these courses and to most other pre-deployment courses organised by EASFCOM in the evaluation period. The POD instructors would have delivered a proportion of the training modules, while other instructors funded by other means would have also delivered modules at the same training courses. We have not been able to find accurate figures for 2010, but assume that POD provided instructors to all nine EASFCOM courses that year. They provided instructors/facilitators to five of the six EASFCOM courses in 2011, to four courses in 2012 and three courses in 2013. We have relied on EASFCOM figures for course participants in 2010, and used internal POD reports for 2011, 2012 and 2013 (there are no POD reports from 2010). For a few courses we do not have a full list of participants or gender breakdown and have estimated the numbers based on average figures for other courses that year.

---

<sup>1</sup> The 2011 report from EASFCOM to the embassy says that Norway provided funding for two courses in 2011, but this may be because they split the funding and used it to co-fund two courses with other donors. The financial report provides no clarity on this.

Most EASFCOM training courses have been delivered through the Kenyan International Peace Support Training Centre, but in the latter half of period courses have also been delivered through police training schools in Rwanda and Ethiopia. All course participants are from member countries of EASF and in some cases also Tanzania which is not an EASF member, but belongs to SADC and takes part in the preparation for SADC's standby force. Some – in the early period – were also coming from West Africa (Ghana and Nigeria). A few officers from outside Africa – including two from Norway – have also participated. Non-African participants are excluded from the figures in Table 4.2 in Chapter Four.

ISS has delivered a total of six TfP-funded courses in the period. They have all been delivered to national participants in police contributing countries in Eastern and Southern Africa – in Uganda (one course), Rwanda (two), Namibia (two) and Malawi (one). They have all nominally been delivered in cooperation with the regional police organisations (EAPCCO and SARPCCO).

The TfP-courses at KAIPTC are, in the same manner as the support to EASFCOM courses, funded both directly and through the deployment of instructors from POD. In 2010 KAIPTC organised two courses. The 2010 work plan from POD says that they planned to send instructors to two courses at KAIPTC that year, but the team was unable to ascertain whether that was to the same courses that received TfP funding, or to two additional courses or whether this deployment actually took place. The reports in the Embassy-archives are better for subsequent years. In 2011 two courses were funded by TfP, one of them also had an instructor from POD while five only have contributions from POD instructors and no direct funding. For two courses we do not have data on participants and have estimated that this is 80 with 30 being females. For 2012 there were three courses with POD instructors, of which two were also funded by TfP. In 2013 POD provided instructors to one course and TfP funded two others.

In addition to these courses POD has with TfP-funding provided instructors to two police training courses in Ghana and Gambia.

Based on the above the team identified 44 pre-deployment courses as TfP-supported. They had a total of about 2700 participants. Of these more than 30 percent are females. There may be some overlap with the same participant having attended several courses, but we do not think that this is major problem in this period compared to earlier phases of TfP. The EASFCOM has a roster (database) of personnel they have previously trained and new applicants will be vetted against this to ensure that participants do not attend the same course twice. There is no vetting between the TfP partners and a participant in an EASFCOM course may have participated in an ISS course in East Africa. The team therefore checked the participants from Rwanda at the ISS courses against the list (where we had them) of courses by EASFCOM in Nairobi, Addis Ababa and Kigali. We found, with one exception, no cases of overlap.

TfP and its partners do not have any hard data on the deployment status of police officers they have trained. Course instructors, particularly at KAIPTC, have attempted to provide some estimates, based upon informal feedback, on the number of trainees that were deployed, but these are indicative and cannot be assumed to be accurate. POD instructors on the same courses also sometimes provide some views of deployment likelihood in their internal reports to POD, in some cases with lower estimates than those provided by KAIPTC instructors. We do however believe that the deployment rate may be substantial (60-70 percent or more) for the mission specific courses where KAIPTC delivers courses in police contributing countries (so called "mobile courses") to officers selected for deployment.

Examples include the training courses for Darfur delivered in Burkina Faso. For regional courses in Accra where participants fly in from different countries, it may be much less.

EASFCOM has provided estimates of deployment, but they are far from accurate. The last official figures from them available to the team is contained in an EASFCOM report to the Embassy in Pretoria in 2010 which estimates that 67 of those nearly 900 trained in the 2008-2010 period had been deployed to a mission by the end of 2010.<sup>2</sup> This is a gross underestimate. Anecdotal evidence indicates that a substantial number of those participating at the EASFCOM courses in the 2008-2010 period were deployed to missions in Darfur (UNAMID) and Somalia (AMISOM). An EASF seminar report from April 2012 states that the deployment rate is not known and that EASFCOM should approach member states to collect data and then feed it into the EASF roster.<sup>3</sup> The team believes that the figure may be substantially below 50 percent of those trained in the 2010-2013 period, also below the 40 percent figure which is sometimes mentioned in guesstimates. The figure is low also because EASFCOM offers training to member states such as the two Sudans, Comoros, the Seychelles and Somalia which do not deploy to any mission. Ten to 15 percent of those trained in the period may come from such countries. More importantly, a main function of the EASFCOM training is to ensure that EASF by 2015 has a trained standby force of 720 individual police officers available for deployment (see more on this in the discussion of rosters in Chapter Four). EASFCOM are not primarily focused on providing trained officers for on-going missions.

The figures for deployment of trainees from the KAIPTC and ISS courses are expected to be higher and possibly far more than 50 percent for many of the courses, especially those targeting officers selected for deployment to specific missions. Interviews by the team in Ghana and Rwanda, both major police contributing countries, suggest that a large majority of those trained are being deployed. Ghana police has a fairly good management and training system and ensures that most of those they are deploying have received pre-deployment training. They do not track the training provider and source of funding and cannot tell how many have been trained with support from TfP. Rwanda which is relatively new to this, but has quickly become a major provider of police officers for peace missions. Like most African countries Rwanda does not (yet) have a good system to provide integration of training and deployment, but one senior deployment officer interviewed estimated that 80 percent of those who had participated in the four ISS and EASFCOM courses in Rwanda had been deployed to Darfur.

The ISS reports from the two training courses in Namibia (in 2010 and 2011) – both mission specific courses for officers selected for deployment to the UN/AU mission in Darfur (UNAMID) – says that the officers they had trained failed to deploy because Khartoum refused to issue visas (refusal or delays in issuing visa for deployment to UNAMID have been a recurrent problem for many police contributing countries in recent years). However, they may have been part of a later group of Namibians successfully deploying to UNAMID (45 Namibian police were in deployment there in early 2014). During the team's data collection in Liberia the one Namibian police officer interviewed there turned out to be one of the trainees from an ISS course in Namibia.

---

<sup>2</sup> See letter to donors from EASFCOM's Director dated 16 November 2010 providing a report on police training activities in 2010.

<sup>3</sup> See the *Report of the EASF UNPOC Trainers Seminar, 2nd-3rd April, 2012, Nairobi, Kenya*, Nairobi: EASFCOM 2012 (unpublished, 6 pages)



There are no data available of the two POD-supported courses in Ghana and Gambia.

This makes it impossible to estimate how many of the 2700 officers trained have been deployed. Assuming that 30 percent of EASFCOM trainees, 55 percent of KAIPTC trainees, 60 percent of ISS trainees and 60 percent of the trainees from the two POD-supported courses have been or are in deployment we would arrive at a figure of about 1200, but this is just a guestimate. It can be lower and also much higher.

### **Driving courses for female police officers**

It has been a particularly challenging task to track down information about the driving course in Kenya. There is no mention of this in any of the POD reports and work plans to TfP. In EASFCOM's 2011 report there is one budget line which says that USD 50 000 is allocated for such a course. There is one line in the 2011 report which says that 45 female officers have participated in such a course, but no mention of where and when. Nor does it appear in the EASFCOM's list of training activities completed that year. However, in two 2011 email reports from the Norwegian police commissioner seconded to EASFCOM to the TfP managers at MFA and the Embassy in Pretoria dated 11 April and 6 July the story is revealed. POD offered up to USD 50 000 – presumably from the TfP grant - to Uganda for such a course. This would be channelled through EASFCOM. Uganda was unable to find a suitable 4x4 vehicle in Uganda and preferred to travel by air to Nairobi for the course. There were no funds for air travel and the Norwegian police commissioner then approached the Kenya police with the offer of funding for such a course (the formal letter is dated 28 March 2011 and is attached to the 11 April report). The letter says that the course is based on the Ghana course and that the Kenya police must prioritise those selected to the course for subsequent UN Selection Assessment Testing and then Kenya must prioritize those passing the test for deployment. The team has been unable to trace any documents providing reports from the course, or the subsequent fate of those trained



## 5: Training Impact - Findings from Interviews with Police Officers

Table A5.1 and Figures A5.1–A5.3 summarise the main findings from our structured interview data with police officers in the UN Mission in Liberia and with returning police officers in Ghana and Rwanda. In Table A5.1 the findings are mapped against the four levels of reaction, learning, behaviour and results in evaluating impact of training. Figures A5.1–A5.3 summarises the findings through result chains for learning, behaviour and expectations. See more on this in Chapter Two which discusses the methodology and in Annex Two which also provides data on the profile of the sample.

We also carried out content analysis of the most common themes and key words emerging from the interview data. They are summarised in Table A5.2.

Chapter Five provides an analysis of the main findings.

### Findings on reaction, learning, behaviour and results

**Table A5.1**  
**Summary of findings on training impact**

Level	Police foundation training outcome area				
	A Knowledge	A Skills	B Attitudes	C Expectations	D Relevance
Reaction	IPOs interviewed and who filled out TFP course evaluations were very complimentary about the way courses communicated key knowledge. The main objection was that the course duration was too short with too many modules crammed in.	IPOs interviewed and who filled out TFP course evaluations were very complimentary about the way courses were delivered. However, the short duration of courses was considered especially detrimental to the skills requiring practical exercises, particularly driving.	IPOs interviewed and who filled out TFP course evaluations were very complimentary about the way courses were delivered.	IPOs interviewed and who filled out TFP course evaluations were very complimentary about the way courses were delivered. We were unable to ascertain how stress management sessions were delivered, or how many mission specific sessions were held in every PDT course, but IPOs reported that the cumulative effect of the whole course prepared them for missions.	When asked to recall useful modules, IPOs listed a number, when asked what was not relevant, most IPOs said everything was relevant. There were exceptions, especially around the need to be mission specific, and more IPOs said PDT was not relevant in AMISOM.
Learning	PDT courses are delivering basic knowledge on the UN, its systems and peace-keeping principles, which IPOs do not have the opportunity to learn formally elsewhere	PDT teaches IPOs to write reports to UN standards and in UN templates, which they may not have encountered before. PDT is an important platform for teaching IPOs about 4 wheel drive vehicles, driving techniques for personal	PDT introduces IPOs to the concept of cultural diversity and the importance of respecting it. This is very new to some more junior IPOs who have never left home or been greatly exposed to different cultures from outside their own environment.	IPOs mention stress management aspects of PDT a lot although this is not a very large component of the course. Other modules are also mentioned in psychologically preparing IPOs for missions.	Few IPOs in UNMIL, Rwanda or Ghana felt learning was not relevant, some asked for sessions to be added on, for example, shooting. We received a strong message in AMISOM that PDT may not be relevant to AMISOM realities, an AU mission. Pre-deployment training needed more material

Behaviour

and road safety and difficult driving terrain.

on the AU and learning on Human Rights designed for community policing was not so relevant to AMISOM.

It is likely that IPOs of all levels of seniority and experience write better reports than they would without PDT in early deployment. However, professional experience may help IPOs to quickly catch up on reporting templates and existing language and drafting skills may be more important in the long run.

In early deployment, IPOs of all ranks may struggle to pass the driving test and to cope with driving without PDT. For many IPOs other training support and practice is also necessary to bring driving up to a sufficient standard for deployment.

IPOs report that they engage better with local police and populations as a result of being sensitised on respect for diversity. Previous professional experience and exposure to other cultures may make this easier. More senior IPOs report that this aspect of PDT is important in guarding against misconduct.

IPOs report that PDT has a tangible impact in reducing their stress in early deployment. PDT may add unique value in that it comes before IPOs have arrived. Those who did not receive PDT reported more stress on arrival.

Few IPOs in UNMIL, Rwanda or Ghana felt PDT was not focussing on the right behaviours. We received a strong message in AMISOM that PDT may not be relevant to AMISOM realities, an AU mission where IPOs were not getting out into communities

Results	It is difficult to test the effect on missions of PDT. However, IPOs with PDT are likely to be more able to put the specific mission into the wider context of UN peace-keeping.	It is difficult to test the effect on missions and home police services of PDT. However, PDT is one part of the process of deployment that teaches IPOs new skills in driving and report writing which may still be relevant to them when they return home. For report writing, adequate existing qualifications may determine how well police can pick up this skill.	It is difficult to test the effect on missions of PDT. Adequate previous professional experience and skills, and the management of performance and conduct in mission may have as much impact on the way IPOs conduct themselves vis-à-vis local populations.	We have not been able to test psychological or physiological welfare of IPOs but there is definitely a value to be placed on IPO welfare and stress reduction, even if this is self-reported.	PDT may save time and reduce stress for all IPOs who are selected for deployment currently, regardless of whether those selected have the right professional skills and experience for deployment. However to maximise the impact of police in mission, selection of IPOs with the right skills and experience may be more important.
	PDT saves IPO time in delivering information which they would otherwise have to catch up on informally.	PDT may save IPO time in catching up on skills, but may not be decisive in determining their performance.	PDT may save IPO time and may add to cumulative processes helping IPOs to absorb messages on conduct, but may not be decisive in determining their actual conduct in mission.		

## Results chains for learning, behaviour and expectations

The results chains below summarises the findings in relation to learning, behaviour and expectations. These result chains should be read in conjunction with the overarching result chain provided in Fig. 2.1 in Chapter Two.

**Fig. A5.1**

### **Learning: results chain and findings – UN peacekeeping**




Fig. A5.2

**Behaviour: results chains and findings – driving, report writing and respect for diversity**

**Basic Skills: Report writing**



**Assumptions**

Training is effectively and consistently delivered. Training includes practical exercises.

Trainees retain knowledge.

Trainees are 'trainable' – they have the right language and drafting ability.


**Evaluation findings**

Courses may be too short and crammed with information, but IPOs remember seeing and practicing UN templates for reporting

Trainees may not retain all knowledge but it is not new when they arrive in mission and are inducted

For PDT to contribute to better report writing, IPOs clearly need the right language and drafting skills. If they have these skills then PDT gives them a headstart

**Basic Skills: Driving**



**Assumptions**

Training is effectively and consistently delivered and contains sufficient practical exercises.

Exercises can emulate difficult mission terrains.

Trainees have sufficient existing driving skills through their work or other training.


**Evaluation findings**

Courses may be too short and crammed with information, and there may not be sufficient time for driving exercises.

PDT may make police more likely to pass their test on arrival. It may be difficult for PDT training to emulate the conditions of any specific mission.

The PDT sessions on driving are seen as an important part of a cumulative process of improving driving skills, helping IPOs to have a headstart but enhanced when other support is also provided.


**Conduct: Respect for diversity**



**Fig A5.3**

**Expectations: results chain – stress management and psychological preparation**

**Expectations: Stress management and psychological preparation**



## Content analysis: common themes and key words

**Table A5.2**

### **Content Analysis - Most common themes and key-words in the interview data**

Learning: UN Mandates and systems	Learning: mission specific	Behaviour: Report writing	Behaviour: 4x4 driving	Behaviour: respect for diversity	Results: stress management	Results: time spent bedding in
<b>UN systems</b>	Country history	Report writing	4x4	Different cultures	Stress	Adapt
<b>UN principles</b>	Country context	Standard format	Difficult driving	People from different countries	Confidence	Expectations
<b>International policing standards</b>	Conflict background	5 H's and 1 W	Bad/no roads	Attitude to others	Mentally prepared	Mistakes
<b>Core values</b>	Mandate	Reporting style	Driving in all terrains	Engage	Cope/coping/ survive/ handle	Catch up
<b>Bigger picture</b>	Specific purpose	factual	Sand	Tolerance	Patience	Learn/learning
<b>Professional/ism</b>	Conflict dynamics	Concise	Snow (less frequent – Kosovo)	Not discriminating	Endurance	Revision (ie induction is a revision)
<b>General introduction</b>	Weather/climate	Precise	Defensive driving	Difference	Mindset	Overwhelm/ing
<b>Traditional versus multidimensional peace-keeping</b>	Temperature	Filing reports	Better driver	Relate to others	Equipped	Familiarise
<b>Understand a range of missions</b>	Local conditions	Daily reporting	Managing a stuck vehicle	Interact	Morale	Orientation
<b>Diversity of missions</b>	Terrain				Self- protection	Opening a gate to the mission
<b>Practice/doctrine</b>	Way of life				Challenges	Hit the ground running
					Prepared	Everything was not new (with PDT)
					(wanting to) go home	Not knowing/knowing the material before
					Know what to do	Substitute previous experience (for those with no PDT)
					Reduced anxiety	Harder for junior officers



## 6: List of Persons Interviewed

### Oslo

*(June, August/September and throughout)*

John Karlsrud	TfP manager, research fellow, NUPI
Maren Eline Kleiven	Police adviser/police superintendent, NUPI
Kjell Hødnebo	TfP Manager, senior adviser, Section for Security Policy and North America, Department for Security Policy and the High North, MFA
Anne Kjersti Frøholm	Senior peace operations adviser, Section for Security Policy and North America, Department for Security Policy and the High North, MFA
Kristin Sverdrup	Senior adviser, Department for Regional Affairs and Development, MFA
Unni Kløvstad	Deputy Director-General, Section for Security Policy and North America, Department for Security Policy and the High North, MFA
Vasu Gounden	Founder and Executive Director, Accord, member TfP International Advisory Board
Cedric de Coning	Head of Department, Peace Operations and Peacebuilding, NUPI/Special advisor on civilian component to head of AU PSOD/Programme advisor, ACCORD
Marina Caparini	Senior researcher, Peace Operations and Peacebuilding, NUPI
Kjersti Rånes Haugan	Controller, Department of Administration, NUPI
Beate Bull	Senior adviser, Evaluation Department, Norad
Tale Kvalvaag	Director, Evaluation Department, Norad
Torbjørn Sande	Senior police advisor, EASFCOM (2012-2013)
Bjørn Hareide	TfP advisor, POD (senior police advisor, EASFCOM 2007-2012)
Tor Skotaam	TfP manager, POD
Anette Haug	Senior advisor, Evaluation Department, Norad
Ida Lindquist	Advisor, Evaluation Department, Norad
Odd Berner Malme	Head of Law Enforcement, OSCE, Serbia (former police advisor/councillor, Norwegian delegation at the UN), (interviewed in London)

### New York

*(August)*

Paul Zandstra Krokeide	Councillor/Deputy Military Advisor, Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations
Andrew Carpenter	Chief, Strategic Policy and Development Section, Police Division, DPKO
Baboucarr Sowe	Former police planning officer and task manager, Somalia with police division, DPKO (now with UNMISS)
Marco Donati	Coordination officer, Policy and best practice service, Policy and Evaluation Training Division, DPKO and DFS, UN
Dirk Druet	Policy and best practice service, Policy and Evaluation Training Division, DPKO and DFS, UN
Åke Thorin	Superintendent, police training officer, Integrated Training Service, DPKO
Jose Ricardo Venramin Nunes	Colonel, Team leader, Member states support team, training officer, Integrated Training Service, DPKO
Omwunmi Omo	Training officer, Integrated Training Service, DPKO
Yvonne Kasumba	Civilian planning and Liaison officer, PSOD, AU
Walter Lotze	Civilian planning and Liaison officer, PSOD, AU
Sandra Adong Oder	Senior Civilian Policy Officer, Policy Development Unit, PSOD AU

Jidi Odeke	Senior Plans and Operations Officer, PSOD, AU
Beverley Mitchell	Human Resources officer, UN office to the African Union
Mark Pedersen	Evaluation Team, Policy and Evaluation Training Division, DPKO and DFS, UN
Annika Hansen	Policy officer, police advisor UN DPKO

## Bulawayo and Harare

*(September)*

Bongie Ncube	Programme Manager, AFDEM
Nancy Moyo	Recruitment officer, AFDEM
Ommaney Chinyungurwa	Regional Specialised Officer, Interpol Sub-Regional Office for Southern Africa/Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperating Organisation (SARPCCO)
Henrik Lunden	First Secretary, Norwegian Embassy
Christopher Chellah	Brigadier General, Commandant, SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre
Ingebjørg Støfring	Ambassador, Norwegian Embassy

## Gaborone

*(September)*

Sophia Gallina	Programme officer, GIZ
Henrik Hartmann	Associate expert, GIZ
Christina Saulich	Intern, GIZ
Subetta Chausa	Student assistant, GIZ
Haretsebe Mahosi	Head of Civilian Component, Planning Element, Organ Directorate on Politics, Security and Defence, SADC Secretariat
Manuel Ludango	Mission Support Officer, Civilian Component, Planning Element, Organ Directorate on Politics, Security and Defence, SADC Secretariat
Nina Liebig	Head of project, Support to SADC RPTC, GIZ

## Pretoria and Durban

*(August, September, November)*

Andre Roux	Senior researcher and Training officer, ISS/TfP
Elma Scheepers	Manager, planning, monitoring, evaluation and reporting, ISS
Onnie Kok	Consultant, conflict management and peacekeeping, ISS
Cathi Egan	Grant Account Manager, ISS
Anton du Plessis	Acting Executive Director, ISS
Mette Tangen	Second Secretary (political affairs), Norwegian Embassy (TFP manager, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011-2012)
Vasu Gounden	Founder and Executive Director, ACCORD, member TFP International Advisory Board
Pravina Makan-Lakha	General Manager: Operations and Business Development, Accord
Jerushnee Moodley	Accountant, Accord
Senzo Ngubane	General Manager: Operations, Accord
Martha Mutisi	Interventions Department Manager, Accord
Seun Abiola	Senior Programme Officer Peacekeeping, Accord (TFP Coordinator)
Barbara Mogale	Programme Officer, Peacekeeping Unit, Accord (TFP)
Olivia Davies	Programme Officer, Peacekeeping Unit, Accord (TFP)
Nkeketo Chauke	TFP Intern, Accord
Nicky Hay	Coordinator: Programmes, Monitoring and Evaluation, Accord
Sondre Bjontveit	First Secretary, Norwegian embassy, TFP manager 2011-2012

## Addis Ababa

*(October and Advisory Board meeting in November)*

Christian Gahre	Second Secretary, Tfp-manager, Norwegian Embassy
Odd-Inge Kvalsheim	Ambassador, Norwegian Embassy
Meressa Kahsu Dessu	Trainer/researcher, ISS/Tfp
Endre Stiansen	Minister Councillor (Regional Affairs), Norwegian Embassy
Sivuyile Bam	Head of Peace Support Operations Divisions (PSOD), Department of Peace and Security, African Union
Yvonne Kasumba	Civilian Planning and Coordination Officer , African Standby Force, AU PSOD
Zinurine Alghali	Senior Civilian Training Officer, African Standby Force, AU PSOD
Eustace Chiwombe	Senior Civilian Rostering Officer, African Standby Force, AU PSOD
Chege Gathogo	Police Commissioner, Plans and Operations Unit, AU PSOD
Katharina Mathias	Expert Peace and Security (civilian component), Support to the AU for the Operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture, GIZ AU office
Oliver Janser	Police Advisor, GIZ AU office
Giorgio Romani	Police Advisor/Rule of Law attaché, EU Delegation to the AU
Carole Poullaouec	Programme advisor, Peace and Security Section, EU Delegation to the AU

The team leader attended the Tfp partner meeting (4 November) and the meeting of Tfp International Advisory Board (5 – 6 November) in Addis Abeba.

## Nairobi

*(October)*

Hilde Solbakken	Minister Councillor, Norwegian Embassy (telephone interview)
Astrid Lervåg	First Secretary, Norwegian Embassy (Tfp manager)
Col Festus B. Aboagye (Rtd)	Executive Director, African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA) Secretariat (with ISS Tfp from 2006 to 2012)
Maj Gen Cyrille Ndayirukiye	Director, EASFCOM
Col Peter Kalimba	Head of Administration, EASFCOM
Col (Dr) Ibrahim Mohamed	Head of Liaison, EASFCOM
Benediste Hoareau	Head of Political Department, EASFCOM
Jack Mugyerwa	Head of Finance Department, EASFCOM
Brig Gen Negash Dagnew	Joint Chief of Staff, EASFCOM Planning element
ACP Kahsay Waldeselasia	Head of Police Component, EASFCOM Planning element
Abdi Rashid Aden	Head of Civilian Component, EASFCOM Planning element
Chao Nyambu	Project accountant, EASFCOM
P Channel Ntarabaganyi	Police officer, Police Component, EASFCOM Planning element
Ludwig Kirchner	Team leader, GIZ, EASFCOM
Daniela Link	Program Manager, GIZ, EASFCOM
Athanase Buregeya	Regional Specialised Officer, EAPCCO/ INTERPOL Regional Bureau
Hosea Manyindo	Regional Specialised Officer, EAPCCO/INTERPOL Regional Bureau
Peter Greste	Al Jazeera correspondent Somalia (phone meeting)
Jan-Petter Holtedahl	Councillor (Somalia), Norwegian embassy

## Accra

*(October, April)*

Dr Emmanuel Kwesi Aning	Director, Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research KAIPTC (Skype)
Susan Catherine Nelson	Programme Head, Tfp, KAIPTC
Dr Thomas Jaye	Deputy Director of Research, KAIPTC
Levinia Addae-Mensah	Director, Plans and Programmes, KAIPTC

Evelyn E. Avoxe  
Supt Dr Fofana Amadou  
Lawrence Akoto Bediako  
Gp Capt JSK Dzamefe  
Supt Henry Otoo,  
Cecilia Harriet Appiah  
Harriet Solheim  
Per Mogstad  
Mille Sofie Brandrup  
Susanne Wendt  
Evelien Weller  
James Oppong Boanuh  
Abu Bakr Siddique  
Jacob Yoroseh  
Habiba Twumasi-sarpong  
Peter Ankomah Boyake  
Prosper Kofi Okru  
Henry Otoo

Researcher, Tfp, KAIPTC  
Course Director, KAIPTC  
Head of Finance, KAIPTC  
Deputy Commandant, KAIPTC  
Director of international Affairs, Ghana Police  
Assistant Superintendent: International Affairs, Ghana Police  
Counsellor, Norwegian embassy  
Minister Counsellor, Norwegian Embassy  
Secretary/ Political Officer, Danish Embassy  
Deputy head of Department, Danish MFA  
Consultant: Manager Channel Research, Belgium  
Commissioner of Ghana Police (former UNAMID Police Commissioner)  
Chief Inspector: CID Database  
Assistant Superintendent: Community Police Officer  
Chief Superintendent: commander of community police unit  
Corporal: Data analyst  
Chief Inspector: Training administrator  
Superintendent: Head of International Relations and Peacekeeping Operations

## Monrovia

*(March, April)*

Mr Greg Hinds  
Mr Mutasem Shawabkeh  
Mr Coniah Britz  
Mr John Gochoma  
Mr R Malambo  
Ms Tone Baerland  
  
Ms Anne Louise Oxeth  
  
Ms Gro Jomaas  
Ms Annie Sanderson  
Ms Jane Rhodes  
Mr Simon Mukama  
Mr Per Evensen  
Mr Leo Droti  
Mr Farmer Moyo  
Mr H.T. Ogunleye  
Mr Mohammad Hussein  
Mr Seedy Touray  
Mr Vance Gariba  
Ms Tabitha Mbugua

Police Commissioner (Australia)  
Special Assistant to the UN Police Commissioner at UNMIL  
Chief of Staff (Namibia)  
Operations Coordinator (Kenya)  
Personnel Department (Zambia)  
Norwegian IPO, Women and Children Protection Section at Liberia  
National Police HQ, former TFP instructor  
Norwegian IPO, Team leader in Facility Management Advisory Team and former Tfp instructor  
Norwegian IPO, Community policing advisor  
Norwegian IPO, Admin and Advisory team  
Reform and Restructuring Coordinator (UK)  
Rwanda Country Coordinator UNMIL (Rwanda)  
Induction Training Unit (Norway), former Tfp instructor  
Induction Training Unit (Uganda)  
Induction Training Unit (Zimbabwe)  
Nigeria Country Coordinator (Chief Superintendent)  
Team Leader Crime Services Department (Egypt)  
Gambia Country Coordinator (Gambia)  
UNMIL Training and Development Coordinator (Ghana)  
Civilian Advisor in Police Commissioner's Office (Kenya)

## Mogadishu

*(January)*

Mr Benson Oyo Nyeko  
Dr Benjamin Kwasi Agordzo  
Mr Isidore Kirukiye  
Amadu Mannah  
Mr Mananu Philips  
Dr Eke Emmanuel  
Brian Khaitha Makokha  
Kombat Damontin

Acting Police Commissioner (Uganda)  
Police Training and Development Coordinator (Ghana)  
Police Operations Coordinator (Burundi)  
Assistant Coordinator Reform & Restructuring (Sierra Leone)  
Head of Induction  
Chief Superintendent  
Office of the Deputy Head of Mission  
AMISOM Police Admin and Personnel

Babu Rahman  
Jeff Sims  
Syed Haque

Senior Adviser to the SRSG, UNSOM  
UNSOM National Strategic Security Adviser, Rule of Law and  
Security Institutions  
Training Coordinator, UNSOA

### **Focus groups: AU Mission in Somalia**

*(January)*

Focus Group 1  
Focus Group 2

7 police officers, AMISOM Headquarters  
5 police officers, Mogadishu Airport Police Station

Abuja

*(March)*

The team leader attended the Annual General Meeting of TfP in March. It brought together the TfP managers from MFA in Oslo and the embassy in Addis Ababa as well as representatives from the embassies in Accra and Abuja with program managers and staff from NUPI, POD, ISS, ACCORD and KAIPTC. The team leader also attended meetings between TfP and the ECOWAS planning element, the Nigeria police peacekeeping directorate and the incoming Advisory Board Member Ibrahim Gambari.

### **Liberia: Individual African Police Officers deployed in-mission (UNMIL)\***

*(April 2014)*

### **Ghana: police officers returned from peace support missions\***

*(April 2014)*

### **Rwanda: Police officers who have returned from peace support missions\***

*(May)*

\*An overview of individual police officers interviewed can be found in tables: A3.3-A3.5. The names can be obtained upon request from the Evaluation Department.



## EVALUATION REPORTS

- 10.00 Taken for Granted? An Evaluation of Norway's Special Grant for the Environment
- 1.01 Evaluation of the Norwegian Human Rights Fund
- 2.01 Economic Impacts on the Least Developed Countries of the Elimination of Import Tariffs on their Products
- 3.01 Evaluation of the Public Support to the Norwegian NGOs Working in Nicaragua 1994–1999
- 3A.01 Evaluación del Apoyo Público a las ONGs Noruegas que Trabajan en Nicaragua 1994–1999
- 4.01 The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Cooperation on Poverty Reduction
- 5.01 Evaluation of Development Co-operation between Bangladesh and Norway, 1995–2000
- 6.01 Can democratisation prevent conflicts? Lessons from sub-Saharan Africa
- 7.01 Reconciliation Among Young People in the Balkans An Evaluation of the Post Pessimist Network
- 1.02 Evaluation of the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM)
- 2.02 Evaluation of the International Humanitarian Assistance of the Norwegian Red Cross
- 3.02 Evaluation of ACOPAMA An ILO program for "Cooperative and Organizational Support to Grassroots Initiatives" in Western Africa 1978 – 1999
- 3A.02 Évaluation du programme ACOPAMA Un programme du BIT sur l'« Appui associatif et coopératif aux Initiatives de Développement à la Base » en Afrique de l'Ouest de 1978 à 1999
- 4.02 Legal Aid Against the Odds Evaluation of the Civil Rights Project (CRP) of the Norwegian Refugee Council in former Yugoslavia
- 1.03 Evaluation of the Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries (Norfund)
- 2.03 Evaluation of the Norwegian Education Trust Fund for African the World Bank
- 3.03 Evaluering av Bistandstorgets Evalueringsnettverk
- 1.04 Towards Strategic Framework for Peace-building: Getting Their Act Together. Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study of the Peacebuilding.
- 2.04 Norwegian Peace-building policies: Lessons Learnt and Challenges Ahead
- 3.04 Evaluation of CESAR's activities in the Middle East Funded by Norway
- 4.04 Evaluering av ordningen med støtte gjennom paraplyorganisasjoner. Eksemplifisert ved støtte til Norsk Misjons Bistandsnemda og Atlas-alliansen
- 5.04 Study of the impact of the work of FORUT in Sri Lanka: Building Civil Society
- 6.04 Study of the impact of the work of Save the Children Norway in Ethiopia: Building Civil Society
- 1.05 –Study: Study of the impact of the work of FORUT in Sri Lanka and Save the Children Norway in Ethiopia: Building Civil Society
- 1.05 –Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norad Fellowship Programme
- 2.05 –Evaluation: Women Can Do It – an evaluation of the WCDI programme in the Western Balkans
- 3.05 Gender and Development – a review of evaluation report 1997–2004
- 4.05 Evaluation of the Framework Agreement between the Government of Norway and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
- 5.05 Evaluation of the "Strategy for Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation (1997–2005)"
- 1.06 Inter-Ministerial Cooperation. An Effective Model for Capacity Development?
- 2.06 Evaluation of Fredskorpset
- 1.06 – Synthesis Report: Lessons from Evaluations of Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation
- 1.07 Evaluation of the Norwegian Petroleum-Related Assistance
- 1.07 – Synteserapport: Humanitær innsats ved naturkatastrofer: En syntese av evalueringsfunn
- 1.07 – Study: The Norwegian International Effort against Female Genital Mutilation
- 2.07 Evaluation of Norwegian Power-related Assistance
- 2.07 – Study Development Cooperation through Norwegian NGOs in South America
- 3.07 Evaluation of the Effects of the using M-621 Cargo Trucks in Humanitarian Transport Operations
- 4.07 Evaluation of Norwegian Development Support to Zambia (1991 – 2005)
- 5.07 Evaluation of the Development Cooperation to Norwegian NGOs in Guatemala
- 1.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS)
- 1.08 Study: The challenge of Assessing Aid Impact: A review of Norwegian Evaluation Practise
- 1.08 Synthesis Study: On Best Practise and Innovative Approaches to Capacity Development in Low Income African Countries
- 2.08 Evaluation: Joint Evaluation of the Trust Fund for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development (TFESSD)
- 2.08 Synthesis Study: Cash Transfers Contributing to Social Protection: A Synthesis of Evaluation Findings
- 2.08 Study: Anti- Corruption Approaches. A Literature Review
- 3.08 Evaluation: Mid-term Evaluation of the EEA Grants
- 4.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian HIV/AIDS Responses
- 5.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Research and Development Activities in Conflict Prevention and Peace-building
- 6.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation in the Fisheries Sector
- 1.09 Evaluation: Joint Evaluation of Nepal's Education for All 2004-2009 Sector Programme
- 2.09 Evaluation: Mid-Term Evaluation of the Joint Donor Team in Juba, Sudan
- 2.09 Study Report: A synthesis of Evaluations of Environment Assistance by Multilateral Organisations
- 3.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation through Norwegian Non-Governmental Organisations in Northern Uganda (2003-2007)
- 3.09 Study Report: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance Sri Lanka Case Study
- 4.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Support to the Protection of Cultural Heritage
- 4.09 Study Report: Norwegian Environmental Action Plan
- 5.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Support to Peacebuilding in Haiti 1998–2008
- 6.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Humanitarian Mine Action Activities of Norwegian People's Aid
- 7.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Programme for Development, Research and Education (NUFU) and of Norad's Programme for Master Studies (NOMA)
- 1.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support 2002–2009
- 2.10 Synthesis Study: Support to Legislatures
- 3.10 Synthesis Main Report: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance
- 4.10 Study: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance South Africa Case Study
- 5.10 Study: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance Bangladesh Case Study
- 6.10 Study: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance Uganda Case Study
- 7.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation with the Western Balkans
- 8.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of Transparency International
- 9.10 Study: Evaluability Study of Partnership Initiatives
- 10.10 Evaluation: Democracy Support through the United Nations
- 11.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of the International Organization for Migration and its Efforts to Combat Human Trafficking
- 12.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI)
- 13.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Brasil
- 14.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Democratic Republic of Congo
- 15.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Guyana
- 16.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Indonesia
- 17.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Tanzania
- 18.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative
- 1.11 Evaluation: Results of Development Cooperation through Norwegian NGO's in East Africa
- 2.11 Evaluation: Evaluation of Research on Norwegian Development Assistance
- 3.11 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Strategy for Norway's Culture and Sports Cooperation with Countries in the South
- 4.11 Study: Contextual Choices in Fighting Corruption: Lessons Learned
- 5.11 Pawns of Peace. Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
- 6.11 Joint Evaluation of Support to Anti-Corruption Efforts, 2002-2009
- 7.11 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation to Promote Human Rights
- 8.11 Norway's Trade Related Assistance through Multilateral Organisations: A Synthesis Study
- 9.11 Activity-Based Financial Flows in UN System: A study of Select UN Organisations Volume 1 Synthesis Volume 2 Case Studies
- 10.11 Evaluation of Norwegian Health Sector Support to Botswana
- 1.12 Mainstreaming disability in the new development paradigm. Evaluation of Norwegian support to promote the rights of persons with disabilities.
- 2.12 Hunting for Per Diem. The uses and Abuses of Travel Compensation in Three Developing Countries
- 3.12 Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation with Afghanistan 2001-2011
- 4.12 Evaluation of the Health Results Innovation Trust Fund
- 5.12 Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Lessons Learned from Support to Civil Society Organisations.
- 6.12 Facing the Resource Curse: Norway's Oil for Development Program
- 7.12 A Study of Monitoring and Evaluation in Six Norwegian Civil Society Organisations
- 8.12 Use of Evaluations in the Norwegian Development Cooperation System
- 9.12 Evaluation of Norway's Bilateral Agricultural Support to Food Security
- 1.13 A Framework for Analysing Participation in Development
- 2.13 Local Perceptions, Participation and Accountability in Malawi's Health Sector
- 3.13 Evaluation of the Norwegian India Partnership Initiative
- 4.13 Evaluation of Five Humanitarian Programmes of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and of the Standby Roster NORCAP
- 5.13 Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative Contribution to Measurement, Reporting and Verification
- 1.14 Can We Demonstrate the Difference that Norwegian Aid Makes? Evaluation of results measurement and how this can be improved
- 2.14 Unintended Effects in Evaluations of Norwegian Aid
- 3.14 Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative
- 4.14 Evaluation Series of NORHED Higher Education and Research for Development. Theory of Change and Evaluation Methods.

**Norad**

Norwegian Agency for  
Development Cooperation

Postal address

PO. Box 8034 Dep. NO-0030 OSLO

Visiting address

Ruseløkkveien 26, Oslo, Norway

Tel: +47 22 24 20 30

Fax: +47 22 24 20 31

No. of Copies: 300

Photo: Ken Opprann

[postmottak@norad.no](mailto:postmottak@norad.no)

[www.norad.no](http://www.norad.no)

